Gualberto Villarroel Bolivian President 19 43-19 46
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Gualberto Villarroel Bolivian President 19 43-19 46 Joseph C Holtey The Book Cover The cover photograph shows a scene in the Plaza Murillo the principle plaza inLaPaz, Bolivia, framed by two of the city's most prominent govemment buildings, the Govemment (Presidential) Palace and the Congress Building, and also the National Cathedral and La Paz's National Museum of Art. The picture shows a small monument memorializing President Villarroel, with a bust of the president, and a lamppost like the one from which his corpse was hung in July 1946. In the background in the upper right of the picture can be seen the Bolivian flag. Copyright O 2019 Joseph C. Holtey With the title Gualberto Villarroel President of Bolivia 1943-1916 All rights reserved ISBN: 978-0-98858 1 3-8-8 Editorial Ichilo Prescott, Aizona TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE CHAPTER 1 A MILITARY-CNILIAN COALITION DEPOSES PRESIDENT PEfrIARANDA Hemrln Siles Zuazo Described the Coup and the Rational of Its Participants Another Account of the Coup A Brief Biographical Sketch and Commentaries on Villarroel by His Contemporaries Description of the Executive Branch of the New Govemment CHAPTER 2 NORMALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE T]NITED STATES Augusto C6spedes Describes the Recognition Problem Delay in Diplomatic Recognition Nonrecognition Blamed on the MNR Jorge T. Lavadenz Defends the MNR Bolivia Receives Diplomatic Recognition CHAPTER 3 EXECUTIONS OF 20 NOVEMBER 1944 Insurrection in Oruro Four Men Die Near Challacollo Chuspipata Murders Violation of Chilean Territory Bodies Found on the Road to Coroico Violent Elements Within Radepa The MNR Retums to the Cabinet Possible MNR Implication Loss ofPopular Support for the MNR Discontent Among the Labor Unions The Aftermath of the 20 November Murders Escobar and Eguino Dismissed 1946 Congressional Elections CHAPTER 4 SOCIAL AND LABOR LEGISLATION AND PARALLEL REFORM EFFORTS, 1944-45 Minimum Wage Decree Fuero Sindical Birth Of the FSTMB Voluntary Retirement Bill of 1944 Agrarian Bill for the Departrnent of Tarija Ley de Alquileres Primer Congreso Indigenal and Decrees of May 1945 Results of the New Laws CHAPTER 5 TIN CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, 1943_1946 CHAPTER 6 MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES OF THE VILLARROEL GOVERNMENT CHAPTER 7 THE DEMISE OF VILLARROEL CHAPTER 8 A SI]MMATION AND CONCLUSION Radepa and the MNR Terror Tactics PIR Versus the Administration Reform Efforts Mining Companies Pay More An Uncooperative United States Villanoel as President Precursor ofa Socia[ Revolution NOTES SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY PREFACE The historical importanqe ofthe presidency of Gualberto Villanoel L6pez (1943-1946) lies in the fact that it's legislative and presidential actions represented accomplishments that, as a whole, were precursory to the 1952 Social Revolution. Villarroel led the fight in the executive branch of governrnent through decrees that outlawed oppressive measrues by the landed oligarchy to enslave the indigenous masses, while the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (lvINR) political faction led the legislative efforts at social and economic reform to help the socially suppressed and disenfranchised peasants. However, it was Villanoel's decrees issued in conjunction with the May 1945 Indian Congress that eclipsed all the legislative reforms ofthe MNR. The president's decrees addressed some ofthe core social injustices facing the indigenous agricultural worker. He made a significant step in the process ofradical change in social and economic thought among political leaders, which less than a decade later culminated in Bolivia's Social Revolution of 1952. Villarroel's support ofan effort to correct peasant injustices eventually resulted in his becoming a martyr to the cause ofpeasant rights when in 1946 a mob supported by the old power elite invaded the presidential palace, killing him and hanging his corpse from a lamppost in the plaza in front ofthe palace. On 20 December 1943 the MNR and a small military faction which called itself Raz6n de Patria or Radepq toppled the government ofPresident Enrique Peflaranda del Castillo and installed as president army Major Gualberto Villanoel L6pez. Three leading members of the MNR subsequently received ministerial appointments to the Villarroel cabinet. However, the selection ofa military man as president indicated a dominating influence by the armed forces. Villanoel and his military colleagues in the executive branch wielded most of the power during his two and one-halfyear administration, while civilian political influence was concentrated in the MNR, first in the cabinet and later in the legislature. However, the final word in govemment policy