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China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report H1 2021 Dr. Christoph NEDOPIL WANG IIGF Green BRI Center Beijing, July 2021 Page 1 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center This brief is produced by the IIGF Green Belt and Road Initiative Center (IIGF Green BRI Center) of the International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF) at the Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) in Beijing. The brief aims to provide a vehicle for publishing preliminary results on topics related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to encourage discussion and debate. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the IIGF, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors. Citation and the use of material presented in this brief should take into account this provisional character. For information regarding Green BRI Center Briefs, please contact the Director Dr. Christoph Nedopil Wang. Please quote as: Nedopil Wang, Christoph (July 2021): “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report H1 2021”, Green BRI Center, International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF), Beijing. Contact: For inquiries, please contact Dr. Christoph Nedopil, Director IIGF Green BRI Center: +86 10 622 88768, [email protected] © 2021 IIGF Green BRI Center / International Institute of Green Finance All rights reserved Page 2 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report H1 2021 Key findings • BRI finance and investments continued to drop in the first half of 2021 to US$19.3 billion (compared to US$27.5 billion in the first half of 2020); • No coal projects received financing or investments in the first half of 2021; • Green energy finance and investments in H1 2021 dropped by 90% compared to H1 2020; • Oil-related finance and investments in the BRI have been US$1.4 billion in the first half of 2021 alone (compared to US$1.9 billion in all of 2020); • Average deal size is getting smaller, dropping from US$1.3 billion in 2018 to US$0.55 billion in 2021; • Various Asian and some Middle Eastern countries could increase Chinese funding during the first 6 months in 2021; • Chinese BRI financing accelerated particularly in the logistics sector; • For the second half of 2021, we expect Chinese BRI investments to accelerate slightly with a focus on transport in Asia, resources and other strategic assets (e.g. ports) • For the second half of 2021, we see potential for increasing demand for Chinese overseas investments due to the possibility of a post-COVID-19 recovery; • For 2021, we continue to see better opportunities in investing in smaller projects that are quicker to implement (e.g. solar, wind) and an opportunity to cut losses in large and often loss-making projects (e.g. coal); • For the second half of 2021, we see an acceleration of green projects and finance, also due to the “Guidelines for Greening Overseas Investment and Cooperation”, issued by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) on July 16. The Guidelines call for application of stricter and if necessary international environmental standards along the whole project lifecycle; • Despite public finance in the G7 and the EU aiming to compete with Chinese funding through the B3W and the “A Globally Connected Europe” strategies, we see opportunities for tripartite cooperation and financing to offer more sustainable development opportunities for BRI countries. Page 3 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center Table of Contents China’s finance and investments in the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) ...................................................... 5 Regional and country analysis of Chinese BRI investments ................................................................................... 6 BRI investments trends in different sectors ................................................................................................................ 8 Energy-related investments in the BRI .......................................................................................................................... 9 Transport investments in the Belt and Road Initiative ........................................................................................ 11 Major players in BRI investments ................................................................................................................................ 14 BRI investments in a global comparison ............................................................................................................ 14 Outlook for 2021 foreign direct investments .................................................................................................... 15 Outlook for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Finance and Investments ...................................................... 16 Appendix: About the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ....................................................................................... 20 Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative ............................................................................................................ 21 About the author ......................................................................................................................................................... 22 About the IIGF Green BRI Center ............................................................................................................................ 22 About the International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF) ........................................................................... 23 Page 4 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center China’s finance and investments in the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) Data1 for Chinese investments in the 140 countries 2019. With COVID-19 pandemic ongoing, BRI of the Belt and Road Initiative2 show that overall investments were at their slowest pace since financing and investments in the BRI in the first six China’s overseas investment strategy was coined months of 2021 was about US$19.3 billion. This is “Belt and Road Initiative” in 2013 when China a decline of 32% compared to the second half of became the major investor in many of the BRI 2020 and a decline of 29% compared to the first countries (see Figure 1). BRI investments picked up half of 2020. It is also US$44 billion less compared in the second quarter of 2021. to the peak in BRI financing in the second half of About the data: On June 28, 2021, the Chinese Ministry of CommerCe (MOFCOM) released its data for “China’s investments and cooperation in countries along the Belt and Road” covering the period of January to May 2021.3 AcCording to these data, Chinese enterprises invested RMB48.2 billion (about US$7.4billion) in non-finanCial direct investments in countries “along the Belt and Road”. The MOFCOM data focus on 55 countries that are “along the Belt and Road” – meaning on a Corridor from China to Europe inCluding South Asia. For this report, the definition of BRI countries includes 140 countries that had signed a cooperation agreement with China to work under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative by 2021. To analyZe investments in these Countries, we base our data on the China Global Investment TraCker. As with most data, they tend to be imperfeCt. Figure 1: China's BRI investments 2013 - H1 2021 1 American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Derek Scissors, “China 2 https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative- Global Investment Tracker H1 2021,” China Global Investment bri/ Tracker (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, July 2021), 3http://fec.mofcom.Gov.cn/article/fwydyl/tjsj/202106/202106031 http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/. 62209.shtml Page 5 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center Deal size is getting smaller Non-BRI countries saw a stronger decline in Chinese investments in 2021 As we predicted last year, the average deal size has decreased from about US$1.3 billion in 2018 to While the first quarter of 2021 was very slow, US$901 million in 2020 and US$500 million in Chinese financing and investment activities in the 2021.One reason might be that many BRI country BRI picked up again in the second quarter with a governments do not guarantee many overseas quarter-to-quarter increase of 36.9%. This projects (a requirement of many large Chinese- compares to a decline of Chinese investments in funded projects) due to the COVID-19 pandemic non-BRI countries in both the first and second and ensuing debt service problems. Also, it is quarters of 2021. easier to raise funds for smaller projects to decrease risks. Figure 2: Chinese overseas investments 2018 – H1 2021 in BRI and non-BRI countries (Source: IIGF Green BRI Center research based on AEI data) Regional and country analysis of Chinese BRI investments BRI investments were not evenly distributed investments (about 49% in the first six months of among all regions. Asian countries continued to 2021), while African and Middle Eastern countries receive the largest share of Chinese BRI received about 38% of BRI investments. Page 6 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center Investments into European BRI countries declined 59%, while investments into West Asia and Middle by 84% compared to the first six months of 2020. Eastern countries (particularly Egypt) increased Similarly, investments into East Asia dropped by (see Figure 3). Figure 3: Chinese investments in different BRI regions (first six months of each year) China’s financing and investment
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