Cold War Blinders How the CIA’s ‘Cold War Tunnel Vision’ clouded American Judgment on Guatemala in 1954 Sjoerd de Vries Lentsch History Master Thesis - American Studies Supervisor: prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens Second reader: dr. H.B. Beukenhorst Final version: October 2014 Table of contents Introduction 5 Chapter 1: The Case of Guatemala 16 Chapter 2: The Actors: The United States of America 27 Chapter 3: The Central Intelligence Agency’s ‘Modus Operandi’ and Operation PBSUCCESS 40 Conclusion 56 Bibliography 63 Introduction Operation PBSUCCESS. The name demonstrates the great confidence and even arrogance the Central Intelligence Agency displayed in the planning and execution of its 1954 covert operation to overthrow the government of Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. The operation was considered a resounding success, as a troublesome president suspected of communism (and therefore seen as inherently under the control of the Soviet Union) was removed from power and a cooperative dictator replaced him. All this was achieved without any direct evidence that the CIA or the United States were involved, though American involvement was widely suspected. Despite this suspicion, the agency was so pleased with operation PBSUCCESS that it would be used as a blueprint for future operations, the most notorious one being the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba which ended in a complete failure for the United States, both militarily and politically. As successful as operation PBSUCCESS was considered from an operational point of view, it would become one of the most controversial CIA operations to date and did considerable damage to the reputation of the CIA and the United States, in particular in Latin America.1 Operation PBSUCCESS, or at least the situation it created, is also seen as one of the main causes of the Guatemalan civil war (that lasted 36 years and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Guatemalans). The controversy surrounding this operation does not only derive from the CIA’s ousting of a democratically elected president because the United States, the ‘protector of Democracy,’ disagreed with this president’s policies. One of the main points of criticism is that Jacobo Árbenz did not intend, as the United States believed, to turn Guatemala into a communist state. Also, historians question the American conviction that Árbenz (and his policies and reforms) were communist to begin with, and if he should have been considered a ‘communist’ in the Eastern European/Soviet tradition. Moreover, as the CIA archives were gradually declassified it turned out that the American claim that Árbenz was controlled and financed by Moscow was not based on any hard evidence. This claim had already met with skepticism in the international community in the years leading up to and following the coup, despite vigorous American efforts to convince the world otherwise.2 In the existing literature on operation PBSUCCESS the role the CIA has played in the operation is predominantly described as merely an executive one: The United States 1 Max Holland, ‘Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of SUCCESS’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17 (2004) 300-332, 323. 2 Holland, 300-332, 310-312. 5 government came to the decision that an intervention was necessary and the CIA was the instrument used to make this happen. This is however a gross undervaluation of the role the Agency played. The CIA operated as an independent body with its own worldview, analytical tradition and with its own set of goals, and its analysis of the situation in Guatemala was wrong precisely because of this. This view of the CIA and its role is something that has only gradually become apparent due to the declassification of CIA archives, and is beginning to be recognized in more recent studies on the subject. The independent role the CIA played will be the focal point of this thesis. The intervention What eventually drove the United States to feel compelled to intervene in Guatemala was a revolutionary land reform program that was planned and enacted by Árbenz. This land reform was the culmination of a radical transformation Guatemala was going through that had started in 1944 with a revolution. In the early 1940s, 2% of all landowners owned 72% of all Guatemalan land. The American United Fruit Company was by far the most powerful economic player in the country; it was the largest landowner in Guatemala and owned the railroads (through its subsidiary the International Railways of Central America), the country’s power supply, and the only major harbor.3 In 1944, the rising tensions after decades of dictatorial rule, combined with economic hardship and calls for democratization, culminated in a revolution led by university teachers. The main inspiration for these teachers was Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous 1941 State of the Union address, or his ‘Four Freedoms speech,’ in which he stated four fundamental freedoms people everywhere should enjoy. This revolution forced dictator Jorge Ubico to step down, and in the following year democratic elections were held for the first time in Guatemalan history. The goals of the revolution were not only aimed at the deposing of a dictator followed by the democratization of Guatemala, but also at reforming the social structures, which was widely considered (even by American economists) to be impossible without rigorous agrarian and economic reform, as land and social status were intimately entwined. It was self-evident that any attempt at large-scale land reform would be met with fierce resistance from the ruling classes and foreign companies with large interests in Guatemala, the United Fruit Company in particular.45 These land reforms were advocated and enacted by Jacobo Árbenz, elected in 3 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit. The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1982) 38, 65-67. 4 Ibid, 52-55. 6 1951 and would eventually lead American president Eisenhower to intervene and approve the planning and execution of operation PBSUCCESS. (The decision to intervene in Guatemala was essentially already made during the presidency of Harry S. Truman, who approved a similar operation prior to PBSUCCESS, named PBFORTUNE. This operation was cancelled however, as it was compromised at an early stage.6) The suspected communist nature of the Árbenz government (and the – according to the United States – therefore inherent ties to Moscow) and the danger the land reforms posed to American economic interests in Guatemala are considered to have led to this controversial decision. The United States government was determined to prevent the creation of a ‘communist beachhead’ in its own backyard. Many books and articles have been written on the 1954 coup, and a few studies are considered to be ‘standard works’ on the subject. Among these standard works are Bitter Fruit by Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, The CIA in Guatemala by Richard Immerman, Shattered Hope by Piero Gleijeses, and Secret History by Nicholas Cullather. In these works the main interpretations of the coup are represented. An important note on Secret History by Nicholas Cullather is that it has been written in 1993 as part of an internal CIA project after a series of declassification of CIA archives concerning the coup, and was initially not intended for publication. In all the aforementioned works the coup itself is essentially considered to have been a mistake caused by gross misinterpretation of the situation in Guatemala by the United States government and the CIA. However, the views differ on how the American government came to the decision to intervene and which players or ‘factions’ influenced the decision and to what extent this influence was decisive or superfluous. Only Cullather acknowledges the aforementioned undervaluation of the role the CIA played, but he does not expand on this as his work had a different focal point. Bitter Fruit In the 1982 book Bitter Fruit. The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala journalists Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer argue that the most important factor in the decision to intervene was the threat president Arbenz and his communist policies posed to American economic interest in Guatemala. The ‘containment of Communism’ played an important role in the validation of the coup as well, but it was only the result of the economic 5 Nick Cullather, Secret History. The CIA’s classified account of its operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 25-26. 6 Ibid, 29-31. 7 angle; without a threat to the economic interests Communism would not have been detected. The United Fruit Company was one of the first (and largest) landowners and employers in Guatemala to be affected by the reforms. The company already had many conflicts with the Guatemalan government caused by the modest reforms of Juan José Arévalo (the first Guatemalan president after the 1944 Revolution). These conflicts would later escalate during the extensive land reforms of the Árbenz administration.7 From early on United Fruit would start lobbying against the Guatemalan government. This lobbying (by influential and respected figures) was not only aimed at the United States government, but also at the American public. The United Fruit Company proved to be very successful at convincing the American public and government that Guatemala posed a communist threat.8 According to Schlesinger and Kinzer this is essentially where ‘the road to intervention’ originates. The relationship between the American and Guatemalan governments escalated, as the economic dispute between United Fruit and Guatemala intensified. By the time relations were at a low, the idea of a communist state so close to the United States was simply unacceptable for the American government during the Cold War, especially during the early 1950s. This scenario would eventually and inevitably lead to a United States sponsored coup (or ‘regime change’).