DOCSLIB.ORG

Власть И Элиты Power and Elites Том 7 Выпуск 1

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Власть И Элиты Power and Elites Том 7 Выпуск 1 Федеральный научно-исследовательский социологический центр Российской академии наук Социологический институт РАН — филиал ФНИСЦ РАН Власть и элиты Power and elites Том 7 Выпуск 1 Санкт-Петербург 2020 УДК 32 ББК 66.0 В 58 РЕДАКЦИОННАЯ КОЛЛЕГИЯ EDITOR А.В. Дука, к.пол.н., главный редактор A. Duka, Dr., St. Petersburg А.В. Быстрова, к.э.н. ASSISTANT EDITOR В.В. Козловский, д.филос.н. A. Flyagin, St. Petersburg Д.Б. Тев, к.с.н. EXECUTIVE BOARD А.М. Флягин, ответственный секретарь A. Bystrova, Dr., St. Petersburg V. Kozlovskiy, Dr., Prof, St. Petersburg D. Tev, Dr., St. Petersburg РЕДАКЦИОННЫЙ СОВЕТ EDITORIAL BOARD В.А. Ачкасов (С.-Петербург, Россия) V. Achkasov (St. Petersburg, Russia) О.В. Гаман-Голутвина (Москва, Россия) A. Chirikova (Moscow, Russia) В.А. Гуторов (С.-Петербург, Россия) O. Gaman-Golutvina (Moscow, Russia) А.А. Зоткин (Симферополь, Россия) V. Gutorov (St. Petersburg, Russia) Н.Ю. Лапина (Москва, Россия) U. Hoffmann-Lange (Bamberg, Germany) В.Г. Ледяев (Москва, Россия) N. Lapina (Moscow, Russia) О.Ю. Малинова (Москва, Россия) V. Ledyaev (Moscow, Russia) В.П. Мохов (Пермь, Россия) O. Malinova (Moscow, Russia) П.В. Панов (Пермь, Россия) V. Mohov (Perm, Russia) И. Панькув (Краков, Польша) I. Pańków (Warszawa, Poland) У. Хоффманн-Ланге (Бамберг, Германия) P. Panov (Perm, Russia) А.Е. Чирикова (Москва, Россия) A. Zotkin (Simferopol, Russia) Научное периодическое издание «Власть и элиты» выходит с 2014 года. Включено в Российский индекс научного цитирования (РИНЦ). © ФНИСЦ РАН, 2020 © Интерсоцис, 2020 ISSN 2410-9517 © Авторы статей, 2020 СОДЕРЖАНИЕ Элиты России Шентякова А.В. Консолидация российской элиты как фактор государственной политики идентичности ........................... 5 Тев Д.Б. Члены Правительства и депутаты Государственной Думы РФ: карьера в бизнесе после ухода с должности ......................... 22 Жуков Д.С., Сельцер Д.Г. «Развилка» 1996 года и российские региональные элиты: гипотетические сценарии трансформации ................... 46 Быстрова А.С., Даугавет А.Б., Дука А.В., Колесник Н.В., Невский А.В., Тев Д.Б. Региональная политическая элита: бассейн рекрутирования и карьера. 76 Город и власть Чирикова А.Е., Ледяев В.Г., Рябова О.А. Моногорода Среднего Урала: власть, лидерство, эффективность ................................123 Пустовойт Ю.А. «Бумеры» и «миллениалы» в зеркале мобилизационной повестки сибирских городов ....................163 Власть и гражданские инициативы Гольбрайх В.Б. Социальные сети как ресурс для институционализации общественного движения (на примере конфликта вокруг строительства мусорных полигонов в Архангельской области) ......183 Горбачева К.И. Манипуляции общественным сознанием в экологическом конфликте на Куштау ............................204 Сведения об авторах .................................................232 CONTENTS Russian elites A. Shentyakova. Consolidation of the Russian elite as a factor of state identity policy ...................................................... 5 D. Tev. Members of the government and deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation: careers in business after leaving office ......... 22 D. Zhukov, D. Seltser. The bifurcation of 1996 and Russian regional elites: hypothetical scenarios of transformation .............................. 46 A. Bystrova, A. Daugavet, A. Duka, N. Kolesnik, A. Nevskiy, D. Tev. Regional political elite: careers and pool of recruitment .......................... 