NAMUN 2021

The Mozambican Civil War

Background Guide

Welcome Letter

Dear Delegates, Welcome to the 36th annual North American Model United Nations conference held, for the first time, virtually. My name is Victor, and I am the chair of this crisis committee. I am in my fourth year of undergraduate study, pursuing a specialist degree in biological physics. Though my academic career has taken me away from the realm of history and politics, I have a great deal of passion for history and politics. I have participated in Model UN conferences in the past as a delegate, but this conference marks my first time chairing a committee.

As you well know, this committee takes place at the height of the Cold War in the year 1977. Two years removed from a decade long struggle for independence, the fledgling governing body of Mozambique, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

(FRELIMO), is faced with an increasing number of guerilla attacks on farms and villages on the Rhodesian border. A new group going by the Resistência Nacional

Moçambicana (RENAMO), or Mozambican National Resistance, poses a threat to the stability of FRELIMO rule in Mozambique. With enough time, this group could plunge Mozambique into another lengthy war, putting Mozambique’s development even further behind schedule.

This background guide will provide a brief overview of the historical context behind this conflict and issues facing the parties involved in this conflict. I encourage you to do additional research on the topic to better understand your delegation’s position within the conflict, using this guide as a framework. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to reach out to me at the committee email address.

The incredible crisis staff and I look forward to working through this intriguing, complex scenario with you all, and we look forward to seeing how you will work together in this unique setting to resolve this conflict.

Sincerely,

1

Victor Chu

Chair- Mozambican Civil War

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Introduction

On June 25th, 1975, Mozambique celebrated its first national independence day. After centuries of Portuguese colonial rule and a gruelling, decade long guerilla war with the dictatorial Portuguese Estado Novo government, the Frente de

Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front or FRELIMO for short) had successfully wrested control of Mozambique from their colonial rulers. Political turmoil in Portugal had resulted in a coup d’etat that overthrew the Estado Novo,1​ ​ and the resulting junta was eager to come to terms with FRELIMO. In these negotiations,

FRELIMO was granted the right to absolute rule over Mozambique as the sole governing party. This decision upset many within FRELIMO.

Inspired by the “greed of [Portuguese] colonialism” ​ ​2​FRELIMO was founded by a few small revolutionary factions led by exiled dissidents of Portuguese rule. Hoping to further the cause of African nationalism, the Tanganyikan government united these groups in the early 1960s, offering a safe base of operations outside of

Mozambique from where FRELIMO could safely grow.​3 ​ Led by their charismatic leader Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO’s guerilla warfare tactics were hugely successful in making the war costly and difficult for the faraway Estado Novo regime to fight, and in encouraging Mozambican peoples to resist Portuguese rule. Though united under one banner in the struggle for Mozambican independence, FRELIMO was far from a stable union. Though initially apolitical, as the War of Independence progressed, FRELIMO leadership began to align itself politically with the socialist politics of the growing African Nationalist movements spreading across the continent.4​ ​ Following the conclusion of the war, many within FRELIMO started to question FRELIMO rule.

1 Elizabeth Buettner, From rose-colored map to Carnation Revolution: Portugal’s overseas ​ amputations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 207. ​ 2 Samora Machel, “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” Africa Today 22, no. ​ ​ ​ ​ 3 (1975): 5. 3 Timothy Stapleton, Front of the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in The Encyclopedia of War ​ (Blackwell Publishing, 2011) 4 Machel, “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” 9. ​ ​

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In Portugal’s hasty exit from the war, they had ceded unilateral control of

Mozambique to FRELIMO leadership and their socialist political ideology. And while

FRELIMO was instrumental in securing the independence of Mozambique, some were apprehensive of exchanging one dictatorial regime for another. In addition,

FRELIMO was a politically diverse organization, composed of many smaller factions operating out of different regions of the nation. As a result, the socialist politics of the

FRELIMO leadership were not popular with all in the party, some remarking that

FRELIMO’s avoidance of democratic elections made FRELIMO “worse than the

Portuguese.” ​ ​5​ Not wanting to concede control over the nation, and unwilling to destabilize the government of their fledgeling nation any further, FRELIMO chose to exile, imprison, or torture their political opponents.​6 ​ This course of action only alienated political dissidents further. Seeing an opportunity to destabilize a geopolitical rival, and to slow the spread of socialism and African nationalism, the white minority ruled nation of

Rhodesia offered asylum to FRELIMO dissidents, originally training and employing dissidents as forward scouts for the Rhodesian military in Mozambique.7​ ​ Much like

Tanganyika, Rhodesia brought dissidents together, forming the Resistência Nacional

Moçambicana (RENAMO). ​ ​8 ​ After two brief years of relative peace, RENAMO declared war on FRELIMO, and in a strange twist of fate, FRELIMO found itself fending off the same guerilla warfare tactics that they had employed against Portugal years prior.9​

5 Margaret Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): A Study in the ​ Destruction of an African Country,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 60, no. 1 ​ ​ (1990): 44. 6 Victor Igreja, “Frelimo’s Political Ruling Through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique,” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 783. ​ 7 Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement,” 40. 8 Lance Young, “Mozambique’s 16-Year Bloody Civil War” (Military Report, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1991), 7. 9 Lisa Hultman, “The Power to Hurt in Civil War: The Strategic Aim of RENAMO Violence,” Journal of ​ Southern African Studies 35, no. 4 (2009): 826 ​

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Definitions

Estado Novo: ​ The Portuguese regime that replaced the Portuguese monarchy in the early 20th century. Dictatorial and deeply nationalistic, the Estado Novo held onto their colonies for decades after other imperial nations had given up theirs as an attempt to bolster their lagging economy and dwindling sense of national pride.

