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The Strategic Effects of Counterinsurgency Operations at Religious Sites: Lessons from India, Thailand, and Israel

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The Strategic Effects of Counterinsurgency Operations at Religious Sites: Lessons from India, Thailand, and Israel Portland State University PDXScholar Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses Winter 3-21-2013 The Strategic Effects of Counterinsurgency Operations at Religious Sites: Lessons from India, Thailand, and Israel Timothy L. Christopher Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds Part of the Asian Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Other Religion Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Christopher, Timothy L., "The Strategic Effects of Counterinsurgency Operations at Religious Sites: Lessons from India, Thailand, and Israel" (2013). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 111. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.111 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: [email protected]. The Strategic Effects of Counterinsurgency Operations at Religious Sites: Lessons from India, Thailand, and Israel by Timothy L. Christopher A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Political Science Thesis Committee: David Kinsella, Chair Bruce Gilley Ronald Tammen Portland State University 2013 © 2013 Timothy L. Christopher ABSTRACT With the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center buildings, the intersection of religious ideals in war has been at the forefront of the American discussion on war and conflict. The New York attacks were followed by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in October of 2001 in an attempt to destroy the religious government of the Taliban and capture the Islamic terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, and then followed by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, both in an attempt to fight terrorism and religious extremism. In both instances, American forces became embroiled in counterinsurgency operations against insurgent fighters who identified themselves in terms of religion and ethnicity. More recently, all of the regional and nuclear powers are engaged in conflicts against insurgents identified as religious in some form. The purpose of this research is to present tactical and strategic policies that can be implemented when ethno-religious violence occurs in and around religious sites, ensuring that operations at these sites will contribute to successful mitigation of violence in the wider conflict. Based on concepts from classical and contemporary counterinsurgency thought, a set of variables that contributes to successful counterinsurgency operations at religious sites was selected in order to understand successes and failures at previous operations. The results from these comparative studies were then used to develop a theoretical framework that contributes to successful counterinsurgency operations at religious sites. The comparative studies chosen for this research includes four cases from India, with the finding then applied to case studies from Thailand, and Israel. Like India, i Thailand and Israel are facing insurgent movements that identify themselves along various ethnic, religious, and national constructs. The findings clearly show that there is a set of operational variables that apply to counterinsurgency operations at religious sites and contribute to tactical and strategic success. Conclusions are drawn that success or failure of counterinsurgency operations at religious sites is not solely tied to a military versus law enforcement approach to the conflict. Contrary to this theory, it is how the operation is carried out, rather than how the counterinsurgents are formed, that contributes to a successful operation. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i LIST OF TABLES v CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER II: TERMINOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 8 CHAPTER III: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY 23 § Operational Implementation 25 § Force Composition 33 § Media Involvement 35 § Religious Leadership Cooperation 38 § External interference 40 CHAPTER IV: CASE STUDIES, INDIAN PUNJAB 43 § Historical Background 43 § Operation Blue Star 47 § Operation Black Thunder 51 § Explaining Divergent Outcomes: Punjab 55 • Operational Implementation 58 • Force Composition 60 • Media Involvement 62 • Religious Leadership Cooperation 64 • External Interference 65 CHAPTER V: CASE STUDIES, INDIAN JAMMU AND KASHMIR 67 iii § Historical Background 67 § Hazratbal Mosque 69 § Charar-e-Sharief Shrine 75 § Explaining Divergent Outcomes: Jammu and Kashmir 79 • Operational implementation 81 • Force Composition 82 • Media Involvement 83 • Religious Leadership Cooperation 85 • External Interference 86 CHAPTER VI: CASE STUDIES, THAILAND AND ISRAEL 88 § Historical Background: Pattani Province 88 § Krue Se Mosque 90 § Historical Background: Bethlehem, West Bank 95 § Church of the Nativity Siege 96 § Comparisons to Indian Cases 98 • Operational Implementation 99 • Force Composition 101 • Media Involvement 102 • Religious Leadership Cooperation 103 • External Interference 104 CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION 106 REFERENCES 111 iv LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1: Case Study Outcomes and Variables 6 v CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION The investigation into how the tactical success of counterinsurgency operations at religious sites relates to strategic success in the broader conflict begs the question; to what end will this research serve? Why is the study of counterinsurgency operations at religious sites important enough to warrant its own research, or is it to simply be viewed as an aspect of the larger counterinsurgency picture? While there are few instances of counterinsurgency operations at religious sites historically, these instances of conflict in sacred space have enormous implications on the larger strategic outcomes and their respective campaigns. In these cases, conflict in sacred space becomes a triggering event, mitigating or exacerbating conflict, shifting the momentum of the conflict to either the insurgent or counterinsurgency forces. This phenomenon is extremely important for the United States’ military forces and policy makers, who are engaged in conflicts or have supporting roles in countries from Iraq to Djibouti, to Yemen to Ethiopia, and from Mali to the Philippines. The populations of these states and their respective insurgent forces identify heavily along ethno-religious lines, and an affront to the religious sites of the particular ethno-religious groups can be and is seen as tantamount to ethnic warfare in the eyes of the insurgents and the community they claim to represent. But the operation is not inherently directed toward that specific ethno-religious group. Insurgents not affiliated regionally religiously, or culturally with the communal ethno-religious groups may attempt to utilize these sites for various political reasons. In this regard, research will not be directed at the 1 ethno-religious group, but will specifically be concerned with counterinsurgency operations in and around the site. But this is in no way limited to the United States. Russian forces have engaged in conflicts with Muslim Chechens, the Chinese military and police have had to deal with ethnic Uighur separatists of western China, Kurds in Turkey and Iran, and the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan all have various ethno-religious separatist and terrorist groups it has confronted in recent years. Some of the most populous and powerful states on the globe are engaged in counterinsurgency operations against ethno-religious groups, and when Pakistan and India are added to this list, at least five of these states are nuclear powers. India also has the other characteristics of being both very heterogeneous in its population as well as being the world’s largest democracy, sharing many similarities with the U.S. and other western nations. Because of this, India is used as a petri dish of sorts, where insurgents test out attacks prior to engaging western targets. The importance of examining this phenomenon is self-evident. In order to explain how tactical and strategic successes interact, a definition for both concepts is needed. The Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms put forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff refers to tactical success as a victory that results in the completion of a tactical objective.1 A tactical objective is the lowest level of operational planning, occurring at a specific site or locale, which aims to complete the goals of the assigned mission or task, so that tactical success would be the 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2010. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02: 280. 2 completion of that mission. Success at the tactical level therefore contributes to the success or failure of the whole operation, i.e. strategic success or failure. Forces operating against insurgent groups in or around religious sites may garner success at the tactical level by using whatever means it deems necessary, but this tactical success does not necessarily translate into strategic success. The means which counterinsurgency forces implement in order to achieve tactical success at a religious site may actually inflame the conflict and contribute to strategic failure. The tactical and strategic success of counterinsurgency operations at religious sites is the culmination of proactive media involvement, intelligent operational implementation, and the ability to limit or negate external interference. But as the case
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