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Working with Vietnam, Russia's Rosneft Draws China's
Working with Vietnam, Russia's Rosneft Draws China’s Ire Rosneft is a crucial arm of Russian foreign policy, yet functions at times without direct Kremlin involvement. By Nicholas Trickett May 19, 2018 China has been the driving force behind Russia’s “Pivot to Asia,” becoming the largest individual consumer of Russian Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Vietnamese oil among its energy trade partners. Early this month, it President Tran Dai Quang attend a news conference was reported that Russia had completed the delivery of its following their meeting in the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia first S-400 regiment – the country’s most advanced air Thursday, June 29, 2017. defense system for export – to China. Beijing’s Ministry of Image Credit: Natalia Kolesnikova/Pool Photo via AP Commerce is signaling that trade turnover with Russia may reach $100 billion this year Russia and that investment under the aegis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is growing fastest in percentage terms in Russia. Trade is up because oil prices are up, not necessarily because of an economic breakthrough, but the messaging is part of a broader commitment to making it appear as though all is well between the two countries. Two recent developments mark a significant change in the relationship. First, CEFC China Energy walked away from a deal to acquire 14.16 percent of Rosneft’s shares. Mired in scandal, the company has come under heavy scrutiny about its international expansion at home. Qatar stepped in to buy the shares instead as Rosneft changed its corporate strategy to provide better returns for shareholders and entice Qatar. -
China Data Supplement
China Data Supplement October 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 29 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 36 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 42 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 45 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR................................................................................................................ 54 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR....................................................................................................................... 61 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 66 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 October 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
Challenges and Solutionsin Building CPEC-A Flagship Of
Issue , Working paper CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE Challenges and CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDORSolutionsIn Building CPEC-A Flagship of BRI Written by: Yasir Arrfat Research Coordinator CoE CPEC Minitry of Planning, Pakistan Institute Development Reform of Development Economics Challenges and Solutions in Building CPEC-A Flagship of BRI Yasir Arrfat Research Coordinator Centre of Excellence (CoE) for China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Islamabad, Pakistan, [email protected] Abstract-One of the OBOR pilot corridors out of the six corridors is CPEC. The CPEC has been initiated in 2013 and due to its speedy progress, CPEC is now vastly considered as the “flagship” project among the OBOR projects. The CPEC initiatives include; development of Gwadar Port, road, rail and optical fiber connectivity, energy corridor and Special Economic Zones development for bilateral benefits to attain inclusive growth and regional harmonization. Before the inception of CPEC, the growth of Pakistan was curtailed by two major bottlenecks; acute energy shortages and weak local and regional connectivity infrastructures. In 2013, CPEC came with 59 billion USDs under OBOR and it has been eliminating all major economic bottlenecks. This paper sheds light on the BRI with deep focusing on CPEC. It further represents the Pakistan’s improving economic indicators through CPEC. This paper will also examine some key challenges and their solutions in building CPEC. Key Words-BRI, Challenges, Connectivity, Corridors, CPEC, Global Competitive Index (GCI), Investment, Infrastructure, OBOR I. INTRODUCTION The Globalization has brought vast changes in global economy and has directed the evolution to a boundary less development. This phenomenon has significantly amplified the maritime trade from 2.37 billion tons of freight to 5.88 billion tons of freight moving through maritime routes. -
Energy China Forum 2019 9Th Asia-Pacific Shale Gas & Oil Summit 25-27 September, 2019 | Shanghai China
Energy China Forum 2019 9th Asia-Pacific Shale Gas & Oil Summit 25-27 September, 2019 | Shanghai China Opportunities in China Shale Gas & Oil OPPORTUNITY IN CHINA SHALE GAS & Oil MARKET As a fast growing market, China shale gas & oil industry has been proved with great resource potential, high government support and increasing drilling and fracturing operations, which makes the market full of opportunities for global technology, equipment and service providers. • Abundant shale resources: China is currently the 3rd largest shale gas producer in the world with a top reserve of 30 tcm. Meanwhile, China has nearly 100 billion tons of shale oil(tight oil) resources. • Highly valued and supported by the government: The country requires vigorous enhancement of domestic oil and gas development and formulate various supportive policies for shale development. • Surging production – It is the two most critical years of 2019-2020 for China to achieve its ambitious 5 years shale gas production target of 30 bcm. • Increasing capital investment: Both CNPC and Sinopec are increasing investment and expenditure with total expenditure for E&P of 216.1 billion CNY in 2018, up by 12% yoy. They are expected to stay high investment in 2019-2020 despite the market fluctuation. • Increasing operations - Starting from 2018, CNPC and Sinopec were accelerating their shale gas production. CNPC plans to drill 6,300 shale gas wells in total during 2018-2035. Sinopec plans to drill around 700 shale gas production wells during 2019-2020. • Cost/efficiency orientation – Chinese shale players are more eager than ever looking for cost-reducing and efficiency-optimizing solutions. -
Chinabrief in a Fortnight
