COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY (CDS)

NATO @ 70: REAFFIRMING THE ALLIANCE’S VALUES

General Report

Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany) General Rapporteur

132 CDS 19 E rev.1 fin | Original: English | 12 October 2019

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: THE ALLIANCE OF ? ...... 2

NATO AND ITS DEMOCRATIC VALUES: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ...... 3 A. THE PERIOD...... 3 B. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS ...... 6

EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIETIES IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT . 8

CONCLUSIONS: INTERESTS VS. VALUES – HOW TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE? ...... 12

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 15

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INTRODUCTION: THE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES?

1. As the Alliance celebrates its 70th anniversary, it is timely to take stock of the values that continue to underpin our Alliance. Signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, DC, the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates in its preamble the determination of the Allies “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of , individual liberty and the rule of law.” In Article 2, the Allies expressed their commitment to “strengthening their free institutions”. These provisions make NATO a unique Alliance – one that is based not only on shared interests, but also on shared values. This combination is the main factor that made NATO the most successful Alliance in history, one that endured and succeeded in protecting the freedom of its people both in the bipolar and the multipolar worlds.

2. In the last decade, significant technological, economic, and demographic developments changed the global political and security environment. The moral supremacy of the liberal democratic order is no longer taken for granted. The continuing growth of seems to challenge the notion that is the only path to wealth, competitive economy, and technological leadership. Democracy and personal liberties are retreating in parts of the world. There are clear signs of decreasing popular confidence in political institutions, disenchantment with mainstream parties and media, growing partisan polarisation, and socioeconomic inequality. In combination with phenomena such as fake news, social media bubbles, and echo chambers, these developments have a deep impact on Western political systems. Unaddressed, these growing political and societal cleavages could weaken the unity of our Alliance and jeopardise our collective security.

3. In January 2019, your General Rapporteur, together with the Political Committee’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations’ Rapporteur, the Hon. Gerald Connolly (), wrote a letter to all NATO PA delegations asking to share their views on two fundamental questions: “1. What role is NATO playing for the security of your country and for the Euro-Atlantic region? 2. Do you consider that current global trends threaten the values upon which the Alliance was founded? If so, how should the Alliance reinvigorate its political and ideological cohesion?”

4. The responses received to the second question reveal that many delegates consider it important, as the Norwegian response put it, to “remind ourselves that NATO is not just a military alliance, but also an alliance of democratic nations adhering to liberal values”. Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Germany, and the United Kingdom identified the current Russian regime as the most significant external threat to the Western model of society and the unity of the Alliance as it attempts to undermine the fundamental values of the Euro-Atlantic community through various hybrid activities. Germany also identified China as a source of such threats. Hungary argued that “the most direct threat to these fundamental values comes from ISIS/Daesh, whose depraved ideology is an antithesis of what NATO represents”, a view also shared by Turkey. The Czech Republic noted that Saudi and Russian religious and economic influence in the Western Balkans is a challenge for NATO, while the Romanian response mentioned Russia’s military activities in the Black Sea area. Poland added the growing power of non-state actors and the technological as challenges to the rules-based world order. Montenegro mentioned the problems of , cross-border crime and illegal migration. Lithuania stressed that “simply maintaining your high moral ground is not enough” as NATO’s adversaries exploit its political correctness and complacency, and urged Allies “to get rid of wishful thinking and narrow economic interests, which can feed illusions and misperceptions with potentially dangerous consequences”. The United Kingdom shared a similar view, noting that “we have grown lazy since the end of the Cold War”. Several delegations noted that the challenges to the Alliance also come from within, for instance, Latvia mentioned “global trends of populism, extreme , and are a direct challenge to the values of the NATO Alliance”. Turkey called on all Allies to empathise with one another and take into account each other’s security realities. There is a consensus among the responses that, regardless of the changes in the global security and political environment, the values underpinning the Alliance remain valid. As Denmark put it, “no matter the changes and challenges, the only way to handle them is to respect the foundations of the Alliance”. Both the reaffirmation of the transatlantic link and closer cooperation

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with the EU featured as top priorities in a number of national responses, including Spain and Latvia’s. Delegations urged NATO to adapt its structures to new strategic realities, in particular in the context where hybrid attacks blur the lines between military and civilian domains. Belgium recalled the relevance of the Harmel doctrine (discussed later in this report) and the importance of combining credible military defence with political dialogue. Canada stressed the need for NATO itself and parliamentarians from NATO member countries to continue to enhance public outreach and education initiatives, including by harnessing social media tools, to help spread awareness of NATO’s core missions and values, including among the youth.

NATO AND ITS DEMOCRATIC VALUES: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A. THE COLD WAR PERIOD

5. NATO was born in the age of stark ideological divisions of the bipolar world. The struggle of two blocs was widely viewed through the lens of a competition between two opposing ideologies: democracy versus communist tyranny (from the Western perspective), or versus (as presented by Moscow). But was ideology used as a mere shroud to disguise the vested national interests of global powers?

6. This argument can certainly be applied to the Soviet bloc. The was clearly an instrument for Moscow to keep Central European countries in subordination. Any attempt to rebel against Soviet dominance was suppressed by force: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-811. Despite ideological proximity, the maintained lukewarm – at times even hostile – relationships with communist regimes in China and Yugoslavia. In a way, today’s Russia continues to follow this tradition, using every effort, including military force, to prevent neighbouring countries from escaping its perceived sphere of influence – aggression against Ukraine and Georgia are the most prominent examples of this.

