COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY (CDS) NATO @ 70: REAFFIRMING THE ALLIANCE’S VALUES General Report Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany) General Rapporteur 132 CDS 19 E rev.1 fin | Original: English | 12 October 2019 132 CDS 19 E rev.1 fin TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION: THE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES? ...................................................... 2 NATO AND ITS DEMOCRATIC VALUES: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ................................... 3 A. THE COLD WAR PERIOD............................................................................................. 3 B. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS ......................................... 6 EURO-ATLANTIC SOCIETIES IN THE CHANGING GLOBAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT . 8 CONCLUSIONS: INTERESTS VS. VALUES – HOW TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE? .................................................................................................................. 12 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 15 132 CDS 19 E rev.1 fin INTRODUCTION: THE ALLIANCE OF DEMOCRACIES? 1. As the Alliance celebrates its 70th anniversary, it is timely to take stock of the values that continue to underpin our Alliance. Signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, DC, the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates in its preamble the determination of the Allies “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” In Article 2, the Allies expressed their commitment to “strengthening their free institutions”. These provisions make NATO a unique Alliance – one that is based not only on shared interests, but also on shared values. This combination is the main factor that made NATO the most successful Alliance in history, one that endured and succeeded in protecting the freedom of its people both in the bipolar and the multipolar worlds. 2. In the last decade, significant technological, economic, and demographic developments changed the global political and security environment. The moral supremacy of the liberal democratic order is no longer taken for granted. The continuing growth of China seems to challenge the notion that liberal democracy is the only path to wealth, competitive economy, and technological leadership. Democracy and personal liberties are retreating in parts of the world. There are clear signs of decreasing popular confidence in political institutions, disenchantment with mainstream parties and media, growing partisan polarisation, and socioeconomic inequality. In combination with phenomena such as fake news, social media bubbles, and echo chambers, these developments have a deep impact on Western political systems. Unaddressed, these growing political and societal cleavages could weaken the unity of our Alliance and jeopardise our collective security. 3. In January 2019, your General Rapporteur, together with the Political Committee’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations’ Rapporteur, the Hon. Gerald Connolly (United States), wrote a letter to all NATO PA delegations asking to share their views on two fundamental questions: “1. What role is NATO playing for the security of your country and for the Euro-Atlantic region? 2. Do you consider that current global trends threaten the values upon which the Alliance was founded? If so, how should the Alliance reinvigorate its political and ideological cohesion?” 4. The responses received to the second question reveal that many delegates consider it important, as the Norwegian response put it, to “remind ourselves that NATO is not just a military alliance, but also an alliance of democratic nations adhering to liberal values”. Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Germany, and the United Kingdom identified the current Russian regime as the most significant external threat to the Western model of society and the unity of the Alliance as it attempts to undermine the fundamental values of the Euro-Atlantic community through various hybrid activities. Germany also identified China as a source of such threats. Hungary argued that “the most direct threat to these fundamental values comes from ISIS/Daesh, whose depraved ideology is an antithesis of what NATO represents”, a view also shared by Turkey. The Czech Republic noted that Saudi and Russian religious and economic influence in the Western Balkans is a challenge for NATO, while the Romanian response mentioned Russia’s military activities in the Black Sea area. Poland added the growing power of non-state actors and the technological revolution as challenges to the rules-based world order. Montenegro mentioned the problems of terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Lithuania stressed that “simply maintaining your high moral ground is not enough” as NATO’s adversaries exploit its political correctness and complacency, and urged Allies “to get rid of wishful thinking and narrow economic interests, which can feed illusions and misperceptions with potentially dangerous consequences”. The United Kingdom shared a similar view, noting that “we have grown lazy since the end of the Cold War”. Several delegations noted that the challenges to the Alliance also come from within, for instance, Latvia mentioned “global trends of populism, extreme nationalism, and authoritarianism are a direct challenge to the values of the NATO Alliance”. Turkey called on all Allies to empathise with one another and take into account each other’s security realities. There is a consensus among the responses that, regardless of the changes in the global security and political environment, the values underpinning the Alliance remain valid. As Denmark put it, “no matter the changes and challenges, the only way to handle them is to respect the foundations of the Alliance”. Both the reaffirmation of the transatlantic link and closer cooperation 2 132 CDS 19 E rev.1 fin with the EU featured as top priorities in a number of national responses, including Spain and Latvia’s. Delegations urged NATO to adapt its structures to new strategic realities, in particular in the context where hybrid attacks blur the lines between military and civilian domains. Belgium recalled the relevance of the Harmel doctrine (discussed later in this report) and the importance of combining credible military defence with political dialogue. Canada stressed the need for NATO itself and parliamentarians from NATO member countries to continue to enhance public outreach and education initiatives, including by harnessing social media tools, to help spread awareness of NATO’s core missions and values, including among the youth. NATO AND ITS DEMOCRATIC VALUES: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW A. THE COLD WAR PERIOD 5. NATO was born in the age of stark ideological divisions of the bipolar world. The struggle of two blocs was widely viewed through the lens of a competition between two opposing ideologies: democracy versus communist tyranny (from the Western perspective), or capitalism versus socialism (as presented by Moscow). But was ideology used as a mere shroud to disguise the vested national interests of global powers? 6. This argument can certainly be applied to the Soviet bloc. The Warsaw Pact was clearly an instrument for Moscow to keep Central European countries in subordination. Any attempt to rebel against Soviet dominance was suppressed by force: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-811. Despite ideological proximity, the Soviet Union maintained lukewarm – at times even hostile – relationships with communist regimes in China and Yugoslavia. In a way, today’s Russia continues to follow this tradition, using every effort, including military force, to prevent neighbouring countries from escaping its perceived sphere of influence – aggression against Ukraine and Georgia are the most prominent examples of this. 7. The claim of the Western bloc to represent the liberal democratic ideology had a much stronger basis. Throughout the Cold War era, the overwhelming majority of NATO Allies had solid democratic credentials and were genuinely committed to individual liberties and human rights. The unity of the Alliance was maintained on a voluntary basis: France’s decision to leave the military wing of NATO in 1966, at the height of the Cold War, has been respected, as has Greece’s decision to follow France’s suit in 1974. NATO membership was also widely considered instrumental in ensuring that West Germany’s military abide by democratic principles (Reiter et al., 2002). The Euro-Atlantic community’s commitment to protect Western Berlin was justified not only on geopolitical grounds, but also, as President John F. Kennedy put it, because it was an “island of freedom”. 8. Finally, due to opposition from several Allies – most notably Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway – Franco’s Spain was not admitted into the Alliance, despite the significant potential added value of this country in terms of strategic location and military capabilities. The proposals to include Spain into NATO were discussed at various points in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in May 1975 (a few months before Franco’s death), only to be rejected due to Spain’s undemocratic political system (Carothers, 1981). The democratic transition in post-Franco Spain cleared the way for the country’s NATO membership in 1982. 9. However, NATO’s Cold-War record as the alliance of democracies has not been without blemish, mainly due to the way it dealt