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During the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962): Mansourah, Kabylia

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During the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962): Mansourah, Kabylia A MICROHISTORY OF THE FORCED RESETTLEMENT OF THE ALGERIAN MUSLIM POPULATION DURING THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1954-1962): MANSOURAH, KABYLIA A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES OF GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN Arab Studies BY DOROTHEE M. KELLOU, B.A. WASHINGTON, DC APRIL 18, 2012 Copyright 2012 by DOROTHEE M. KELLOU All Rights Reserved ii A MICROHISTORY OF THE FORCED RESETTLEMENT OF THE ALGERIAN MUSLIM POPULATION DURING THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1954-1962): MANSOURAH, KABYLIA DOROTHEE M. KELLOU, M.A. THESIS ADVISOR: OSAMA ABI-MERSHED, PHD. Abstract During the Algerian war of independence, which lasted from 1954-1962, about 3,525,000 Algerians were forced to leave their homes. 2,350,000 of them were resettled in camps created ex-nihilo by the French army and 1,175,000 of them were resettled in pre-existing villages near French military outposts. This practice of resettlement, euphemistically referred to as regroupement in the French official terminology, was an essential tool of the French military policy of pacification. This thesis presents a microhistory of the resettlement of Algerian Muslims by the French military. It focuses on one case, the village of Mansourah, located in the South of Kabylia, 220 km East of Algiers. By juxtaposing and putting into dialogue memories of both the Algerian Muslim population and the French army, and with the aid of archival documents, I seek to illuminate the history of regroupement in Mansourah. By using a Foucauldian conception of subject and power, this thesis shows how the French colonial powers used disciplinary methods and brutal means of repression to create docile bodies, perpetuate their domination over Algeria, and affect the subjectivity of the colonized. Regroupement in Mansourah becomes a motif for analyzing how material structures and systems of representations create a new disciplinary order. In addition, a microhistorical examination of regroupement in Mansourah brings to light how iii Algerians found themselves caught up in the "web of power" tied by the colonial authorities and how they challenged it from within. iv Acknowledgements Over the past two years I have accumulated a number of debts to colleagues, family and friends in the process of conducting my research and writing this thesis. This project began in the fall of 2010 with a study of regroupement in the particular setting of the village of Mansourah, Algeria. I would like to thank Dr. Osama Abi-Mershed for encouraging me to pursue this research and overcome the emotional and intellectual challenges it posed to me. I also would like to thank Dr. Judith Tucker with whom I have continued working on this research in the framework of her research seminar History and the Middle-East. I also would like to thank Dr. Adel Iskandar and Dr. Sylvie Durmelat for their constant support and belief in my work. I also would like to thank Dr. John Esposito for providing me with the financial means and time to write this thesis. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Dr. Rochelle Davis who I first had the opportunity to meet during an undergraduate year abroad at Georgetown in 2006-2007 and who was a wonderful source of encouragement and support in my decision to pursue a MA in Arab Studies at Georgetown University. I would like to thank in particular Chris Gratien for his precious edits and insightful discussions. I also want to thank my friends and roommates, Abbie Taylor, Bohumira Smidakova and Mercedes Fernandez for their moral support and the much-needed entertainment moments. I also want to thank Nehad Khader for her precious comments as well as Diana Shin and Lawrence Mac Mahon, for their last minute and yet fundamental insights into my work. Last but v not least, I want to thank Malika Dekkiche for her encouragements and close reading of my work. In France, I would like to thank Dr. Michel Cornaton and General Maurice Faivre, for granting me an interview and giving me access to their personal archives. I also want to thank Dr. Gilbert Meynier and Michel Sabourdy, editor in chief of the association of veterans of the Algerian war (Fédération Nationales des Anciens Combattants d'Algérie, FNACA) for helping me in my research of witnesses of regroupement. I also want to thank those who replied to my announcement published in the newspaper of the FNACA and accepted to share their often-painful memories. In Algeria, I would like to express my gratitude to the people of Mansourah and El- Hamra for their hospitality, invaluable testimonies and the trust they placed in me. I would like to thank in particular Abdelhamid Benhacen, a local historian, who has helped me in numerous ways to fully grasp the history of this place. I also want to thank Abdallah Aggoune for providing us with a home during our visit to Algiers. The Center for Contemporary Arab Studies provided me with a generous grant in the summer 2011 which allowed me to travel to France and Algeria to conduct fieldwork. I would like to extend my deep gratitude to my father and my mother, Abdelmalek Kellou and Catherine Sommier, without whose support and encouragement conducting this research and writing this thesis would never have been possible. