Why the SPD exiles in Scandinavia failed to persuade the post-1945 SPD to adopt the ideas and ideals of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. The SPD exiles and the Scandinavian Social Democrats in the period 1933-1956.

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of “DOCTOR OF ”

by

AMI VATURY

Submitted to the Senate of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

30 of August 2004

Beer-Sheva

Why the SPD exiles in Scandinavia failed to persuade the post-1945 SPD to adopt the ideas and ideals of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. The SPD exiles and the Scandinavian Social Democrats in the period 1933-1956.

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of “DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY”

by

AMI VATURY

Submitted to the Senate of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Approved by the advisor Approved by the Dean of the Kreitman School of Advanced Graduate Studies

30 of August 2004

Beer-Sheva

This work was carried out under the Supervision of Professor Frank Stern

In the Department of History

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Table of Content

Introduction

Chapter A: The aims of the research, the existing scholarship in this area, 1 the nature of the sources and the structure of the dissertation. Chapter B: The development of SPD ‘pragmatism’ and Swedish Social 7 Democratic ‘’ up to 1914. Chapter C: The development of the Swedish Social Democrats ‘Functional 19 ’ from 1914 to 1956, and main similarities with the Danish and Norwegian Social Democratic parties.

Part 1- Good Cooperation but only Limited Influence (The SPD Exiles and the Scandinavian Social Democrats up to 1940)

Chapter 1.1: SPD ‘party ’ from 1920 to 1933 compared to the ‘party 40 Ideology’ of the Scandinavian Social Democrats; the role played by the most senior SPD exiles in Scandinavia (Fritz Tarnow and Kurt Heinig) during this period and their views regarding the ‘Weimar SPD party ideology’. Chapter 1.2: The founding of the So.Pa.De and the attitude of future leading 71 SPD exiles in Scandinavia towards the exiled secretariat in June 1933. Chapter 1.3: SPD exiles and Social Democratic in 1933 75 Chapter 1.4: The ‘ Manifesto’ compared to the political programs 83 of the Swedish and Danish Social democrats. Chapter 1.5: SPD exiles and the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats 87 during the period 1934-1935. Chapter 1.6: SPD exiles and Danish and Swedish Social Democrats during 96 the period 1936-1937. Chapter 1.7: SPD exiles and Scandinavian social Democrats during the 104 period 1938 to 1940. Chapter 1.8: Kurt Heinig begins to be influenced by the Scandinavian 120 Social Democrats. Chapter 1.9: SPD(RSD) Exiles in Norway during the period 1938 to 132 1940.

Part 2- ‘Swedophiles,’ SPD exiles who were minimally influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats and SPD exiles with non-egalitarian views. (The stands taken by the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London; the internal politics of SPD exiles in from 1940 until 1944, the views they held during the period 1940-1948 and how these were influenced by the Scandinavian social Democrats)

Chapter 2.1: The stands taken by the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London 141 compared to positions of the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

I Chapter 2.2: SPD exiles in Sweden from the spring of 1940 till the 145 winter of 1943. Chapter 2.3: Kurt Heinig becomes an admirer of the Swedish Social 153 Democrats and a supporter of their ‘party ideology.’ Chapter 2.4: Otto Friedländer’s naïve perception of Swedish Social 163 . Chapter 2.5: SPD exiles who were minimally influenced by the 173 Scandinavian Social Democrats. Chapter 2.6: Paul Bromme and his non-egalitarian views. 180 Chapter 2.7: A ‘radical model of Paul Bromme’: 193 views in the 1940’s

Part 3 – Closed to Some, Open to Others. (The road to the post- 1945; the activities of Fritz Tarnow from 1940 to 1951; the political actions of the main SPD exiles in Sweden from 1944 to 1956; Heinigs efforts to promote Swedish till 1956)

Chapter 3.1: Factors that influenced the successful integration of an 198 SPD exile from Scandinavia into the new SPD. Chapter 3.2: The opportunist 201 Chapter 3.3: How the political career of Kurt Heinig, the main 212 ‘Swedophile’ came to an end. Chapter 3.4: The fates of Stahl, Raloff, Sassnick, Friedländer 223 and the supporters of cooperation with the communists. Chapter 3.5: Paul Bromme- the road to Lübeck. 228 Chapter 3.6: Kurt Heinig tries to convince the SPD that ‘reform 234 should lead to a social revolution.’ Chapter 3.7: SPD ’party ideology’ in the period 1945-1956 240 and the ‘action program’ of 1952/1954.

Concluding remarks. 246

Appendix

A- The SPD and the Swedish Social Democrats from 1871 to 253 1956 (important dates). B- A copy of the ‘Prague Manifesto’ from ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 264 of the 28.1.1934. C- Abbreviations of organizations names 271

Sources 272

II Abstract

Introduction The aim of this dissertation is to explain the limited influence of the Scandinavian Social Democrats on SPD exiles whom they hosted in the period 1933-1956 and on the main organization of the exiles – the So.Pa.De. Many of the SPD exiles in Scandinavia were senior figures in the Weimar SPD and the So.Pa.De leadership viewed the Scandinavian Social Democrats as important allies. However, the SPD did not adopt, after 1945, the egalitarian goals of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. The most successful politicians of the post 1945 SPD who spent a period of exile in Scandinavia were not members of the Weimar SPD but members of the German SAP (Willy Brandt) or the KPD ().

In addition to defining the aim of the dissertation, the Introduction provides a detailed description of the SPD up to 1914 and of the Scandinavian Social Democrats up to 1956 (Chapter B and Chapter C). The time frame of the research ends in 1956. These two chapters are not part of the research (there was no significant political activity by the main, future SPD exiles in Scandinavia before 1914, and the history of the Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties is not an integral part of the research), however their content is essential in order to understand the claims put in this paper.

The first chapter describes the development of the SPD’s pragmatic tendency up to 1914 and the development of the policy of ‘reformist Socialism’ of the main Scandinavian (the Swedish Social Democrats) prior to 1914. The second chapter describes the form of ‘reformist Socialism’ ultimately adopted by the Scandinavian Social Democrats and its implementation up to 1956. The emphasis in the second chapter is on the Swedish Social Democrats because theirs was the most prominent example of this policy and because most SPD exiles in Scandinavia spent the latter part of their exile in Sweden.

The two chapters aim to show the main differences in ideas and political tactics between the SPD and the Scandinavian Social Democrats, differences that one would

III have expected to diminish in light of the large concentration of SPD exiles in Scandinavia and the close contacts between the So.Pa.De and the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

The ideas of ‘reformist Socialism’ were expressed clearly by the Swedish Social Democrats as from 1911 and by the Danish Social Democrats as from 1913. The platform was also adopted by the Norwegian Labor Party in the mid 1930s. After 1945, it became the policy of the ruling Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Social Democratic Parties as well as that of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, which formed coalition governments with the Communist Party. The central aims of ‘reformist Socialism’ were: A) to create a classless society with equal distribution of income and capital; B) to achieve this goal and finance generous payments and extensive public services through high taxes; C) to organize the entire workforce in trade unions and to create a policy of equal wages; D) to promote a Keynesian macroeconomic policy in order to create full employment, assigning a lesser role to central planning; E) to give trade unions a large percentage of control in the management of their workplaces and to place key parts of the economy under public ownership (not necessarily through ); F) to garner the political support of small farmers and the self employed in addition to that of urban workers.

Up to 1914, the SPD had an ‘orthodox’ party program, the Erfurt Program, which did not address the needs of small farmers and the self-employed. The revisionist movement which developed in the SPD did not adopt the egalitarian goals of Scandinavian ‘reformist Socialism.’ The trade unions were the pragmatic body within the SPD but they were small in relative size compared to their counterparts in Scandinavia.

Part 1 Part one deals with the SPD exiles and the Scandinavian Social Democrats up to 1940. Chapter 1 is devoted to the main SPD exiles in Scandinavia and their position regarding SPD policies and ideas in the period 1920-1933. The chapter compares these policies and ideas with those of the Scandinavian Social Democrats at the same period. This was the period, which led to the exile of the SPD since it was unable to prevent the rise of the extreme right in and save the democratic Weimar

IV Republic. The process led to the outlawing of the SPD in June 1933. During the same period, the Social Democratic Parties became the main political power in Scandinavia.

The chapter describes the SPD’s lack of assertiveness during the Weimar period and its willingness to form coalitions with parties that favored strong anti-welfare policies (the DVP) even though the coalitions were not essential in order to protect the democratic regime. The SPD’s policies in the 20s were opposite to those of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. The chapter compares the SPD’s party program of this period with the 1920 program of the Swedish Social Democrats and discusses the ideas of the SPD’s main economic theoretician (). The comparison demonstrates that, unlike the Swedish Social Democratic program, the SPD programs did not adopt a comprehensive program of taxes and welfare payments, nor did they offer detailed proposals for solving the problems of small farmers. In general, SPD policies towards small farmers and the self-employed were rather vague, as were their definitions of their party’s final goal and their policy towards public control of the economy. In the 20s, the SPD saw itself primarily as the representative of organized labor and the rival of the farmers (Fritz Baade and Rudolf Hilferding). The SPD rejected Keynesian macroeconomic policies and Hilferding accorded central planning the status of a ‘Socialist principle’ even when it was implemented by private cartels and monopolies.

The two main future SPD exiles in Scandinavia discussed in this chapter are Fritz Tarnow and Kurt Heinig. Tarnow was the head of the Woodworkers’ Trade Union from 1921 to 1933 and an SPD Reichstag member from 1928 to 1933. He was also a member of the Secretariat of the Federation of German Socialist Trade Unions (ADGB) and its official economic expert. Kurt Heinig was the economics editor of Vorwärts (the main SPD organ) in 1924 and editor of the main ADGB periodical from 1925. In addition, Heinig was an SPD Reichstag member from 1928 to 1933 and the official financial expert of the SPD Reichstag group.

While Tarnow supported Keynesian macroeconomic policy and a comprehensive tax and welfare policy, Heinig was a mainstream theoretician who gave priority to central planning although he did not share Hilferding’s enthusiasm regarding private cartels

V and monopolies. Tarnow’s involvement in the ‘flirt’ between the ADGB and the NSDAP (the Nazi Party) cast doubt on the authenticity of his reformist views.

Following the outlawing of the ADGB, Tarnow fled from Germany to Denmark in May 1933, but his son, Reinhold Tarnow remained in Germany and later became a member of the Nazi Party. Heinig, like the other important SPD exile in Scandinavia Karl Raloff (an SPD Reichstag member in 1933 and one of the party leaders in Hanover), was still in Germany in June 1933 and took part, together with in the SPD headed by Paul Löbe, which opposed the SPD Secretariat in exile (the split ended when the SPD was outlawed on June 22, 1933). Heinig then fled to Denmark in August 1933, following a wave of arrests of SPD activists in Berlin. Raloff fled to Denmark in September 1933 after harassments by the SA. Richard Hansen, Head of the ‘Reichsbanner’ in Schleswig-Holstein arrived in Denmark in May 1933 following the directive of the SPD Secretariat to organize illegal SPD work in Northern Germany from Denmark. Heinig and Raloff helped him operate the So.Pa.De’s (the exile SPD organization) ‘Grenzsekretariat’ in Copenhagen, which received its orders from the So.Pa.De leadership in Prague. The other senior SPD exiles in Denmark were Otto Buchwitz, an elderly SPD Reichstag member, and his friend (former SPD Prime Minister in 1919) who joined Buchwitz in 1934.

On January 28, 1934 the So.Pa.De published the Prague Manifesto, which had the status of an official political program (although there were also good reasons to view it only as a platform for united action by all the German left). The Manifesto did not include clear egalitarian goals such as those of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. It called for the ‘socialization’ of heavy industry and major credit institutions, as well as for public supervision of other parts of the economy. These demands were less radical than the demand of the Swedish Social Democratic programs since 1944 to transfer ‘decision rights over production to the hands of the population as a whole’ or the demand of the Danish Social Democratic programs since 1913 ‘to transfer all to society’s ownership.’ The Manifesto gave priority to central planning and did not put forward detailed proposals regarding taxation and social legislation.

VI The RSD, ‘Revolutionäre Sozialisten Deutschlands,’ was in 1933 and 1934 a party within a party. It was part of the So.Pa.De but it also had its own autonomous organization and institutions and was, in fact, the left wing of the So.Pa.De. Its members supported a high degree of cooperation between SPD exiles and Communist exiles and believed that German Communists could be free from Moscow’s dictates. They also had good contacts with the German SAP, a party which was positioned between the SPD and the KPD. In October 1934, the RSD published its own political platform which was accepted by German SAP founder, Max Sydewitz. Of the people responsible for drafting the document, three went into exile in Scandinavia (Siegfried Aufhäuser, Fritz Bieligk and Max Sydewitz). This suggests that the authors had good contacts with the Scandinavian Social Democrats. Like the Scandinavian Social Democratic programs, the RSD’s platform aimed to create a classless society, promised to put all decisions in social and economic matters in the hands of elected bodies, and did not give priority to central planning.

In early 1935, the heads of the So.Pa.De ( and Hans Vogel) expelled the RSD’s representatives from the So.Pa.De Secretariat accusing them of maintaining contacts with the Communists via the ‘Neu Begin’ group. As result, the RSD became an independent organization, which competed with the So.Pa.De. The Scandinavian Social Democrats and Trade Unions financed, on an individual basis, So.Pa.De and RSD exiles, but refused to finance the different organizations of SPD exiles and supported only the main organization of SPD exiles (the So.Pa.De). One of the services given by the Scandinavian Social Democrats to the So.Pa.De, was to ensure the safekeeping in Copenhagen of a large part of the SPD archives, which became an important source of income for the So.Pa.De. The archives arrived in Denmark in the period 1933-1934 and remained there till 1938, although they were sold in 1936 to the Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. The archives included the original manuscript and drafts of Das Kapital by .

By the end of 1937, it became clear that the So.Pa.De had to move its headquarters out of the Czechoslovakian Republic. was chosen as the new location of the Secretariat and the So.Pa.De decided to move most of its assets to France and neighbouring countries (Belgium and Holland). It is clear from articles published in Neuer Vorwärts that the Scandinavian countries were perceived by the So.Pa.De

VII leadership as Hitler’s next target, with a fate similar to the Czechoslovak Republic. The importance of the Scandinavian Social Democratic countries thus decreased in the eyes of the So.Pa.De leadership and, despite the achievements of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, the leadership was not ready to adopt the Scandinavian Social Democratic model. Nonetheless, in May 1938, Emil Stahl, a member of the So.Pa.De Secretariat, was sent to Sweden to help organize SPD exiles there. The Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat maintained, in 1934, that many of the exiles in Sweden were Communists claiming to be SPD members because the Swedish Communist Party did not have the means to finance them.

In Denmark, Kurt Heinig became the only member of the mainstream So.Pa.De who was influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats and supported their Keynesian macroeconomic approach and their tax and welfare payments policies. In late 1937, the RSD reunited with the mainstream So.Pa.De. However by 1938, most of the RSD exiles in Scandinavia preferred to settle in Norway, at a distance from Emil Stahl who was based in Sweden and at a distance from the large group of mainstream So.Pa.De members in Denmark. The Oslo So.Pa.De leadership, in 1938 and 1939, was made up of RSD members Fritz Bieligk, Otto Friedländer (head of the SPD student organization in the early 30s) and Paul Bromme (a young SPD member who came from Lübeck like Willy Brandt). Aufhäuser one of the two RSD leaders came to Norway but he was very sick and spent most of his time in Norwegian hospitals.

Part 2 Between mid-1940 and mid-1945, nearly all the SPD exiles in Scandinavia concentrated in Sweden. Tarnow, Heinig, Raloff and Hansen fled from Denmark to Sweden (Hansen left Sweden and went to the US in 1941, Buchwitz was arrested in Denmark and sent to a concentration camp and Scheidemann died in December 1939). The total number of SPD exiles in Sweden during this period (1940-1945) was 300, the second largest concentration of SPD exiles in after the UK.

The So.Pa.De surviving Secretariat moved to London in 1940. The dominant figures in this Secretariat were former SPD General Secretary, Hans Vogel (the more senior General Secretary, Otto Wels died in in 1939) and So.Pa.De Secretariat member

VIII . The London Secretariat adopted, under the influence of Willy Eichler (head of the ISK), a compromising, non-egalitarian political platform.

The SPD exiles in Sweden were divided among themselves. Between 1941 and early 1943, Carl Polenske, head of the So.Pa.De group, became the rival of Emil Stahl. In January 1943, Stahl resigned from his post, as So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden, following accusations by the Stockholm So.Pa.De group that he had been guilty of embezzlement. Kurt Heinig was nominated by the So.Pa.De Secretariat as the new So.Pa.De Secretariat Representative in Sweden. Fritz Tarnow opposed Heinig’s appointment and worked hard to discredit him.

During his years of exile in Sweden, Heinig became a hardcore supporter of Swedish Social Democratic ideas and policies. His group (which split, in January 1944, from the Stockholm So.Pa.De pro-cooperation with the Communists group) published in February 1945 a proposal for the SPD’s postwar party program. The proposal had radical, egalitarian goals and was very much in line with the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1944.

Otto Friedländer, of the pro-cooperation with the Communist Stockholm So.Pa.De group, also supported the Swedish model, but tended to view Sweden as a place that had unique conditions. Paul Bromme, a former RSD member, and Willy Brandt member of the German SAP, had close contacts with the Scandinavian Social Democrats ,but renounced radical, egalitarian goals already in their exile period in Sweden.

Part 3 Fritz Tarnow, an opportunist figure, was the most influential SPD exile in Sweden. Tarnow had contacts with the German rightwing and with Nazi party members who conspired against Hitler (the July 20, 1944 failed coup attempt). At the same time, he cooperated with exiled German Communists in Sweden through the organization of ‘Exiled German Trade Unions in Sweden’ (this group was headed by Tarnow and included 350 members). In his correspondence with the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London, Tarnow hid his contacts both with the German rightwing and the German

IX Communists, portraying himself as a loyal Social Democrat. Tarnow also made a good impression on American intelligence. He returned to Germany in 1946 and became head of the trade unions in the American occupation zone. While in Sweden, he managed to sideline Heinig whose anti-Bolshevik views made him unpopular among most SPD exiles in Sweden.

Heinig regarded Tarnow as a personal enemy. He was deterred from rejoining the SPD after the war because of Tarnow’s important position in the trade unions and because of the success of Willy Brandt whom Heinig viewed as a young opportunist. Schumacher’s cold response to Heinig, who offered him a political alliance, convinced Heinig to give up the idea of pursuing a political career in Germany. His efforts to influence the SPD from the outside by promoting the merits of Swedish Social Democracy were unsuccessful.

Friedländer, Raloff, Stahl and Polenske stayed out of SPD politics due to personal reasons or age. In Friedländer’s case, he also felt that, as a Jew, he could not longer view Germany as his homeland. Bromme, the most successful member of the post- 1945 SPD who had been an SPD member before 1933 and had gone into exile in Sweden, made good use of his political patrons. He sided with Heinig as long as the latter remained a powerful figure, but from mid-1946 Bromme moved closer to Brandt. His relatively young age also helped him garner Schumacher’s support.

In 1952 and in 1954, the SPD adopted a non-egalitarian political program in line with the positions of the London Secretariat, a development which was not opposed by the post-1945 senior SPD members who had returned to Germany from Sweden (Bromme, Sassnick, Brandt and Wehner).

X Key words SPD So.Pa.De Swedish Social Democrats Scandinavian Social Democrats Exile Kurt Heinig Fritz Tarnow Paul Bromme Willy Brandt Functional Socialism Egalitarianism 1933-1956

XI Introduction

Chapter A The aims of the research, the existing scholarship in this area, the nature of the sources and the structure of the dissertation.

The SPD and the Scandinavian Social Democrats represent two different forms of Social Democracy. The SPD is an example of a party that failed politically during the ‘’ period and failed to prevent the rise of the National (the Nazi Party). This failure was, to a large extent, the result of SPD political tactics and economic programs, rather than the outcome of the humiliations suffered by Germany following WWI or the economic hardships it experienced in the 1920s and early 1930s. The ‘Weimar SPD’ tended to put too much emphasis on ‘central planning.’ It did not offer any solutions to the economic problems of small farmers and its aims were vague and open to multiple interpretations. Taxes, transfer payments and later on ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policies’ (manipulation of the ‘market economy,’ creation of ‘full employment’ through public works and raising the ‘purchasing power’ of workers) were not given a priority or were rejected by the SPD. ‘The Weimar SPD’ also had a tendency to make political compromises (‘in order to save the Republic’) with parties that took extreme anti- social stands. Not all these compromises could be justified as essential for the survival of political democracy in Germany. The post 1945 SPD had more political success. However this party gave the term ‘social democracy’ a non-egalitarian interpretation and renounced completely the idea of a ‘publicly controlled economy’ and a ‘classless society.’

Scandinavian Social Democrats (Swedish Social Democrats, Danish Social Democrats, the Norwegian Labor party and, after 1945, Finnish Social Democrats) had a ‘party ideology’ (the term ‘party ideology’ refers to the programs, speeches and articles of leading party figures together with the party’s political platforms and tactics) which is defined as ‘reformist socialism’ or ‘functional socialism’ (the name

1 given in 1967 to ‘Swedish Social Democratic ideology’ and to the Swedish social model by the famous Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Adler- Karlsson 1).

The Scandinavian Social Democratic ‘party ideology’ and particularly the ‘party ideology’ of the Swedish Social Democrats included the following elements: A) the egalitarian goal of equal income distribution and a ‘classless society’; B) achieving this goal through high taxes, extensive public services and generous transfer payments, ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policies’, wage equality with only small differences between the pre-tax wages of non-professional and professional workers and between ordinary workers and managerial staff; C) unionization of the entire workforce, control of firms by unions through direct and indirect means and public ownership of a large part of the economy.

The Scandinavian Social Democrats were also able to succeed where the SPD failed. They had a detailed program aimed at improving the economic situation of small farmers and, in return, they gained considerable political support from this sector. They did not make formal coalitions with hard-core ‘capitalistic parties’ and their ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policy’ appealed to people who were not hard-core ‘socialists’. In the early 30s, the Social Democrats became the dominant political force in their countries (with the exception of the Finnish Social Democrats) and garnered more political success than any non-Scandinavian Social Democratic party.

From 1933 on, SPD exiles had an excellent opportunity to learn from Scandinavian Social Democrats. A significant number of SPD members including many senior figures in the ‘Weimar SPD’ fled to Scandinavia between 1933 and 1938. Most of these exiles concentrated in Sweden in the period 1940-1946. During this time they had direct contact with the Secretariats of the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Social Democratic parties. Almost all succeeded in acquiring a good command of the local languages and were able to study, without the need of intermediaries, the ideas and successes of the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

1 Adler –Karlsson, G., ‘Functional Socialism. A Swedish Theory for Democratic Socialization’ (Stockholm 1967).

2 The So.Pa.De (the SPD in exile) Secretariat also had extensive contacts with the Secretariats of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. The So.Pa.De received many services from the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties. These services included financial support for SPD exiles, financing of So.Pa.De ‘illegal activity’ in North Germany, safekeeping of the SPD archive between 1933 and 1939, support for its foreign policy positions in the SAI (the Social Democratic International) and hosting the So.Pa.De leadership as it made its way from Czechoslovakia to France.

The main differences between the SPD’s 1952/1954 ‘Aktionsprogramm’ and the political programs of the post-1944 Swedish Social Democrats, the post-1945 Norwegian Labor Party program, and the post-1913 Danish Social Democratic program, prove that the influence of the Scandinavian Social Democrats on the post- 1945 SPD was very limited. The SPD Bad Godesberg program of 1959 made the SPD an even less egalitarian party and widened the gap between the ‘post-1945 SPD party ideology’ and the ‘Scandinavian Social Democratic Party’s ideology.’ The senior figures in the post 1945 SPD, who had been in Scandinavian exile, were for the most part young people who were not members of the ‘Weimar SPD’ or the So.Pa.De of the 30s and early 40s. Therefore the question, which stands at the core of my dissertation, is ‘why did the SPD exiles fail to learn from the Scandinavian Social Democrats and, in the case of those who did adopt the ideas of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, why did they fail to influence the post war SPD?’

In order to answer this question, I will describe the political biographies (in some cases the personal biographies as well) and ideas of the leading SPD exiles in Scandinavia before, during and after their period of exile. I will demonstrate the influence the Scandinavian Social Democrats had on the exiles and explain why the exiles were able or unable to influence the post-1945 SPD. I will also analyse the contacts established between the So.Pa.De leadership and the Scandinavian Social Democrats and the internal politics of the SPD exiles in Sweden, both factors having played a part in the final outcome.

3 Because the central figures in the post-1945 SPD were not members of the ‘Weimar SPD’ or the So.Pa.De, most of the research undertaken on the ‘German speaking exiles in Scandinavia’ has concentrated on figures such as Willy Brandt or on organizations such as the German SAP as well as on other figures who were not SPD exiles and on organizations which were not made up of SPD exiles. It is true that most of the principle scholars on the ‘German speaking exiles in Scandinavia’ (Helmut Müssner, Einhart Lorenz, Klaus Misgeld and others) also wrote on the SPD exiles in Scandinavia but this was not their main subject, nor did they do so in order to answer the question that stands at the core of this paper. These writers barely commented on the motives of the political and personal actions of the leading SPD exiles. There is also only very limited discussion by these scholars on the literary work of the SPD exiles before, during and following their period of exile. The biographical information on the exiles provided by these writers is considerably less detailed than that presented in this dissertation.

This dissertation will focus minimally on ‘non-Weimar SPD’ figures such as Willy Brandt and only in so far as they relate to the main thesis put forward. (The view of Willy Brandt put forward in this dissertation accords with the views intimated by Einhart Lorenz in his works on Willy Brandt.)

The main methodological problems confronted in writing this dissertation were: A- whether to cover all German-speaking exiles, only non-communist exiles or solely SPD exiles; B- deciding the time frame for the research. Regarding the first point, I opted to deal solely with SPD exiles, although I do relate to some of the literary work of Willy Brandt – the most important German-speaking exile in Scandinavia. The separation between the SPD exiles and other exiles who subsequently became part of the SPD, is not an artificial one. The SPD continued to exist between 1933 and 1945 as a political organization with publications, leaders and rules. A non-anachronistic view would expect that the post 1945 SPD leadership coming from Scandinavia would have been made up of surviving senior figures of the ‘Weimar SPD’ and senior members of the So.Pa.De. But this was not the case and the fact that non SPD figures became the main link between the post 1945 SPD and the Scandinavian Social Democrats, points to a failure on the part of the So.Pa.De and the SPD exiles in Scandinavia. It is important to make this point since the non-SPD figures, with the

4 exception perhaps of Wehner, brought with them strong political ambitions combined with a weak commitment to the Scandinavian Social Democrats ideal. This is also the justification for focusing on the SPD exiles in contrast to previous researchers.

The timeframe chosen for this dissertation was based on the following factors: in 1945 most exiles were still in Scandinavia due to the political situation in Germany. The return of the majority of the exiles took place between 1945 and 1950. Several leading exiles chose to stay in Scandinavia but they also did not completely renounce their contacts with the SPD and they continued to try and influence the SPD from the outside. I therefore chose 1956 as the cut-off year because by then all the leading exiles had either returned to Germany or no longer had any influence on the SPD. 1956 was also the year when the leading SPD exile in Sweden (Kurt Heinig) died in Stockholm.

The primary sources for this research are diverse, covering German, Swedish and Danish sources. These include correspondence that throw- light on events from more than one perspective and enable a more reliable assessment of the events as well as So.Pa.De newspapers and periodicals. The sources also include books, essays and articles (including articles in Scandinavian newspapers) written by SPD exiles. I also make use of American intelligence reports on Sweden that dealt with SPD exiles, although the exiles themselves had more extensive knowledge about their comrades than American intelligence.

I was unable to use interviews because there are very few former SPD exiles still alive. The archives used include the SPD archives in -Archiv der sozialen Demokratie Bonn (AdsD), the archives of the Swedish Labor Movement in Stockholm-Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek Stockholm (ARAB), the Swedish Royal Library in Stockholm, and the Danish Royal Library in Copenhagen. Other primary sources and secondary sources were found in the Uppsala University Library, the Copenhagen University Library, the Hebrew University Library, the Tel-Aviv University Library and Harvard University Library. Given that I had access to all the primary sources that had been used by the principle scholars on German-speaking exiles in Scandinavia, in addition to having access to new sources, I did not need, in most cases, to use non-primary sources. On the other hand, I did make use of non-

5 primary sources when writing on issues not at the core of the dissertation. I point out areas where sources were limited or unreliable.

The introduction includes two more chapters. The first chapter describes the difference in development between the SPD and the Swedish Social Democratic Party – the SAP. The second chapter describes the Scandinavian Social Democratic model (‘Functional Socialism’) on which the SPD exiles in Scandinavia and outside Scandinavia could have based their future political programs.

6 Chapter B The development of SPD ‘pragmatism’ and Swedish Social Democratic ‘reformism’ up to 1914.

The SPD was established as a union of ‘Marxist’ and ‘Lassallians’ in 1875 at the Gotha convention. The ‘Lassallians’ (the supporters of ) were the larger group in this union (16,000 compared to 9,000 Marxist) but the leaders, and , were Marxist. Nonetheless, the party’s new political program was vehemently criticized by Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels did not object to the idea of a political party that aimed to educate the masses through parliamentary activity. They also did not object to using the state as a tool to bring about a ‘revolution’ – meaning that they considered it legitimate to achieve universal suffrage and to use a ‘proletarian’ majority to create a parliamentary ‘socialist’ majority. What Marx did not like were the ‘Lassallian’ elements in the program. In his view, these elements were incoherent and unmethodical and could easily be disproved. Marx opposed ‘Lassallian socialism’ and its claim that it was possible to redistribute means of consumption without changing ‘the system of production’.2 Marx opposed any mention of the state as a way of fulfilling the goal of socialism. In his eyes, the state could only be a transitional tool in the process of changing society.3 Calling for the ‘elimination of all social and political inequality’ was also unacceptable to Marx for he placed the emphasis on the ‘elimination of classes’ after which there would be no more inequality.4

The ‘anti socialist laws’, which were in effect between 1878 and 1890, limited the SPD’s political activity to a very large extent, though the party continued its activities in Germany throughout the 1880’s. With the return of the SPD to full political activity, the party garnered political success with 1427,000 votes in the 1890 elections to the ‘Reichstag’ and a new political program, the ‘Erfurt Program,’ in 1891. This program took greater account of Marx’s criticisms which, by then, had been made

2 Marx Karl, ‘Marx und Engels Werke.’ Band 19 Deitz Verlag (Berlin 1962), p13-14, p15-23, p26-27 3 Ibid, p23-24 4‘Ibid, p7, p26

7 public.5 was the chief writer of this program. Born in 1854, Kautsky began editing in 1883 a Socialist paper in called ‘Die Neue Zeit’, which became one of the SPD’s main organs. In 1887,while in exile in Paris, Kautsky published a work entitled ‘The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx’ which became a popular textbook on Marx in Germany. The ‘Erfurt Program’ called for the ‘socialization of all means of productions and the replacement of the capitalist production system by a socialist production system based on the needs of society’.6 It made the ‘historic prediction’ that the ‘capitalist system’ would create a society consisting of a huge ‘proletariat class’ and a small ‘class’ of capital owners, and thus lead to mass poverty.7 The prediction paid tribute to Marx’s theories. The program demanded ‘for the near future’ a shorter working day (8 hours maximum) and a shorter working week (with a minimum weekly vacation of 36 hours). The program made few demands for the agriculture sector.8 Kautsky considered farmers as a class that would eventually disappear. In 1899, many years after the ‘Erfurt Program’ had been adopted, Kautsky wrote in his book ‘The Agrarian Question’ that no particular program was needed to protect the interests of agricultural wage earners because these were covered in the general demands. He also wrote, on the other hand, that the SPD should support the peasantry because it would become a power base like the ‘industrial proletariat.’9 However, in practice, the SPD programs did not move in this direction and the lack of emphasis on the interests of small farmers remained.

The political success of the SPD made it a model for many emerging Socialist parties in Europe. The Swedish Social Democratic Party was founded in 1889 as a union of socialist clubs. In its first years, its political program was based on a Danish translation of the SPD ‘Gotha Political Program’. Only in 1897, did the Swedish Social Democrats initiate their first original political program, based, to a large extent, on the SPD’s ‘Erfurt Program’. The SPD was thus the model for the Swedish Social Democrats, but at an early stage, they opted for redistribution of income without changing the entire system of production while manipulating the ‘market economy’. An egalitarian spirit and the demand for equality in the near future rather than at the

5 Marx criticism of the ‘Gotha Programm’ was published in ‘Die Neue Zeit’ for the years 1890-1891 number 18. See Marx, op.cit., p12 6 The ‘Erfurt Program’, in ‘Vorwärts’ 21.10.1891 p1 7 Ibid 8 Ibid

8 ‘end of time’ also became a major element of their political ideas and activity. To a certain degree, the German Social Democrats underwent a similar process but their distancing from the ‘Erfurt Program’ was much slower and less encompassing. In addition, the SPD did not officially adopt at any stage the egalitarianism of the Swedish Social Democrats.

At first, the two main leaders of the Swedish Social Democrats were: Axel Danielsson, who was head of the party and editor of the party’s paper (Arbetet) in Malmö in Southern Sweden from 1887 till 1899 and Hajlmar Branting head of the party in Stockholm and editor of the party’s paper in Stockholm (the ‘Social Democraten’) from 1887 onward. August Palm the founder of the party became a marginal figure at an early stage due to his contacts with anarchist elements. Danielsson, the main writer of the 1897 program, was a young man with no previous direct contact with Marx. Branting, who became the head of the still small Social Democratic party came from a middle class background and was open to influence from ‘radical liberals’. It is quite conceivable that Danielsson saw no problem in omitting from the Swedish Social Democratic program the part of the ‘Erfurt Program’ that described the ‘capitalist production system’ as the cause of mass poverty, a description that seemed at his time not to have empirical support. The 1897 program included a long list of social demands regarding the rights of small farmers, something that was missing from the SPD 1891 ‘Erfurt Program.’10

The massive rise of the Swedish Social Democrats took place between 1898 and 1911. It was during this period that the majority of the party’s future theoreticians and leaders, such as Wigforss, Möller, Lindhagen, Hansson and Karleby, became Social Democrats. They respected Marx and accepted parts of his ‘theory of history’ and his views on ‘class relationships.’ However they were already veering towards ‘reformist’ alternatives to Marx regarding the implementation of ‘socialism’, such as Bernstein ‘’ and the Fabian ideas of the British Labor movement.

Eduard Bernstein was born in 1850. He was almost 50 years old and had been a longstanding member of the SPD when he introduced his revisionist ideas. His

9Kautsky Karl, ‘The Agrarian Question.’ (London 1988), p 313 10 Tingsten, H., ‘Den Svenska socialdemokratins idéutveckling.’ (Stockholm 1941), p 119-120

9 position, as someone who had personal contacts with Engels at the time of his exile in London and as the editor of an important SPD paper, which was for a short period the official SPD paper, protected him from expulsion from the SPD despite the fact that his ideas turned Marx on his head. Bernstein maintained his position in the SPD and that in itself proved that his views became part of the accepted version of SPD political policy. However the ‘Erfurt Program’ remained the official SPD program. Bernstein summed up his criticism of Marx, which had already appeared in published articles, in a letter to the SPD Congress that took place in Stuttgart from October 3 to 8, 1898. Bernstein viewed the idea that the ‘capitalist system’ would lead to the shrinking of the ‘bourgeoisie’ and to economic catastrophe as false.11 He noted that Engels himself acknowledged this ‘fact’ in the Preface to his book ‘Class War in France.’12 After further emphasizing that his views were in line with those of Engels, he concluded his letter with a call to ‘strengthen equally the realistic and idealistic elements in the socialist movement.’13

Bernstein put forward more detailed criticism in his book ‘Evolutionary Socialism’ which was first published in German in October 1899 and translated into English in 1909. Although Bernstein maintained that his criticism was based on ‘’ he attacked many of Marx’s main ideas. Bernstein accepted, the basis of Marx’s ‘theory of history’ but considered that Marx accorded too much emphasis to economic factors and not sufficient weight to the important role of ideas and ethics.14 Bernstein criticized using the level of direct wages as a measurement of morality. He agreed with Marx that all products are the outcome of direct work and ‘dead work’ invested in capital and raw materials. However he noted that ‘the theory of value gives norm for the justice or injustice of the partition of the product of Labor just as little as does the atomic theory for the beauty or ugliness of a piece of sculpture’.15

Bernstein’s defined Socialism as ‘a society based on the principle of association.’ 16 To him, Socialism was an extension of ‘liberalism’ and a method of organizing

11 Meyer, T., ‘Bernsteins konstruktiver Sozialismus.’ (Berlin/Bad Godesberg 1977), p392 para. 5 12Ibid, para. 6 13‘Ibid, last sentence. 14Bernstein Eduard, ‘Evolutionary Socialism.’ (New York 1961), p15 15 Ibid, p39 16 Ibid, p96

10 ‘liberalism’17. Regarding its goal, he wrote: ‘the ultimate goal of socialism is nothing but the movement is everything.’ By this, Bernstein explained that he did not mean to say that socialism had no goals, but rather that its ultimate goal would be achieved in the very distant future and that, in the meantime, the SPD should advance those things that were achievable.18 Bernstein also put forward some inspiring goals such as ‘raising the worker from the social position of a proletarian to that of a citizen, thus making citizenship universal’19 and ‘The individual should be free not in the metaphysical sense, as dreamt by anarchists i.e. free from all obligations towards the community - but free from all economic constraints on his actions and choice of calling. Such freedom is only possible for all by means of organization.’20 With regard to practical means Bernstein appealed to powerful potential allies. His statements that trade unions are a ‘democratic element in industry’ and that when the price of goods is settled by competition, unions will be able to raise the income of wage earners,21 made Bernstein a champion of the trade unions. The centre of the German trade union organization, was founded in 1892 and by the turn of the century trade unions had already become quite significant. (it was called till 1919 “Generalkommission der freien Gewerkschaften” than it’s name was changed to the ADGB “ Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund”). By 1910 more than 10% of the German work force was affiliated to a trade union, making the unions a powerful voice pushing for pragmatism.

Bernstein was no different from Kautsky regarding small farmers: he did not propose special plans aimed at improving their situation and he admitted that the idea of improving the relationship between the farmers’ cooperative organization and the SPD was already a lost cause.22 On nationalism, Bernstein held a completely opposite position to that of Marx. He wrote that, with his transformation into ‘citizen’ the ‘proletarian’ began to have a ‘homeland’ in addition to becoming a ‘citizen of the

17 Ibid, p154 18 Ibid, p202 19 Ibid, p148 20 Ibid, p153 21 Ibid, p138-139 22 Ibid, p186-187

11 world.’23 This position accorded with his view that an ‘enlightened society’ was only possible through a state. 24 Kautsky later addressed the issue of ethics in his 1906 book ‘Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History’. In it, he recognized the need for morality and defined the aim of social democracy as ‘equal rights for all in the product of social labor.’25 In his view, this was the meaning of the ‘moral value - equality’26 ,but Kautsky also claimed, in the same book, that ‘science (‘Marxist materialism’) stands above morality.’27

In the first decade of the 20th century, the SPD thus had two leading theoreticians: Kautsky who believed in an egalitarian goal but that little could be achieved in the near future and that the ‘historic law of societal development’ is more important than any idea or ethics; and Bernstein who believed in ethics and in the possibility of achieving progress in the near future through the implementation of ‘socialist ideals’. However, the full egalitarian goal was of minor importance to Bernstein. What he considered important was the ‘process of moving forward’.

A factor, which strengthened ‘revisionist’ and pragmatic views such as those of Bernstein and the trade unions, was the SPD’s representation system up to 1909. This system gave small towns and the less urban areas a large share in SPD representation. By 1909, when the system was changed in favor of more radical urban areas, ‘revisionism’ was already well established within the SPD although far from being the party’s mainstream view. The ‘Erfurt Program’ remained the SPD’s official program until 1921 and its supporters, such as Kautsky, were perceived as ‘centrist’, positioned between Bernstein on the one side and ‘radicals’ such as and the pacifist (son of Wilhelm Liebknecht) on the other side.

The strengthening of the trade unions had a similar effect on the Swedish Social Democrats as on the SPD in Germany. (The LO, the Social Democratic Trade Union Organization, was founded in 1898 and by 1909 it already numbered 231,000

23 Ibid, p169 24 Ibid, p158-160 25Kautsky Karl. ‘Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History.’ (1907 London), p197 26 Ibid

12 members, representing 11.5% of the Swedish workforce – a higher percentage in relative terms than that of the ADGB in Germany.) The new generation of theoreticians within the Swedish Social Democratic Party was also more open to ‘non- orthodox’ ideas, as noted earlier. Carl Lindhagen (1876-1950) was the best example of the new generation of theoreticians that emerged at this stage in the development of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Lindhagen was a dominant member of the ‘left wing’ in the Swedish Liberal Party and also Mayor of Stockholm. In 1909, when he decided to join the Swedish Social Democrats, he immediately became part of the leadership. Such a meteoric rise was possible in a young party with a short tradition and with an already high degree of openness to ‘reformist’ views, as evident in its 1897 political program. It is hard to imagine a similar development in the SPD. This young party would very soon become as strong as the SPD in relative terms. In the elections to the Lower House of Parliament (the first with universal, equal suffrage for men to the Lower House) the Swedish Social Democrats received 28% of the votes compared with the 34.8% received by the SPD in the 1912 elections to the ‘Reichstag’. The party owed part of it success to its ‘reformist’ political program, of which Lindhagen was one of the principal writers.

The new program was adopted at the 1911 Party Congress and Lindhagen gave the main address: ‘The chance of Socialism realizing its innermost thoughts depends on its capacity to be true to these thoughts. Thus, it should never be forgotten that socialism is only the current term for the age-old struggle for the eternally human – . Furthermore, we should not lose sight of the fact that it does not concern only the liberation struggle of the . Rather, it concerns the struggle for the right of all of us – ‘the final struggle.’ Once and for all, we wish to get to the bottom of the evil that has mainly been responsible for setting man against man – the struggle for property…Humanism desires to ensure real spiritual and economic freedom for all peoples. As well as to do away with poverty, because it knows that this is unjust and believes that that which is just can be realized… Humanism desires to do everything for the present generation, to enable it to achieve things big and small, as well as

27 Ibid, p203

13 those possible under present conditions. However, in the work towards these simultaneous goals, humanism is not interested in small reforms but only in structural changes…Humanism wants to tear down the system of private privileges and give the fruits of society to everyone…consequently it desires to get rid of the various wealthy classes and create in its place a single class in which every member feels that he is working on behalf of both himself and others.’28

The main element behind Lindhagen’s Socialism was ethics just as with Bernstein and like Bernstein, Lindhagen also believed in the effectiveness of action in the immediate future. However, unlike Bernstein, Lindhagen did not relate to the egalitarian goal as a goal that could be fulfilled only in the distant future. As in the later programs of the Swedish Social Democrats, there was none of Kautsky’s fatalism or Bernstein’s ‘the process of moving forward is everything, the goal is nothing.’

The 1911 political program included the following ‘reformist’ elements: First the opening: ‘Social Democracy is distinguished from other political parties in that it desires to completely transform the economic organization of bourgeois society and bring about the liberation of oppressed classes.’29 The Swedish Social Democrats thus put themselves forward as the champions not only of the workers but also of other deprived groups. This becomes clearer when a later paragraph notes that small farmers, craftsmen and small tradesman are the other members of the ‘oppressed classes.’30 The second new element in this context was the statement that the properties of these groups should not be nationalized because ‘the fruits of labor will be given to those who labor when the means of production and labor are joined together’.31 Another new element was the addition to the general goal – ‘Social Democracy aims to do away with class power’ – of the more immediate goal: ‘Social Democracy aims to do away with poverty.’32

28 Tingsten, op.cit., p181 29 Ibid, p182 30 Ibid 31 Ibid 32 Ibid

14 This program also put forward more detailed demands for the near future regarding the agricultural sector and welfare than those set out in the 1897 program and the ‘Erfurt Program’.33

In both the SPD and the Swedish Social Democratic Party the intense internal rivalry was not between ‘orthodox’ and ‘reformists’. The main internal contention in the SPD was between ‘centrists’ and ‘radicals’. Among the Swedish Social Democrats, the main contention was between the mainstream and the pacifist stream. In the SPD, in Germany, the issues at the core of the debate were the ‘left’s’ vehement opposition to Germany’s colonial aspirations and the growth of Germany’s military force and their demand to use trade unions as a ‘revolutionary’ tool through general strikes. In Sweden, there was support in the ‘left’ of the party for very radical steps to enable the separation of Norway from Sweden in 1905 and, as in Germany, there was the issue of a general strike.

In the SPD, ‘radicals’ such as Rosa Luxemburg promoted the idea of using the trade unions and a general strike to make ‘revolutionary’ changes. The resistance of the trade union leadership to this idea, which was based mainly on their understanding that the trade unions, despite their success, were still too small for a general strike to be successful, meant that the idea did not have much of a chance of materializing. The pragmatic ‘centrists’ agreed with the trade union leadership and found themselves in the same camp as the ‘revisionists’ who objected to these ideas on an ‘ideological’ basis. The German trade unions had had, at the beginning of the 20th century, a bitter experience with a strike. In order to decrease the growing power of the trade unions, the employers had organized themselves in 1903 in a strong employers’ organization and the weapon they used to bankrupt the unions was the lockout. The trade unions continued to grow but in 1905 almost a third of the SPD trade unions members went on strike and the ‘strike funds’ which the unions had to pay this year alone amounted to more than the funds they laid out during the previous 15 years.34

33 Ibid, p183 34Schorske, C. E., ‘German Social Democracy 1905-1917.’ (Cambridge, MA 1955), p31

15 Using a general strike as a mean of defending the right to vote was accepted in 1903 by both ‘centrists’ such as Rudolf Hilferding who was then a young editor in Kautsky’s paper ‘Neue Zeit’ and by ‘revisionists’ such as Bernstein.35 The Russian Revolution that began on January 22, 1905, convinced ‘radicals’ like Luxemburg that a general strike should also be used in Germany. The SPD Congress held in May 1905 in Köln did not share Luxemburg’s enthusiasm, which left the ‘radicals’ frustrated. Fearing a split in the party, the SPD Congress held in Jena on September 17, 1905 accepted the decision that a general strike could be used in order to protect universal suffrage and the right of association. The ‘radicals’ saw this as an achievement because it ensured that a strike could be held under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, when Saxony changed its elections law, making it less equal, no general strike was called. The unsuccessful conclusion of the Russian Revolution played a part in this outcome. The pro-strike ‘radicals’ were then officially sidelined when the SPD Congress, held on September 23, 1906 in Mannheim, gave the trade unions a veto right in all strike actions.

In contrast, in Sweden a general strike did materialize in 1909. At first sight, it would seem to have been quite unexpected considering the ‘reformist’ stance of the party, but the circumstances were different to Germany’s. One of the main aims of the strike was to obtain general and equal voting rights, at least for men in the first stage, to the Lower House of Parliament. This was a goal that united all Swedish Social Democrats. The right to vote for all men to the Lower House of Parliament existed in Germany since 1871 and any act against this right could have led to a similar reaction in the SPD. Although the Swedish strike did make some contributions to reforms in the electoral system in 1907-1909 it almost destroyed the Swedish trade unions. The natural conclusion, whether it was admitted or not, was that a general strike should be used with caution and, preferably, only after consolidating the strength of the trade unions.

Although the ‘radicals’ were sidelined in both Sweden and Germany by developments related to the use of general strikes, the ‘reformists’ in both countries were unable to show significant achievements as a result of promoting social reforms. With no

35 Ibid, p34

16 Parliamentary majority and no proper democratic system, the ability of the Social Democratic parties to influence social legislation was very limited. Social legislation in Sweden and Germany was the initiative of Liberal and Conservative elements and it was very far in nature and extent from the social legislation of a modern . For example, the main piece of legislation in Sweden that could be considered social was the 1913 Pension Law. This Law was passed with the support of the Social Democrats, already a powerful party, and the support of the Liberal Party. It had no previous parallel. The law ensured disability pensions and old age pensions for insured persons. However, the population that contributed to the insurance plan were people who could not afford private insurance. People with medium to high incomes contributed to different, better insurance plans. The publicly-insured population received a meager pension and had to rely on the community’s assistance programs for the poor – participation which meant the loss of civil rights such as the right to vote.

In Germany, the social system was based on mutual funds that provided financial support for medical expenses and on free non-governmental funds. The legislation of 1892 was supposed to have left in place only the government funds (funds initiated by Bismarck in 1883). The legislation of May 25, 1903 raised the insured income level in cases of illness and accident to 2000 marks per year. This income level meant that the insurance was financed only by low and medium incomes and that the level of support provided, as a result, was also limited. The trade unions had their own insurance funds with similar limitations. In 1899 similar funds for disability insurance were established (also based on funds initiated by Bismarck in 1889). There were also governmental and non-governmental old age pension schemes and assistance programs for the poor. The creation of new social funds gave the impression that the establishment of a welfare system was in process but, as in Sweden, the nature of these funds meant that the costs were financed by the less well off and did not contribute to a redistribution of incomes.

The years before WWI represented the period during which the SPD and the Swedish Social Democrats consolidated their positions as the largest political parties in their respective countries. The electoral success of the Swedish Social Democrats in September 1914 (one month after the outbreak of war) was even larger than that of

17 the SPD (with 36.4% of the votes to the Lower House of Parliament compared with the SPD’s 34.8% in 1912 elections). Only the other Scandinavian Social Democratic movements garnered electoral success similar to that of the SPD and the Swedish Social Democrats. The Danish Social Democrats received 22% of votes in the pre-war elections. The Norwegian Labor Party received around 30% of votes in their pre-war elections. The Social Democratic Party in Finland (then still part of the Russian Empire and not an independent state) reaped an astonishing result with 51.5% of votes in the 1916 elections (Finland had universal suffrage for men and women since 1906). In the next 30 years, the Swedish Social Democratic Party became a model for successful ‘reformism’. In contrast, the story of the SPD was tragic and painful.

18 Chapter-C The development of the Swedish Social Democratic Party ‘functional Socialism’ from 1914 to 1956, and main similarities with the Danish and Norwegian Social Democratic Parties.

Because this dissertation focuses on the history of SPD exiles until 1956, the description of the political development of Swedish Social Democrats and their social achievements is limited to the period 1914-1956. However the implementation of the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s ‘ideology’, meaning income equality and economic power as the goal and taxes, welfare payments and economic supervision of the state, trade unions, and companies as the means, did not end in this period. Significant developments took place during the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s in the implementation of these goals and policies. The Swedish Social Democratic Party’s programs of 1960, 1975 and 1990 continued to support and clarify the ‘party ideology’. Nevertheless, by 1956 almost all the main guidelines of the ‘Swedish Social Democratic Party’s ideology’ had been defined and had begun to be implemented.