rested with the Radepa army faction. Disharmony between the MNR and Radepa and within Radepa itselfdid not bode well for the strength and longevity ofthe govemment of Villanoel. Intemational developments likewise weakened the administration. The United States considered MNR members of the junta to be pro-Nazi and therefore unsympathetic toward the Allied cause. Only after the junta cleansed itself of MNR membership did the United States extend its recognition in June 1944. Despite these developments, the MNR later returned to assume some positions of authority in the executive branch. After winning control ofcongress in July 1944 and retuming to the cabinet at the end ofthat year, the MNR introduced a number of socio-economic and political reforms. However, disagreement in policies between the MNR and the military and opposition from big business interests prevented full implementation of both legislation and presidential decrees. A combination of factors eventually resulted in the downfall of the Villanoel regime. Weakened by the non-recognition problem; disagreements within the MNR-military alliance and especially dissension within the military wing of the governmenq inability to substantially increase tin revenues; and lastly two reckless Radepa officers within the govemment who headed the major law enforcement agencies committed serious atrocities in 1944 with their brutal and senseless actions, the worst occurring in November 1944.The gradual revelation ofthe details surrounding the latter incident occasioned the loss ofessential popular support for the govemment. The loss of this essential pillar of middle class support for the govemment gave the 6 mining and landed oligarchy an opportunity to foment sufficient discontent to allow, in July 1946, amob to murder Villarroel and go on a rampage of murder and destruction. While in power, President Villarroel and the civilian legislative branch of his govemment attempted to ameliorate the abject poverty and the vassal-like living conditions of the vast majority ofthe population. As late as the 1940s the rural labor force had no political influence and in general received little protection under the law. Their social position was so inferior that they could not walk on some of the principal streets inLaPaz. When the Indian found it necessary to approach a fair-skinned member ofthe upper-class society, he had to kleel to address his superior and kiss the hand of the person with whom he wished to converse. Social legislation and presidential decrees between 1943 and 1946 had little effect because of the short period of Villarroel's presidency. Following its downfall the indigenous population continued to serve a landed oligarchy which held large tracts ofland sometimes encompassing a million hectares on which the peasants labored as virtual serfs. farm workers living within these private estates worked for a period ofone to five days a week in retum for the right to till a small plot ofland for their own needs. The same indigenous population worked the nation's tin mines. Earlier efforts by prior presidents David Toro (1936-1937) and Germiin Busch (1937-1939) as well as Villarroel to force the mining oligarchy to leave more of their profits in Bolivia failed. Indigenous mine workers continued to endure long workdays under poor conditions for subsistence wages. Just three men-Simon Ituni Patiflo, Carlos Victor Aramayo, and Mauricio Hochschild--controlled 80 percent of the national tin production. Mineral exports between the years 1900 and 1950 usually accounted for 95-99 percent ofall exports, with tin making up 70- 75 percent of this figure. Tin was therefore essential for the acquisition of foreign exchange used to purchase foodstuffs and other imports. Most profits went straight into the pockets ofthe mine owners, and Bolivia remained a poor country where the three tin barons used their money and influence to persuade political leaders to keep export taxes low and the exchange rate favorable. This maximized ore production profits and permitted mine o*rlers to use the minimum amount offoreign exchange when acquiring local currency needed to pay miners' salaries. Likewise, Villarroel nor the legislative branch ever made serious efforts to enfranchise the masses. They knew that the immense power of the oligarchy composed ofthe owners of massive land holdings and the wealthy mine owners made any such attempt very unlikely to succeed, especially because ofthe presence within the executive branch ofmany who opposed such a radical approach. Literacy requirements continued to make most adults ineligible to vote, thereby limiting the franchise to a select minority ofabout 3 percent ofthe population. For example, in 1940 army General Enrique Pefraranda del Castillo won election to the presidency by receiving the majority of a total of 80,000 votes cast from a population of nearly 3 million. Only the