Effects of Institutional Variables on Legislative Voting Behaviour: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Eight Bicameral Legislatures
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MASARYK UNIVERSITY The Faculty of Social Studies The Department of Political Science Mgr. Kamil Gregor Effects of Institutional Variables on Legislative Voting Behaviour: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Eight Bicameral Legislatures Dissertation Thesis Advisor: Prof. PhDr. Maxmilián Strmiska, Ph.D. Brno 2015 1 Affidavit / Čestné prohlášení I declare that this thesis was written by me alone and using only sources listed in References. Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto dizertační práce vypracoval samostatně a pouze s použitím uvedených zdrojů. Brno, 20. 11. 2015 Mgr. Kamil Gregor 2 Abstract This thesis challenges conventional straightforward accounts of legislative voting behaviour found in existing literature by systematically testing a set of hypotheses regarding effects of three institutional independent variables – the dependency of the executive on the legislature, party leadership control over prospects of legislators’ re-election and cameral symmetry – on two dependent variables describing legislative voting behaviour – party group unity and prevalence of strategic legislative voting. In order to control for effects of possible intervening variables, a quasi-experimental design is employed: Values of the three independent variables are dichotomized and eight national bicameral legislatures with all possible combinations of these values are analysed. Differences in values of the dependent variables between the lower and the upper chamber in each legislature are measured. The differences are then used as the outcome in the csQCA method in order to estimate combinations of institutional conditions necessary and sufficient for the measured differences to occur. The thesis finds that in symmetrical legislatures, strategic legislative voting is similarly prevalent in both chambers while in asymmetrical legislatures, it is more prevalent in the lower chamber. Party group unity is about the same in both chambers of legislatures that the executive is independent from. In legislatures that the executive is dependent on, party group unity is about the same in both chambers if the legislature is symmetrical and it is higher in the lower chamber if the legislature is asymmetrical. Party leadership control over prospects of legislators’ re-election does not appear to be tied to either party group unity or prevalence of legislative voting behaviour. Abstrakt Dizertační práce problematizuje konvenční a poměrně jednoduchá vysvětlení legislativního hlasovacího chování v dosavadní literatuře tím, že systematicky testuje sadu hypotéz týkajících se efektů tři institucionálních nezávisle proměnných – závislosti exekutivy na parlamentu, kontroly vedení strany nad možností znovuzvolení zákonodárce a kamerální symetrie – na dvě závislé proměnné popisující legislativní hlasovací chování – jednotu stranických klubů a prevalenci strategického legislativního hlasování. Aby byly kontrolovány efekty možných intervenujících proměnných, je použit kvazi-experimentální výzkumný design: Hodnoty závisle proměnných jsou dichotomizovány a je analyzováno osm národních bikamerálních parlamentů se všemi možnými kombinacemi těchto hodnot. V každém tomto parlamentu jsou měřeny rozdíly v hodnotách závisle proměnných mezi dolní a horní komorou. Tyto rozdíly jsou následně použity jako výstup v csQCA metodě, čímž jsou získány kombinace institucionálních podmínek, které jsou postačující a nezbytné pro výskyt měřených rozdílů. Tímto způsobem je zjištěno, že strategické hlasovací chování je podobně časté v obou komorách symetrických 3 parlamentů a častější v dolních komorách asymetrických parlamentů. Jednota stranických klubů je zhruba stejná v obou komorách parlamentů, na nichž je závislá exekutiva. V parlamentech, na nichž je exekutiva nezávislá, je jednota stranických klubů zhruba stejná v obou komorách, pokud je daný parlament symetrický, a vyšší v dolní komoře, pokud je daný parlament asymetrický. Kontrola vedení strany nad možností znovuzvolení zákonodárce se nejeví být spojena ani s jedním aspektem hlasovacího legislativního chování. Key Words Legislative voting behaviour, party group unity, strategic legislative voting, bicameralism, qualitative comparative analysis, weighted principal component analysis, institutionalism Klíčová slova Legislativní hlasovací chování, jednota stranických klubů, strategické legislativní hlasování, bikameralismus, kvalitativní srovnávací analýza, vážená analýza hlavních komponent, institucionalismus Character Count / Počet znaků 385,919 characters 4 Table of Content Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 11 Theories of Legislative Voting Behaviour ......................................................................................... 18 Meta-Analysis of Existing Literature .............................................................................................. 19 Conceptualization of Party Group Unity and Strategic Voting Behaviour .............................. 23 Explanations of Party Group Unity and Strategic Voting Behaviour ....................................... 26 Research Design of the Thesis ............................................................................................................ 35 Causal Inference Strategy and Hypotheses ................................................................................... 35 Case Selection .................................................................................................................................... 44 Research Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 48 Indicators of Party Group Unity .................................................................................................... 48 Weighed Principal Component Analysis Models ......................................................................... 52 Qualitative Comparative Analysis ................................................................................................... 58 Political Context and Empirical Measurements in the Legislatures ............................................... 64 Australia .............................................................................................................................................. 64 Brazil ................................................................................................................................................... 71 Chile .................................................................................................................................................... 76 Czech Republic .................................................................................................................................. 80 Poland ................................................................................................................................................. 86 Romania .............................................................................................................................................. 91 Switzerland ......................................................................................................................................... 97 United States .................................................................................................................................... 102 Comparing the Legislatures ................................................................................................................ 108 Party Group Unity .......................................................................................................................... 108 Strategic Legislative Voting ........................................................................................................... 113 Discussion ........................................................................................................................................ 116 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 125 References ............................................................................................................................................. 129 5 List of Charts Chart 1: Literature on legislative voting behaviour according to case selection and decade ...................................................................................................................................................... 20 Chart 2: Legislative voting data availability in relation to the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index and the Freedom House Index in 2015 ......................................................... 45 Chart 3: A W-PCA model of legislative voting in the Chamber of Deputies (Czech Republic) in 2013-2015 ......................................................................................................................... 54 Chart 4: Strategic legislative voting in a hypothetical legislature .................................................... 58 Chart 5: A W-PCA model of legislative voting in the Parliament of Australia in 2007- 2011 ......................................................................................................................................................... 69 Chart 6: A W-PCA model of legislative voting in the Parliament of Australia in 2011- 2014 ........................................................................................................................................................