As noted, the Swedish Social Democrats reaped greater success than the SPD in the 1914 elections. In the first elections of that year, the Swedish Social Democrats received 30.1% of votes and in the later elections of September, 1914 they received 36.4% of votes. Sweden was not involved directly in the Great War and normal political life continued throughout this period. From February 1914, the Conservative government of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld held office. The government had no majority in the Lower House. Following the elections of September 1914, the Social Democrats became the largest party in the Lower House with 87 representatives and the Hammarskjöld government, which still had no majority in the Lower House, increasingly found that it could not ignore the Social Democrats. The official policy of the Conservative government was that it could keep on working with the support from the Liberals as long as it remained committed to a policy of neutrality. In reality, Swedish policy was pro-German. Prior to the war, Sweden’s two most important trading partners were Britain and Germany. When war broke out, the entire Swedish

19 commercial navy returned to Swedish ports. Only on August 17, when the government created commercial war insurance, did the ships return to sea. Shipping firms were ready to work only on lines that were insured: the Swedish government thus had complete control in deciding which countries Sweden would trade with. It refused to yield to British pressure and trade only with Britain’s allies. Instead, partly out of fear of the Russian Empire which bordered Sweden through Finland and partly because the German regime represented a model for Swedish Conservatives, the government signed a trade agreement with Germany. According to the agreement of March 1915, Sweden would supply pork and butter to Germany and, in exchange, would enjoy the freedom to trade logs in the Baltic Sea area. In 1915, trade with Germany grew dramatically while trade with Britain almost ceased to exist. In May 1915, the government restricted trade through Sweden in order to prevent France and Britain sending supplies to Russia through Swedish territory. In September 1916, Britain ceased all cacao exports to Sweden. On January 31, 1917 Germany launched its ‘submarine war’ and on February 5, Sweden responded by allying itself fully with the German trading bloc, terminating its sea trade insurance and thus all trade with Britain and France. The 1917 elections brought in a new Conservative government headed by Swartz who continued Sweden’s pro-German policy. When the U.S.A joined the coalition of France and Britain, Swedish trade with the U.S.A also ended. Then, on May 29, 1918, succumbing to pressure from the Western allies, the Socialist Liberal government of Sweden (in power since October 19, 1917) signed an agreement strictly limiting trade with Germany and enabling complete freedom of trade with France and Britain.

The Social Democrats had agreed, at the beginning of the war, to Sweden’s policy of neutrality. The party leadership also agreed to Sweden’s continuing to have an army and compulsory service although this was opposed by the pacifist wing of the party which suspected that the government’s policy of neutrality was not genuine and objected to the idea of an army. But they were outnumbered. In a party manifesto of April 1914 (pre-war) ‘Manifest till Sveriges folk’ (Manifesto of the Swedish People) the capitalist classes are warned that, if they start a war, there will be a ‘judgment day’ when the war ends.36 The manifesto also called for a general strike if Sweden entered

36‘Manifest till Sveriges folk’, in [Kongressprotokoll 1914] ARAB/SAP1:1, B20/9 p1 para. 1

20 the war. The leadership’s policy was to view the government’s policy of 1915 as a policy of neutrality. In order to keep the pacifists in line, the party activated ‘parliamentary discipline’ for the first time. The Social Democrats voted against proposals by the Conservatives to formally join Germany. However, the party also prevented the introduction of anti-war measures proposed by the pacifists in Parliament. The split in the Swedish Social Democratic Party began in March 1916, at the same time as the SPD began to split. After all the pacifists’proposals for active anti war measures were rejected by the ‘Socialist Youth Federation’ (the affiliate organization for young and frequently also more assertive Swedish Social Democrats), the pacifists left the party. The split was in no way a split between ‘reformist’ and ‘orthodox’ Social Democrats. The secessionists included, on the one hand, people like Zeth Höglund (head of the Swedish Socialist Youth Organization at its founding and Member of Parliament since 1914) who tended to be more ‘orthodox’ and, on the other hand, they included people such as Carl Lindhagen, the central author of the 1911 ‘reformist’ program.

In February 1917, with the first Russian Revolution in the background and two months before the establishment of the USPD, the secessionist party was founded (SVP). The new party’s program was similar in principle to the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1911, the main difference being the SVP’s call for non- Parliamentary mass action. Both parties thus took a ‘reformist’ line and both had their ‘orthodox’ elements. In the SVP, this was Höglund and in the main Social Democratic Party, it was Arthur Engberg, a member of the party secretariat in the 20’s and a central figure in the party. Nevertheless, these ‘orthodox’ elements agreed to stay in parties that had a clear tendency towards ‘reformism.’ Determinism similar to Kautsky’s appeared mainly in publications and efforts by members who opposed the tendency to use strikes and mass rallies.

In addition to the SVP, Sweden also had a ‘Syndicalist Movement’ whose members refrained from parliamentary activity and operated at the local level and within trade unions. In the early 20’s membership in their trade unions was around 10% that of the LO (the Social Democratic Trade Union) but by the late 20’s membership fell

21 dramatically. This movement was keener to launch strikes or take action that could turn into violence. Gustav Möller, a leading figure in the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat and editor of their main theoretical organ, ‘Tiden’, used determinism similar to Kautsky’s to justify political compromises and a non-assertive line.37 The target of his attacks was Nils Karleby, a young man (only 24 at the time) who was one of the leaders of the SSU (Swedish Socialist Youth Federation). Although a member of the main Swedish Social Democratic Party, Karleby maintained close contacts with SVP members.38 In his view, actions that had no influence on the welfare of the masses could not be part of the historic process that would lead to a ‘Socialist society.’ Karleby subsequently developed the egalitarian theory which maintained that equality in purchasing power was the main way of achieving complete democracy and should be the goal of Social Democracy.

In the 1917 elections, the Social Democratic Parties together increased their votes from 36.4% to 39.1%. The main Social Democratic Party received 31.1% of votes, less than in September 1914, and the SVP received 8%. The Government, made up of the main Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Liberals, considered that extricating Sweden from the conflict with the ‘Western’ allies was its central task. The other challenge was to bring about democratic reforms and introduce universal, equal suffrage to the Upper House of Parliament. The chief obstacles were the Conservatives in the Upper House and the king. But the news of a ‘German Revolution’ created the necessary atmosphere for this reform. On November 15, 1918, six days after the ‘German Revolution,’ the LO published a manifesto proclaiming that if the legislation for the democratization of the Upper House was stopped by the Conservatives, ‘the workers will take the same steps as taken in the German Revolution’. On November 23, the day of the Parliamentary debate, all the Social Democratic papers echoed the threat and proclaimed that any attempt to impede the legislation would lead to inevitable ‘revolution.’ The SVP contributes its part by issuing similar threats and instigating the main Social Democrats in the same direction.39

37 Jonsson, T., ‘Att anpassa sig efter det möjliga.’ (Göteborg 2000), p143-144 38 Ibid, p138 39 Tingsten, op.cit., p 403

22 The Swedish Social Democrats had, by that point, achieved several social reforms, the main one being legislation of an 8 hour ‘normal’ working day and a 48 hour ‘normal’ working week. The reforms were less in extent than in Germany for the Swedish Social Democrats were then smaller in political power than the SPD following the ‘German Revolution’. By 1920, the gap in favor of the SPD would no longer exist.

Already in 1919, the Swedish Social Democrats began drafting a new program. One draft was drawn up by Möller after discussions with Karleby (who now had a better relationship with Möller), another by senior Secretariat member Rickard Sandler which reflected the mainstream line, and one by Arthur Engberg that promoted the ‘orthodox’ stance. All the drafts were in line with the 1911 program. The new program, which was adopted in February 1920 by the Social Democrats did not represent a major step forward in comparison to the 1911 program. Nonetheless, the program was considerably more ‘reformist’ in nature and less open to vague interpretation than the SPD’s ‘Görlitz programm’ (a comparison between the two programs appears later in this dissertation).

The coalition with the Liberals ended in March, 1920. A minority Social Democratic government with Branting its head was left to govern for a short time till the elections, which were due for September 1920. During this short period, the government tried to implement steps towards ‘socialization’ based on clause 13 of their new program (they established a committee to decide which part of the economy ought to be owned by the government in order to have full ‘social control’ over the entire economy.) The other step, which was impeded for lack of a Parliamentary majority, was reform of the provincial tax system in order to make it more progressive.

The elections of September 1920 were the first in which both men and women had the right to vote. This new factor makes it difficult to compare the results with former Swedish elections. The Swedish Social Democratic Parties maintained the same electoral success as they had garnered since the end of 1914. The two parties won a combined 36% of votes, of which 29.6% went to the main Social Democratic Party and 6.4% to the SVP. The Social Democrats went into the opposition but did not have to wait long before their ‘reformism’ and commitment to social welfare reaped greater success at the ballot box. New elections took place in October 1921

23 after the failure of the right-wing government of ‘professionals’. In the new elections, the SAP (the Swedish Social Democratic Party) and the SVP received a combined 44% of votes, of which 36.2% went to the SAP. The Social Democrats received 40% of the votes of urban lower middle class voters compared with 25% in 1917; 70% of votes of very small farmers compared with 60% in 1917; and the highest vote among urban workers and a rate similar to 1917.40 The Swedish Social Democrats solidified their support in sectors, which did not significantly support the SPD in Germany.

The Swedish economy suffered from high inflation throughout 1920. In 1921, the ‘stability’ program of the right-wing governments of De Geer and Von Sydow turned the problem of inflation into one of deflation. Industrial production fell by 40% and unemployment among industrial workers rose to 27%. The crisis continued through 1921 and 1922 with the GDP returning to its 1920 level only in 1924 after growth began to rise in 1923. As for ‘real wages’, the entire decade of the 20’s was needed before they returned to their1920 level.41

Against this background, Branting formed the second Social Democratic Minority Government in October 1921. Unlike the SPD, the Swedish Social Democrats refrained from a coalition government with ‘non socialist’ parties until 1932. They were thus able to use their standing as a minority government for declarative purposes, to make ‘anti-capitalist’ propaganda and to proclaim their intentions regarding social legislation even though they were unable to implement these intentions for lack of a parliamentary majority.

In their electoral platform of 1921, the Social Democrats emphasized: a) the need to protect the social achievements of Eden’s Socialist Liberal Government, the 8-hour working day and the right to strike; b) the need for new legislative reforms in line with their 1920 Program such as unemployment insurance, the establishment of new farms for agricultural workers and small farmers and workers’ participation in the management of their firms.42

40Lewin L. and Jansson B., ‘The Swedish Electorate 1887-1968.’ (Uppsala 1972), p142-148 41Johung L. and Wedensjö E., ‘A Model for the Determination of Wages and Prices in Sweden 1922 -1971.’ (Lund 1978), p107

24 In declaring its guidelines, the new government included elements from its electoral propaganda in order to earn the party some points among its more radical supporters. It stated that: ‘The unavoidable result of the capitalistic production system is the unbridled recession that has swept over us, bringing with it unemployment and suffering to countless people who, in other circumstances, would have been working now.’43 The new government tried to pass a trade agreement with the USSR in 1922 but failed. However, it succeeded in significantly raising the budget for assistance to the unemployed, which was done in cooperation with the Liberals. When Parliament blocked its proposal to change the law that prohibited workers who refused to take the place of striking workers from receiving unemployment benefits, the government resigned,44 sending out the message that one of their main tenets was workers’ right to strike. In this, the Swedish Social Democrats were making an assertive stand, choosing to resign when unable to improve the economic situation, unlike the SPD in 1930, which chose to leave the government because it was unable to prevent the situation of workers becoming worse.

The Social Democratic Government resigned in April 1923 and the Social Democrats remained in opposition till the elections of October, 1924. They were replaced by a minority government of the Conservative Party and Agrarian Party. The October 1924 elections were a big success for the Swedish ‘socialist’ parties and especially for the Social Democrats (SAP). The ‘left’ block received 46.2% of votes and the SAP alone garnered 41.1%. Thus the Swedish ‘left’ came close to the 50% vote line, with the SAP succeeding in marginalizing the Communist Party (SKP) which had replaced the SVP (the SVP split in 1921 when a majority accepted the conditions of the Communist International; the remaining minority gradually joined the SAP; the SVP folded completely in 1923). The success of the Social Democrats in these elections was the result of a relatively high turnout among industrial workers and small farmers, who were the backbone of the SAP electorate.45

The third Social Democratic Minority Government was formed in October 1924 and was able to survive because the Conservatives and Liberals were divided on foreign

42Tingsten, op.cit., p250 43 Ibid 44 Ibid, p251

25 policy, ruling out the possibility of a ‘bourgeois government.’ On assuming office, the new government declared that it would follow the policies of the former Social Democratic Government in trying to implement social reforms.46 Branting died in 1925 and was replaced by Sandler as Prime Minister. Despite its dependence on the support of the Liberals, the government succeeded in passing several social reforms: a) a law extending the rights of small farmers living on leased farm to acquire control without payment of houses they built for their own use on the land; b) a law enabling agricultural workers to receive state land with a guaranteed lease for the purpose of farming; c) the 8-hour ‘normal’ working day was renewed and covered additional sectors. Efforts to pass an accident insurance law and a medical assistance fund failed.

On June 9, 1926 the Social Democratic Government resigned after failing to change the unemployment law in order to enable workers who refused to take the place of striking workers to receive financial aid. The Swedish Social Democrats thus adhered to their principles of leaving a government when a central piece of social legislation was rejected. In 1926, Zeth Höglund, one of the last senior Social Democrats who had not returned to the SAP, left the Communist Party and joined the SAP. Two years later he became a member of the SAP Secretariat.

Assertive political tactics, loyalty to a relatively ‘reformist’ political program and solidifying support among small farmers and the lower middle class were not the only important developments of the SAP during the period 1921-1928. During this period, the Swedish Social Democrats developed ‘functional socialism’ in its full form although they would only reap the benefits of this ‘party ideology’ in the elections of 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944. However this’party ideology’ appeared in the SAP’s official political program only in 1944.

Two figures played an important role in this process: Nils Karleby and Per Albin Hansson. Karleby developed the theoretical base, particularly regarding economic theory, of ‘functional socialism’ and Hansson defined the SAP’s ultimate goal and

45 Lewin, op.cit., p149-162 46 Tingsten,op.cit p260

26 generated the political power needed to turn this ‘party ideology’ into the mainstream line of the SAP. The main goal of this emerging ‘functional socialism’ was to achieve an egalitarian society where there would be neither rich nor poor and where every individual and every human need would be cared for. The means of achieving this goal were: a) high taxes, generous social benefits and a developed system of public services; b) managerial power for trade unions; c) manipulation of the ‘market economy’ by public bodies; d) public ownership of significant ‘property rights’ without necessarily involving direct, formal, public ownership.

In 1922, Karleby was appointed co-editor of ‘Tiden’ (the main theoretical organ of the SAP). The articles he wrote between 1922 and 1926 were gathered together shortly before his death and published in 1926 as a book entitled ‘Socialismen inför verkligheten’ (Socialism in the Face of Reality). Karleby was stressing that the ‘party ideology’ of the Swedish Social Democrats was an original ‘ideology’ uninfluenced by the ‘revisionism’ of the SPD and it was the SPD that ought to take a lesson from the Swedish Social Democrats. ‘The widespread impression that our Social Democracy lacks theoretical independence and has been dominated intellectually by foreign theories, particularly German revisionism, is on the whole incorrect and results from inadequate observation. Anyone who goes to the trouble of reading some of ’s writings and other party manifestos will recognize that we felt sympathy with German revisionism when it finally broke through. This was natural. They had advanced towards our position.’47

Karleby claimed that the concept of ‘property’ did not relate to the machinery itself but rather to the relationship between the ‘owner class’ and the class it dominated, i.e. the class that possessed no property but only the ability to work. This relationship, Karleby noted, was not a law of nature and private profits were simply a product of this specific relationship. Re-distribution of income was therefore possible since like, everything else in society; it depended only on human decisions. Profits could be divided among the entire population or be given to public institutions. Karleby thus

47Karleby Nils, ‘Socialismen inför verkligheten.’ (Stockholm 1976), p104-105

27 viewed profits as a ‘tool of oppression’ only when they were used for the benefit of the ‘ruling class’. If they contributed to the public income or were divided among the entire population, then they would become a planning tool, which, like free price setting for consumer goods, could often be more efficient than any central planning program.

After according to central planning its ‘right’ place, in his view, Karleby spelled out, in his book, the means for raising the share of the ‘working classes’ in ‘societal income’ and in company profits: a) leveling high taxes on incomes of capital owners (the equivalent of high income tax on high earnings to be used for the benefit of the less affluent in the form of transfer payments and public services); b) limiting the powers of owners over their firms and their capital; c) increasing the powers of trade unions in the workplace and promoting ownership through collective organizations. Only in this way, claimed Karleby, could a ‘socialist society’ be achieved.48

By 1928, Hansson was already the new head of the Swedish Social Democrats and although he did not enjoy the same status as Branting, the majority of the party supported him. He made his celebrated ‘Folkhem’ (home of the people) address of January 1928 in the Swedish Parliament during the budget debate.

Tingsten, one of the leading researchers on Swedish Social Democracy, tried to ignore this address (perhaps due to his stand within the SAP- see later paragraph) and claimed it was an expression of the SAP’s ‘radicalism’ before the 1928 elections.49 In his 1992 book ‘Från kosacval till kohandel’ Bengt Schüllerqvist accords little importance to the ideals set out in the ‘Folkhem’ address, preferring to place the emphasis on the SAP’s ‘anti-’ between 1928 and 1932 and on its adoption of a ‘people/folk’ rhetoric in place of ‘class struggle’ rhetoric. In his 2000 book ‘at anpassa sig efter det möjliga’ Jonsson Thomas considers that the ‘Folkhem’ represented an utopia that was not implemented in the 30’s because of the influence of paternalistic figures such as Gunnar and Alva Myrdal. He claims that the ‘Folkhem’ address became a myth during this period. Others such as Seppo50 consider

48 Ibid, p209-210 49 Tingsten, op.cit, p265 50Seppo H ‘The Origin of the Folkhem Ideology in Swedish Social Democracy.’ Scandinavian Journal

28 the ‘Folkhem’ address as an event that set a real goal and real ideals for Swedish Social Democrats and thus had significant influence on their politics. I tend to agree with this opinion. It is true that paternalistic figures such as Gunnar and Alva Myrdal distorted the ideals of the ‘Folkhem’ in the 30’s and 40’s. But the core ideals found their way into the SAP political programs of 1944, 1960, 1975, and 1990. The Swedish Welfare State is also modeled on it and its creation clearly necessitated long- term planning.

Hansson made the ‘Folkhem’ ideal a central tenet of the Swedish Social Democrats throughout the late 20’s and early 30’s 51. The ‘Folkhem’ address was not a nationalistic text. It spelled out a vision of an egalitarian society in a way no SPD leader had ever done in a public address. Below is a quotation from the address: ‘The basis of a home is togetherness and a feeling of communality. A good home does not consider anyone as privileged or unappreciated; it knows no favorites and no stepchildren and no one looks down on anyone else. In a good home, no one tries to profit at the expense of others and the strong do not suppress or plunder the weak. In a good home, equality, consideration, cooperation, and helpfulness prevail. Applied to the homes of all people and citizens, this means the breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that presently divide citizens into privileged and unfortunate, into rulers and subjects, into rich and poor.,,,If Swedish society is going to be a good citizens’ home, class differences must be eliminated, must be developed, economic equality must be ensured, workers must be given a role in economic management, and democracy must be carried through and applied both socially and economically... I believe that, in the near future, the union of all the oppressed classes will be achieved and give support to a strong popular policy sensitive to the needs of the people and ready to reform society from its roots by achieving democracy in every area and making liberty, equality, and fraternity a reality’.52

of history 1978 vol 3 p323-345 51See Jonsson, op.cit chapter 6 for the latest description of this process 52 ‘Per Albin Hanssons tal om folkhemm-medborgarhemmet I riksdag remissdebatt 1928’ [Stockholm 1989] ARAB, SAP 6,B20/9-

29 The combination of what I call in this dissertation ‘Swedish Social Democratic functional Socialism’ appears in the ‘Folkhem’ address. Its goal is economic equality with no rich and no poor; the means of achieving the goal are: developed social services, workers’ involvement in management, and democratization of the economy; and the political base is the union of all the ‘oppressed classes’.

The 1928 elections were characterized by an informal alliance between the SAP and the Communists promoted by the ‘orthodox’ members of the SAP Secretariat, Höglund and Engberg. The SAP vote rose but the ‘right’, as a result of scare tactics, garnered more vote than usual and, in relative terms, the SAP lost. Its vote decreased from 41.1% to 37% and the entire ‘left’ block fell from 46.2% to 43.4%. The result was better than that of the ‘left’ block in Germany but nonetheless it represented a failure in the eyes of the SAP. It also seemed that those who benefited most from the alliance were the Communists, who doubled their vote. Hansson thus decided to move away from the alliance with the Communists and also ignore the ‘orthodox’ elements in his party. Henceforth, more emphasis would be placed on ‘reformist’ ‘Folkhem- based’ policies. In the fall of 1928, Hansson launched a wave of anti- communist activity through essays and addresses at party gatherings. By the beginning of 1929, the ‘class struggle’ rhetoric had been replaced by rhetoric that emphasized the ‘struggle of the people’ against the ‘small group of wealthy privileged.’53 According to Schüllerqvist’s book, Lindström, a young member of the party’s inner circle, was instrumental in pushing the party in this direction and checking, on behalf of Hansson, the threshold of party tolerance.

Ernst Wigforss’s position in the SAP Secretariat was midway between the ‘orthodox’ and the ‘Folkhem reformists’. Wigforss was the man who developed the SAP’s ‘Keynesian-style’ program for the solution of Sweden’s economic crisis and was thus one of the central figures in the development of SAP ‘Reformism’. In the fall of 1931, Wigforss, together with Wennestrom and Sklod, took part in the committee established by the SAP Secretariat to find a ‘social democratic solution’ to the economic crisis and problem of mass unemployment. The committee drew up a proposal that represented ‘Keynesian policy’ at its best. It proposed to create a budget

53 Schüllerqvist Benget book ‘Från kosacval till kohandel’ (Uppsala 1992) is devoted to this claim

30 of 100 million Swedish crowns (Skr) to finance public projects, primarily in the housing sector. The financing would come from new direct taxes on the affluent sector and from a cut in the defense budget. The workers employed in the projects will receive a ‘normal market’ wage that was well above the regular wage given in former public works projects for the unemployed.54 Funds would thus be transfered from people with a low tendency to consume and a high tendency to save (the affluent) to people with a high tendency to consume and a low tendency to save (the unemployed workers) resulting in an increase in the ‘aggregate demand’, which, in its turn, would create a demand for more production and more workers. A cycle of growth would thus be created with new employed workers who would increase the ‘aggregate demand’ and, as a result, raise production. Wigforss acknowledged that the price of agriculture products would rise as result of increased demand, but he viewed this as a positive development since the incomes of workers were supposed to rise at a higher rate than prices. The rise in the price of agriculture products was also supposed to help solve the economic crisis of farmers. The committee also proposed to allocate 20 million SKr to assist farmers who were most hurt by the economic crisis.55

In their 1932 election manifesto, the SAP called again for the creation of unemployment insurance, a new public pension system with higher benefits and a limit on the length of agricultural workers’ workdays.56 With its proposals for a solution to the mass unemployment problem and the economic crisis of small farmers, and its egalitarian ‘Folkhem’ vision, the SAP was well on the way to a major electoral success. It garnered 41.7% of votes in the 1932 elections. Thus with the Communist Parties, the Swedish ‘left’ block attained the critical 50% margin, even though the general participation rate was not lower than in the 1928 elections. The Communists retained their power and the SAP increased their strength among small farmers and the small self-employed in addition to maintaining their traditional support-base among urban and agricultural workers and very small farmers.

54 Tingsten, op.cit., p287-288 55 Ibid 56 Ibid, p304

31 The ‘non-socialist’ parties, nevertheless, still held a majority in the Lower House of Parliament with 118 seats compared to the left’s 112. But the fact that the ‘socialist’ parties had attained 50% of the votes and that the SAP had a sound program for resolving the recession convinced the center Farmers’ Party to enter into a coalition with the SAP. The SAP’s program promised improvement for farmers, while the ‘right’s market economy orthodox theory’ offered them little. The new development thus gave the SAP a solid majority and saved it from having to form a coalition of more than two parties. Per Albin Hansson was the new Prime Minister and Wigforss his Finance Minister, positions which they kept until the mid 40’s.

Naturally the SAP had to make political compromises, but it still managed to implement the main promises of its election manifesto. The new government’s economic program allocated a budget of 100 million Skr to public projects in which the workers would be paid ‘normal market’ wages. Another 80 million Skr was allocated to help small farmers and the unemployed. Part of the financing came from a wealth tax and the other part from a budget deficit which in an economy with over capacity would, according to Keynesian theory, increase demand and production without creating high inflation. The program was successful and, by 1936, the unemployment rate returned to its 1928 level. In 1934, the SAP-Farmers government passed an unemployment insurance law which would be financed progressively and accord with SAP policy.

The main conflict between the SAP and the Farmers’ Party was over SAP proposals to change Swedish public pension legislation. The original Pension Law of 1913 had none of the elements of true social legislation (see previous chapter) and a 1918 adjustment added other groups of workers to those who had to contribute to the public pension insurance. The SAP wanted a public pension scheme to which all wage earners and self employed, including the most well-to-do, would contribute. The new scheme aimed to raise the level of old age pensions and disability pensions and allocate an equal sum to all insured persons. Thus, unlike the 1913 Law, the affluent sector would pay for the higher benefits of the less affluent elderly and invalids. The scheme represented a major new form of transfer payment (money raised from taxes leveled on the affluent were to be used to subsidize the less affluent population).

32 When the SAP proposal was presented to Parliament in 1935, it was roundly rejected by all the ‘non-Socialist’ parties, including the Farmers’ Party. In contrast, in Denmark, the Danish Social Democratis Party (with which the SAP developed ‘special’ relationship in the early 30’s) had already achieved similar legislation in 1933.The Farmers’ Party’s rejection of the program led to the end of the first SAP-Farmers Government.

The 1936 elections to the Swedish Lower House consolidated the SAP’s dominance on Swedish political life. With the pension proposal at the top of its election platform, the SAP obtained 45.9% of votes and the Swedish ‘left’ bloc together garnered 53.6%. The SAP was now in a much healthier position, with the ‘socialist’ bloc numbering 123 members in the Lower House compared to the ‘non-socialist’ bloc’s 107 members. Since the Upper House still had a ‘non-socialist’ majority, the SAP did not have total freedom to carry out all its programs. However, it was now strong enough to push through Parliament the pension legislation in its original form. Thus the new public pension plan was passed by the second SAP-Farmers coalition and took effect in January 1937. According to Leif Lewin, the success of Wigforss’s economic program reinforced the SAP’s view that efficient management of the economy with a focus on the needs of the masses, can be realized through manipulation of the ‘market economy’ rather than through central planning and full direct public ownership.57

In 1938, the LO and the Swedish Industrialists Federation signed a binding agreement according to which the LO would be the sole representative of the workers and all decisions concerning workers, such as wages, length of work days and redundancies, had to be negotiated between the trade unions and the employers. The agreement was similar to the agreement signed between the ADGB and German employers on November 15, 1918 and it represented another example of the growing dominance of the SAP in Sweden and another step forward in the implementation of its ‘reformist’ policy.

57 Lewin, L., ‘Planhushållnings debatten.’ (Stockholm 1970), p104-112

33 During the 30’s, public spending excluding defense grew from Skr 746 million to 118158, representing a rise of almost 60% (30% in relative terms after deduction of growth in the GDP and rise in prices). The funds came from a parallel rise in direct taxes even though unemployment had returned to the level of the late 20’s. The real jump in the implementation of ‘reformism’ nevertheless had to wait for a ‘Socialist’ majority in both the Upper and Lower Houses. This was achieved in 1940 but the circumstances were still not ripe for implementing the full program. With the German occupation of Norway and Denmark and with general war in Europe, the SAP found it had no choice but to opt for a ‘national unity government’ to save Sweden from occupation by Germany and ensure its independence.

Only in 1943, with Germany’s defeat in the horizon, could preparation for a new party program begin. The SAP’s 1944 political program gave the final touch to ‘Swedish Social Democratic functional socialism’ and constituted a major advance on the 1920 Program and a natural development of Hansson’s ‘Folkhem’ address, Karleby’s ideas, Wigforss’s economic policy and the SAP election manifestos of 1932 and 1936. Almost all the SAP leadership took part in drafting the 1944 Program. Rickard Lindström of the radical ‘reformist’ segment of the party and Herbert Tingsten, the well-known SAP historian who opposed including any Marxist ideas in the party program (he subsequently moved from the SAP to the Liberal Party), sat on the committee responsible for deciding the ‘general principles’ of the program. Arthur Engberg represented the ‘orthodox’ elements in the party and Rickard Sandler and Ragnar Ericson the ‘centrist’ position. Ernst Wigforss, Per Albin Hansson, Gustav Möller and Tage Erlander (who replaced Hansson in 1946 as head of the party) all took part in the final wording. The latter were all with either ‘reformist’ positions (such as Hansson’s) or ‘centrist’ positions.

The SAP’s 1944 political program was every thing that the SPD’s 1959 Bad Godesberg program was not, meaning its goal was radical and egalitarian. Unlike the SPD’s ‘Weimar period’ programs and its post- 1945 programs, the 1944 Program used clearer terminology regarding public control of the economy. It also had none of

58 Ibid, p151

34 the deterministic ‘theories of history’ that plague the old SPD programs and unlike pre-war SPD programs, it dealt at length with taxation and social legislation. The program opened with the following statement: ‘The Social Democrat aim is to transform bourgeois organization of societal economy to transfer the decisions rights over the production into the hands of the entire nation and to liberate the people from the rule of a minority of capital owners. Instead of a society composed of different economic classes, the Social Democrats want to create a society in which every citizen has the same, free, equal standing.’ 59 The ‘socialization’ demand was for full public control, not simply supervision of companies and productive capital.

The following egalitarian declaration appeared in the third paragraph:. ‘The need for economic equality means also a need for equality in education, equality in the living conditions of children and youth, and equality in the possibility to win participation in all the fields of spiritual and material culture.’60 And the third paragraph from the end states: ‘the driving force for economic advance that lies in a person’s desire to improve his position will continue to exist even after one achieves the essential equalization of incomes and, with it, greater equality in social and cultural positions.’61 All the demands for ‘equality’ were also expressed in point 10 which called for ‘equalization of income and property (distribution)’, and did not define the upper limit of this equalization process.62 Point 8 put forward the most radical ‘equality demand’: ‘to secure for all citizens a standard of living corresponding to the common (average) labor yield (GDP) in the full extent needed for such a household (a citizens household) to be fulfilled’.63

The program represented a clear commitment not to postpone equalization to the distant future and to create a situation in which all citizens would have a standard of living close to the average national income level (after extracting naturally the part which goes to investment). Regarding capital ownership, the program stated that ‘society should own’ natural resources, industrial companies, credit institutions,

59 SAP, ‘Program för Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarparti.’ (Stockholm 1944) p3 para 1 60 Ibid, p4 para 1 61 Ibid, p8 62 Ibid, p11 63 Ibid, p10

35 transportation and communication networks, and placing the rest of the economy under ‘the supervision of society’.64 The statement at the beginning of the program made it clear that the productions means ‘in the ownership of the society’ would have to include a significant part of the sectors mentioned in this list.

The term ‘in the ownership of the society’ could be implemented in several ways as proposed in subsequent Swedish Social Democratic and Swedish trade union programs: through state ownership, ownership by trade union pension funds, voting rights for workers in management, and ownership through cooperatives (the 1944 Program mentioned the last two options in addition to state ownership). Point 10 also made a demand for full employment. In the area of tax policy (also point 10) the program put forward demands for a progressive income tax system with minimum incomes free of tax and taxes on .65 In the area of social legislation, the program put forward demands for social insurance that would cover unemployment, work accidents, sickness vacation, disability, old age, pregnancy and the raising of children. It also listed a demand to ensure satisfactory housing for all families with children and demands for health insurance, free basic schooling, professional training and financial support for academic students in need.66 The demands regarding working hours were similar to those of the 1920 Program.67

On September 17, 1944, a few months after the Party Congress which adopted the new program, elections were held to the Swedish Parliament. The SAP was successful in obtaining an absolute majority in both Houses and it was thus able to implement its program and election promises to a greater extent than in the 30’s. The ‘national unity government’ was dismantled in July, 1945 and gave place to an entirely SAP government. The Communist Party supported the government but was not a part of it. In 1946, Tage Erlander replaced Hansson as Prime Minister. His first government (in office till 1951) was very productive in areas of tax reform, social legislation and ‘democratization of the economy’. In 1946, a new law made it compulsory for ‘workers’ representatives’ to sit on the management of all companies with more than 100 workers. Against vehement

64 Ibid, p10 point 8 65 Ibid, p11 66 Ibid, p 9-12

36 opposition by the ‘non socialist’ parties, the government succeeded in raising sharply the rate of property and corporate taxes and passing a new inheritance tax. It also introduced a Child Benefit Law that provided relatively generous payments for families with children. Also passed was the old age and disability pension plan, which covered all Swedish citizens and gave them equal pension rights. The pension rate was tripled in 1948. A National Health Insurance Law was enacted in 1946 but because of the need to create financial reserves, it was only fully operational in 1955. Major public housing projects and housing assistance programs were also introduced.

In 1951, the SAP government was replaced by a SAP-Farmers’ Party coalition government, even though the ‘left’ still had a majority in Parliament. The legislative pace slowed down but the new government continued to move in the direction of social reform. In 1954, the Disability Pension Law was adjusted to include alcoholics. LO activities in the early 50’s also contributed to equalizing incomes. In 1952, the first national wage agreement came into effect according to which all workers in every economic sector would receive the same wage with marginal ‘legitimate differences’ based on their level of ‘professional skills’ and level of ‘responsibility’. By 1955 this type of wage agreement became the official long-term policy of the LO. In 1960 this policy was also adopted by the TCO (The Federation of White Collar Workers’ Trade Unions).

The other Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties which had close contacts with the exiled SPD members, the Danish Social Democrats and the Norwegian Labor Party ( DNA), had ‘party ’ and political and social policies similar to those of the Swedish Social Democrats though there were also some differences. Of the three parties, the SAP was the most successful and represented the ‘classic’ model of ‘reformist socialism’. But the main guidelines of the ‘party ideologies’ of the DNA and the Danish Social Democrats were identical to the Swedish Social Democrats’ ‘functional socialism’.

The 1913 political program of the Danish Social Democrats was very close in content to the SAP’s 1911 political program and it remained the official program of the

67 Ibid, p12

37 Danish Social Democrats till the early 60’s. It included detailed demands to ensure the rights of small farmers, a radical demand (parallel to that of the SAP’s 1944 political program) to ‘pass into the hands of society the property and the means of production’ and an egalitarian demand ‘to level all social and political inequalities’. It also had a highly progressive program regarding its demand for equality between men and women. From 1929, the Danish Social Democrats were the dominant political force in Denmark. They formed a coalition government with a convenient partner, the ‘Social Liberals’, and had more than 40% of the seats in Parliament. The coalition ruled from 1929 till 1940 but only began to implement a clear-cut ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policy’ in January 1933 (following the success of the Social Democrats in general elections). The success of the Danish Social Democrats in the 1935 elections led to a faster rate of social legislation during the period 1936 to 1940. Another similarity with the SAP was the ‘Danmark for Folket’ program (23 May, 1934) of Danish Social Democratic leader . The program was similar in content and made a similar impact to Hansson’s ‘Folkhem’ address of January, 1928.

The DNA’s program was relatively ‘orthodox’ although it put forward a much more detailed list of demands for agriculture than the ‘Erfurt Program’. The DNA also ‘flirted’ with the Communist International, joining it for a short period. After leaving the Communist International, it also stayed out of the Social Democratic International. Prior to the 1933 elections, the DNA drafted a ‘Keynesian macroeconomic program’ called ‘Hele folket I arbejde’ (all the people at work) that was implemented by the 1935-1940 DNA government. In 1945 the DNA adopted a new political program, which was based on the model of the SAP’s 1944 political program.

In 1956 the SAP formed again an entirely SAP government, as the left enjoyed a Parliamentary majority. All subsequent Swedish governments, till the end of the century, with the exception of the governments of 1976 to 1982, and 1991 to 1994, were based on this model, i.e. an entirely SAP government. During the 60’s and 70’s, Sweden became the most egalitarian society in the industrialized world, together with Norway, Denmark, and Finland, all of which underwent a similar process of political development and achieved a parallel level of equality in income distribution. These achievements were sustained throughout the 80’s and 90’s. The creation of ‘equality in income distribution’, the development of a high degree of public ownership and the

38 attribution of extensive rights to workers in the management of their workplace were primarily post-1956 developments. The social changes of this period are outside the timeframe of this research and they will be described briefly in the concluding chapter.

39 Part 1: Good Cooperation but only Limited Influence (The SPD exiles and the Scandinavian Social Democrats up to 1940).

Chapter 1.1 SPD ‘party ideology’ from 1920 to 1933 compared to the ‘Party ideology’ of the Scandinavian Social Democrats; the role played by the most senior SPD exiles in Scandinavia (Fritz Tarnow and Kurt Heinig) during this period and their views regarding the ‘Weimar SPD party ideology.’

The SPD faced acute problems during the period 1920 to 1933. Its lack of assertiveness and reluctance to define a clear goal led to the loss of a significant share of radical workers to parties left of the SPD. The party also failed to win support from equivalent sectors which, in Scandinavia, supported the Social Democrats. Approx. 60% of the population in both Sweden and Germany were, according to their social status and economic position, potential supporters of a ‘reformist’ party. The Swedish Social Democratic Party won a large part of its support from agricultural workers and small farmers and, at later stage, also from middle-size farmers68. The SPD lost the votes of these groups to the Zentrum Party and the BVP (Bavarian People’s Party) in Catholic areas and to nationalist parties in Protestant areas.69 The SPD often cooperated with the Zentrum Party however this was not beneficial as winning their votes for itself. Towards the end of the Weimar Republic, the NSDAP (Nazi Party) won most of the farmers’ votes in Protestant areas with almost 100% support in certain areas.

While, in the 1920 elections, more than 40% of the German electorate voted for the ‘German left’ (41.7%), the ‘40% threshold was never crossed again, except in the

68See in the introduction chapter c.

40 1928 elections, and the critical ‘50%’ threshold became a distant dream. The SPD went into opposition following the elections and this enabled what could be described as a more assertive policy. At the Kassel Congress of October 1920 the party passed a decision not to ‘cooperate with parties that were not fully pro-Republican’. It also decided to call for the ‘socialization of industries that were ripe for socialization’. But within a few months, the SPD ‘lowered its tone’. The General Secretary of the party, Otto Wels, declared in December 1920 that the decision taken at the Congress did not apply to state level.70 Thus, in the small State of Mecklenburg, following the SPD’s failure in the elections, the party agreed on March 13, 1921 to form a coalition with the Conservative Liberal Party (DVP).

The ‘London ultimatum’ of May 5, 1921 and the decision by the anti-German allies to place sanctions on Germany brought an end to the minority ‘bourgeois’ government of Prime Minister Fehrenbach. Because the nationalist right would not support a government prepared to negotiate a reparation settlement with the allies, a coalition government of the SPD, the Zentrum Party and the DDP returned to power on May 10, 1921 under Prime Minister Wirth. This government had a much smaller support base than former ‘Republican’ coalitions and the SPD did not hold the position of Prime Minister. On May 17, 1921 Robert Schmidt, the SPD Finance Minister, brought before the government an SPD proposal for financing reparations to the allies according to which the government would seize 20% of properties (businesses and farms) and pay a low rate of interest to property owners. The difference between the interest paid to owners and the ‘real’ interest rate was intended to finance 50% of the reparation cost. At the same time Wirth, the ‘non-socialist’, proposed a hike in existing income and wealth taxes. Gustav Bauer, senior SPD member in the government, refused to choose between the two proposals and in the end, a proposal by Walter Rathenau combining the two plans was accepted. But the government was unable to implement the proposal as it lacked a broad base of support in the ‘Reichstag’.

Kurt Heinig and Fritz Tarnow were of the generation of SPD activists who began the main part of their political career in this stagnant SPD period. Heinig had joined the

69Hamilton, R.F., ‘Who voted for Hitler.’ (Princeton 1981), p130-134 70Winkler, H.A., ‘Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung.’ (Bonn 1985), p450

41 SPD in 1906 at the age of 20 and, in 1908, he had become a journalist for the SPD party paper ‘Wirtschaft Information für Partei und Gewerkschaft’ (economic information for the party and trade union). His rise in the party began in 1918, when after serving as a soldier in WWI, he became a member of the Berlin ‘workers and soldiers’ committee’. As a loyal SPD member and with his experience as an economic writer, Heinig was able to find work in the Prussian Ministry of Finance. In 1920, just as the SPD became an opposition party, Heinig left the Finance Ministry to become an SPD theoretician which meant that he begun publishing essays and articles in the SPD press aimed primarily at SPD members and supporters. In 1923, Heinig became a member of the Editorial Board and Economics Editor of ‘Vorwärts’ (the main party organ). The appointment made Heinig officially one of the principal SPD authors on economic matters. Fritz Tarnow, who was 6 years older than Heinig, was already the head of the woodworkers’ trade unions in Stuttgart at the time in which Heinig joined the party in 1906. In 1919, Tarnow became a member of the Woodworkers’ Trade Union Secretariat. In 1921, he became the head of the Woodworkers’ Trade Union and one of the main leaders of the ‘Free Trade Union Federation’ (ADGB). During the period 1920-21, both men defended the SPD against attacks from the ‘right’ as well as from the ‘left’. Heinig attacked the ‘far right’ and the accusations claiming that supporters of democracy had betrayed Germany. Tarnow also attacked the Communists, describing them as ‘professional splitters.’

In May, 1920 Heinig published the essay ‘Die groβe Ausrede von der erdolchten Front’ (the big excuse of a ‘dagger in the back’) which was meant to be a counterattack to the allegations of the ‘far right’ claiming that the ‘Republicans’ had caused Germany to lose the war because ‘they had stabbed the fighting army in the back’. Heinig retorted that all the non-democratic fighting nations had got rid of their monarchs, for they were the ones responsible for the war.71 As proof, Heinig pointed to the fact that opposition to the military regime of Ludendorff and Hindenburg came primarily from political parties that represented the majority of the people.72

Tarnow’s first lecture as head of the Woodworker’s Union, ‘Gewerkschaftliche Zeit und Streikfragen’ (questions about strike and trade unions) was given at the

71Heinig Kurt, ‘Die groβe Ausrede von der erdolchten Front.’ (Berlin 1920), p6 72 Ibid, p7

42 Woodworkers’ Trade Union Congress which took place from June 5-11 1921. In it, Tarnow attacked the Communists and argued that the ‘development of Socialism’ was possible only through organization of the economy and organization of workers. Choosing the path of violence, he said, would eat up energies needed for the organization of the economy73 and Communists who supported violence were hurting the ‘workers struggle’ because they were splitting the ‘workers camp.’74 This was Tarnow’s reaction to the ‘Rhúr revolt.’ In the latter, more interesting parts of his lecture, Tarnow proposed certain ‘reformist’ demands, beginning with the ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft’ (the ‘work committees’ of Wissel and Bauer’s program). He admitted that the ‘work committees’ did not represent ‘socialization’ and were simply a forum for negotiations between employees and employers.75 The goal to be aimed at, he said, was not ‘all for me and nothing for you’ nor ‘high profits for you and high wages for me’ which would involve high prices and a devaluation of the currency. The sole goal of the ‘work committees’ was ‘to be a platform for our economic priorities.’ 76 In this, Tarnow was reflecting the almost religious attitude of the ‘Weimar SPD party ideology’ towards committees and organizations that do not contribute directly to the welfare of workers but which were viewed by the SPD as a means by which to lay down the infrastructure of future ‘socialization.’ However, Tarnow also presented a list of social demands that could be viewed as forming a comprehensive ‘reformist program’. The demands included calls to defend the ‘minimal work day’ and the ‘minimal work week’, calls for ‘full-employment, and calls for the establishment of a disability and old age pension scheme. The demands were not new in the SPD but they had not been given a central place in the ‘Erfurt Program’. Placed at the center of a major address, shortly before the SPD’s new program was adopted at the Görlitz Congress emphasized Tarnow’s ‘non-orthodox’ views. Tarnow, however, did not make it clear whether he considered these demands as part of a short-term solution until the implementation of ‘socialization’ or simply as future desirable elements.

After more than 20 years of ‘revisionism’ and trade union pragmatism, the time had come for an update of the ‘Erfurt Program’. Deciding whether to present demands that

73Tarnow Fritz, ‘Gewerkschaftliche Zeit und Streikfragen.’ (Berlin 1921), p4 74 Ibid, p8 75 Ibid, p22

43 were detailed or general, clear or vague was very important when it came to drafting the official political program of the SPD or of the Swedish Social Democrats. The decision to formulate a new program had already been accepted at the Kassel Congress of October 1920 and obtaining support from sectors other than industrial workers was one of the party’s new aims. The committee nominated to write the new program included , who wrote the program’s introduction. His inclusion represented official acceptance by the SPD of ‘revisionism’ as one of its core ideas.

Committee member Adolf Braun, who represented the party ‘left’ or the ‘orthodox’ side, was very much opposed to Bernstein’s inclusion on the committee but ultimately agree to it.77 Heinrich Cunow represented the ‘right wing’ on the committee, which was made up also of pro-agrarian supporters. Other committee members were Georg Gradnauer, Antonie Pfülf, Hermann Molkenbuhr, Herman Müller and Wilhelm Keil – financial expert of the party’s Reichstag group, a position that would be held later by Kurt Heinig.78

The first draft of the new program, which was published in ‘Vorwärts’ on July 17, 1921, presented a detailed list of demands in the areas of taxation, social legislation and agriculture.79 However, these demands were omitted from the program approved by the Party Congress, which took place at Görlitz from September 18 to 24, 1921, in order to appease and keep in the party ‘orthodox’ members such as Heinrich Ströbel (Ströbel returned to SPD from the USPD in 1920) who was the program’s main critic at the Congress. Ströbel was primarily critical of the too small emphasis placed on ‘socialization’ in the new program.80 The vague formulations made it easier for those who opposed a move away from the ‘Erfurt Program’ to accept the new program. The final program was accepted by a very large majority and could be seen as representing a consensus within the SPD.

76 Ibid, p22 77Winkler, op.cit p437 78 Ibid 79 ‘Vorwärts’ 17.7.1921, p1 80 See Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1921 AdsD, X-2096

44 The ‘Görlitz Programm’ defined the SPD as a party of ‘working people in in towns and in the country ‘ and as the party of all those ‘who work with their bodies and minds.’81 The definition allowed the SPD to be seen also as the party of small craftsmen, small farmers and white-collar workers. In contrast, the 1920 Program of the Swedish Social Democrats presented a much clearer definition and called for the liberation of the ‘oppressed classes’. It considered that the self employed and small farmers had the same status as workers with regard to ‘economic freedom and having to pay the price for a constantly developing ’. Accordingly, it considered the self employed and small farmers as the two other ‘oppressed classes’ besides urban and agricultural workers.82 Unlike the Swedish program, the SPD program left room for interpretation with regard to small farmers and the self-employed since it did not mention them by name. In terms too of who it represented, its definition left room for interpretation since, theoretically, bank managers also work with their minds but clearly the SPD did not intend to fight on behalf of bank managers.

The program defined the goal of the SPD as follows: ‘the progressive transformation of the entire capitalist economy into a socialist economy operated for the common good…the abolition of class rule and of class itself … equal rights and equal obligations for all without distinction of sex and origin.’83 ‘Abolition of class rule and class itself’ was a general long-term goal common to both the ‘Görlitz Programm’ and the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1920. However, the medium-term, more measurable goal such as the ‘elimination of mass poverty’ figured only in the Swedish Social Democratic Program, reflecting a greater commitment to immediate social achievements. As for the phrase ‘equal rights and equal obligations,’ the context gave the impression that this demand referred to political and legal rights in the spirit of Bernstein’s ‘universal citizenship’, rather than to equality of income and economic status.

Although public control of the ‘means of production’ was a central tool to creating a ‘classless society’ in both the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1920 and the ‘Görlitz Programm’, the Swedish Social Democrats did not view it as the only tool.

81The ‘Görlitz Programm’ in ‘Vorwärts’ of 25.9.1921, p1 82 Tingsten, op.cit,. p216 83‘Görlitz Programm’,op.cit., p1

45 The ‘Görlitz Programm’ presented only four demands regarding taxation: a) raising income tax; b) raising the wealth tax; c) making the state the inheritor in inheritance cases where the inheritors were distantly related; d) effective prosecution of tax evasion.84 The Swedish Social Democratic program of 1920 presented six similar demands: a) raising the tax rate on non–salaried income (by raising the wealth tax and income tax); b) introducing a progressive income tax scale (high tax levels on high incomes); c) making the wealth tax progressive as well (for the benefits of small farmers and the self employed); d) creating state capital from taxes; e) using state capital profits for budgets; f) setting a minimum income that would be exempt from income tax. 85 The ‘Görlitz Programm’ presented four demands in the area of social legislation compared with the ten demands in the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1920: a) re-organization of social insurance into a public welfare system; b) re- organization of the school system; c) free schooling; d) special relief for large families. The Swedish program’s demands were: a) work accident insurance; b) health insurance; c) maternity insurance; d) unemployment insurance; e) old age pension; f) disability pension; g) child benefits; h) widows’ pension; i) free schooling; j) re- organization of the school system (mainly a demand for secondary professional schools).86

In the area of labor legislation, the demands in both the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1920 and the ‘Görlitz programm’ did not go above existing achievements. The ‘Görlitz Programm’ called for a maximum 8-hour workday and a 42 hour minimum weekly vacation while the Swedish program called for a ‘normal’ work day of 8 hours and a 36 hour minimum weekly vacation. However, the ‘Görlitz Programm’ presented 8 demands in this area compared with the 10 demands in the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1920, which included a demand for a ‘minimum satisfactory wage level for all those insured by the state’.87 This demand appeared only in the Swedish program and was clearly aimed at eradicating mass poverty. Regarding legislation for farmers and farming workers the ‘Görlitz Programm’ made only two demands – a) legal measures against the expansion of existing agricultural

84 Ibid, economic policy chapter 85Tingsten, op.cit., p223-236 86 Ibid

46 estates; b) transferring land into social control – compared with the seven demands of the Swedish Social Democratic Program of 1920 which included: a) forced purchase by the state of large private properties; b) confiscation by the state of neglected properties; c) abolition of entitled estates; d) leasing of state lands fit for small scale farming to farmers and giving them right of possession; e) ensuring the rights of crofters and lessees on private lands; g) state involvement and control of the ‘own your own home movement’. 88 The less concrete nature of the ‘Görlitz Program’ in comparison with the Swedish Social Democrats Program of 1920 was not limited to the areas of taxation, social legislation, labor legislation and legislation regarding the farmers and agricultural workers. Both programs made the same number of demands regarding ‘socialization’ but those of the Swedish Social Democratic 1920 Program are clearly defined and supported by a comprehensive plan of taxation, social legislation, support for farmers and protection of workers’ rights that was ensured through society’s control of the entire economy. The compromise in the ‘Görlitz Program’ between the ‘revisionists’ who were less radical than the ‘Scandinavian Socialist reformists’ and the ‘orthodox’ who placed the emphasis on ‘historical determinism’ left greater room for interpretation regarding the definition of ‘socialization’. The Swedish program stated that all industrial enterprises, credit institutions, natural resources and means of transportation and communication needed in a ‘planned’ economy should come under state ownership. All other companies would be under state supervision.89 This clearly defined the tools of ‘socialization’: state ownership and state supervision. It also meant that all companies would be controlled though state ownership or through state supervision according to clear standards. The ‘Görlitz Programm’ used the terms ‘to transfer land mineral deposits and natural sources of energy to the service of the people’ and ‘national state supervision of capitalistic ownership of the means of production’.90 The term ‘service of the people’ could theoretically also refer to private firms acting in accordance with ‘the needs of the people’. As for ‘supervision of capitalistic ownership’ this did not represent a more radical goal than its Swedish parallel.