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the youth in France and Algeria and in particular to my sister Malya Kellou and my niece and nephew Noa and Côme Mascherin, with whom I hope to vi visit Mansourah one day. May we learn from the lessons of past violence in our respective countries. This thesis is richer due to the contributions of all those I have mentioned, and many I could not. Its failings, however, are solely my own. Dorothee M. Kellou vii Glossary of French and Arabic terms ALN, French acronym for Armée de Libération Nationale, National Liberation Army. It is the military wing of the Front National de Libération (FLN) that commenced guerrilla operations on November 1, 1954. bureaux arabes, Office of Arab affairs, were created as early as 1833. They were headed by French officers whose functions were to collect information on the indigenous people and to carry out administrative functions (police, taxes, education etc...). They were crucial instruments of French penetration in Algeria. chouf, an Arabic word, meaning looking and by extension guarding. It entered the French military slang djebel, an Arabic word, meaning mountain. It entered the French military slang douar, administrative framework created by the Senatus-Consulte of April 22, 1863. By extension, it designates in the French language a village in North Africa. fellagha, an Arabic word used to designate bandits and highwaymen. It entered the French military slang to refer to Algerians combating French colonial rule. FLN, French acronym for Front de Libération Nationale, Liberation National Front. Revolutionary movement seeking independence of Algeria from French colonial rule by the use of military force. gendarmerie, a military body charged with police duties. gourbi, huts of mud and dung. harka, mobile territorial unit composed of Algerian Muslims enrolled by the French army as auxiliaries during the war harki, Arabic term used to refer to Algerian Muslims recruited among local population to fight along French troops. maquis, a guerrilla fighter in the French underground during World War II, by extension refers to a member of an irregular armed force that fights a regular army. moghazni, Arabic term used to refer to Algerian Muslims recruited among local population to serve along the French troops. They were often assigned to protect SAS officers MNA, French acronym for Mouvement National Algérien, former Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques- Parti du Peuple Algérien (MTLD-PPA), reorganized by its leader Messali Hadj as the MNA in December 1954. pied noir, French term used to designate the settler community of European descent in Algeria. ratissage, sweeping operations regroupement, term used by the French military during the war to refer to the practice of resettling the population. Sections Administratives Spécialisées (SAS) were created in 1955 during the war. SAS officers were charged with establishing a French administration in areas considered underadministered. They were notably in charged of administering regroupement "centers. viii Preface My research goals and purpose were in no small part a function of my deep personal conection to the topic. My father and his relatives were indeed children of regroupement, making me in some way the grandchild of colonialism/regroupement. I have been deeply affected by these testimonies. As I immersed myself in churning this sea of memory, I was and am at times still overwhelmed with feelings of fear and anxiety, experiencing the trauma from afar, in time and distance, and yet still so close. I do not live in Algeria and have never lived there. Yet, I have been drawn into my Algerian naturalized French father's partial and often denied exilitic state. Fifty years have passed since Algeria acceded to its independence. Most eye-witnesses I have interviewed are above 60 years old and are, as one of them told me metaphorically, "on the verge of falling from the cliff of death to meet the emptiness of the soul."1 Despite this geographical and temporal distance, the topic is near to me, because I have collected testimonies from family members whom I had not met before starting this research and yet with whom I immediately identified and sympathized. My father who had only told us bits and pieces of his chidhood experience during the war and who had never returned to his village since the war ended, i.e. for fifty years, finally told me his story and gave clarity to those undecipherable yet palpable images of my youth.
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