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Understanding Strategic Interaction in the Second Nuclear Age UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE THOMAS G. MAHNKEN GILLIAN EVANS TOSHI YOSHIHARA ERIC S. EDELMAN JACK BIANCHI UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE THOMAS G. MAHNKEN GILLIAN EVANS TOSHI YOSHIHARA ERIC EDELMAN JACK BIANCHI 2019 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Thomas G. Mahnken is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He is a Senior Research Professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has served for over 20 years as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve, to include tours in Iraq and Kosovo. He currently serves as a member of the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy Commission and as a member of the Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University. His previous government career includes service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning from 2006–2009, where he helped craft the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2008 National Defense Strategy. He served on the staff of the 2014 National Defense Panel, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. He served in the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment and as a member of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. In 2009 he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service and in 2016 the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal. Gillian Evans is a Senior Analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. At CSBA her work focuses on U.S. national security strategy, nuclear strategy and modernization, and trends in future warfare. Prior to joining CSBA, Gillian worked as a Consultant Analyst in PA Consulting Group’s Federal Defense Strategy practice, supporting projects for the Office of Naval Research and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Her prior experience also includes work for the Afghanistan Policy team at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and from 2014 to 2015 she served as a fellow at the Lahore University of Management Sciences in Lahore, Pakistan. She has an M.A. in Strategic Studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS and an undergraduate degree from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. Toshi Yoshihara is a Senior Fellow at CSBA. Before joining CSBA, Toshi Yoshihara held the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College where he taught strategy for over a decade. He was also an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the war college. Dr. Yoshihara has served as a visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego and the U.S. Air War College. He is the recipient of the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award in recognition of his scholarship on maritime and strategic affairs at the Naval War College. His latest book, with James R. Holmes, is the second edition of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2019). Eric Edelman is Ambassador Eric S. Edelman is Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He retired as a career minister from the U.S. Foreign Service on May 1, 2009. He has served in senior positions at the Departments of State and Defense as well as the White House, where he led organizations providing analysis, strategy, policy development, security services, trade advocacy, public outreach, citizen services, and congressional relations. As under- secretary of defense for policy (August 2005-January 2009), he was DoD’s senior policy official, overseeing strategy development with global responsibility for bilateral defense relations, war plans, special operations forces, homeland defense, missile defense, nuclear weapons and arms control policies, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, arms sales, and defense trade controls. He served as U.S. ambassador to Finland in the Clinton administration and Turkey in the Bush administration and was Vice President Cheney’s principal deputy assistant for national security affairs. He was chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, special assistant to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, and special assistant to Secretary of State George Shultz. His other assignments included the State Department Operations Center, Prague, Moscow, and Tel Aviv, where he was a member of the U.S. Middle East delegation to the West Bank/Gaza autonomy talks. Ambassador Edelman has been awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Presidential Distinguished Service Award, and several Department of State Superior Honor Awards. In 2010, he was named a knight of the French National Order of the Legion of Honor. Ambassador Edelman serves as the Chair of the National Defense Strategy Commission and on the bipartisan board of directors of the United States Institute of Peace. Jack Bianchi is a Senior Analyst at CSBA who focuses on national security strategy and defense issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Mr. Bianchi was previously a Research Analyst at Defense Group Inc. where he performed bilingual (Chinese and English) open source research and analysis for U.S. government clients on Chinese cybersecurity issues and China’s defense-related science and technology development. Mr. Bianchi has working proficiency in Mandarin Chinese and has studied the language at academic programs in both Beijing and Taipei. He co-authored “Warfare Drivers: Mission Needs and the Impact on Ship Design,” a chapter in Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course. Mr. Bianchi’s prior experience also includes work at the Department of Justice and in the Office of Investment Security at the Department of the Treasury. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank Hal Brands, Frank Miller, Evan Montgomery, and Travis Sharp for their insightful comments on previous drafts of this monograph, and Kamilla Gunzinger for her editing and publication support. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the respon- sibility of the authors. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group of contributors, including private foundations, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors. Cover: A U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing refuels a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit from the 509th Bomb Wing during a mission that targeted Islamic State training camps in Libya, January 18, 2017. U.S. Air Force Photo by Staff Sgt. Kate Thornton. Contents CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . 1 The Net Assessment Approach ............................................. 2 Report Structure ....................................................... 4 CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIC INTERACTION . 5 External Sources of Competition ............................................ 5 Internal Sources of Competition ............................................ 8 Thinking About U.S.-Russia-China Strategic Interaction ............................ 9 CHAPTER 3: U .S . STRATEGIC CULTURE & INTERACTION . 11 Early Cold War and the Development of a Deterrence Theory ...................... 12 Late-Cold War, Détente, and the Revitalization of Competitive Strategies .............. 18 Post-Cold War and Current Policy ........................................... 23 Continuity and Change in U.S. Nuclear Policy. 32 Conclusion .......................................................... 38 CHAPTER 4: RUSSIA: STRATEGIC CULTURE AND INTERACTION . 39 Early Cold War and the Threat of Surprise Attack ............................... 40 Late Cold War and the Pursuit of Nuclear Superiority ............................ 42 Post-Cold War and Current Policy ........................................... 45 Continuity and Change in Soviet and Russian Nuclear Policy ....................... 54 Conclusion .......................................................... 57 CHAPTER 5: CHINA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NUCLEAR POLICY AND STRATEGY. 59 Chinese Nuclear Policy from a Historical Perspective ............................ 60 Continuities in Chinese Nuclear Policy. 64 Potential Sources of Change in Chinese Nuclear Policy ........................... 71 Conclusion .......................................................... 83 CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS . 85 LIST OF ACRONYMS . 89 www.csbaonline.org 1 CHAPTER 1 Introduction The nuclear balance is changing. Whereas the total inventory of nuclear warheads has been decreasing for decades, the number of nuclear powers is increasing. Whereas the nuclear balance throughout
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