7. The claim of the to represent the liberal democratic ideology had a much stronger basis. Throughout the Cold War era, the overwhelming majority of NATO Allies had solid democratic credentials and were genuinely committed to individual liberties and human rights. The unity of the Alliance was maintained on a voluntary basis: ’s decision to leave the military wing of NATO in 1966, at the height of the Cold War, has been respected, as has Greece’s decision to follow France’s suit in 1974. NATO membership was also widely considered instrumental in ensuring that West Germany’s military abide by democratic principles (Reiter et al., 2002). The Euro-Atlantic community’s commitment to protect Western Berlin was justified not only on geopolitical grounds, but also, as President John F. Kennedy put it, because it was an “island of freedom”.

8. Finally, due to opposition from several Allies – most notably Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway – Franco’s Spain was not admitted into the Alliance, despite the significant potential added value of this country in terms of strategic location and military capabilities. The proposals to include Spain into NATO were discussed at various points in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in May 1975 (a few months before Franco’s death), only to be rejected due to Spain’s undemocratic political system (Carothers, 1981). The democratic transition in post-Franco Spain cleared the way for the country’s NATO membership in 1982.

9. However, NATO’s Cold-War record as the alliance of democracies has not been without blemish, mainly due to the way it dealt with authoritarian regimes and/or military coups in , Greece, and Turkey.

1 In Poland’s case, the Soviet invasion did not take place, but the threat of invasion was a key factor that helped the Jaruzelski regime suppress the Solidarność movement.

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10. Portugal was one of the founding members of the Alliance, even though Antonio Salazar’s regime did not meet the democratic principles stipulated in the Washington Treaty. Clearly, the Allies valued Portugal’s neutral but pro-Allied stance during World War II, as well as the fact that the inclusion of Portugal offered the Alliance a foothold on the Iberian Peninsula, and in the and Madeira archipelagos in mid-Atlantic. Estado Novo was also generally regarded as less brutal than similar regimes elsewhere in Europe.

11. Nevertheless, in the 1960s and especially early , the Portuguese was increasingly seen as a problem within the Alliance, particularly as Portugal engaged in a series of wars to suppress liberation movements in its colonies. These wars were criticised, at various stages, by US President John Kennedy, ’s Canada, centre-left governments in Norway, Netherlands, and Italy, and liberal ministers in Denmark, including within the NATO framework. One of the drivers of this criticism was to dissociate NATO’s name from these colonial wars. Norway’s foreign minister Andreas Zeier Cappelen noted at the North Atlantic Council in 1971 that Portuguese policies were “undermining support for NATO in our own countries and […] hurting NATO's image in as well as in other parts of the world”. The most powerful Allies, as well as Secretaries General Manlio Brosio and Joseph Luns, however, refused to join these critical voices, in part hoping that the new Portuguese leader Marcelo Caetano, who replaced Salazar, would liberalise the regime. For instance, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office argued at the time that NATO was not “an appropriate forum to discuss either Portugal internal affairs or her African policies; such discussion would be most offensive to the Portuguese and threaten the cohesion of the Alliance” (Lopes, 2016). Then Secretary General Brosio called the debate on Portugal in the NAC “futile”, “dangerous” and “undermining the substance of our Alliance” (Sawyer Samp, 2017). The Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974 ended the debate on Portugal’s democratic deficit.

12. Greece represented the first case of democratic backsliding of an Ally. The military coup in 1967 was not welcomed by the Allies and resulted in a temporary suspension of military cooperation with this country. However, following reassurances of the new regime that the Greeks would be the “best pupils of the Atlantic class”, the cooperation was promptly resumed (Someritis, 1972). Under the “Regime of the Colonels”, Greece significantly increased its defence spending and offered facilities to the US 6th Fleet.

13. Denmark was the most vocal critic of the “Regime of the Colonels”, and this view was also shared by the Netherlands and Norway, which went so far as to initiate a parliamentary debate on expelling Greece from NATO (Woodhouse, 1985). These criticisms did not tangibly affect Greece’s participation in NATO activities, but the Allies continued to expect Athens to return to democratic practices. For instance, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted: “We have made it clear to the Greek Government both in public and private that we should welcome the restoration of democratic processes there” (Lopes, 2016). The United Kingdom’s then ruling Labour Party even adopted a resolution calling for the expulsion of Greece from NATO (Nafpliotis, 2013). Democracy was restored in 1974, but the Alliance could hardly claim much for it.

14. The Alliance’s position vis-à-vis successive military coups in Turkey (in 1960, 1971, and 1980) was even more neutral. Turkey’s geographic location – even more strategically valuable in the Cold War than that of Greece and Portugal – and the perception of the Turkish military as the guardians of the secular Western-type political system in the country preempted any meaningful intra-Alliance pressure on Turkey to restore democratic procedures. During the three-year rule of the military following the 1980 coup, Turkey’s NATO membership was noticeably affected, and external pressure to democratise came mainly from the European Communities and the Council of Europe.