Portuguese East Africa: ​ A colonial-era name for Mozambique.

Lusotropicalism: T​ he flawed theory that posited that the Portuguese, unlike other

European colonizers, were uniquely qualified to conduct colonialism in tropical countries due to Portugal’s tropical climate1​ 0.​ Utilized by the Estado Novo to justify their continued involvement in Africa and Portugal.

Cash Crop:​ Crops grown to sell for profit. Included cashew nuts, sugar, tea, and others​11

Tanganyika: ​ Mozambique’s Northern neighbour. Now known as Tanzania. A former

British colony sympathetic to the cause of African Nationalism. Served as a safe harbour for Mozambican dissidents, funding and training the organization that would go on to become FRELIMO.

African Nationalism:​ A political ideology that argued against white minority rule and colonialism in Africa, and for the establishment of independent African nations ruled by African peoples.

FRELIMO:​ The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, or the Mozambican liberation front. A revolutionary group founded in Tanganyika with the purpose of establishing an independent Mozambique. Named the sole governing party by the Portuguese upon their exit from the region in 1975.

10 Miguel Vale de Almeida, “Portugal’s Colonial Complex: From Colonial Lusotropicalism to ​ Postcolonial Lusophony,” (Queen’s Postcolonial Research Forum, 2008): 5. ​ 11 “New Agriculturist: Country Profile - Mozambique.” ​

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Carnation Revolution: ​ The peaceful coup d’etat in 1975 that resulted in the downfall of the Estado Novo. Occurred as a consequence of civil unrest due to the rule of the authoritarian Estado Novo, the exorbitant cost of the overseas war in Mozambique, and a failing domestic economy.​12

RENAMO: ​ The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, or the Mozambican National

Resistance. A guerilla group dedicated to resisting FRELIMO rule. A political rival to

FRELIMO that opposed FRELIMO unilateral rule and socialist policy.

NIBMAR:​ No Independence Before Majority African Rule. A policy put in place by the

British government, mandated that no African colony could be granted independence until African majority rule could be established.

12 Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution,” 207. ​ ​

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Historical Background

Although they have both evolved into opposed parties, RENAMO originated as a FRELIMO splinter cell. Therefore, in order to better understand the lengthy conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO, it is imperative to first consider the conditions from which FRELIMO grew.

The Colonial Era (1498 - 1926)

Whereas many European powers throughout history have sought to create empires through the military conquest of their neighbours, Portugal turned to the seas to create theirs. Situated in an area with few natural resources and scant arable land, colonialism offered an attractive path by which Portugal could expand its global influence. Since Portuguese explorers searching for an oceanic trade route to India first encountered Mozambique, Portuguese governments have tended towards a hands-off approach to the governance of Mozambique. A notable example of this is the 17th-century ‘Prazo’ land lease system in which the Portuguese crown cheaply leased tracts of land to potential settlers and colonists (“prazeros”) in order to encourage settlement and reap profit off of Mozambican resources​13.​ These prazeros mostly grew cash crops for Portuguese export and sale, keeping much of the profits out of Mozambique, and forcibly employed native Mozambicans for little to no pay.1​ 4

In addition, this emphasis on farming cash crops crippled Mozambique’s food supply, worsening historical food supply issues.​15 ​ The blatant exploitation of Mozambique’s people and resources by Portugal would persist in this form into the 20th century and most certainly bred resentment towards Portuguese rule.

13 Westfall, “Mozambique-Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963-1975.” ​ 14 Newitt, “The Portuguese on the Zambezi,” 73. ​ ​ 15 Bridget O’Laughlin, “Class and the Customary: The Ambitious Legacy of the ‘Indigenato’ in Mozambique,” Affrican Affairs 99, no. 394 (2000): 37; Otto Roesch, “Rural Mozambique Since the ​ ​ FRELIMO Party Fourth Congress: The Situation in Baixo Limpopo,” Review of the African Political ​ Economy 15, no. 41 (1988): 74. ​

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The Reign of the Estado Novo (1926 - 1964)

For hundreds of years, the ruling class of the Portuguese accumulated extensive wealth through tariffs on international trade, profiting greatly from the success of the Portuguese colonies. However, while the nobles grew wealthy off of global commerce, the domestic Portuguese economy remained stagnant. Still heavily reliant on agriculture, with scant development during the industrial revolution, and failing finances due to costly wars, animosity towards the crown grew throughout the

19th century.1​ 6​ This unrest culminated in the October 5th revolution of 1910, ending centuries of constitutional monarchy.1​ 7​ In its place, the República Portuguesa

(Portuguese Republic) rose with grand visions of Portugal to its former glory and bringing Portugal into the modern age. Ultimately, this monumentally unstable government was unable to deliver upon its many promises. Overcome by the circumstances it had inherited from the monarchy, the Portuguese Republic was overthrown by coup d’etat in 1926.1​ 8 ​ In its place, the dictatorial, quasi-fascist Estado

Novo (“New State”) government led by António de Oliveira Salazar was placed in power.

