...... ..... ...... ..... .......... ... ........ .!;:i - - ... K.-- i:--B ........ .. ........ .......... .... ... ... ..... .... ... ... ... ..... .... oiu on .... ....... .. Coun n torri.e.,va ol, til Mozamb4w's War of ln.dOen en,-,o 19"64-1974 THOMAS 1. HENRIKSFN .... --------. ........ ........ ... ..... .... ... .......... i- - ro P. ....... .......... .................... 27 Northwestern University Library Evanston, Illinois 60201 LL Revolution and Counterrevolution Mozambique ... 9- i . + J . ,i+J m+. Revolution and Counterrevolution Mozambique's War of Independence, 1964-1974 THOMAS H. HENRIKSEN Contributions in Intercultural and Comparative Studies, Number 6 P Greenwood Press Westport, Connecticut * London, England 9G-1.103 H r Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Henriksen, Thomas H. Revolution and counterrevolution. (Contributions in intercultural and comparative studies, ISSN 0147-1031 ; no. 6) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Mozambique-Politics and government-To 1975. 2. National liberation movements-Mozambique. 3. Guerrillas-Mozambique. I. Title. I. Series. DT463.H46 967'.903 82- 6132 ISBN 0-313-23605-4 (lib. bdg.) AACR2 Copyright © 1983 by Thomas H. Henriksen All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 82-6132 ISBN: 0-313-23605-4 ISSN: 0147-1031 First published in 1983 Greenwood Press A division of Congressional Information Service, Inc. 88 Post Road West Westport, Connecticut 06881 Printed in the United States of America 10987654321 Once again, for Margaret Mary, Heather, Damien and Mungo Contents Tables ix Preface xi 1. Background to Revolution: Pacification and Resistance 3 2. The Military Insurgency of the Revolution 27 3. The Military Counterinsurgency of the Counterrevolution 45 4. Mobilization 71 5. Countermobilization 93 6. Terror and Counterterror 117 7. Liberated Zones versus Aldeamentos and Development 143 8. Foreign Assistance 171 9. FRELIMO's Coming to Power: An Interpretation 205 Notes 217 Bibliography 279 Index 283 Tables 1. Mozambique's Largest Ethnolinguistic Groups in 1970 8 2. List of High-ranking Defectors 106 3. Number of Attacks by FRELIMO Against the Population 122 4. Aldeamentos and Relocated Population by District in Mid-1973 155 5. Comparative Per Capita Income 164 Preface Mozambique, economically underdeveloped and a cockpit of political turmoil for centuries, underwent a ten-year war of independence and varying amounts of social restructuring in parts of its countryside. It is hoped that this volume will contribute to a useful overview of the Mozambican revolution and the Portuguese counterrevolution in the southeast African country from 1964 to 1974 for students of Africa, of revolution and of guerrilla warfare. The format is topical rather than chronological. The military aspects of the war saw no great set-piece battles. Instead the fighting consisted of countless small- unit actions and counter actions, although encounters were lumped together by each side for operational purposes. A detailed retelling of ambushes, raids and sweeps would numb even an ardent specialist of insurgent campaigns. Besides such a narrow focus would obscure the well-established fact that rural revolutions are much wider in scope than troops marching to and fro for tests of strength. The endeavor in these pages is to give weight to such themes as the contestants' attempts to mobilize or terrorize the population and the impact of foreign intervention into the struggle. The thematic approach, nevertheless, requires some unavoidable repetition; the author trusts that the reader will understand this necessity. In writing this book, the author faced a few nettlesome obstacles. Research demanded a visit to revolutionary Mozambique and post-coup Portugal along with investigative trips to libraries and archives in Mozambique, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although much material, some useful and other propaganda, resulted from these ventures, candid statements or secret documentation were hard to come by. Some materials were destroyed. Other data were lost or withheld. Yet courageous participants on both sides shared some documentation. And more granted interviews in return for anonymity. I have respected their wishes and kept their names out of this work. In some cases, their careers or personal safety warrant such treatment. Their trust is greatly appreciated and their knowledge was of a great help. xii Preface Another obstacle also stems from the nature of the war itself. An effort has been made in these pages to get to the down-to-earth fighting, mobilizing and terror tactics in a revolutionary war. It is my hope that the chapters also reflect the ironies, ambiguities and tragedies of a society