BRI – Economic Corridors and Key Operational Investments

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

BRI – Economic Corridors and Key Operational Investments Strictly Private and Confidential BRI – Economic Corridors and Key Operational Investments March 2018 Merchant Banking Innovation Strictly Private and Confidential Selected Projects pre-Belt and Road Kazakhstan – China China's 1st oil pipeline co-owned by CNPC and KazMunayGas. Agreed in 1997, 1st section completed in 2003, 2nd section completed in 2005, 3rd section in 2009. Total length of the pipeline is over 2,200 kilometers with annual production of 20 million tons/year. In 2011, the Chinese government announced that it would jointly sponsor the construction of a high-speed rail line between Astana and Almaty in Kazakhstan between China and Western Europe as part of an HSR link. Central Asia – China Gas Pipeline In 2006, China and Turkmenistan signed a framework agreement on the pipeline construction and long term gas supply. In 2007, it was announced that Turkmenistan will join China- Kaz pipeline. In 2008 construction of the Uzbek section started. In 2009 the whole pipeline was launched. In 2010, China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to expand this into Western Kazakhstan. The 2nd line was completed in 2010, the 3rd line by 2012, the 4th by 2014. Turkey – HSR Turkish State Railways began building HSR in 2003. The 1st section of 533 km was inaugurated in 2009, linking Istanbul to Ankara. The Marmaray Project/Tunnel will connect the railway lines on the European and Asian parts of Istanbul. Arguably, the first Belt and Road project dates as far back as 1967, when China provided both a $60 million loan and labour to the Karakoram highway, the highest paved international road in the world, which links Pakistan to China. 1 Merchant Banking Innovation Strictly Private and Confidential Official OBOR – Pre launch (2013) Merchant Banking Innovation 2 Strictly Private and Confidential OBOR 2013 map – Selected Projects along Corridors since launch Budapest-Belgrade railway upgrade initially agreed in 2013 Belarus railway electrification (2013 – 2015) Two nuclear power plants in Ekibastuz Power Plant Iran (2015) (Kazakhstan) Moscow China and Russia combine to fund expansion (2014) Rotterdam Duisburg Silk Road Economic Alataw Pass Venice Belt Istanbul Samarkand Urumqi Athens Lanzhou Beijing Dushanbe Shipping Project Xi’an COSCO Shipping signed 35 Teheran year lease with Piraeus Port Fuzhou in 2010; acquired control in Quanzhou 2015 Beihai Guangzhou Hanoi Haikou 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Colombo Penang Bridge Tunnel Project Two Chinese firms plus local partners Kuala Lumpur (2013) Ethiopia-Djibouti railway Nairobi First section signed 2011. 2nd section signed 2012. Colombo Port City Project Operational 2016 Jakarta launched by China in 2014 Hanoi Expressway Project (2014) Merchant Banking Innovation 3 Strictly Private and Confidential BCIM Economic Corridor (2013) The Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) is a sub-regional organisation of Asian nations aimed at greater integration of trade and investment between the four countries. The corridor covers 1.65 million square kilometers, encompassing an estimated 440 million people in China's Yunnan province, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and West Bengal in Northern India. The concept was initially discussed by all the countries during the late 1990s and was known as the ‘Kunming Initiative’. The first meeting of the Initiative was convened in 1999 in Kunming. In December 2013, the four nations drew up a long discussed plan, whereby it was agreed that the corridor will run from Kunming to Kolkata, linking Mandalay in Myanmar as well as Dhaka and Chittagong in Bangladesh. Merchant Banking Innovation 4 Strictly Private and Confidential Specific BCIM Economic Corridor Projects Bangladesh In October 2016, Bangladesh and China approved a draft MoU for two loan agreements of $706 million with China for the construction of a multilane road tunnel beneath the Karnaphuli river. It is also part of a plan to bolster Chittagong’s role as a communications hub, develop the Dhaka-Chittagong-Cox’s Bazar national highway, create a link with the Asian Highway Network thus increasing connectivity with Myanmar and India. Bangladesh has a power grid deficiency, and has turned to China increase grid capacity. The goal, announced in 2016, as part of a plan to increase the country’s total power generation capacity to 40,000 MW by 2030, from the current level of around 13,500 MW. It is estimated that 30% of the target capacity will be generated from coal-fired power plants while the remaining 70% is to come from renewable energy. Bangladesh’s state-run Ashuganj Power Station Ltd (APSCL) and China Energy have agreed to build a 1,320-MW coal-fired TPP in Patuakhali through a 50/50 joint venture. The proposed 2x660-MW generating project is to be developed at Kalapara at an estimated cost of US$2 billion, with a debt-to-equity ratio of 70%/30% (loans from CEXIM). The technology-based plant will use imported coal of around 12,000 tonnes of coal/day. From