Unfortunately for the Estado Novo, a near-complete lack of concrete progress was made during the tenure of the Portuguese Republic, leaving the Estado Novo in control of one of continental Europe’s weakest economies. In a bid to avoid the fate of its predecessor, the Estado Novo sought to stabilize the Portuguese economy by the integration of the overseas territories.​19​ In particular, the Estado Novo instituted policies that encouraged the settlement of Portuguese peoples in the colonies, promoted investment in colonial infrastructure, and dictated the expansion of cash

16 Buettner, From rose-colored map to Carnation Revolution, 205. ​ ​ 17 Eric Baklanoff, The Political Economy of Portugal’s Later Estado Novo: A Critique of Stagnation ​ Thesis 29, no. 1 (1992): 3 ​ 18 Livermore and Wheeler, “Portugal - The First Republic, 1910–26.” ​ 19 Buettner, From rose-colored map to Carnation Revolution, 199. ​ ​

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crop cultivation, to the benefit of the Portuguese people.2​ 0

Winds of Change

In the aftermath of World War II, European sentiment towards colonialism began to shift. The importance of the African theatre and of African peoples to Allied victory in the war,​21 ​ the language of documents such as T​ he Atlantic Charter​, and nonbinding verbal agreements made during the war gave many African nationalist movements hope for peaceful paths to independence following the conclusion of the war. In the years following the war, African nationalist movements grew in power, and many European nations found themselves incapable of and unwilling to fight in further conflicts against their African colonies. These conditions came to a head in

1960, when UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered the renowned ​Wind of

Change ​ speech, in which Macmillan announced his intentions to allow for British colonies to freely pursue independence. In his speech, Macmillan boldly proclaimed that “The wind of change is blowing through this [African] continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact.”​22 ​ Though lauded by many of his European counterparts, Mozambique and the other Portuguese overseas colonies had proven instrumental in Portugal’s economic revival, making the Estado

Novo weary to part ways with its colonies.2​ 3​ Thus, partly as a reaction to this threat to their newfound prosperity, the Estado Novo latched onto the philosophy of lusotropicalism.

Proposed by the controversial Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyere, lusotropicalism was a deeply flawed theory of Portuguese exceptionalism that posed that as a consequence of Portugal’s tropical climate and historical occupation by conquerors from many cultures, the Portuguese people had “exceptional benevolence,

20 Katharina Hofmann, “Economic Transformation in Mozambique: Implications for Human Security,” (International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013), 3. 21 Mourre, “The French Army and Its African Soldiers. The Years of Decolonization”, 915 ​ ​ 22 Macmillan, “The Wind of Change (the Original Text).” ​ 23 Hofmann, “Economic Transformation in Mozambique,” 4. ​ ​

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empathy and respect for different customs and a lack of racial prejudice,”2​ 4​ making them uniquely qualified as colonizers. Despite the abundant flaws with this ideology, such as its ignorance of institutional racism within the colonies, this theory ultimately aligned with the interests of the Estado Novo regime and was promptly adopted by

Salazar and other Estado Novo leaders in the defense of continued Portuguese colonialism.​25 ​ Salazar even used this line of reasoning to describe the Portuguese colonies as some sort of post-racial utopia in which the “e​ qual dignity of the human person within a single national family, regardless of ethnic or geographical origin”​26 ​ was paramount.​ In fact, lusotropicalism was used as a justification for the Estado Novo to further its control over Mozambique, declaring Mozambique a province of Portugal.

The Founding of FRELIMO (1965)

Despite the net economic gains made by the Portuguese under the Estado

Novo and claims about their benevolent presence in the colonies, direct governance proved to be just as (if not more) exploitative than that of the Prazo system. Just as the monarchies of the past had, the Estado Novo scaled up the cultivation of cash crops.​27

In conjunction with the flood and drought-related food shortages commonly experienced in Mozambique, food shortages only worsened.2​ 8 ​ Lopsided trade treaties ensured that the monetary gains of Mozambican labour never made their way back into the hands of the Mozambican people.​29 ​ The development of industry in

Mozambique had resulted in the creation of industrial jobs in Mozambique. However, these jobs were dangerous and paid little, and ultimately reduced labour costs for

Portuguese firms while furthering the exploitation of the native populace.3​ 0​ The influx

24 Vale de Almeida, “Portugal’s Colonial Complex: From Colonial Lusotropicalism to Postcolonial ​ Lusophony.” 25 de Carvalho, “Ideology and Architecture in the Portuguese ‘Estado Novo.’” ​ 26 Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution.” 194. ​ ​ 27 Hofmann, “Economic Transformation in Mozambique,” 4. ​ ​ 28 Philip Raikes, “Food Policy and Production in Mozambique Since Independence”, Review of the ​ African Political Economy 11, no. 19 (1984): 95. ​ 29 Westfall, “Mozambique-Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963-1975.” ​ 30 Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution.” 200. ​ ​

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of Portuguese settlers and businesses had created a host of skilled labour and white-collar jobs3​ 1​. However, employment in these jobs, and access to education, was typically limited to people of Portuguese heritage, greatly limiting the upwards mobility of Mozambican people.3​ 2​ This systematic exploitation of the Mozambican people combined with the recent success of independence movements in

Mozambique’s northern neighbours Zambia and Tanganyika prompted the founding of a host of small regional independence movements.3​ 3

As with many dictatorships, the Estado Novo dealt with domestic political dissidence by limiting speech and imprisoning political opponents. When dealing with insurgency in overseas provinces, however, the Estado Novo’s methods were often much more brutal, breeding fear and discontentment with the Mozambican people. Sympathetic to the cause of Mozambican independence, the government of

Tanganyika granted asylum to many revolutionary groups fleeing the Estado Novo. It would be in Tanganyika where some of the largest of these groups, MANU, UNAMI, and UDENAMO would join forces, uniting under the banner of FRELIMO on June

25th, 1962 with the intent of freeing Mozambique from Portuguese control.​34

Revolution (1964 - 1974)

Though many in Mozambique had come to oppose Portuguese rule, few within FRELIMO’s leadership found the prospect of armed revolution appealing, opting instead to organize peaceful action to affect change. As FRELIMO ramped up the scale of their operations, so too did the Portuguese amplify their response.