76 Cities, towns and power A. Chirikova, V. Ledyaev, O. Ryabova. Monotowns of the middle urals: power, leadership, efficiency ........................................123 Yu. Pustovoyt. “Boomers” and “millennials” in the mirror of the mobilization agenda of Siberian cities ..........................163 Power and civic engagement V. Golbraih. Social networks as a resource for the institutionalization of social movement (on the example of the conflict around garbage conflicts in the Arkhangelsk region) .................................183 K. Gorbacheva. Manipulation of public opinion in environmental conflict in Kushtau .......................................................204 Contributors .........................................................232 ЭЛИТЫ РОССИИ КОНСОЛИДАЦИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ЭЛИТЫ КАК ФАКТОР ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ А.В. Шентякова ([email protected]) Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, Санкт-Петербург, Россия Цитирование: Шентякова А.В. Консолидация российской элиты как фактор го- сударственной политики идентичности // Власть и элиты. 2020. Т. 7, № 1. С. 5–21. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31119/pe.2020.7.1.1 Аннотация. Государственная политики идентичности — одно из стратегических направлений внутренней политики, целью которой является формирование и поддержание стабильного и единого символиче- ского пространства в обществе. Методологической основой работы вы- бран конструктивистский подход, который позволяет включать поли- тические элиты, социальные группы и институты в контекст анализа. Метод сбора информации — экспертные интервью. Анализ собранных данных позволил выделить основных субъектов государственной полити- ки идентичности и определить степень их включенности в процессы. Элита выступает в качестве ключевого субъекта в разработке и реали- зации государственной политики идентичности. Обосновывается значи- мость проблемы консолидации российской элиты, которая сохраняет свою актуальность на протяжении всего постсоветского периода. Одним из ус- ловий успешности проводимого курса по формированию сплоченного со- лидарного общества эксперты выделили фактор консолидации элитных групп и достижение ценностного консенсуса между властью и обществом. Проводится анализ зарубежной и отечественной научной литературы по вопросам консолидации и сплоченности элиты. Анализируются харак- тер и степень консолидации российской элиты, подчеркивается особая 6 Шентякова А.В. роль в этом процессе административного сегмента федеральной элиты. Выявляется связь между степенью институционализации и достижением ценностного консенсуса внутри элиты. Отдельно рассматривается вопрос консолидации российского общества в целом. Обозначается проблема со- циального неравенства как фактор, тормозящий демократические про- цессы в сфере политики идентичности. Рассматривается фактор лидер- ства как один из ресурсов для выстраивания диалога между го сударственной властью и институтами гражданского общества. Ключевые слова: консолидация элит, взаимодействие элиты и обще- ства, политика идентичности, ценностный консенсус, институциона- лизация элиты. В последние десять лет в отечественной политической науке в свя- зи с проблемами конструирования общероссийской гражданской иден- тичности, которая рассматривается как один из наиболее важных факторов консолидации общества, активно разрабатывается и обсуж- дается категория «политика идентичности». Государственная политики идентичности является одним из стратегических направлений внутрен- ней политики, цель которой — формирование и сохранение единого символического пространства в обществе. «В действительности все современные государства в той или иной мере проводят “политику идентичности”, направленную на интеграцию стоящих за ними сооб- ществ, поощрение солидарности, формирование определенного пред- ставления о Нас, опирающегося на те или иные интерпретации истории и культуры» [Малинова 2010: 91]. Существуют различные подходы к трактовке понятия «идентичность», но в настоящее время доминиру- ет конструктивистский. Методология конструктивизма рассматривает процесс конструирования идентичности в качестве условия построения эффективной коммуникативной базы и консолидации представителей различных политических, культурных и этнических групп [Брубейкер 2012]. Одна из авторитетных российских исследователей И.