countries such as Indonesia, India and Australia. Bangladesh’s state-owned West Zone Power Distribution Co Ltd will build a transmission line from the proposed plant to Patuakhali sub- station to connect the national power grid. Payra Project: Also North-West Power Generation Co Limited last year set up a 50/50 joint venture with CMEC in 2016 for development of a 1,320-MW coal-fired TPP at Payra. CEXIM provided a US$1.6 billion loan for this project. Myanmar China’s CITIC Group is looking to lead a consortium (which includes CHEC, China Merchants Holdings, TEDA, and Yunnan Construction Engineering Group) to take a stake of up to 85% in the $7.3 billion Kyauk Pyu port , a strategically important sea port in Myanmar. In exchange for control of the port, China had signalled it was willing to abandon the controversial $3.6bn Myitsone dam project, which has been blocked for a number of years. Like Gwadar (discussed later),Kyauk Pyu is important for China because the port is the entry point for a Chinese oil and gas pipeline which gives it an alternative route for energy imports from the Middle East that avoids the Malacca Straits. The port is part of two projects, which also include an industrial park, to develop a special economic zone in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State. A second consortium led by CITIC has also proposed taking a 51% stake in the $2.3bn industrial park. The only non-Chinese SOE involved in the consortium is Thailand’s Charoen Pokphand Group. 5 Merchant Banking Innovation Strictly Private and Confidential OBOR map – BCIM Economic Corridor (2013) Budapest-Belgrade railway upgrade initially agreed in 2013 Belarus railway electrification (2013 – 2015) Two nuclear power plants in Ekibastuz Power Plant Iran (2015) (Kazakhstan) Moscow China and Russia combine to fund expansion (2014) Rotterdam Duisburg Silk Road Economic Alataw Pass Venice Belt Istanbul Samarkand Urumqi Athens Lanzhou Beijing Dushanbe Shipping Project Xi’an COSCO Shipping signed 35 Teheran Fuzhou year lease with Piraeus Port BCIM Corridor Kunming in 2010; acquired control in Quanzhou 2015 Kolkata Beihai Guangzhou Hanoi Haikou 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Colombo Penang Bridge Tunnel Project Two Chinese firms plus local partners Kuala Lumpur (2013) Ethiopia-Djibouti railway Nairobi First section signed 2011. 2nd section signed 2012. Colombo Port City Project Operational 2016 Jakarta launched by China in 2014 Hanoi Expressway Project (2014) Merchant Banking Innovation 6 Strictly Private and Confidential China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (2014) CPEC is an economic corridor comprising a collection of projects currently under construction at a cost of $62 billion. CPEC aims to provide sufficient power to eliminate the power shortages and to facilitate trade along an overland route that connects Kashgar and Gwadar, through the construction of a vast network of highways, railways, optical fiber and oil pipelines. The corridor is intended to rapidly expand and upgrade Pakistani infrastructure. Pakistani officials predict that the project will result in the creation of upwards of 700,000 direct jobs between 2015– 2030, and add 2 to 2.5% to Pakistan’s GDP growth. Upon implementation, the value of those projects would be equal to all foreign direct investment in Pakistan since 1970, and would be equivalent to 17% of Pakistan's 2015 GDP. Gwadar Port became operational in November 2016 when the initial outbound vessel (with Chinese goods) set sail to the Middle East and Africa: in December 2016 the first large shipment of Chinese goods arrived into Gwadar. Once fully operational, China will realise considerable cost savings ($ billions per year), shortening oil shipping from 13,000 kms to 3,000km/barrel for every barrel of oil imported from the Persian Gulf as well as providing additional revenues to Pakistan. 91% of the revenues to be generated from the Gwadar port in CPEC would go to China, while the GPA would get 9% for the next 40 years. Merchant Banking Innovation 7 Strictly Private and Confidential China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (2014) In Q2 2015, and as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China announced $46 billion in pledges to Pakistan. Original estimates thought that roughly $35 billion investments would relate to the energy sector and $11 billion in infrastructure and Gwadar. By Q4 2016, roughly $37 billion of this amount had already been allocated to specific or proposed projects. Early Harvest Project Status Only 4-5 of the 18 projects have been completed to date (less than 2,000MW). Most of the major energy grid uplift pushed back to 2018 completion or later (delaying GDP growth). Chinese Domination of Early Harvest Financing Chinese policy banks and ICBC have 90% market share of the debt for the Early Harvest projects- local ICBC operation has grown substantially; BoC planning to double presence in 2018. Despite plenty of liquidity, Pakistani banks have been virtually shutout of all of the Early Harvest projects – except for Thar II, where 5 Pakistani banks share nearly equal debt exposure with 3 Chinese banks.
