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On the Eve of the V Caspian Summit in Astana 20.09.2016-26.09.2016 • No: 82 ON THE EVE OF THE V CASPIAN SUMMIT IN ASTANA Current geopolitical situation in the Caspian Caspian states’ Deputy Ministers of Foreign Caspian Five could manage to revert to the region clearly demonstrates the necessity for Affairs held in Baku in February 2003. issue only in the four-year period, in particu- searching a mutually acceptable solution Nevertheless, it took the littoral states 5 years lar, during the IV Caspian Summit held in regarding both establishment of the new legal to arrange the II Caspian Summit in Tehran on Astrakhan on September 29, 2014. The issue status and determination of the regime of use October 16, 2007. This time, the discussion was resolved by adopting a 19-point final of the Caspian Sea. For more than two dec- on prospects for multilateral cooperation and communique. According to this communique, ades, the littoral countries have been trying to the legal status of the Caspian Sea was held in the littoral countries would extend their adopt a five-party document regulating legal a constructive atmosphere. As a result, the national sovereignty out 15 nautical miles off obligations for the parties in maintaining parties adopted a 25-point joint declaration, their respective coasts, with exclusive fishing rights to use waters above the seabed, the which touched upon several issues such as in 10 nautical mile areas. Besides, at the end seabed, the subsoil, and the airspace above the navigation, transportation, security, etc. The of the Summit, the Agreement on the conser- Caspian Sea. Improved political dialog among parties unanimously agreed that the littoral vation and rational use of marine biological the regional states is one of the crucial pre- states would neither use their armed forces resources, the Agreement on cooperation in conditions for the successful implementation against each other nor allow any other state to the field of prevention and liquidation of of normative regulations. Witnessing contra- use their territory for military operations emergencies and the Agreement on coopera- dictory and sometimes mutually exclusive against any of the littoral states (Article 14- tion in the field of hydrometeorology of the actions of the Caspian Five states about the 15). Moreover, the Tehran Declaration re- Caspian Sea were signed. interpretation of the international legal norms flected that shipping in the Caspian Sea Encouraged by recent developments in the the parties clearly understood that a regional should only be carried out under the flags of Caspian talks the parties felt confident that a compromise lies in direct political consulta- the littoral states (Article 7). Furthermore, the definitive delineation and division of the tions at the highest level. As a result, at the document enshrined the North-South transport Caspian’s offshore waters and seabed would beginning of 2000s the heads of the littoral corridor as an integral part of the Caspian be achieved at the V Caspian Summit to be states agreed to establish the five-sided mech- dimension (Article 4). Therefore, the first held in 2016 in Kazakhstan. Actually, the anism of negotiations, namely, the Caspian political document signed by all Caspian Five President Nursultan Nazarbayev clearly Summit format. Presidents during the Tehran Summit indi- declared that during the Astana Summit the To date, there have been four meetings of the cates widening the Caspian agenda by includ- parties would adopt the final version of the Caspian Five leaders within the framework of ing economic, energy and security issues. Convention. However, during the meeting of the Caspian Summits. However, the positive Despite a convergence of positions on some the Caspian Ministers of Foreign Affairs in impact of these negotiations was widely core issues essential for reaching an agree- Astana on July 13, 2016, the high-ranking acknowledged only after a decade of consulta- ment on the Caspian Sea regime, the III officials stated that there was still a number of tions. For instance, on the first day of the I Caspian Summit also faced with endless problems that need to be addressed. Accord- Caspian Summit held in Ashgabat on April delays. It was expected to be held in Baku in ing to the optimistic scenario suggested by the 23-24, 2002, all Caspian Five Presidents 2008. However, due to serious disagreements Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, expressed their ideas about the sea delimita- the Baku Summit was held on November 18, there is a strong possibility that the document tion issue demonstrating no flexibility or 2010. Since the most important and most would be signed in the first half of 2017. As a mutual understanding. controversial issues of the sea delimitation result, the Astana Summit could be postponed The confrontation between Azerbaijan’s were essentially bypassed, the parties could until the completion of the process of drafting President Heydar Aliyev and Turkmenistan’s manage to sign the extended joint declaration, the Convention. President Saparmurat