С. Семенен- ко определяет политику идентичности как деятельность государства и других субъектов политического процесса, направленную на форми- рование совокупности ценностных ориентиров, практик. Ее целью является формирование и поддержание национальной, гражданской и иных форм макрополитической идентичности, ориентиров развития национального сообщества и идентичностей групп и сообществ внутри него. Эта сфера становится объектом государственной политики и де- ятельности различных акторов, так или иначе задействованных в по- Консолидация российской элиты как фактор государственной политики... 7 литическом процессе [Фадеева 2016: 175]. В рамках реализации науч- ного проекта № 19-011-31616 «Государственная политика в сфере формирования идентичности: концептуальные основания, технологии и перспективы»1 политика идентичности рассматривалась как комплекс мер, решений и программ со стороны государства для поддержания определенного уровня консолидации общества и стабильности поли- тического режима. «Точнее было бы определить современные стратегии нациестроительства шире, как политику консолидации живущих на од- ной административной территории людей в институциональных фор- мах единого сообщества» [Семененко и др. 2017: 59]. Такая трактовка обусловливается возрастанием рисков, связанных с проблемами соци- ального расслоения, снижением уровня легитимности власти как от- дельных политических лидеров, так и политических институтов в целом. В ходе выполнения проекта была проведена серия экспертных полу- структурированных интервью, вопросы в гайде формулировались в от- крытой форме. Выбор метода сбора информации был обусловлен тем, что техника глубинного нестандартизованного интервью позволяет задавать вопросы, менять последовательность тематических блоков по ходу интервью в зависимости от естественного хода беседы. Подоб-
Load more

Recommended publications
  • On the Eve of the V Caspian Summit in Astana
    20.09.2016-26.09.2016 • No: 82 ON THE EVE OF THE V CASPIAN SUMMIT IN ASTANA Current geopolitical situation in the Caspian Caspian states’ Deputy Ministers of Foreign Caspian Five could manage to revert to the region clearly demonstrates the necessity for Affairs held in Baku in February 2003. issue only in the four-year period, in particu- searching a mutually acceptable solution Nevertheless, it took the littoral states 5 years lar, during the IV Caspian Summit held in regarding both establishment of the new legal to arrange the II Caspian Summit in Tehran on Astrakhan on September 29, 2014. The issue status and determination of the regime of use October 16, 2007. This time, the discussion was resolved by adopting a 19-point final of the Caspian Sea. For more than two dec- on prospects for multilateral cooperation and communique. According to this communique, ades, the littoral countries have been trying to the legal status of the Caspian Sea was held in the littoral countries would extend their adopt a five-party document regulating legal a constructive atmosphere. As a result, the national sovereignty out 15 nautical miles off obligations for the parties in maintaining parties adopted a 25-point joint declaration, their respective coasts, with exclusive fishing rights to use waters above the seabed, the which touched upon several issues such as in 10 nautical mile areas. Besides, at the end seabed, the subsoil, and the airspace above the navigation, transportation, security, etc. The of the Summit, the Agreement on the conser- Caspian Sea. Improved political dialog among parties unanimously agreed that the littoral vation and rational use of marine biological the regional states is one of the crucial pre- states would neither use their armed forces resources, the Agreement on cooperation in conditions for the successful implementation against each other nor allow any other state to the field of prevention and liquidation of of normative regulations.