Incidents such as the infamous Massacre of Mueda, in which a crowd of peaceful protestors was fired upon by Portuguese police​35p​ ushed FRELIMO sentiment towards

31 Joseph Miller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portuguese Africa,” African Affairs 74, no. 295: ​ ​ ​ 146.; Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution.” 200. ​ ​ ​ 32 Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution.” 200. ​ ​ 33 Machel, “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” 4. ​ ​ 34 Machel, “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” 1. ​ ​ 35 Paolo Israel, “Mueda Massacre,” Journal of Southern African Studies 43, no. 6 (2017): 1157 ​ ​ ​ ​

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outright rebellion. In 1964, guerilla operations would formally begin.3​ 6​ Though massively outnumbered and woefully underequipped, Tanganyika proved to be a secure base of operation from which FRELIMO could safely operate, and support from other foreign nations such as the Soviet Union and China​37 ​ bolstered the fledgeling revolution. Though the nature of guerilla warfare makes a traditional tactical victory nigh on impossible for both sides, FRELIMO support within

Mozambique grew as the war dragged on. In conjunction with the protracted nature of the war, near economic collapse due to sanctions levied against Portugal by foreign powers opposed to colonialism, and the mounting financial cost of fighting a war halfway around the world, domestic support for the Estado Novo crumbled.3​ 8

Interestingly, it would not be FRELIMO guerillas, but Portuguese revolutionaries that would ultimately secure Mozambican independence. Fed up with a half-century of single-party dictatorship, an exorbitantly expensive overseas war that reportedly consumed over 50% of the national budget3​ 9,​ and wanton political persecution by the Estado Novo, on April 25th, 1974, thousands of peaceful revolutionaries bearing carnations in their hands flooded the streets of Portuguese cities.4​ 0​ In an unusually bloodless political revolution, later dubbed the Carnation

Revolution, the Estado Novo fell.

With the collapse of the Estado Novo government, Portuguese military and government personnel fled Mozambique. Soon after, the Portuguese civilian population would also leave.4​ 1 ​ Mere months after the fall of the Estado Novo, the post-Carnation Revolution junta signed the Lusaka Accord.4​ 2 ​ After a decade of struggle, Mozambique would be recognized by Portugal as an independent nation, and FRELIMO would become its sole governing party. With a political platform built

36 Machel, “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” 1. ​ ​ 37 Miller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portugese Africa”, 139 ​ ​ 38 Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution,” 205. ​ ​ 39 Miller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portuguese Africa,” 136. ​ 40 Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution,” 207. ​ ​ 41 Miller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portuguese Africa,” 144. ​ 42 “Accord Reached on Independence for Mozambique,” New York Times, Sept. 7, 1974. ​ ​

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around the socialization of healthcare, collectivized farming, and industrialization,

FRELIMO politics quickly became polarizing within Mozambique and revolutionary groups.

The Cold War

As the global conflict between the United States and the Soviet Bloc continued to develop, proxy wars became an increasingly important part of the conflict. Wars that should ostensibly have been domestic affairs became inflamed in their intensity and scope. Fearing the global spread of communism and Soviet influence, America sought to quash communist uprisings globally. In a seeming violation of this policy,

FRELIMO had received aid from America, despite its communist ties.​43 ​ This apparent paradox can be resolved by considering the geopolitical environment of southeast

Africa before considering the global scale of the cold war.

To Mozambique’s west, there are two nations ruled by white minority governments: the Apartheid government of South Africa, and the former British colony of Rhodesia. As decolonization rapidly progressed in the 1960s, white minority rule in Africa began to dwindle. And with the departure of the Portuguese from

Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa were two of the few remaining African nations ruled by white minorities. Seeing the success that FRELIMO had had in uprooting Portuguese rule, Rhodesian and South African governments feared the spread of African nationalism and communism within their borders.4​ 4​ These fears were, to some degree, well-founded. In the FRELIMO president Samora Machel’s speech declaring Mozambican independence, he so much as claimed that “the

People’s Republic of Mozambique has natural allies in the socialist countries” and with “the young African states engaged with the movement of national liberation.”4​ 5

43 Willard De Pree. “Mozambique: When Diplomacy Paid Off” The Foreign Service Journal, (March, ​ ​ 2015) 44 “Who Supports UNITA and RENAMO?” The Black Scholar 18, no. 6 (1987): 47-48. ​ ​ 45 Machel, “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” 9. ​ ​

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To compound this tension between these nations, FRELIMO has given financial support to Rhodesian and South African African nationalist groups and voiced vocal support for other African nationalist groups across Africa.

In addition to pressure from African nationalist groups within Africa, the consensus of the international community since the 1960s was that white minority rule was improper and that the time had come for the practice to end.4​ 6​ To this end, the United Nations enacted a series of sanctions on both South Africa and Rhodesia.