15. It is important to note that during the Cold War, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – under its former name, the North Atlantic Assembly – was one of the most important forums to discuss cases of non-democratic governance within the Alliance. At various points, the Assembly took drastic measures to address democratic backsliding among its ranks – the memberships of the Greek, Portuguese, and Turkish parliamentary delegations were suspended or downgraded on several

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occasions. The Assembly’s preparedness to resort to such extreme measures stood in contrast with NATO’s more lenient approach. The discussions on democratic standards were particularly heated in the early 1970s, when as many as three NATO countries had authoritarian regimes. During the discussion and adoption of Assembly documents, deep divisions among the Allied nations became apparent. Scandinavian and Dutch parliamentarians urged their colleagues not to tolerate within the Alliance. Others seemed to favour refraining from direct criticism of the internal affairs of individual Allies, arguing that NATO’s unity vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc was paramount. In 1972, the Assembly’s Political Committee discussed a report by Dutch parliamentarian Max van der Stoel, who lamented that “NATO does not seem to appreciate the repugnance with which many people within its member countries, particularly in the democratic left, regard the situation in Greece and Portugal”. He stressed that “self-determination, free , and the rule of law should be the governing principles of all our member states”. In the following year, another Dutch rapporteur, Pieter Dankert, referred to public criticism based on the “paradox of attacking the Soviet Union for its repressive policies whilst within the Alliance there are countries who deny liberty of expression, burn books and practice imprisonment without trial”. The Assembly’s Committees had also maintained contact with dissidents, including the Speaker of the last Greek parliament. Following the 1980 coup in Turkey, several Assembly delegations successfully opposed the participation of the new Turkish delegation in Assembly activities. In 1984, the Turkish delegation was re-admitted under the condition that “...further moves to restore full democracy [would] be vigorously pursued”.

16. In sum, during the Cold War period, the Alliance did play a role in promoting democratic values among its members, but, quite understandably, the realist approach and security considerations prevailed over the idealistic objective of democratic purity within the Alliance. Although the so-called Three Wise Men (1956) and Harmel (1967) reports, commissioned by NATO, advocated for a broader definition of security, NATO’s Cold War-era Strategic Concepts focused exclusively on defence and deterrence. Even if NATO had a “stick” – expelling one of its non-democratic members – there was clearly no political will to use it, as was evident from the Alliance’s refusal to apply lower-level sanctions on these members, such as suspension of military cooperation or postponement of NATO meetings to be held in these countries. NATO’s position on the democracy-security nexus during the Cold War can be best described using a quote by US President John F. Kennedy on the US policy options regarding the Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo: “In descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third” (Poznansky and Carter, 2016).

17. Looking at it retrospectively, it may have been more prudent for the Alliance to find a middle ground between the very critical position of the Scandinavian-Dutch group and the overly accommodating policies of major NATO powers towards authoritarian regimes in Portugal and Greece. While the latter approach prevailed at the time, it eventually led to some problems for NATO: when Greece and Portugal eventually rejected authoritarian regimes, they also somewhat distanced themselves from NATO, because democratic forces in both countries felt disappointed by NATO’s collaboration with these regimes (Hatzadony, 1996). The new government in Athens followed the French example and left – temporarily – the military wing of NATO, while the left-wing government in Portugal considered joining the non-aligned movement. During the period of dictatorship in Greece, several delegations stressed "public opinion problems" in their own countries vis-à-vis NATO, while the Norwegian representative stated: "Norway would withdraw its delegation to the Assembly if representatives from the present Greek regime were admitted. The military coup d'État last April had produced a new wave of hostility towards NATO in Norway." Some also saw a correlation between authoritarianism and the risk of conflict within the Alliance. Then Assembly rapporteur Peter Dankert argued that the Greek military junta should bear chief responsibility for the crisis in Cyprus in 1974, and reproached NATO for shying away from “adopting a critical attitude towards the dictatorship in Greece and from exerting any form of pressure on the junta to return to democratic rule”. The Assembly’s The Parliamentarian’s Role in the Alliance, published in 1981, stated that it was “tempting to believe that a more positive and united reaction by the Alliance nations

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at the time of the coup in Greece could have permitted the speedier resolution of the parliamentary crisis and forestalled the developments which led Greece and Turkey to open hostility in Cyprus” (Charman & Williams, 1981).

B. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS

18. The period between the fall of the and the economic crisis of 2008 is widely considered as the zenith of liberal democracy. In his work “The end of history and the last man” (1992), American scholar Francis Fukuyama famously announced that the triumph of liberal democracy was so overwhelming and definitive that it de facto ended history as such. “Liberal democracy” as a political system practised in the West – based on individual liberties, the rule of law, competitive elections, , free market economy, secularism, political correctness, and protection of minorities – was promoted as the only type of genuine democracy.

19. NATO has transformed profoundly, adapting to the post-Cold War era – not only by going “out of area”, but also by highlighting the political side of its identity as a political-military Alliance. The emphasis on NATO’s democratic values has become much more prominent in the Alliance’s rhetoric and documents. The 1991 NATO Strategic Concept called on NATO to build security in Europe, notably by fostering “the growth of democratic institutions”. At the Madrid Summit in 1997, the Allies stated that “[t]he consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent […] is therefore of direct and material concern to the Alliance”. The 1999 Strategic Concept also reiterated NATO’s commitment to promoting democracy and specified that NATO’s doors are open to democratic European countries that meet membership standards. A similar line was reiterated in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

20. Indeed, NATO’s Open-Door policy, and to some degree NATO’s partnerships mechanisms, offered a powerful tool for NATO to promote its democratic values beyond its borders. As then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the North Atlantic Council in 1993: “Our alliance of democracies can help consolidate democracy across an undivided Europe at peace. We can help design a comprehensive and inclusive architecture that enhances security and freedom for all … [NATO enlargement] will strengthen the hand of forces committed to political, military, and economic reform” (NATO, 1994). In 1995, the Alliance published a “Study on NATO Enlargement” which emphasised the need for candidate countries to have a democratic political system and to establish democratic civilian control of their armed forces. Also, in 1995, then US Secretary of Defence William Perry identified democracy as one of four principles (“Perry Principles”) of the enlargement process.