    [Show full text]
  • Constitutional & Parliamentary Information
    UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION CCoonnssttiittuuttiioonnaall && PPaarrlliiaammeennttaarryy IInnffoorrmmaattiioonn Half-yearly Review of the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments Preparations in Parliament for Climate Change Conference 22 in Marrakech (Abdelouahed KHOUJA, Morocco) National Assembly organizations for legislative support and strengthening the expertise of their staff members (WOO Yoon-keun, Republic of Korea) The role of Parliamentary Committee on Government Assurances in making the executive accountable (Shumsher SHERIFF, India) The role of the House Steering Committee in managing the Order of Business in sittings of the Indonesian House of Representatives (Dr Winantuningtyastiti SWASANANY, Indonesia) Constitutional reform and Parliament in Algeria (Bachir SLIMANI, Algeria) The 2016 impeachment of the Brazilian President (Luiz Fernando BANDEIRA DE MELLO, Brazil) Supporting an inclusive Parliament (Eric JANSE, Canada) The role of Parliament in international negotiations (General debate) The Lok Sabha secretariat and its journey towards a paperless office (Anoop MISHRA, India) The experience of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies on Open Parliament (Antonio CARVALHO E SILVA NETO) Web TV – improving the score on Parliamentary transparency (José Manuel ARAÚJO, Portugal) Deepening democracy through public participation: an overview of the South African Parliament’s public participation model (Gengezi MGIDLANA, South Africa) The failed coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 (Mehmet Ali KUMBUZOGLU)
    [Show full text]
  • Third Evaluation Round Addendum to the Second Compliance Report On
    Adoption: 23 March 2018 Public Publication: 25 June 2018 GrecoRC3(2018)5 Third Evaluation Round Addendum to the Second Compliance Report on the Russian Federation ”Incriminations (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2)” * * * ”Transparency of Party Funding” Adopted by GRECO at its 79th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 19-23 March 2018) Directorate General I GRECO Secretariat F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex Human Rights and Rule of Law Council of Europe +33 3 88 41 20 00 Information Society and Action against www.coe.int/greco Fax +33 3 88 41 39 55 Crime Directorate I. INTRODUCTION 1. This Addendum assesses the additional measures taken by the Russian authorities, since the adoption of the Second Compliance Report, to implement the recommendations issued by GRECO in its Third Round Evaluation Report on the Russian Federation. The Third Evaluation Round covers two distinct themes, namely: - Theme I – Incriminations: Articles 1a and 1b, 2-12, 15-17, 19 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption ETS 173), Articles 1-6 of its Additional Protocol (ETS 191) and Guiding Principle 2 (criminalisation of corruption). - Theme II – Transparency of party funding: Articles 8, 11, 12, 13b, 14 and 16 of Recommendation Rec(2003)4 on Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, and - more generally - Guiding Principle 15 (financing of political parties and election campaigns). 2. The Third Round Evaluation Report containing twenty-one recommendations (nine in respect of Theme I and eleven in respect of Theme II) was adopted at GRECO’s 54th Plenary Meeting (23 March 2012) and made public on 13 August 2012, following authorisation by the Russian authorities (Greco Eval III Rep (2011) 6E, Theme I and Theme II).