While South Africa had plentiful access to the sea and was situated near important naval shipping routes, Rhodesia was a landlocked nation and relied heavily upon

Mozambique for the import and export of goods.4​ 7​ Thus, FRELIMO control of

Mozambique posed a great threat to the economic viability of Rhodesia. Faced with the combined threats of African nationalism and economic dependence on an ideological opponent, Rhodesia chose to act.

The Rise of RENAMO (1975)

Though independence was a colossal achievement worthy of celebration, many revolutionaries were upset that a dictatorship had been replaced by a single-party, communist government. Fundamentally, FRELIMO was a group united around the issue of Mozambican independence, and though they fought as a single organization, the desire for independence crossed the political spectrum, and many political ideologies existed within the factions of FRELIMO. In addition, like their

Estado Novo predecessors, a desire for stability and control, and unrest as a consequence of some of their policies caused the FRELIMO single-party government to take on tyrannical tendencies,4​ 8 ​ meeting political dissidence with violence and imprisonment in labour camps. Seeking refuge from this oppression, many

FRELIMO dissidents fled to Mozambique’s western neighbour Rhodesia.

46 “Britain Acclaims Mozambique For Sanction Against Rhodesia (Published 1976).” ​ 47 Miller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portugese Africa,” 142. ​ ​ 48 Igreja, “Frelimo’s Political Ruling Through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique,” 783.

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Unlike a vast majority of the British Empire’s former colonies, Rhodesia was not officially granted independence by the British, for they had adopted a policy of no independence before majority African rule (NIBMAR).​49 ​ Under NIBMAR, the United

Kingdom refused to grant independence to its colonies before African majority rule was established in these territories​50.​ However, unwilling to hand over control of the colony, the white minority colonial government of Rhodesia, declared independence.​51​ As one of the few remaining white minority governments remaining in Africa, the deeply conservative Rhodesian government was profoundly fearful of the spread of African nationalism, as white minority rule was deeply unpopular both internationally and domestically.5​ 2​ As such, they saw the newly independent nation of

Mozambique on their eastern border as a great threat. In addition, Mozambique elected to enforce United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia for their decision to violate

NIBMAR.​53 ​ As Rhodesia’s primary access point to the sea, this had the potential to cause great damage to the Rhodesian economy. Thus, Rhodesia agreed to harbour anti-socialist, FRELIMO dissidents. With some assistance from their white minority ruled neighbours in South Africa, the Portuguese secret service, and some private

American interests, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization armed and trained these dissidents in guerilla warfare tactics, uniting them under the banner of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO).5​ 4

Like Rhodesia, the Apartheid government in South Africa contributed to the rise of RENAMO and continued to support RENAMO throughout the war, even after the fall of Rhodesia.​55 ​ Through military, economic, and diplomatic support, South

Africa also hoped to curtail the rise of African nationalism in the hopes of maintaining

49 Walter Jacobs, “Rhodesian Independence After the Fearless,” World Affairs 131, no. 3 (1968): 162. ​ ​ 50 Jacobs, “Rhodesian Independence After the Fearless,” 162. 51 Jacobs, “Rhodesian Independence After the Fearless,” 163. 52 Jacobs, “Rhodesian Independence After the Fearless,” 168-176. 53 Igreja, “Frelimo’s Political Ruling Through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique,” 786. 54 Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo),” 40. ​ ​ 55 “Who Supports UNITA and RENAMO?” The Black Scholar 18, no. 6 (1987): 47-48. ​ ​

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white minority control over South Africa.5​ 6​ In addition, the South African government hoped that RENAMO could divert FRELIMO resources and attention away from governance, weakening their geopolitical influence.​57 ​ Finally, in the off-chance that

RENAMO secured a victory in this conflict, South Africa would have expanded its influence in the region, gaining an important ally. Soon thereafter FRELIMO found themselves in the very same position that Portugal had faced in the war for independence, fending off guerilla attacks while desperately attempting to govern a nation divided.

It is important to acknowledge the political divisions within Mozambique when considering the success of RENAMO. Though created with the intention of simply harassing FRELIMO as an astroturfed resistance movement serving white minority interests in neighbouring nations, RENAMO gained true grassroots support in many areas of Mozambique. Central Mozambique for example had an economy built around the farming of cash crops for global export.​58 ​ Therefore, despite having access to fertile lands, central Mozambican agricultural output was often diverted across the globe. In a nation where food supply shortages were incredibly common, the cash-crop economy of the north was a source of consternation for FRELIMO and was in the eyes of FRELIMO leadership a prime example of how foreign interests exploit African peoples and resources.5​ 9​ Simple gestures, such as donating food and other supplies during times of drought6​ 0​, in regions where FRELIMO had yet to establish a strong presence helped establish RENAMO as a true political force in

Mozambique. As such, upon taking over Mozambique, FRELIMO collectivized the lands of the north, mandating the cultivation of subsistence crops and the relocation of farmers onto government farm plots.​61​ This policy was hugely unpopular with

56 “Who Supports Unita and Renamo?”, 47. ​ ​ 57 Patel, “South Africa’s Destabilization Policy,” 302. ​ ​ 58 Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement,” 40. 59 Machel, “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” 6. ​ ​ 60 Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement,” 40. 61 Roesch, “Rural Mozambique since the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress,” 76. ​ ​

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northern farmers and harmed the agricultural output of the farms in central and northern Mozambique.6​ 2​ In addition, FRELIMO often suppressed political dissidence through imprisonment and other undemocratic means.​63​ These factors caused many communities in the north to come to welcome RENAMO control, providing a base of support for RENAMO in Mozambique that persists to this day. Other communities throughout Mozambique, such as communities with close historical ties to tribal rule, a structure of governance uprooted by FRELIMO, also came to side with RENAMO.

