Corruption Control Measures Inthe Philippines

Philippine .Journal. of Public Administration; Vol. XXIX, No.2 (April 1985). • Corruption Control Measures in the Philippines: 1979-1982 MA. CONCEPCION P. ALFILER* The government's anti-corruption strategy has been essentially punitive rather than preventive in approach, as shown by an examination of the operations ofthe San diganbayan and the Tanodbayan. The experience of the Philippine Overseas Employ ment Administration validatesprevious findings that leadership, a professionalizedstaff, systematized rules and procedures, and continuous dialogues with clients are more po tent factors in preventing corruption. It is proposed that the government adopt a stra tegy which, while including a system for punishing the corrupt, should also elicit the the active participation of the public and the support of the government officials in • preventing corruption. Introduction Because of its magnitude, complexity and elusive character, corruption requires a systematic, scientific and multi-pronged description and analysis of the causes and factors that enhance or deter its occurrence. This demand ing task can only be undertaken if conscious effort is directed at contin-' uously building up on our existing body of knowledge on the subject. This should be complemented by simultaneous monitoring of the outcomes of current societal strategies aimed at reducing this problem to more manage able and less damaging proportions. This paper attempts to apply this approach in an effort to arrive at anti-corruption strategies that could effectively minimize, if not eliminate, corruption in Philippine government. Specifically, this paper: (1) summarizes the findings of an earlier study on the factors which • facilitate or inhibit the commission of corruption at the agency level,as well as the various means of dealing with the problem; (2) describes and analyzes the nature and main elements of the government's anti-corruption control measures adopted after the earlier study was conducted; and, *AssociateProfessor, Collegeof Public Administration, University of the Philippines. This paper is a revised version of a report submitted to the President's Center for Special Studies on June 11. 1983 as part of the "Study on Graft and Corruption, Red Tape and Inefficiency in Government." The author is grateful to Misses Jessica Buelvaand Eva Marie Famador who ably assisted her in gathering data/materials, preparing tables and in conducting interviews for this paper. 180 April • • CORRUPTION CONTROL MEASURES 181 (3) proposes a framework for a government-wide anti-corruption program which features the involvement and participation .not only of government institutions but, more importantly, that of the general public. Methodology Data for tl\is study were collected mainly through the use of secondary materials. These included annual reports and statistics from the Tanodbayan, the Sandiganbayan, and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Newspaper accounts on these abovementioned agencies were examined. Interviews were -conducted with officials of these agencies and with representatives of the clients of the POEA. The experiences of other countries in the Asian region were also examined to determine the mote relevant approach for dealing with corruption in our culture. The data gathering phase started in the last quarter of 1982 and ex- • tended up to the first two months of 1983. Previous Research From 1974 to 1978, a UP College of Public Administration (UP-CPA) research team conducted an extensive study on the definition, causes, processes, consequences and control measures adopted to minimize cor ruption. Of relevance to this paper are. its findings on organization factors that promote or deter corruption at the agency level, and strengths and weaknesses of previous anti-corruption strategies. On the first finding, leadership, internal systems and procedures, and appropriate mechanisms for monitoring employes' conduct and per formance were identified as critical factors in increasing or minimizing opportunities for corruption. Incidence of corruption in an agency could be minimized considerably if there is a determined leader who will not hesitate to use this office and its authority to fight what is an otherwise extensive • network of corruption. This determination must be backed up by com plementary measures such as a system of rules and procedures which will limit employe discretion and a mechanism for monitoring employe be havior and performance. Table 1 summarizes how these factors facilitated or inhibited corruption in three offices. On the second finding, the study showed that the government's anti corruption strategies have been carried out mainly through (1) presidential anti-corruption/investigating offices or committees, (2) citizen or church sponsored anti-corruption campaigns, (3) purges of government officials across different agencies, and (4) occasional agency-wide clean-up drives. These strategies are essentially heterogeneous and variable in terms of their 1985 • 182 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION • Table 1. Factors .Facilitating/Inhibiting Corruption in Three Selected Agencies, 1978 Factors Inhibiting: Facilitating Leadership Scrupulously honest, dedicated Non-ranking employees complain . and hard-working Commissioner of involvement of ranking. bent on weeding out corrupt employes in corrupt acts** personnel* Head of agency was heavily involved in corrupt activities; Director was reported to have biggest share.in dividing proceeds from illegal transactions. Mechanism for An organizational unit monitored Culture of corruption in the Monitoring Employe the activities of employes; agency and the absence of a Conduct and criteria were set to determine monitoring system resulted in Performance who among them will be audited* the acceptance of bribe as a norm while sanctions are insti- tu ted to ostracize or punish those • not belonging to the "ingroup"** Internal Systems Tax structures and existing Absence of rational and objective and Procedures system streamlined to limit procedures in·assessing applica discretion of examiners and tion, equipment, clients who agents; additional measures leave a lot of judgment to instituted were (1) expanded bureaucrats, which in turn becomes payment system through banks, an opportunity for corruption; (2) confirmation letters to and lack of adequate information taxpayers, (3) spot checks or on procedures for clients** audit* Weaknesses in the system of con trol relative to purchasing, espe cially in canvassing and inspection of technical supplies have led to collusion between officials and suppliers- • Source: This table was based on data gathered from the Graft and Corruption study conducted in 1978 by the College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines. Legend; * Bureau of Internal Revenue (revenue raising) ** Board of Transportation (regulatory) + .Agency X (revenue spending) April • • CORRUPTION CONTROL MEASURES 183 rationale, scope, authority, perspective and political context. Nevertheless, certain patterns emerge in the adoption of these strategies especially those undertaken by government. First, over time these efforts appear sporadic and segmented, and do not relate together as elements of a coordinated program. While the pres idential investigating bodies persisted, instability and lack of sustained and continuing anti-corruption program beyond a president's term was more of a weakness than a strength. The same can be said of the relatively short-lived participation of the private.sector organizations whose activities were severe ly curtailed with the declaration of martial law in 1972. Purges appear as spurts of action undertaken at one point in time as a reaction to the lingering inability of government offices to weed out corrupt employees and to control corrupt practices. As to agency clean-up drives, they were limited in scope and confined to only one or two related bureaus or offices whose reputation has been tarnished by the corrupt' behavior of its employees. Of all these strategies, agency revamps come closest to being a part of a thor • ough anti-corruption action. The paradox, however, is that of these four strategies, reorganization cannot be resorted to so often, as too frequent recourse to it is not only disruptive but can also considerably diminish its effectiveness. Second, the Philippine experience suggests that the adoption of an anti-corruption strategy tends to rely heavily on the chief executive's deci sion. The creation and abolition of the purge list and the decision to reorga nize or change the leader of an agency have all been decisions of the Presi dent. In the past, the Philippine Congress had its own investigating bodies but none of these was sustained after their immediate objective of conduc ting hearings for legislation had been met. Third, the anti-corruption efforts were focused on only one of the two parties involved: the bureaucrat. No attention has been given on how to deal with other equally guilty parties, the general public and the members of • the private sector. Fourth, government action tends to be more in the direction of penal izing the apprehended guilty party rather than in preventing the commission of the corrupt acts. Investing valuable time and effort in preventing the commission of a corrupt act has not yet been a component of these stra tegies. Current Anti-Corruption Measures: 1979-1982 Having described and assessed the nature and characteristics of previous anti-corruption

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