Niyazov, over the which consolidates the provisions of the On the other hand, the parties could suspend disputed offshore oil and gas fields (Azeri- Declaration approved by the Caspian Five signing the Convention during the Summit in Chirag-Kyapaz/ Omar-Osman-Serdar) made during the II Caspian Summit in 2007. More- order to discuss the most important problems the situation more complex. As a result, the over, during the Summit the parties inked the of regional cooperation. In that case, the V heads of the Сaspian states refused to sign a first five-sided official agreement, which Caspian Summit will particularly focus on the joint declaration and the first attempt to marked the beginning of a new period in the Caspian Five’s economies. For instance, the discuss the issue of the Caspian legal status Caspian interrelations. The Agreement on littoral states leaders could consider the failed. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Security Cooperation in the Caspian Sea creation of a Caspian Free Trade Area sug- parties could not manage to hold the next specified the areas for security cooperation gested by Kazakhstan or concentrate on Caspian Summit in Tehran in April 2003 as it such as combating terrorism, poaching, orga- drafting an Agreement on trade and economic was planned. nized crime and smuggling, and ensuring safe cooperation initiated by Turkmenistan. However, the Ashgabat high-level meeting shipping. Therefore, the meeting at the highest level is a triggered some positive developments. Actu- It should be mentioned that the Summit’s major factor in the revitalization of the nego- ally, in a month period Baku officially de- participants were unable to move beyond the tiation process on the Caspian Sea. Since the clared that exploration works at the disputed framework of the initial agenda discussing the start of the Caspian Summits, the littoral offshore hydrocarbon fields Alov-Araz-Sharg harmonization of the width of the national states have carried out joint activities in known as Alborz by the Iranians, would be maritime zones. As a result, the parties agreed almost all major issues of partnership in the stopped until resolving the border issue. The to instruct corresponding agencies to prepare region. Therefore, even if the Convention is situation started to seem more promising suggestions concerning the sea borders of 24 not signed during the forthcoming Summit, when some progress was achieved on drafting or 25 miles off the coast within the next three the meeting at the highest level still has the the Convention on the legal status of the months. most potential to settle the dispute on the legal Caspian Sea during the 8th session of the However, the solution to the problem of status of the Caspian Sea. Special Working Group at the level of the national maritime zones was postponed. The Written by Lidiya Parkhomchik, Eurasian Research Institute, Kazakhstan Politics, Foreign Affairs and Security According to the Border Guarding The Head of the Astana International Service of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan Financial Centre (AIFC), Kairat The President of Russia, Vladimir reopened a border crossing with Kelimbetov, reported that the Hong Putin, called on the recently elected Kyrgyzstan and withdrew its police Kong Trade Development Council 7th State Duma (Parliament) to sup- and border guards from a disputed signed an agreement with AIFC in port the candidacy of Vyacheslav part of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border in order to promote investment projects Volodin as its Speaker. The previous the area of the Ungar-Too mountain. in Kazakhstan in the framework of State Duma Speaker, Sergey Economy, Finance and Energy One Belt One Road initiative. Naryshkin, was appointed as the During the meeting of the Russian- Head of the Russian Foreign Intelli- During the 13th Session of the Azer- Vietnamese Intergovernmental gence Service. baijan-Kazakhstan Intergovernmen- Commission, the First Deputy Prime On the sidelines of the UN General tal Commission on Economic Coop- Minister of Russia, Igor Shuvalov, Assembly held in New York, the eration held in Astana, the Minister reported that the free trade zone Minister of Foreign Affairs of Rus- of Energy of Kazakstan, Kanat agreement between the Eurasian sia, Sergei Lavrov, and the U.S. Sec- Bozumbayev, offered Azerbaijan’s Economic Union (EAEU) and Vi- retary of State, John Kerry, took part state oil company SOCAR to consid- etnam would come into force in Oc- er the possibility of participation in in the meeting of the International tober 5, 2016. It was also noted that the international Eurasia project de- Syria Support Group. The parties all domestic procedures in the EAEU signed for searching hydrocarbon discussed the implementation of the member-states and Vietnam were fi- deposits in the Caspian basin. package of five documents aimed to nalized. Lukoil, Rosneft, Shell, Chevron and bring about ceasefire in Syria China’s CNPC have already ex- According to the Fitch International reached during the Geneva talks.
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