Recommended publications
  • Publication: BELT and ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI)
    “CGSS is a Non-Profit Institution with a mission to help improve policy and decision-making through analysis and research” Copyright © Center for Global & Strategic Studies (CGSS) All rights reserved Printed in Pakistan Published in April, 2017 ISBN 978 969 7733 05 7 Please do not disseminate, distribute or reproduce, in whole or part, this report without prior consent of CGSS CGSS Center for Global & Strategic Studies, Islamabad 3rd Floor, 1-E, Ali Plaza, Jinnah Avenue, Islamabad, Pakistan Tel: +92-51-8319682 Email: [email protected] Web: www.cgss.com.pk Abstract Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) is a massive project which can be termed as a revival of the Ancient Silk Road in order to materialize the Prophecy of Asian Century through the economic expansion and infrastructural build-up by China. The project comprises of two major components that are: 21st Century Maritime Silk Route (MSR) and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) which is further distributed in six overland economic corridors where China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one significant corridor. The project holds massive importance for China in particular and all the other stakeholders in general and will provide enormous opportunity for the socio-economic as well as the infrastructural development of many countries across the globe. The rationale behind China’s massive investment in this project is to attain global domination through geopolitical expansions. China’s economic activities and investment are directed to the promotion of global trade. Although the commencement of the project met with skeptical views as for few specific countries, it is China’s strategic policy to upsurge and enhance its military and economic presence in the World especially in the Indian Ocean and emerge as an economic giant by replacing USA’s superpower status.
    [Show full text]
  • Challenges and Solutionsin Building CPEC-A Flagship Of
    Issue , Working paper CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE Challenges and CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDORSolutionsIn Building CPEC-A Flagship of BRI Written by: Yasir Arrfat Research Coordinator CoE CPEC Minitry of Planning, Pakistan Institute Development Reform of Development Economics Challenges and Solutions in Building CPEC-A Flagship of BRI Yasir Arrfat Research Coordinator Centre of Excellence (CoE) for China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Islamabad, Pakistan, [email protected] Abstract-One of the OBOR pilot corridors out of the six corridors is CPEC. The CPEC has been initiated in 2013 and due to its speedy progress, CPEC is now vastly considered as the “flagship” project among the OBOR projects. The CPEC initiatives include; development of Gwadar Port, road, rail and optical fiber connectivity, energy corridor and Special Economic Zones development for bilateral benefits to attain inclusive growth and regional harmonization. Before the inception of CPEC, the growth of Pakistan was curtailed by two major bottlenecks; acute energy shortages and weak local and regional connectivity infrastructures. In 2013, CPEC came with 59 billion USDs under OBOR and it has been eliminating all major economic bottlenecks. This paper sheds light on the BRI with deep focusing on CPEC. It further represents the Pakistan’s improving economic indicators through CPEC. This paper will also examine some key challenges and their solutions in building CPEC. Key Words-BRI, Challenges, Connectivity, Corridors, CPEC, Global Competitive Index (GCI), Investment, Infrastructure, OBOR I. INTRODUCTION The Globalization has brought vast changes in global economy and has directed the evolution to a boundary less development. This phenomenon has significantly amplified the maritime trade from 2.37 billion tons of freight to 5.88 billion tons of freight moving through maritime routes.