21. From the candidates’ perspective, joining NATO was important for security reasons, but also because they considered themselves as sharing the same values as old NATO members. For instance, upon Hungary’s accession to NATO in 1999, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Janos Martonyi, stated that Hungary was “returning to her natural habitat” and that “[i]t has been [Hungary’s] manifest destiny to re-join those with whom [the country] share[s] the same values, interests and goals” (Perlez, 1999).

22. NATO’s numerous accession and partnerships mechanisms – including Partnership for Peace, Membership Action Plan, Planning and Review Process, and Individual Partnership Action Plan – are mainly designed to reform defence sectors and increase interoperability with Allied forces, but they also cover aspects of other political and economic reforms. Pundits note that NATO was one of the main regional organisations that had a “socialisation effect” on aspirant countries. Namely, interactions between political and military elites of fledgeling democracies and NATO institutions facilitated the adoption of NATO’s democratic underpinnings in candidate countries and were instrumental in the establishment of multi-party liberal democracies there. NATO certainly cannot claim sole credit for these transformations – the EU has a more elaborate “democratic conditionality” approach – but it certainly played its part, particularly in terms of promoting democratic civilian oversight of the armed forces (Cassis, 2008). The NATO Parliamentary Assembly through its

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Rose-Roth programme and other activities has also been an important part of this “socialisation effect”.

23. The importance of adherence to democratic values as an accession criterion was demonstrated during the first wave of NATO enlargement in 1999. Invitations were issued in 1997 to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but not to the fourth member of the Visegrad Group, Slovakia (even though this left Hungary geographically separated from the rest of the Alliance). The omission of Slovakia was tied to the undemocratic policies of then Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. In 1997, Western leaders such as German Chancellor and US President Bill Clinton had signalled that Slovakia would not be invited because of "domestic problems", while the State Department's annual review of human rights practices criticised in severe terms the Meciar government's disregard of democratic rules. In a letter to Slovak President Michal Kovac, President Clinton pointed out that "more work needs to be done to promote an atmosphere of openness to opposing views and concerns of minorities". The Allies made it clear, however, that NATO’s doors remained open to Slovakia once the concerns about the quality of democracy were addressed (Goldman, 1999). Slovakia joined the Alliance in 2004, along with six other new members.

24. Another case in point is the Republic of North Macedonia. Since its , the country has been locked in a dispute with Greece over its name. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Allies indicated that the country would be invited to join the Alliance as soon as the name issue was resolved. However, in subsequent years, the country regressed in terms of the rule of law and freedom of speech. During several visits of NATO PA delegations to Skopje, a number of interlocutors, including Western diplomats, stressed that even if the name issue was resolved, the country would need to improve its democratic credentials in order to become a full-fledged member of NATO and the EU. Your Rapporteur would argue that North Macedonia’s impending membership in NATO has been made possible not only because of the Prespa agreement with Greece but also because of the improvement of democratic standards in the country since 2017.

25. Commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law continues to be an important prerequisite for NATO membership of three remaining candidate countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine. All three have made significant progress in consolidating democratic political systems and holding a series of competitive elections2. NATO advisors have been instrumental in helping Georgia and Ukraine draft their recent legislation, significantly enhancing democratic parliamentary oversight of the defence and security sectors. At the last NATO Summit in Brussels in July 2018, Allies declared that “Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law is key for Euro-Atlantic security”. They highlighted the importance of “wide-ranging reforms, including combatting corruption and promoting an inclusive electoral process, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law”. Indeed, Kyiv’s failure to achieve tangible results in tackling corruption and oligarchic influences remains3 a major impediment to Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration4. Allies also called on Bosnia and Herzegovina to “demonstrate political will for the benefit of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of political, economic, and defence reforms”. As for Georgia, NATO has stressed that the push for democratic reforms since 2003 was “a strong catalyst for intensified partnership with the Alliance”. NATO supports broad

2 It has to be noted, however, that the 2018 presidential elections in Georgia were not assessed as positively as previous elections by international observers. While described as “competitive and professionally administered”, the elections were marred by “harsh rhetoric” and “misuse of administrative resources”. International observers concluded that “one side enjoyed an undue advantage and the negative character of the campaign on both sides undermined the process”. 3 According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, in the 2015-2018 period, Ukraine moved up from 130th to 120th place – progress clearly below the expectations of the supporters of the Euro-Maidan revolution. 4 It remains to be seen if the new president, Mr Volodymyr Zelensky, who campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, and the new parliament will manage to achieve a tangible breakthrough in addressing the problem of corruption.

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reforms in Georgia in the political, economic, defence, resource, security, and legal arenas, as outlined in the Annual National Programme.

26. It is safe to assert that significant democratic backsliding in an aspirant country would essentially nullify its chances to join the Alliance. On the positive side, the trends show that both Georgia and Ukraine are firmly on track with their transformation process and are catching up with current NATO members in international ratings that assess the level of media freedom, the rule of law, and the business environment. In Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2018, Georgia ranked higher than ten NATO members and one soon-to-become member. The General Rapporteur strongly supports the “more for more” approach to supporting Georgian and Ukrainian reforms that pave the way for eventual European and Euro-Atlantic integration of these countries. Completing the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans is also a critical prerequisite for durable stability and democratic development in this part of Europe.

27. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and particularly this Committee, has been closely monitoring the progress made by aspirant countries in terms of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights by drafting numerous reports, adopting policy recommendations, and conducting fact-finding missions. When assessing whether to accept new associate members, the Assembly has taken into account Council of Europe assessments, which is why the Assembly’s partnership network differs somewhat from that of NATO. For instance, the Assembly ended its cooperation with the Belarussian parliament after the country’s turn towards authoritarianism in 1996. The Assembly has also terminated its relations with Mauritania following the 2008 coup. NATO itself maintains, albeit limited, partnership relations with both Belarus and Mauritania.