87 Ibid, p227 88 Ibid, p232-234 89 Ibid, p228

47 The first political act of the SPD following the Görlitz Congress was to form a coalition with the DVP in Prussia, the largest and most important German State, on November 5, 1921 which was to last till 1932. The result of this move meant that the SPD would cooperate with the party of the ‘big capitalists’ for the rest of the Weimar period, which damaged the credibility of the SPD’s commitment to its long-term social goals.

In December 1920, the USPD was divided, as the majority of its members and a minority of its leadership chose to accept Moscow’s demands at the Second Communist International congress. The entry of USPD members in its ranks made the KPD a mass party for the first time. After the split, it was only a question of time before the remaining USPD members returned to the SPD. Assassination attempts against Wirth’s coalition members, which were incited by nationalist propaganda, narrowed the gap between the SPD and the remaining USPD members. On June 4, 1922 an assassination attempt was made on Philipp Scheidemann and on June 24, 1922 Walter Rathenau was murdered. The shock caused by these events led to the introduction of an emergency law to protect the Republic, which was passed by a two- thirds majority in the Reichstag, with the support of the USPD. The next development was the reunification of the SPD and the USPD on September 24, 1922.

The temporary basis of the re-united party was the ‘action program’ formulated on September 6, 1922 by Kautsky, Bernstein, Adolf Braun, Hilferding, Molkenbuhr, Stampfer, Crispin, Dittmann, Herman Müller, and Wels. It included nothing new except for rhetoric stating that ‘socialism’ was the only road to ‘freedom and welfare’ and a call to ‘socialize key industries’ without explaining what it meant by the term ‘socializing’. The goal was described as ‘an economy and society order in which everybody will be guaranteed his share in the consumption and culture products of society’91 and did not include the word ‘equality’. The vague wording of the ‘Görlitz Program’ had become even vaguer. Following the reunification, the editorial board of ‘Freiheit’, the USPD’s official organ, merged with that of ‘Vorwärts’ and in 1923, Heinig began a working contact with Hilferding.

90 ‘Görlitz Programm’,op.cit., economic policy chapter 91Winkler,op.cit p497

48 The SPD was ready to make important concessions in order to recruit the DVP into the Wirth coalition and this readiness for compromise was expressed in its agreeing to the cancellation of existing social achievements and to changing the ‘maximum’ 8- hour workday into a ‘normal’ 8–hour workday. With the Zentrum Party preferring to support the DVP, the SPD left the government on November 13, 1922. On November 22, a center-right government made up of the DDP, the Zentrum Party, the DVP and the BVP was formed. The new Prime Minister, Wilhelm Cuno, was a shipping line manager who was unaffiliated with any party. The SPD and the nationalist DNVP agreed not to topple the government but would not vote in its favor. The new government aimed to negotiate with France and Belgium reparations payments that accorded with Germany’s economic resources.

On January 11, 1923 France and Belgium invaded the Rúhr area with the intention of seizing the profits of German heavy industry. Cuno’s government decided on passive resistance in the Rúhr area. The already weak mark plunged and Germany’s high inflation reached a peak. The economic crisis was worsening by the day with income unable to catch up with inflation. Former USPD member Artur Crispin, then an SPD General Secretary, proposed holding general elections in order to achieve the ‘best possible program for the suffering masses’. 92 The SPD considered forming a united front with the KPD, which feared the arrival of a right-wing dictatorship as in Italy 93 but, after the KPD’s motion of no confidence brought down the Cuno government, the SPD opted for the ‘Prussian grand coalition’ model and the majority of its Secretariat agreed to enter this coalition headed by Gustav Stresemann of the DVP.

In August 1923, Heinig published a new essay ‘Die industrielle Dividende’ stating that economic stability would be of great benefit to workers. Heinig claimed that the real weekly wage at that time amounted to a fraction of the real weekly wage of 1913 and that capital income had grown significantly.94 He went on to hint that nationalist opposition to a stabilization program was based on greed: ‘more people are ready to die for 100% profit than for the homeland, humanity, the future or idealistic

92Winkler,op.cit p587 93See Winkler,op.cit p586 on a meeting on the 29 of July 1923 of SPD and KPD Reichstag members. 94Heinig Kurt, ‘Die industrielle Dividende.’ (Berlin 1923), p6-7

49 proposals for helping the poor’95. To emphasize his point, he explained that in ‘non- normal’ years such as those that followed the Great War, industrial profits were synonymous with the profits of ‘gold capital’ because in such an economic climate financial profits could not be obtained through correct managerial decisions.96

In the new government, the SPD was in charge of the coveted Finance Ministry with Hilferding at its head. A special SPD committee was established to work on a method of financing the reparation payments and government expenses. The committee included: Wissell, ‘Minister for Economic matters’ in the 1919 government, as committee head; Bölter and Fallenberg who represented the public sector workers’ trade union; Schröder who represented the AfA Bund and ADGB representatives Badert and Fritz Tarnow. Aufhäuser, Schweiger and Heinig were responsible for drafting the committee proposals, Aufhäuser representing the ‘left’ of the party and Heinig the mainstream. The committee published its proposals in September 1923. Its main recommendation was the introduction of a higher corporate tax on firms with more than 100 workers or a higher capital tax on firms with a capital of more then one million marks. In addition to creating a more just income distribution, the proposal also aimed to enable the ‘Reich’ to have a greater influence on the economy. But the committee’s proposals were never implemented as the SPD left the government shortly after they were published.

On September 26, Stresemann’s ‘grand coalition’ stopped ‘passive resistance’ – a move which required wide support. The coalition almost collapsed in October following a demand by the DVP to cancel the 8-hour work day legislation. A last minute compromise enabled the SPD to return to the government (the issue was postponed to a later stage) but without the Finance Ministry. On November 23, 1923 following what was seen by the left as unequal treatment by Stresmann of left-wing in comparison to right-wing radicals, the SPD on the left and the BVP on the right voted against the government and brought it down. A new Center-Right government headed by Wilhelm Marx of the Zentrum Party replaced the ‘grand coalition’. The government also included the DDP, DVP and BVP. Since it had no majority and the Emergency Power Law had ended with the last government, SPD support was needed

95 Ibid, p8 96 Ibid, p8-9

50 again on December 8, 1923 when the Emergency Power Law was presented for renewal and the SPD had to vote a second time for this unpopular measure.

The Dawes reparation plan initiated by America. the main creditor of France and the U.K., was presented to Germany on April 9, 1924 and accepted by the Marx government on April 16, 1924. The plan proposed to establish a new ‘Reichsbank’ with a German president, German Board of Directors and, under it, a professional committee made up of seven German and seven representatives from the U.K., France, Holland, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and the USA. It was to have a basic capital of 400 million gold marks and the right to a reserve ratio of one third, which meant it could give out loans up to 1.2 billion new marks. It was estimated that by 1928-1929 the bank would have accumulated interest amounting 2.150 billion new marks making it possible to pay 1.25 billion marks in reparations. The plan also included a reorganization of the tax system with emphase on raising indirect taxes. The third part of the Dawes program called for the re-organization of the German Railway Company to make it the major user of the bank’s loans and the major payer of interest. By selling some of its stocks and with future earnings, the Railway Company could thus contribute to raising sufficient funds to pay back the bank’s basic capital, the reparations and the cost of re-organizing the German Railway Company.

In his article the ‘Das Dawes Gutachten’ published in mid-1924, Heinig praised one of the plan’s main authors, the British center-left economist John Maynard Keynes for his humanity and quality of thought.97 Heinig was then editor of the economic board of the SPD’s official organ. His statement thus represented the official ‘view of the party’ as well as his own opinion. His positive views of the plan were not surprising since industrialists and capital owners would be the main users of the bank’s loans and the main interest payers and the wages of workers would not suffer since these depended on trade union power rather than on the aspired profits of employers. The proposed plan for raising indirect taxes was therefore worth paying from the point of view of organized workers. The situation of unorganized workers was naturally quite different. The economic columns of ‘Vorwärts’ during this period were filled with

97 Heinig Kurt, ‘Das Dawes Gutachten.’ (Berlin 1924), p11

51 expositions by Heinig on the new price level, wage levels and the value of pensions compared to pre-war periods demonstrating that the wages of organized workers had kept their value.98

With the stabilization of the economy and an end to high inflation, most trade union members found themselves better off than in 1913. Although the unemployment level among trade union members rose during the stabilization period from 9.9% in September, 1923 to 28.2% in December, 1923, it had dropped to 8.6% by May, 1924. The percentage of trade union members working in part-time jobs dropped from 47.3% in October, 1923 to 8.2% in May, 1924.99 The real weekly wage of professional workers was almost the same as in 1913 but the hourly wage was higher in real terms.100 With the real GDP lower than in 1913 this meant that workers’ share in the national income had grown significantly.

The SPD, as the party of organized workers, showed itself very successful in promoting the interests of this group but the interests of other ‘oppressed classes’ such as small farmers and the self-employed did not improve. The image of the SPD was of a party that was hostile to these groups (see above for their political programs and proposals when in government). The elections of May 1924 proved a ‘political nightmare’ for the SPD. The party won only 20.5% of votes, representing a drop of 1.4% even though the SPD included then almost half of former USPD members, making it worth approx. 30% of the votes in June, 1920. In these elections, the KPD proved its status as a mass party, obtaining approx. 12% of votes. The share of the ‘left block’ had fallen from 41.7% in June, 1920 to 33.1% in May, 1924.

In June 1924, the SPD held its first Congress following this electoral failure. Heinig took part in the Congress as representative of the ‘Greater Berlin’ area and he used the event to demonstrate his position in the mainstream of the party. When Toni Sender (who represented the Dresden area) proclaimed that ‘We should be better Republicans’, Heinig responded by stating that ‘the Republic was only a step from

98 See in ‘Vorwärts’ volumes from March and April 1924 99Winkler, op.cit p720-721 100 Ibid, p723

52 yesterday to tomorrow’101 meaning that the Republic was far from being the goal of the SPD. He also proposed that the party leadership should be given the freedom to take ‘pragmatic considerations’ when deciding whether to support or join the government.102 Sender was quick to point out that her view of the Republic was no different to Heinig’s and that the transcript backed her claim (true). However Heinig had, in fact, used Sender in order to stress his mainstream views rather than as part of a personal attack.

In his article ‘Der Wertmeister und die Wirtschaft’ published in the summer of 1924, Heinig continued to stress, as in his other publications in the period 1923-1924, the importance of price stability for workers and proposed that ‘workers’ should lead the fight for price stability. 103 On August 29, 1924 the Dawes plan won the support not only of the government and the SPD but also of half the DNVP, the nationalist party.

The fact of being in opposition together with the improvement in the economic conditions of organized workers was positive for the SPD. After unsuccessful efforts by Marx to persuade the DNVP to join his coalition, new elections were set for December 7, 1924. In these elections, the SPD obtained 26% of votes, while the KPD only obtained 9%. The ‘left block’ as such was still in a worse situation compared with the early 20’s and compared also with the ‘left’ in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. After the elections, a new center-right government was formed with the DNVP and with Hans Luther, Marx’s former Finance Minister, at its head.

The economic situation of industrial workers was better than in 1913. Real Wages per week were, on average, equal or higher by around 20% than in 1913. The wage level reached a peak in 1928 and 1929, even with average work week that was 10% shorter than in 1913. 104 However, the average ‘purchasing power’ of wages was only two thirds that of Sweden and half that of Denmark.105 The strict 8-hour maximum work day and 48 hour maximum work week legislation evaporated in a situation where the

101Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1924 AdsD, X-2096 p116 102 Ibid 103Heinig Kurt, ‘Der Wertmeister und die Wirtschaft.’ (Düsseldorf 1924), p9 104Dietmar P. Werner A. Anselm F.,’ Materialien zur Statistik des Reiches 1914-1945.’ (München 1978), p98 105Winkler, H.A., ‘Der Schein der Normalität.’ (Berlin/Bonn 1987), p55

53 ‘normal’ working week was over 48 hours for 30% of German workers, as it was in 1928 (compared to 12% in Sweden and less than 5% in Denmark for the same year).106 Scandinavian workers were better off because their countries were wealthier than Germany and their trade unions relatively stronger than German trade unions. Being less well off meant that there were more German workers who were in dire situations and therefore more ready to adopt radical or extreme ideas.

The SPD remained in opposition throughout 1925, 1926 and 1927 and this brought it some benefits. The SPD’s new program, which was adopted at the Heidelberg Congress held in 1925 from September 13-18 aimed to replace the ‘Görlitz Program’ and the temporary action program of 1922. The head of the committee responsible for the program was Hilferding, who had become the SPD’s main theoretician and was not someone who would push for change in a ‘reformist’ direction. The ‘Heidelberg Program’ was not a step backwards from the ‘Görlitz Programm’ but whatever ‘reformist’ developments it proposed were minor. It retained the ‘polarization’ theory of the ‘Erfurt Program’.

Some advance in the direction of the Swedish Social Democrats could be found in the claim that ‘capitalism oppresses all working classes,’107 which resembled the ‘oppressed classes’ of the Swedish Social Democratic programs and hinted that the SPD was not just the party of wage-earning workers. Additional social demands also narrowed the gap between the program and those of the Swedish Social Democrats. These included a demand for public works for the unemployed to be administrated by trade unions108; a demand similar to that proposed in the Swedish Social Democratic economic program of 1920 for a minimum wage free of tax; 109 and a demand for more public housing projects.110 The gap between the Germans and the Swedes in their demands regarding social policy, taxation, economic policy and working conditions had now come down from 12 more demands in the Swedish programs to 8 more demands. The agricultural section continued to be considerably less detailed than its Swedish parallel and the program retained the same vague terms regarding

106Ibid, p61 107‘The Heidelberg Program’ in ‘Vorwärts’ of 19.9.1925 p1 prg. 4 108Ibid, social policy chapter 109Ibid, finance and taxes chapter 110Ibid, social policy chapter

54 ‘socialization’ and the status of the self-employed and small farmers, and the goal of ‘eliminating mass poverty’ was still absent.

By 1926, Heinig was no longer Editor of ‘Vorwärts’ economic board. He was strongly connected with the trade unions and had launched in 1925 a new paper of his own – ‘Gewerkschaften und Wirtschaft’ – in which he published an article titled ‘Ein Goldbilanzen’ and an essay in May, 1926 entitled ‘Wie lese ich die Vierjahrshefte der Aktiengesellschaft’ in which he explained certain economic terms. He also published some articles attacking the nationalists.

In contrast, instead of focusing on the definition of economic terms, Tarnow presented an action plan that had many similarities with the ‘reformism’ of the Swedish Social Democrats. In his lecture of March 29, 1926 entitled ‘Gegenwärtige Aufgaben deutscher Wirtschaftpolitik’ Tarnow attacked the ‘price dictatorship’ of cartels, favoring, like Karleby in the same year, a system of ‘free’ price setting. 111 He also called for a much higher level of taxes to finance social projects, pointing out that a rise in the level of social expenses and taxes would reflect greater collective influence on the economy at the expense of the private economy (similar to Karleby’s views).112 He summed up his plan with a comprehensive call to ‘smash price dictatorship’, ‘increase the purchasing power of workers’ wages’, ‘introduce a social policy that would help the poor in the face of the egoism of the strong’ and ‘introduce a just tax system’ that would target the rich.113 With the exception of Karleby call for income and economic power equality, Tarnow’s plan reflected many of the principles of ‘Swedish Social Democratic functional socialism’ of that time. But Tarnow did not have as great an influence as Hilferding.

The SPD Congress held in Kiel on May 22, 1927 reflected the fact that the SPD had become, to a great extent, a party that represented an interest group (urban workers) while being in open confrontation with farmers and that considered ‘central planning’ as the main element of ‘socialism’. The lecture given by the young Fritz Baade, one of the SPD’s ‘agrarian experts’, described farmers as economic rivals of urban

111Tarnow Fritz, ‘Gegenwärtige Aufgaben deutscher Wirtschaftspolitik.’ (Berlin 1926), Ms in AdsD, A80-4397, p8-9 112 Ibid, p17-18

55 workers. Baade claimed that the SPD was the party of the ‘urban masses’ and that the SPD’s policy in agrarian matters was solely in the context of the well-being of the ‘urban masses’114. He also claimed that the agrarian population, as a percentage of the general population, was steadily declining. After arguing that the rise in the ‘purchasing power’ of farmers was at the expense of the ‘urban masses’, he outlined his solution to the problem – increase of the farming production.115 Baade’s views reflected views of the SPD until 1933.

In his lecture ‘Die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie in der Republik’ (the tasks of the SPD in the Republic), which was the central lecture of the Congress, Hilferding began by claiming that Marxism was not fatalism but rather activism. His rhetoric was a strange combination of ‘non-reformism’ and political pragmatism. Hilferding created the new term ‘Spätkapitalismus’ (late capitalism)116 which he said stood for an economy in the process of changing from an economy based on the ‘principle of competition’ to an organized economy – a change which was considered positive, for it opened new possibilities for the German .117 Hilferding believed that the change would render what he saw as the main argument against ‘socialism’ meaningless: ‘organized capitalism’ he said actually ‘replaced the capitalist principle of free competition with the socialist principle of central planning’. 118 With this claim, Hilferding made Central Planing the central principle of ‘Socialism’ – the principle that made ‘socialism’ different from ‘capitalism’. There was a clear difference between Hilferding and Tarnow in 1926. Kautsky, on the other hand, could consider Hilferding as a loyal follower of his views.

In the strategic part of his lecture, Hilferding claimed that obtaining less than 30% of votes in the Prussian elections was a good result because the nationalists did much worse119 – an atypical view in a party that did not believe in its ability to win an absolute majority. By citing the municipality of Vienna as an example (where even

113 Ibid, p30-31 114Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1927 AdsD, X-2096 p119 115Ibid, p122 116Ibid, p166 117Ibid, p167 118Ibid, p168 119Ibid, p178

56 with a Social Democratic majority, the Christian Democrats won a share in local government120) and claiming that workers’ wages were a ‘political wage’ that depended on SPD power in government121 Hilferding stressed his message that the SPD ought to be part of a coalition government even with parties that had totally different social and economic programs because this would promote the interests of the group represented by the SPD (‘Urban workers’).

The main piece of social legislation in which the SPD took part at this time, together with most of the Reichstag parties, was the Unemployment Insurance Law passed on July 16, 1927. The law did not represent social achievement since it did not promote the transfer of money from the affluent to the less affluent. What it did do was to create a fund into which workers would pay 3% of their salaries and would receive in return 52% of their salaries for a limited period of time when unemployed. The fund was structured to be fully balanced for short-term unemployment of less than 6% and did not cover the long-term unemployed. As a result of low unemployment levels in 1927 and in 1928, workers paid for the entire scheme out of their own pockets. The only social element in the Law was a government guarantee for the unemployment fund in the case of an unexpected rise in the unemployment rate, which in 1927 was not believed likely to happen.

More closely connected to the pragmatic trade unions and having more non- mainstream views, Heinig attacked the cartels and, indirectly, Hilferding’s notion that ‘organized capitalism’ was a good thing. In his essay of November 1927 ‘Was sind Kartelle?’ (what is a cartel?), Heinig criticized every possible aspect of cartels, accusing them of decreasing efficiency and creativity, raising prices at the expense of consumers, and transferring financial resources from the less affluent to the affluent.

In the elections to the ‘Reichstag’ of May 20, 1928, the SPD and the Communists obtained a better result than in the elections of the mid 20’s. Together they succeeded, for the last time, in winning more than 40% of the votes, the SPD receiving 29.8% and the KPD 10.6%. The nationalist DNVP party obtained only 14.2%. Instead of putting its relative success to good use in the opposition and waiting until the ‘left’

120Ibid, p180 121Ibid, p169

57 won 50% of votes, the SPD chose to join a ‘grand coalition.’ Unlike the first months of the ‘grand coalition’ of 1923, the ‘grand coalition’ of 1928 was not the only reasonable option for a ‘responsible political party’. The right-wing government of 1927 had fallen because of disagreement between the DVP and the Zentrum Party over the status of religious schools and the fact that these two parties sat together in Müller’s ‘grand coalition’ showed that the gaps between them were bridgeable. The ‘center’ and ‘moderate right-wing’ parties (Zentrum, BVP, DDP, and DVP) had together 148 seats in the ‘Reichstag’. The Communists and the DNVP had between them 139 seats. The SPD therefore had the option of tolerating a moderate, center- right government by abstaining when the government was presented to Parliament and supporting or abstaining on issues of foreign affairs (primarily regarding approval of the last part of the Dawes program which was due to begin in 1929). At the same time, by voting against the ‘right-wing’ economic policy, it would push the government to cooperate with the ‘far right’ and thus make the ‘right wing’ parties pay the full political price for their ‘orthodox market economy’ policy.

There was also a good chance that a stable ‘center right’ coalition with more extreme ‘right wing’ parties would come to power, leaving the SPD totally free to benefit from the advantages of being in opposition. The ‘Wirtschaftspartei’ (the ‘economics party’) had, after the 1928 elections, 23 representatives in the ‘Reichstag’ – enough to give a ‘center right’ coalition an absolute majority. This party was more moderate than the DNVP. In January 1926, it took part in a ‘gathering of parties representing the middle class’, which included the ‘Wirtschaftspartei’, the DDP and DVP.122 In its party political program of summer 1926, the ‘Wirtschaft partei’ expressed ‘loyalty to the Republican form of government’ although it called for revisions in the with regard to ‘certain excesses in popular sovereignty’.123 The party would probably have supported or been willing to join a ‘center right’ coalition at least in economic matters, and the SPD would then not have had the need to support economic policies that were against its ideals.

122Jones, L., ‘German liberalism and the dissolution of the Weimar party system1918-1933.’ (Chapel Hill 1988), p279 123Ibid, p259

58 The ‘grand coalition’ was the direct outcome of views similar to those put forward by Hilferding in his ‘Die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie in der Republik’ lecture. If according to this line, Germany was already an organized economy, a society that fulfills a ‘socialist principle’ enabling all groups to use ‘political means’ (parties) to obtain their ‘just share’, then it followed that the SPD should be a representative of an ‘interest group’. A ‘grand coalition’ with the DVP and BVP was the natural place in which both the ‘representatives of capital’ (DVP and BVP) and the ‘representatives of the workers’ (SPD) could share in ‘the national income’. The main problem with this theory was the fact that, with a ‘non socialist’ majority, it did not take long before the SPD failed to protect the social achievements of the 20’s in a government led by the SPD. On June 28, with little opposition from the SPD, a ‘grand coalition’ with Herman Müller of the SPD at its head and Hilferding as Finance Minister was formed. In addition to the SPD, the coalition included the Zentrum Party, the DDP, the DVP and the BVP.

In January, 1928, a few months before Müller’s ‘grand coalition’, Tarnow published under the aegis of Heinig an article titled ‘Warum arm sein?’ (why are we poor?). The article put forward a ‘Keynesian macroeconomic’ theory, which represented a major change for the SPD. In the article, Tarnow developed his theory that the key to economic growth and lower unemployment in Germany lay in raising the ‘purchasing power’ of workers. Heinig then was still the editor of ‘Gewerkschaft und Wirtschaft’ the paper had become one of the main theoretical organs of the ADGB. In his introduction to the article, Heinig was neither critical of Tarnow’s views or of Tarnow the man, describing him as a person whose position imparted special significance to his words. While Tarnow’s mainly stressed the issue of workers’ ‘purchasing power’, Heinig focused on the claim that ‘rationalization’ of the economy was not a ‘socialist goal’ but was something the trade unions ought to know how to deal with while working within the framework of a ‘market economy’. Tarnow, he said, provided the answer to the problem.124 At this time, unlike Tarnow, Heinig did not consider that ‘Keynesian macroeconomics theory’ was central to the issue – something he would later admit during his exile in Denmark and Sweden. At this point he considered the theory as another example for ‘correct Socialist behavior’ in a ‘market economy’.

124 Heinig Kurt introduction to ‘Warum arm sein’ in ‘Gewerkschaft und Wirtschaft’ of January 1928 (Berlin 1928), p 1

59

In his article, Tarnow claimed that Germany was not poor but suffered from a gap between its production capability and actual production.125 The ‘purchasing power’ of workers, the subject of chapter 7, was, he noted, the factor that closed the gap between production capability and actual production. Increased ‘purchasing power’ meant more money in the hands of consumers who purchased the products of the economy and these consumers would create demand for more production.126 The issue of ‘purchasing power’ he said, was connected with the issue of wages: without an increase in wages ‘purchasing power’ would continue to be to low and prevent full production capability. Wages therefore constituted, in his view, the main factor determining ‘purchasing power’.127

At first sight, Tarnow’s views did not seem to conflict with Hilferding’s concept of ‘political wages’ being dependent on the power of the SPD to care for its supporters, i.e. the workers. But, in fact, Tarnow considered wages as the most important factor on which the possibility of reaching low unemployment and a high standard of living depended. Therefore, the ability of the SPD to create a Germany with good economic conditions for the ‘masses’ depended on ‘real’ wage growth. If the SPD had chosen to increase ‘purchasing power’ through a budget deficit, the potential collision with the ‘non socialist’ parties might have been smaller. But the SPD was not strong enough to force a deficit policy on its coalition partners. It made no sense therefore for the SPD to believe it could deliver the transfer of income from the affluent to the less affluent through a long-term increase in ‘real’ wages at the expense of company profits. Consequently there was no logic in Tarnow’s support of a ‘grand coalition’ headed by Müller.

Following the May 1928 elections, both Heinig and Tarnow became members of the Reichstag. With his mainstream views, it was natural for Heinig to support a grand coalition. In contrast, Tarnow’s support was the first evidence of his opportunistic trait which cast doubt on the credibility of his reformist views, or for that matter any of his views. His support for the coalition was not the only example of his

125Tarnow Fritz ‘Warum arm sein.’ (Berlin 1928), p17 126‘Ibid, p46-47 127‘Ibid, p49, 52

60 development into a figure who combined creative economic thinking with a flexible approach and, later on, questionable moral views. At the ADGB congress in Jena on November 10 and 11, 1928, Tarnow, as head of the Woodworkers’ Trade Union, claimed, in line with Hilferding and Kautsky, that the German economy was becoming more of an economy of wage earners and less an economy of self- employed.128 The large number of cartels, he said, was important because it proved acceptance of the principle of central planning by ‘capitalists’.129 Tarnow also claimed, in this lecture, that ‘the social politic is to a large extent the realization of society’s power over the economy’130 but this ‘reformist’ declaration was tarnished when Tarnow went on to describe the 1927 Unemployment Insurance Law, which had few social elements, as the best example of the implementation of this principle.131

There were few social achievements in the early part of 1929. The SPD yearbook of 1929 mentions a disability assistance law of January 1929, which raised the basic disability benefit and created more protected homes for the disabled. The very modest sum of four million marks was also paid as assistance to families with children and there was increased spending on public housing projects compared with former governments132. These reforms represented the implementation of a new tradition of more activity in social legislation, which was adopted by the SPD parliamentary group during the opposition years of 1925-1928, but this activity never took center stage. They were noted down only in the summaries of the SPD yearbooks of those years, in the sections dealing with SPD activity in social legislation, and not in the party’s programs or in speeches of leaders.

The few social achievements of early 1929 were about to lose weight as a result of the DVP’s challenge to the ‘most important example of the realization of society power over the economy’ (the 1927 Unemployment Law). Unemployment began to rise rapidly after October 1929 even from the high rate of 1928. In times of ‘negative employment conditions’ the Minister of Labor could extend the period of unemployment benefit from 26 to 39 weeks. This was the main social element in the

128Tarnow Fritz, ‘Die Stellungnahme der freien Gewrekschaften zur Frage der Wirtschaftsdemokratie.’ (Jena 1929), p6 129Ibid, p14 130Ibid, p20 131 Ibid,

61 Unemployment Law. An adjustment to the Law in June 29, 1929, extended the payment period to 52 weeks for unemployed peopled aged 40+. On October 12, 1929 the social element was fully activated as a result of the worsening employment situation, a move vehemently opposed by the DVP which called for the cancellation of the social element of the Unemployment Insurance Law.

The DVP wanted to lower unemployment benefits from 52% of the last wage to 40% of the last wage and to raise the contributions of insured worker from 3% of their wage to 4.5%. Unemployment benefit for a short and medium-term unemployment level of 11% would thus be financed entirely out of the workers’ pockets. With 3,300,000 unemployed in the first quarter of 1930, a large percentage of whom were long-term unemployed, this meant that workers would be paying entirely for the scheme. The SPD justifiably would not agree to these proposals, which were supported also by the BVP and met with mild opposition by the DDP and the Zentrum Party. On March 27, 1930 the ‘grand coalition’ came to an end and was replaced by a ‘center- right’ coalition with a majority in the ‘Reichstag’. The new government, headed by Dr. Heinrich Brüning of the Zentrum Party, consisted of the Zentrum Party, the DDP, the DVP, the BVP, the ‘Wirtschaftspartei’. The nationalist DNVP supported the government without beeing part of the coalition. The inclusion of all the right- wing parties, except for the NSDAP (Nazi Party that was already in close cooperation with the DNVP in the “Harzburger Front”) and the government’s economic approach should have led to the SPD being fully in opposition. But on April 3, 1930, with the government facing its first ‘no confidence’ vote, 24 SPD members abstained and did not vote against the government, even though the government would have had a majority if every SPD member had voted against it. The 24 SPD members, who did not even have the courage to make a protest vote, included Hermann Müller, Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Braun, head of the Prussian Government. The SPD contributed to preserving the ‘Prussian grand coalition’ and was therefore still cooperating politically with the DVP.

In the elections of September 14, 1930, the SPD paid a heavy price for the positions it took from May 1928 to September 1930. Although the number of voters rose in

132SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschland vom 1929.’ (Berlin 1930), p101-102

62 these elections from 31,167,245 in 1928 to 35,226,657, the number of SPD voters fell from 9,150,533 votes in 1928 to 8,575,699 in 1930. In percentage terms, the SPD vote fell from 29.8% to 24.5%. The number of KPD voters rose from 3,262,876 in 1928 to 4,590,453. In percentage terms, thus, the KPD vote rose from 10.6% to 13.1% and it became the country’s third largest party. The National Socialist Party became the second largest party in Germany, after the SPD, with 18.3% of the vote.

Both Kurt Heinig and Fritz Tarnow were re-elected. Their respective positions, as the SPD’s Parliamentary financial expert (Heinig) and the economic expert of the ADGB (Tarnow), was much of great importance in an SPD that had no ministers in government. The failure of Hilferding’s theory also increased their standing since both men had disagreements with Hilferding’s economic views.

Brüning’s second cabinet, formed after the elections, was no less problematic than the first for the SPD as it had more surprises in store for the workers and the unemployed. On October 6, 1930, the government raised the unemployment contribution of insured workers from 4.5% of their income to 6.5%, the second rise in less than half a year. At the same time it proposed to lower taxes on firms and farmers and to lower company tax by 20%. The SPD had to decide whether to tolerate or to oppose the Brüning government. In mid-September, ‘Vorwärts’ was already describing the KPD and the NSDAP as two sides of the same evil coin (a reaction to KPD attacks on the SPD). Since the Brüning Government relied on SPD support to obtain more votes than the NSDAP and the KPD together, the SPD decided to vote unanimously on October 18, 1930 in favor of the anti-welfare government rather than have new elections.

An alternative solution to the unemployment problem, proposed by the trade unions, called for shortening the work week from 48 to 40 hours. Employed workers, in an act of ‘solidarity’, would thus share with the unemployed the burden of not working. The proposals did not include any transfers from rich to poor, something which was not achievable given that the SPD and the trade unions had no significant political power. Tarnow was skeptical of the proposal, fearing that employers would exploit the law to

63 pay workers less without employing more workers. Leipart, head of the ADGB, however was in favor of the plan.133

On December 6, 1930, the SPD agreed to support cuts in social welfare for the second time. Whereas on October 18, only two SPD members abstained, this time 8 SPD members abstained. The SPD did have a chance to block a government proposal to build more tanks when it was presented to the ‘Reichstag’ in February 1931: together with the KPD, it voted against but the proposal, not unexpectedly, won the support of the NSDAP.

During the SPD Party conference held in Leipzig from May 31, 1931 to June 5, 1931 the SPD was clearly a frustrated party. For more than a year it had had to go along with an ‘orthodox market economy policy’ promoted by the DVP without being part of the government and watch the KPD increase its popularity at the expense of the SPD. The party conference was a good opportunity to ‘let off steam’. Tarnow gave the main lecture, confirming his growing importance within the SPD although his influence on final SPD policy remained limited until the end of the ‘Weimar Republic’. His lecture was called ‘Kapitalistische Wirtschaftsanarchie und Arbeiterklasse’ (capitalist economic anarchy and the working class). He began by describing mass unemployment as a catastrophe created by ‘capitalism’, then offered empirical examples of how Germany’s production capability grew dramatically between 1913 and 1928.134 He went on to criticize Hilferding directly by claiming that monopolies organized economic relations but also created anarchy in the ‘national economy’ by promoting ‘economic civil war between people’.135 Monopolies did not progress in their development, he noted, and there was thus no justification for political cooperation in economic and social areas with the party of ‘big capital’ and the ‘big monopolies’ i.e., the DVP, a cooperation that was supported by former USPD member Hilferding. According to Tarnow, ‘capital owners’ did not suffer in the 20’s and their capital accumulation grew even with the outflow of reparation payments from Germany to other countries.136

133Winkler H.A., ‘Der Weg in die Katastrophe.’ (Bonn1990), p228-230 134Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1931 AdsD, X-2096 p32-38 135Ibid, p39 136Ibid, p41-42

64 In line with his 1928 essay ‘Warum arm sein,’ Tarnow claimed that the economic crisis was the result of insufficient ‘purchasing power’. If only 70% of workers were employed and had salaries, it was no wonder that there was a lack of ‘purchasing power’. The solution, he said, was not to lower wages (as proposed by industrialists and the DVP), but to increase real wages.137 A way of achieving such real wage growth was to give workers the same weekly wage, which they were presently receiving (1931) but for a work-week of 40 hours instead of 48. 138 The logic was that, in order to maintain the same rate of production level, employers would have to employ more workers and their aggregate wage expenses would rise. This would make a firm’s aggregate wage expenses which were equal to the workers’ aggregate earnings higher than before the change to a 40 hour work week, resulting in a rise in the ‘national purchasing power’ since workers tend to consume more than employers tend to save. The rise would create more demand for goods and services and would cause production to rise and unemployment to fall. Tarnow knew that there was not much likelihood that small farmers would see long- term benefits for themselves in such a program, when as it was they did not have great faith in the SPD’s sympathy towards them and their problems. Tarnow therefore called for urgent drafting of an SPD agricultural program, which, as he reminded his audience, had been decided on in 1927 at the Kiel Congress but had not materialized. 139 The KPD’s proposals were not an alternative, said Tarnow, because what they were proposing was to imitate the Soviet Union ‘where the standard of living was much lower than in capitalist countries’. The Soviet economic plan, according to Tarnow, was an example of a process that destroyed not only ‘capitalism’ but the economy itself, causing widespread misery and the death of millions. 140 Tarnow’s comments on the NSDAP hinted at the stand he would take in the future. He described the NSDAP (‘the soldiers of anti Marxism’), as a party that had already rejected ‘capitalism’ but had yet to accept ‘socialism’.141

Heinig’s own comments regarding Tarnow’s address showed he was on friendly term with Tarnow (or at least intended to be) while not supporting his ‘Keynesian

137Ibid, p43 138Ibid, p50 139Ibid, p49 140Ibid, p46 141Ibid, p51

65 macroeconomic position’. Heinig began his address with: ‘I believe, dear Tarnow’ (‘lieber Tarnow’)142, which was the common form of address in correspondence between party members but not at party congresses where the more usual form would have been ‘comrade Tarnow.’ Heinig used Tarnow’s criticism of Communism to emphasize his own view, as the party’s ‘finance theory expert’ (a title which he did not forget to mention), that even solutions to economic crisis must include monetary caution.143 This view did not conflict with Tarnow’s proposal to increase ‘real’ wages through a 40 hour work week at the same wage as for a 48 hour work week but it was in conflict with Tarnow’s future proposals to increase ‘purchasing power’ through a budget deficit and an ‘inflation tax’ to finance public works (‘classical Keynesian macroeconomic policy). Heinig’s views on this matter represented the mainstream view in the SPD. Tarnow did not propose inflation-tax programs at this stage but views expressed in 1928 and in Spring 1931 set the stage for future proposals of this nature.

The Swedish guest at the Congress, Gustav Möller, a senior member of the Swedish Social Democratic Party but not one of its creative theoreticians (see Chapter C of the Introduction), gave a very short, polite address in which he praised the SPD for its efforts to protect the democracy in Germany, making no mention of his or his party’s view of SPD political tactics and SPD ideas on economic policy.144

On October 4, 1931, shortly before the end of the ‘Reichstag’ recess, a new party – the ‘Sozialistischen Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands’ (German SAP) – made up of ‘left- wing’ SPD members was founded. It was an unsuccessful political gamble on the part of SPD members who opposed the SPD’s policy of tolerance towards the Brüning government, felt unable to change it from within and did not want to join the KPD. The new party included prominent SPD members such as Heinrich Ströbel and SPD ‘Reichstag’ members Kurt Rosenfeld and Max Seydewitz (a future exile to Sweden). In organizational terms, it was a very small party, numbering only 25,000 members compared with almost 1,000,000 SPD members and more than 300,000 KPD members and only obtaining 0.2% of votes in the elections of July 1932.

142Ibid, p74 143Ibid, p75 144Ibid, p31

66

At the opening of Parliament on October 13, 1931, the NSDAP proposed to do away with the ‘gold basis’ and using inflation to get the economy out of its deflationary state, a proposal opposed by the SPD. It was clear from party conferences and past political programs that this opposition was not only based on the fact that it came from the NSDAP. In the ADGB, Tarnow, who did not support his party’s total rejection of the NSDAP’s economic proposal, drafted a new ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policy’ program titled the WTB program. The program derived its name from its authors – Wladimir Woytinski, a journalist in the ADGB press, Tarnow the main political figure in the group, and Fritz Baade, SPD expert on agrarian matters and a Reichstag member since 1930.

The WTB program, which was presented for the first time on December 23, 1931, called for one million unemployed to be employed in public works. On January 26, 1932, the authors suggested that the financing of the public works, which would require two billion marks, could be done by taking out a loan from the ‘Reichsbank’. This clearly meant opting for a budget deficit, since the ‘Reichsbank’ was the German National Bank and a national loan would be infact a budget deficit. This deficit will increase the public’s ‘purchasing power’. According to Keynesian theory, the increase would be balanced in part by a rise in the GDP (based on the fact that the economy was not working at full capacity) and partly through inflation, which would amount to a tax on the financial assets of the entire population. Since most financial assets were in the hands of the affluent, they would be paying most of the ‘inflation tax’.

When the WTB program was discussed by the Party on February 8-9, 1932, it met with harsh criticism from Hilferding and others who believed that it would lead to hyperinflation.145 On March 23, 1932, the program was finally rejected. However the SPD, unlike the Swedish Social Democrats, was not in a position to gain an absolute majority. The program alone was not enough to save it in the elections of July 1932. In an essay published on March 27, 1932 entitled ‘Von der Wirtschaftsanarchie zur Planwirtschaft’ (from economic anarchy to a planned economy), the flexible Tarnow pointed out that the economic crisis was a world crisis and it was therefore not

145Winkler, op.cit. p499

67 possible to create ‘automatic economic recovery in one country’. 146After renouncing his ‘Keynesian macroeconomic’ views in face of the party’s stand, Tarnow claimed that the problem of unemployment could be solved only in a ‘socialist planned economy’.147

On May 18, 1932 the Brünnig Government proposed to cut the maximum period of unemployment benefit from 20 to 13 weeks and raise the minimum insurance period required to gain the right to unemployment benefit from 38 to 45 weeks. The proposal, which was strongly opposed by the ADGB, brought an end to the SPD’s tolerant policy towards the Brünnig government. On May 30, 1932 Hindenburg formed a ‘government of professionals’ headed by Franz Von Papen. It was a ‘right- wing’ government with a clear anti-social-welfare approach. An initiative by the SAP in early June 1932 to create a united front of the KPD, the SPD and the ADGB was unsuccessful. In one of his political flip-flops, Tarnow proposed to accept the offer in order to ‘unmask the face of the KPD’.148 On June 14, 1932 the Von Papen Government shortened the duration of unemployment benefit from 20 to 6 weeks, making the Brünig Government look like a champion of social legislation. In Prussia, the informal support given by the KPD to the SPD-Zentrum Party coalition was used by the Von Papen Government to put the Prussian Government out of office. On July 20, 1932 it was replaced by a Nazi official on the basis of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which allowed a government to take emergency measures to protect the Republic.

The general elections to the ‘Reichstag’ of July 30, 1932 followed violent clashes in which ten people were killed. On election day itself, 12 SPD sympathizers were killed. The SPD continued to lose ground, obtaining only 21.6% of the votes. The KPD won 14.5%, representing a slight increase and the NSDAP obtained 37.4%, more than the KPD and the SPD put together. Tarnow and Heinig were both re- elected. The SPD now had 133 ‘Reichstag members’ compared with 143 before the elections. The NSDAP’s base was mainly among small farming communities in Protestant areas (the rural areas of Schleswig-Holstein surrounding Lübeck and Kiel

146Tarnow Fritz, ‘Von der Wirtschaftanarchie zur Planwirtschaft.’ (Reichenberg 1932), p8 147Ibid, p18-21 148Winkler,op.cit. p625

68 were the areas where the NSDAP obtained its highest support) and among the middle class in big cities. The SPD and the KPD were very weak among small farmers and did not have a majority even among agricultural workers, but their dominance among urban workers was impressive. In Berlin, the SPD and KPD together, obtained more than 60% of votes, part of which came from liberal middle class voters, who viewed the SPD as the last force that was loyal to democracy and still had some political power. It was nonetheless clear, from the shrinking of support for the ‘left’ between 1928 and 1930 and between 1930 and July 1932, that some of the urban workers’ votes had gone to the NSDAP both in 1930 and, to a greater extent, in 1932. The ‘right-wing’ parties, the NSDAP, DNVP, BVP and DVP had together less than 50% of seats in the ‘Reichstag’. But since a possible coalition of the SPD, Zentrum and Liberals had no majority and there was no chance of the KPD supporting a Zentrum- Liberal government, the Von Papen Government remained in place.

The success of the NSDAP in the July 1932 elections drove Tarnow to make a highly controversial action. On August 3, 1932, during a meeting of the ADGB leadership, Tarnow rejected the party line of no contact with the extreme right-wing, stating that this could help create a new economic situation, i.e. a planned economy backed by the ADGB, the SPD, the KPD and the NSDAP. 149 Tarnow put forward similar ideas in an article published in ‘Vorwärts’ on August 20, 1932. On August 26, 1932 Tarnow met with NSDAP official Herman Cordemann and with Gregor Strasser, the contact man between the ADGB and the NSDAP. Reporting on the meeting in a letter to Leipart, Tarnow stated: ‘there is a lot in the internal development of the NSDAP that we can learn from’150. Tarnow was clearly the main figure in the ADGB leadership promoting contacts between the NSDAP and the ADGB. It is not clear whether he held more meetings with Strasser and there is no way of verifying what was discussed during his meeting with Cordemann. Tarnow’s son would later become a member of the NSDAP. 151 No agreement between the ADGB and the NSDAP ever came out of these contacts. Still Tarnow was one of the most non-assertive trade union leaders that year.

149Ibid, p714 150Ibid, p716 151See Heinig claims in chapter 3.2

69 On September 14, 1932, after being humiliated in the ‘Reichstag’ and receiving support from only one fifth of Parliament, Von Papen announced new elections for November 6. In these elections, the NSDAP came out weaker, losing votes to the more moderate DNVP and winning 33.1% of votes instead of 37.4%. The SPD continued to shrink, obtaining its worst result since 1912 with 20.4% of votes (700,000 less voters than in July 1932). Heinig was re-elected, which was not surprising in view of the fact that his electoral district was a SPD stronghold in Berlin, a privilege given to the party elite, and so was Tarnow. On December 3, 1932, after the Zentrum Party agreed to sit with the NSDAP, a new government was formed with Kurt von Schleicher, former Defense Minister under Von Papen, as Prime Minister. On January 30, 1933, under pressure from the NSDAP, the coalition parties agreed to a new Prime Minister – Adolph Hitler. Believing that the organized workers were too depressed after years of economic hardship and unable to form real resistance, a fearful ADGB leadership declared its neutrality and, in an act of complete submission, declared on April 19, 1933 that the workers should join the NSDAP demonstration planned for the first of May, a decision in which Tarnow played a central role.152 SPD actions such as the publication of an essay by Heinig titled ‘Der Osthilfe Skandal’ in which he attacked the government’s support for farmers when it was already clear that the support of urban workers alone was insufficient, were of no effect.

Hitler initiated another round of elections to solidify his party’s power base. These elections were held under an atmosphere of SA terror. The SPD received only 18.3% of votes and the KPD ( a party whose activities were now outlawed) 12.3% of votes. The NSDAP won 43.9% giving Hitler, together with the DNVP’s 8%, the majority he needed to approve his dictatorial ‘emergency powers’.

Chapter 1.2

152 Ibid,

70 The founding of the So.Pa.De and the attitude of future leading SPD exiles in Scandinavia towards the exiled Secretariat in June 1933.

On March 23, 1933 the SPD stood alone in its opposition to the Reichstag’s decision giving Hitler ‘emergency powers’. On May 2, 1933, the government outlawed the ADGB and on June 22, the SPD was outlawed too. It re-established itself on June 24, 1933, in Prague under the name So.Pa.De. (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). According to Friedrich Stampfer, the party’s new name was chosen in order to symbolize a new beginning, free from the old SPD tendency to compromise and avoid using radical means against the National Socialists.153

There were several good arguments for choosing Czechoslovakia as the center of the So.Pa.De and its struggle against the new German regime. The Czechoslovak Government was hostile to the Nazi regime because of the latter’s aspirations to take over the German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia.The So.Pa.De could also get logistic help from the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party, which was a minority party among the three million German-speaking inhabitants of Czechoslovakia but still a significant organization. The Czechoslovak border was also relatively close to the main SPD strongholds in Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and the Erfurt area.

The SPD Secretariat exiles (in early June 1933 exiled Secretariat members who acted together and spoke with one voice were: Otto Wels, Hans Vogel, Erich Ollenhauer, Fridrich Stampfer and Siegmund Crummenerl) did not inform SPD members as to the reasons for choosing the Czechoslovak Republic as the party’s new centre, preferring to focus on the reasons for choosing to operate from foreign soil. In the Secretariat’s open letter to SPD members, it claimed that, since January 1933 (when Hitler was named Prime Minister), activities by the party and the party leadership became impossible due to harassment of senior party members and the confiscation of the

153 ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 19.6.1938, p32

71 assets of ‘Vorwärts’.154 The Secretariat denounced efforts to question its legitimacy to operate from abroad and the idea of holding an SPD conference in Berlin when the Secretariat was already in Prague (the Secretariat informed the SAI on the 2 .6.1933 on its new location155) as ‘inappropriate’: ‘The party secretariat feel that this conference,(the conference planned for June 8 ) is an inappropriate event’.156

But the efforts by the exiled Secretariat to reach a consensus, according to which the entire SPD leadership would operate from abroad, did not succeed until the SPD was outlawed on June 22, 1933. On June 8, 1933 the SPD Reichstag group convened together in Berlin, ignoring the exile Secretariat’s letter of June 2. The conference did not include arrested or exiled SPD Reichstag members who represented approx. one third of the SPD Reichstag group (14 out of 120 members were under arrest157 in addition to the Reichstag members who were members of the Prague Secretariat and thus in exile and to several ADGB Reichstag members such as Fritz Tarnow also in exile). Paul Löbe, main initiator of the conference, claimed he opposed Hitler but did not oppose his foreign policy158, adding that, in view of the fate of other exiled Social Democratic Parties such as the Italians and Russians, the future SPD in exile would become a group of guests dependent on the support of other SAI members.159 For his part, Kurt Schumacher stated that there were also opposite examples with respect to exiled parties and pointed to that of the Lenin Bolshevik Party.160 He declared ‘we have already wasted too much time not organizing illegal resistance activity’ and maintained that reconciliation between the SPD and the Fascists would never be possible.161

Karl Raloff, who later went into exile in Denmark, claimed that organizing ‘illegal resistance activity’ was not as simple as Schumacher made out. 162 Heinig agreed with Dietrich (representing Erfurt) that there was a need for a leadership change and a

154 ‘An open letter by the SPD Secretariat to the SPD members dated 3.6.1933, AdsD/ M-6 para. 3-4 155 A letter by the SPD Secretariat to the SAI dated 2.6.1933 AdsD M/ -6 para. 1 156 An ‘open letter by the SPD Secretariat to SPD members dated 3.6.1933 AdsD/ M-6 para. 2 157 A private protocol of the June 8 SPD Reichstag group conference written on June 10 by SPD Reichstag member and published in ’Vorwärts’ on the 5.10.1956 para. 1 158 Ibid, para. 14 159 Ibid, para. 15 160 Ibid, para. 22 161 Ibid, para. 22 162 Ibid, prg 26

72 need for new party elections to choose a new leadership, which would be unassociated with the policies of the last year and therefore have the trust of SPD members.163 He claimed that the SA had separated from his ‘Bolshevik charateristics’ and had become an organization under the strict control of the SS. There was no hope, he said, of Germany becoming again a society with civil rights and there was no hope of moderating the regime.164 Heinig pointed out that the regime’s commitment to the ‘private capitalist system’ would deepen the economic crisis and lead to pressure for regime change.165 Heinig did not oppose ‘illegal activity’ and did not echo Raloff’s scepticism but he was, like most of the conference participants, critical of the SPD Secretariat.166 Otto Buchwitz, another future SPD exile in Denmark, is not mentioned in the protocol of the debate, which probably meant that this relatively old member of the Reichstag did not support Löbe’s iniative. Richard Hansen was the only senior exile in Scandinavia who at this stage supported the Secretariat and was already working on its behalf in Denmark (see next chapter).