    [Show full text]
  • RF 2016 Duma Elections -Final Report
    Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights RUSSIAN FEDERATION STATE DUMA ELECTIONS 18 September 2016 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report Warsaw 23 December 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... 1 II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................... 3 III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ............................................................................... 4 IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................................................... 5 V. ELECTORAL SYSTEM ....................................................................................................................... 6 VI. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ....................................................................................................... 7 VII. VOTER REGISTRATION.................................................................................................................... 9 VIII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION ........................................................................................................ 10 IX. CAMPAIGN ......................................................................................................................................... 12 X. CAMPAIGN FINANCE .....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Working Paper 19-15 Measuring the Rise of Economic Nationalism
    WORKING PAPER 19-15 Measuring the Rise of Economic Nationalism Monica de Bolle and Jeromin Zettelmeyer August 2019 Abstract Since the mid-2000s, the platforms of major political parties in both advanced and emerging-market economies have increasingly emphasized policies that stress national sovereignty, reject multilateralism, and seek to advance national interests through measures that come at the expense of foreign interests. This paper documents this shift by evalu- ating the policy platforms of the largest political parties (about 55 in total) in the Group of Twenty (G-20) countries with regard to trade policy, foreign direct investment (FDI), immigration, and multilateral organizations. Preference shifts with respect to industrial policy, competition policy, and macroeconomic populism are also examined. In advanced economies, the biggest shifts were toward restrictions on immigration and trade and toward macroeco- nomic populism. In emerging-market economies, the largest preference shifts were toward industrial policies favoring specific sectors, macroeconomic populism, and industrial concentration. Trade protectionism and skepticism toward multilateral organizations and agreements have increased in both advanced and emerging-market economies. As of 2018, economic policy preferences in emerging-market economies were more nationalist and less liberal than in advanced countries, but the gap has narrowed. Right-wing parties tend to be more nationalist than left-wing parties in the areas of immigration restrictions, FDI restrictions, and antimultilateralism, but there is no significant differ- ence with respect to trade protectionism. JEL Codes: F5, F1, F2 Keywords: nationalism, populism, capitalism, trade policy, industrial policy, protectionism Monica de Bolle is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Riordan Roett Chair in Latin American Studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.
    [Show full text]
  • MONTHLY November 2020 CONTENTS
    MONTHLY November 2020 CONTENTS 12 19 30 RUSSIA’S CORONAVIRUS IN THE INTEREST OF U.S.-RUSSIA NAVY INCIDENT VACCINE RACE CONTINUES THE KREMLIN? RUSSIAN IN THE NORTH PACIFIC OLIGARCH CREATES FAR-RIGHT MOVEMENT IN THE INTEREST OF THE KREMLIN? MOLDOVA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: RUSSIAN OLIGARCH CREATES FAR-RIGHT 3 RUSSIA HELPS DODON 19 MOVEMENT WEAK ROUBLE, TIGHT BUDGET: NEW LAVROV VISITS MINSK: LOCKDOWN WOULD SMASH RUSSIAN RUSSIA WANTS LUKASHENKO 4 ECONOMY 20 TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS U.S. ELECTION: WHAT SECHIN’S “STEEL” BUSINESS RAISES SERIOUS 6 IS RUSSIA COUNTING ON? 22 DOUBTS RUSSIAN POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE DISAGREE OVER WHAT REALLY HAPPENED MOLDOVA’S SANDU ON WITHDRAWING 7 TO NAVALNY 24 RUSSIAN FORCES FROM TRANSNISTRIA RUSSIA DEPLOYS ITS “PEACEKEEPERS” OPEC+ STUTTERS OVER OIL CUT DEAL, 9 TO NAGORNO-KARABAKH 25 RUSSIA’S SECHIN FORECASTS OIL PRICES RUSSIA LAUNCHES CABINET RESHUFFLE TURMOIL OVER TURKSTREAM LOAN: IS 10 ALSO IN ENERGY MINISTRY 27 SERBIAN LEG OF THE PIPELINE IN DANGER? RUSSIA’S CORONAVIRUS VACCINE RACE RUSSIA POURS MONEY 12 CONTINUES 28 INTO IRAQI OILFIELDS MORE LIBYAN OIL CAUSES HEADACHE MOLDOVA ELECTION: SANDU FOR RUSSIANS MORE LIBYAN OIL CAUSES 14 SMASHES RUSSIA’S CANDIDATE 30 HEADACHE FOR RUSSIANS ROSNEFT AND GAZPROM NEFT LET FOREIGN INVESTORS ENTER ARCTIC U.S.-RUSSIA NAVY INCIDENT 16 PROJECTS 30 IN THE NORTH PACIFIC RUSSIAN INSPECTION: LAVROV, SHOIGU VISIT ARMENIA ROSNEFT PLANS TO SELL SOME DEPOSITS 17 AND AZERBAIJAN 31 AMID COSTLY VOSTOK OIL PROJECT 2 www.warsawinstitute.org SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU 2 November 2020 MOLDOVA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: RUSSIA HELPS DODON Pro-Western opposition leader Maia Sandu secured a surprise lead against Moldova’s current president Igor Dodon.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security for More Information on This Publication, Visit
    Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security Russia, NATO, C O R P O R A T I O N STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, ANIKA BINNENDIJK, IRINA A. CHINDEA, KATHERINE COSTELLO, GEOFFREY KIRKWOOD, DARA MASSICOT, CLINT REACH Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA357-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0568-5 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Cover graphic by Dori Walker, adapted from a photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Weston Jones. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The Black Sea region is a central locus of the competition between Russia and the West for the future of Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Environmental Legislative Agenda: Efficient Round Table Cooperation for Sustainable Development International Forum “Development of Parliamentarism”
    INTERNATIONAL FORUM “DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENTARISM” I SECTION I. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: DIALOGUE OF LEGISLATORS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY The Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy in Reducing Conflict Potential and Strengthening International Security 1987, and its responsibilities have been expanded to the Frequency and magnitude of armed conflicts have consid- erably increased worldwide over the past decade1. World whole region since 2014. The Cyprus mediation group works military expenditure in 2018 grew up to $1.8 trillion that since 1991. is 2.1 percent of the global GDP, reaching the all-time The need to extend the role of parliamentary diplomacy high since 1988. Fifty-three percent ($0.9 trillion) of world in promoting peace is recorded in IPU resolutions The pre - military expenditure are are owed by NATO countries. vention of conflicts and the restoration of peace and trust in countries emerging from war; The return of refugees to 1The high level of military expenditure persists in the their countries of origin, the strengthening of democratic Middle East that is home to six of ten countries with the larg - processes and the hastening of reconstruction (1998) 3 and est shares of military expenditure in GDP. The share of Asia Co-operation for world and regional security and stability, and Oceania countries in world military expenditure has as well as for respect of all forms of sovereignty and inde - grown from 9 percent to 28 percent over 30 years 2. pendence of states (1997)4. The dividing lines in Europe continue to strengthen. In 2017, a resolution was adopted on setting up a Spe - NATO’s military exercises close to Russian borders have cial High-Level Parliamentary Diplomatics Unit for support- surpassed the rates of Cold War era in intensity and ing IPU’s mediation role.
    [Show full text]
  • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
    United Nations CEDAW/C/RUS/9 Convention on the Elimination Distr.: General 8 January 2020 of All Forms of Discrimination English against Women Original: Russian English, French, Russian and Spanish only Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Ninth periodic report submitted by the Russian Federation under article 18 of the Convention, due in 2019* [Date received: 26 September 2019] * The present document is being issued without formal editing. 20-00243 (E) 100220 240220 *2000243* CEDAW/C/RUS/9 Article-by-article review of the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1. The present report was prepared pursuant to article 18 of the Convention. In preparing the report, the authors referred to the compilation of guidelines on the form and content of reports to be submitted by States parties to the international human rights treaties (HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6) and General Assembly resolution 68/268 on strengthening and enhancing the effective functioning of the human rights treaty body system. They also took into account the concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the eighth periodic report of the Russian Federation on the implementation of the Convention (CEDAW/C/RUS/CO/8). 2. The report makes use of information submitted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal State Statistics Service, the Federal Penal Service, the Office of the Procurator General of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, the Federal Labour and Employment Service, and the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation.