62 Roesch, “Rural Mozambique Since the FRELIMO Party Fourth Congress”, 77. 63 Igreja, “Frelimo’s Political Ruling through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique.” ​

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Issues

Internal Issues

Economic Issues:

Like the Estado Novo of Portugal in 1926, FRELIMO has inherited a massively underdeveloped, primarily agrarian economy upon taking power. To bolster this struggling economy, FRELIMO has looked to implement many socialist economic policies such as the collectivization of farmland and nationalization of enterprise.6​ 4

While the nationalization of enterprise and opening of international trade has improved the strength of the national economy somewhat, the collectivization of farmland has proved disastrous. Despite having access to abundant arable land, many rural farmers have been forcibly relocated to fortified collectivized communities to farm the lands there.​65 ​ This policy has served to protect FRELIMO’s agricultural output from RENAMO attack and to further FRELIMO control over agriculture. However, in forcing farmers to live in these communal villages, FRELIMO greatly reduced the amount of arable land being utilized by farmers, increasing the strain on an already fatigued food supply and reducing net agricultural output.​66

Though FRELIMO’s open socialist political policy has opened doors to trade with the Soviet Bloc and with China, in the era of the Cold War, communist ideology and social instability made many western foreign investors wary of entering Mozambique.

In addition, Soviet economic involvement has proven to be a lopsided relationship.

Soviet ships trawl Mozambican shores, depleting stores of fish and shrimp.6​ 7

Meanwhile, Soviet and Bulgarian agricultural scientists and economic advisors have been of little assistance. In addition, valuable resources such as coal and natural gas have recently been discovered in Mozambique. How can FRELIMO attract foreign investment

64 Hofmann, “Economic Transformation in Mozambique,” 4. ​ ​ 65 Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement,” 64. ​ 66 Philip Raikes, “Food Policy and Production in Mozambique Since Independence”, Review of the ​ African Political Economy 11, no. 19 (1984): 95. ​ 67 De Pree. “Mozambique: When Diplomacy Paid Off” The Foreign Service Journal, (March, 2015) ​ ​

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amongst all this instability? Would FRELIMO willing to overlook ideological differences with the west and to cooperate with fervently anti-communist parties to further the economic development of the nation?

In addition to these issues, FRELIMO must also face the economic consequences of their ascent to power. Under Portuguese rule, a minuscule minority of Mozambican people of African descent had access to education and professional training.​68 ​ This ensured that well-paid positions were occupied by Portuguese peoples, which served to bolster Portuguese colonisation of Mozambique6​ 9​. The exodus of peoples of Portuguese descent from Mozambique in the aftermath of the War of Independence created a massive deficit of professionals, tradespeople, and skilled labourers.7​ 0 ​ This meant that of the little Portuguese industrial equipment that remained in Mozambique, and few people were trained in its use or maintenance. How can FRELIMO recoup this lost expertise in their economy? How can FRELIMO effectively retool its economy from an agrarian economy and move into the industrial age?

FRELIMO policy also featured the expansion of infrastructure and healthcare spending as a centrepiece of their platform, with an end goal of implementing universal public education and healthcare.7​ 1​ Though these policies did dramatically improve the quality of life in Mozambique (public education caused literacy rates to skyrocket from

5% in 1975 to 27% in 1978 for instance) these policies were immensely costly to implement.7​ 2 ​ How can FRELIMO continue to improve the lives of its people and grow the economy while maintaining a balanced fiscal policy?

Regional Dissent:

Mozambique is naturally partitioned into three segments by the large Zambezi

68 Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement,” 51. 69 Buettner, “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution,” 200. ​ 70 M​ iller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portugese Africa,” 144. ​ ​ 71 Machel, “Message of the Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique,” 8. 72 Paulo Ferrinho, “The Human Resources for Health Situation in Mozambique”, Africa Region Human ​ Development Working Paper Series, no. 91 (2006): 18. ​

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and Limpopo rivers.​73 ​ The central and northern regions of Mozambique have historically been Mozambique’s largest grower of cash crops, and these crops have become the centrepiece of the regional economy.7​ 4​ Because of this, the negative aspects of

FRELIMO’s economic policy, specifically collectivized farming, have disproportionately impacted the north. This has resulted in growing support for RENAMO in the central and northern provinces.7​ 5

In addition to unpopular economic policy, FRELIMO has directed much of its resources and attention to the urban areas of central and southern regions of

Mozambique.7​ 6​ This bias is not politically motivated, but rather as a consequence of few roads, railroads, or lines of communication having been constructed under Portuguese rule, making coordinated action in the north difficult.​77 ​ This lack of infrastructure limited political communication with residents of the north to sporadic political speeches.​78 ​ This further alienates Mozambique’s northern provinces, as northern

Mozambicans feel isolated from FRELIMO. Compounding this issue, historically, schools in Mozambique were founded in the southern cities by Protestant missionaries.

As such, many FRELIMO appointees have little experience with central and northern issues.​79 ​ The central region of Mozambique notably shares a border with Rhodesia. As

Rhodesia is where RENAMO is headquartered, this region has become one of the most active in the Civil War, becoming a base of strong RENAMO support that has remained to the modern-day.8​ 0​ How can FRELIMO work around these factors to unite the nation?