in the throes of a violent transition in which nearly every action has good and bad consequences and every hero is also a traitor. Yet another obstacle, but of less trouble for the writer than the reader, centers on the usage of place names. In short, preindependence Mozambican names have been kept. For example, Mozambique's capital is presently called Maputo. This fact and others like it are noted in parentheses alongside the old designations. The colonial names have been retained because both sides generally used them prior to the end of the war. One major exception, which is also noted in the text, revolves around the Portuguese decision in July 1970 to divide and rename the District of Manica e Sofala into Vila Pery and Beira. The guerrillas did not make this distinction. Similar reasoning applies to the use of Rhodesia. Since Mozambican insurgents fought against Rhodesian troops, whether black or white, and not Zimbabweans who also fought the Rhodesian soldiers, the settlers' name for the country lying to Mozambique's west has been used. Much of the final stages of research and writing of this volume was undertaken while the author was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. As such, I am profoundly grateful for the resources placed at my disposal while a recipient of a National Fellowship. This program, which is under the direction of its Executive Secretary, Dr. Dennis L. Bark, not only allowed a year free from teaching and committee responsibilities but also permitted contact with resident and visiting scholars at the Hoover Institution. In this regard, I would like to repeat the fact that books are often the efforts of individuals who have benefited from the conversations, insights and previous scholarship of others. Chief among those whose dialogue helped sharpen my knowledge of armed revolutions in the Institution's Senior Commons Room are Senior Fellows Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan. Dr. Gann read the manuscript and furnished much useful criticism. In the earlier stages of the project, two other scholars of Africa and politics provided years of intellectual sustenance and support; they are Professors Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Douglas L. Wheeler. None, of course, should have to bear any criticism for this effort, for the errors and interpretations are my own. Library and archival staffs at the Arquivo Hist6rico de Mocambique, Boston University and the Hoover Institution deserve more than a note of thanks; Karen Fung at the latter institution was most helpful. Two typists-Janet Dutra and Polly Tooker--will always have my gratitude for this project as well as others. Finally, my family who should receive not just a "thank you" but also a note of deep appreciation for their understanding. T. H. H. Palo Alto, California Revolution and Counterrevolution I Background to Revolution: Pacification and Resistance By and large, it would seem that what made the machinery of European troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain. --E. L. Katzenbach, "Time, Space, and Will" There were black men in those forests, men with weapons and leadership and a purpose. They were as cruel as the Portuguese and he did not know what kind of future there would be when they reclaimed their country. Perhaps it would be worse than the Portuguese and there would be no work in the factory or cooked meat in the shops or soccer on a Sunday afternoon. But only they would cleanse the country of men like Saturnino. --Ronald Hardy, Rivers of Darkness \Mozambique is a strange country for a People's Republic established on Marxist- Leninist foundations. Since classical Marxism envisaged socialist revolutions occurring in industrially advanced nations, why did Mozambique, a backward land, undergo violent internal conflict ending in a Marxist government? By African standards, it had made a certain amount of economic progress before its Revolution. Yet Mozambique was much less developed than Cuba, China, North Korea or even Vietnam--all regarded by Mozambican guerrillas as allies on the road to world revolution. To this day, the vast majority of Mozambique's people continue to till the land with simple tools. By 1964, when the war against Portuguese colonial rule began, economic development had begun to accelerate in a modest fashion. Portuguese and other foreigners had set up a number of light industries and cash-crop farms. There were rudiments of modern transport and modern social services. 4 Revolution and Counterrevolution Cement and steel cities were expanding. But taken as a whole, Mozambique remained an underdeveloped country, much more so than Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), its western neighbor, not