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The Eisenhower Administration, the Bolivian Revolution and Latin American Leftist Nationalism

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The Eisenhower Administration, the Bolivian Revolution and Latin American Leftist Nationalism A Bond that will Permanently Endure: The Eisenhower administration, the Bolivian revolution and Latin American leftist nationalism Oliver Murphey Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Oliver Murphey All rights reserved Abstract A Bond that will Permanently Endure: The Eisenhower administration, the Bolivian revolution and Latin American leftist nationalism Oliver Murphey This dissertation examines how Latin American diplomacy helped shape U.S. officials’ response to revolutionary movements at the height of the Cold War. It explains the striking contrast between U.S. patronage of the Bolivian revolution and the profound antagonism with similar leftist nationalist movements in Cuba and Guatemala. Although U.S. policymakers worried that “Communists” were infiltrating the Bolivian Government, Bolivian diplomats convinced the Eisenhower administration to support their revolution. The dissertation demonstrates that even during the peak of McCarthyism, U.S. policymakers' vision extended far beyond Cold War dogmatism. This vision incorporated a subtle, if ultimately contradictory, appreciation of the power of nationalism, a wish to promote developmental liberalism, and a desire for hemispheric hegemony regardless of strategic and ideological competition with the Soviet Union. U.S. officials were eager to exploit the emerging force of third world nationalism and employ it to strengthen the “inter-American system.” The Bolivian revolutionaries presented their political project as copacetic to Washington’s wider regional goals, and thus managed to secure considerable freedom of movement to continue to pursue a radical revolutionary agenda and statist program of development, financed and enabled by hundreds of millions in U.S. aid dollars. Contents Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... iii Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Defining terms ........................................................................................................................................ 27 Chapter outline ........................................................................................................................................ 33 Chapter 1 The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, the building of a revolution, and U.S. responses ...................................................................................................................................... 38 The MNR and Ideology: Searching for models of autonomy ................................................................. 39 U.S. attitudes towards the MNR ............................................................................................................. 54 The Truman Administration’s reaction ................................................................................................... 59 Major developments under Eisenhower .................................................................................................. 69 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 71 Chapter 2 Communism, emotionalism and irresponsibility: the potential for conflict between the MNR and the Eisenhower Administration ............................................................................... 74 Tin diplomacy: the free market and the iron curtain ............................................................................... 82 Communism, emotionalism and irresponsibility: the potential for conflict between Bolivia and the United States ........................................................................................................................................... 90 The anti-MNR lobby ............................................................................................................................. 107 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 116 Chapter 3 Eisenhower and the MNR: Avoiding “overzealous anticommunism” ................................. 118 A move in the right direction? Bolivia adopts an “actively anticommunist policy” ............................. 134 The MNR and radical leftism: “we just let it pass” .............................................................................. 140 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 146 Chapter 4 The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario's appeal in Washington: nationalism, the inter-American system and revolutionary diplomacy ........................................................... 148 The appeal of the MNR: moderation and revolutionary zeal ................................................................ 149 Nationalism, the Eisenhower administration and Bolivian diplomacy ................................................. 160 The “inter-American system” ............................................................................................................... 172 i Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 181 Chapter 5 Guatemala: Testing the limits of the inter-American system ............................................... 184 Arbenz comes to power: a “New Dealer” for Guatemala ..................................................................... 186 Overthrowing Arbenz: Caracas and the Inter-American system .......................................................... 192 After Arbenz: US hegemony, land reform and leftist nationalism ....................................................... 208 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 218 Chapter 6 Eisenhower, Congress and Bolivian aid: 'trying to do something intelligently about South America' ..................................................................................................................................... 221 Expropriated mines: “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” or “nothing but words and no action”? ................................................................................................................................................. 229 Public Law 480: dependency and the U.S. Congress............................................................................ 240 Austerity and Plan Eder ........................................................................................................................ 254 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 258 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 260 Bibliography and list of sources .............................................................................................. 267 ii Acknowledgements I wish to thank the generosity and faith shown in me by Columbia’s Institute of Latin American Studies, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Foreign Language and Area Studies program, who all contributed money that helped make this project possible. To the staff at Escuela Runawasi, who showed me patience and warmth and helped me to develop a love and appreciation for Bolivia. To Luis Antezana Ergueta, for his patience with my faltering Spanish, and his passionate insight into Bolivian history. And especially to José Pradel Barrientos, whose kindness and willingness to help went so far above and beyond the call of duty that I still blush to think of it. I hope someday to be able to repay your kindness and support. The greatest thanks must go to Matt Connelly, who also showed patience, but also tough love and encouragement when needed. Without his careful reading, insightful comments, guiding mentorship and powerful intellect, I would not have been able to have achieve half of what I have during my time at graduate school. John Coatsworth too, was a generous and thoughtful reader, a pleasure to teach for and a deeply knowledgeable and kind human being. To my other committee members, Robert Karl, Anders Stephanson and Marc Trachtenberg, I thank you for your generosity in taking time out of your summers to read and respond to my work, and help craft it into the finished version. My thanks also to Chester Pach, Hal Brands, Seth Fein, Thomas Fields and Tanya Harmer, who all provided thoughtful comments on my work at various stages. Trent McNamara, Simon Stevens and Stephen Wertheim were repeatedly subjected to drafts that were always rougher than I would have liked, and always came through with great insight into how to craft my arguments, marshal my material and address shortcomings. You are all deeply impressive to me and I know you will achieve great things in the years to come. I must also thank my fellow graduate students, who all were the finest companions and peers one could have wished for. You
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