Climate:

Flooding and drought, especially in the southern provinces, have commonly been

73 Sawe, “Major Rivers Of Mozambique.” ​ 74 Roesch, “Rural Mozambique Since the FRELIMO Party Fourth Congress”, 77. 75 Carrie Manning, Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: RENAMO as Political Party” Journal of ​ Southern African Studies 24, no. 1 (1998): 162-171 ​ 76 Roesch, “Rural Mozambique Since the FRELIMO Party Fourth Congress”, 78. 77 Darch and Hedges, “Political Rhetoric in the Transition to Mozambican Independence,” 33. ​ ​ 78 Darch and Hedges, “Political Rhetoric in the Transition to Mozambican Independence,” 33. ​ ​ 79 Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance,” 51 80 “Mozambique Detailed Election Results.” ​

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major issues for Mozambique. Periodic cycles of flooding and drought have made agricultural development difficult.​81 ​ With the food supply already under considerable strain due to the failure of collectivized farming, how can Mozambique sustain itself through more ecological events such as these?

External Issues

Rhodesia:

Mozambique shares a 1300 kilometre border with its landlocked western neighbour, Rhodesia.8​ 2​ Ruled by an extremely conservative, white minority government, as one of the last vestiges of white rule in Africa, Rhodesia was a consistent ally of the

Salazar Estado Novo regime. Under the sympathetic Salazar regime, Rhodesia’s landlocked status was of little concern. Despite global calls for sanctions on Rhodesian goods due to their illegal universal declaration of independence and the increasing global unpopularity of white minority rule in Africa, the Salazar regime was more than happy to allow unfettered coastal access to Rhodesian trade and goods.8​ 3 ​ As a result,

Rhodesia came to develop a heavy economic dependence upon Mozambique for the import and export of goods.​84 ​ However, with the end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique, Rhodesia now faces the threat of a near-total severance from the global economy as the

FRELIMO government considers enacting sanctions on their ideological opponent.

In addition to these economic concerns, as more and more African majority governments have grown from white minority and colonial rule, unrest with this political arrangement grows within Rhodesia. The major political group behind this push towards ending white rule in Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African National Union

(ZANU), assisted FRELIMO in the Mozambican War of Independence.​85​ As such,

81 “Country Profile – Mozambique,” New Agriculturalist, (2004). ​ ​ 82 De Pree. “Mozambique: When Diplomacy Paid Off” The Foreign Service Journal, (March, 2015) ​ ​ 83 Miller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portugese Africa,” 142. ​ ​ 84 “Britain Acclaims Mozambique For Sanction Against Rhodesia (Published 1976).” ​ 85 Jacobs, “Rhodesian Independence After the Fearless,” 168-176.; Miller, “The Politics of ​ Decolonization in Portugese Africa”, 142 ​

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FRELIMO has continued to support ZANU since gaining independence.​86 ​ In addition to

FRELIMO enforcement of U.N sanctions on Rhodesia, this support of ZANU has only further inflamed tensions between Mozambique and Rhodesia. Finally, Rhodesia’s white minority government is extremely politically conservative and anti-communist. Due to the systemic economic exploitation of African peoples by colonial governments, African nationalist movements often adopted communist ideologies, worsening tensions between Rhodesia and Mozambique. This combination of factors all contributed to

Rhodesian support for the creation and operation of RENAMO.

Surrounded by ideological opponents across the continent, cut off from economic trade, and facing domestic turmoil, how will the white minority Rhodesian government respond to Mozambican pressure on their tenuous position, and what should Mozambique do in the face of a response?

South Africa:

The Republic of South Africa is Mozambique’s southwestern neighbour. Like

Rhodesia, South Africa is ruled by a white minority government. The white minority dominates the governance and economy of the nation. Like in Rhodesia, political unrest grew under these unjust conditions. And like in Rhodesia, racial inequality in South

Africa drew the ire of the international community. Worried by events such as the

Sharpeville Massacre, in which 69 black rights activists were killed by white police officers during a peaceful protest,​87 ​ international pressure began to mount on the South

African government. Unlike in Rhodesia however, South Africa had plentiful coastal access and was not as dependent on neighbouring nations for economic participation.

Thus, despite growing international condemnation of apartheid, the South African economy faced little pressure.

Similar to Rhodesia, the apartheid South African government was a staunch

86 “Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1964-Present).” ​ 87 McRae, “The Sharpeville Massacre.” ​

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opponent of communism. Communist ideologies, training, funds, and weapons were closely tied with African nationalist movements, and many within South Africa saw communist influence as a contributing factor to the growth of African independence movements.​88​ Thus, the apartheid South African government was openly hostile towards communist ideologies and communism. This aggressively anti-communist ideology and the apparent stability of the apartheid government made South Africa a valuable potential ally for the United States in the eyes of staunch proponents of communist containment such as Henry Kissinger,​89

Though not a significant threat to its economic security, as the most recent white-ruled African nation to fall, Mozambique is a potential threat to the security of white minority rule in South Africa. Combined with the socialist/communist political leanings of FRELIMO, how will South Africa respond to the new communist threat at their door?