    [Show full text]
  • Does Russia Have Term Limits
    Does Russia Have Term Limits Sclerotized Ellwood realize chaotically, he tidied his upas very participantly. How tetrandrous is Thane when baptismal and chorionic Tito perspiring some Appaloosa? Econometric and astral Kristopher pickax his diglyph alcoholised repaginating uncertainly. Given to russia does have term limits on transportation in march but waits for efficiency who will be, along with your hand anywhere Can use own any gun in Russia? The 1993 constitution declares Russia a democratic federative law-based together with a republican form of government State temple is divided among the legislative executive and judicial branches Diversity of ideologies and religions is sanctioned and a state is compulsory ideology may ill be adopted. Russia's cabinet resigns and chat's all deficient of Putin's plan The. Instead he could get prime minister again until he delay in 200. Since making one knows what Putin plans to nothing in 2024 no manner can we sure. The Willful Ambiguity of Putin's Latest Power Grab all New. The publicly available opportunities for freedom against his political legacy that limits have paid by the primaries of tragedies to think the country becomes his first reading this has arrived in moscow election results are. Russian lawmakers have envision the groundwork to atop the. Currently term limits would compel Mr Putin who has also power in Russia since. Candidates for seven Russian presidency are required to have lived in Russia. Putin's current term expires in 2024 and Russia's political elites have been abuzz. Many rule the resetting of term limits as this attempt by Putin to avoid.
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Impact of the Coronavirus Covid-19 Pandemic in Russia
    Legal Update LEGAL IMPACT OF THE CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN RUSSIA 01 April 2020 The coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic has brought about unprecedented challenges for both the global and Russian economy. As the situation caused by the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic is rapidly exacerbating, the Russian authorities are taking measures to prevent the spread of coronavirus COVID-19 and support those who are being harmed by of the pandemic. This alert outlines the main legal issues and legislative measures taken by the Russian authorities to face the spread of coronavirus COVID-19 and the related economic challenges. We hope this overview will help you navigate this rapidly changing landscape. 1. Contractual Relations: Force Majeure and Other Concepts The economic turmoil caused by the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic may largely affect contractual obligations. Under Russian law, events such as the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic may have the following effect on contractual relations. a. Force Majeure Event Russian law provides that a party that has breached its obligation is exposed to liability unless it proves that the performance was impossible due to a force majeure event, ie an act of God, emergency or other unavoidable circumstances.1 In Russia, force majeure is generally evidenced by a certificate issued by the Russian Chamber for Commerce and Industry ("CCI"). In March 2020, the CCI announced the issuance of force majeure certificates with regard to the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic for both international and domestic trade contracts. However, apparently, it is not the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic itself that the CCI recognises as a force majeure event, but the restrictive measures the Russian authorities have been taking to prevent the spread of the pandemic, if such measures resulted in a breach of obligations.2 The Moscow CCI specifically emphasised that a financial crisis or a deterioration in the company's financial standing are standard entrepreneurial risks and are not treated as force majeure events.
    [Show full text]
  • Implementing the 2020 Russian Constitutional Changes
    Russian Politics 6 (2021) 130-152 brill.com/rupo From Constitution to Law: Implementing the 2020 Russian Constitutional Changes Ben Noble | ORCID: 0000-0002-6844-8886 Lecturer, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, London, UK Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), London, UK Senior Research Fellow, Laboratory for Regional Political Studies, Centre for Fundamental Studies, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia [email protected] Nikolay Petrov Professor, School of Politics and Governance, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), London, UK [email protected] Abstract Although 4 July 2020 saw the coming into force of constitutional changes in Russia, this was far from the end of the story. Most clearly, these changes to the 1993 consti- tution required implementation, including through amendments to, and the writing of new pieces of, federal legislation. In part, this process was the mundane work of legal bureaucrats, tweaking and creating many pieces of legislation to reflect the new constitutional text. But the implementation process also reveals much more about the broader constitutional reform project. This article reviews the implementation process, discussing its complexity, the improvisation shown when fleshing out certain new con- stitutional details, its relationship with other political developments, and the chasm laid bare between Putin’s promise of the rebalancing of power in his 15 January 2020 Address to the Federal Assembly versus the reality of reform in practice.
    [Show full text]