28. In the post-Cold War period, NATO’s out-of-area operations were, in several cases, justified on humanitarian rather than security grounds. For instance, in March 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana based NATO’s decision to begin airstrikes against Yugoslavia on the obligation to “support the political aims of the international community”, “avert a humanitarian catastrophe” and “prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population of Kosovo”. The subsequent deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo Force, KFOR, was designed, inter alia, to protect minority rights in Kosovo, and this role is widely appreciated by both main ethnic communities there. On the other hand, the Alliance was unable to forge a consensus among its ranks and to act decisively in order to stop the dreadful security and humanitarian crisis in Syria.

29. Your Rapporteur does not argue that NATO’s post-Cold War policy has been exclusively idealist. Aspects of were clearly present as well. For instance, the pace and the scope of NATO enlargement have been influenced by geopolitical considerations, most notably the Russian factor. Involvement in the Balkan conflicts was significantly motivated by the need to stabilise and prevent the spread of violence in “Europe’s soft underbelly”. Nevertheless, the first two decades since the marked a significant rebalancing of NATO’s strategic thinking in favour of idealist motivations.

EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIETIES IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

30. The global economic crisis of 2008-2009, the meteoric rise of social media, and the crisis in recent years have had a profound impact on the global political environment. Liberal democracy is widely considered to be in retreat. Freedom House estimates that democracy around the world has deteriorated to the lowest point in more than a decade. According to Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2018, only 4.5% of the world’s population currently lives in a “full democracy”.

31. Alarmingly, nearly all studies by prominent international organisations, think tanks, and watchdogs find that the erosion of democracy has been taking place in the developed industrial world – the bedrock of liberal democracy. The latest Freedom House report Freedom in the World 2019

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recorded the 13th consecutive year of decline in global freedom, including among long-standing democracies: in the last five years, of the 41 countries that were consistently ranked “free” from 1985 to 2005, 22 have registered net score declines. The vast majority of NATO countries ranked on the top of the list, but three Allies and one future NATO member found themselves in the “partly free” category, while one Ally was assessed as “not free”.

32. The EU institutions have also expressed concern over what they considered a democratic backsliding in their members Hungary and Poland: in September 2018, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for sanctions on Budapest for alleged violations of media freedom and the rule of law. In the same month, the European Commission sued Poland in the Court of Justice of the for adopting a law on the Supreme Court, which, according to the Commission, was incompatible with EU law and undermined the principle of judicial independence. Budapest and Warsaw dismiss these accusations, claiming that the EU’s mainstream seeks to punish Hungary and Poland for their anti-immigrant stance. Interestingly, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban himself embraced the term ‘illiberalism’, maintaining that it is compatible with the notion of democracy.

33. The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s study of policy performance and governance capacities in the OECD and EU showed that, of the 41 OECD and EU countries surveyed in 2018, some 26 states feature a deterioration in the quality of their democracy compared with the previous survey four years ago. The study also notes that new populist leaders in several countries are less efficient in terms of good governance, because even when in office, they often stay in a “permanent campaign” mode. As a result, the study concludes, “the capacity to solve problems in many OECD and EU countries has, on average, diminished in recent years” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

34. The presence of populist, protectionist, and anti-immigration parties and leaders has been a feature of European politics for decades. However, these tendencies have accelerated in recent years and, to a degree, manifested themselves on the other side of the Atlantic as well. Public trust in establishment parties has declined in the Euro-Atlantic area: it is estimated that between 2004 and 2015, anti-EU parties increased their vote share from around 10% to 23% across Europe (Brechenmacher, 2018). Anti-establishment parties in Southern Europe are both on the far-left and the far-right of the political centrum, while the rest of Europe tends to face the challenge predominantly from the far-right. New pro-European centrists – such as France’s La République En Marche – as well as the rising Green movements can also tap into dissatisfaction with the status quo.

35. In the United States, the Democrats and the Republicans continue to dominate the party scene, but there too the candidates from outside the party establishment won or nearly won party nominations in 2016 presidential elections. Unlike in Europe, the US party system remains immune to the rise of far-left and far-right parties, but there is a noticeable polarisation between the two main American parties. For instance, two-thirds of Democrat supporters identify global climate change as a top priority, while just 21% of Republicans do so. The partisan gap is also growing in areas such as immigration and health care. According to the Pew Research center, twenty years ago, and even as recently as 2014, the views of Democratic and Republican supporters were much more aligned than today (Jones, 2019).

36. In addition to parties, polls show a continuing decline of trust in political institutions. In the United States, for instance, Congress’s In the United States shows the share of Americans who expressed at least a “fair amount of trust” in political leaders declined from 63% in 2004 to 42% in 2016 (The Economist, 2019). Similar processes are taking place in Europe: according to Eurobarometer, trust in national governments and national parliaments across the European Union fell from, respectively, 34% and 38% in 2004 to 27% and 28% in 2016. Naturally, there are significant variations among countries – trust tends to be much lower in Southern Europe (Brechenmacher, 2018). When it comes to trust in the EU itself, 40% of Europeans have a positive image of the Union (37% a neutral and only 21% a negative one) (European Commission, 2018). However, the vote in

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the Brexit referendum and continued criticism of the EU’s bureaucracy and democratic deficit are signs that a meaningful overhaul of the EU project is overdue.