ChinaBrief Volume XIV s Issue 13 s July 3, 2014 VOLUME XIV s ISSUE 13 s JULY 3, 2014 In This Issue: IN A FORTNIGHT Brief by David Cohen 1 WITH ZHOU’S CIRCLE DOWN, XI’S PURGE MAY TURN TO HU By Willy Lam 3 CHINA’S STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCE: SHARPENING THE SWORD (PART 1 OF 2) By Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase 6 China’s PLA Second Artillery appears more confident, having made progress CHINESE HIGH SPEED RAIL LEAPFROG DEVELOPMENT on the “conventionalization of deter- By Clark Edward Barrett 10 rence” (Source: China Military Online) INDONESIA AVOIDS OPEN TERRITORIAL DISPUTE WITH CHINA, DESPITE CONCERNS China Brief is a bi-weekly jour- By Prashanth Parameswaran 13 nal of information and analysis CORRECTIONS 16 covering Greater China in Eur- asia. China Brief is a publication of In a Fortnight The Jamestown Foundation, a private non-profit organization ON PARTY’S BIRTHDAY, PROMISES OF A CONTINUED PURGE based in Washington D.C. and is edited by David Cohen. By David Cohen The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely those On the 93rd anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party of the authors, and do not (CCP), General Secretary Xi Jinping highlighted his campaign to fight corruption necessarily reflect the views of and improve cadres’ “work style,” making it the focus of a speech delivered at The Jamestown Foundation. a Politboro meeting the day before the anniversary (Xinhua, June 30). Official commentary surrounding top-level arrests approved at the same meeting makes it clear that this purge is intended to continue indefinitely. -
China Turns up Heat on Ex-Security Chief with Crash Probe
CHINA PRIME TARGET: Zhou Yongkang was head of domestic security and a member of the Communist Party Standing Politburo Committee, making him one of the most powerful people in China, until he stepped down in 2012. REUTERS/STRINGER Authorities have begun investigating a crash in 2000 that killed the first wife of Zhou Yongkang, the prime target in China’s biggest corruption scandal, Reuters source says. China turns up heat on ex-security chief with crash probe BY BENJAMIN KANG LIM, CHARLIE ZHU AND DAVID LAGUE SPECIAL REPORT 1 CHINA’S POWER STRUGGLE BEIJING/HONG KONG, SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 ittle is known about the exact circum- stances in which Wang Shuhua was Lkilled. What has been reported, in the Chinese media, is that she died in a road ac- cident sometime in 2000, shortly after she was divorced from her husband. And that at least one vehicle with a military license plate may have been involved in the crash. Fourteen years later, investigators are looking into her death. Their sudden inter- est has nothing to do with Wang herself. It has to do with the identity of her ex-hus- band – once one of China’s most powerful men and now the prime target in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. Investigators are probing the death of the first wife of Zhou Yongkang, China’s HUNTING TIGERS: President Xi Jinping has launched the biggest corruption crackdown since the retired security czar, a source with di- communists came to power in 1949, going after “tigers” or high-ranking officials as well as “flies”. -
Adaptive Fuzzy Pid Controller's Application in Constant Pressure Water Supply System
2010 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Engineering (ICISE 2010) Hangzhou, China 4-6 December 2010 Pages 1-774 IEEE Catalog Number: CFP1076H-PRT ISBN: 978-1-4244-7616-9 1 / 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS ADAPTIVE FUZZY PID CONTROLLER'S APPLICATION IN CONSTANT PRESSURE WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM..............................................................................................................................................................................................................1 Xiao Zhi-Huai, Cao Yu ZengBing APPLICATION OF OPC INTERFACE TECHNOLOGY IN SHEARER REMOTE MONITORING SYSTEM ...............................5 Ke Niu, Zhongbin Wang, Jun Liu, Wenchuan Zhu PASSIVITY-BASED CONTROL STRATEGIES OF DOUBLY FED INDUCTION WIND POWER GENERATOR SYSTEMS.................................................................................................................................................................................9 Qian Ping, Xu Bing EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF MULTI-CHANNEL OPERATION IN SEISMIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM..........................14 Li Tao, Hu Guangmin, Zhao Taiyin, Li Lei URBAN VEGETATION COVERAGE INFORMATION EXTRACTION BASED ON IMPROVED LINEAR SPECTRAL MIXTURE MODE.....................................................................................................................................................................18 GUO Zhi-qiang, PENG Dao-li, WU Jian, GUO Zhi-qiang ECOLOGICAL RISKS ASSESSMENTS OF HEAVY METAL CONTAMINATIONS IN THE YANCHENG RED-CROWN CRANE NATIONAL NATURE RESERVE BY SUPPORT -
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
China Data Supplement March 2008 J People’s Republic of China J Hong Kong SAR J Macau SAR J Taiwan ISSN 0943-7533 China aktuell Data Supplement – PRC, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, Taiwan 1 Contents The Main National Leadership of the PRC ......................................................................... 2 LIU Jen-Kai The Main Provincial Leadership of the PRC ..................................................................... 31 LIU Jen-Kai Data on Changes in PRC Main Leadership ...................................................................... 38 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Agreements with Foreign Countries ......................................................................... 54 LIU Jen-Kai PRC Laws and Regulations .............................................................................................. 56 LIU Jen-Kai Hong Kong SAR ................................................................................................................ 58 LIU Jen-Kai Macau SAR ....................................................................................................................... 65 LIU Jen-Kai Taiwan .............................................................................................................................. 69 LIU Jen-Kai ISSN 0943-7533 All information given here is derived from generally accessible sources. Publisher/Distributor: GIGA Institute of Asian Studies Rothenbaumchaussee 32 20148 Hamburg Germany Phone: +49 (0 40) 42 88 74-0 Fax: +49 (040) 4107945 2 March 2008 The Main National Leadership of the -