With the outlawing of the SPD, the opponents of the Secretariat in exile had to give way and accept the Secretariat’s authority: it was now impossible to elect a new ‘legitimate leadership’ and everyone, including the SPD Reichstag members, had to base their legitimacy on their status prior to June 22. The debate over ‘illegal activity’ also ended, since this was the only way of operating within Germany.

The last elected SPD Secretariat now became the Secretariat of the So.Pa.De. Its members were: Otto Wels, SPD General Secretary since 1919 and now the So.Pa.De General Secretary; Hans Vogel who was another So.Pa.De General Secretary (he had been one of the four SPD General Secretaries 1931 and 1933); and three secretaries who were elected to the SPD Secretariat in early 1933 – Erich Ollenhauer, head of the SPD youth organization and the second youngest member of the Secretariat (32 years old in 1933); Paul Hertz and Erich Rinner (the youngest member, aged 30). Siegmund Crummenerl, SPD Treasurer in 1931, became Treasurer of the So.Pa.De.

163 Ibid, prg 30 164 Ibid 165 Ibid 166 Ibid

73 Friedrich Stampfer, Editor of ‘Vorwärts’ became the editor of the So.Pa.De organ ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ and a member of the Secretariat without a managing role. The other members of the Secretariat with the same status were Emil Stahl, who had held the same position since 1931; Siegfried Aufhäuser and Karl Böchel who had been elected in 1933. Only Paul Hertz, Siegfried Aufhäuser and Karl Böchel belonged to what was defined as the ‘left’ in the SPD. Siegfried Aufhäuser and Karl Böchel headed an internal organization within the SPD – the RSD (Revolutionäre Sozialisten Deutschlands), which had been founded in the early 30’s and favored greater cooperation with other parties in the German left such as the KPD and SAP. It also had more concrete demands regarding economic and social policies (which will be described at a later stage). Paul Hertz was not part of the RSD but he had contacts with the ‘Neu Beginnen’ group, which tried to create a new party, uniting all the German left (the group’s activity was tolerated by the So.Pa.De Secretariat until late 1933).

The So.Pa.De also continued to have representatives in the SAI (Social Democratic International) – Otto Wels, Hans Vogel and Rudolf Hilferding retained their place on the SAI Executive. Henceforth, the members of the SAI, which was founded by Otto Wels in 1924, became the main source of political and financial support for the So.Pa.De.

74 Chapter 1.3 SPD exiles and Social Democratic Denmark in 1933.

Denmark, like the Czechoslovak Republic, was a good exile option for So.Pa.De members who wanted to be active in the ‘anti-Nazi resistance’ in Germany but were unwilling or unable to remain in Germany. The advantages it offered were: a) a border with Northern Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) and the cities of Hamburg, Kiel, and Lübeck which were SPD strongholds and had busy shipping routes to Denmark. Since a large percentage of the population in Southern Denmark was of German origin, it was relatively easy for a German to go back and forward across the German- Danish border without arousing suspicion; b) Denmark had a strong Social Democratic Party which was already the leading force in the Danish Government (see Introduction) and hostile to the right wing regime in Germany. SPD exiles, as members of the SAI, could count on its support; c) the Danish Emigration Law allowed, until 1934, anyone with a German passport to stay in Denmark for up to six months without requesting a visa from the Danish authorities.167

The first senior SPD exiles who came to Denmark were Richard Hansen, head of the ‘Reichsbanner’ in Schleswig Holstein and Fritz Tarnow, the trade union leader, who both arrived in May/June 1933, before the SPD was outlawed on June 22. Hansen’s move to Denmark was natural as Denmark was the closest foreign country to his area of operation and the move accorded with the Secretariat’s decision of May 1933 to create in Denmark a coordination centre for underground activities to be carried out in Northern Germany. (A letter sent on September 3, 1935 by the So.Pa.De Secretariat to the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat through the Danish Social Democratic Secretariat stated in the first paragraph: ‘We ask for your support in the following matter. As you know, since we took up illegal Social Democratic work in Germany in May 1933, border Secretariats have been established on central border points and are responsible for contacts with illegal groups in nearby German areas. The border Secretariat responsible for North Germany is based in Copenhagen and has developed into one of our main support centers.’168 The names of the members who

167 See Lorenz Einhart and Petersen Uwe ‘Fremdenpolitik und Asylpraxis’ in ‘Ein sehr trübes Kapitel?’ (Hamburg 1998), p 20 168 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat dated 3.9.1935 AdsD/ M-50 para. 1

75 operated the ‘Grenzsekretariat’ were not mentioned for security reasons but were disclosed in a much later letter by Raloff, which is quoted at the beginning of Part 2. Hansen began sending letters from Denmark already in early June 1933. A letter by Hansen to Wels dated June 8,1933 reports that material was sent from Denmark to Germany via fishermen, noting the cost of expenses and cooperation by the Danish Social Democrats.169 This is clear evidence that Hansen began operating the Copenhagen ‘Grenzsekretariat’ in June 1933.

It is unclear whether Tarnow’s quick release from arrest (he was arrested on May 2, 1933 with all the other senior ADGB officials and released two days’ later170) was because of his past contacts with Nazi officials or was a favor given for something in return. Tarnow provides no explanation as to why he chose Denmark for his place of exile. A possible explanation, which does not paint Tarnow in a problematic light, is the Danish Emigration Law which provided easy entry from Germany, The two other senior SPD exiles who fled to Denmark were Kurt Heinig (then aged 47) and Karl Raloff (aged 34), who had been a member of the SPD leadership in Hanover from 1925 till 1933 and a member of the Reichstag from July 1932.

Heinig arrived in Denmark in August 1933, Heinig arrived with his wife and two children,171 two months after the SPD was outlawed.172 His flight can be explained by the fact that a wave of arrests of Social Democratic activists (altogether 84) took place that month in Berlin.173 Heinig’s criticism of the SPD Secretariat at the Reichstag group’s conference on June 8 (see previous chapter) and the necessity of repairing his relationship with Wels and Vogel, may have been another reason as to why Heinig chose to move first to Denmark.

169 A letter from Richard Hansen to Otto Wels dated 8.6.1933 AdsD/ M-47 para. 2 and 3. 170 See in the BHI (Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933) edited by Werner Röder and Herbert A.Strauss (New York/ München London/Paris 1980-1983) under Tarnow 171 Unlike Raloff, Heinig did not mention in his correspondence a period when he was in exile separated from the rest of his family. 172 See the editor introduction to ‘Det tyske problemet I dag.’(Copenhagen 1946), Ms in AdSD, A- 54501, p2 173 According to the ‘Berliner Berichte’ Nr 3 of 25.7.1933 written by Emil Stahl, there were 20 groups in Berlin till August 1933 which distributed So.Pa.De material (Sozialistische Aktion) with a united leader ship that included Stahl. Heinig headed one of these groups.

76 Raloff arrived alone, leaving his wife Margrethe (b. 1904), whom he addressed as Grete in his letters, and two children in Germany. Grete Raloff was harassed by the SA in Hanover174, evidence of Raloff’s importance in the eyes of local Nazis, and as result she moved in September 1933 to Magdeburg.175 Raloff’s brother was harassed in Hamburg by the secret police in their search for Raloff.176 Aided by an SPD activist from Hanover, Raloff fled across the border into Denmark in early September 1933, thus avoiding arrest and being sent to a concentration camp.177 (Denmark was the closest country to Hanover and a place were Raloff had studied in 1921 and 1922 and developed contacts with Danish Social Democrats. Raloff had also visited Denmark in June 1933 on his own initiative, renewing his contacts with the Danish Social Democrats Secretariat.178) At the end of 1933, Raloff requested the So.Pa.De Secretariat to help bring his wife and children to Denmark, which it did.179

The fifth important SPD exile who arrived in Denmark in 1933 was Otto Buchwitz (1879-1964) who had been an SPD Reichstag member from 1924 till 1933. Buchwitz fled to Copenhagen alone in July 1933. His wife succeeded in joining him later that month by crossing into the Czechoslovak Republic with the help of SPD activists in Görlitz and traveling onto Copenhagen.180 Philip Scheidemann (the first Prime Minister on behalf of the SPD in the ‘Weimar Republic’), who had a close relationship with Buchwitz, fled first to the Czechoslovak Republic and then joined Buchwitz in Denmark in 1934. Based on the evidence available, most of the group (the six men were the most important SPD exiles in Scandinavia) did not choose Denmark because of special contacts they had with the Danish Social Democrats. They came to Denmark because it was the most convenient option in their cases as a place of political refuge from where they could continue the struggle against the NSDAP. Hansen’s arrival appears to have been the result of a former party decision and it is possible that personal contacts played a role in Raloff’s choice of exile.

174 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 18.9.1933 AdsD/ M-89 SPD 175 Ibid 176 Ibid 177 Ibid 178 See letter from Richard Hansen to Otto Wels dated 8.6.1933 paras. 2 and 3, in which Raloff is called for security reasons R (Hanover). 179 The request is not repeated in his letters of early 1934. 180 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Robert Hawel dated 10.7.1933 AdsD/ M-50.

77 Although the arrival of senior SPD exiles in Denmark and the rest of Scandinavia in the summer of 1933 was, in most cases, not the result of a decision by the SPD or So.Pa.De institutions, Denmark and the Danish Social Democrats began to have a special status as a potential ally in the eyes of the So.Pa.De Secretariat. On June 9, 1933, Alsing Andersen, senior member of the Danish Social Democratic Secretariat, sent a letter to Wels expressing his shock and sadness at the fate of the SPD.181 His letter of support, which arrived even before the formal outlawing of the SPD and the end of the split between Berlin and Prague, was one of the first indications of the readiness of the Danish Social Democrats to help the exiled SPD.

One of the main and most costly activities of the So.Pa.De.182 was the weekly publication of the So.Pa.De organ ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ for the consumption of a few thousands SPD members in exiles (now So.Pa.De members) and the distribution in Germany of thousands of copies of a shorter version of ‘Neuer Vorwärts’. With Friedrich Stampfer as Editor and Erich Rinner as head of the So.Pa.De.’s ‘illegal activity’ in Germany and responsible for the distribution of the paper in Germany, all the operations around ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ were in the hands of mainstream So.Pa.De members and fully in accord with the positions of Wels and Vogel.

During 1933, Denmark and the Danish Social Democrats were mentioned in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ in an extremely positive manner. On July 9, 1933, the paper published an article titled ‘Dänemark rüstet’, and written, in all probability, by Stampfer since it was not signed and the paper did not have a special correspondent in Denmark. The article described the readiness of the Danish Social Democrats to prepare militarily against possible German aggression, even though they were ‘traditionally pacifist’. This readiness, explained the author, was driven by fear of developments in Germany and its stress on military education for German youth. The main compliment to the ‘Danish people’, which was in fact a compliment to the leading political force in Denmark (the Danish Social Democrats), came at the end of the article. ‘…it is also Hitler’s Germany which is fortunately located near Denmark so that it can cure the

181 A Letter from Alsing Andersen to Otto Wels dated 9.6.1933 AdsD/ M-50. 182 This was the only publication of the So.Pa.De which appeared on a weekly basis. The paper had a high standard of graphics and a few thousands copies were printed every week. In Germany a few thousand copies of a shortened version of the paper was also distributed.

78 truly Nordic and truly peaceful Danish people of their pacifism.’ 183 The message was that the Danes (ruled by Social Democrats) were a ‘truly democratic and peaceful people’ but understood that pacifism was no longer an option. The writer clearly viewed the Danish Social Democrats as a model party that represented the values of ‘democracy and peace’ in the right way (meaning not peace at any price). This idea will reappear in Raloff’s and Heinig’s articles a few years later. The compliments were too general, however, to constitute acceptance of the political tactics and economic goals and policies of the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats. The phrase ‘truly Nordic’ was also a little ambiguous as it represented, on the one hand, a barb aimed at the NSDAP and its claims that ‘true Arians’ were democratic and peaceful but also constituted, on the other hand, a form of racial generalization linking ethnicity with political culture.

An unsigned article dated September 17,.1933 expressed enthusiasm for the ‘courage’ of the Danish Social Democratic General Secretary and Danish Prime Minister, Thorvald Stauning, who mocked Germany’s demands with his retort that Denmark was not ruled by machine guns, ‘special police’ or ‘clowns’ (see beginning of next page).

183 ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 9.7.1933, p7

79

184

The article appeared on the cover page of ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ and was most likely written by Raloff who was in Denmark by then and had begun work as the ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ correspondent in Denmark. Raloff was probably also the first senior exile who had a good enough command of Danish to pen the article.

On October 22, 1933 a caricature that first appeared in the Danish Social Democratic organ ‘Socialdemokraten’ was translated into German and published in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ under the title ‘Denmark laughs’. The translation had probably been done by Raloff or even Hansen, who may have acquired some Danish having been in Denmark longer than any other senior SPD exile. 185

184 ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 17.9.1933, p1 185 In his letter of 18.9.1933 Raloff mentions Hansen but not Tarnow as active and organized.

80 186

Just as the September 17 article, the caricature presented a somewhat problematic mockery of NSDAP racial theories for it stressed the fact that Nazi leaders themselves did not look like the aspired Aryan (Nordic) prototype, hinting that those who do look Aryan (Nordic) have better qualities than the Nazis.

For the SPD exiles, support at state level for their opposition to Hitler was of critical importance. In 1933, only the Czechoslovak Republic, which feared German claims on Sudetenland and Denmark, which had similar problems with Germany on its Southern border, were ready to give such support to the exiles. In Denmark, the support also had a moral base, since the government in power was Social Democratic

186 ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 22.10.1933, p2

81 but Denmark could not offer the So.Pa.De the logistic backing of a German-speaking Social Democratic Party, as was the case in the Saarland and in German- speaking areas of the Czechoslovak Republic. The SPD exiles who went to Denmark, although senior and loyal to the Secretariat, had in most cases personal or political reasons for maintaining a certain distance from the So.Pa.De Secretariat in Prague. Their ability to influence the development of the So.Pa.De’s ‘party ideology’ which led to the Prague Manifesto was therefore limited.

82 Chapter-1.4 The ‘Prague Manifesto’ Compared to the Political Programs of the Swedish and Danish Social Democrats.

The Prague Manifesto of January 28, 1934 did not have the same status as SPD programs of the period of the ‘Weimar Republic’ since it was a document that was approved by a small group of people (So.Pa.De Secretariat) and not by the Party Congress, which could not be convened for obvious reasons. The main opposition to the Manifesto came from Kautsky, one of the SPD’s main theoreticians, and a major figure in the party. But the support of Vogel and Wels ensured its acceptance. The ideas it put forward represented a compromise between the positions of Secretariat members such as Hertz Aufhäuser and Böchel who supported cooperation with the KPD, and the positions of Wels and Vogel who vehemently opposed all contacts with the KPD.187

In December, 1933, Kautsky published a pamphlet in which he stated there was no need for a new program. Neuer Vorwärts published articles on December 23, 1933 and January 21,1934 supporting the Manifesto and opposing Kautsky’s stand. The January article was written by Max Klinger (pseudonym for Kurt Geyer) 188 who had worked together with Stampfer since the inception of Neuer Vorwärts and would hold the position of co-editor from 1935 till 1940. Geyer’s views therefore could be said to reflect those of the So.Pa.De mainstream leadership (Wels, Vogel, Ollenhauer, Rinner, Crummenerl and Stampfer). According to the article, Kautsky wrote, on the one hand, in the final paragraph of his pamphlet that ‘the elimination of unemployment, the taking over of the positions of the bourgeoisie, of big profits, large estates, heavy industry, and banks are laws which a Social Democratic regime should implement rightaway’ 189 and, on the other hand, he claimed there was no need for a new program.190 The party program, wrote Geyer, usually combined ‘SPD theory and

187 The Manifesto was accepted by the So.Pa.De Secretariat unanimously. 188 Kurt Geyer 1891-1967 an USPD member from 1917 till 1920, a KPD member from 1920 to 1921, back in the USPD on 1922 and from 1922 an SPD member. A Reichstag member from 1920 to 1924, the editor for ‘internal political matters’ of Vorwärts from 1925 to 1933. 189 Max Klinger ‘Der Sinn eines neuen Programms’ ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 21.1.1934 p 3 para. 1 190 Ibid, para. 1

83 politics,’ but now there was a need to express the practical side of Social Democracy instead of its ‘classical programs’191 meaning that the Prague Manifesto, unlike the ‘Weimar SPD’ programs, had to provide a practical guide for the German Social Democrats rather than a theoretical program. The main author of the Prague Manifesto was Hilferding192 who continued to represent the mainstream line of the SPD.

On January 28, 1934, Neuer Vorwärts published the Prague Manifesto, representing the So.Pa.De.’s new program (a photocopy of the full document from Neuer Vorwärts appears in the Appendix to the dissertation). The Manifesto did not show signs of having been influenced by the ‘party programs’ of the hosting Social Democratic Parties such as the Scandinavian Social Democrats. It was accepted by all those who would continue to be active members of the So.Pa.De. and it will be useful to compare the Manifesto with the future ideas of these members that were influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats, and with other ideas they would develop during their exile in Scandinavian. A comparison between the Manifesto and the programs of the Scandinavian Social Democrats will also be constructive.

The Prague Manifesto reflected less tendencies to make compromises or use moderate language to describe the goals of the German Social Democrats and the means to attain them than the party programs of the ‘Weimar SPD’. This change narrowed the gap between So.Pa.De positions and the longterm goals and economic and social demands of the Swedish and Danish Social Democrats. The Manifesto promised in ‘post revolution’ Germany ‘equal social rights and responsibilities’, ‘access to knowledge and culture for everyone’ stating that ‘the socialist new order of the economy is more than a material issue, it is a means of realization of genuine freedom and equality’ 193. This represented more radical terminology than that used in the ‘Heidelberg Program’ which used the less specific expression ‘equal rights and responsibilities’. Even so, the goals put forward in the Manifesto were not as egalitarian as the goals of the Danish Social Democratic program of 1913 (their party program till 1961) which called for the ‘elimination of all social and political

191 Ibid, para. 4 192 Lange. D., ‘Das Prager Manifest von 1934.’ In’ Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft’, 1972 vol 7 193 The ‘Prague Manifesto’ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of the 28.1.1934 p1 section 2.

84 inequalities’ or of the Swedish Social Democrats’ ‘Folkhem Address’ of 1928, which called for a society that would have no rich and no poor. The goals were also certainly less clear than the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic program’s demands for equality in the distribution of income and property. The Manifesto was also less advanced than the 1913 program of the Danish Social Democrats for it mentioned ‘equal rights with no religious or racial discrimination’194 but did not mention sexual discrimination as did the Danish program.

Its economic demands were also moderate. The Manifesto used the term ‘socialization’ (a term more open to interpretation than the term ‘nationalization’, which appeared in the 1920 Swedish Social Democratic program) to define policy regarding heavy industry and credit institutions195 and pledged to give a role to workers in the management of insurance institutions, heavy industry, large chemical industries, power utilities and agriculture 196. It proposed economic supervision of the market economy and ‘non-socialized’firms’197 but was less clear than the Swedish Social Democratic program of 1920 (see chapter 1.1). The economic demands of the Prague Manifesto were certainly less radical than the 1913 Danish Social Democratic demand for ‘transition into community property of the production means’ or the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic demand for ‘to transfer the decision rights over the production to the hands of the whole nation’. The Manifesto’s economic demands, however, were more specific than those of the ‘Heidelberg Program’. The Manifesto’s stress on the importance of ‘central planning’198 was in line with the views of is main author (Hilferding) and did not accord with the views developed by the Scandinavian Social Democrats in the 20’s and 30’s. Also absent were the detailed demands in the areas of taxation, social legislation and pro-small farmers legislation of the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats. In these areas, the ‘Heidelberg Program’ was closer to the Swedish and Danish Social Democratic model.

194 Ibid, section 3 195 Ibid, section 4 196 Ibid 197 Ibid 198 Ibid

85 The word ‘revolution’ appears often and in many forms in the Manifesto. This rhetorical element did not change the fact that the Manifesto was less radical in its demands for equality and not more radical in its economic demands than the Scandinavian Social Democrats. The lack of detailed demands in the areas of taxation, social and pro-small farmers legislation was understandable under the circumstances, but nevertheless this was a big gap between the position of the So.Pa.De and ‘Scandinavian Social Democratic reformism’.

Kautsky’s fears and Geyer’s assertion that the Manifesto represented a significant move away from SPD programs of the ‘Weimar period’ were both baseless. As shown above, the differences between these programs and the Manifesto and between them and the Scandinavian Social Democrats were in the same areas and of the same scale. Although the rhetoric was sharper, nothing in the Manifesto hinted at a ‘Soviet-style revolution’. And even though the Manifesto was published by the So.Pa.De Secretariat in the main So.Pa.De organ, it was not a So.Pa.De program but rather a proposal for a possible platform that would unite all those who wished to take part in the struggle against the Nazi regime, i.e. Social Democrats and Communists.199 This was the main concession in the Manifesto to the positions of Hertz. Aufhäuser, Böchel and those who claimed that the split between the SPD and the KPD was the main reason for the failure to stop the Nazis from taking over Germany. In its aim of uniting the So.Pa.De against the challenge presented by the KPD, the Manifesto was a failure for it failed to prevent the split in the So.Pa.De that took place in early 1935. The Manifesto’s rhetoric also lost meaning when it became clear in 1935, 1936 and 1937 that the chances of the So.Pa.De bringing about a regime change in Germany were very slim.

199 Ibid, section 7

86 Chapter-1.5 SPD exiles and Danish and Swedish Social Democrats during the period 1934-1935.

The numbers of SPD exiles rose between 1934 and 1935, with the weakening of the SPD’s infrastructure in Germany. As a result, countries such as Sweden which did not have a border with Germany began to have an influx of SPD exiles. SPD exiles in Denmark had a higher status in the ‘Weimar SPD’ than SPD exiles in Sweden and the level of trust between the So.Pa.De Secretariat and the Danish Social Democratic leadership was higher than that with the Swedish Social Democrats. Nonetheless, the Swedish Social Democrats were perceived as trustworthy allies as the Danes by the So.Pa.De leadership (Wels and Vogel).

Already in the Summer of 1933, the Swedish Social Democrats had begun to correspond directly with the So.Pa.De and had sent Otto Wels a birthday greeting on his 60th birthday.200 In the same letter, Paul Olberg (spokesman of the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat) expressed his party’s hope that the exile of Wels and the German SPD would soon be over, but refrained from openly attacking the NSDAP regime: ‘I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the friendship and support you gave me during my long years of residence in Berlin. Together with my comrades and friends, I hope and pray that the period of your exile will terminate very soon. Yours sincerely, Paul Olberg’ 201.

In January 1934, the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat claimed it was financing, through the party’s ‘aid committee’ and the Swedish trade unions, around 100 German political asylum seekers who had presented themselves as Social Democrats. But, according to the Swedish Social Democrats, many of the exiles were actually Communists, who had turned to the Social Democrats for help because the Swedish Communists did not the means to assist them.202 Since there was no senior SPD exile

200 A letter from the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat to the So.Pa.De Secretariat 15.9.1933 AdsD/ M-135 . 201 Ibid, last para. 202 A letter from the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat to the So.Pa.De Secretariat 19.1.1934 AdsD/ M-135 line 18-19.

87 in Sweden, the local Social Democrats turned to the So.Pa.De for help in resolving the problem203.

In contrast, Denmark had no such problem. Although in September 1933, Raloff described So.Pa.De activity in Denmark as highly unorganised204, by early 1934, four senior SPD exiles were already active in Denmark. As in Sweden, financial support came from trade unions and the local Social Democratic Party. Evidence of the trust the So.Pa.De Secretariat had in both the Danish Social Democratic Party and the group of SPD exile in Denmark was seen in the fact that documents from the SPD archives were sent, in early 1934, to Denmark for safe keeping in the main administration building of the Danish Social Democrats under Raloff’s supervision. The documents included original manuscripts of Karl Marx and 205. The four senior SPD exiles members also held other positions, in addition to being supported by the Danish Social Democrats like less senior SPD exiles (probably around 100 in early 1934 206). Tarnow, formerly head of a very large trade union, held his position in the Trade Union International. Richard Hansen was responsible for distributing So.Pa.De material in Schleswig Holstein through his contacts as former head of the ‘Reichsbanner’ in this area. Karl Raloff was the Danish correspondent of ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ and he also wrote for the Danish Social Democratic organ ‘Social- Demokraten’207. From 1934, Heinig wrote for ‘Deutschland Berichte’ which was edited by So.Pa.De Secretariat member Erich Rinner, head of the So.Pa.De’s ‘illegal work’ in Germany. ‘Deutschland Berichte’ was also distributed in Germany. The wives of the exiles held no formal positions, like the wives of the So.Pa.De Secretariat members, and this remained unchanged throughout the period in exile. 28

203 A letter from the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat to the So.Pa.De Secretariat 19.1.1934 AdsD /M-135 p2 204 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 18.9.1933 AdsD/ M-89 last para. 205 A letter from Karl Raloff to Crummenerl dated 23.2.1934 AdsD/ M-89 . 206 According to Einhart Lorenz and Uwe Petersen p34 in ‘Ein sehr trübes Kapitel’ (see full details in source list) there were 285 exiles who were supported at the end of 1938 by the Matteotti Committee which gave financial support to Social Democratic exiles in Denmark and the number of political exiles in Denmark in 1934 was about half the number in 1938 also according to a So.Pa.De Secretariat report of November 1933 AdsD /M-6 there were 69 SPD exiles in Denmark in November 1933. 207 See Meyer Frank ‘Schreiben für die Fremde,’ in ‘Ein sehr trübes Kapitel?’ (Hamburg 1998), p 237

88 women exiles were supported by the Danish Social Democratic Matteotti-Committee, all of whom were wives of SPD exiles and only 13 of whom had work permits 208.

While in Denmark it was natural for the Social Democrats to attack the regime in Germany, the Swedish Social Democrats acted against Nazi disinformation only after requests by the So.Pa.De. In May 1934, the Swedish Social Democrats reported to the So.Pa.De Secretariat that they published the correct figures for the number of Jews in high posts in the ‘Weimar republic’ contradicting Nazi propaganda209.

The growing contacts with the Swedish Social Democrats, the excellent relationship with the Danish Social Democrats and the important role played by SPD exiles in Denmark did not help make Scandinavian Social Democrats a model for the So.Pa.De in 1934. ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ did not publish one article throughout 1934 dealing with the ideas and tactics of the Danish or Swedish Social Democrats although the two parties were the only Social Democratic parties in Europe that governed with coalition partners that did not put obstacles in their way and with almost 50% of Parliamentary seats in the hands of ‘left wing parties’.

However, ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ did report on the internal developments of the British Labor Party in 1934 in an article written on October 4,1934 and was published on October 6,1934 but the Labor Party’s ‘ideology’ in the mid 30s, which was close to that of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, was not described in detail. The article simply reported that the Labor Party had rejected the ideas of the ‘party’s left’ for a ‘socialization program’ over a five-year period 210 without mentioning other proposals or explaining the meaning of the term ‘socialization’.

Refraining from describing the egalitarian and clear-defined ‘party ideology’ of the Scandinavian Social Democrats did not imply that the latter had become less important in the eyes of the So.Pa.De leaders and their supporters. On the contrary.

208 See Jacobsen Tina ‘Frauen im dänischen Exil 1933-1945’ in ‘Ein sehr trübes Kapitel?’ (Hamburg 1998), p136 209 A letter to the So.Pa.De Secretariat from the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat 15.5.1934 AdsD/ M-135. 210 ‘Der Weg der ’ ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 14.10.1934 p7 column 2

89 By early 1935, following the expulsion of the RSD representatives Aufhäuser and Böchel from the So.Pa.De Secretariat after they had been accused by Wels of having contacts with Communists (via the ‘Neue Beginen’ group), the So.Pa.De was no longer the organization of all SPD exiles. The RSD ‘Revolutionäre Sozialisten Deutschlands’, now had its own institutions and a representation in the SAI. The ideas of the RSD were closer to the Scandinavian Social Democrats compared to the mainstream So.Pa.De. In October 1934, a few months before their expulsion from the So.Pa.De Secretariat, the RSD published its official platform. It was drafted by Böchel, Aufhäuser, Fritz Bieligk, Fritz Sternberg and Max Sydewitz, founder of the German SAP who was not a member of the SPD 211.

Three of the authors later became exiles in Scandinavia (Böchel, Bieligk and Sydewitz), which may suggest that they already had some contact with Scandinavian Social Democrats. The RSD called for united action by SPD and KPD activists in the belief that, in view of the situation of the ‘working class’ in Germany, KPD activists would be free from the dictates of Moscow. The goal, regarding post-revolution Germany, was to be a classless society and voting rights for the working masses regarding new legislation and administration of the new Germany. There was no mention of giving priority to central planning or making it a central ‘socialist principle’212.

Another development, which reduced the centrality of the So.Pa.De, was the re- organization of Saar Social Democrats in exile under the leadership of Max Braun (head of the Saar area Social Democratic Party which continued to operate legally until the taking over of the Saar by Germany Nazi regime in 1935). The organization, whose headquarters were in France, included German Communists and German SAP members in addition to SPD members.

The majority of SPD exiles in Denmark and all the active senior exiles in Denmark opposed all cooperation with the Communists and were therefore loyal to the

211 Osterroth. F and Schuster, D., ‘Chronik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie’ (Berlin 1980) Electronic ed: Bonn : FES library, 2001 Band 2 Stichtag: Sept/Okt 1934 212 Ibid

90 leadership of Wels and Vogel. Wels, however, feared that Max Braun and the RSD would compete for the support of the Danish and Swedish Social Democratic Secretariats. In a letter dated May 17, 1935 to Hansen Hedtoft, member of the Danish Social Democratic Secretariat, Wels tried to gather information about Max Braun’s visit to Scandinavia. According to Wels’s information, Braun had had meetings in Sweden with members of the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat – Lindström (one of the main promoters of Swedish Social Democratic ‘reformism’213) and Höglund (chief supporter among the Swedish Social Democrats of ‘orthodoxy’ and cooperation with the Communists 214), as well as with Lundberg, head of the Swedish Trade Union Federation (LO)215.

Wels also had information that Braun had had meetings in Norway with Norwegian Labor Party Secretariat member Tranmäl and that Braun had claimed to have received financing in the sum of 2500 DKR for a daily newspaper from the Danish Social Democrats.216 In order to make sure Hedtoft knew the nature of Braun’s organization, Wels informed that there are KPO members and Communists in Braun’s organization.217 It is clear that Wels had greater trust in the Danish Social Democrats than in other Scandinavian Social Democrats, since he tried to find out information about Max Braun’s meetings in Sweden and Norway via the Danish Social Democrats and not directly from the two parties. He also mentioned that he had had a conversation with Lindström but the latter had not revealed any information about his meeting with Braun218.

In his reply, which arrived three days later. Hedtoft reported that Braun had held only a private, unofficial meeting with Andersen, member of the Danish Social Democratic Secretariat, and that the Danish Social Democrats were committed, as per SAI policy, to assist also members of the Saar Social Democratic Party 219. Regarding Braun’s claim that he received 2500DKR for a new paper, the truth was that he received only

213 See chapter c in the introduction. 214 Ibid 215 A letter from Otto Wels to Hans Hedtoft dated 17.5.1935 AdsD/ M-50 para.1. 216 Ibid, para. 2 217 Ibid, para 2 218 Ibid, last para. 219 A letter from Hans Hedtoft to Otto Wels dated 20.5.1935 AdsD/ M-50 para. 1.

91 200 DKR ‘and that is all that our relationship with him would permit’.220 (This was approx. 10% of the annual support by the Danish Social Democrats of So.Pa.De operations in Germany 221.) In what could be regarded as an attempt to calm Wels’ fears while, at the same time, hinting that there was no need to be paranoid, Hedtoft added that all those who received support by the Danish Social Democrats were former Social Democrats (regardless of their present views) 222. Hedtoft claimed he knew nothing about Braun’s meetings in Sweden and Norway, but added that he believed, based on his close knowledge of the two parties, that they would not have acted differently to the Danish Social Democrats.223

As is clear from the letter, the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats had no intention of financing rivalry between the different SPD groups in exile. It was easier for them to finance exiles on an individual basis since financing several organizations would have been costlier. Because the So.Pa.De continued to be the largest organization and because most of SPD exiles in Denmark belonged to the So.Pa.De and there was a So.Pa.De ‘Grenzsekretariat’ in Denmark, the organization was favored over others irrespective of its ‘party ideology’.

Another development, which gave the So.Pa.De supremacy over the other SPD groups in exile in their relationship with the Danish Social Democrats, was the establishment by the Danes of the Matteotti Committee which organized under one roof financial support for SPD exiles in Denmark. Hans Hedtoft was the head of the committee, which included Richard Hansen and Karl Raloff as members224, both of whom were loyal to the Secretariat and opposed the RSD. (The Committee began operations in mid 1933, well before the split in the So.Pa.De.225)

During September 1935, the contacts between the So.Pa.De and the Swedish Social Democrats became stronger. On September 3, 1935 the So.Pa.De requested the Swedish Social Democrats to help finance So.Pa.De activities in Denmark which

220 Ibid, para. 3. 221 See next paragraphs 222 A letter from Hans Hedtoft to Otto Wels dated 20.5.1935 AdsD/ M-50 para. 3. 223 Ibid, last para. 224 Lorenz, E., ‘Ein sehr Trübes Kapitel?’ (Hamburg 1998), p 525-526 225 Lorenz and Petersen, op.cit. p 30

92 covered not only assistance for SPD exiles in Denmark but also ‘illegal work’ in North Germany. In a letter, sent via the Danish Social Democrats226, the So.Pa.De Secretariat asked the Swedish Social Democrats to contribute half the monthly budget (300DKR) needed to finance the ‘Kopenhagen Grenzsekretariat’ (the other half was contributed by the Danish Social Democrats)227. The monies were needed, in part, to finance two extra people to help Hansen228 (almost certainly Heinig and Raloff who, during 1936, reported on So.Pa.De ‘illegal activities’). On September 24, 1935 the Swedish Social Democrats sent Ollenhauer a letter confirming agreement to this arrangement229. The underground activity of the So.Pa.De in North Germany thus became a joint operation by the So.Pa.De, the Danish Social Democrats and the Swedish Social Democrats, with Hansen, Raloff and Heinig in direct contact with all three Secretariats.

In October 1935, the Danish Social Democrats achieved a very impressive result in the Danish national elections with 46% of the votes, predicting what would be an even more impressive victory by the Swedish Social Democrats in 1936. As seen from the article at the top of the next page, the So.Pa.De was impressed by the victory but there was no hint that it viewed the Danish Social Democrats as a model.

226 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Hans Hedtoft dated 3.9.1935 AdsD/ M-50 . 227 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat of 3.9.1935 AdsD/ M-50. 228 Ibid, para. 2 229 A letter from the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat to Erich Ollenhauer dated 24.9.1935 AdsD /M-135 .

93

230

‘Ein Sieg der Demokratie’, an article regarded important enough to appear in the cover page of ‘Neuer Vorwärts’, was probably written by Raloff. The article attributed the electoral success of the Danish Social Democrats to their employment policy (see second column) but there was no explaination or mention of the ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policy’ that brought about its success. The article pointed out that ‘political radicalism’ had no base in Denmark’ (column 3), and that both the Danish Nazi Party and Danish Communist Party received little support. The article, however, did not refer to the combination of an egalitarian goal, which marginalized the Communists, and a pro-farmers and pro-small self-employed policy, which garnered a lot of support for the Danish Social Democrats from these sectors – sectors which, in Germany, tended to support the NSDAP.

230 ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 27.10.1935 p1

94 The So.Pa.De Secretariat may not have been interested in learning from the Danish Social Democratic ‘party ideology’ but they were very keen to obtain financial support from them. In a letter to Hedtoft dated December 16, 1935 Wels describes the proposal by the Communist Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow to purchase from the SPD all the original writings of Marx and Engels and counter purchase proposals by members of the SAI, among them the French Socialists. The monies from the sale were intended to finance, in part, a research institute in Amsterdam and, in part, pay for assistance to SPD exiles and finance (60%) So.Pa.De activities in Germany231. The Danish Social Democrats were offered a share in the project and partial ownership of the documents together with other members of the SAI.232 In the meantime, archives remained in the safekeeping of the Danish Social Democrats. The Danes did not question, in any of their correspondence with the So.Pa.De Secretariat, the absolute claim to ownership of the archives by the So.Pa.De, even though other SPD groups in exile could have claimed an equal right to them. This was another example of the Danish Social Democrats’ policy not to become involved in internal SPD disputes and to favor the largest SPD group.

231 A letter from Otto Wels to Hans Hedtoft dated 16.12.1935 AdsD/ M-50 para. 1-4 232 Ibid, paras.5-6 .

95 Chapter-1.6 SPD exiles and Danish and Swedish Social Democrats during the period 1936-1937.

1936 and 1937 were the last years during which the So.Pa.De centre was still based in the Czechoslovak Republic. During this period, So.Pa.De activity in Germany became more and more restricted in nature following the arrest in 1935 of many members who distributed So.Pa.De materials in Germany.

In this period, the difference in character between SPD exiles in Denmark and SPD exiles in Sweden is clearly illustrated in the correspondence between the So.Pa.De Secretariat and the Social Democratic Secretariats of these two countries as well as in the correspondence of the exiles themselves. In Denmark, the exiles continued to be well organized. They had representation on the Matteotti Committee, which was responsible for deciding whether an exile was a former SPD member and therefore entitled to financial support. The senior exiles had direct contact with both the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats Secretariats and positions in the So.Pa.De or the Trade Union International (Tarnow). The number of exiles based in Denmark was also relatively large (285 members were supported by the Matteotti Committee in 1938 and the numbers must have been similar in 1936 and 1937 with a relatively small number of exiles arriving in 1938 from Czechoslovakia)233.

The number of SPD exiles in Sweden continued to be unknown to both the So.Pa.De Secretariat and the Swedish Social Democrats. As already mentioned, approx. 100 exiles received some kind of financial support from the LO and the Swedish Social Democrats, but many were believed by the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat to be in fact German SAP members or Communists (see previous chapter). No SPD exile in Sweden, at this time, had the same status in the ‘Weimar SPD’ hierarchy as Hansen, Tarnow, Raloff, Heinig, Buchwitz or Scheidemann. As a result, a large part of the correspondence between the So.Pa.De Secretariat and the Swedish Social

233 Lorenz and Petersen,op.cit. p 34 based on a protocol of the ‘refugee conference’ in Copenhagen on November 19-20, 1938 in the Swedish Labour movement archive (ARAB) box 617.

96 Democratic Secretariat in the summer of 1936 and during 1937 dealt with verifying the political identities of exiles who claimed to be former SPD members.

In Denmark, SPD exiles were able to carry out information-gathering operations234. Heinig reported to Wels that he had had meetings in Paris and London regarding a highly important and secret issue, which he would only disclose to Wels in person on his next visit to Copenhagen235. However Wels and Rinner had no knowledge of Heinig’s so-called clandestine activities236. Another example of the good organization of SPD exiles in Denmark was the publication of a Danish version of the So.Pa.De’s Berichten (‘Tyskland – Beretninger’) during the period 1936-1939. The paper, which was edited by Heinig, had its own offices including a telephone line and separate bank account in the Copenhagen ‘Workers’ National Bank’ as well as a high standard of graphics. In July 1937, 32 editors of Danish Social Democratic newspapers and periodicals were among its permanent readers237. With operations in Germany becoming ever more difficult, Heinig focused more on the paper and on writing articles in Danish as will be elaborated in Chapter 8.

234 This is an assumption which was raised by Ludwig Eiber in his essay ‘Richard Hansen das Grenzsekretariat der So.Pa.De in Kopenhagen und die Verbindungen nach Hamburg 1933-1939’ in ‘Ein sehr trübes Kapitel’ (Hamburg 1998) 235 A letter from Heinig to Wels dated 23.12.1935 AdsD/ M-52 . 236 A letter from Wels to Heinig dated 3.1.1936 AdsD/ M-52 . 237 A letter on an official paper of the ‘Tysklands Beretninger’ from Kurt Heinig to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 1.7.1937 AdsD M-52 .

97

In spite of the differences regarding the standing between SPD exiles in Denmark and Sweden, the Secretariats of both countries continued to be regarded as importantl allies of the So.Pa.De within the SAI. In February 1936, Wels wrote the following letter to Hedtoft. (Presented at the top of the next page).

98 238

Wels was clearly very pleased with the reaction of the Swedish Social Democrats to his ‘peace program’, which was based on a common stand against the ‘fascist regimes’ of Europe. What he found particularly pleasing was the report by Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat member Engberg (one of the less ‘reformist’ members of the Secretariat239) that the support for such a stand in Sweden was not limited to ‘intellectuals’ but included the ‘large numbers of the general population’240, a report, which Wels described as ‘promising music to my ears’.241 It was evident that Wels considered the Swedish Social Democrats as much allies as the Danish Social Democrats to whom he described Engberg’s report.

238 A letter from Otto Wels to Hansen Hedtoft dated 29.2.1936 AdsD/ M-50 239See chapter C of the Introduction. 240 A letter from Wels to Hedtoft dated 29.2.1936 AdsD/ M-50 lines 8-9 . 241 Ibid, line 11

99

The presence of the So.Pa.De archives in Denmark was another sign of the strength of the alliance and trust between the So.Pa.De and the Danish Social Democrats. Although Wels and the So.Pa.De had decided to sell the archives to the ‘Institute for Social History’ in Amsterdam, in mid 1937. two years after their decision, the archives were still in Copenhagen. From a letter written by the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Hans Hedhoft dated May 26,1937, we learn that the archives included the original manuscript of ‘Das Kapital’ by Karl Marx, notes by Marx to the manuscript and letters by Marx and Engels dated 1870 and 1871242. According to the letter, the Danish Social Democrats had been requested to lend the documents to Boris Nikolajewski, an exiled Russian ‘Menschewik’ who became in 1937 administrative manager of the Paris branch of the ‘Institute for Social History’. Nikolajewski needed the papers for research he was conducting on the history of French Socialism.

The alliance between the Scandinavian Social Democrats and the So.Pa.De, however, did not alter the limited influence which the Scandinavian Social Democrats had on the So.Pa.De. On September 22, 1936 Wels wrote to Per Albin Hansson to congratulate him on his party’s impressive victory in the 1936 elections (the Swedish ‘left’ gained an absolute majority in the Lower House of Parliament). Wels considered the victory as evidence of the effectiveness of the Swedish Social Democratic politics 243 and he expressed the hope of seeing Social Democratic rule not only in Sweden but in all European countries, including ‘my own unfortunate land’ : ‘ It [the victory] demonstrates that people can be grateful, it demonstrates the justification of your politics through which you maintained party unity and striking power. I am convinced that not only your people and your land will benefit from it, but all countries including my own unlucky homeland will benefit from .’ 244

Wels was expressing primarily admiration of Hansson’s ability to keep his party united and of the party’s popularity among Swedish voters but since he did not refer to the tactics of the Swedish Social Democrats or to the ‘party ideology’ the letter

242 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Hans Hedtoft dated 26.5.1937 AdsD M-50. 243 A letter from Otto Wels to Per Albin Hansson dated the 22.9.1936 AdsD M-50 lines 5-7. 244 Ibid, lines 9-11

100 cannot be regarded as evidence of his support or acceptance of the Swedish/Scandinavian Social Democratic models. In a sense, Wels’ letter expressed his frustration at his own inability to keep unity among the SPD exiles. Furthermore, during all of 1936 ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ did not publish one article dealing with the ‘party ideology’ or political tactics of the Swedish Social Democrats or of the Danish Social Democrats.

Hansson’s short reply dated October 3, 1936 supports the assessment that Wels’ compliments were not intended to express full acceptance of the Swedish Social Democrats’ ‘party ideology’. Hansson thanked Wels for his letter and expressed the hope that democracy would spread to other European countries. ‘We know that our small nation has little influence on results in other countries. However, we hope that knowledge about our model democracy will harness other movements outside the borders of Sweden to the capability of democracy, when a nation works together for the well being of all’. 245 No reference is made in the letter to the economic policy of the Swedish Social democrats or to their long-term vision. However Hansson does refer to some of the ‘Folkhem’ ideals and calls his country ‘a model democracy’.

A fair assessment of this correspondence is that Wels was impressed by the political success of the Swedish Social Democrats and Hansson was happy to accept his compliments. But there is no evidence that Wels was acquainted with the exact policies of the SAP or the full scope of the egalitarian ‘Folkhem’ ideal. Nor is there any reason to conclude, from the two letters (the only ones sent directly by Wels to Hansson and by Hansson to Wels), that the So.Pa.De leadership had begun to be influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats as a result of their political success.

The correspondence relating to Arthur Crispien’s efforts to find a dignified shelter in Sweden reveals a less rosy side to the relations between the So.Pa.De and the Swedish Social Democrats in 1937. Crispien had been one of the SPD General Secretaries from 1922 till 1933 (before that he was a member of the USPD) and therefore had a status almost similar to Wels and Vogel, although he was no longer an acting General Secretary. On August 4, 1937

245 A letter from Per Albin Hansson to Otto Wels dated 3.10.1936 AdsD M-50 lines 4-8 .

101 Vogel sent a letter to the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat explaining that Arthur Crispien, who had been in exile in Switzerland for the last four years, was finding it hard to support himself and his wife 246. Vogel noted that Crispien had worked for many years as a cartoonist and illustrator of posters 247 and asked whether the Swedish Social Democratic Party could find work for Crispien job in Sweden, preferably in his profession248.

In his response, Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat member Ewald Jansson explained that it would be very difficult to find Crispien work as an illustrator because of his age and the fact that he had no practice in this profession for many years249. Jansson wrote that, despite the difficulties, his party would continue its efforts to find a solution and, in the meantime, he advised Crispien move to Bern in order to arrange for travel documents should he decide to go to Sweden 250. On September 6, Vogel wrote a rather dry letter thanking Jansson for his efforts to find Crispien a job, despite the difficulties involved. ‘Many thanks for your letter of August 31 and for your promise, in principle, to take up, despite their professional difficulties, the case of comrade Crispien and his wife.’251 Vogel ended his letter by informing Jansson that Crispien would contact the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat directly252.

Crispien wrote a letter to Jansson on September 14,1937 describing his economic plight and pleading for help in the name of ‘socialist solidarity’253. There is no further correspondence on this issue after this date, indicating that Crispien gave up the idea of turning to the Swedish Social Democrats for help. In view of the fact that the Swedish Social Democratic Party had several daily newspapers with cartoons and several publishing houses, its inability to find work for a former SPD General Secretary who faced economic hardship showed a lack of willingness to make a

246 A letter from Hans Vogel to the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat (the Stockholm Matteotti - committee) dated 4.8.1937 AdsD M-135 para. 2 247 Ibid, para. 3 248 Ibid 249 A letter from the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat (Ewald Jansson) to the So.Pa.De Secretariat (Hans Vogel) dated 31.8.1937 AdsD M-135 para. 1 250 Ibid, para. 1-2 251 A letter from Hans Vogel to Ewald Jansson dated 6.9.1937 AdsD M-135 para. 1 252 Ibid, para. 2 253 A letter from Arthur Crispien to Ewald Jansson dated 14.9.1937 AdsD M-135 p 2 para. 4

102 serious effort to come to the aid of a senior German Social Democrat and as result increase its expense on supporting the So.Pa.De.

103 Chapter-1.7 SPD exiles and Scandinavian Social Democrats during the period 1938 to 1940.

In 1938, the So.Pa.De had to find a new center of operations. Already in June 1937, the Czechoslovak Government, under German pressure, closed its border to prevent activity inside Germany. In a parallel process, with a dwindling number of activists inside Germany and the only support in terms of income coming from SAI members, whose attention had been focused for more than a year on the Spanish Civil War, the So.Pa.De as well as the much smaller RSD continued to lose ground. On September 2, 1937 the majority of RSD members returned to the So.Pa.De.

The logic behind the decision to move the So.Pa.De’s headquarters to France (a process that began in January 1938) was that France was the largest country hostile to Hitler’s regime, it had a common border with Germany, had a party that was an important member of the SAI in its government (a fact that would change while the So.Pa.De was in the process of moving from Czechoslovakia to France). The desire for support from France’s ‘Popular Front’ government, which included the French Communist Party, was probably another reason for reuniting with the RSD and lowering the anti Communist tone of the So.Pa.De leadership and party organs. 254 Moving the Secretariat to Brussels, the permanent location of the SAI offices was considered by the So.Pa.De 255 but this option was abandoned due to the Belgium government’s refusal to allow the move, for fear of endangering its relationship with Germany.256

The planned move from the Czechoslovak Republic to France entailed routes that, in most cases, necessitated crossing Scandinavia. The most convenient route, without having to go through a hostile country, was through Poland, to Gdynia, from there to

254 It is important to mention that already in 1936 the So.Pa.De lowering the ‘anti-Bolshevik’ tone in the So.Pa.De publication. One of Heinig ‘anti-Bolshevik’ articles was censored in September 1936 for being too ‘extreme’ (See a letter to Heinig from the So.Pa.De Secretariat of 3.9.1936 AdsD/ M-52 ) 255 See a letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat (Erich Ollenhauer) to Hans Hedtoft dated 23.2.1938 AdsD/ M-50.

104 Denmark, Norway or Sweden, then to Antwerp by boat and from Antwerp onto France. In consequence, the number of SPD exiles in Sweden and Norway grew significantly ( in Norway mainly RSD exiles, which will be dealt with in the relevant chapter). All the senior So.Pa.De members made the journey through Denmark with the help of the Danish Social Democrats257. On April 28, 1938 most of the members of the So.Pa.De office in Prague arrived in Denmark and were guests of the Danish Social Democrats for few days before traveling onwards to France (the journey of Wels and Ollenhauer was postponed to May 28, 1938 due to Wels’ illness). 258

In 1936, an SPD exile made a journey in the opposite direction, intending to travel from Switzerland, through France, to Czechoslovakia. Walter Sassnick, one of the most politically successful SPD exiles in post-1945 Germany, was not a senior figure in the ‘Weimar Republic’ period. Born in 1895, he was editor from 1923 till 1933 of ‘Volkswacht Regensburg’, a small SPD paper in Regensburg, a town with a few thousand inhabitants in North-East . He was also one of the heads of the ‘Reichsbanner’ and of the SPD in Regensburg. In line with this organization’s policy, he was very active against the NSDAP and a hardcore anti-Communist. Although Regensburg is close to the Czechoslovak border, Sassnick preferred to move, in June 1933, to the Saarland. This was not an unusual action as the Saarland was the only part of Germany that, due to its special political status (it was under French control from 1920 till 1935 in accordance with mandate), continued to be free of NSDAP rule. By November 1933, the Saarland had absorbed almost 600 SPD exiles from the rest of Germany, more than the number of SPD exiles in the rest of Europe at that time and more than twice the number of SPD exiles in the Czechoslovak Republic259. The Saarland is also much closer to Regensburg than to Berlin, Hanover or the North of Germany.