    [Show full text]
  • Asia's Energy Security
    the national bureau of asian research nbr special report #68 | november 2017 asia’s energy security and China’s Belt and Road Initiative By Erica Downs, Mikkal E. Herberg, Michael Kugelman, Christopher Len, and Kaho Yu cover 2 NBR Board of Directors Charles W. Brady Ryo Kubota Matt Salmon (Chairman) Chairman, President, and CEO Vice President of Government Affairs Chairman Emeritus Acucela Inc. Arizona State University Invesco LLC Quentin W. Kuhrau Gordon Smith John V. Rindlaub Chief Executive Officer Chief Operating Officer (Vice Chairman and Treasurer) Unico Properties LLC Exact Staff, Inc. President, Asia Pacific Wells Fargo Regina Mayor Scott Stoll Principal, Global Sector Head and U.S. Partner George Davidson National Sector Leader of Energy and Ernst & Young LLP (Vice Chairman) Natural Resources Vice Chairman, M&A, Asia-Pacific KPMG LLP David K.Y. Tang HSBC Holdings plc (Ret.) Managing Partner, Asia Melody Meyer K&L Gates LLP George F. Russell Jr. President (Chairman Emeritus) Melody Meyer Energy LLC Chairman Emeritus Honorary Directors Russell Investments Joseph M. Naylor Vice President of Policy, Government Lawrence W. Clarkson Dennis Blair and Public Affairs Senior Vice President Chairman Chevron Corporation The Boeing Company (Ret.) Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA U.S. Navy (Ret.) C. Michael Petters Thomas E. Fisher President and Chief Executive Officer Senior Vice President Maria Livanos Cattaui Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. Unocal Corporation (Ret.) Secretary General (Ret.) International Chamber of Commerce Kenneth B. Pyle Joachim Kempin Professor; Founding President Senior Vice President Norman D. Dicks University of Washington; NBR Microsoft Corporation (Ret.) Senior Policy Advisor Van Ness Feldman LLP Jonathan Roberts Clark S.
    [Show full text]
  • The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Effects and Recommendations for Sustainable Development and Trade
    Denver Journal of International Law & Policy Volume 45 Number 4 Article 3 April 2020 The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Effects and Recommendations for Sustainable Development and Trade Shirin Lakhani Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp Recommended Citation Shirin Lakhani, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Regional Effects and Recommendations for Sustainable Development and Trade, 45 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 417 (2017). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR: REGIONAL EFFECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE By: Shirin Lakhani' In November 2003, China and Pakistan signed a Joint Declaration of Cooperation outlining their bilateral intent to promote trade and economic development.' In 2006, these nations composed and signed the Pakistan-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) according to World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines. 2 It was not until April 2015, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pakistan, that the fruits of these agreements came to blossom. During this visit, China and Pakistan signed 51 agreements, memorandums of understanding (MoUs), and financing contracts, signaling the beginning of what is now known as the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC is a $51 billion Chinese investment to develop Pakistan's infrastructure, transportation, and energy sectors.4 Approximately 80% of the projects are energy- related, with the remaining 20% dedicated to expanding existing infrastructure.s The Corridor will link Kashgar to Gwadar, providing China with a direct route to the Persian Gulf.
    [Show full text]
  • Bibliography
    Bibliography Aamir, A. (2015a, June 27). Interview with Syed Fazl-e-Haider: Fully operational Gwadar Port under Chinese control upsets key regional players. The Balochistan Point. Accessed February 7, 2019, from http://thebalochistanpoint.com/interview-fully-operational-gwadar-port-under- chinese-control-upsets-key-regional-players/ Aamir, A. (2015b, February 7). Pak-China Economic Corridor. Pakistan Today. Aamir, A. (2017, December 31). The Baloch’s concerns. The News International. Aamir, A. (2018a, August 17). ISIS threatens China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China-US Focus. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/isis-threatens- china-pakistan-economic-corridor Aamir, A. (2018b, July 25). Religious violence jeopardises China’s investment in Pakistan. Financial Times. Abbas, Z. (2000, November 17). Pakistan faces brain drain. BBC. Abbas, H. (2007, March 29). Transforming Pakistan’s frontier corps. Terrorism Monitor, 5(6). Abbas, H. (2011, February). Reforming Pakistan’s police and law enforcement infrastructure is it too flawed to fix? (USIP Special Report, No. 266). Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Abbas, N., & Rasmussen, S. E. (2017, November 27). Pakistani law minister quits after weeks of anti-blasphemy protests. The Guardian. Abbasi, N. M. (2009). The EU and Democracy building in Pakistan. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Accessed February 7, 2019, from https:// www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/chapters/the-role-of-the-european-union-in-democ racy-building/eu-democracy-building-discussion-paper-29.pdf Abbasi, A. (2017, April 13). CPEC sect without project director, key specialists. The News International. Abbasi, S. K. (2018, May 24).