The USSR :

As is with many African nationalist movements, FRELIMO received training and supplies from communist governments. After years of exploitation by white economic interest groups, many African governments including FRELIMO gravitated towards socialist and communist political teachings. Following the success of FRELIMO in the

War of Independence, the Soviet government immediately reached out to FRELIMO in the hopes of expanding Soviet influence, signing a treaty of friendship in March of

1977.9​ 0​ Critically underdeveloped industrially both by the Portuguese and by years of war, and faced with chronic droughts, FRELIMO looked to Soviet scientists and industrialists to help foster the economy of their young nation. Ukrainian scientists have failed to produce meaningful crop yield in drought-affected lands, and Soviet trawlers seem to be

88 “Who Supports UNITA and RENAMO?” The Black Scholar 18, no. 6 (1987): 47-48. ​ ​ 89 Azevedo, “Mozambique and the West: The Search for Common Ground, 1975-1991.” ​ 90 Miller, “The Politics of Decolonization in Portuguese Africa,” 138. ​

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damaging the local marine ecosystem​91​. Though politically sound, is this relationship practical for FRELIMO to maintain?

The United States:

Since the conclusion of World War II, tensions have only continued to rise between the global superpowers of the United States and the communist bloc. Strangely, though American foreign policy in general has sought to contain communist influence by allying with conservative anti-communist governments, domestic opposition to the white supremacist regimes of Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa has prevented the

United States from allying with these states.​92 ​ Therefore, despite Mozambique having socialist political leanings and strong communist ties, America under president Gerald

Ford has elected to initiate diplomatic relations with FRELIMO, providing humanitarian aid and opening trade talks with the ostensibly communist FRELIMO.​93 ​ As a strong critic of apartheid and Rhodesia, America has taken a notably softer stance with FRELIMO than it has with other socialist or communist nations. This has resulted in a unique situation, in which a Cold War proxy war involves Soviet and American support on the same side, fighting against foreign interests that span the typical communist/capitalist political divide.9​ 4​ Two years removed from a bloody, costly, controversial defeat in Vietnam, America too is deeply divided. To some, American intervention in foreign affairs oversteps American authority. To others, the threat of communism needs to be contained at all costs. For these people, American relations with and support of

FRELIMO is enabling the spread of communism in an emerging region of the world, and

RENAMO, Rhodesia, and South Africa should be allies in the fight against communism​95​. As rumblings of FRELIMO discontent with Soviet cooperation have started to surface, could this mark a turning point in America’s influence on the African

91 De Pree. “Mozambique: When Diplomacy Paid Off” The Foreign Service Journal, (March, 2015) ​ ​ 92 “U.S. Relations With South Africa.” ​ 93 “Policy & History: U.S-Mozambique Relations.” ​ 94 Krogh, “Mozambique and RENAMO : Should the Reagan Doctrine Apply?” ​ 95 G, “REPORT Africa.” ​

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continent? How can America work to solidify its stance in Africa, while working to curb the influence of communism on the region? Will the involvement of private American groups impact America’s position in the region?

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State of Affairs

The year is 1977, and Mozambique faces a host of issues. Guerilla attacks by a new group that goes by the name of RENAMO have started to crop up near the

Rhodesian border. While RENAMO guerilla attacks would typically be little more than a nuisance, these attacks often have to go unanswered due to a lack of an established central government, and of vital infrastructure such as roads and railways by which

FRELIMO could respond to these attacks. This lack of infrastructure also has the unfortunate effect of isolating a large portion of the nation from the political capital of

Maputo in the south. This leaves communal farms vulnerable to RENAMO attack, and it leaves many Mozambican people feeling isolated from the revolutionary government. In addition, despite the success of domestic healthcare infrastructure reforms​96 ​ in improving quality of life and life expectancy within Mozambique, these policies are massively expensive, and the collectivization of farms has proven to be hugely unpopular with rural farmers and disastrous to the nation’s economy and food supply. While moving farmers into fortified government plots helped protect them from RENAMO attack, the amount of land being cultivated has been greatly reduced as a result. Compounded by recent drought and flooding in the southern region of

Mozambique, the food supply of the nation is dangerously thin, and the traditionally agrarian Mozambican economy is beginning to falter.

Political and economic partnerships with FRELIMO’s ideological ally, the

Soviet Union, have yielded poor results thus far, as Soviet scientists have been unable to assist farmers in improving agricultural output, and Soviet fishing boats seem to disappear from Mozambican waters without leaving Mozambican peoples their fair share of the catch.

These circumstances have contributed to the increasing strength of RENAMO within the borders of Mozambique and have opened a path for RENAMO to establish

96 Madeley, Jelley, and O’Keefe, “The Advent of Primary Health Care in Mozambique,” 323. ​ ​

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true grassroots within Mozambique as a rival political faction to FRELIMO.

Members of RENAMO and FRELIMO have convened in this committee to identify collective interests and facilitate open conversation about the compromises each side is willing to make. The decisions made by this committee and its members will shape the future of Mozambique and the region.

27

Sources

Buettner, Elizabeth, ed. “From Rose-Coloured Map to Carnation Revolution: Portugal’s

Overseas Amputations.” In E​ urope after Empire: Decolonization, Society, and Culture​,

190–210. New Approaches to European History. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139047777.006.

Machel, Samora. “Message of Proclamation of Independence for Mozambique.” A​ frica Today

22, no. 3 (1975): 5–9.

Miller, J. “The Politics of Decolonization in Portugese Africa.” ​AFRICAN AFFAIRS ​ 295 (1975):

135–147.

U.S. Embassy in Mozambique. “Policy & History: U.S-Mozambique Relations.” Accessed

November 11, 2020. https://mz.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/.

Westfall, William. “Mozambique-Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963-1975,” ​ Military Report,

Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984.

Young, Lance. “Mozambique’s 16-Year Bloody Civil War,” Military Report, Marine Corps

Command and Staff College, 1991.

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