With the occupation of the Saarland, Sassnick and his wife moved to Paris from where Sassnick reported on Max Braun’s initiatives to the So.Pa.De Secretariat in

256 See a letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat (Erich Ollenhauer) to Hans Hedtoft dated 24.3.1938 AdsD /M-50. 257 See letters from Erich Ollenhauer to Hans Hedtoft dated 12.3.1938, 24.3.1938 and 6.4.1938 dealing with the journeys of Otto Wels, Hans Vogel and Erich Rinner AdsD/ M-50 258 See letters from Erich Ollenhauer to Hans Hedtoft dated 16.4.1938 and 18.5.1938 AdsD/ M-50. 259 A summary of data on the SPD exiles at the end of 1933 AdsD /M-6 .

105 Prague 260. After a few months, unable to extend his residence permit in France, Sassnick moved to Switzerland.261 By April 1936, Sassnick and his wife concluded they could not extend their stay in Switzerland262 and considered moving to the Czechoslovak Republic.263 Mrs. Sassnick obtained a travel visa through Sweden, and the couple planned to travel on April 28, 1936 through France and Antwerp to Gothenburg, Sweden.264 Sassnick arrived in Sweden but did not continue his journey probably because of the ease with which he obtained a residence permit in Sweden, which had a Social Democratic government.

In 1938 Sassnick was joined by another senior SPD exile, So.Pa.De Secretariat member Emil Stahl, who came from the more common direction (i.e. Czechoslovakia). Emil Stahl had been a SPD member of the Prussian Parliament from 1928 to 1933 and, from 1924, a member of the SPD Berlin Secretariat. As already mentioned, Stahl was a member of the SPD Secretariat from 1931. While in Prague, he worked with Rinner organizing So.Pa.De activities in Germany, and was responsible for the Berlin area. When the Czechoslovak’s border with Germany was closed, Stahl’s work was ended but he remained in the Czechoslovak Republic after January 1938, most likely in order to complete the transfer of the So.Pa.De organization from the Karlsbad border area. On May 13,1938 the Czechoslovak government issued Stahl a travel document 265 and on June 8, 1938 he sent his first letter from Sweden. On June 30, 1938 the So.Pa.De Secretariat in Paris notified the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat that Stahl was its representative in Sweden and all contacts should be carried out through him266. Stahl was thus entrusted by the So.Pa.De Secretariat with the task of creating order in the highly disorganized group of SPD exiles in Sweden.

Placing a So.Pa.De Secretariat member in Sweden was an indicator of the growing importance of Social Democratic Sweden to the So.Pa.De, after losing its center in Czechoslovakia. However, compared to the growth in importance to the So.Pa.De of

260 A letter from Walther Sassnick to Hans Vogel dated 26.7.1935 AdsD/ M-112 p3 . 261 A letter from Walther Sassnick to Hans Vogel dated 18.1.1936 AdsD /M-112 p1 . 262 A letter from Walther Sassnick to Hans Vogel dated 15.4.1936 AdsD /M-112 para. 2 . 263 A letter from Walther Sassnick to Hans Vogel dated 15.4.1936 AdsD /M-112 para.1. 264 Ibid, para.4-6 265 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 20.8.1938 AdsD M/-131 .

106 countries such as France and Holland, it did not yet represent a dramatic development. The So.Pa.De Secretariat representative (Stahl) was not pleased with his living conditions. He had found for himself and his wife a two-room apartment with warm water and central heating in an old house at Stockholm, but complained that the apartment cost 81SKr per month, amounting to more than half the support he was receiving. 267. At today’s prices, the couple had to get by on an income of approx. 800 Euros a month (excluding travel expenses).

In early August, 1938 Stahl met Lindberg, Head of the LO, and another member of the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat in order to clarify who was or was not a So.Pa.De member.268 In July, Sassnick and his wife also began to assist Stahl in his efforts to organize the SPD exile group in Sweden.269 Sassnick held the belief that So.Pa.De members in Sweden have lived too long with Communist exiles and this had had a ‘nefarious influence’ on them..270 In order to ‘fight’ this phenomenon, Sassnick proposed launching a new monthly paper called Das Wort, for which he requested and received financing from the So.Pa.De Secretariat.271 The new paper reflected the views of the Secretariat and fully followed the line of Neuer Vorwärts. It also reflected Sassnick’s ‘anti-Bolshevism’ (which will be discussed later), but made no reference to the Scandinavian Social Democratic ‘party ideology.’

On August 5, 1938 Stahl reported that another important So.Pa.De member was due to arrive at Sweden from the Czechoslovak Republic. This was Theodor Hartwig, SPD member of the Prussian Parliament from 1921 to 1933 and an acquaintance of Stahl from Germany (Hartwig was only one year older than Stahl who was born in 1879 and they had served together in the same Parliament).272 Hartwig had also been the SPD General Secretary in the city of Stettin (now part of Poland) from 1918 to May 1933.273 On March 25, 1938 he had received a letter from the So.Pa.De in Paris

266 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Anders Nielsson of the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat dated 30.6.1938 AdsD/ M-135 267 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 8.6.1938 AdsD/ M-131 para. 1 268 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 3.8.1938 AdsD /M-131 p .1 dealing with meetings with these figures and describing to them the ‘real status’ of certain German SAP exiles 269 A letter from Walter Sassnick to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 28.7.1938 AdsD/ M-112 para.1 270 Ibid, para.4 271 Ibid, page 4 272 A letter from Stahl to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 5.8.1938 AdsD/ M-131 p1 . 273 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to the ‘Swedish Miners' Trade Union’ with a copy to Hartwig dated 29.3.1938 AdsD/ M-53

107 informing him that the Refugee Committee in Stockholm (an organization founded by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the trade unions to give support to Social Democratic exiles) would support him.274

In 1938, three other relatively important So.Pa.De members arrived in Sweden from the Czechoslovak Republic. The first was Martin Krebs, an important official in the German Glassworkers’ Trade Union and its representative since 1930 to the Glassworkers’ Trade Unions’ International. Krebs, who was 46 when he arrived in Sweden, had had one year’s experience in underground activity in Germany when he left Germany in September 1934 for the Czechoslovak Republic. His readiness to cooperate with the Communists (although he was not a former RSD member) would put him on a confrontation course with Stahl. The second exile to arrive was Carl Polenske, SPD member of the Neüekölln City Council (a working class area of South Berlin) from 1910 to 1933 and a member of the Secretariat of the ‘German Public Workers’ Trade Union since 1930. Polenske was 62 when he arrived in Sweden and, like Krebs, would find himself in confrontation with Stahl. The third to arrive was Hans Mugrauer, aged 39, and a member since 1929 of the Secretariat of the German Mineworkers’ Trade Union, an organization in which Communists and Social Democrats had a close relationship. In 1931, in the internal elections to the Mineworkers’ Trade Union Secretariat, the Communist received 29% of votes compared to the Social Democrats’ 36.1% .275 With the death of Friedrich Husemann, head of the organization in 1935, the organization was left without a leader.( Huseman was probably murderd by the Nazis). In July 1936, a committee made up of some Mineworkers’ Trade Union Secretariat members nominated itself as the new leadership. The committee included Social Democrats Franz Vogt, Richard Krin and Hans Mugrauer and the Communist Wilhelm Knöchel.276 On November 17, 1936 Heinrich Schliedst, head of the German exiled trade unions declared that Mugrauer was the head of the exiled German Mineworkers’ Trade Union.277

274 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Theodor Hartwig dated 25.3.1938 AdsD/ M-53 275 Detlev J.K / Peukert F.B., ‘ Spuren des Widerstands. Die Bergarbeiterbewegung im Dirtten Reich und Exil.’ (München, 1987), p47 276 Ibid, p 119 277 Ibid, p 109

108 Mugrauer’s organization operated a network which, from 1937 and till the end of 1939, distributed in Germany copies of 151 anti-Nazi leaflets published by the Mineworkers’ Trade Union. The network operated from Holland until September 1940, when it was discovered the and 70 of its members (29 in Germany and 41 in Holland) were arrested, including Social Democrats and Communists.278 The Swedish Mineworkers’ Trade Union was the second largest contributor to the financing of the German Trade Union Organization’ in 1938 and 1939, testifying to Mugrauer effective work in Sweden.279 Mugrauer’s case is an illustration of the readiness of the new arrivals (the exiled trade unionists in Sweden) to cooperate with Communists as a result of having worked with KPD members before and after 1933. With the composition of the pre-1938 SPD exiles in Sweden, members favoring cooperation with the Communists were more likely to win a majority support than Stahl or Sassnick. Despite this, during 1938 and 1939 the relationship between the main exiles in Sweden was a good one. 280 In September, 1938 the Stockholm So.Pa.De group numbered 32 members 281 with the newcomers and their wives accounting for approximately one third. According to Stahl, the So.Pa.De group represented only half of the German left-wing exiles in Stockholm, the rest being German SAP members or Communists.282

There were no major changes in 1938 and 1939 among the SPD exiles in Denmark. Tarnow received a promotion at the conference held on August 15, 1938 in Mulhouse (Alsace-Lorraine, France). He was elected as the new head of the Exiled German Trade Unions replacing Schliestedt after the latter’s death. Tarnow was the most senior former trade union member who was apparently loyal to the So.Pa.De Secretariat, which still had a majority among the members of the Exiled German Trade Unions. Tarnow was not very active between 1933 and 1938 in So.Pa.De illegal activities but at a conference held in Copenhagen on November 3, 1937 dealing with illegal activity in Germany, he claimed to have contacts with 29 cities and activists in all these

278 Ibid, p 117-119 279 Ibid, p 121 280 For example in his letter of 18.8.1938 Stahl passes to the So.Pa.De Secretariat Krebs' proposals following the death of Schliestedt, head of the ‘exile German trade unions,’ that the new organization will include only the unions that are fully under the control of the So.Pa.De Secretariat. AdsD M-131. 281 A letter from Emil Stahl to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 18.9.1938 AdsD/ M-131 para. 1. 282 Ibid, para. 4.

109 places.283 But, since these contacts were exclusively with Tarnow, there was no way of verifying the nature of the contacts or whether they truly existed. Tarnow’s contacts with rightwing elements, apart from his involvement in the ‘flirt’ between the ADGB and the NSDAP, became known to other senior SPD exiles only years later. The organization, which elected Tarnow as its head consisted only of a few hundred exiles who, by the end of 1938, did not have extensive contacts inside Germany. For example, the Swedish delegate to the Mulhouse conference was elected by a group consisting of only 10 people.284

The flight of So.Pa.De members from the Czechoslovak Republic to France through Denmark in March, April and May 1938 (see beginning of this chapter) brought additional SPD archive material for safeguarding by the Danish Social Democrats under the supervision of So.Pa.De members in Denmark (Raloff).285 However, by the end of May, the Danish Social Democrats were requested to transmit the entire archives to the SAI’s Institute for Social History in Amsterdam.286

At this stage (late 1938), the block of Germany ,annexed Austria and Italy divided European democratic countries into two geographical blocs. The division also meant that there were now two groups of Social Democratic Parties: the Social Democratic Parties in Scandinavia, which, by 1938, controlled Sweden, Norway and Denmark and the bloc that included the West European Social Democratic Parties of France (the French Socialists), Belgium, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K. (the Labor Party). The So.Pa.De still had a large group of exiles in Denmark (close to 300), which included more than a dozen senior members, its own newspaper edited by Heinig, an activity coordination center for North Germany (headed by Hansen, Heinig and Raloff), the head of the Exiled German Trade Unions (Tarnow, a So.Pa.De member but, as will be shown in the third part of this dissertation, a man loyal only to himself) and a few senior members in Sweden including a member of the Secretariat. However, the main assets of the So.Pa.De , the rest of the Secretariat, Neuer Vorwärts and the So.Pa.De archives, moved to Western Europe whose Social

283 Eiber,op.cit. p191 284 A Letter from Emil Stahl to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 5.8.1938 AdsD/ M-105 . 285 Letters from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Hans Hedtoft dated 23.2.1938 and 29.4.1938 and 21.5.1938 AdsD /M-50 . 286 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Hans Hedtoft dated 21.5.1938 AdsD/ M-50 .

110 Democratic Parties were not as dominant as the Scandinavian Social Democrats and whose ‘party ideology’ differed from that of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. However, these countries seemed to be more significant potential rivals of Nazi Germany.

In December, 1938 the relationship between the So.Pa.De Secretariat and the Danish Social Democrats (allies from 1935 to 1937) almost came to breaking point. An article claiming that the Danish Social Democrats were responsible for the disappearance of documents from the SPD archives when it was transferred to their hands and that the Danish Social Democrats had never supported So.Pa.De’s illegal work in Germany, infuriated the Danish Social Democrats who regarded the claims as grave ingratitude for their help. Below is an extract from the angry letter sent by Hans Hedhoft to Erich Ollenhauer: ‘Dear Erich, As I already warned you in our previous communication, we discovered a breach [in our communication system]. Someone used the stolen material to make a political attack against us. Yesterday I urged the Danish press to publish an explanation. In order to verify the matter, I request you to send me the exact wording of your article and inform me what was said about this matter in the “Sopade – Bericht.” If anyone inquires as to the reality, I ask you to transmit the wording of my letter to those who wish to have the information’.287 Hedhoft also denounced the claim that the Danish Social Democrats had not financed the So.Pa.De’s illegal activity in Germany, describing the author of the claim as an ‘evil writer’ 288 and adding that the Danish Social Democrats could not tolerate such allegations in view of the extensive assistance given to the So.Pa.De. 289

The So.Pa.De Secretariat was quick to apologize290 but the impression of having being used by the So.Pa.De at a time of need and then being discredited in the eyes of other SAI members would clearly not be easily erased from the memory of the Danish Social Democratic Secretariat, even though the incident was attributed to a German spy or someone who had collaborated with anti-Social Democratic elements.

287 A letter from Hans Hedtoft to Erich Ollenhauer dated 13.12.1938/ M-50 paras. 1-2 288 Ibid, p2 para. 1 289 Ibid, p 2 para.3-4. 290 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Hans Hedtoft dated 14.12.1938 AdsD/ M-50 .

111 The articles published in Neuer Vorwärts in March and May 1938 dealing with Sweden and Norway expressed the So.Pa.De Secretariat’s assessment that, in the likelihood of war, which it considered inevitable, these countries (and probably Denmark as well) would be the first targets of a German military invasion 291. After its harsh experience in the Czechoslovak Republic, the So.Pa.De leadership apparently did not want to base its organization in countries that were very empathetic to its cause but whose fates they believed were sealed. In July, 1938 Neuer Vorwärts reported on the extreme ‘right wing’ movement in Sweden in a special article titled ‘R.S.T Goebbelsfiliale im Norden.’ 292 This type of article was expected in an anti- Nazi organ such as Neuer Vorwärts but the fact that in the first nine months of 1938 the only articles it published on Sweden, Denmark or Norway dealt with the rise of pro-Nazi movements or the danger to these countries from Germany showed that the attitude of So.Pa.De Secretariat towards the Scandinavian countries had changed: rather than allies, it viewed them as countries that could pose a danger. This despite the fact that, in 1938, the Swedish Social Democrats and the Communists had an absolute majority in the Swedish Lower House of Parliament, a phenomenon without parallel in other European countries. In 1938, too, the LO achieved a binding agreement with Swedish employers making it compulsory to obtain trade union agreement to any managerial decision by a firm that affected its workers. Developments in Denmark and Norway were similar and these countries all saw a significant growth in 1938 in the level of the ‘public sector’ and of ‘transfer payments.’ Yet these achievements were not considered important enough to warrant mention in Neuer Vorwärts.

On September 18, 1938 Neuer Vorwärts again reported on Sweden, this time regarding a scandal concerning the maltreatment of a young Swedish girl who visited Germany as part of a youth exchange program (the maltreatment was due to the fact that the girl looked ‘too Jewish’).293 Although the article complimented the ‘Swedish democratic spirit’ which made it impossible for Swedes to understand Nazi racism (column 2 of the article), choosing to cover this story was also a covert (justified) way

291 See ‘Schweden wird beschimpft’ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 6.3.1938 p7 and ‘Kampf um Kiruna’ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 29.5.1938 p3-4. 292 ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 3.7.1938 p5 293 ‘Schweden in Entrüstung’ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 18.9.1938 p4

112 of criticizing the Swedish Social Democrats who had not stopped the one-sided youth exchanges before this incident.

The success of the Swedish Social Democrats in the local elections of September 19, 1938 (50.6% of the votes compared to 0.8% for the Swedish Nazi Party) elicited, in October, more positive coverage by the So.Pa.De organ as well as compliments on the ‘democratic nature’ of the ‘Swedish people who prefer social democracy even though they are ‘Aryans.’294 No reference was made, however, to the specific policies of the Swedish Social Democrats and the rest of the article dealt with fears for the future of Scandinavian countries in light of the success of German policy towards the Czechoslovak Republic.295 On October 16, a Neuer Vorwärts article claimed that Denmark would be the next target of German aggression. It assumed that, following Chamberlain’s concessions to Germany over the issue of Sudetenland, that annexation of the Danish Schleswig area would be Germany’s next demand.296 The title of the article, ‘Next Target – Denmark,’ reflected the extent to which the So.Pa.De leadership was uncertain about Denmark’s future.

In early 1939, the ability of Richard Hansen’s ‘Grenzsekretariat’ to continue its operation was significantly reduced following a wave of arrests in Schleswig Holstein in January 1939.297 Meanwhile, in Sweden, Stahl complained that the work of organizing the So.Pa.De in Sweden was very hard for a 60-year old man like himself (younger than Wels) due to his limited resources.298 On January 29, Stahl asked if Ollenhauer, who was due to go, in February, to Oslo for a meeting of the Social Democratic ‘Youth Organizations International,’ could also come to Stockholm to assist him because his wife was very sick and had to enter a medical institution.299

On April 9, 1939 Raloff’s report on the Danish general elections appeared in Neuer Vorwärts. These were the elections, which gave the Danish Social Democrats an absolute majority in Parliament. Raloff’s report did not describe the social or economic platforms of the Danish Social Democrats’ campaign. The report focused

294 ‘Der Norden und die Kriegsgefahr’ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 2.10.1938 p2 column 1 295 Ibid, column 2 296 ‘Nächstes Ziel Dänemark’ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 16.10.1938’ p2 297 A letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat to Hans Hedtoft dated 8.2.1939 AdsD/ M-50 . 298 A letter from Emil Stahl to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 16.1.1939 AdsD/ M-131 p2 .

113 primarily on the struggle against nationalist elements among the German speaking population of South Denmark (South Jütland). Raloff reported on incidents between the police and Nazi supporters in this area and on anti-Danish propaganda in South Jütland300 even though this was only one aspect of the elections and the whole German speaking population of South Denmark (which, as Raloff admitted, were the only group that tended to support the Nazis) represented less than 5% of Denmark’s population.

It was natural for Raloff, as a German exile, to be interested in these Nazi threats and even give them priority over others aspects of the Danish elections. But if Raloff, who had by then resided for six years in Denmark, did not consider any of the Danish Social Democratic social proposals important enough to be reported, what was the chance of other senior members of the So.Pa.De, who were not permanent residents of a Scandinavian country, understanding the political tactics and ‘party ideology’ of the Scandinavian Social Democrats?

The congratulatory article written by Wels on May 7, 1939 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Swedish Social Democratic Party expressed appreciation for the support of the Scandinavian Social Democrats and their political success, but showed no understanding of the reasons for its success.

299 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 29.1.1939 AdsD /M-131 p3 . 300 ‘Der Kampf um den Norden ‘ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 9.4.1939 p3-4.

114

115

116

301

301 ‘Gruss nach Schweden ‘ in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 7.5.1939 p3

117

Almost the entire article dealt with the role that the Swedish Social Democrats played in trying to create a consensus at the of 1917 and with their support for the SPD at the beginning of the ‘Weimar Republic’ (columns 2 and 3). Wels also thanked the Swedish Social Democrats for supporting the German labor movement (column 1), singling out for mention Hjalmar Branting, head of the Swedish Social Democratic Party almost from its beginning, and who died the same year (1925). Wels also alluded to his joint role with Branting in organizing the Social Democratic International (SAI).

Only the last column of the article (column 4) was devoted to the political success of the Swedish Social Democrats. Wels attributed the rise of the ‘National Socialists’ and the outlawing of the SPD as a legal entity in Germany to the effects of the war, hyperinflation, the ‘Ruhr area crisis’ and the ‘needless split in the labor movement.’ The Swedish Social Democrats, he wrote, had the luck of not suffering from any of these problems and were able to use this advantage to keep their country free. His praise completely ignored the differences in ‘party ideology,’ political tactics and economic policies of the two parties, which were a major factor in determining their different fates (see Introduction). Instead of focusing on events in Sweden where the Communist Parties did not compete successfully with the Swedish Social Democrats, Wels wrote on the problems faced by the SPD and the So.Pa.De and their attempt to remain relevant in face of the increasing popularity of the KPD. Placing the emphasis on relations with leading Swedish Social Democrats in international forums was also in line with the So.Pa.De’s immediate needs (help for SAI institutions and financial help for the So.Pa.De), rather than making plans for post-Nazi Germany, something that seemed very far away.

As a central figure of the ‘Weimar SPD,’ Wels was not the most likely man to admit that the SPD had made wrong choices. Such an admission on the part of the So.Pa.De leadership would have meant playing into the hands of less senior SPD exiles or the opposition inside and outside the circles of SPD exiles. But, at this stage, six years after the SPD had been outlawed, Wels could have, at least, mentioned some of the good points of Scandinavian Social Democratic policies. There was indeed no indication that Wels, as the leading figure of the So.Pa.De, saw any interest in

118 learning from parties which, until 1933, he had considered simply as junior sister parties. The lives of Wels and Hilferding came to an end in 1939-1941. Hans Vogel and Erich Ollenhauer, who were next in line, had contacts with the Scandinavian Social Democrats mainly for administrative purposes and not always with the best results (see the case of Crispien). They were not the best candidates to be influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats, as will be shown in the next part of this dissertation.

119 Chapter-1.8 Kurt Heinig begins to be influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

Not all the So.Pa.De exiles were indifferent or uninfluenced by the ‘party ideology’of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. Kurt Heinig did not vote once against the party leadership stands between 1918 and 1933 (with the exception of his role in the split between ‘Prague’ and ‘Berlin’) and was thus part of the mainstream ‘Weimar SPD party ideology.’ Part 1, Chapter 1 showed how Heinig’s views were in line with those of Hilferding except for the issue of cartels and monopolies. Tarnow the ‘opportunist’ was much closer than Heinig to the Scandinavian Social Democrats when it came to ‘Keynesian policy.’ But it was Heinig who underwent the most radical transformation and became the strongest advocate of the Scandinavian Social Democratic ‘party ideology’ of SPD exiles and German-Speaking exiles in Scandinavia. The process began during his stay in Denmark and reached its peak after his arrival at Sweden.

Why was Heinig the exile who went through the most radical transformation? After all in many important aspects there was little difference between Heinig and the other senior SPD exiles in Scandinavia. The transformation was perhaps the outcome of Heinig’s interest in economic theory. Tarnow was primarily a political leader who had questionable moral standards and Raloff had little interest in economic theory, as could be seen in most of his written works. Heinig was also strongly committed to a publicly-owned economy (see Chapter 1), something which younger SPD members such as Bromme (see Part 2) and young German SAP members (such as Willy Brandt) did not share with Heinig, although they were supposed to be more radical than Heinig in view of their political affiliations.

The Scandinavian example of radical egalitarianism, an economy under public control or ownership and strong democratic institutions, was undoubtedly a tempting combination for a man like Heinig who, despite his commitment to a publicly owned economy, had such strong ‘anti- Bolshevik’ views that the So.Pa.De Secretariat was

120 forced to censor some of his articles302. He was also vehemently opposed to any cooperation with the Communists and as a result he did not consider the split between the SPD and the KPD as an important issue for the Weimar Republic labor movement.

In 1935, Heinig, like other SPD exiles, was focused on protecting the ‘SPD legacy’ rather than attempitn to analyze SPD mistakes during the period of the Weimar Republic. On June 15, 1935, Heinig sent a letter to the So.Pa.De’s Graphia publishing house in which he criticized the book ‘Geschichte der deutschen Republic’ (History of the German Republic) by Arthur Rosenberg, a politically independent-figure who was not a member of any party (though he was once member of the KPD and the USPD). His letter could be summed up as expressing the view that ‘we did nothing wrong.’

302 See letter to Kurt Heinig from the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 3.9.1936 AdsD M-52 .

121

122

303

He began by stating that he had read Rosenberg’s book thoroughly and had made an effort to be objective towards the writer. He attacked Rosenberg for moving from party to party (paragraph 2) and went on to state that Rosenberg’s book was an ‘overexposed’ and represented an ‘immature historical lie’ (paragraph 2). He then

303 A letter from Kurt Heinig to the So.Pa.De Secretariat and the ‘Graphia’ publishing house dated 15.6.1935 AdsD/ M-52.

123 listed a series of what he saw as ‘empirical lies.’ Heinig rejected Rosenberg’s claim that Germany had been ripe for a socialist revolution during the years 1920 to 1923. He did not elaborate on this point, but it is clear that he opposed the implication that the SPD, out of fear or opportunism, had refrained from implementing a transfer of means of production to some form of public ownership (missing also the opportunity to remove the bourgeois classes from political power). This was the position of the KPD and the more radical elements of the USPD but Heinig, who had been a middle rank SPD official at the time, disagreed with Rosenberg’s portrayal of his party, although there was some truth in it since the SPD had not proposed any clear cut action of that kind or any alternative policy of high taxation, comprehensive social legislation, or public ownership of key elements of the economy. Heinig also criticized Rosenberg for claiming that the SPD viewed ‘radical workers’ as a problem that should be dealt with by the police (page 2b, paragraph 3). The SPD, according to Heinig, was not afraid of radical workers, even though ‘Weimar SPD’ was often ready to cooperate with ‘anti- social welfare’ parties such as the DVP. Rosenberg’s claim that it was the American Stock Exchange and not the 1924 stabilization program that saved the German economy (page 2, paragraph 4) was, in Heinig view, ‘an expression of very bad taste.’ As Economic Editor of ‘Vorwärts, Heinig had felt obliged at the time to defend the difficult compromises made by the SPD (see Chapter 1) in order to launch the stabilization program, compromises that included drastic cuts in welfare.

In 1937, Heinig published his first book in exile. It was also his first book in Danish and was called ‘Krigsgaeld’ (War Money). Like ‘Tysklands Beretninger’ and Raloff’s articles in the ‘Social Demokraten,’ the book aimed at justifying to a Danish audience the actions of the ‘Weimar SPD’ and the So.Pa.De. The aim of the book, Heinig explained in his introduction, was to present governmental methods that were used to finance ‘this abnormal need, this pathologic need for war’304. ‘Today, we officially live in a period of peace, therefore the financing of big countries cannot be compared with the budget needed at the beginning of the Big War’305he added. After preparing his readers for his later elaboration on the more advanced means used by Nazi

304 Heinig Kurt, ‘Krigsgaeld-Rustningsomkostninger.’ (Copenhagen 1937),Ms in D.K.B, s.001099903 p5N 305 Ibid, p7

124 Germany to finance the future war, Heinig described the problems faced by the 1914- 1918 economies in order to finance a ‘total war’ such as the need to replace the male workforce, with huge numbers dying in the war or serving at the front, a need, which, according to Heinig, led to many women entering the workforce306.

Heinig then described the solutions adopted by the main warring nations in order to cope with the financial needs created by ‘total war.’ France financed the war by taking out massive loans from the ‘Bank of France’ (the National Bank), amounting to 25 billion gold francs307. Germany chose to finance the war through taxes, as a result of which Germany’s debt at the end of the war was almost the same as its debt at the outbreak of war 308. (Heinig ignores the fact that many Germans were encouraged to buy government bonds which were subsequently devalued during the period of hyper- inflation). Britain, like France, financed the war through loans, as a result of which it had to pay, in its 1919 budget, 1.2 billion pounds in war loan interest309.

Although he did not state it explicitly, Heinig hinted that because the SPD was involved in decision-making during the war, the financing of the war was done in such a way that it did not create a long-term burden on the economy. Its advantage over the French and British methods was that it placed the burden of financing the war on the affluent (through taxes) rather than on the general population (loans taken from the wealthy to be repaid with interest from the national budget to which the entire population contributed). Heinig also believed that the cost of the methods used by Britain and France to finance the war was not limited to those countries since the Versailles Treaty transferred the burden of their war loans to the German economy 310. In support of his claim, Heinig quoted from a 1920 essay by Keynes311. Heinig argued that the economic burden placed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty compensation payment clause resulted in more than 100,000 Germans living in poverty: these people would not have sunk into poverty had it not been for the cost of the reparation payments for they would have been protected by Germany’s ‘progressive social

306 Ibid, p 7-8 307 Ibid, p9 308 Ibid, p9-10 309 Ibid, p 10-11 310 Ibid, p-12 311 Ibid, p13

125 advanced welfare policy’312. Heinig blamed external factors for the social problems of the ‘Weimar Republic’ and described its limited social legislation as advanced. From past views and future opinions of Scandinavian social legislation, it is hard to believe that Heinig truly held this view of the ‘Weimar Republic’s’social system. His claims were no doubt based on the desire to defend the policies of the ‘Weimar SPD’ and decisions in which the SPD took part. An example of this desire was his allusion to the fact that the SPD was not in power from 1922 to June 1928 with the exception of a few short periods 313. This was the period of the relatively stable economic years, 1925, 1926 and 1927, when the Dawes program was working successfully. Heinig hinted that the SPD was unable to use these years to steer the German economy in the right direction because it was not part of the ruling coalition – a view which was not very different from those expressed by Hilferding in his lecture ‘Die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie’ regarding sharing political power with bourgeois parties.

Heinig went on to deal with the economic situation in the mid 30s. He pointed out that the expenses of the war and those of a possible future war were taking up most of the national budgets of Europe. Data quoted in the book regarding France’s budget for 1936 shows that 21.3% of the budget was devoted to debt repayment (due mostly to the war), 26.95% to military expenses, 11.43% to war pensions and 8.9% for interest on bonds used to finance the pensions314. Approx. two thirds of the total budget was war-related. Heinig noted that no data was available on Germany’s budget, but the decision not to pay war reparations to the allies left a large sum of money for other purposes315.

The growth of military expenses raised production of the German textile industry (uniforms) and machinery industry (weapons), using money that had been slated for war reparations. But Heinig was not impressed by Germany’s economic recovery, for it was based on the refusal to pay reparations and on creating growth through the production of arms for future use. Heinig then noted the military expenses of non- neutral countries such as the Czechoslovak Republic and the U.K, which amounted to

312 Ibid, p16 313 Ibid, p20 314 Ibid, p27 315 Ibid, p29

126 approx. 30% of the national budget. An even larger percentage was devoted to military costs by Germany’s potential ally, Japan316.

In chapter 10, Heinig concluded that the most efficient method for financing a future war cost was inflation tax317. This was a case of Keynesian macroeconomic policy with a negative goal, a policy also used by Italy although Heinig does not mention Italy in this context. Again, Heinig used a quote by Keynes to support his claim regarding the role of inflation318. The last paragraph in the book was devoted to Scandinavia, which Heinig described as an ‘oasis of peace’ in a Europe that was preparing itself for war 319. It was clear that, in Heinig’s view, policies that had a negative goal in countries such as Germany were positive when used for non-military goals as in Scandinavia. Although Heinig continued to defend the policies of the SPD, he was admitting, if not explicitly, that there were advantages to the economic policy of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, which he did not agree with in the early 30s.

At the end of 1937 and beginning of 1938, the need to defend the SPD and the So.Pa.De had become less important in Scandinavia for several reasons: the reunion of the So.Pa.De with the RSD; the choice of France as the So.Pa.De’s new base; improved relations with the Communists; and the So.Pa.De leadership’s view of Denmark and Sweden as countries whose fates were sealed. Heinig was therefore less motivated to defend his party’s policies regardless of their effectiveness and he was freer to express views influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

While ‘Krigsgaeld’ was a short book, only somewhat longer than Heinig’s essays during the ‘Weimar Republic’ period, his next book, ‘Dagliglivets Socialøkonomi,’ was 136 pages long. Heinig clearly had more time to write as result of the restrictions on So.Pa.De activity in Germany from its base in Denmark. The book shows that Heinig had aspirations to pursuing an academic career in Scandinavia, since the end of the Nazi regime in Germany seemed far off. ‘Dagliglivets Socialøkonomi’ (The National Economy of Today) was published in mid 1938 by the ‘Nyt Socialt

316 Ibid 317 Ibid, p44 318 Ibid, p44-45

127 Bibliotek,’ a publishing house affiliated to the Danish Social Democratic party. The Swedish version ‘Vardagens nationalekonomi’ (with the same meaning in English), published in 1942 was more detailed and will be dealt with in Part 2 and will be compared with the Danish version. A relatively successful German version (translated from the Swedish) was published in the early 50s.

In his introduction, Heinig described the book as ‘a cartoon book without cartoons’ that aimed to present the economies of the day as they really were320. Early on in the book, he praised projects such as public housing for they ‘create jobs and income for many people’ and he pointed to Britain and Denmark as examples of countries which had successfully implemented such policies321. Public projects when financed from sources belonging to the affluent sectors were ‘Keynesian macroeconomic’ policies, whether financed by progressive taxation, inflation tax or by long-term state loans. However, Britain in the 30s was not as good an example of such policy as Denmark or Sweden were. The fact of mentioning Britain could be seen as an effort to compliment a potential rival of Nazi Germany.

The next part of Heinig’s book focused the American model of ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policy’ – the New Deal322. Heinig’s positive or, at least, uncritical attitude towards the New Deal was not, at this stage, a novelty in the So.Pa.De. In an article published by Neuer Vorwärts on October 22,1933 the supporters of Roosevelt (mostly Democrats and the American trade unions ) were described as ‘The American anti-capitalist movement.’ The author of the article (Richard Kern, probably a pseudonym for Rudolf Hilferding since the original Richard Kern was a member of the Sudeten German Social Democrats, not the SPD, and Hilferding was the chief economic expert of the So.Pa.De and the main author of economic articles) claimed that limiting the work week to 40 hours and setting a minimum wage raised the ‘purchasing power of workers’ but he considered that the rise in prices, which he attributed to wage rises, was problematic. Still the author’s final assessment of what

319 Ibid, p46 320Heinig Kurt, ‘ Dagliglivets Socialøkonomi.’ (Copenhagen 1938), Ms in D.K.B, s.001099903 p7. 321 Ibid, p9-10 322 Ibid, p 11-14

128 he called the ‘American experiment’ was positive323 although he did not support the more classic ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policies’ of public projects or manipulating the economy through inflation to promote social goals. With the SPD’s attitude ‘softening’ on this issue in 1933, Heinig’s views could not be considered radical.

The second chapter of Heinig’s book dealt with ‘free trade’. He was always pro-free trade (a traditional SPD stand) and his views remained unchanged in this chapter. Heinig took the opportunity here to describe the economic model of Nazi Germany, which was based on a planned economy and which Heinig called ‘Prussian Socialism.’ This type of economy meant that the means of production were controlled by the state, the aim being to create the resources for a future war. As such, it had no benefits whatsoever for the workers themselves324. Heinig noted that even liberal countries such as France and Britain were preparing for war and their economic policies therefore should be seen as policies of a cease-fire period325. In contrast to future versions of the book, only the German economy was presented, in the Danish version, as an example of an economy of a non-democratic nation. Heinig did not relate to the economy of the Soviet Union and kept his harsh views of the Soviet Union to himself, although they appear in subsequent versions. He was clearly following So.Pa.De policy of the time not to strain their relationship with Communist parties. It is clear, however, that Heinig did not consider central planning and state control as representing ‘socialism’ if the goal was not social security and a classless society. His stand did not contradict that of Hilferding but it was a hint that he did not view central planning as one of the core principles of ‘socialism.’

The chapter on trade balance was purely descriptive and did not contain remarks that could be seen as expressing moral values or political and social ideas. In the chapter on production prices, Heinig returned to his anti-inflation stand of the 20s: even low inflation was something, he believed, that could have negative effects. Inflation, in Heinig’s view, whether resulting from a rise in income or in the profits of the employers, was basically the outcome the lack of an organized economy326. This

323 ‘Das amerikanische Experiment’ (Dr Richard Kern) written actually by Rudolf Hilferding in ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of 22.10.1933 p8 324 Heinig,op.cit. P20 325 Ibid, P21-23 326 Ibid, p35

129 view, which was in line with that of Hilferding, placed Heinig in 1938 in a rather contradictory position. He was not against Keynesian macroeconomic policy such as that of the Danish government, but unlike Wigforss, the Swedish Finance Minister (see Introduction for his views and policies in the 30s), he did not view prices as a factor that could be manipulated and that could have a positive effect when used properly, through low inflation. Heinig had still not decided whether he preferred a ‘manipulated market economy’ owned by the public (the Scandinavian functional socialism model) over an ‘organized economy’ with public or non-public ownership (the ‘Weimar SPD’ mainstream position)

In later chapters he described stockholders’ rights according to Danish laws and the method of calculating dividends (there were no changes in these laws during the 20s and the 30s). Another chapter was devoted to the Stock exchange market and methods of speculation but Heinig did not refer to the possibility of public bodies owning stocks with dividends going to public purposes or to taxing speculation profits on the Stock Exchange (future policies and current theories of the Swedish and other Scandinavian Social Democrats).

On the subject of taxes (one of the main elements, alongside transfer payments and public services, of the Scandinavian Social Democratic ‘manipulated market economy’), Heinig claimed that in countries with free public opinion, free press, a Parliament and an opposition, the state budget ought to deal with the financing of welfare, insuring pensions, and so on 327. In other words, he considered taxes and the state budget which the taxes financed (to pay for public services and transfer payments) as the main means of creating the desired society. This was a breach from the traditional ‘Weimar SPD’ position, which Heinig had so well represented, and which viewed taxes, transfer payments and the public services they finance as secondary to central planning. After having given a lot of importance to central planning in the preceding chapters, Heinig now placed taxes and re-distribution policy almost at the same level of importance. Heinig viewed 1918 as a year of change, because from then on taxes and state budgets began to finance social payments328.

327 Ibid, P97 328 Ibid, p101

130 This development, he noted, was paralleled by the granting of general voting rights in many European countries.

In the last chapters on cartels and ‘economic rationalization,’ Heinig repeated his ‘Weimar period’ views, which were not in opposition to the Scandinavian Social Democratic policy, he saw nothing positive in monopolies and cartels (the basis of the main disagreement in the ‘Weimar period’ between Heinig and Hilferding).

The views expressed in ‘Dagliglivets socialøkonomi’ and in ‘Krigsgaeld’ were still far from those of the ‘Swedophile’ Heinig of the 40s. Partial changes could be seen in his views but Heinig was still not an enthusiastic advocate of Scandinavian, and particularly, Swedish Social Democracy. This could be explained by the fact that, at this stage, the success of the Danish Social Democrats was less evident than that of the Swedish Social Democrats from 1940 onwards and the process of changing his ideas would clearly take time. Nonetheless, despite all his reservations, Heinig was, in the late 30s, the most senior So.Pa.De member with the closest views to mainstream Scandinavian Social Democracy.

131 Chapter-1.9 SPD (RSD) Exiles in Norway during the Period 1938 to 1940

Up to this point, this part of the dissertation has dealt primarily with the mainstream So.Pa.De that was loyal to the leadership of Otto Wels and Hans Vogel and tended to be opposed to any substantive cooperation with the KPD. The RSD also had members (and later on former members) in Scandinavia, most of whom were gathered in Norway during the period 1938 to 1940. Since they were less senior than the mainstream So.Pa.De exiles, there are fewer direct sources on them for the years preceding 1940. Information about these exiles derives primarily from mainstream So.Pa.De sources such as Emil Stahl and Erich Ollenhauer or non-So.Pa.De material, rather than from their own written material. Because of the scarcity of sources it would be pointless to assess them, as was done with the mainstream So.Pa.De exiles, regarding to what extent they were influenced, uninfluenced or indifferent to the Scandinavian Social Democrat model. In Part 2, which deals with SPD exiles in Sweden in the 40s, there are many more sources and it will be possible to make such an assessment.

The ‘party ideology’ of the Norwegian Labor Party was similar to that of the Swedish and Danish Social Democrats. However, on the international arena, it chose at first to join the Communist International and, later, when it left this International due to its refusal to take orders from Moscow, it stayed out of the Communist International and the Social Democratic International (SAI). Hence, it was the only strong and successful party to whom small parties such as the German SAP, which positioned itself between the KPD and the SPD, could turn for support. In 1935 the Norwegian Labor Party became the dominant political power in Norway and its tolerance of organizations to the ‘left’ of the SAI and between the SAI and the Communists International meant that RSD exiles, even after the reunion with the So.Pa.De, had good reason to choose Norway as their country of exile. The Norwegian Labor Party had contacts with the So.Pa.De through its youth organization’s memberhsip in the Social Democratic International of Youth Organizations, a body in which Ollenhauer, as head of the Weimar SPD Youth Organization, represented the So.Pa.De. At a later stage, it had also contacts with the So.Pa.De through its direct membership in the SAI.

132

The two most active RSD exiles in Norway were Otto Friedländer and Paul Bromme. Karl Böchel, one of the two RSD leaders, also settled permanently in Norway at the end of 1938 but, at this stage, he was not a member of any organization, as he had not rejoined the So.Pa.De when most RSD members returned to its fold. Böchel also withdrew completely from politics at this time as he was very sick and had to be hospitalized in Norwegian hospitals for long periods till his death in 1946. Anna Zammert (1898- 1982), USPD member from 1917 to 1922, SPD member from 1922 to 1933, Secretary of the League of Women’s Factory Workers from 1927 to 1933 and an SPD Reichstag member from 1930 to 1933, also came to Norway. She arrived in 1936 with her husband after having been held under arrest in Germany from 1933 to 1935 and after a short stay in Denmark in 1935.329 But, despite her long period of exile in Norway (1936 to 1940), Zammert is not mentioned in any Oslo So.Pa.De group letters or in any of Stahl’s letters relating to the group.

Otto Friedländer (born 1897 in Berlin) had studied at and subsequently received a doctorate in political science from Berlin’s Von Humboldt University. He was head of the SPD students’ organization from 1924 to 1929 and from 1926 to 1932 he was also a member of the Secretariat of the Social Democratic International of Students’ Organizations. He moved to the Czechoslovak Republic in January 1933, as part of the SPD’s re-organization outside Germany.330 On March 29, 1934 his German citizenship was cancelled 331 (at a relatively early stage for medium-ranking SPD official but his Jewish origin may have played a role in this). Friedländer had joined the RSD from its inception, but he returned to the So.Pa.De when it re-united with the RSD. He left the Czechoslovak Republic in August 1938, moving directly to Norway.

Like Willy Brandt, who also came from Lübeck, Bromme was not an important political official during the ‘Weimar period.’ He became important only in his exile period and in the post-1945 Germany when he was the most successful politician of all former SPD exiles in Scandinavia.

329 FES Nachlasse und Despositation von Frauen im AdsD 330 See Erich Ollenhauer letter to Emil Stahl dated 27.4.1939 AdsD/ M-131 para. 2 331 See list number 2 of the ‘Ausbürgerungen’ in the German foreign office archive Bonn according to Einhart Lorenz in ‘Exil in Norwegen’ p350

133 Bromme was born in 1906 in Lübeck and joined the SPD in 1927. He studied political science in the newly founded University of Hamburg (established in 1925). While Willy Brandt (b. Karl Frahm in 1913) was a member of the Lübeck SPD only for one year, from 1930 to 1931, after which he joined the new German SAP party, Bromme remained a member of the Lübeck SPD for six years, until 1933. Lübeck, a city with close to 300,000 inhabitants in the early 30s, was an SPD stronghold in the middle of Schleswig-Holstein, an area with a hard-core pro-Nazi rural population. Young SPD activists such as Bromme and Frahm found themselves therefore at the center of the violent confrontations that took place between the NSDAP and the SPD in Lübeck. In the years 1932 and 1933, Bromme worked and wrote for ‘Lübecker Volksboten,’ the SPD daily newspaper. In his autobiography ‘Mein Weg nach Berlin,’ Brandt claimed that he too wrote for this paper,332 however no articles by Brandt were published in ‘Lübecker Volksboten’ during the period 1930 to 1933 (Brandt did not repeat his claim in his later memoirs of 1989). Brandt’s attempt to re-invent his biography on this issue is a sign that Bromme’s position in the SPD, at least on the local level, gained in importance as a result of his articles, which carried more status than heading an organization of a few dozen youngsters (the Lübeck branch of the German SAP Youth Organization) which was Brandt’s position in 1932 and 1933. Bromme was the criminal court reporter for ‘Lübecker Volksboten’ and he wrote a weekly column called ‘Aus der grossen Burgstrasse,’ which included reports on trials in Lübeck’s Criminal Court. The column gave Bromme the opportunity of criticizing NSDAP members, antisemitism and Lübeck’s judicial system, which he lambasted for being too lenient with NSDAP members and too harsh with SPD or ‘Reichsbanner’ members. His column did not cover economic issues. The first column was published on the July 21, 1932 and is reproduced below in order to illustrate Bromme’s style of writing and his signature, which helps to identify other articles he wrote.

332 See Brandt Willy ‘Mein Weg nach Berlin’ of 1960 in ‘Porträt und Selbstporträt’( München 1971), p 57-58.

134

333 The column centered primarily to an incident in which two Nazis stabbed the brother- in-law of a well-known Nazi official in Lübeck, an incident that emphasizes the criminal character of NSDAP supporters. As was usually the case in his column (Aus der grossen Burgstrasse), Bromme focused on criminal issues involving prrimarily NSDAP or NSDAP supporters. In his column, a week later, Bromme protested against the lenient sentence given to a NSDAP official who had published a brochure with hard core antisemitic content. 334 In his column of August 27,1932 Bromme claimed that ‘Reichsbanner’ members, who had guarded an SPD rally, were given an

333 Bromme Paul ‘Aus der grossen Burgstrasse’ in ‘Lübecker Volksboten’ dated 21.7.1932 334 Bromme Paul ‘Aus der grossen Burgstrasse’ in ‘Lübecker Volksboten’ dated 27.7.1932

135 exceptionally harsh sentence although they had acted in self-defence after being attacked by NSDAP activists.335

Bromme’s column appeared for the last time on March 27, 1933, and one can assume that he started to take part in underground activity at the beginning of April, 1933. This would have been a natural continuation of his work as a journalist who opposed the NSDAP. Bromme first went to the Czechoslovak Republic and then moved, in 1934, to Denmark which was closer to his hometown of Lübeck. There, during 1934 and 1935, he collaborated with the Danish Seamen’s Trade Union to distribute So.Pa.De material in Lübeck and Hamburg 336. In 1935, shortly after the RSD split from the So.Pa.De, Bromme, who was now an RSD member, moved to Sweden were he remained until 1938. 337 His move may have been due to the fact that he was unable to operate from the base of the So.Pa.De dominated Danish SPD exile group. In 1938, he moved to Norway at the same time as Stahl arrived in Sweden to organize the So.Pa.De groups there.

In Norway, Bromme and Friedländer became part of a mixed group containing SPD- German SAP exiles as well as exiles belonging to some smaller German left-wing organizations. The ‘Justizfond der Arbeiterbewgung,’ the body established by the Norwegian Labor Party and Norwegian Trade Unions to support ‘political exiles’ was, unlike its parallels in Denmark and Sweden, non-selective in its support as long as the exiles were not Communists. Friedländer and Bromme did not consider themselves rivals of Stahl, however it can be assumed that they preferred to be in Norway, away from his direct supervision. They thus had a different status from that of the So.Pa.De groups in Sweden, which were, according to the So.Pa.De Secretariat, under Stahl’s area of responsibility 338 (in addition to the Stockholm So.Pa.De group, there were small So.Pa.De groups in Malmö and Göteborg). As a result they were freer to have contacts with non-So.Pa.De left wing German exiles.

335 Bromme Paul ‘Aus der grossen Burgstrasse’ in ‘Lübecker Volksboten’ dated 27.8.1932 336 See in ‘Biographisches Handbuch der Deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933’ edited by Werner Röder and Herbert A. Strauss (München/New-York 1983), p96. The information is based on post 1949 reports by Bromme since there are no written materials by him or on him from this period. 337 Ibid with the same reservations. 338 A letter from Erich Ollenhauer to Emil Stahl dated 27.4.1939 AdsD/ M-131 para. 4-6 .

136 The core of the Oslo So.Pa.De group consisted of Friedländer, Bromme, Fritz Bieligk (an SPD and RSD member who had worked with Friedländer in Czechoslovakia and was one of the authors of the RSD’s political platform339) and Hermann Fischer, a low ranking SPD member340 (the signatures of the four appear on almost all the correspondences of the Oslo So.Pa.De group with the Secretariat while other SPD exiles are simply referred to). On May 9, 1939 Ollenhauer wrote to Stahl requesting him to give the Oslo So.Pa.De group documents and money in order to help their operations 341 and reorganize less active SPD exiles. Stahl informed Ollenhauer that he had already sent, on May 8, 15 cards (with So.Pa.De organizational information) and 200 marks. 342

Friedländer and Bieligk were elected heads of the small Oslo So.Pa.De group.343 Stahl, however, suspected that Friedländer had maintained his contacts with German SAP members and with Communists. 344 Friedländer, Bromme and Bieligk maintained that the contacts with non- So.Pa.De members were the result of the nature of the ‘German speaking political exiles in Norway’ community,345 where everyone was supported by the same funds and had good relations with their host, the Norwegian Labor Party. The So.Pa.De Secretariat had good reason to feel suspicious about the real nature of the contacts maintained by Friedländer and Bromme with non-So.Pa.De political exiles, who probably included Communists. Friedländer’s memoirs made it clear that he visited Moscow (probably during the time he was in exile in the Czechoslovak Republic), but the exact date of his visit is not known .346 On the other hand, the members of the group were making efforts to become more connected to the mainstream So.Pa.De. In a letter dated August 21,1939 the group asked to receive more copies of ‘Neuer Vorwärts,’ promising to pay for the papers in the future. They lamented that they had to get by with the single copy which Bieligk received every week.347 The request was a sign of

339 Ibid, para. 3. 340 A letter from the Oslo So.Pa.De group to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 21.8.1939 AdsD/ M-24 341 A letter from Erich Ollenhauer to Emil Stahl dated 9.5.1939 AdsD/ M-131 .

342 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer from the 11.5.1939 AdsD/ M-131 . 343 Ibid 344 Ibid 345 A letter from the Oslo So.Pa.De group to Erich Ollenhauer from the 11.5.1939 AdsD/ M-24 346 See in Friedländer Otto ‘Reiseandenken für meine Freunde’ (Stockholm 1951) p7 347 A letter from the Oslo So.Pa.De group to the So.Pa.De secretariat from the 21.8.1939 AdsD/ M-24 .

137 how small and disconnected the SPD exiles in Norway were at this stage compared with the more organized SPD exile group in Sweden and the much more organized SPD exile group in Denmark.

At this time, the group wanted to accept Arthur Gross (born in 1900) and Peter George (born in 1911), who both claimed to be SPD exiles, 348 although Stahl had information to the contrary. It is unclear whether the men, whom Stahl believed were Communists, had been invited to join the Oslo So.Pa.De group as a result of the group’s lack of organization or because of an effort to bring Communists in from the backdoor. The fact that the two men were acquaintances of Bromme, strengthened Stahl’s opinion that the Oslo So.Pa.De group should not be allowed to accept new members. 349 The Oslo group appealed his decision in their letter of July 20, 1939 and Ollenhauer agreed, at least, to check the possibility of asking the Norwegian Labor Party to support these new members through the ‘Justisfond,’350 which illustrates that, despite his reservations, Ollenhauer considered Bromme and Friedländer important members who should be kept in the So.Pa.De (and he was probably also appreciative of their previous work against the NSDAP).