37. A disconcerting aspect of the changing global political landscape is the growing mistrust in mainstream news organisations. A study, conducted in 2016 by the European Commission among the citizens of 27 EU countries, revealed that more than six respondents out of ten tend not to trust the media. In the United States, the credibility of mass media has decreased from 53% in 1997 to 32% in 2016. Distrust in the media is particularly high among the less educated and less wealthy (Brechenmacher, 2018). In the Reporters Without Borders freedom of speech ranking, eight NATO Allies are in the top 15, while some are considerably further in ranking.

38. The declining trust in traditional news outlets takes place against the background of a social media revolution. Social media both emboldens those fighting against authoritarian regimes and empowers human rights and anti-corruption activists, but also provides new opportunities for those who seek to disrupt the liberal democratic world order. Social media is being used by terrorist organisations as a recruiting and propaganda tool. It is also being exploited by states, most notably Russia, that seek to influence and undermine liberal democracies, their government institutions, and their social fabric. Social media networks have facilitated the propagation of false and disruptive stories as well as conspiracy theories which users accept at face value. While political engagement on social media has opened new avenues for information flow, it has also entrenched users within ideological cocoons and echo chambers. The loudest and most engaged voices online are producing deep political change, but those calls increasingly come from polar ends of the political spectrum. The relative success of many anti-establishment parties in the Euro-Atlantic area may be attributed to skilful social media strategies. Their accounts usually post more online content, use colourful and even inflammatory language, and interact more intimately with their constituents than their more mainstream counterparts (The Economist, 2015). The use of social media, including through “trolls” and “bots” and other cyber tools, enabled the Kremlin to meddle in a series of European and North American elections and referenda in order to destabilise democratic states. In December 2018, the EU introduced a Rapid Alert System (RAS) as part of the Union’s approach to tackling disinformation. RAS is designed to facilitate the sharing of insights and issue alerts related to disinformation campaigns among EU institutions and member states. However, the efficiency of RAS needs to be further improved: so far, reportedly, the platform merely serves as a reservoir of unanalysed information, only some of which is actually relevant to participating nations. Moreover, many EU member states have yet to contribute to this system (Apuzzo, 2019).

39. Among other drivers of global political discontent is the growing gap between the world’s richest and poorest. Oxfam International claims the 26 richest individuals currently own as much wealth as the bottom half of the world population. According to a UK House of Commons report, if trends seen since the 2008 crisis were to continue, the top 1% would hold 64% of the world’s wealth by 2030. Since 2008, the wealth of the richest 1% has been growing at an average of 6% a year – twice as fast as the growth in wealth of the remaining 99% (Savage, 2018). Soaring inequality is fuelling anger and anti-establishment sentiments. For instance, Oxfam argues that the growing inequality in France, where a third of France’s wealth is allegedly in the hands of just eight billionaires, triggered the Yellow Vest movement as "an expression of anger against a sentiment of fiscal injustice" (RFI, 2019). It is particularly worrying that these anger-fuelled in France were, to a degree, exploited by radicals and turned into street violence and destruction of property. Wealth redistribution policies often prove ineffective in the globalised world because wealthy individuals and corporations can exploit tax safe havens and find other means to evade taxation. To tackle this problem effectively a multilateral – and preferably global – response is needed.

40. On the positive side, according to the latest Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, the retreat of democracy has paused in 2018. Forty-two countries experienced democratic backsliding, down from 89 in 2017. However, 48 countries have improved. The crackdown on continued to expand in 2018, but – crucially – political participation has risen significantly. Voter turnout in the 2018 mid-term elections in the US was the highest in over 100 years. Importantly,

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the political activism of women has grown tangibly in 2018 (The Economist, 2019). The European Parliament (EP) elections in May 2019 did not result in a surge of votes for far-right and/or Eurosceptic parties – their share in the new EP is estimated to have increased from 21% to 23%. Anti-liberal parties in Austria5, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain received fewer votes than in previous European or national elections. Voter turnout in these elections was 51% - the highest since 1994. Far-right populists have also suffered defeats in several national elections in Europe, including in Denmark and Greece. Public support for democracy in NATO and EU member states remains high: according to a Pew Research Center survey, only about 10% of Europeans support authoritarian methods, and only 7% in Canada and the USA (Pew Research Center, 2017).

41. The question of whether or not reported backsliding in some Allied countries affects the Alliance’s cohesion is an open one. So far, all Allies reaffirm in the strongest terms their commitment to NATO, often backing their statements with concrete actions, such as the significant increase of US funding for its European Deterrence Initiative. Some observers explain Hungary and Turkey’s warmer relations with Russia by finding parallels between their “strongman” governance styles. However, a direct correlation between illiberalism and sympathies to Putin’s regime is difficult to establish, especially since Poland, also accused of illiberal trends, remains one of Putin’s toughest critics within the Alliance. Hungary’s cooperation with Rosatom on a nuclear power plant project and Turkey’s plan to buy the S-400 Russian missile defence system, especially, are criticised by a number of Allied countries, but so is Germany’s support for the Nord Stream 2 project. It appears that bilateral relations between individual Allies and Russia are predominantly determined by historical and geopolitical contexts rather than governance styles.

42. At this stage, the issue of alleged or real democratic backsliding in some Allied countries appears to be too sensitive to be discussed within NATO structures. In the context of the Turkish government’s reaction to the failed coup in 2016, then US Secretary of State John Kerry called on Ankara to act in adherence with the rule of law to prevent democratic backsliding, implying that Turkey's NATO membership would be scrutinised otherwise. However, this strong statement has not been followed up on in NATO circles.