    [Show full text]
  • Connectivity Through BCIM-EC 121
    Connectivity Through BCIM-EC 121 CONNECTIVITY THROUGH BCIM-EC: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES Sultana Yesmin∗ Abstract The paper examines the status of physical connectivity along the proposed overland routes of the BCIM economic corridor. The study tends to elucidate the areas of common interests of the BCIM countries by and large due to geo- strategic and geo-economic importance of physical connectivity in the BCIM sub- region. The paper, thereby, observes the successive developments of the BCIM Regional Cooperation Forum, since its inauguration, towards achieving its goals and objectives. Hence, the paper comes up with some policy recommendations while exploring major threats prevailing across the BCIM-EC. INTRODUCTION The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Regional Cooperation Forum has been established with a view to boosting regional integration among the four member countries through intensifying physical connectivity and economic corridor in the region. Connecting three sub-regions together, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, the BCIM- Economic Corridor (BCIM- EC) is not only geo-strategically significant but also geo-economically requisite for the member countries to be essential parts of global trade and business in the region. Given the importance, since the establishment, the BCIM-EC has made massive progresses towards the fulfilment of its goals and objectives along with the cooperation of the four countries. Though initially starting as a non- governmental project, the BCIM Forum is now one of the major priority agendas of the governments of the BCIM member countries in order to enhance regional connectivity and multilateral trade relations. As far as the interests of four countries from three distinct regions are concerned, it is important to specify the areas of their common interests with a view to signifying the common objectives of the BCIM-EC.
    [Show full text]
  • China's High-Speed Rail Diplomacy
    China’s High-speed Rail Diplomacy: Global Impacts and East Asian Responses Gerald Chan University of Auckland, New Zealand February 2016 Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia EAI Working Paper Knowledge-Net for a Better World The East Asia Institute (EAI) is a nonprofit and independent research organization in Korea, founded in May 2002. The EAI strives to transform East Asia into a society of nations based on liberal democracy, market economy, open society, and peace. The EAI takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. is a registered trademark. Copyright © 2016 by EAI This electronic publication of EAI intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of EAI documents to a non-EAI website is prohibited. EAI documents are protected under copyright law. “China’s High-speed Rail Diplomacy: Global Impacts and East Asian Responses” ISBN 979-11-86226-77-3 95340 The East Asia Institute #909 Sampoong B/D, 158 Euljiro Jung-gu, Seoul 04548 Republic of Korea Tel. 82 2 2277 1683 Fax 82 2 2277 1684 Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia China’s High-speed Rail Diplomacy: Global Impacts and East Asian Responses* Gerald Chan University of Auckland, New Zealand February 2016 Abstract China as a high-speed rail power has just begun to capture the attention of the world.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political Economy of China-Latin American Relations in the New Millennium
    See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312721514 The Political Economy of China-Latin America Relations in the New Millennium Edited by Margaret Myers & Carol Wise Book · August 2016 CITATIONS READS 14 2,336 2 authors, including: Carol Wise University of Southern California 81 PUBLICATIONS 841 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: National Bureau of Asian Research Annual Book View project All content following this page was uploaded by Carol Wise on 24 January 2017. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. The Political Economy of China-Latin American Relations in the New Millennium In this book, China-Latin America relations experts Margaret Myers and Carol Wise examine the political and economic forces that have underpinned Chinese engagement in the region, as well as the ways in which these forces have shaped economic sectors and policy-making in Latin America. The contributors begin with a review of developments in cross-Pacific statecraft, including the role of private, state- level, sub-national, and extra-regional actors that have influenced China-Latin America engagement in recent years. Part two of the book examines the variety of Latin American development trajectories borne of China’s growing global presence. Contributors analyse the effects of Chinese engagement on specific economic sectors, clusters (the LAC emerging economies), and sub-regions (Central America, the Southern Cone of South America, and the Andean region). Individual case studies draw out these themes. This volume is a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on China-Latin America relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Policy Review VOLUME 13
