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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON FACULTY OF HUMANITIES Ambassador Donald R. Heath, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954 by Alexander David Ferguson Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2018 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON Abstract FACULTY OF HUMANITIES History Doctor of Philosophy AMBASSADOR DONALD R. HEATH, THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SAIGON AND THE FRANCO-VIET MINH WAR, 1950-1954 By Alexander David Ferguson This thesis provides the first scholarly analysis of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon from the American decision to support France’s war against the Viet Minh with military and economic assistance in 1950 to Ngo Dinh Diem’s appointment as prime minister of Vietnam in 1954. It explores the embassy’s influence with Washington and its impact on events on the ground in Indochina. The major focus of the thesis is Donald R. Heath, the chief of the American diplomatic mission in Saigon in this period. The thesis contends that Heath played a key role in maintaining a U.S. policy that placed greater preference on sustaining the French war effort over the development of an independent, anti-communist government in Vietnam. Heath used his reporting to insist on the workability of this policy and intervened to counter the efforts of other Americans to reorient the balance of U.S. policy. Heath’s repeated interventions with French, Vietnamese and American actors also helped to sustain the French commitment in Indochina, preventing diplomatic incidents in Saigon from encouraging the French to abandon their vital Cold War military effort. Heath’s actions had unintended consequences, however. His prioritisation of the French effort over the development of anti-communist Vietnamese nationalism damaged the prestige of the United States in Vietnam and the Vietnamese government’s chances of drawing political support away from the Viet Minh. Heath’s embassy, which demonstrated activist tendencies after 1950, was also complicit in the deepening of American involvement in Vietnam. Embassy attempts to buck up the French and, after their European ally was defeated, the government of Ngo Dinh Diem committed greater American assistance and prestige to the struggle to prevent Vietnam’s fall to communism, setting the scene for the later American war in Vietnam. iii iv Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii Academic Thesis: Declaration of Authorship ............................................................................... vii Acknowledgments...........................................................................................................................ix Acronyms ........................................................................................................................................xi Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Individuals and Contingency in Vietnam..................................................................................... 1 Ambassador Donald R. Heath, the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and the Franco-Viet Minh War ..... 4 Argument ................................................................................................................................... 10 Structure ..................................................................................................................................... 16 Chapter 1 – The Rise to Prominence of the American Diplomatic Post in Saigon, 1889-1950 .... 19 The Beginning of an American Diplomatic Presence in Saigon................................................ 20 The U.S. Consulate in Saigon up to World War II .................................................................... 20 World War II, the Japanese Occupation of Indochina and the Closure of the Consulate .......... 21 The Reopening of the Consulate ................................................................................................ 22 American Recognition of the Associated States ........................................................................ 27 Chapter 2 – The Ugly Americans in French Indochina, 1950-1954 .............................................. 35 ‘A New World’ and the Failure to Sell Southeast Asian Specialisation .................................... 37 Informal Preparation and Ideological Baggage ......................................................................... 44 Tongue-Tied Foreign Service .................................................................................................... 48 Security Issues and Life in ‘Little America’ .............................................................................. 56 Chapter 3 – ‘To Supplement but not to Supplant’: Donald Heath and the Quiet Americans, July 1950-June 1952 .............................................................................................................................. 65 A European Hand in Saigon ...................................................................................................... 66 The Melby-Erskine Mission ...................................................................................................... 68 RC4 and the Search for ‘Middle Ground’ Relations .................................................................. 72 De Lattre and the Quiet Americans ........................................................................................... 76 ‘The Sacrificial Offering for which the Gods are Clamoring’ ................................................... 84 ‘A Snowball has Started to Form’ ............................................................................................. 93 Chapter 4 – ‘France is Fighting the Good Fight’: Donald Heath and Sustaining the French in Indochina, June 1952-December 1953 .......................................................................................... 99 Tam and French War Weariness .............................................................................................. 100 ‘Misinformed Traveling Prophets’ .......................................................................................... 103 Getting France Back on the Offensive ..................................................................................... 109 Eisenhower in Office ............................................................................................................... 111 v Last Chance Saloon ................................................................................................................. 116 ‘Indochina, All But Lost’ ......................................................................................................... 118 ‘Emotional, Irresponsible Nationalism’................................................................................... 125 Chapter 5 – The Dien Bien Phu Crisis, January-May 1954......................................................... 135 Heath’s Fall from Favour ........................................................................................................ 136 ‘We Must Work with [the] French Through Existing Channels’ ............................................ 146 ‘I Had No Indication of What Washington Thought of Recent French Suggestions Re [the] Internationalization of [the] War’ ............................................................................................ 153 ‘American Intervention in Indo-China Might be Interpreted as [a] Protection of Colonialism’ ............................................................................................................................ 161 Chapter 6 – The Geneva Conference, May-July 1954................................................................. 169 Saigon Diplomats at Geneva ................................................................................................... 170 The Embassy and U.S. Attempts to Sabotage the Conference ................................................ 171 Accepting Partition .................................................................................................................. 179 A Glass Half Empty or Half Full? ........................................................................................... 183 Changes to the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Indochina ........................................................... 187 Chapter 7 – Ngo Dinh Diem and the U.S. Commitment to South Vietnam, July-November 1954 ....................................................................................................................................................