43. In conclusion of this chapter, your Rapporteur would like to draw attention to one particular area where today’s NATO has ostensibly demonstrated its democratic credentials – namely the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. In 2012, the Secretary General of NATO created a position of Special Representative for WPS, currently occupied by Clare Hutchinson. Countries where women are empowered are generally more democratic, secure and prosperous. UN Security Council resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions in this area have profoundly influenced the way NATO operates. This was reaffirmed at the NATO Summit in Brussels in July 2018, where leaders endorsed a new policy and action plan on WPS. They set ambitious goals that rest on three principles. The first principle is integration: NATO must make sure to mainstream gender through all its policies. As an example, cyberdefence was mentioned as a field where it is necessary to identify the risks faced by women in cyberspace. The second principle, inclusiveness, is about removing barriers for women and improving the gender balance in all NATO’s structures and activities. This applies to the forces deployed – in NATO deployments, only 12% are women – but also to the political level. The third principle is integrity: NATO must adopt the highest standards of professional and personal conduct – both within NATO’s civilian and military staff. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and this Committee, in particular, are steadfast advocates of the implementation of the WPS agenda on the parliamentary level and continue to engage with NATO in this area.

5 The popularity of Austria's far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) was harmed by a scandal where the party's leader Heinz-Christian Strache was forced to resign as vice-chancellor of Austria after the publication of a video that showed Mr Strache allegedly promising to offer government contracts to a Russian oligarch's niece.

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CONCLUSIONS: INTERESTS VS. VALUES – HOW TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE?

44. The commitment to values of democracy, personal liberty, human rights and the rule of law continues to define the Alliance’s identity, as stipulated in the last three NATO Strategic Concepts and Summit decisions, particularly the 1997 Summit in Madrid. Adherence to these values in all member states is vital for the existence of trust and solidarity among the Allies. Without trust, an organisation such as NATO, which operates on the basis of consensus, would be paralysed. As one observer put it bluntly, “which democratic government could justify to its citizens putting its forces in harm’s way in order to defend an eventual dictatorship in another NATO country?” (Biscop, 2018). The lack of trust among the Allies will certainly be exploited by those who consider NATO to be their adversary. The link between democratic values and Euro-Atlantic security is unambiguous.

45. The General Rapporteur is convinced that it would strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance if Allied leaders and institutions took a more proactive approach in promoting democratic values within the Euro-Atlantic community and beyond. For instance, Celeste A. Wallander, a former high-ranking official in the Obama administration, suggested replacing NATO’s consensus rule with a “consensus minus one” mechanism, in order to prevent NATO’s “weak links” from paralysing the entire organisation. She also suggests mandating a senior NATO official responsible for monitoring and reporting on the democratic credentials of member and candidate states, when there is reasonable ground for it (Wallander, 2018). Other experts suggest establishing a NATO committee to deal with issues of governance, democratic backsliding, and human rights violations; creating a position of special ombudsperson to raise concerns of violations to the Washington Treaty; updating NATO’s Strategic Concept to include stronger commitment to democratic values; and expanding references to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in NATO’s external communication, including NATO Summit Communiqués (Katz and Taussig, 2018). The General Rapporteur strongly supports the consideration of these proposals by the Alliance. Should the Allies establish a position of ombudsman or designate a senior NATO official to report on upholding NATO’s core values, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly would be a natural counterpart and interlocutor for such an official.

46. At the same time, it is extremely important to address questions of democratic governance and human rights within the NATO framework in a prudent and balanced manner. As one observer noted: “Russia, for one, would be delighted if NATO washed its dirty linen in public” (Dempsey, 2018). Discussions among Allies should take place in an intimate, respectful, constructive, and facts-based manner, refraining from disproportionate public chastising of each other, but offering expert assistance or exchanging best practices. The history of the Alliance shows that despite occasional disagreements and even tensions among themselves, the Allies have always been able to find a solution and move forward together in a spirit of solidarity. As member of this Committee Vitalino Canas noted during the Assembly’s Spring session in Bratislava in May 2019, the example of Portugal shows that constructive patience eventually pays off and that NATO membership contributes to the democratisation process.

47. As a democratic structure closely associated with, but formally separated from NATO, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is an appropriate venue for Allies to exchange their views on how to defend NATO’s core principles within the Alliance and beyond. Throughout its history, the Assembly has been more proactive than NATO in urging its members to adhere to democratic values, occasionally going as far as suspending the membership of certain delegations due to their weak democratic credentials. This role of the Assembly has been helpful for NATO: it represented the broader NATO community’s reaction to democratic backsliding, thus compensating for the absence of reaction from the governmental side of NATO. As the global liberal democratic order faces serious challenges, the demand for this proactive role of the Assembly is growing again. It must be remembered that as democratic representative political systems become targets, parliamentarians find themselves on the frontlines of this new security domain.

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48. Many of the concerns discussed in this general report are beyond NATO’s direct remit. The nations in the Euro-Atlantic community will need to work on the national, regional, and international levels to tackle the root causes of public discontent, including migration and income inequality. While the General Rapporteur is convinced that accommodation and integration of migrants and especially in the developed world is a feasible endeavour, the grievances of parts of Western populations concerned about the changing demography should not be dismissed without an honest and fact-based debate. The contours of a compromise pan-European framework to handle border security and asylum seekers are currently emerging and this framework should be supported.

49. Regarding growing wealth inequality, the Euro-Atlantic community should lead a global action to address the problem of tax havens, tax fraud, and tax evasion. Prominent US economist James Henry estimates that tax havens hold between USD 24 and 36 trillion. The EU estimates that it loses up to EUR 1 trillion annually due to these problems. The EU has launched several important initiatives in that direction, including compiling a list of tax havens. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also taken an important step by introducing, in 2014, a scheme called the Common Reporting Standard, designed to share financial information about taxpayers in participating countries (Shaxson, 2018). These efforts need to expand and potentially lead towards the establishment of an international mechanism to combat tax evasion and fraud.