    Foreign Policy Review VOLUME 13 ALEXANDRA ZOLTAI & PÉTER KLEMENSITS: WHAT DO CHINA AND THE BRI MEAN TO ASEAN ECONOMIES? ZOLTÁN VÖRÖS & PONGKHAO SOMSACK: LAOS AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE. AN INTERCONNECTOR HELPING THE CHINESE NEEDS? TEMJENMEREN AO: COUNTERWEIGHT TO CHINA? THE POTENTIAL OF ASEAN’S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH INDIA TAKESHI DAIMON-SATO: SINO-JAPANESE COMPETITION OVER THE “AID MARKET” IN ASEAN: POLITICAL TENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES ANIKÓ MAGASHÁZI: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SUPPLY CHAINS IN EAST-ASIA AND THE EVOLVING ASEAN REGIONALISM ZOLTÁN PÁLDI: THE EU-ASEAN TIES: A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP? ASSESSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION TO MINH THU & HAN LAM GIANG: ASEAN’S FTA PROCESS AND PROSPECTS KATIGBAK JOVITO JOSE: REVAMPING FINANCE VIA FINTECH: PROMISES, PERILS, AND PRACTICES IN ASEAN DÁNIEL MOLNÁR & DIÁNA HORVÁTH & GÁBOR REGŐS: MONETARY POLICY IN THE FOUNDER COUNTRIES OF ASEAN Foreign Policy Review Volume 13 Volume Review Policy Foreign 2020 KÜLÜGYI ÉS KÜLGAZDASÁGI INTÉZET INSTITUTEINSTITUTE FOR FOR FOREIGN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFFAIRS AND TRADEAND TRADE Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade Budapest, 2020 This publication was financially supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary. Foreign Policy Review Publisher: Márton Ugrósdy Editor: Péter Goreczky Layout and design: Tamás Lévárt Published by the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade H-1016 Budapest, Bérc u. 13-15. Phone: +36 1 279 5700 Fax: +36 1 279 57 01 Email: [email protected]; Web: www.kki.hu © Institute
    [Show full text]
  • Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan
    U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CMSI China Maritime Reports China Maritime Studies Institute 8-2020 China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan Isaac B. Kardon Conor M. Kennedy Peter A. Dutton Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports Recommended Citation Kardon, Isaac B.; Kennedy, Conor M.; and Dutton, Peter A., "China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan" (2020). CMSI China Maritime Reports. 7. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/7 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the China Maritime Studies Institute at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CMSI China Maritime Reports by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. August 2020 iftChina Maritime 00 Studies ffij$i)f Institute �ffl China Maritime Report No. 7 Gwadar China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton Series Overview This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.1 Each case study analyzes a different port on the Indian Ocean, selected to capture geographic, commercial, and strategic variation.2 Each employs the same analytic method, drawing on Chinese official sources, scholarship, and industry reporting to present a descriptive account of the port, its transport infrastructure, the markets and resources it accesses, and its naval and military utility.
    [Show full text]
  • China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment
    China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report H1 2021 Dr. Christoph NEDOPIL WANG IIGF Green BRI Center Beijing, July 2021 Page 1 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center This brief is produced by the IIGF Green Belt and Road Initiative Center (IIGF Green BRI Center) of the International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF) at the Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) in Beijing. The brief aims to provide a vehicle for publishing preliminary results on topics related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to encourage discussion and debate. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the IIGF, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors. Citation and the use of material presented in this brief should take into account this provisional character. For information regarding Green BRI Center Briefs, please contact the Director Dr. Christoph Nedopil Wang. Please quote as: Nedopil Wang, Christoph (July 2021): “China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report H1 2021”, Green BRI Center, International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF), Beijing. Contact: For inquiries, please contact Dr. Christoph Nedopil, Director IIGF Green BRI Center: +86 10 622 88768, [email protected] © 2021 IIGF Green BRI Center / International Institute of Green Finance All rights reserved Page 2 © 2021, IIGF Green BRI Center China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report H1 2021 Key findings
    [Show full text]
  • OPINION | the Chinese Silk Road in South & Southeast Asia: Enter
    www.ssoar.info The Chinese Silk Road in South & Southeast Asia: Enter "Counter Geopolitics" Joshi, Prateek Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Joshi, P. (2016). The Chinese Silk Road in South & Southeast Asia: Enter "Counter Geopolitics". IndraStra Global, 3, 1-4. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3084253 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-52348-4 indrastra.com http://www.indrastra.com/2016/03/OPINION-Chinese-Silk-Road-in-South-Southeast-Asia-002-03-2016-0007.html OPINION | The Chinese Silk Road in South & Southeast Asia: Enter "Counter Geopolitics" By Prateek Joshi Graduate Student in International Relations from South Asian University, New Delhi The Chinese Silk Road projects signal towards a new era of the changing geopolitical order with infrastructure corridors that would span across the Asian landmass in the form of highways, railways, industrial parks ,Oil & gas pipelines connecting the landlocked regions of hinterland China with the sea ports. Considered from the economic point of view, the projects aim to utilize the contiguity of Asian landmass to setup a network of infrastructure projects poised to benefit the vast expanse of the Asian territory and further extending westwards, knocking the door of European markets .The linkage of industrial hubs to ports via efficient transportation will ease the connectivity of hinterland industrial products.
    [Show full text]