CHINA AT THE GATES A NEW POWER AUDIT OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS François Godement & Abigaël Vasselier ABOUT ECFR The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and values- based European foreign policy. ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements that define its activities: • A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a distinguished Council of over two hundred Members - politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Carl Bildt, Emma Bonino and Mabel van Oranje. • A physical presence in the main EU member states. ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. Our offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications. • Developing contagious ideas that get people talking. ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to carry out innovative research and policy development projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR produces original research; publishes policy reports; hosts private meetings, public debates, and “friends of ECFR” gatherings in EU capitals; and reaches out to strategic media outlets. ECFR is a registered charity funded by the Open Society Foundations and other generous foundations, individuals and corporate entities. These donors allow us to publish our ideas and advocate for a valuesbased EU foreign policy. ECFR works in partnership with other organisations but does not make grants to individuals or institutions. www.ecfr.eu The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. This paper, like all publications of the European Council on Foreign Relations, represents only the views of its authors. Copyright of this publication is held by the European Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the European Council on Foreign Relations. © ECFR December 2017 ECFR/239 ISBN: 978-1-911544-39-5 Published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 4th Floor, Tennyson House, 159-165 Great Portland Street, London, W1W 5PA [email protected] Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 China inside Europe: 9 Time for realism Divergent trajectories: 21 From ‘win-win’ to ‘pick and choose’? China’s investment in Europe: 37 Opportunity versus security 16+1 or 1x16? 64 China in central and eastern Europe Public diplomacy and lobbying: 75 How influential is China in Europe? Putting the ‘strategic’ into ‘partnership’: 89 Urgent steps, future challenges COUNTRY PROFILES 98 Acknowledgements 126 About the authors 127 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since 2009, the time of the European Council on Foreign Relations’ first Power Audit, China has become more present and influential within Europe. This is no longer only about a massive trade surplus; it is also about investment, lending, and financial power which serves China’s public diplomacy. What has not changed is the asymmetry claimed by China as a developing economy, even as it reaches the first rank among global economies. And it explains the increasing quest for reciprocity by Europeans. China practises “pick and choose” in its relations with the European Union, focusing on its direct interests, and often ignoring EU norms in its proposals. It has vastly increased efforts to strengthen bilateral relations with member states, putting special emphasis on Europe’s periphery. China holds its own summit with central and eastern European nations, the so-called 16+1, and it seized the opportunity of the euro crisis for massive takeovers in southern Europe. Fascinatingly, its offers and their packaging are not very different from those made to African and other developing nations: a flurry of projects creating competition among recipients, loans at commercial rates, and a strong insistence on identical statements and agreements. China is now inside Europe. Its soft power diplomacy relies on positive, repeated messages. There is a gold rush on the part of some European figures, while many companies, media groups, and universities seek to protect their access to the Chinese market. 7 The EU has been learning from the experience of difficult – or sometimes non-existent – relations. New agreements are missing, even on trade and economic issues which are at the core of the interest for Europe. The agreed Agenda 2020 for political and security cooperation with China has been fulfilled only minimally – with human rights and humanitarian aid as the most disappointing areas. This gap is also explained by the opportunistic behaviour of many – but not all – member states. Climate and environment issues seem more promising, but at the 2017 EU-China summit China held a joint statement on climate hostage to its dispute on market economy status. Europe does not link together different issues in this way. It seeks engagement with China on peacekeeping and support for fragile states, but at best these actions happen only side by side and not jointly. Europe is now turning towards realist engagement with China, getting over the temptation of cash from China. China is strengthening its command economy, turning to full state-led industry and technology policies, including its military applications. In Europe, this means acquisition of critical technologies, scientific cooperation agreements mirroring China 2025 goals, and other massive plans to lead the fourth industrial revolution. A requirement for reciprocal opening has entered European policy statements on China. The European Commission has proposed new trade defence instruments and has expanded an initiative by three core member states on investment screening. This is not a turn to protectionism. Europe seeks engagement rather than confrontation, but must also gear up for a China that is presently unresponsive to its requests. To that end, this Power Audit of EU-China relations proposes the following priorities: • Complete the construction of an EU-wide system of investment screening; • Replace dispersion with common strategies; • Prevent new investment rules from affecting other aspects of relations; • Leverage Europe’s like-minded partners in Asia. 8 China inside Europe: Time for realism China is now firmly inside Europe – not only in the form of goods and visitors, but also making itself felt through investment, loans, subregional groupings, public diplomacy and influence, and growing military and defence ties. On any given day, Europe is open; China, meanwhile, is in a process of political and mercantilist closure that undercuts its own surface support for globalisation. This explains why Europeans’ demand for ‘reciprocity’ has become a keyword embedded throughout their statements on China. But it is rapidly becoming clearer that the European Union must also devise policies fit for an era in which China rejects reciprocity. While becoming the world’s second largest economy thanks to global trade and finance rules, China refuses to recognise the consequences of this change: in Xi Jinping’s words, “China’s international status as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.”1 When the European Council on Foreign Relations last studied the balance of power between China and Europe, in 2009, it made a forceful case for ‘reciprocal engagement’ – that the benefits of developing the relationship should be shared between the two sides of the aisle.2 Even at that point in time, a more optimistic period was drawing to a close. The ‘myth of convergence’ of the 2000s – that China, as an economy developing ever more dense relations across the world, would eventually transition to a market economy and rule of law – had already been coming under sustained challenge: in 2007, James 1 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, Opening address to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xinhua (translation), 18 October 2017, available at http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. Hereafter, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society”. 2 John Fox and François Godement, “A Power Audit of the EU-China relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2009, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR12_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-CHINA_ RELATIONS.pdf. 9 Mann’s China Fantasy did much to dispel this illusion. The experience of the near-decade since then has been one of a quiet but dramatic shift. There is now a deeper, and still-growing, imbalance between Europe and China. China has become ever more entrenched on many economic fronts inside Europe – while at home it has in many respects pulled up the drawbridge to Europe. The ‘myth of convergence’ has been replaced by a new lore, one that tells Europeans of a cornucopia of potential Chinese investment and contributions, of “an offer