Following the pact between Hitler and Stalin, all cooperation with Communists was considered unacceptable for Social Democratic exiles (a policy that would last for the next two years). In a letter dated October 9, 1939 Stahl complained that Bromme had invited Max Seydewitz (founder of the German SAP and the main promoter of a united KPD and So.Pa.De front) to give a lecture on the pact and requested the Secretariat to restrain Bromme .351 In another letter, dated October 3, 1939 Stahl complained that some of the members of the Oslo Group belonged to ‘Neu Beginnen,’352 which was a serious allegation. ‘Neu Beginnen,’ unlike the RSD, was not a formal organization with a recognized status within the SPD. It was a group, consisting of So.Pa.De and KPD members, that did not publicize its efforts to create a united So.Pa.De/ KPD front. The So.Pa.De leadership and the mainstream members had no official knowledge as to who belonged to ‘Neu Beginnen.’ Membership of the

348 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer from the 17.7.1939 AdsD/ M-131. 349 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer from the 17.7.1939 AdsD /M-131. 350 A letter from Erich Ollenhauer to Paul Bromme from the 24.7.1939. AdsD/ M-24 351 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer from the 9.10.1939 AdsD /M-131 prg 5 352 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer from the 3.10.1939 AdsD /M-131 prg 4

138 group had been considered, from October 1933 according to a So.Pa.De Secretariat decision, cause for expulsion from the So.Pa.De, 353 even though the most senior So.Pa.De member suspected of membership in the group was Secretariat member Paul Hertz (who was indeed the most senior figure in ‘Neu Beginnen’).

According to Stahl, at least five members of the Oslo So.Pa.De Group belonged to ‘Neu Beginnen,’ and six others had been members part of the time. In addition, most of the group’s members had no clear proof of pre-1933 SPD membership. Stahl did not mention any names in his letter to the Secretariat, but his conclusion was that the Oslo So.Pa.De group was completely under Communist control. 354 The So.Pa.De Secretariat, now without Wels, was not convinced by Stahl’s allegations as, according to information given to them by Richard Hansen, most of the Oslo group had been member of the SPD before 1933. However, it did say it would check the issue of possible membership in ‘Neu Beginnen.’355 With the death of Wels, it was all the more important for Ollenhauer and Vogel to preserve the structure of a weakened So.Pa.De and not expel members over suspicions that had not been definitively proved. Stahl did not give up and repeated his criticism of the Oslo So.Pa.De group in late October, albeit more moderately. 356

Even without Stahl, Bromme faced a grilling. On December 30,1939 he received a letter from the So.Pa.De Secretariat politely requesting him to explain why his name appeared on a list of RSD members published in Paris by the independent RSD (the small group of RSD members that did not rejoine the So.Pa.De in late 1937).357 Bromme was able to overcome this incident thanks to his letter of December 31, 1939 in which he provided the So.Pa.De Secretariat with comprehensive information on the status of the Communists in Norway after September 30, 1939 .358 This information gathering work against the Communists secured Bromme’s position in the So.Pa.De and, by March 1940, he had taken on the responsibility for corresponding with the So.Pa.De Secretariat and, through it, with the Norwegian Labor Party regarding the personal and economic problems faced by members of the Oslo group such as Fischer

353 See ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 22.10.1933 p8 354 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer from the 3.10.1939 AdsD /M-131 p3 . 355 A Letter from the So.Pa.De secretariat to Emil Stahl from 10.10.1939 AdsD/ M-131 . 356 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer from the 29.10.1939 AdsD /M-131 . 357 A letter from the So.Pa.De secretariat to Paul Bromme from the 30.12.1939 AdsD/ M-24

139 and others. 359 A few weeks later, following the German occupation of Norway, the Oslo So.Pa.De group ceased to exist and its members joined the SPD exiles in Sweden.

After 1940, So.Pa.De groups in Norway and Denmark integrated with the So.Pa.De groups in Sweden. With Sweden the only country not under German occupation, all the SPD exiles fled or tried to flee to Sweden from Denmark and Norway. With the exception of Philip Scheidemann who died in Denmark in early December, 1939, Otto Buchwitz who was unable to escape and was consequently arrested and imprisoned in Germany till 1945, and Richard Hansen who came to Sweden but left in 1941 for the U.S. (probably because he had the most to fear from a future occupation of Sweden), all other So.Pa.De senior members were now in Sweden. All the former RSD active So.Pa.De members in Norway also came to Sweden. The total number of SPD exiles in Sweden was now second only to the U.K and the U.S.

The next part of this work will deal with this important concentration of SPD exiles, who were henceforth very limited in their ability to operate outside of Sweden (for obvious reasons), but had plenty of time to observe and learn from the Swedish Social Democratic model.

358 A letter from the So.Pa.De secretariat to Paul Bromme from the 9.1.1940 AdsD/ M-24. 359 A letter from the So.Pa.De secretariat to Paul Bromme from the 12.3.1940 AdsD M-24.

140 Part 2: ‘Swedophiles,’ SPD exiles who were minimally influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats and SPD exiles with non-egalitarian views (the stands taken by the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London; the internal politics of SPD exiles in Sweden from 1940 until 1944, the views they held during the period 1940-1948 and how these were influenced by the Swedish Social Democrats).

Chapter-2.1 The stands taken by the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London compared to positions of the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

By the end of 1940, the SPD exiles in Europe were concentrated in three countries – Switzerland where a relatively small number of SPD exiles were concentrated, the UK, which replaced France as the location of the SPD in exile center, and Sweden which hosted approx. 300 SPD exiles (about half the number in the UK). So.Pa.De Secretariat members who fled to the UK were Hans Vogel and Erich Ollenhauer. Paul Hertz terminated his relationship with the So.Pa.De in 1938 and from 1939 lived in the U.S. Stampfer and Rinner also left for the U.S. in 1940 and became the heads of the So.Pa.De delegation to the U.S. Hilferding was less lucky than the Secretariat members – he was arrested by the Vichy Government and handed over to the Gestapo. He committed suicide on February 1, 1941.

The So.Pa.De as a centralized organization existed only on paper at this time. Most SAI members were now in exile. Vogel and Ollenhauer were still figures of importance in the eyes of most SPD exiles, but they did not have the status of the So.Pa.De Secretariat under Wels. In the US, the UK and Sweden, refuge was not

141 given on the basis of party membership. In the UK, the So.Pa.De became part of a union of exiled German leftwing organizations. On March 19, 1941 the So.Pa.De in Britain and the local groups of Neu Beginnen, the German SAP and the ISK created a new organization – the Union of German Socialist Organizations in Great Britain. The ISK (Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund) originated from the philosophical school of Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) and was established in 1926 under the leadership of Nelson's student, Willy Eichler (b. 1896). The ISK was a more politicized organization, but it did not become a party as such; it was a small organization with no significant political influence in the Weimar Republic. Nelson's philosophy was based on the belief that there existed a ‘moral obligation that was not dependent on personal will’ and that ‘ethics existed in order to be applied.’ As such, ‘morality’ instead of Marxism was the main tenet behind the political operations of Nelson’s philosophical school and the ISK.

The political demands of the ISK were extremely moderate and did not aim at an egalitarian utopia. They included demands for equal opportunities, a social security net, and a public education system but there were no demands for equal income distribution and equal possibilities for everyone to enjoy the material and cultural benefits of society. Egalitarianism was not part of the ‘party ideology’ of the ISK.

Willy Eichler had a significant influence on the main political document of the ‘Socialist German Union,’ an address by Erich Ollenhauer at a conference of the ‘Socialist Union’ on December 6, 1942. His influence echoed Eichler's influence on the drafting of the SPD programs of the 1950s. Ollenhauer's address followed Eichler's proposal of October 14, 1942 to create a united labor movement in postwar Germany, and represented in fact the final version of Eichler’s proposal. It was titled ‘Möglichkeiten und Aufgaben einer geeinten sozialistischen Partei in Deutschland, Grundgedanken’ (Possibilities and Tasks for a United Socialist Party in Germany).

Ollenhauer began his address by calling for and end to the split among the German Socialist organizations in the face of the major challenges that lay ahead.360 The role of the exiles, he said, was not to organize a new party, but to debate ideas and

360 ‘Möglichkeiten und Aufgaben einer geeinten sozialistischen Partei in Deutschland’ in Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ of 30.12.1942 p2

142 establish programs that would be a basis for a party in postwar Germany. 361 The proposed ‘action program’ of the new party stated that the ‘control over production by the owners of heavy industry and finance should be abolished in order to create social security for all.’ 362 However, nothing was said about public ownership and the call for the abolition of the power of heavy industry could be interpreted simply as a call for the abolition of monopolies and cartels. Calling for a social security net was also less radical than calling for equality in income distribution or the elimination of class differences as demanded by the programs of the Scandinavian Social Democrats. It was also less radical than the call by the Prague Manifesto for a society with no exploitation or class power. The next demand used the words ‘just distribution of work production.’363 The choice of the ambiguous term ‘just’ instead of ‘equal’ reflected the non-egalitarian nature of the document.

Regarding the Communists, the proposed program of the new party aimed to solve the ‘unfortunate split’ within the German labor movement and considered that the ‘question of former party membership’ should not stand in the way of membership in the new party. 364 At the same time the program rejected cooperation with the KPD as an organization because it was perceived as a tool of the ‘Russian Communist Party dictatorship.’365 The program was very close to an official position of the organization of SPD exiles in the UK and it was similar to the future SPD programs of the 1950s. In June 1943, the ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ (the So.Pa.De organ in the UK) published an article by Arno Uhlmann (a SPD exile in the UK) outlining a program for the economic and social future of Germany. Regarding social rights, the program called for a ‘universal social security net’ without making any specific demands.366 In the economic sphere, it called for ‘a synthesis between Western capitalism and Soviet-style .’367 The program also recommended that ‘personal property rights’ should

361 Ibid, the chapter ‘Die Rolle der Emigration’ p4 362 Ibid, in the chapter ‘Das Aktionsprogramm der neuen Partei’p9 363 Ibid, chapter ‘Das Aktionsprogramm der neuen Partei’ p9 364 Ibid, chapter ‘Das Verhältnis zu den Kommunisten’ p16 365 Ibid, Chapter ‘Das Verhältins zu den Kommunisten’ p17 366 ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ of 30.6. 1943 p 16 367 Ibid, p 18

143 not be limited when it is not in the ‘public interest’ 368 – a definition that was open to ‘pro-market economy’ interpretations.

On May 10, 1944 the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London published, under the title ‘Sozialistische Moeglichkeiten in unserer Zeit,’ a call for the ‘social emancipation’ of Germany's population and a demand to ‘change all economic institutions’ so that they would serve the ‘wellbeing of the average man.’369 This declaration also did not reflect a clear egalitarian commitment.

The SPD exiles in Sweden were not committed to Uhlman's program or to Ollenhauer's address, which were not binding programs for all the SPD exiled groups (the use of the name So.Pa.De at this time to describe their organizational status became more and more problematic as the organization became weaker). Some of the SPD exiles in Sweden had proposals and views of their own which accorded more with the views of the Scandinavian Social Democrats and were thus far from the views expressed in ‘Möglichkeiten und Aufgabe einer geeinten sozialistischen Partei in Deutschland.’ But although these views were assumed to be shared by most of the guests of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, they were, in fact, held by only few of the SPD senior exiles. The rest refrained from expressing personal views or tended to accept the proposal of the London Secretariat.

368 Ibid, p 20 369 ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ of 10.5.1944 p 14

144 Chapter-2.2 SPD exiles in Sweden from the Spring of 1940 till the Winter of 1943.

With the growth of the SPD exile community in Sweden, Emil Stahl became responsible for managing a large group of exiles who were not prepared to accept him straightaway as their leader simply because he was the So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden and a member of the So.Pa.De Secretariat. The SPD exiles in Sweden, during the 1940s, lacked legitimate political hierarchy and, as a result, many exiles undertook independent political initiatives of their own. Stahl tried to create the impression of an organized exile group until he was succeeded by Heinig in early 1943. But both Stahl and Heinig were aware of the fact that they had no real authority over SPD exiles in Sweden.

It is important to note the internal politics of the SPD exiles in Sweden had limited importance because these exiles did not have the same legitimacy as So.Pa.De Secretariat members and as SPD members who continued to work under dangerous conditions in Germany, Kurt Schumacher being the most prominent example. The future political careers of the SPD exiles in Sweden were dependent on their ability to have a good relationship with the above groups or gain legitimacy from them. For this reason, a large portion of the following chapters will deal separately with dominant figures among the Swedish exiles, focusing on their views.

Between the years 1940-1942, the cultural and scholarly activity of the SPD exiles in Sweden was relatively minor compared with the years 1943-1945. This was probably due to the fact that they must have felt under siege, with the Germans having occupied Denmark and Norway and stationed armed forces in Finland. This feeling was made even more acute by the knowledge that a victory over Nazi Germany was still far away. By 1943, with more optimism in the air and a greater sense of security, the exiles were more motivated to write about political matters.

145 Karl Raloff's description of his flight to Sweden, as well as that of Kurt Heinig and Richard Hansen illustrated the feelings of distress and horror felt by the SPD exiles who fled from Denmark to Sweden in 1940. According to Raloff, more than 150 heavy bombs fell on April 9 on a radius of 200 meters around his home in Copenhagen. That same evening, Richard Hansen and his good friend Kurt Heinig, the other two members of the Copenhagen Grenzsekretariat, came to Raloff's house to see whether he had survived the bombing. They gathered together in one place (not specified by Raloff for obvious reasons), Hansen having brought all essential documents in his briefcase. The summoned group comprised 50 to 60 exiles and included Fritz Tarnow. Later, with the help of Danish friends, probably Danish Social Democrats, they were all smuggled in a small boat within a period of just eight days to the Swedish shore. Raloff’s wife and children remained in Denmark.370 The SPD exiles, who fled from Denmark, arrived in Sweden with almost no belongings and no idea as to how they would maintain themselves in their new place of refuge.

In mid 1941, Stahl reported to Ollenhauer on the efforts of the SPD exiles in Sweden to play a part in the fight against Nazi Germany. This was the first sign that the SPD exiles in Sweden had overcome the distressing events of 1940, when they had been forced to flee in haste as a result of the Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway. According to Stahl, information was gathered from a German seaman, with the help of Danish friends (exiles from the Danish Social Democratic Party in Sweden) and with the help of a large amount of alcohol. The seaman, who came from Bremen, provided the group with information on the impact of the British bombing on the morale of the German population.371 Stahl also reported on the effort to send exiles to the US from Sweden, as in the case of Richard Hansen. Stahl wrote that the atmosphere reminded him of that which reigned in the Czechoslovak Republic during May 1938.372

In another letter to Fritz Heine, Wels’ personal assistant and the personal assistant of Ollenhauer and Vogel, Stahl dealt with financial matters and wrote that the SPD

370 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 12.11.1942 AdsD/ M-89 . 371 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 7.4.1941 AdsD /M-131 p 1-2 372 Ibid, p2

146 exiles in Sweden and the German Trade Unions in exile were waiting to receive the sum of 2000 Skr promised by the Swedish Social Democrats and the Swedish Trade Unions, a sum that was to be delivered to them through the SPD exiled leadership in London. This roundabout transaction testified to the limited contact that existed between the Swedish Social Democrats (Stahl was clearly not sufficiently trusted to receive the money directly) and the local exiles and to the financial difficulties experienced by exiles who had arrived from Denmark and still had no proper means of finance. Because of the delay in the transfer of the money, Stahl asked Heine to send him a telegram giving details of when the money was due to arrive. 373

Another indication of the hardships of SPD exiles in Sweden was an unsigned letter from an SPD exile in Sweden, published in the Sozialistische Mitteilungen on October 1, 1941 (the letter was dated mid September, 1941). After describing the panic atmosphere in Sweden following the occupation of Norway by Germany and mentioning that the exiles did not suffer from hunger but from a shortage of coffee, the letter reported that unemployed exiles working in agricultural public projects in August 1941 earned a daily wage of two Swedish crowns (equivalent to tenEuros).374 The writer stated that, nonetheless, no exile was considering going to the US on account of the dangers involved.375

In 1942, when the US and the USSR joined the war against Nazi Germany, the exiles in Sweden stopped viewing Sweden merely as a temporary shelter on their way to safer places. They now had more time for re-organization and, taking advantage of Sweden's neutrality, for gathering information on the situation in Germany. They also had more time to quarrel. The Stockholm So.Pa.De group, the biggest SPD exile group in Sweden, elected on January 31, 1940 a leadership that included four minor SPD exiles, Kurt Weck, Cichocki Erich, Hahnewald Edgar and Neidhardt Arthur (one of the leaders of the Reichsbanner in Berlin376), and one senior exile, Carl Polenske. 63 group members, probably all the active members, took part in the elections.377

373 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 20.5.1941 AdsD/ M-131 374 ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ of 1.10.1941 p 28 375 Ibid, p 28 last para. 376 Detlev, op.cit., p 93 377 A letter from Emil Stahl to the So.Pa.De Secretariat dated 4.2.1940 AdsD/ M-131 .

147 Stahl, who considered himself responsible for all So.Pa.De groups in Scandinavia, considered himself not in competition with the Stockholm So.Pa.De group leadership

In April 1942, Stahl reported that in Stockholm there were 165 members in ‘our bowling club, of which 80 are loyal to other bodies in this country.’378 Stahl was trying to conceal as much information as possible, for fear of surveillance agencies that cooperated with Nazi Germany. What he was saying, in fact, was that there were 165 German leftwing political exiles in Stockholm, 80 of whom were not former SPD members and the other 85 were SPD exiles. He noted that most of the members were working in jobs given to them by the trade unions so they had no reason to complain, particularly since millions in Europe were much worse off. 379 In a letter written two months later, Stahl pointed out that the Stockholm group included prominent members such as Fritz Tarnow and Theodor Hartwig.380

In a letter dated July 3, 1942, Stahl reported on the deteriorating situation in Germany. His source (a Swedish businessman with an excellent knowledge of German) had told him that there was an acute shortage of meat and fish in Danzig. On the other hand, the Danzig shipyards, which produced armaments, were employing 20,000 workers compared to 5000 in the previous war and 2000 prior to the war.381 Stahl reported that between 20,000 and 25,000 people had fled the city of Rostock because of the bombings and food shortage. 20,000 had gone to Holland since the economic conditions there were better in relative terms.382 Stahl also reported that his young daughter had contacted him for the first time since 1936 and informed him that she was in dire economic plight because she had not received the money promised to her by the Berlin underground So.Pa.De group.383 The fact that Stahl and the other SPD exiles in Sweden had sufficient time to gather information on the situation in Germany indicated that they felt a certain security in Sweden but, at the same time, they were increasingly anxious about those who had been left behind in Germany.

378 A letter from Emil Stahl to Hans Vogel dated 3.4.1942 AdsD/ M-131 . 379 Ibid, 380 A letter from Emil Stahl to Wilhelm Sander of the London Secretariat office dated 20.6.1942 AdsD /M-131. 381 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 3.7.1942 AdsD/ M-131 p1. 382 Ibid, p2. 383 Ibid, p 3.

148 Carl Polenske engaged in his own correspondence with Vogel and Ollenhauer. In January 1942, he reported that SPD exiles in Sweden were in conflict with each other and their politics would be an ‘unpleasant chapter in the history of the exiles.’384 In June 1942, as part of his undeclared rivalry with Stahl, Polenske claimed he had contacts in Germany outside his family circle, namely, with anti-nazi activists in Berlin, central Germany and Schlesien.385 Regarding the Stockholm So.Pa.De group, Polenske stated that the group had around 100 members (15 more than in Stahl's report of early 1942).386 The difference was probably due to the fact that Polenske included exiles living outside Stockholm who were relatively less active, as part of the group. In the second part of his letter, Polenske described, like Stahl, the hardships faced by relatives in Germany, noting that some had died or been seriously wounded on the Eastern front.387 In August 1942. Polenske wrote a report, paralleling Stahl’s of a month earlier, in which he noted, according to his source, that the atmosphere in Germany was one of apathy. Since his source was a businessman from Berlin, who was not a Social Democrat and uninvolved in politics, he believed his information to be objective.388

The enmity between Stahl and Polenske now became increasingly public. In October 1942, Stahl complained to Ollenhauer about a memorandum sent to London by Polenske accusing him (Stahl) of financial irregularities. According to Stahl, the issue had already been raised at a meeting of 30 So.Pa.De members in Stockholm, in which Stahl received the support of Tarnow, Krebs and others389. Senior SPD exiles who were not mentioned were Raloff, who was living in Southern Sweden and Heinig who appeared to be trying to keep out of the dispute. Stahl hinted at financial irregularities by Polenske, in his claim that, while most of the Swedish exiles from the Czechoslovak Republic and Denmark took part in the ‘illegal work’ in Germany, Polenske went to Switzerland with 8000 German Marks but did not organize any major activity in Germany.390

384 A letter from Carl Polenske to Hans Vogel dated 10.1.1942 AdsD/ M-88. 385 A letter from Carl Polenske to Hans Vogel dated 21.6.1942 AdsD /M-88 p 1. 386 Ibid, 387 Ibid, p 2. 388 A letter from Carl Polenske to Hans Vogel dated 18.8.1942 AdsD /M-88 p 1. 389 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 9.10.1942 AdsD/ M-131 p 1. 390 Ibid, p 2.

149 By early December 1942, their enmity had subsided somewhat. In a letter to Ollenhauer, Stahl reported on the low morale in Finland and on reports from Germany and Norway according to which most Germans as well as the Nazis in Norway knew that Germany was going to be defeated.391 But by December 7, the enmity between Stahl and Polenke peaked once again. Stahl described the relations between the Swedish SPD exiles as one of rivalry between a small fraction in the Stockholm So.Pa.De group and the head of the SPD exiles in Sweden. He was in fact referring to the dispute between himself and the leadership of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group.392 Stahl then reported on the intention of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group leadership to pass material concerning his actions to the Swedish police and once again repeated his allegations against Polenske.393 He called some of the exiles ‘big troublemakers ‘ and noted that the Stockholm So.Pa.De group leadership was less important than those who supported him in terms of their former contribution to the SPD and the So.Pa.De.394

On January 17, 1943 Stahl sent Ollenhauer another report on the situation in Germany based on a meeting with an industrialist on January 2, 1943 in Malmö.395 The report was almost certainly an effort on Stahl's part to diminish the negative impact of his dispute with the Stockholm So.Pa.De leadership and to demonstrate his contribution to the So.Pa.De. Like previous reports of his and Polenske’s, this one described the chaotic situation in Germany and plight of the German population. On the same date, Stahl sent Ollenhauer a letter dealing with the internal dispute among the Stockholm exiles, in which he termed the vote regarding against him over financial irregularities as ‘a pogrom vote.’396 Stahl wrote that he had expected the meeting would deal with Tarnow's report on the ‘Amerikaaktion’ (the plan for sending SPD exiles from Sweden to the US in 1941). According to Stahl, only a minority of group members took part in the meeting, with 15 out of the 20 who attended voting in favor of the

391 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 1.12.1942 AdsD/ M-131 p1-3. 392 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 7.12.1942 AdsD /M-131 p1. 393 Ibid, p 1-2. 394 Ibid, p 2-4. 395 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 17.1.1943(sent on the 13.2.1943) AdsD/ M-131 p 1. 396 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 17.1.1943 (second letter) AdsD M-131 p 1.

150 decision to send a letter on behalf of the group to London calling for action against him regarding his financial irregularities.397

On February 2, 1943 Stahl sent a letter to the Stockholm So.Pa.De group with a copy to Ollenhauer, in which he accused the Stockholm So.Pa.De group leadership of using his private letters in order to build a case against him, and involve the Swedish police in the accusations against him.398 In early February, Stahl was investigated by the Swedish ‘foreigners’ police’ regarding the Stockholm So.Pa.De group leadership’s allegations that he had mishandled money given to him for his duties as the representative of the So.Pa.De Secretariat in Sweden.399 On February 2, 1943 Stahl announced that as a result of the ordeal, and because of his wife's illness, he was resigning from his position as the ‘So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden.’400

Kurt Heinig was then named successor as the So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden. Since Tarnow was now head of the Exiled German Trade Unions in Sweden (Tarnow was no longer head of all the Exiled German Trade Unions as they were primarily concentrated in the UK and the US) and Raloff had chosen to stay in Southern Sweden and had limited his political involvement, Heinig was the obvious choice. Stahl himself recommended Heinig for the job noting, that in the last months before February 1943, Heinig had assisted him in operating the office of the So.Pa.De Secretariat in Sweden and that he was not involved in the personal disputes of the Stockholm group.401 Stahl also recommended Heinig in another letter in which he claimed that Tarnow had tried to convince the Stockholm So.Pa.De group to oppose Heinig's nomination.402 This was one of many examples that attested to the bitter rivalry between the two men – a rivalry that, as will be argued later, was not limited to the struggle for the support of SPD exiles in Sweden.

On March 11, 1943 Stahl officially informed the Secretariat in London that he had transmitted all the material required for the position of So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden to Heinig, and that he had given Heinig a full account of his

397 Ibid, 398 A letter from Emil Stahl to the Stockholm So.Pa.De group dated 2.2.1943 AdsD /M-131 p 1-2. 399 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 9.2.1943 AdsD /M-131. 400 Ibid, p 1. 401 Ibid, p 3

151 expenses in order to show that there were no financial irregularities.403 Heinig wrote a letter on March 1, 1943 confirming that he received all the archive material that he required for his new position as well as the reports by the heads of the Stockholm Malmö and Göteborg So.Pa.De groups.404

The SPD exile groups in Sweden were no doubt shaken by the conflict between Stahl and the Stockholm So.Pa.De group leadership. Raloff, for instance, was alienated by the dispute and kept his distance.405 Heinig could not count on solid support after all norms had been broken in the dispute between Stahl and Polenske, which was even more bitter than the dispute between himself and Tarnow. On the one hand, the fact that the SPD exiles in Sweden numbered less than 300 people and still were unable to act as a unified body because of internal disputes made them less influential than the exiles in the UK. On the other hand, the writings and literary works of many of the exiles were more significant, Since these exiles also had a good chance of playing a central role in the post-war SPD due to their former positions in the Weimar SPD and in the 1933-1940 So.Pa.De. The following chapters will examine in detail the actions and literary works of the senior SPD exiles in Sweden.

Chapter-2.3

402 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 19.2.1943 AdsD/ M-131 p1. 403 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 11.3.1943 AdsD M-131 p1-9. 404 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Ollenhauer and Vogel dated 1.3.1943 AdsD M-35.

152 Kurt Heinig becomes an admirer of the Swedish Social Democrats and a supporter of their ‘party ideology.’

Kurt Heinig's transformation into a supporter of the Scandinavian Social Democrats ‘party ideology’ began in Denmark as was discussed in the first part of this work. Heinig and Raloff were the two most senior SPD exiles who learnt Danish and, later on, Swedish and had an excellent command of these languages. Heinig's close contacts with the Secretariats of the Danish and Swedish Social Democrats were another advantage that Heinig had over Stahl. In 1942, prior to his position as So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden, Heinig published the Swedish version of his 1938 book in Danish ‘Dagliglivets Socialøkonomi.’ ‘Vardagens Nationalekonomi’ (the Swedish version) contained new ideas that did not appear in the Danish version. While the Danish version presents a rather mixed message, the Swedish version takes clear stands that fully support the economic policy of the Swedish Social Democrats and the ideas behind this policy.

The book was published in Stockholm by the Natur och Kultur publishing house (a publishing house connected to the Swedish labor movement). The preface to the book was written by Karin Kock (1891-1976), a member of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the first female minister in a Swedish government. Kock was also an economist who had written, in 1938, a research paper on the role of women in the Swedish labor market. In her preface, she complimented Heinig’s book, describing it as a good introduction for beginner students of economics and a work that stimulated readers' thinking skills.406 The contact between Heinig and a Swedish Social Democratic economics theoretician was just one example of Heinig's openness to influences from the Scandinavian Social Democrats and of his growing identification with their policies and goals.

The Swedish version of his book was also 268 pages long, twice that of the Danish version. From the very beginning, in the first chapter titled ‘Market Conditions,’ Heinig expressed a classic Swedish Social Democratic ‘Keynesian macroeconomic’

405 More information will appear in chapter 3.3. 406 Kock Karin in Kurt Heinig ‘Vardagens nationalekonomi.’ (Stockholm 1942), p4

153 position. The chapter described how economic expansion resulting in the growth of purchasing power leads to growth in employment, a lower unemployment rate and some rise in prices, which was not considered negative in the context of economic growth and reduction in unemployment.407 As in the Danish version, Heinig used the construction industry as the best example of a sector in which a ‘peace time economy’ could create more jobs and more income through public initiatives. In the new version, Sweden is mentioned, in addition to Denmark and the UK, as a country which implemented this policy.408

In the chapter titled ‘Free Trade,’ Heinig added the USSR and Italy as examples of non-democratic economies while the Danish version referred only to Nazi Germany. He described the Italian economy as ‘,’ in the sense that the state supported big industry and financial institutions, protected them against financial risks and gave them loans on good terms.409 Heinig claimed that this was a policy of taking resources from the whole of society in order to support its most affluent members. Feeling no necessity to censor his anti-Bolshevik views, Heinig expressed his negative opinion of the USSR in the clearest terms: ‘In Russia, the state owns all the land, all the production means, and all the people’410 (my emphasis). His view of the USSR as a slave society explained why Heinig did not tolerate anyone who held a positive opinion regarding cooperation with the KPD. In the chapter on ‘Costs and Prices,’ Heinig wrote what he refrained from saying in the earlier version of the book: ‘prices are political and constitute a major element in the way a state is governed.’411 Heinig thus accepted the element of manipulating prices in the economic policy of the Swedish Social Democrats, as well as its expansion policy through public works in the construction sector which aimed to raise ‘purchasing power’ partly through an ‘inflation tax.’

The chapters on dividends, stocks, bonds, and profit calculations were more detailed than the Danish version and the examples were taken from the Swedish economy. However, as in the Danish version, the examples related only to the methods of a

407 Heinig Kurt, ‘Vardagens nationalekonomi.’(Stockholm 1942), p5-6 408 Ibid, p8-9 409 Ibid, p33 410 Ibid, p33 411 Ibid, p75

154 capital market. In the chapter on taxation, Heinig stated that the nature of a budget, i.e. the level of taxation, the type of taxation and the level and type of spending determined whether a state was Social Democratic or not.412 The same claim appeared in the early version but it was expressed in a clearer manner in the Swedish book.

In April 1943, shortly after Heining became the So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden, he began to publish his own monthly newspaper ‘Zur Information.’ It was not an expensive operation for, in contrast to the So.Pa.De newspapers of the 1930s including that edited by Heinig (Tyskland - Beretninger), the graphic design was very basic (like a leaflet) and only few dozen copies were printed every month. Heinig wrote almost all the articles himself and the publication of ‘Zur Information’ became his major activity during the years 1943 and 1944. The rest of the time, Heinig was often occupied in writing letters of complaint to Ollenhauer over the ‘pro-Communist tendencies’ of the majority of SPD exiles in Sweden. Below is an example of the format of ‘Zur Information.’

412 Ibid, p-207-209

155

413

413Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 12.4.1943 p1

156

Officially, the paper aimed to inform SPD exiles in Sweden about the latest developments regarding their organization. In practice, it was first and foremost an outlet enabling Heinig to express his views. Heinig opposed the tendency of many exiles to cooperate with Communists and his arguments were not solely based on his anti-Bolshevism. He believed that the exiles in the UK, Sweden and Switzerland had no legitimacy to decide on the future of their organization, i.e. whether it should be a united party of the left or an independent Social Democratic party. These decisions, he argued, should be left to the German workers themselves after the fall of the Nazi regime: ‘We are Social Democratic emigrants, we have no mandate to effect change, nor is it our mission. This will be done by the German labor movement.’ 414

On May 1, 1943 all the exiled Social Democratic groups in Sweden held a united event. The largest groups were the Danish Social Democratic exiles and the Norwegian Labor Party, which had thousands of members all over Sweden. The exiled So.Pa.De in Sweden was the next largest group, but far behind. In total, 600 people took part in the event which primarily provided an opportunity to socialize.415 Heinig also reported, in Zur Information, on the tendency of the Swedish police to harass SPD exiles (elements in the Swedish police acted according to the interest of the Swedish ‘right-wing’ exploited the precarious situation Sweden was in between 1940 and 1944, when the country was surrounded by German forces). Heinig quoted a report from ‘Örebro Kuriren’ (the Swedish Social Democratic newspaper which employed Paul Bromme) about the arrest of three SPD exiles by police on the grounds of distributing propaganda material. Heinig criticized the police action, stating that people could not be expected to give up their political beliefs because they were ‘guests’ in a foreign country. 416 At this point, Heinig took his position seriously and saw himself as the ‘head of all the SPD exiles in Sweden.’ While praising the fact that for the first time since 1940 an open political event bringing together exiles had been held (the May 1 gathering), he was also able, because of his perception of his political status, to take the risk to publish a written protest against the actions of the Swedish police.

414 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 12.4.1943 p3 415 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 10.5.1943 p1 416 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 10.5.1943 p4-5

157

Heinig used the June 1943 copy of ‘Zur Information’ to criticize Bolshevism. He described the historical background of the First Communist International (1919), and claimed that the Russian revolution headed by Lenin was accomplished with the help of the German secret police.417 After describing the gradual change in the policies of the Communist International, he noted that the Bolsheviks’ preferred policy, since the fourth congress of 1922, was to promote the establishment of a unified Socialist party,418 and hinted that the Bolsheviks had intended to eliminate Social Democracy in this way. From the very beginning of ‘Zur Information,’ Heinig stressed his view that exile was not the right place to develop a unified party and that the move would lead to the end of the SPD.

Heining felt quite safe in his position and in the impact of his blunt attacks against the KPD on SPD members. Through his paper, he launched a survey of all 220 SPD exiles in Sweden known to him regarding the issue of cooperation with the Communists.419 He also proposed that all SPD exiles in Sweden should pay a membership fee as was the case in the UK420 and that the Stockholm So.Pa.De group should develop programs for post-war Germany.421 Nothing came out of Heinig's proposals. As he became more aware of his political failure, Heinig decided to use ‘Zur Information’ to publish his own ideas on the economic policies of different countries, as well to preach the merits of Swedish Social Democracy. As such, it seemed that he was trying to create by himself a model for the post-war SPD, the model being Swedish Social Democratic ‘functional Socialism.’

In Zur Information from September 28, 1943 Heinig write critically on the economic and social promises of ‘center–left’ American Vice President Henry A. Wallace. He described Wallace’s ‘list of freedoms’: freedom from fear regarding job security, freedom from poverty in old age, freedom from fear of illness (lack of medical care) and hunger, freedom from hatred between farmers and workers, freedom from hatred based on religion or race, freedom from fear of bankruptcy as result of over-

417 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 1.6.1943 p1-2 418 Ibid, p-2 419 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 10.7.1943 p1-2 420 Ibid, p 6 421 Ibid, p 8

158 production, freedom for capital movement and freedom for companies from high taxation and state regulations. While supporting the first part of the ‘freedom’ list, Heinig claimed that the last ‘freedom’ clauses contradicted the first ones, which he supported.422

Heinig’s position was clearly in accord with the mainstream Scandinavian Social Democratic stand which allowed only few limitations on the degree of public intervention and taxation in order to ensure the implementation of its far reaching social goals. As such, Heinig’s view was much more ‘radical’ than that of the mainstream SPD during the 1950s and the 1960s. His articles in later editions of ‘Zur Information’ attest to this.

In the edition of ‘Zur Information’ dated October 28, 1943 Heinig described the Swedish Social Democratic policy on the issue of the nationalization of companies. He reported in detail the acquisition of 78 companies by the Swedish Government, and listed the main Swedish companies that were then under the control of the Swedish Government. 423 He also described another element of Swedish Social Democratic economic policy – the acquisition through the Stock Exchange of key Swedish firms, which were then managed by the government as commercial companies.

In ‘Zur Information’ of November 28, 1943 Heinig described how the Swedish Government allocated budgets for projects aimed at creating full employment in post- war Sweden424. One of the main goals of this policy was to ensure political power for Swedish workers. In the same paper Heinig ‘invaded’ Tarnow’s ‘territory’ and wrote about the re-building of the German trade unions after the war. He noted that the main problem of the German trade unions in the ‘Weimar Republic’ was that they represented only 25% of the German labor force. The new trade unions, he said, should therefore try to include as large a percentage as possible of the German labor

422 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 28.9.1943 p 5 423 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 28.10.1943 p 6-7 424 Heinig Kurt‘Zur Information’ 28.11.1943 p 5

159 force. This was a central element in the Scandinavian Social Democratic economic policy.425

In an effort to avoid an all-out war with Tarnow, Heinig clarified his proposals regarding the re-building the German trade unions. In ‘Zur Information’ of December 20, 1943 he wrote that he had made his comments were only in the context of the London debate on the German exiled trade unions. 426 The list of people who received ‘Zur Information’ still included Tarnow, at this stage.427 The latter’s revenge was quick to come, although he did not have sole responsibility for it. On January 5, 1944, Peter Hass. the new head of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group who had replaced Polenske in late 1943 (more on Peter Hass in the relevant chapter), passed a decision (with a tiny majority of 32 against 28) to cooperate with all German-speaking exiles in Sweden including the Communists, as a result of which, Heinig and his 28 supporters left the Stockholm So.Pa.De group.428 With major divisions of opinions in the group, Tarnow's support, as a leading figure, was essential in achieving a majority (a more detailed description of Tarnow’s actions in this context will follow).

From this point on, Heinig decided to publish ‘Zur Information’ in Swedish. He had several reasons for his decision. Most of the members of his group had spent a relatively a long time in Scandinavian countries and had a good command of Swedish. The second and more important reason was to communicate his pro-Swedish Social Democratic views to his friends in the Swedish Social Democratic Party. In this way, he would also gain points over his rivals among the Swedish Social Democrats regarding his opposition to cooperation with the Communists. Already in the first copy of ‘Zur Information’ published in Swedish and dated January 24, 1944 Heinig defined Sweden as a ‘Socialist model state’ (the underline appears in the original text).429 This was not an attempt at flattery; it represented a view that was in accord with his former writings from 1942 and 1943 in Swedish and in German. Heinig was addressing first and foremost his colleagues among the SPD exiles in Sweden.

425 Ibid, p 8 426 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 20.12.1943 p 1 427 Ibid, p 2 428 See for example in Helmut Müssner book ‘Exil in Schweden’ (München 1974), p 140 and in ‘Zur Information’ of 24.1.1944 p 11

160 In the ‘Zur Information’ editions of May and June 1944, Heinig declared his full support for the Swedish Social Democratic ‘party ideology’ in his description of the party congress of the Swedish Social Democrats (the congress which approved the 1944 political program).

430 ‘We do not have sufficient space to describe this important congress …… is it not surprising that our sister party is able to reform its party program in the midst of an all-out war … The shining advocate of the new party program, Ernst Wigforss (Swedish Finance Minister and chief writer of the Swedish Social Democratic 1944 Program – see Introduction) gives the guidelines for the future programs of rising Social Democratic parties in other countries still under oppression (Germany).’431

Heinig was totally supportive of the Swedish Social Democratic 1944 Program – a program that had maximum egalitarian goals and followed all the guidelines of the Swedish Social Democratic ‘classic party ideology.’432 It was clear from this article that he had become a complete hardcore supporter of the Scandinavian/Swedish Social Democratic ‘party ideology.’ On September 30, 1944 Heinig claimed that the

429 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 24.1.1944 p 11 430 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information ‘ 30.6.1944 p 3 431 Central sentences from the Swedish text above 432 See part 1 of the work

161 impressive political success of the Swedish Social Democrats in the Swedish Parliamentary elections was proof of the popularity of the 1944 Program among the Swedish public, and pointed to the potential popularity of the program among working classes in other countries.433

At the end of March 1945, Heinig published Paul Pankowski's (a former German SAP member and later a member of the So.Pa.De in Sweden and head of the So.Pa.De group in Solna, a suburb of Stockholm) proposal for a post-war SPD program. Pankowski proposed replacing the Heidelberg Program of 1925 (the last official SPD program) with a program whose goal would resemble the egalitarian economic demands of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, namely ‘converting capitalist private property into the property of society’ (almost the same goal as that of the Danish Social Democratic program).434 Pankowski also proposed changes in the main principles of the party's political tactics and called for a union of all ‘non-bourgeois classes,’ which was also in line with the programs of the Scandinavian/Swedish Social Democrats.435 Pankowski’s proposal, coming from an exile who remained in Heinig’s camp after December 1944, was certainly accepted by Heinig (perhaps after some revisions and amendments of his own) since it was close to the 1944 Program of the Swedish Social Democrats, which Heinig fully supported.

Rainer Behring (a scholar who dealt with So.Pa.De foreign policy) argued that Pantowski’s proposal was an indication of the radical views of Heinig’s group. Behring distinguished between Heinig's group, which preferred ‘revolution through reform’ as the best road for achieving a ‘Socialist Germany’ and the pro-cooperation with Communists group, which supported revolution through united action with the Communists.436 Behring ignored the fact that the difference between the two groups was primarily the result of the influence of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, as well the fact that some of the supporters of cooperation with the Communists did not hold egalitarian views and their support of cooperation was primarily aimed at ensuring a united Germany.

433 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 30.9.1944 p 2 434 Pankowski Paul ‘Zur Information’ for the months February and March 1945 p 3 435 Ibid, p 4 436 Behring, R., ‘ Demokratisch Außenpolitik für Deutschland. Die Außenpolitischen Vorstellungen deutsche Sozialdemokraten im Exil 1933-1945.’ (Düsseldorf 1999), p 563

162 Chapter-2.4 Otto Friedländer's naive perception of Swedish Social Democracy.

After fleeing from Norway, Friedländer joined the Stockholm So.Pa.De group, keeping a low profile in the first years and taking no part in the dispute between Stahl and the group’s leadership. Like Heinig, he focused during this period on literary work and, like other exiles, he developed by the early 1940s a good command of the Swedish language.

1942 saw the publication of Friedländer’s first book in Swedish, ‘Makt och magi’ (Power and Magic). It was published the same year as Heinig’s book and by the same publishing house. ‘Makt och magi’ dealt with the issue of ‘rationalist’ and ‘non- rationalist’ elements in politics. The first historic event mentioned in ‘Makt och magi’ was the , which according to Friedländer, was not simply an event that transferred political power from the nobility to the bourgeoisie which already possessed economic power as perceived by ‘.’437 The important issue in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era was, said Friedländer, the introduction of and the idea of human rights.438 This was a ‘moralistic’ position that echoed the views of SPD ‘revisionists.’ Friedländer claimed that the French Revolution gave birth to a new ‘religion of rationalism,’ and to political ‘utopists’ and social theoreticians such as Marx and Engels. 439 In Friedländer’s view, this era came to an end in 1914 with the beginning of WWI, which led to ‘cultural pessimism’ as in the ideas of Nietzsche and Georges Sorel.440

Friedländer then claimed that societies that gave up rationalism found a scapegoat in others.441 He went on to describe, at length, theories of ‘social psychology’ and ‘mass hysteria.’442 An example of the phenomenon of ‘mass hysteria,’ he wrote, was the

437 See introduction chapter B for definition. 438 Friedländer Otto, ‘Makt och magi.’ (Stockholm 1942), p 7 439 Ibid, p8 440 Ibid, p 10 441 Ibid, p 13-15 442 Ibid, p 16-80

163 story of Sabbatai Zvi who believed he was the messiah and succeeded in convincing a large number of Jews in Europe and the Middle East. Friedländer noted that the rise of Sabbatai Zvi resulted from the economic crisis of East European Jews and the massacres of Jews in the middle of the 17th century.443 Friedländer drew an interesting political connection between Sabbatai Zvi and Benjamin Disraeli, the British Conservative leader of Jewish origin, claiming that both men exercised their extraordinary ability and charm to captivate people.444 In his view, political conservatism had strong demagogic and irrational elements. Regarding the Nazis, Friedländer claimed that they used ‘irrationality’ and myths to maintain their power and control over people and made Jews into scapegoats who were responsible for Germany's problems.445

In the last part of the book, Friedländer discussed the question whether Marxism is a religion and an ‘irrational’ political theory. In Friedländer’s view, Marxism is a rationalist theory which aims to explain the development of human history just like Darwin’s theory aimed to explain evolution.446 Friedländer, however, also found ‘irrational’ elements in Bolshevism, and described the ‘idealistic notions’ of a ‘future Socialist society’ as a ‘classless paradise’ as ‘mythological’ propositions. In his view, this also applied to Lenin's statement that ‘morality’ is a privilege. He viewed all these claims as ‘mythological’ arguments that were used by the Bolsheviks to fulfill their quest for power.447

Friedländer clearly was doubtful of the idea of a classless society when portrayed as a paradise (rather than as a moral condition that will solve many but not all the problems of mankind). He also emerged in the book as a harsh critic of the Bolsheviks and their supporters like the KPD outside Russia. But in contrast to the views expressed in ‘Makt och magi,’ Friedländer was still ready (as in his period in the RSD) to cooperate with the Communists against the Nazi regime and possibly to cooperate with them as well in post-war Germany. Unlike Heinig, Friedländer

443 Ibid, p80-94 444 Ibid, p 95 445 Ibid, p144-152 446 Ibid, p 155-157 447 Ibid, p 158-159

164 believed that the KPD members could be independent from full control by the Soviet Union, in a united political coalition with the Social Democrats.

His readiness was expressed mainly in his activity in the ‘Freier Deutscher Kulturbund’ FDKB, a forum which included exiles from all the exiled political groups and even ‘center-right’ Jewish exiles. It was founded in early 1944, and its main activity was to organize lectures and cultural events. By the mid 1945, it reached the peak with almost 450 members.448 With a budget of no more than 200-225Skr per month (2400-2700 Skr per year),449 the FDKB was not an organization that could compete with the So.Pa.De in Sweden which operated on a budget of 2000-3000 Skr per year,450 solely for office expenses. This budget did not include the salary expenses of the full time position of the So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden, which amounted to a further 2000Skr per year (see chapter 1.7). In total, the budget of the So.Pa.De in Sweden was 5000Skr per year, excluding the financial support given to unemployed exiles by Swedish trade unions and Swedish Social Democrats.

In early 1944, Heinig accused the FDKB of being controlled by Communists451 and in mid 1944, he claimed that its steering committee, which was elected on May 20, 1944, included 11 Communists, a member unaffiliated with any party and one Social Democrat, Friedländer. Heinig continued, from then on, to claim that the FDKB was a Communist organization,452 a view shared by the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London.453 In agreeing to be a member of the steering committee, Friedländer became one of the SPD exiles with the highest degree of cooperation with Communists – at least, in the eyes of Heinig and his supporters.

In order to fully understand Friedländer's political development, it is useful to examine his literary work during 1943 which led to the publication of the first book by a German speaking exile in Sweden dealing with Germany's future after Hitler. The book was published in January 1944, few months after the discussions on this

448 Sozialistische Tribüne’ January 1946 (Stockholm 1946) p 3 449 The number of members was between 300-350 depending on the year and the membership fee in June 1945 was 0.5SKr – see in an advertisement in Otto Friedländer's ‘Thomas Mann als Politiker’ p11 450 See accounts in Emil Stahl letter to Erich Ollenhauer of 11.3.1943 AdsD/ M-131 p5-7. 451 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ 24.1.1944 p 11 452 Heinig Kurt ‘Zur Information’ May and June 1944 p 2

165 subject in the forum of the ‘International Group of Democratic Socialists in Stockholm’ which took place in mid 1943. The forum included representatives of the Swedish Social Democrats and all the exiled left-wing parties in Sweden except the Communists (it will be described in more detail in subsequent chapters). An examination of the book will illustrate Friedländer’s political ideas and possible influences by the Scandinavian Social Democrats as a result of spending five years in Scandinavia.

Friedländer took part in the debating forum of the ‘International Group of Democratic Socialists in Stockholm’ as a member of the committee for ‘postwar cultural issues.’ The committee held some six meetings between June and September 1943 and was headed by of the exiled Sudeten German Social Democrats and Alva Myrdal of the Swedish Social Democrats (Myrdal and her husband were responsible for the more paternalistic features of the Swedish welfare state in the 1930s and 1940s, a contribution to the ‘Swedish model’ which has been viewed in recent debates as problematic454). Willy Brandt also took part in some of the meetings.455

Kurt Heinig did not oppose the forum but, according to Klaus Misgeld, he was very critical of its post-war peace programs. Misgeld based his claim mainly on Heinig's articles on the forum in ‘Zur Information’ in late 1943.456 In view of the fact that both Heinig and Brandt were members of the forum, one would expect to find similarities between Friedländer's book ‘Tyskland efter Hitler’ and later written works on this subject by Willy Brandt. The committee provided another opportunity to be influenced by the Swedish Social Democrats, since Alva Myrdal did not oppose the mainstream line of the Swedish Social Democrats in the areas of economics and political tactics.

453 See in ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ for January and February 1944 p 22-23 454 See the claims against the paternalistic attitude of the Myrdals in the last part of Jansson Thomas's book ‘Att anpassa sig efter det möjliga’ (Göteborg 2000) 455 All the information on the composition of the committee comes from a report in a letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 31.12.1943 AdsD /M-134. 456 Misgeld K., ‘Die Internationale Gruppe Demokratischer Sozialisten in Stockholm 1942-1945.’ (Uppsala/Bonn, 1976), p 87-89

166 The first chapter of ‘Tyskland efter Hitler’ claimed that nations do not have permanent features and are prone to changes resulting from the social and political conditions of a particular period.457 In the next chapter, Friedländer described Germany as a nation torn between the ‘democratic spirit’ symbolized in the book by the town of Weimar and the ‘autocratic spirit’ symbolized by Potsdam. Regarding the Weimar Republic, Friedländer echoed Brandt's claim that the problem of the Weimar Republic was class hatred, a problem he considered far more serious than the legitimate economic rivalry between classes.458 This idea, which did not appear in any of Heinig's writings, was used by Brandt to justify the abandonment of non- compromising egalitarian ideals.