50. Western democracies are also threatened by the activities of corrupt Russian officials, oligarchs, and criminals with links to the Kremlin and Russian security services. For too long, the West has been a safe haven for Russian “dirty money”. It is estimated that some EUR 230 billion from suspicious Russian and Azerbaijani6 sources have been transferred through the Estonian branch of Danske Bank, possibly making it the largest money-laundering scandal in Europe (Milne & Binham, 2018). A Transparency International UK report found that of the GBP 4.4 billion-worth of UK property bought with “suspicious wealth”, one fifth was purchased by Russians, mostly through shell companies. Urgent steps are needed by all Allies to tackle similar problems, for instance, by introducing, as the United Kingdom plans to do, a register of the beneficiary owners of overseas companies that hold UK property (Lawford, 2018).

51. Further efforts are necessary to adapt our democracies to the ongoing information and cyber revolution. Nations should invest more in the cyber literacy of all their citizens, to foster critical thinking and the ability to navigate the sea of information and disinformation. They should exchange best practices and innovative techniques in this area, including with non-NATO countries such as Sweden and Finland. Multinational, state and civil society, and media initiatives to monitor, detect, and counter disinformation should be further supported. Cooperation with the social media industry in order to remove extremist content, hate speech, and fake news from online platforms should continue. Civil society is a powerful ally of democratic governments in fighting extremism and fake news. Support for grassroots initiatives such as Stopfake.org (to expose the Kremlin’s fake news) and the mobilisation of credible local leaders as well as “elves” (volunteers who hunt “trolls”) could give Western societies the edge in the information space. The EU also has an important role to play in this regard by boosting its East StratCom Task Force.

52. Electoral systems should be considered strategic national and receive adequate protection levels. State security services should brief and train officials in political parties on how to recognise and prevent hostile interference during campaigns. To increase popular trust in election processes, some Allies would find it helpful to address problems of partisan gerrymandering and to revisit campaign finance regulations.

53. The General Rapporteur welcomes NATO’s efforts to reach out to new generations of Europeans and North Americans, explaining the nature and the purpose of the Alliance. However, more needs to be done to spread awareness of NATO’s core missions and values. The NATO PA

6 The government of Azerbaijan rejects firmly the allegations that Azerbaijani officials could have been involved in this scheme.

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Working Group on Education and Information about NATO is a valuable part of this joint endeavour. The Working Group has collected a comprehensive package of best national practices in education about NATO and global security; NATO parliamentarians are encouraged to use this information in their constituencies and to encourage their governments to replicate or adapt some of these best practices in their respective national education systems. NATO parliamentarians, as the link between NATO and member country citizens, should be actively engaging, especially with the next generation at the school and university levels on issues relating to NATO and its values.

54. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to stress that, despite current uncertainties, the liberal democratic community should speak with a more confident and optimistic voice. While the symptoms of the world’s democratic malaise should not be ignored, it is important to recall that the year 2018 was, as Pulitzer prize winner Nicholas Kristof put it, “the best year in human history”: statistic shows, that never before in history “such a large portion of humanity been literate, enjoyed a middle-class cushion, lived such long lives, had access to family planning or been confident that their children would survive”. For instance, in 2018, fewer than 10% of the world’s population lived in extreme , compared with 44% in the early 1980s (Kristof, 2019).

55. The authoritative figures in politics, culture, and science are increasingly alert about the need for democratic forces to unite and resist the challenge of authoritarianism and xenophobia. Former US Ambassador to NATO Ivo H. Daalder proposed creating an Alliance of Democratic States, that would include all nations with entrenched democratic traditions across the planet. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, and former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi co-chaired a Task Force that drafted a “Declaration of Principles: For Freedom, Prosperity, And Peace”. The Declaration is a part of the broader initiative by the North Atlantic Council to launch a campaign designed to rebuild bipartisan support for democratic values and to develop concrete recommendations for policymakers in leading democracies to secure the rules-based order.

56. The reintroduction of nationalism and protectionism does not offer a long-term solution to the challenges we are facing today. As the President of France Emmanuel Macron wrote in his open letter to European citizens, “retreating into nationalism offers nothing; it is rejection without an alternative.” Electoral choices should be based on a positive agenda, rather than an irresponsible agenda of destruction. At the same time, the new generation of democratic leaders cannot afford to be complacent and must be spearheading significant changes, including revising institutions and policies to meet today’s challenges while remaining faithful to fundamental principles of democracy.

57. The General Rapporteur would like to end by quoting an open letter co-signed by a number of prominent figures in the world of culture and science, including novelists Milan Kundera, Salman Rushdie, Elfriede Jelinek, and Orhan Pamuk, as well as philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy: “In response to the nationalist and identitarian onslaught, we must rediscover the spirit of activism or accept that resentment and hatred will surround and submerge us. Urgently, we need to sound the alarm against these arsonists of soul and spirit who, from Paris to Rome, with stops along the way in Barcelona, Budapest, Dresden, Vienna, and Warsaw, want to make a bonfire of our freedoms. In this strange defeat of “Europe” that looms on the horizon; this new crisis of the European conscience that promises to tear down everything that made our societies great, honourable, and prosperous, there is a challenge greater than any since the 1930s: a challenge to liberal democracy and its values” (The Guardian, 2019).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

(For further information on sources, please contact the Committee Director)

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