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Effects and Recommendations for Sustainable Development and Trade
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 45 Number 4 Article 3 April 2020 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Effects and Recommendations for Sustainable Development and Trade Shirin Lakhani Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation Shirin Lakhani, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Effects and Recommendations for Sustainable Development and Trade, 45 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 417 (2017). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR: REGIONAL EFFECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE By: Shirin Lakhani' In November 2003, China and Pakistan signed a Joint Declaration of Cooperation outlining their bilateral intent to promote trade and economic development.' In 2006, these nations composed and signed the Pakistan-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) according to World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines. 2 It was not until April 2015, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan, that the fruits of these agreements came to blossom. During this visit, China and Pakistan signed 51 agreements, memorandums of understanding (MoUs), and financing contracts, signaling the beginning of what is now known as the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is a $51 billion Chinese investment to develop Pakistan's infrastructure, transportation, and energy sectors.4 Approximately 80% of the projects are energy- related, with the remaining 20% dedicated to expanding existing infrastructure.s The Corridor will link Kashgar to Gwadar, providing China with a direct route to the Persian Gulf. -
China at the Gates a New Power Audit of Eu-China Relations
CHINA AT THE GATES A NEW POWER AUDIT OF EU-CHINA RELATIONS François Godement & Abigaël Vasselier ABOUT ECFR The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and values- based European foreign policy. ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements that define its activities: • A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a distinguished Council of over two hundred Members - politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Carl Bildt, Emma Bonino and Mabel van Oranje. • A physical presence in the main EU member states. ECFR, uniquely among European think-tanks, has offices in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. Our offices are platforms for research, debate, advocacy and communications. • Developing contagious ideas that get people talking. ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to carry out innovative research and policy development projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR produces original research; publishes policy reports; hosts private meetings, public debates, and “friends of ECFR” gatherings in EU capitals; and reaches out to strategic media outlets. ECFR is a registered charity funded by the Open Society Foundations and other generous foundations, individuals and corporate entities. -
Final Report
25 June 2015 Final Report Assessment of the normative and policy framework governing the Chinese economy and its impact on international competition For: AEGIS EUROPE Brussels Belgium THINK!DESK China Research & Consulting Prof. Dr. Markus Taube & Dr. Christian Schmidkonz GbR Merzstrasse 18 81679 München Tel.: +49 - (0)89 - 26 21 27 82 [email protected] www.thinkdesk.de 1 This report has been prepared by: Prof. Dr. Markus Taube Peter Thomas in der Heiden 2 Contents Executive Summary ························································································· 11 1. Introduction ······························································································ 27 Part I: The Management of the Chinese Economy: Institutional Set-up and Policy Instruments 2. Centralised Planning and Market Forces in the Chinese Economy ··················· 32 2.1 The Role of Planning in the Chinese Economy ············································ 32 2.1.1 Types of Plans ··············································································· 32 2.1.2 Plans and Complementary Documents················································ 41 2.2 Dedicated Government Programmes for Industry Guidance ··························· 45 2.2.1 Subsidies – An Overview ································································· 45 2.2.1.1 Examples for Preferential Policies and Grant Giving Operations by Local Governments ································································ 51 2.2.1.2 Recent Initiatives by the Central Government -
Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan
U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CMSI China Maritime Reports China Maritime Studies Institute 8-2020 China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan Isaac B. Kardon Conor M. Kennedy Peter A. Dutton Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports Recommended Citation Kardon, Isaac B.; Kennedy, Conor M.; and Dutton, Peter A., "China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan" (2020). CMSI China Maritime Reports. 7. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/7 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the China Maritime Studies Institute at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CMSI China Maritime Reports by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. August 2020 iftChina Maritime 00 Studies ffij$i)f Institute �ffl China Maritime Report No. 7 Gwadar China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton Series Overview This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.1 Each case study analyzes a different port on the Indian Ocean, selected to capture geographic, commercial, and strategic variation.2 Each employs the same analytic method, drawing on Chinese official sources, scholarship, and industry reporting to present a descriptive account of the port, its transport infrastructure, the markets and resources it accesses, and its naval and military utility.