Friedländer, however, did not use this idea to support a moderate form of Social Democracy (at least not to the degree in which Brandt did). He added interesting information on a subject well known to him as former head of the SPD students' organization. He believed that the rise in the number of university students from 70,000-80,000 to approx. 130,000 in the years of the Weimar Republic derived from the wish of lower middle class youth to differentiate themselves from proletariat youth in the only possible way available, in view of the high level of unemployment at the time and, as a result, a ‘class of academic proletariat was created.’459 In Friedländer’s view, these students made excellent ‘recruiting material’ for extreme ‘right-wing’ organizations.460

Friedländer’s definition of class hatred referred mainly to the hatred between ‘working classes’ and ‘lower middle class’ groups such as the students’ proletariat. In his view, the solution to the problem of class hatred lay in more equal opportunities and a more democratic educational system, without necessarily giving up the idea of a classless society. Chapter three of his book titled ‘The Main Alternatives’ dealt with different forms of democratic and non-democratic planning systems. According to Friedländer, if demand for consumer goods is not high enough to create full use of the producing capacity of an economy then there is insufficient ‘purchasing power’ to create full employment; increasing ‘purchasing power’ is therefore the recommended

457 Friedländer Otto, ‘Tyskland efter Hitler.’ (Stockholm 1944), p 7-16 458 Ibid, p56 459 Ibid, p80

167 economic strategy of a democratic planning system. Capitalist planning system, on the other hand, aims to ensure higher profits for capital owners and creates monopolies and cartels, which are protected by the state. These economic structures create overcapacity and a purchasing power that is lower than the level needed for full employment leads to more unemployment, and a higher share of the national income goes to the upper classes. 461 The means recommended by Friedländer to raise ‘purchasing power,’ were public housing projects and transfer payments financed by taxes which aimed to create greater equality.462 This was a clear example of Swedish Social Democratic influences.

These policies, wrote Friedländer, should be conducted in the framework of what he defined as ‘humanistic values or human rights.’ These values are: A) ‘respect for the value of man and recognition that all human races are equal;’ B) ‘securing the rights of citizens;’ C) ‘greater opportunity for thinking and acting in freedom for common goals;’ D) ‘society ruled by law combined with tolerance towards minorities;’ E) ‘free choice of government and regime;’ F) ‘respect by politicians for free elections and the will of the majority.’ Friedländer also noted three other ‘rights’ relating to his economic proposals.463

The USSR was undoubtedly a country that did not fulfill these conditions, but Friedländer did not mention the USSR as an example of a non-democratic planning system. Instead, he expressed a relatively moderate view of Communism and represented it as a movement that had good causes and intentions but used the wrong methods. He dealt with the specific issue of post-war Germany only in Chapter five and subsequent chapters. In general, one can conclude that Friedländer supported the idea that Germany should retain its pre-1933 borders and its political and economic sovereignty.464 In the last chapters of the book, Friedländer dealt with the idea of a corporative economic system which, as he explained, was the economic ideal of RSD members already in 1934 when they were still part of the So.Pa.De.465

460 Ibid, p 81 461 Ibid, p92-93 part of the implied conclusion from what he wrote about capitalistic and non- capitalistic planning. 462 Ibid, p 93-94 463 Ibid, p 104-105 464 Ibid, p 124-140 465 Ibid, p 143

168

This idea, he claimed, would garner the support not only of the SPD but also of the Catholic Center Party and of German Communists who would support the idea given that Stalin made a pact with a conservative such as Churchill.466 In contrast to Heinig, Friedländer did not promote a ‘party ideology’ such as that of the Danish and the Swedish Social Democrats and the Norwegian Labor Party which marginalized both the Communists and the Center Parties and tried to convince their potential voters to vote for Social Democracy instead. Friedländer expressed here the hope for an almost unattainable coalition of the Zentrum Party, the SPD and the KPD. This was another reason why the idea of a party vying for the support of all the ‘oppressed classes’ did not appear in his future program for the SPD.

The corporative ideal which Friedländer believed in so fervently included the following: A) insuring for every child ‘decent housing and living conditions,’ free basic education and easy access to academic studies; 467 B) general public health insurance and sickness/vacation insurance. 468 In the economic area, his goal included a policy of public intervention aimed at creating full employment469 and workers’ representation in all public and private firms with workers receiving 50% of voting rights in all levels of management.470 Thus the gap between the economic ideals of the Swedish Social Democrats and Heinig’s, and those of Friedländer was very small. The only significant gap was with respect to political tactics and party strategy but this gap was sufficient to place Heinig and Friedländer in opposing groups.

Friedländer's political activity in late 1944 and in 1945 will be discussed further on when I explain why Friedländer, like Heinig, decided to stay in Sweden and did not return to Germany. At present I wish to deal with a work written in 1947 by Friedländer and published in 1948: ‘Die Schwedische Demokratie.’ This work, I argue, demonstrated a naive perception of the ‘Swedish model’ and rendered it practically irrelevant to any country other than Scandinavia. It put forward a different

466 Ibid, p144-148 467 Ibid, p 167-169 468 Ibid, p 174 469 Ibid, p188-190 470 Ibid, p190-191

169 perception to that of Heinig’s pro-Swedish model books of the same period which will be discussed further on. The book reflected Friedländer’s tendency in early 1944 to accept a large part of the economic policy of the Swedish Social Democrats but not their political strategy. It was written for German readers and stemmed from a personal need to describe a ‘social success story’ rather than a desire to disseminate propaganda for Sweden (at least this was the impression of the Swedish academic board for ‘re-building democracy’ which supported the publication of the book).471 Friedländer did not cater his work specifically to the German public but aimed to present a general example to members of the United-Nations.472

The book opens with the rather anachronistic statement that Sweden is a nation with a long democratic tradition.473 This description ignored the fact that, until 1911, Sweden had one of the most autocratic constitutions in Europe (much less democratic than the 1871 constitution of Germany – see Introduction) and the fact that only in the period 1918 to 1920 did Sweden become a political democracy. Friedländer explained his statement on the basis of the homogeneity of the Swedish nation, its flora, geography and weather. According to Friedländer, Swedish flora and geography, in addition to the relatively low population density, acted against a centralized authoritarian regime and favored decentralized communities with a strong local democracy (it is hard to believe that Friedländer was unaware of the fact that Russia had similar geographical traits).474 He was however aware of the problematic nature of his arguments, since they did not provide universal political arguments for the Swedish model such as Heinig's. He, therefore, invested great effort to explain that his arguments were not racist or based on the ethnic origin of the Swedish people since the population included many Finnish immigrants, German tradesmen and Jews who settled in Sweden during the last two centuries and had been successfully assimilated.475

The homogeneity mentioned by Friedländer consisted in a common language; common culture and common religion (conditions which also existed in countries that were not similar to the Swedish model such as Portugal, Hungary, Austria and France,

471 Friedländer Otto, ‘Die Schwedische Demokratie.’ (Offenbach/Main 1948), p7 472 Ibid, p9-10 473 Ibid, p11 474 Ibid, p 14-15 475 Ibid, p 14

170 and other European nations) Friedländer was also well aware of the fact that Denmark had a similar political model to Sweden, but unlike the latter, had a German-speaking community and was therefore not a homogeneous society such as Sweden. He was probably also aware of the fact that there was no major difference in the level of hostility towards ‘Socialism’ between Catholics and Protestants in Germany.

Friedländer then proceed, in support of his argument, to list examples from the Swedish history of the Swedish ‘democratic spirit,’ among them, the Swedish constitution of 1809 – a constitution which, even in its time, was far from being advanced.476 The period 1866-1922, considered by Friedländer as representing a major step towards democracy, was described only briefly with no mention of the tough political struggle involved in the process of transforming Sweden into a democracy.477 This struggle was again omitted in his description of the civil rights legislation in Sweden in the first decades of the 20th century. 478 His portrayal of Swedish political society was of one based on consensus. Here, again, he made no mention of the fact that almost all the social legislation passed in Sweden during the 1930s and 1940s (and, for that matter, in the 1950s and 1960s as well) was pushed through by a ‘Socialist’ majority against the will of ‘bourgeois’ parties.479

Only when Friedländer came to describing Sweden's social system and economic policy, could similarities with Heinig be detected. He correctly described the Swedish Social Democratic view that the essential combination needed for a ‘true democracy’ was political democracy, social security and a high degree of economic equality, but he mistakenly gave the impression that this view represented a consensus and was shared by all the main political groups in Sweden.

However, Friedländer also expressed in this part of the book his own political beliefs and his full support for the political ideals of mainstream Swedish Social Democrats. ‘But what are all legal freedoms, when one cannot find support in the area of material security. Therefore a politic that steals the rights and social security of workers is the real meaning of maintaining the rights of the bourgeoisie… for this purpose [ensuring

476 Ibid, p 19 477 Ibid, p 42-46 478 Ibid, p 61-63

171 the social security of the entire population] an equalizing tax policy will cancel the process whereby monies are taken from those with limited resources and directed to those with high incomes’. 480

After stating that legal political rights were meaningless without workers' rights and social security and after emphasizing the importance of an income equalization policy through taxation of the affluent (with no mention however of aiming to create, through workers’ rights, social legislation, progressive taxation and public services for a classless society), Friedländer proceed to list in great detail existing Swedish social legislation, while repeating his mistake of describing some of the regressive social legislation of pre-1914 as representing the beginning of this process of social security equalization.481

Friedländer was particularly thorough in his description of single mothers' social rights, and how the Swedish state ensured that these families, as well as families with many children, would receive an income close to the national average. He showed, through statistics, how Social democratic Sweden was much more generous in its financial support of families with children and people with housing needs than Britain under a Labor government.482 Like Heinig, Friedländer also described public ownership in Sweden and Swedish ‘corporatism.’ However, in the absence of a political context and a true description of the forces which shaped the ‘Swedish model’ of his time, Friedländer’s book was no more than a description of an ‘utopia’ which could not contribute in any way to the future SPD ‘party ideology.’

479 Ibid, p 64-67 480 Ibid, p 72 481 Ibid, p 74-81 482 Ibid, p 84-85

172 Chapter-2.5 SPD exiles who were minimally influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

This category includes all SPD exiles who maintained their original ‘Weimar SPD’ stances and those of their early exile period. Some, like Stahl and Sassnick, were hard-core anti-Communists while others, such as Polenske, favored pro-cooperation with the Communists. Others, such as Peter Hass, are classified into this group because they wrote little material and it is possible that they were influenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats but did not see the need to promote Scandinavian Social Democracy by publishing works on this subject.

It should be clarified that the term ‘minimally influenced’ does not mean that these exiles did not express any trace of support for the Swedish Social Democratic ‘party ideology’ in their published works; it simply means that the support they expressed was minimal. SPD exiles who are classified in this category and are important enough to be dealt with in detail are divided into two groups: the first consists of ‘anti– Bolsheviks’ and includes Stahl, Sassnick and Raloff; the second includes Polenske, Hass, Krebs and Mugrauer.

Stahl did not write any articles or books during his exile period and there are almost no sources apart from those that deal with his personal problems. His views regarding the power struggles within the So.Pa.De could be found in his letters, but only to a very limited degree. They nearly all reflect his strong anti-Bolshevik feelings. In his letter dated December 1, 1942 Stahl denounced ‘Bolshevism’ stating that ‘Bolshevism and Nazism are the same in their essence and in their actions.’483 Even Heinig and Raloff, despite their anti-Bolshevik positions, did not make such statements, not because they saw any positive in ‘Bolshevism’ but rather because they were more aware of the unparalleled barbarity of National Socialism. In ‘Zur Information’ of October 28, 1943 Heinig published a protest signed by all the German political exiles in Sweden (including the Communists) against the deportation of the Danish Jews by

483 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 1.12.1942 AdsD/ M-131.

173 the Nazis. The protest described the actions of the National Socialists ‘as actions not of human nature’ conducted by ‘people who call themselves Germans.’484

Stahl did not write anything on economic matters or on the theories and policies of the Swedish/Scandinavian Social Democrats, nor did he write anything that could help readers understand his views on these matters. The only indication as to his views on economic and social matters was his loyalty to the So.Pa.De Secretariat mainstream leadership, meaning that, at least in theory, he accepted the ‘Prague Manifesto’ and later the program of the ‘German Socialist Union.’

Sassnick was more articulate than Stahl when it came to non-personal matters. Between 1938 and 1940 he published a newspaper in Sweden called ‘Das Wort’ and addressed to SPD exiles in Sweden (see Part 1). Sassnick did not write most of the articles but used his paper to give many exiles the opportunity of expressing their views. In ‘Das Wort.’ No. 27 of December 1939, Sassnick described what he believed should be the economic and social goals of the SPD after the fall of the Nazi regime in Germany, stating that ‘democracy must insure bread and work for everyone,’ meaning social security and full employment. He argued that this should be achieved by ‘regulating the entire economy’ and that ‘socializing big capital and ‘demilitarizing Germany are worthy goals for the German people.’485

Thus, after more than three years in Sweden, Sassnick’s view accorded with the Prague Manifesto, which represented a position that was more open to interpretation in its egalitarian aspects than that of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, but was still more radical than the ‘Socialist Union Program.’ ‘Full employment’ was a typical goal of the Scandinavian Social Democrats, but it was not unique to them and Sassnick’s support for this position could also have derived from SPD ‘Party ideology’. After ‘Das Wort’ ceased to appear, in early 1940, Sassnick did not turn to writing in Swedish newspapers nor did he publish books through the Swedish Social Democratic publishing houses.

484 ‘Zur Information’ 28.10.1943 p 10 485 ‘Das Wort’ Number 27, December 1939 p 2

174 Because of his anti-Communist views, Sassnick joined Heinig’s group of 28 supporters after the split in the ‘Stockholm So.Pa.De group’ in January 1944. Although he had some disagreements with Heinig, as a result of his own efforts to have reasonable relations with the much stronger Tarnow/Hass/Polenske group as well (see Part 3), Sassnick was still able to publish articles in Heinig’s ‘Zur Information.’ In the issue dated September 30, 1944 Sassnick published an article in memory of Wilhelm Leuschner — a relatively senior SPD member from the area who was for a short period SPD Interior Minister in the State of Hesse and a very active figure in SPD ‘illegal activity.’ Leuschner was executed in Germany after having been incarcerated in harsh conditions in a concentration camp. Sassnick complimented him primarily for his fight against cooperation with the Communists. (Sassnick considered legitimate Leuschner’s contacts with politicians from the Zentrum Party, the DVP and moderate nationalists of the ‘Treviranus circle’486). Sassnick’s approval of Leuschner’s stand against any coalition with the Communists (which was not necessarily a genuine description of Leuschner’s view) and in favor of cooperation with former members of the ‘Müller grand coalition’ were an indication of his continued support for the political tactics of the ‘Weimar SPD.’

Karl Raloff was also an SPD exile who kept a low profile after his arrival in Sweden. Unlike other senior exiles, he preferred, instead of Stockhom, to settle in Öland, a small island in Southern Sweden since his wife and small children were still in Denmark from his base in Southern Sweden, he could help them financially by sending money to Denmark (he worked for more than a year in a paper business).487 Raloff did not wish to take part in the internal politics of the So.Pa.De in Sweden, but he did take part in the establishment of the national organization of SPD and German SAP exiles in Sweden in late 1944 (see Part 3). Unlike his exile period in Denmark, Raloff did not write regularly for any newspaper and did not publish any book in Sweden. His correspondence is therefore the main source for his views.

In a letter dated late 1943, Raloff repeatedly expressed his fear and that of his relatives in Germany that the Bolsheviks would take control of Germany, stressing the

486 ‘Zur Information’ 30.9.1944 p 3 487 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 12.11.1944 AdsD M-89 p 2.

175 importance of ensuring a democratic Germany.488 However, he did not mention the social elements of such a democracy.Due to the fact that Raloff was occupied with his efforts to assist his family in Denmark, he had no time to take part in the work of the International Group of Democratic Socialists’ Forum in Sweden.

In late 1944, he described the threat of a Bolshevik regime in Germany after the war as a ‘huge catastrophe.’489 Political activity became less important for him except for his effort, in the Fall of 1944, to achieve a compromise between Heinig and the group that wanted a general organization of SPD and German SAP exiles in Sweden. Raloff did not express his views in any forum in the following years and, as with Sassnick and Stahl, there are no sources to indicate whether he supported Scandinavian Social Democracy.

Neither Hass, Krebs, Mugrauer or Polenske wrote literary works on a scale with those of Friedländer and Heinig. Hass poses the most problems in this area. Despite his important role in the internal politics of the So.Pa.De in Sweden, he left little correspondence and almost no literary work. The highest position held by Hass in the Weimar SPD was that of SPD member of the Hamburg Parliament in 1933 (this position required less than 5% amount of the support required in the party and in the SPD electorate to be a SPD Reichstag member like Heinig or Raloff). Hass remained in Germany taking part in SPD illegal activity in Hamburg from 1933 to 1936 when he fled to Denmark. He was probably well known to Raloff and Heinig through the Copenhagen ‘Grenzsekretariat’ and when they were head of the SPD exile community in Denmark. After fleeing to Sweden in 1940, he maintained a low profile.

Even after January 1944, when Hass was elected head of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group which supported cooperation with the Communists in the FDKB (the decision that led to Heinig’s departure from the group), he wrote very few letters and what he wrote revealed no new knowledge regarding his views, except for his support for a united German Socialist Party’ under the leadership of the SPD. The only article written by Hass for the Sozialistische Tribüne dealt with Germany’s responsibility for the antisemitic actions of the NSDAP.

488 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 25.11.1943 AdsD M-89 p 2-5. 489 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 10.12.1944 AdsD/ M-89 p 1.

176

Krebs and Mugrauer were fairly active in Tarnow’s group of exiled German Trade Unions in Sweden and wrote somewhat more than Hass. Mugrauer was unsuccessful when he tried to be elected in 1940 to the leadership of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group.490 But both Krebs and Mugrauer were elected for the steering committee of the Exiled German Trade Unions in Sweden and both supported Polenske's views and, later, those of Hass in the Stockholm So.Pa.De group.

The sources for Krebs’ and Mugrauer’s views derive from articles they wrote 1945 for the Sozialistische Tribüne. In his article Gewerkschaftsarbeit von Morgen, Mugrauer claimed that, according to Marx, the alternatives facing human society were either ‘socializing the means of production’ or ‘falling into barbarism,’ and that the case of Germany proved this ‘in a terrifying way that no one dared imagine.’491 In later parts of his article, Mugrauer added that because trade unions were always the ‘democratic force in the German society’ the re-building of the trade unions ought to be a primary task.492 Mugrauer's position did not differ from that of Weimar SPD members who held a radical stance on economic matters. Mugrauer’s article of September 1945, Kol Kol Kol, did not contribute new information except that Mugrauer, like most other exiles, had a good command of the Swedish language.

Kreb's stance was more radical than that of Mugrauer. In his article ‘Die Internationale erkämpft das Menschenrecht’ (the international struggle for human rights) published in the Sozialistische Tribüne in 1945, Krebs called for united action by the entire working class, irrespective of national boundaries, against nationalism and against the bourgeoisie of all nations. He also advised German Socialists, meaning Social Democrats, Communists, and trade unions, to play a central role in this process because of ‘their internationalist nature.’493 Krebs’ radical rhetoric and his call against all the ‘bourgeoisie’ could have easily placed him in a more radical body than the So.Pa.De. His reaction may also have been one of shock at the scale of the Nazi horrors, which were being revealed as the war approached its end and reflected the extent of the hatred towards Germany as a nation.

490 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 4.2.1940 AdsD /M-131. 491 Mugrauer Hans ‘Gewerkschaftsarbeit von Morgen’ in ‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ January 1945 p 12 492 Ibid, p13-14

177

In a letter to Ollenhauer dated June 21, 1942 Polenske expressed the view that the failures of the central planning system in Nazi Germany were perhaps proof that central planning needed to be re-examined.494 It is hard to believe that Ollenhauer, who presented a few months later the very non-egalitarian program of the ‘German Socialist Union’ needed Polenske's advice. Polenske’s statement attested to his lack of belief in hard-core ‘orthodox’ views, although the example he chose of Nazi Germany to support his claim was problematic. After January 1944, Polenske and his rival Stahl were the oldest exiles in Sweden. But, henceforth, they were no longer deeply involved in the politics of the So.Pa.De, although Polenske still actively supported the political actions of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group and wrote occasional articles in the Sozialistische Tribüne.

In his an article ‘Brot und Einigkeit,’ published in January 1945, Polenske described the split in the German labor movement as a ‘tragedy for the German labor movement’ and for the German Republic.495 This view, which represented a call for unity between Social Democrats and Communists, did not appear in Polenske's letters to the Secretariat in which he was more prudent and in which he described Heinig (like other supporters of union with the Communists) as a man who imagined things that did not exist. In the economic area, Polenske stated that ‘we (he and those with similar views) are convinced that the combination of a planned Socialist economy and modern techniques will create a better standard of living.’496 This represented a change from the view he expressed in 1942 but neither view related to Swedish/Scandinavian Social Democracy and remained within the framework of the old debates within the Weimar SPD and the So.Pa.De in the 1930s. The means he proposed to protect against an undemocratic regime (such as the USSR although it was not mentioned by name) was for all political organizations inside Germany to be fully committed to political democracy.497

493Krebs Martin ‘Die Internationale erkämpft das Menschenrecht’ ‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ p 2-3 494 A letter from Carl Polenske to Erich Ollenhauer dated 21.6.1942 AdsD M 88 P 2 495 Polenske Carl ‘Brot und Einigkeit’ ‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ January 1945 p 21 496 Ibid, p 21 497 Ibid, p 22

178 This group (pro-cooperation with the Communists) did not play a significant role in the post-war SPD like Sassnick and many exiles from the German SAP (Mugrauer was an exception in this category). Yet, none joined the SED. They held the almost unattainable view of forming a united party with the KPD without relinquishing democracy. The logic behind this view meant giving up politics. Remaining active in the SPD meant, in Mugrauer’s case and, to a lesser degree, in that of Krebs, that their stand in favor of ‘cooperation with the Communists’ could not be sustained for long. .

Chapter-2.6

179 Paul Bromme and his non-egalitarian views.

Paul Bromme was younger than the other SPD figures who are discussed in this dissertation and, as already mentioned, there is little source material on his views regarding economic and social matters prior to 1940. Bromme was a member of the RSD, and it is reasonable to assume that he supported its ‘corporatism’ which included (according to Friedländer) an economic model where all firms are managed together with workers and the workers are given a minimum of 50% representation in management, where there is public ownership of key industries and a generous public social security system (see chapter on Friedländer) These views were in close accord with the Scandinavian Social Democratic position which also called for the manipulation of the ‘market economy’ through ‘Keynesian macroeconomic policies,’ high taxes, and generous transfer payments in order to support a combination of social security and labor policy. The aim being not just to create a security net, but to establish a system of equal income distribution that would create a ‘one class society.’ The other element of the ‘Swedish Social Democratic party ideology’ not included in the RSD position was its tactic for gaining the political power needed to promote its social goals. Their tactic was to create a party that appealed to small farmers and the self-employed on the one hand, and to those who favored a radical vision on the other hand, a policy leading to the marginalization of center and the communist parties. These were additional ideas which Bromme could have adopted from the Scandinavian Social Democrats while staying loyal to RSD radicalism. But like Brandt, Bromme did not retain the challenging vision of the RSD or of the German SAP (in Brandt’s case).

What makes this surprising is the fact that Bromme and Brandt were in all likelihood the exiles who had the closest relationship with the Scandinavian Social Democrats. Brandt was practically raised by the Norwegian Labor Party. Bromme had a somewhat longer political career before he went into exile and changed his location several times before 1940, but after his return to Sweden in 1940 he integrated into the Swedish Social Democrats better than any other exile. Unlike most of SPD exiles, Bromme did not settle in Stockholm, favoring instead Örebro, a middle-sized town of around 80,000 inhabitants at the time, 160km West of Stockholm. The editor of the

180 Social Democratic newspaper in the Örebro area (the ‘Örebro-kuriren’), Sven Blome, was particularly sympathetic towards the German political exiles.498 Bromme, who already mastered Norwegian and Swedish and had experience as a journalist in Germany (see Chapter 1), was recruited by ‘Örebro–kuriren’ and by 1943 he was writing a weekly column for the newspaper dealing with prominent political figures, evidence that he had reached a senior position in ‘Örebro-kuriren.’

Bromme maintained a good relationship with Heinig and, later, also with some of his rivals (a subject that will be discussed in more detail in Part 3). As a rule of thumb, he refrained from taking part in the bitter internal disputes, which plagued the Stockholm So.Pa.De group, which was a a wise decision. His articles in ‘Örebro-kuriren’ are thus the only source for his views and it remained a relatively detailed source until the middle of 1945. His shift from being an active RSD member to being an editorial writer with strong pro-political democracy and anti-Fascist views, in addition to a non-radical view on social and economic matters could be explained by two factors. In the first place, Bromme decided, in early 1940, to express loyalty to the leadership of Vogel and Ollenhauer — a decision probably resulting from the fate of the RSD. Due to the fact that Bromme had no political power in Germany, the main political assets he could gain were good connections with the more senior members of the So.Pa.De and this, he believed would ensure insure him a successful political career in post-war Germany. The second a less probable explanation is that he underwent a genuine change in his political beliefs due to his assumption that ‘full Socialism’ was possible only in a non-democratic Communist model. Since he was not ready to renounce political democracy, he chose to give up, instead, the far-reaching social goals of ‘Socialism.’499 Both Bromme and Brandt used this explanation (although not explicitly) as the reason for their change of views, even though it does not accord with their close knowledge of the Scandinavian Social Democrat alternative.

498 See an article in his memory in ‘Zur Information’ dated 30.9.1944 p 8 499 In an article Tyskland mellan öst och väst’ in ‘Örebro kuriren’ ‘dated April 9, 1946 Bromme describes the creation of a Soviet style economy in East Europe as a ‘social revolution’ which is different from Heinig's view who claims that Soviet Union is just a camp of slaves. However, Bromme claims in the same article that the Soviet style economy in East Germany cannot be combined with German democracy.

181 Bromme’s column in ‘Örebro-kuriren’ was called ‘Veckans profil’ (This Week's Profile). In it, he expressed his views through descriptions of political figures and through his comments on their actions and opinions. The columns presented here are divided into categories. The first articles reflect Bromme's strong anti-Fascist views and his opposition to antisemitism. The second group consists of articles that reflect his opposition to the Catholic religious establishment and the third group expresses his call for moderate treatment of active Communists (a relic from his period in the RSD). The last group includes columns that reveal his tendency to compromise on social and economic issues. Some articles naturally contribute to views on more than one subject. The articles from 1946 will be dealt as a separate category due to the change in the political situation.

Bromme devoted more columns to Fascist nationalists and German generals than to any other subject. He was, here, in safe water, since he was criticizing figures that were seen as the foes of all liberal and Socialist movements. But the influence of these articles on Swedish anti- Fascist public opinion was very minor at this stage, since it was clear that Nazi Germany was going to be defeated. I will present a few examples that clearly reflect Bromme’s attitude towards such figures. In his column dated April 18, 1944 Bromme dealt with Jon Antonescu, the Fascist rightwing leader of Romania, describing him as an extreme, dangerous man, who had committed a long series of crimes. Indirectly, Bromme aimed here to protest against suggestions by the US and the UK to support Antonescu in order to ‘save Romania from Bolshevism’ once his alliance with Germany ended.500 Bromme clearly did not share Stahl's opinion that Nazism and Fascism were equal to ‘Bolshevism.’

In his next article Bromme attacked Louis Marin, the antisemitic leader of the French rightwing party. Marin's hostility towards De Gaulle automatically rendered De Gaulle a favorable figure in the eyes of Bromme.501 Bromme did not limit himself to describing Marin’s views and actions, he also discussed Marin’s social class. From this article as well as later articles, it is clear that Bromme believed that social class determines in most cases people’s political views and morals (he would usually

500 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 18.4.1944 501 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 25.4.1944 para 1-3

182 describe the ‘class’ of both good and bad figures.) In Marin’s case, he noted that Marin came from a ‘rich bourgeois family.’502

Bromme also related to the split that emerged in 1944 between Hitler and his Prussian generals. In one instance, he wrote about German general Günther von Kluge and the public’s lack of trust in Hitler, claiming that even this Prussian officer did not trust Hitler,503 meaning that Hitler was too extreme even for the Prussian military elite. Bromme did not seem fond either of British generals, describing General Alexander Harold (after noting his upper class origin) as a snob.504 Bromme opposed any proposal aimed at preventing an independent Germany after the fall of Hitler. He attacked the proposals of Robert Vansittart (another British ‘snob’) and distinguished between the ‘innocent’ (my expression) ‘German working class’ and the ‘guilty’ German elite.505

Bromme also opposed any idea of re-establishing a monarchy in Germany or Austria even in a very limited form, as in the proposal to bring Otto von Habsburg back to Austria from the US. Bromme described von Habsburg as a ‘political corpse’ and another member of the upper classes whom he abhorred.506 Bromme's opposition to any form of aristocracy and his description of the upper classes as tending to be anti- democratic, pro-Fascist and militaristic was not historically baseless. It was also an expected view for a hard core ‘Socialist’. It should be noted, however, that Bromme did not make generalizations on the subject and did not place extreme labels on all the bourgeoisie, as the KPD was wont to do.

Bromme’s hostile attitude towards the Catholic Church was also in line with classic Marxist anti-religious views. Coming from a Lutheran area (Schleswig-Holstein), Bromme had no contact with Catholicism and his view was the result of the Catholic establishment’s cooperation with Fascist and Nazi regimes. On June 6, 1944, the figure whom Bromme viewed as the most deserving of his criticism, was Pope Pius XII. Bromme noted the Pope’s background (a rich patrician family) and stated that he

502 Ibid, para 5 503 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 11.7.1944 504 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 16.5.1944 para. 5 505 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 19.7.1944 506 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 13.3.1945

183 had to explain his contacts with the ‘Fascist regimes in Rome and Berlin.’507 A year later, Bromme attacked Catholicism much more fiercely in the second article published in ‘Örebro kuriren’ which he signed by his full name.

507 ‘Paul Bromme ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 6.6.1944

184

508 The above article (the important paragraphs are marked) represented the most blatant attack on the Catholic Church by any SPD exile in Sweden. Friedländer dreamed of a political alliance between the Social Democrats, the Communists, and the Catholic Zentrum Party. 18 months later, Bromme once again attacked the Catholic Church and its effort to project itself as a body that fought Nazism. Bromme claimed that the opposite was true, noting the pact between the Vatican and the Fascist and Nazi regimes, and the open support given by the Vatican to Franco's

185 regime in Spain.509 Bromme recognized that many Catholic priests did resist the Nazi regime and noted that 2800 Polish Catholic priests and 840 German Catholic priests had been sent to Dachau, but he pointed out that the actions of the resisters had not received the blessing of the Church's leadership.510 At the end of the article, he noted that the Social Democrats in many countries were ready to cooperate with Catholic organizations. In Bromme’s view, even if the Catholic Church was now committed to the struggle against dictatorship, there should be no cooperation with those elements in the Church who had collaborated with dictators.511 This position, however, did not exclude the possibility of a coalition between the SPD and Catholic parties in post- war Germany, something which Bromme noted would be hard to implement. This suggested that, in contrast to Friedländer, Bromme favored a political strategy that aimed to win support from potential center party voters.

Bromme had a positive attitude to Communist figures and those who had close ties with Communists. He complimented the qualities of Marshal Govorov (head of the Russians forces who fought Germany on the Finnish front) noting that Govorov was a ‘good friend to his soldiers’ and ‘a man with a sharp mind.’512 The compliments were certainly not based on personal acquaintance. Bromme’s description of Govorov was much more sympathetic than his comments about British generals, even though Swedish public opinion had very mixed feelings regarding the Finnish front since it identified with Finland’s wish since 1939 to defend itself against Stalin’s expansionism.

In another article Bromme expressed admiration for Toledano, head of the Mexican trade unions, even though Toledano maintained a relationship with Soviet trade unions – a fact, which Bromme viewed as resulting from the difficult relations between workers and employers in South America.513 Bromme noted that he had met Toledano at the Trade Unions International in Oslo in 1938 and head been very impressed by him514 (in addition to trade unions headed by Social Democrats the

508 BrommePaul ‘Aktuelt I dag: Katolsk offensiv’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 20.6.1945 509 Ibid, paras. 1-2 510 Ibid, para.3 511 Ibid, last para. 512 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 27.6.1944 para. 6 513 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 21.2.1945 paras. 2-4 514 Ibid, para. 1

186 International included Soviet trade unions.) Because of Bromme's positive attitude towards Communists and his critical attitude towards Catholic organizations, together with his opposition to a union between the SPD and the Communists at this stage, one would have expected that Bromme would have adopted the political strategy of the Swedish Social Democrats which consisted in trying to win both votes from people who favored ‘radical left’ parties and from people who supported center parties: they aimed to win the radical left vote through their egalitarian goals, and the center vote through a policy of tolerance towards capital ownership by the self-employed and small farmers, and by using the ‘manipulated market economy’ instead of central planning as the main way of regulating production. Instead Bromme chose to support less radical policy on economic and social matters that aimed to appeal mainly to the middle class vote, leaving no political alternative to those who wanted to combine egalitarianism with political democracy.

On May 2, 1944 Bromme wrote an article on American State Department Assistant Edward R. Stettinius, who, according to Bromme, had an aristocratic origin,515 a factor which did not affect Bromme's positive view of the man. Stettinius had a successful managerial career in American heavy industry, of which Bromme approved, and he had taken part in Roosevelt’s NRA public works project (the American version of Keynes’ macroeconomic policy) working as a coordinator between the government and the companies. 516 Bromme also praised him for his new position as coordinator between American and Soviet industry noting that he was highly talented and could contribute to the success of the new project.517 The NRA, unlike Scandinavian Keynesian macroeconomic policies, included massive involvement by large American firms and big capital owners. Bromme's sudden positive approach towards a man who was promoting social projects involving big capital owners was a sign –although not unequivocal – of his leanings on the issue of economic policy. His article of a week later clarified his position on the matter:

515 Bromme Paul ‘Veckan profil’ ‘Örebro kurriren’ 2.5.1944 paras. 1-2 516 Ibid, 2.5.1944 para. 3-5 517 Ibid, 2.5.1944 para. 6-7

187

518

518 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 9.5.1944

188 The subject of this article was Harold Laski, one of the main theoreticians of the British Labor Party who supported a combination between egalitarian goals, democracy, corporatism, and trade union power, and did not believe in the possibility of fruitful cooperation with the British upper classes aimed at making the British economy more egalitarian. Laski’s solution was to reform the economy through Parliament with the support of trade union power, in addition to a parliamentary majority. He also called for steps to protect democracy from the upper classes, were they to resist essential social changes. Laski's views were considered too radical by important elements in the British Labor Party, but they were quite in line with the views of mainstream Swedish Social Democrats. Laski’s views were never criticized by Heinig (he is mentioned in ‘Zur Information’ in the issue of January 1945). Bromme, on the other hand, did not want to see Laski's position weakened in the Labor’ because of his contribution to the politics of the Socialist International even though Laski according to Bromme had ‘dogmatic Marxist views,’519 meaning that Bromme viewed Laski's egalitarianism and readiness to exercise social and economical means to their maximum as ‘dogmatic Marxism.’

On December 15, 1944 Bromme wrote about George Papandreou and the civil war in Greece between ‘Left’ and ‘Right,’ a war, which Bromme viewed as a tragedy, claiming both sides were responsible for the war (the ‘Liberals’ who were supported by Britain and resisted all idea of and the ‘Socialists’ who were supported by the Yugoslav Communists).520 Bromme hoped that the Greek Socialists would be wise enough to compromise with the Liberals, although he was aware of their strong resistance to any genuine land reform in Greece.521 Bromme had a good argument for supporting a compromise, in this case, since it was the best way of avoiding needless bloodshed.

On March 20, 1945 Bromme wrote an article on Johan Nygaardsvold, outgoing leader of the Norwegian Labor Party. Bromme complimented the leader of the party that had hosted him for two years and its successful Keynesian macroeconomic policy

519 Ibid, para 5 520 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘ Örebro kuriren’ 15.12.1944 para. 2 521 Ibid, para. 3

189 between 1935 and 1940522 as well as its support for Scandinavian cooperation on foreign policy.523 This was the minimum compliment even a ‘left liberal’ could have given to a Scandinavian Social Democratic Party. Bromme made no significant remarks on the economic policy of the Norwegian Labor Party in his article on Nygaarvold’s successor, Einar Gerhardsen.524

By 1946, Bromme had already begun to have contacts with Schumacher and, therefore, no longer permitted himself to write sympathetic articles on Communists. Bromme's ideas on economic matters are also easier to understand in this period, due to the articles he published in 1946 dealing directly with this issue. On February 1, 1946 Bromme wrote the first of two articles based on a visit to Norway. The article was called ‘ Pampig norsk bostadsplan 650 miljoner till armen’ (A magnificent Norwegian housing plan of 650 million Nkr for the Poor). In it, Bromme praised the fact that 650 million Nkr out of a budget of two billion (equivalent in terms of the year 2000 to 19.5 billon Nkr out of a budget of 60 billion or approx. 13% of the GDP out of a national budget amounting to 40% of the Norwegian GDP) were devoted to a Keynesian macroeconomic policy of housing projects, including the building of some 100,000 new apartments as financial aid for the poor.525 In the second article, Bromme praised Norwegian workers for their support of political reforms and for refraining from demanding high wage rises.526 The conclusion from these articles is that Bromme was a strong supporter of Keynesian macroeconomic policy but when he wrote about reform policy it was not clear what version of reforms he supported – radical like that of the Swedish Social Democrats or moderate like that of the future SPD.

In another ‘Veckans profil’ article published three months later, Bromme explained what he meant by ‘reform policy’: ‘every Social Democratic social policy has the same principles as William Beveridge's social reform program.’527 Beveridge's program included a basic social security net to protect people from extreme poverty or

522 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 20.3.1945 para. 2 523 Ibid, paras. 4-6 524 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 26.6.1945 525 Bromme Paul ‘Pampig norsk bostadsplan 650 miljoner till armen’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 1.2.1946, column 1 526 Bromme Paul ‘Ingen ‘silkfront I Norge’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 6.2.1946 527 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 15.5.1946 para. 2

190 lack of essential services such as medical care and primary education, but did not call for an effort to create a classless society through social reform policy. The principles of the program, which Bromme viewed similar to Social Democratic policy, aimed to ensure a minimum income and, at the same time, encourage every individual to earn more through private initiative, both principles aiming to prevent ignorance, illness, idleness and squalor. There was no demand for an equal starting point. Bromme claimed that the Social Democratic program had more far-reaching goals than the Beveridge program (referring most probably to an equal starting point) but he had no problem with the final moderate improved version of the program, which was accepted by the Labor Party and promoted by Ernest Bevin (one of Laski’s rivals in the British Labor).528

All transfer payments in the social program of the British Labor Party were lower by 30% - 50% in relative terms, compared to their parallels in the Swedish Social Democratic program of the time. A similar gap existed between the two programs in the areas of public education and general direct tax levels. The only similarity between the two programs was in public health (see in Chapter 3.6). A month earlier, Bromme had showered compliments on British Labor Finance Minister Hugh Dalton for reducing income taxes in Britain, 529 a step that, contrary to Bromme's claim, helped more the British middle class than low income earners.

The following points can be noted in summary of Bromme's position on economic policy. Although Bromme wrote in a Swedish Social Democratic newspaper that gladly supported egalitarian measures such as a call for radical tax and transfer payments policy or articles supporting measures to introduce ‘,’ Bromme did not publish one article whose content could be interpreted as supporting any of these stands. He had the courage to show sympathy for Communist figures or people who had contacts with the Soviet Union but this did not prevent him from calling Laski a ‘dogmatic Marxist’ in an article that purported to express personal support for the man. Bromme supported tax reductions and claimed, though with some reservations, that moderate liberal social programs had the same principles as Social Democratic social programs. In short, in the period 1944-1946, Bromme

528 Ibid, 529 Bromme Paul ‘Veckans profil’ ‘Örebro kuriren’ 17.4.1946 para. 1

191 supported Keynesian macroeconomic policy and a social security net, but did not favor achieving income equality and a classless society through Scandinavian Social Democratic means. While Heinig fully supported, in this period, the egalitarian Swedish Social Democratic program of 1944, Bromme was already much closer to the SPD’s non-egalitarian program of 1959.

192 Chapter-2.7 A ‘radical model of Paul Bromme’: Willy Brandt views in the 1940s

Willy Brandt was not an SPD exile. He was a member, since 1931, of the German SAP, which became in late 1944 part of the united organization of German SPD and SAP exiles in Sweden. Nonetheless, Brandt was, in many aspects, a more radical model of Bromme. Like Bromme, he was very young at the time he went to exile. His official political stand placed him on the left of the non-Communist German exiles and more to the left than Bromme because he was part of the German SAP rather than the RSD. Brandt also had a very successful, even more resounding, political career in the post 1945 SPD and, like Bromme, adopted in the mid 1940s a non-egalitarian stand which was more extreme than Bromme’s. The two men also had similarities in their backgrounds (mentioned previously), making the comparison between them all the more interesting.

Brandt arrived in Norway in the Summer of 1933. Norway was the ideal host country for exiles from organizations such as the RSD and the German SAP (see Part 1, Chapter 9). Brandt, who had played no significant political role in the Weimar Republic, headed the small German SAP representation in Norway, which included at the most some 10 members. But Brandt quickly found an important political patron in the shape of Fin Moe, Norwegian Labor Party member responsible for foreign affairs. Brandt had comfortable life in Norway. In September 1934, he began to study at Oslo University530 and subsequently wrote for the Norwegian Labor Party daily paper ‘Arbeiderbladet.’ Brandt left Norway only for a conference of the German SAP youth organization in Paris in February 1934 and for a short visit to Berlin in 1936 to make contact with German SAP members there under the cover of being a Norwegian student. He also visited to Barcelona in 1937.

In 1940 Brandt fled to Sweden together with a large group of Norwegian Labor Party members. In Sweden, he became very active in the debating forum of the

530 Brandt Willy, ‘Erinnerungen.’ (Berlin 1993), p 101

193 International Group of Democratic Socialists in Sweden. He was also regularly mentioned in reports by American intelligence in Sweden, while figures such as Heinig and Stahl were not mentioned and Tarnow was mentioned only on two occasions. The information of American intelligence on the exiles was not very accurate (see Part 3 on Tarnow) but the recurrence of Brandt’s name suggested that he was viewed as an important future leader. It’s also possible that Brandt was given a lot of coverage in the reports, despite not having real political power or a significant political past, because he gave American intelligence information gathering services regarding Communists and radical exiles.

I will focus on his two main works dealing with future programs for post-war Germany. One is dated 1944 and the other 1946. In March 1944, Brandt published his book ‘Efter segern,’ which was a summary of his conclusions and proposals stemming from the debates of the International Forum, which will be compared with Friedländer’s ‘Tyskland efter Hitler.’ At an early stage in the book, Brandt described the joint declaration by Roosevelt and Churchill of January 1941 as an important political development. Unlike Wilson’s of 1919, the declaration by Roosevelt and Churchill included a reference to the economy, in addition to political democracy and ‘self determination,’ and called on all nations to adopt an ‘open economy’ and ‘social security.’531 Brandt noted also that the list of essential freedoms itemized in the declaration included the ‘freedom from want’ and the ‘freedom from fear.’532

Brandt considered this attitude very promising, for it meant that political democracy combined with a social security net was the basis for cooperation with ‘moderate Conservatives’ and ‘Liberals’ such as, respectively, the British Conservative Party and the American Democratic Party. This position did not necessarily go against the position of people with more radical goals and ideas, such as Heinig and Friedländer, because it did not state the targets of the Social Democrats. However Brandt’s views in this section of the book did not present any clear or sharp criticism of the vision of the American Democrats (contrast to Heinig's criticism of Wallace’s ‘list of freedoms’). A large part of the book was devoted to the subject of ‘self determination’ and national minorities. Like most Social Democratic exiles, Brandt supported the

531 Brandt Willy, ‘Efter segern.’ (Stockholm 1944), p 17 532 Ibid, p 17

194 implementation of the principle of national self-determination and, like Heinig, 533 was in favor of the movement for a Jewish national home (Zionism).534

Under the category Brandt defined as ‘first aid,’ he described the British-American programs for the immediate economic development of Germany and UNRWA support.535 Another large part of the book dealt with proposals to establish an organization to assure peace in Europe and independence in European colonies. The last part of the book was devoted to Germany. Brandt rejected any program such as the Vansittart program, which would have left Germany a crippled and dependent nation (a stand similar to Bromme’s).536 Like Friedländer, Brandt noted the anti-Nazi stance of the German Catholic Church but he did not discuss the possibility of a political alliance between the Catholics and the Social Democrats.537 Then, after a lengthy review of American and British long-term economic development programs, Brandt offered a short description of his vision for Germany.

I will focus first on what did not appear in Brandt's vision. There was no mention of ‘co-determination’ as in Friedländer’s proposals and nothing similar to Friedländer's proposal to give 50% of voting rights in every firm to workers. There was also nothing equivalent to Heinig's unconditional support of the Swedish Social Democratic 1944 Program with its demands for equality in income and property distribution, and its demand to place the ‘decisions over production in the hands of the nation.’ There was also nothing similar to what was implied in Heinig's criticism of Wallace's ‘list of liberties,’ meaning that there should be no limit on taxation and government intervention in order to achieve the desired ‘moral social goals.’

Brandt called for a democratic Germany based on the principle of ‘reforming the purposes of society.’538 Brandt attributed this quotation to Laski, although his interpretation was not truly egalitarian. The new society, he claimed, should accord all individuals the right to work in return for an income; a right to food and clothing, a

533 Ibid, in the last chapter of part 4 although this is not the subject of the chapter 534 Ibid, p 56 535 Ibid, p 100-125 536 Ibid, p 200-222 537 Ibid, p 236-241 538 Ibid, p 287

195 right to housing, rest and education.539 Brandt thus proposed securing a minimum decent standard of living for everyone through a social security net and full employment. Regarding equality, Brandt called for equal development possibilities and equal right for protection against illness and poverty.540 This could be interpreted as health insurance for all and access to higher education. The Swedish Social Democratic programs, in contrast, demanded ‘equal possibilities to enjoy the material and cultural advantages of society,’ meaning equal access for all to the goods of society, irrespective of personal success and ability, which represented a very different level of social commitment to Brandt's.

Brandt supported planning and intervention in the economy in order to achieve the goals he had mentioned.541 But, unlike Friedländer's book, he offered no detailed description of proposed social policy measures and one cannot dismiss the notion that Brandt, who devoted most of the book to diplomacy and foreign affairs, was not very interested in economic matters. Brandt's views were fully in line with those of American Democrats in the 1940s or the dominant rightwing of the British Labor movement at this time.

Brandt’s second book ‘Förbrytare och andra Tyskar’ (Better and Different Germany), was published in Swedish in April 1946, shortly before the first Congress of the new SPD in Hanover. The book described the situation of Germany in early 1946 but presented little about Brandt’s own opinions. A large part of the book aimed to convince a Swedish-reading audience of the importance of rebuilding Germany quickly and of the fact that most Germans were not Nazis or Nazi supporters. A lengthy section of the book focused on Nazi atrocities in occupied countries and on the acknowledgment of the responsibility of all Germans for these crimes. Another section focused on the ‘de-Nazification’ process in Germany in late 1945 and on the British-American occupation of Germany, which Brandt described in a relatively positive manner. He also described the extent of the physical damage to Germany’s infrastructure.

539 Ibid, p 287 540 Ibid, 541 Ibid, p 288

196 Part 6 dealt with German political parties after 1945. The Social Democrats, Brandt stated, based their political program on the programs of the British Labor Party and of the Scandinavian Social Democrats.542 This was mainly flattery aimed at obtaining support from Scandinavian Social Democrats since the SPD did not have any formal program until 1952. Declarations which could have been considered a basis for its program were the Ollenhauer address of 1942 which did not include the Scandinavian Social Democratic egalitarian vision and their co-determination demands, or the relatively ‘orthodox’ program presented at the general meeting aimed at re- establishing the SPD in British and American occupation areas in late 1945.

Part 7 of the book discussed the economic, social and political policies that were implemented in post-war Germany. Brandt described the different economic systems that were implemented by each of the occupying forces in their areas. In his view, the Social Democrats were critical of the economic policies in the Russian occupation area because they felt that insufficient importance was accorded to the role of ‘free initiative’ and ‘private capital.’543

In conclusion, it is clear that, by the mid 1940s, Brandt had already adopted views that were in line with those of Eichler and Ollenhauer.

542Brandt Willy, ‘Förbrytare och andra Tyskar.’ (Stockholm 1946), p258 543 Ibid, p 329

197 Part 3: Closed to Some, Open to Others. (the road to the post-1945 SPD; the activities of Fritz Tarnow from 1940 to 1951; the political actions of the main SPD exiles in Sweden from 1944 to 1956; Heinig’s efforts to promote Swedish Social Democracy till 1956.)

Chapter-3.1 Factors that influenced the successful integration of an SPD exile from Scandinavia into the new SPD.

The degree of success in integrating into the post-1945 SPD determined the ability of the former SPD exiles in Scandinavia/Sweden to influence the ‘party ideology’ of the new SPD. As demonstrated in Part 2, some SPD exiles such as Heinig and, more naively, also Friedländer became admirers of the Scandinavian Social Democratic model, particularly the Swedish version. Kurt Heinig also ‘fell in love’ with the ‘party ideology’ of the Swedish Social Democrats and believed that all Social Democratic Parties in Europe and especially the SPD ought to adopt their ‘party ideology.’ Others, such as Stahl, Raloff, Sassnick and, on the opposite side, Krebs and Mugrauer were almost uninfluenced by the Scandinavian Social Democrats. The third type of exiles was represented by men such as Bromme who adopted a non-egalitarian ‘party ideology’ like that of the ISK and the official proposals of the ‘Socialist Union’ in London. In Part 2, it was noted that this decision may have reflected a career choice.

A good relationship with Schumacher was an essential condition for the successful integration of an exile into the post-1945 SPD. Schumacher was not the most senior member left from the Weimar SPD after 1945. Indeed, as a SPD Reichstag member from 1930 to 1933, he was less senior than Heinig who had been a Reichstag member for five years and held a role of ‘expert’ in the SPD Parliamentary group. Tarnow and

198 Ollenhauer were also more senior than Schumacher, however Schumacher’s activity in the resistance against the Nazi regime and his incarceration in concentration camps gave him a moral status that was not shared by the SPD exiles. The death of Hans Vogel in October 1945 left no one with formal legitimacy as head of the SPD and this made Schumacher an even more central figure. Schumacher also worked hard at re- organizing the SPD in Germany in the first months following the end of the war, a fact that earned him organizational power which the exiles did not possess. As a result of his status Schumacher’s preferences shaped the post 1945 SPD. His preferences were partly the outcome of his anti-Communist views, of his wish to avert competition by former senior Weimar SPD members, his need for people with power or extensive past contacts with trade unions, and his desire to have young new members who had the strength to combat the Communists, even if they had favored, in the past, cooperation with the Communists. Schumacher was also obliged to accept people with a dubious past when it became clear that it was practically impossible to have a mass political movement in Germany without including some individuals who had had contacts with the NSDAP.

Ollenhauer was important to Schumacher because of his status as the last remaining, accessible SPD Secretary with anti-Communist views (the other living members of the SPD Secretariat had a rank that was lower than that of Secretary, pro-Communist leanings or were located far away in the US). Ollenhauer therefore had some influence and he brought with him into the new SPD men like Eichler who had established a good relationship with him in the UK. The SPD exiles in Sweden did not include anyone of the stature of Ollenhauer. Their internal politics could have had some influence on Schumacher but, as will be shown subsequently, these politics had little influence on the integration of the Swedish exiles into the new SPD. The main factors that determined their fate was their relationship with Schumacher, the personal feuds between them after 1945, their willingness to be flexible and the strength of their political ambitions.

Another important factor that requires attention was the policy of the British and Americans in their occupation zones. Entrance visas to Germany and permission to conduct political activity in the American and British occupation zones were not given automatically to every former German exile, who then had the status of stateless

199 persons. The Americans and the British were interested in preventing entry to those viewed as hostile elements, in other words to people who had contacts with the Communists. Receipt of a ‘clean bill of health’ by the Americans or the British was therefore essential for an exile wishing to return to Germany in 1946 and resume political work. The exiles in the UK held an advantage in this respect. Exiles from Scandinavia who made a good impression on American intelligence services (mainly Tarnow and Brandt) had the advantage of being able to begin their work in Germany right away. Brandt had another advantage – his Norwegian passport, which allowed him free travel throughout Europe. Ollenhauer and Schumacher were also able, because of their status in the eyes of the British, to decide whether an exile should receive an entrance visa to Germany. In this way, they were able to block men who were political rivals and not merely supporters of cooperation with the Communists. The Americans and the British were particularly determined to prevent the entry of pro-Communists into the trade unions, which again favored those who were able to make a good impression on the Americans or the British.

200 Chapter-3.2 The Opportunist.

Fritz Tarnow was mentioned only briefly in Part 2 because it is my belief that his views could not be regarded as genuine in light of his political conduct during his years of exile in Sweden. This chapter will explain why Tarnow’s success in the internal politics of the So.Pa.De in Sweden and in SPD politics after his return to Germany had a negative impact on the chances of the SPD adopting the Swedish Social Democratic ‘party ideology.’

Tarnow arrived in Sweden in 1940 as part of a group that included most of the senior SPD members who had been in exile in Denmark (see Part 1). In April 1941, Tarnow wrote to the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London explaining that, since he was unable to travel to London (travel across the North Sea to Britain had become very dangerous), he had no other choice as head of the ‘Exiled German Trade Unions’ but to organize a new organization based on the exiles German Trade Union members in Sweden.544 Tarnow promised Vogel he would wrestle the ‘Bolshevik chaos’(communists) on one side and the ‘nihilist revolution’(German right wing elements) on the other,545 a promise he did not seriously apply. Heading an organization that was located far from the UK gave Tarnow a large degree of independence from the So.Pa.De leadership in London. The ‘Exiled German Trade Union Organization in Swede’ was a much weaker organization than the So.Pa.De or the KPD since German exiles were financed through their parties’ Internationals rather than on the base of their trade union membership. The number of members in Tarnow’s organization at its peak was also much smaller (350) than the number of So.Pa.De members in the 40s (1000-2000).

Tarnow did not maintain extensive correspondence contact with So.Pa.De Secretariat members in London. His next letter to Vogel came almost a year after the April 1941 letter. Tarnow reported that he had contacts in Germany but did not reveal to Vogel who the contacts were and what they entailed. He expressed the view that Hitler could

544 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 1.4.1941 AdsD/ M-134 para. 3 545 Ibid, para. 4.

201 be replaced only by a coup546 but did not admit in the letter that he had contacts with senior elements in the German army who were, like his son Reinhold, members of the Nazi party and people who backed the NSDAP in the 30s. Tarnow apparently was preparing his excuse in the case that his involvement became public knowledge. He added that the labor movement in Germany could not remain passive. Tarnow wrote this letter while heading an organization that enabled him to have contacts with the Communists. It would seem that he was making an effort to secure his political future through contacts with the German nationalist right on one side and with the Communists on the other side.

In October 1942, Tarnow sent Vogel the main points of a lecture he gave to an audience of exiled Social Democrats and German SAP members in which he discussed the issue of ‘Germany after Hitler.’ The content was supposed to prove to Vogel that Tarnow was loyal to the idea of an independent Social Democratic Party. Tarnow promised Vogel that the debates on the issue of a united party were only theoretical and that everyone in Sweden was aware that such a decision could be taken only by the ‘masses’ in Germany after the fall of Hitler.547 His comment left open the question of why was it so important for Tarnow to support ‘united action’ if such a decision would only be taken in Germany by the masses after the fall of Hitler. The other supporters of union were more candid, expressing openly support for a future coalition with the Communists in Germany (Friedländer) or calling openly for a union (Krebs) but Tarnow refrained from expressing such views to Vogel. There was also the question of why Tarnow felt it necessary to use the verb ‘promise.’ He may have had good reason to believe that Vogel suspected his intentions (no attacks had been made on Tarnow by Stahl or by Heinig at this stage). Tarnow himself claimed that the only important thing was to have ‘democratic, peaceful’ conditions in post- war Germany.’548 In the same section of his letter, Tarnow added, unlike the ‘left- wingers,’ he did not believe that the fall of Hitler would be accompanied by a social revolution.549 Since Tarnow had contacts with ‘left-wingers’ and supported united

546 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 4.5.1942 AdsD /M-134 para. 3. 547 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 28.10.1942 AdsD/ M-134 p1. 548 Ibid, p2 para. 1. 549 Ibid, p2 para. 2.

202 action frameworks such as his trade union group and later on the FDKB, he was hiding his real opinion from these ‘left-wingers’ or from Vogel or from both of them.

In line with the view expressed in previous paragraphs, Tarnow informed Vogel that he believed, in view of the large unorganised workforce in Germany, that a social revolution would lead to chaos.550 He did not explain what he meant by ‘social revolution’ and what was the connection between an insufficient number of organized workers and a ‘revolution’ that would lead to chaos in Germany. If, by social revolution, he was referring to the implementation over a short period of the ideals of the RSD as presented by Friedländer, or of the medium term goals of the Swedish Social Democrats, as Heinig proposed two years later, it was not a convincing argument to say that ‘social revolution would lead to chaos.’ High direct taxes, extensive public services, generous transfer payments, manipulation of the economy through a Keynesian macroeconomic policy and 50% share by workers in the management of workplaces in all the firms were not going to create chaos. His argument only had logic if Tarnow believed that such actions would be strongly opposed by the German right but there was no reason to take on the right if the majority of the electorate supported a ‘social revolution.’ It means that there was clearly no reason to have a social revolution against the ‘German nationalist right’ because they were potential allies (of Tarnow).However Tarnow’s main message to Vogel was that he was not likely to form an alliance with the Communists. According to Tarnow, only in the long term, after re-building the trade unions, would programs such as a ‘social revolution’ be possible. The first stage, therefore, was to re-build the trade unions (preferably under Tarnow’s leadership). It is unlikely that Tarnow’s comments could be interpreted as expressing opposition only to a ‘Bolshevik style revolution’ and supporting, like Heinig, the adoption of something like the Swedish Social Democratic 1944 Program, implementing it gradually in the course of 15-20 years, because his words were too vague to be interpreted this way. For instance, he did not call those whom he defined as supporters of ‘social revolution’ Communists or pro-Communists, thus blurring the difference between them and ‘radical democratic Socialists.’

550 Ibid, p2 para.3.

203 In early 1943, Tarnow used the clash between Stahl and Polenske, which came to its peak at this period, to get rid of Stahl and one less competitor for the post of leader of the SPD exiles in Sweden (and hopefully of all German speaking exiles in Sweden). Stahl, for his part, believed or pretended to believe, in his letters to Ollenhauer and Vogel, that Tarnow was on his side (see Part 2). Tarnow had no intention of being on his side. In his letter to Vogel of January 10, 1943 Tarnow acknowledged that Stahl’s wife was very sick but noted that Stahl found time to travel in Sweden,551 hinting that Stahl was exaggerating his hardships in order to excuse his bad management of the So.Pa.De Secretariat in Sweden. In the same letter Tarnow stated that, irrespective of whether the allegations against Stahl were true, it was clear that he should quit his post.552

Tarnow’s next task was to try to cancel the post of So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden, especially after learning that Heinig, who was the most senior exile besides himself, wanted the job. In an open letter to the Stockholm So.Pa.De group dated January 10, 1943 Tarnow claimed that there was no room for this position and recommended that members should have direct contact with the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London.553 Tarnow also claimed that Heinig was not fit for the task because he had not been involved in the last two years in So.Pa.De ‘illegal’ activity in Germany and believed that the exiles had no role in a future Germany (which was not true).554 Tarnow, whose ‘illegal’ activity in the 30s was not affiliated to the activity of the So.Pa.De ‘Grenzsekretariat’ and was therefore no independent verification of its extent and nature, was accusing Heinig, one of the three leaders of the ‘Copenhagen Grenzsekretariat’ of not taking part in the almost non-existent ‘illegal’ activity of the last two years. It was clear that Tarnow was prepared to do anything in order to render Heinig’s position meaningless. Heinig’s vehement stance on the issue of cooperation with the Communists played into the hands of Tarnow, who was ready to cooperate with almost anyone.

551 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 10.1.1943 AdsD/ M-134 para. 2. 552 Ibid, para.1. 553 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to the Stockholm So.Pa.De group dated 10.1.1943 AdsD /M-134 para. 1- 3. 554 Ibid, para. 4-9

204 In 1943, the relationship between Tarnow and Heinig had still not become one of open confrontation. In July 1943, Tarnow began taking part in the Forum of the ‘International Group of Democratic Socialists in Stockholm,’ and played a central role in the Forum, heading the Committee on ‘post-war economic questions.’ Among its members was Bruno Kreisky of the Austrian Social Democrats. The Committee began its work on June 30, 1943. It held nine meetings and Ernst Wigforss, the Swedish Finance Minister, gave a lecture to its members. The Committee’s proposals, however, were not as far-reaching as those of the hosting Swedish Social Democrats. They included ‘full employment,’ ‘ensuring a minimum standard of living for everyone’ and a call for further discussion on the question of ‘industrial democracy.’555 Tarnow was not committed even to decisions taken by a Forum of which he was a member.

In a letter to Vogel dated September 23, 1943 Tarnow expressed his feelings regarding the forum’s proposals. ‘my own desire to work on specific future programs is not very strong for no one knows what will be practical politically in the coming years’.556 In other words, whatever stance was declared by Tarnow during his exile was not to be taken seriously, according to his own testimony, since his stance was subject to whatever political alliances would be formed after the war.

American intelligence in Sweden, whose main interest in the SPD exiles was to ascertain whether they were influenced by Communists, had a positive view of Tarnow. They held the opinion that, although Tarnow had many ‘Communist friends,’ he had ‘no interest to lie’ about these contacts ‘because he and his comrades are committed to the re-building of the German labor movement with Anglo-American support and are suspicious of long-term cooperation with the Communists.’557 American intelligence assessments revealed a continuous ‘flirt’ on Tarnow’s part with Communists. His efforts to be seen as loyal to Vogel and having good contacts with

555 A report on the activity of the ‘International Group of Democratic Socialists in Stockholm’ written on 31.12.1943 by Willy Brandt Richard Sterner and Ernst Paul AdsD/ M-134 . 556 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 23.9.1943 AdsD /M-134 para. 1. 557 See State Department records of the U.S.A delegation to Stockholm published in 1985 as microfilms, memo number 2090 of 15.8.1943 and memo number 2185 of 15.9.1943 which described the information source as ‘Carl Rogers’ an O.S.S (the organization that later became the CIA) employee.

205 the Americans and the British while also maintaining contacts with German generals were not known then. So Tarnow was ‘covered’ from all directions.

At the same time, Tarnow did not want to be seen as a pawn of ‘capitalist Anglo- American interests’ (his words) and he emphasized the importance he accorded to the support of the Swedish Social Democrats; he claimed that he had told them that Germany’s post-war situation would be disastrous both for ‘German democracy’ and the ‘German working class’ and their help was thus essential.558 Seeing another source of future potential influence, Tarnow invested in preparing the Swedish Social Democrats and Swedish trade unions to play a role in the financial support of the post-war German trade unions.

In January 1944, Tarnow succeeded in his aim of marginalizing Heinig. He fully supported the decision of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group to support cooperation with the German-speaking Communist exiles through the Forum of the FDKB, as shown in his letters of January and February, 1944 which aimed at defending this decision against possible criticism by Vogel or Ollenhauer. With the majority of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group opposing him, Heinig began to lose ground, a process which came to its peak with the conference of the ‘Group of German Social Democrats in Sweden.’ In a letter to Vogel, Tarnow raised the idea that Russia had to re-build itself after the destruction of the war and therefore had interest in a united Germany, which would have full production capacity and an economy that would be able to support Russia’s reconstruction program. This idea was contrary to that held by certain voices in the Anglo- American camp who wanted to cripple Germany’s production capacity.559

Tarnow then presented three possible scenarios: there would be a ‘social revolution’ in Germany which would lead to civil war; Germany would gradually develop a democratic regime that would have an economy centered on ‘peace-time oriented’ production plus a social element; Germany would come under Russian military occupation regime, possibly through an alliance with German Generals which, in Tarnow’s view, the Communists would support without hesitation but not the Social Democrats – the military regime would later be replaced by a civilian regime in which

558 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 6.12.1943 AdsD/ M-134. 559 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 10.1.1944 AdsD/ M-134 para. 7.

206 workers would have significant influence.560 In this, Tarnow was indirectly admitting his tactics: to have good relations with the British and Americans in case the democratic alternative emerged most likely; to have contacts with the Communists in case that they took over Germany; and develop contacts with the German Generals who were planning a coup against Hitler in order to soften the attitudes of the Russians and Americans towards Germany, once Hitler and the Nazi Party were overthrown.

In his letter of February, 1944 Tarnow returned to the subject of cooperation with the Communists through the FDKB, this time using the argument that the FDKB was only a cultural forum and had no political role ‘in the tradition of the German humanism.’561

On July 24, 1944, four days after the failed coup against Hitler, Tarnow informed Vogel for the first time that he had contacts with the Generals at the center of the attempted coup. Tarnow stated that, five months before the failed coup, he became acquainted with a group consisting of Christian groups, democratic bourgeois, senior German officials (which were highly placed in the Nazi Party, but which Tarnow preferred not to mention) and German generals which intended to carry out a coup against Hitler.562 Even at this point, Tarnow hid the fact that he had had these contacts for a long time and that he was the group’s candidate for post of Labor Minister.563

In order to explain his support for the coup, although he did not admit to being significantly involved, Tarnow claimed that it aimed to show the ‘real face of the German people’ and create, as in Italy, a regime willing to negotiate with the allies.564 Tarnow did not explain why, two months after the allied landing in Normandy, he was ready to agree to the rehabilitation of senior members of the German army and of the Nazi Party, instead of supporting the development of a democratic Germany under British and American rule to begin with, a view he had convinced American intelligence that he supported. By October 1944, Tarnow no longer mentioned his

560 Ibid, p3. 561 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 23.2.1944 AdsD /M-134 para. 3. 562 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 24.7.1944 AdsD /M-134 para. 1. 563 Heinig describes this information in his letters to Schumacher (see next chapter) and based it on a report which Schumacher and Ollenhauer did not cast off as untrue.

207 involvement in the failed coup attempt coalition. He was again trying to be seen as supporting the re-building of the SPD under Anglo-American sponsorship and claimed that the ideas of German left-wing exiles to have a ‘total social revolution’ in Germany were naïve, in light of the historical events of the last 12 years.565

In December, 1944 Tarnow succeeded in weakening Heinig even more than in January 1944. Heinig was unpopular among most SPD exiles in Sweden because of his strong stand against cooperation with the Communists. Tarnow supported the initiative to have an organization of all SPD and German SAP exiles in Sweden. Heinig’s opposition to what was seen as a democratic step made him even more isolated. Even Raloff, who was not pro-cooperation with the Communists did not accept Heinig’s argument that, until the end of the war and the re-building of a new SPD in Germany, the legitimate body was the So.Pa.De Secretariat which chose him to his job and which was elected by the mass of SPD members in Germany in 1933 (see next chapter). Heinig had a strong case (although he had a different opinion of the Secretariat in June 1933 - see part 1), but it did not accord with the views of less senior SPD exiles. This group needed a senior figure who would support their intiative and Tarnow was happy to play this role. In his letter dated December 7, 1944 Tarnow explained that this was the will of the majority of SPD exiles in Sweden, noting that two thirds supported the initiative (one third of SPD exiles in Sweden supported Heinig’s stand and took no part in the organization).566 Since Heinig refused to attend the new land organization conference, Tarnow stated that the group would sever all ties with him and he no longer represented them in any way.567 Tarnow also informed Vogel of the establishment of the ‘Sozialistische Tribüne,’ the new organ of the SPD/German SAP land organization (a competitor of Zur Information).568

Tarnow began to publicly express a pro-cooperation stance in line with that of his more naïve friends in the Sweden SPD exile group. In January 1945, he published an article called ‘Historisches zur Frage: Partei und Gewerkschaften’ in which he stated

564 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 24.7.1944 AdsD /M-134 para. 2. 565 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 22.10.1944 AdsD/ M-134. 566 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 7.12.1944 AdsD /M-134 p1. 567 Ibid, p2. 568 Ibid, p4.

208 that the trade unions were founded before the SPD, meaning they were older than the party and independent of party discipline.569 He then noted that Marx himself claimed that trade unions were the body that operated the ‘true class struggle’ through its fight over workers rights and workers’ wages.570 Tarnow also mentioned the Mannheim Congress of 1906, which gave trade unions rather than the party the right to decide on a general strike.571 Tarnow concluded the article by stating that trade unions were the framework for united action by all Socialist streams.572

In his letters to Vogel, Tarnow insisted that claims about close contacts between himself and Communists were put out as disinformation on the part of Heinig’s group. He maintained that the ‘28s,’ as he called Heinig’s group, lacked all morals,573 adding that every effort by the Communists to persuade him to join a Communist-controlled ‘Committee for a Free Germany’ in Sweden had failed.574 In February 1945, in another article published in ‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ and titled ‘Partei und Gewerkschaften: Zukunftsaussichten,’ Tarnow repeated his claim that the trade unions were the framework for ‘united action’ with the Communists.575 He tried again to justify the July 20 coup group, writing (without mentioning his involvement) that, because of the coup’s failure, the war had continued into 1945. He then declared his support for a post-war democracy with a social element.576

On March 16, 1945, with American and British forces occupying a significant part of Germany, Tarnow made another effort to appease Vogel and curtailed his independent trade union rhetoric of January and February, 1945. He denied the allegations, this time by Raloff, of having had contacts with the Communists through Max Seydewitz, who had become, during his period of exile in the Czechoslovak Republic and Sweden, very close to the Communists and had joined the KPD in 1945.577 Tarnow also needed to explain again his involvement in the July 20 coup. He refuted new

569 Tarnow Fritz ‘Historisches zur Frage: Partei und Gewerkschaften’ January 1945 in ‘Sozialistischen Tribüne’ p 17-18 paras. 1-2 570 Ibid, paras. 3-5 571 Ibid, paras. 6-9 572 Ibid, last para. 573 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 18.1.1945 AdsD /M-134 para. 1. 574 Ibid, para. 2. 575 Fritz Tarnow ‘Partei und Gewerkschafften : Zukunftsaussichten’ ‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ February 1945 p 12-13 para.1 576 Tarnow,op.cit., p 12-13 577 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 16.3.1945 AdsD M-134 para. 2-3.

209 information provided by a German navy officer and a high-ranking official in Goebbels’ Ministry of Propaganda that he had been in contact with them and denounced the claim as based on personal interests.578 He did however admit to knowing the two men and that they were part of the organization. Tarnow was sufficiently acquainted with these Nazis to describe the official in Goebbels’ office as being of ‘weak character.’579

In addition to ensuring that he was not viewed by Vogel as pro-Communist or a friend of German nationalists, Tarnow continued to develop his relationship with Swedish trade unions. The Swedish trade unions could not be compared in importance to the British and Americans or to the Soviet Union, but as Social Democrats they were ready to help in the reconstruction of a sister Social Democratic trade union movement and Tarnow, like the So.Pa.De in the 30s, knew how to capitalize on this and obtain funds from them. In September 1945, he was promised by the LO the sum of 6000Skr – a sufficient sum to have ten full-time officials employed in recruiting trade union members and organizing them until the organization was able to finance itself from membership fees.580 Tarnow wanted more but the sum was conditioned on the number of members he was able to recruit (meaning that the LO had doubts about him). Nonetheless, it represented a significant sum in ruined Germany and helped Tarnow position himself once more as head of a German trade union. Together with the Americans’ positive attitude towards him, he was able to start working without being too dependent on Schumacher.

In November 1946, Tarnow became responsible for the pro-SPD trade unions in Hamburg581. On November 6, 1947 a united trade union in the British and American occupation zones, with two Generals Secretaries, was formed. As head of the trade unions in the American zone, Tarnow was one of the two General Secretaries. In May 1948, the organization was replaced by a trade union covering the three Western occupation zones. Tarnow was not elected as part of the new organization’s leadership but he became a SPD member of the temporary Parliament of the Western zones and he remained influential almost until his death in late 1951.

578 Ibid, para. 4. 579 Ibid, para. 5. 580 A letter from Fritz Tarnow to Hans Vogel dated 6.9.1945 AdsD M-134 paras. 2-3.

210

581 Sozialistische Mitteilungen November 1946 p 10

211 Chapter-3.3 How the political career of Kurt Heinig, the main ‘Swedophile,’ came to an end.

The decline in Heinig’s political status during 1944 played but a minor role in Heinig’s failure to become a central figure in the post 1945 SPD. It is my view that the factor that played a major role in this process was Schumacher’s attitude towards Heinig. Heinig was one of the 20 most senior surviving members of the Weimar SPD and more senior than Stahl in many aspects. He had a strong motivation to influence and to play a political role in the new SPD, there was no suspicion in his regard of corruption or collaboration with German rightwing elements, and Schumacher could be certain of Heinig’s anti-Communist views. It is therefore hard to accept Helmut Müssener claim that Heinig chose to stay in Sweden, never return to Germany, and be left out of the new SPD due to ‘personal reasons.’582 What is clear is that specific individuals, rather than personal reasons, were behind Heinig’s decision to keep his distance from the new SPD.

Kurt Heinig 1944 attacks against Tarnow and all those whom he believed cooperated with the Communists made him seem to be a fanatic and a person who could not lead the people under his responsibility. This could have made both Ollenhauer and, later, Schumacher believe that Heinig was not an asset to the SPD and that he lacked managerial skills, even though the political qualities needed to run a group of a few hundred exiles, many of whom saw themselves as future leaders, were very different to those needed in a mass party. Ollenhauer, also, was very watchful of any initiative that could entail cooperation with the Communists. For example, on January 25 1944, he sent Heinig a letter asking him to confirm information he had obtained from Communist publications stating that a ‘Committee for a Free Germany’ had been established in Stockholm including Heinig, Friedländer, Mugrauer, Hartwig, and Tarnow as SPD representatives. Ollenhauer asked Heinig to send back an answer as quickly as possible.583 One can conclude from this that Heinig had the full backing of

582 See Müssener Helmut ‘Exil in Schweden’, (Stockholm 1974), p 144-145 as well as all the biographical entries he wrote on Heinig. 583 A letter from Erich Ollenhauer to Kurt Heinig dated 25.1.1944 AdsD/ M-35 .

212 So.Pa.De Secretariat members in London in all his efforts to fight cooperation with the Communists. Ollenhauer’s letter began with the words ‘dear friend’ instead of the usual ‘dear comrade,’ which was another indication of the good relations between Heinig and Ollenhauer. Thus, despite all the humiliations he had been subjected to in January 1944 and later in November 1944 (the establishment of the Sweden organization of SPD and German SAP exiles against his will), he continued to enjoy the trust of the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London.

After visiting the British and, later, the American occupation zones meeting surviving SPD officials, Schumacher succeeded in arranging a General Congress aimed at restarting SPD operations in these areas. The Congress was held from October 5 to 7, 1945 in Hanover (British occupation zone). After Vogel’s death in October 1945 put an end to his initiative to organize the SPD under his leadership, Ollenhauer arrived at the Congress in Hanover with 30 members of the ‘Socialist Union’ in order to assist Schumacher. They were able to make the journey with relative ease because Hanover was in the British occupation zone. In February 1946, a permanent office of the Schumacher-led SPD, was established in Hanover. Ollenhauer and Heine, who were experienced in this area from the So.Pa.De period, ran the office in addition to Schumacher. Ollenhauer’s experience has already been described. Heine worked as a special aid to Wels and later as the aid of the Secretariat members in London.

Heinig corresponded with Schumacher’s office from its inception. His first letter dated March 1, 1946 was sent to Wilhelm Sander (an aid of the London-based Secretariat) with a request to pass it on to Schumacher’s office. In the letter, Heinig reported on his lack of success in obtaining financial help from the Swedish Social Democrats for the operation of a pro-Schumacher SPD campaign. He wrote that he and his wife were doing almost all the work by themselves and mentioned that a note from Schumacher to the Swedish Social Democrats would be of help.584 Heinig was clearly not questioning Schumacher’s leadership and he stressed the ‘hard work’ he and his wife were engaged in on behalf of the Schumacher SPD.

584 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 1.3.1946 AdsD/ M-65 paras. 2-3.

213 This was the line adopted by all SPD and German SAP exiles in Sweden, who wished to integrate into the Schumacher-led party. In 1946, most of the exiles, including those who had been the first to arrive, continued to live in Sweden or in liberated Norway and Denmark as conditions in Germany were still chaotic. Those who had families or a good job in Scandinavia would certainly have had to take this into account. Heinig reported that Hass and Krebs, both of whom held views that did not accord with Schumacher and Ollenhauer’s opposition to a union with the Communists, intended to return soon to Germany. Heinig added that they, as well as Mugrauer who had similar views, were pro uniting with the Communists and he wanted to make sure that they would not be received warmly by Schumacher’s SPD.585 On March 9, 1946 Heinig sent another letter in which he requested Sander to send him material on the real nature of the united party (the SED – the Communist- led union of KPD and SPD members mainly in the Russian occupation zone). Heinig also asked Sander to pay a condolence visit on his behalf to Vogel’s widow.586

On March 12, 1946 Heinig received the first reply to his letters of early March. Sander told Heinig that his letters of March 1 and 9 had been forwarded to Hanover587 but he rebuked Heinig for his criticism of Mugrauer, Krebs and the other trade unionists whom Heinig accused of cooperation with the Communists.588 Heinig was being given the message that his negative opinion of SPD exiles in Sweden was not valid as Schumacher’s SPD was interested in any experienced trade union officials who were ready to come and help, irrespective of their past views. Heinig informed Sander, and through him the Hanover office, that there were also SPD exiles in Sweden who were returning to Germany and whom he fully supported. He noted, at the beginning of his next letter, that he had attended a farewell party for Ortloff and Lindstaedt (SPD exiles from the Malmö So.Pa.De group) and a few others who intended to return to Germany via Lübeck.589 But he also issued a warning against those whom he genuinely considered to be unreliable new members of the

585 Ibid, paras. 5-8. 586 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 9.3.1946 AdsD /M-65. 587 A letter from Wilhelm Sander to Kurt Heinig dated the 12.3.1946 AdsD/ M-65 para. 8. 588 Ibid, paras. 3-4. 589 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 13.3.1946 AdsD /M-65 para. 1.

214 SPD, mentioning Willy Brandt and noting that Brandt’s articles in Sweden were critical of Schumacher.590

The integration of Brandt and Tarnow into the Schumacher SPD and the Social Democratic Trade Union movement was in fact the main thing that angered Heinig and made him feel unwanted in the new party. He could pass over the fact that warning regarding less important figures had been ignored, but the success of these two men – Tarnow, whom he hated and Brandt, whom he viewed as a young, unreliable opportunist, was too much for him. Their success became a symbol of Schumacher’s humiliating attitude towards Heinig, an attitude which Heinig also felt in other ways.

To begin with, Heinig tried to remind the Hanover office of his importance. His letter to Sander of March 30, 1946 began by describing his meeting with Sven Andersson of the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat and with Lindberg head of the LO.591 Heinig then noted that he was being treated by the Swedish Social Democrats not as a private person but as someone who had ‘internal and external political importance.’ Heinig reminded the Hanover office that Stahl, the former So.Pa.De Secretariat representative in Sweden, was only a member of the Prussian Parliament hinting that he, Heinig, had been a Reichstag member for a longer period than both Schumacher and Ollenhauer.592

He then launched into another attack on Tarnow, which further explained why it would be practically impossible for Heinig and Tarnow to be in the same party. Heinig wrote that he had learnt that Tarnow’s son (Reinhold Tarnow), as a member of the Nazi Party, had expropriated Heinig’s home in Berlin and allowed it to be damaged while in Nazi hands. Heinig added that he found it very difficult to leave the responsibility for settling this matter in the hands of Stahl who was, Heinig hinted, not entirely honest in financial matters and did not have to worry about money (despite his complaints) due to the fact that his wife owned a lot of property. Heinig added

590 Ibid, para. 2. 591 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 30.3.1946 AdsD /M-65 para. 1. 592 Ibid, para. 2-3.

215 that, naturally, he could not write to Tarnow on the matter.593 It thus became clear that the feud between Tarnow and Heinig was not just on ideological matters (Heinig’s uncompromising attitude towards cooperation with the Communists versus Tarnow’s readiness to cooperate with both Communists and right-wing nationalists), nor was it simply a power struggle over the leadership of the SPD exiles in Sweden. Tarnow’s son was directly responsible for Heinig’s being left without a home in Germany. It was also obvious that Heinig did not trust Stahl’s judgment on the matter for he suspected him of having a secret agreement with Tarnow based on Stahl’s weakness for money (although Heinig did not dare make such allegations in public). Stahl was in fact relevant in the matter since he had been head of So.Pa.De activities in Berlin at the time.

On April 1, 1946 Heinig sent another letter to the Hanover office via Sander, in which he reported on his meeting with Lindberg of the Swedish LO, describing Lindberg’s status as the ‘Swedish Leipart (head of the ‘Weimar trade unions’) of the Swedish ADGB.’ Heinig noted that he gave Lindberg Schumacher’s address in Hanover and reported that Lindberg had promised to send to the Hanover office the significant sum of 25,000 Skr for the re-building of the German trade unions (enough to finance 15 full-time positions for trade union officials for one year).594 The money could help to put the trade unions under the control of Schumacher’s SPD since he would be receiving the funds. Heinig once again raised serious allegations against Tarnow, claiming that Tarnow had been responsible for the ‘shameless’ appeal to the NSDAP by the ADGB (to prevent its outlawing) and had tried ‘hypocritically’ to have an alternative relationship with the Nazi Party. Heinig added that he was sure there were party members in Germany who had much more to say on the subject.595 Tarnow’s central role in the ‘flirt’ between the German trade unions and the Nazi Party was now common knowledge. Nonetheless, Heinig’s attacks against Tarnow were completely ignored by the Hanover office and none of the letters sent to him by the office referred to the matter.

593 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 30.3.1946 AdsD M-65 paras. 3-4. 594 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 1.4.1946 AdsD M-65 paras. 1-4. 595 Ibid, para. 4.

216 On April 3, 1946 Heinig received an answer to his letter of mid-March. This was the first letter, which was sent to Heinig directly from Hanover. In what seemed as an effort to appease Heinig (even though the letter did not directly answer Heinig’s letters of April 1 and March 30), Sander thanked him for the information he provided in his letters of mid-March, explained that there were many problems with the mail and added that Schumacher had read all the issues of Zur Information and was very pleased.596 A copy from all the issues of ‘Zur Information’ was send to the So.Pa.De secretariat in London (see chapter 2.3) and they were probably brought to Hannover by Ollenhauer group.

On the same day (April 3), Heinig sent another letter via Sander in which he described his achievements in Sweden, reporting on a conversation he had held with Per Albin Hansson (still head of the Swedish Social Democrats and Swedish Prime Minister).597 The next day, Heinig sent a letter reporting that the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat had requested an address for telegrams so it could have direct contact with the Hanover office.598 On April 9, following his successful meetings, and before he knew that his accusations against Tarnow and Brandt were considered unimportant by the Hanover office, Heinig wrote directly to Schumacher, requesting a leadership post in the new SPD.

596 A letter from the ‘Hanover office’ to Kurt Heinig dated 3.4.1946 AdsD/ M-65. 597 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander paras. 2-3 dated 3.4.1946 AdsD/ M-65. 598 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 4.4.1946 AdsD /M-65.

217

599

In the letter, Heinig stressed the fact that the two men held similar political views and had similar seniority, adding that the SPD would benefit from their common experience and that he was ready to help in any possible way – all of which left no doubt as to Heinig’s aim. His offer was not naïve, in his view. He probably believed, after Sander’s letter of April 3, that he and Schumacher shared similar views regarding the future nature, tactics and ideals of the SPD, nor did he see any logic in Schumacher’s preferring upon him over a dubious personality such as Tarnow, who represented the complete opposite of Schumacher. Heinig also saw no reason why Schumacher would prefer a man with no significant political career or achievements such as Willy Brandt.over an experienced, senior SPD official such as himself.

On April 12, Heinig sent another letter directly to the Hanover office, in which he tried to ascertain whether his letter April 9 had been received, indicated the importance he attributed to the letter.600 Heinig also described his latest activities

599 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Kurt Schumacher dated 9.4.1946 AdsD/ M-65. 600 A letter from Kurt Heinig to the ‘Hanover office’ (Heine) dated 12.4.1946 AdsD/ M-65 para. 1.

218 aimed at explaining the SPD’s stands to the Swedish public.601 On April 16, Heinig received an invitation to the new SPD’s first General Congress, which was due to be held in Hanover from May 9-11, 1946. Heinig informed the Swedish Social Democratic Party Secretariat of the Congress.602

On October 24, Heinig reported that the Swedish Social Democratic Party had decided to send Richard Lindström (a member of the Swedish Social Democratic Secretariat who strongly supported the Folkhem policy and ideals and someone who had a very close relationship with Per Albin Hansson) to the SPD Congress. Heinig also reported that he had talked with the Danish Social Democrats, who planned to send two party members but had not yet decided who these would be. Since he planned to drive to Hanover with Lindström and the two Danish guests, Heinig offered to give a lift to one or two delegates from Hamburg. 603

It was only on April 30 that Heinig finally received an answer to his proposal for a political alliance (April 9) and indeed to all the efforts and achievements he had made on behalf of Schumacher’s new SPD in Scandinavia. All that was said with regard to his offer was ‘thank you for your letter of April 9.’ The letter was not signed by Schumacher and had actually been written by Heine.604

The message was clear: in Schumacher’s eyes, Heinig was no more than one out of many former SPD members who were welcome to join the new SPD but would receive no preferential treatment. Regarding Heinig role in the ‘Weimar SPD’ it was not an appealing option to have to restart a political career from the bottom at the age of 60. However, Heinig did take part in the SPD congress as a guest.605

Heinig received a letter from the Hanover office on May 18 (censored by the British)606 and on May 24 and he sent a letter to the office on May 21, 1946. It would appear that he had not given up hope of having some political influence on the new

601 Ibid, paras. 2-3. 602 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Kurt Schumacher dated 16.4.1946 AdsD/ M-65. 603 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Wilhelm Sander dated 24.4.1946 AdsD /M-65. A letter from the Hanover office to Kurt Heinig dated 30.4.1946 AdsD /M-65.

605 ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ June 1946 p 5 606 See Kurt Heinig's letter to the SPD Secretariat of June 7, 1946 AdsD/ M-65 para. 1.

219 SPD, if he proved his usefulness. In his letter of June 3, Heinig gave a long report on the exiles who intended to join the new SPD, men such as Paul Lewy and others. In a second attack, Heinig branded Willy Brandt as a ‘political adventurer’607 and he reminded the SPD secretariat for the third time that Tarnow had had contacts with ‘far-right’ German elements. Heinig also reported on a man named Wurbs, whom he viewed as untrustworthy as he was suspected of having also worked for the Nazis, but he noted that this man had disclosed, at a time when he had no interest in lying, that the German generals at the center of the July 20, 1944 coup attempt wanted Tarnow as Labor Minister.608 Tarnow admitted, in his letters after the coup attempt, that he had had contacts with these right-wing nationalist elements (see former chapter) but at no time did he admit that he had been offered the post of minister.

On June 4, Heinig sent a letter to Schumacher and Ollenhauer in which he suggested them to develop close contacts with August Lindberg, head of the Swedish trade unions since Lindberg spoke excellent German and understood their situation, due in part to the fact that his wife was of German origin and in part to the long period he had spent in Germany and in the Czechoslovak Republic.609

The Hanover office, which was now the office of the new SPD Secretariat, was happy to give Heinig information material for distribution in Sweden and thanked him for his activity in this area.610 Heinig’s advice was treated differently.

In a letter sent by the Secretariat on June 6, 1946 Heinig was asked to provide more information on Paul Lewy in view of the fact that Heinig had claimed that Lewy had been a spy. The Hanover office wished to present Lewy ‘correctly’ and prevent him from writing in Frankfurt newspapers while describing himself as a loyal Social Democrat.611 This was a case of how Heinig’s information was viewed reliable and was not ignored when it related to a figure who was unwanted by the new SPD leadership, which was not the case when it came to Brandt and Tarnow.

607 A letter from Kurt Heinig to the SPD Secretariat dated 3.6.1946 AdsD/ M-65 para. 2. 608 A letter from Kurt Heinig to the SPD Secretariat dated 3.6.1946 AdsD /M-65 para. 5-6. 609 A letter from Kurt Heinig to Kurt Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer dated 4.6.1946 AdsD /M-65. 610 A letter from the SPD Secretariat to Kurt Heinig dated 6.6.1946 AdsD /M-65. 611 Ibid

220 On July 10, Heinig again attacked Brandt claiming that Brandt had slandered him and Ollenhauer.612 He offered the following negative opinion of Brandt. ‘Er ist stark emotionell veranlagt. Nach meiner Auffassung gehört er zu jenen Typen, intelligent und gefühlsbetont , demagogish und an gutem Leben interessiert, die man besser nicht in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung hat.’613 (He is emotionally unstable. According to my understanding he belongs to the type that is intelligent, emotional, demagogic and interested in the good life. It is best for the man not to be in the German labor movement.) For Heinig it was clearly a case of choosing him or Brandt and Tarnow. The reply of July 29, 1946 related to Brandt and Heinig’s claim that Brandt had slendered Ollenhauer seemed to have an effect (the letter noted that Ollenhauer would deal with the matter).614 However there was no evidence that the Secretariat agreed with Heinig that Brandt should be prevented from joining the SPD.

The strongest expression of thanks, which Heinig received from the SPD Secretariat related to the fact that he had managed to send the Secretariat a large amount of paper in order to help it function (there was an acute paper shortage in Germany).615 This seemed to be the only area in which Heinig was still important to the SPD Secretariat.

On August 12, 1946 Heinig again criticized some of the elements who had joined the new SPD. He noted that reports that former members of the Nazi party had joined the SPD in Schleswig Holstain had damaged the reputation of the SPD in Scandinavia and particularly in Denmark.616 It took almost a month before the Secretariat responded to Heinig’s warning. The answer explained that the SPD was not able to check all new members who arrived from East Prussia.617

Heinig did not sever his contacts with the SPD. He retained the title SPD Representative in Sweden till December 1947 (there were parallel posts in London, Paris and New-York618) and helped arrange Schumacher’s visit to Sweden which took

612 A letter from Kurt Heinig to the SPD Secretariat dated 10.7.1946 AdsD/ M-65 para. 3. 613 Ibid, para 5. 614 A letter from the SPD Secretariat to Kurt Heinig dated 29.7.1946 AdsD /M-65. 615 A letter from the SPD Secretariat to Kurt Heinig dated 1.8.1946 AdsD /M-65. 616 A letter from Kurt Heinig to the SPD Secretariat (Heine) dated 12.8.1946 AdsD/M-65 p2 . 617 A letter from the SPD Secretariat to Kurt Heinig dated 11.9.1946 AdsD/ M-65. 618 Sozialistische Mitteilungen July/ August 1947 p 1

221 place November 17-24, 1947.619 Heinig also tried to influence the SPD from the outside through his writings in the period 1947-1956. But he remained in Sweden during the second SPD Congress in June 1947.620

Once Brandt joined the SPD leadership in Berlin in 1947, and with Tarnow as head of the German trade unions in the American occupation zone, and Schumacher ignoring his offer of a political alliance and letting him understand that he would have to start from the bottom again, Heinig had good reason to remain in Sweden. For younger men such as Bromme or even Sassnick, it was perhaps possible to re-start from this point but not for Heinig, in view of his age and former status. The treatment he received at the hands of the new SPD Secretariat was humiliating and he was intelligent enough to understand that he was not wanted.

619 ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ December 1947 p 4-5 620 ‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ July/August 1947 p 1

222 Chapter-3.4 The fates of Stahl, Raloff, Sassnick, Friedländer and the supporters of cooperation with the Communists.

The reasons, which accounted for the successful re-integration of SPD exiles into German politics or to their exit from political life and choosing to remain in Sweden, varied according to the personal and political circumstances of each of the figures dealt in this chapter. Men such as Raloff and Sassnick were welcomed, in principle, into Schumacher’s new SPD as they had always been loyal to the So.Pa.De Secretariat. Unlike Heinig, they had no leadership aspirations and they had been less senior than Schumacher and Ollenhauer in the Weimar SPD period. They also did not take a central part in the intrigues of the SPD exiles in Sweden during 1941-1945. They did not express views that opposed the mainstream and did not pursue a political line that could have brought them into friction with strong figures in the new SPD. It was therefore unsurprising for Sassnick to become well integrated in the new SPD. In Raloff’s case, in view of his and his wife’s preference already in the early 40s, it was clear that personal reasons were the main reasons for the decision to remain in Scandinavia.

Stahl and Polenske were aged 70 when the war ended and both of them suffered from the impact of their feud in 1942 and early 1943. Hass, Mugrauer and Krebs were relatively young, which made them a commodity in Schumacher’s party, on condition they renounced their support of cooperation with the Communists. As for Friedländer, he had good political reasons as well as personal reasons not to join Schumacher’s party. I will deal with each of these figures in detail.

Sassnick kept a relatively low profile after early 1943. When the Stockholm So.Pa.De group split in January 1944, Sassnick chose to side with Heinig’s group but he was not willing to stand with Heinig in the front line and be a target for attacks by Tarnow and pro-cooperation supporters. On January 19, 1944 Sassnick sent a letter to Heinig with a copy to Ollenhauer in which he protested at the inclusion of his name and that of his wife on a list of protesters against the direction of the Hass-led Stockholm

223 So.Pa.De group, stating that he did not wish to be involved in the row and believed every one was entitled to their own opinion even if their views differed from his.621 Heinig, however, was not resentful and did not attack Sassnick who published, in September 1944, an article in Zur Information.622

In May 1945, Sassnick renewed (after a break of almost seven years) his direct correspondence with Vogel who was planning to re-build the SPD under his leadership. In the letter, which began with the words ‘Dear comrade and friend,’ Sassnick stressed that he had always been loyal to the Secretariat and rejected any notion that his letter of January 1944 or his actions represented criticism of the Secretariat or that he had criticized Vogel.623 With Vogel’s death in October 1945, Sassnick had to focus on another direction. In May 1946, he began to correspond with the SPD Secretariat in Hanover. In his letter of June 6, 1946 he put forward a modest request: he asked for a position of journalist or editor in the new SPD press. He gave Heine, to whom the letter was addressed, details of his journalistic career in Sweden (the publication of Das Wort)624 and expressed his intention of returning to Germany as quickly as possible.

In his letter of June 11, 1946 Heine informed Sassnick that he had heard from several people about his journalistic activities in the Weimar Republic and that he was the editor of a Social Democratic paper. He assured him that there was a place for him in the new SPD press when he came to Germany.625 In his answer, Sassnick thanked Heine, noting that he had no personal ambitions except for the wish to serve the party as a journalist and intended to return to Germany as quickly a possible.626 On his return to Regensburg (in South-Eastern Germany) in 1946, Sassnick quickly became the editor of the SPD newspaper in the Regensburg area and one of the SPD senior figures in the Nürnberg area. He was elected as SPD member in 1949 and remained a member of the Bundestag till his death in 1955. However, the protocols of

621 A letter from Walter Sassnick to Kurt Heinig with a copy to Erich Ollenhauer dated 19.1.1944 AdsD/ M-112 para. 2. 622 ‘Zur information’ 30.9.1944 p 8 623 A letter from Walter Sassnick to Hans Vogel dated 3.5.1945 AdsD/ M-112. 624 A letter from Walter Sassnick to Fritz Heine dated 6.6.1946 AdsD /M-68. 625 A letter from Fritz Heine to Walter Sassnick dated 11.6.1946 AdsD /M-68. 626 A letter from Walter Sassnick dated 27.6.1946 AdsD /M-68.

224 the SPD Bundestag group do not mention Sassnick who continued to be quiet and to refrain from expressing his opinions.

Raloff was younger than Sassnick and had, unlike the older SPD exiles, young children. Germany, in the mid and late 40s was a ruined country with dire conditions compared to Denmark. Raloff and his wife had chosen in the early 40s to settle, she in Denmark and he in Southern Sweden, thus keeping a distance between themselves and the politics of the SPD exiles in Stockholm (see previous part). Raloff made a brief effort to intervene in the dispute between Heinig and the organizers of the land organization of the SPD and German SAP exiles in Sweden. He tended to take the side of the land organization supporters and in a letter to Ollenhauer he described Heinig’s arguments against this development as trying to save his political future.627

In another letter to Ollenhauer in April 1945, as a counter measure to this stand against Heinig and his support for the new exile organization, Raloff emphasized his loyalty to the London-based Secretariat.628 But he wrote that he had no intention of dragging his family again to another country and would only consider returning to Germany when it became a safe democracy.629 In September 1945, he told Ollenhauer that his wife, Grete, was not eager to return to Germany in the near future.630 He learnt about the SPD’s conference in Hanover in October 1945 from a Swedish newspaper.631 Raloff settled in Denmark and, in 1952, was appointed Press Attaché at the German embassy in Copenhagen.

Stahl was barred from mid-1943 from receiving information directly from London and complained about this in early 1944.632 He was naturally glad when Vogel proposed maintaining the So.Pa.De Secretariat as the temporary Secretariat of the new SPD.633 After Vogel’s death in October 1945, Stahl was no longer relevant. His letter to Ollenhauer of December 17, 1945 dealt mainly with his family.634

627 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 10.12.1944 AdsD/ M-89 p2-4. 628 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 12.4.1945 AdsD /M-89 p1. 629 Ibid, p2. 630 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 17.9.1946 AdsD /M-89 . 631 A letter from Karl Raloff to Erich Ollenhauer dated 22.10.1945 AdsD/ M-89. 632 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 25.1.1944 AdsD /M-131. 633 A letter from Emil Stahl to Hans Vogel and Erich Ollenhauer dated 9.5.1945 AdsD/ M-131.

225 Polenske did not maintain an extensive correspondence with the Secretariat in London after leaving the leadership of the Stockholm So.Pa.De group at the end of 1943 but continued to play a role in the internal politics of the SPD exiles in Sweden during 1944. Polenske wrote to the Secretariat mainly in order to support the Stockholm So.Pa.De group that favored cooperation with the Communists, even though he was no longer its head.635 His political activity ended with the dismantling of the ‘SPD and German SAP exiles organization in Sweden’ but he remained in Sweden till 1950 and returned to Germany at the age of 74. In subsequent years, he wrote in the German trade union press and in 1952, he published a short book, in a limited edition, on the German trade unions. At the beginning of the book, he described Scandinavian countries as countries where trade unions played a central role in the economy and noted that such a system, which combined trade union rule and corporative national economies, should be a model for the DGB.636

Mugrauer and Krebs returned to Germany in 1946 (see Heinig’s letters) and integrated into the trade unions. Since the trade unions were relatively independent of the new SPD, their former status as men who had not stood for election to Parliament or played a leading role in the party, was less problematic. The DGB adopted in 1949 a more radical and egalitarian stand compared to the party action programs of the 50s, which was another element in their favor. Good contacts with Tarnow, who was very influential in the trade union movement in 1946 and 1947 must have also helped. Mugrauer became in 1952 a Secretariat member of the strong Metalworkers’ Trade Union. Hass, who also returned in 1946 to Germany, was elected to the Hamburg Parliament in 1947 but by the following year was back in Sweden, which almost certainly meant that he did not have the support of the SPD which had begun to control the left block in the British and American occupation zones.

The political strategy for Germany, which Otto Friedländer supported (a coalition between the Zentrum Party, the SPD and the KPD) became unfeasible in 1946 and 1947. The alternatives for Friedländer were Schumacher’s anti-Communist SPD which was not likely to support such a coalition and the SED, which was clearly

634 A letter from Emil Stahl to Erich Ollenhauer dated 17.12.1945 AdsD /M-131. 635 See for example Polenske's letter to Hans Vogel of 10.3.1944 AdsD M-88. 636 Polenske Carl, ‘Die Gewerkschaft.’ (Braunschweig 1952), Ms in AdsD,AKO1809, p 9

226 under Communist control although officially a union of the SPD and the KPD. Friedländer was shocked by the role played by the German people in Nazi atrocities. In an article in the ‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ published in October 1945 and titled ‘Pädagogik und Okkupation,’ Friedländer called for the re-education of Germans so that they would know the ‘difference between black and white.’637

Heinig did not strongly criticize Friedländer except for the latter’s membership in the FDKB. For his part, Friedländer did not make a special effort to have extensive contact with the Hanover office and there is almost no correspondence between him and the SPD Secretariat in Hanover.

In the epilogue to his privately published 1951 book ‘Reiseandenken’ (Thoughts While Travelling), Friedländer left no doubt as to the reason why he decided not to return to Germany. ‘Germany and Sweden - Epilogue We who are called German Jews, We have no more trust in the human community of this land because when they hunted, tormented and burned us, they [the Germans] protested little or not at all. The [German] community can no longer profit from the centuries old association [with Jews]. The old dream [Israel] circles the Mediterranean Sea, Yet my homeland is in the North where people live freely in the community,and where they take care of the old and the young.’ 638

637 Friedländer Otto ‘Pädagogik und Okkupation’ ‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ October 1945 p14-17

638 Friedländer Otto, ‘Reiseandenken.’( Stockholm 1951), p 9

227 Chapter-3.5 Paul Bromme – the Road to Lübeck.

Paul Bromme became head of the SPD in Lübeck in the early 50s and held this position till the early 70s. His achievements were not of the level of Willy Brandt’s ‘road to Berlin’ but they were impressive, especially for a man whose last job in the Weimar Republic SPD was that of a journalist in the Lübecker Volksboten. Bromme was also a SPD member of the Bundestag from 1949 to 1953, a senator in the Schleswig- Holstein Landtag from 1954 to 1971, and the Mayor of Lübeck in 1956.

Bromme made a great effort to be seen as a loyal member by the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London and he was regarded by Heinig in 1943, 1944 and 1945 as an ally. Bromme regularly received Zur Information during 1943 (the paper was sent to some 60 SPD exiles in Sweden and one copy was sent every month to the So.Pa.De Secretariat in London).639 On March 25 and 26, 1944 following the split in the Stockholm So.Pa.De group, Bromme and Heinig took part in a conference in Örebro which was organized by Bromme’s paper the ‘Örebro kuriren.’ The main questions discussed were whether the Communists were taking control of the trade unions and how to improve the organization of the So.Pa.De’s activities in Sweden.640

In January 1945 (after the Congress of the land organization of the SPD and German SAP exiles in Sweden, which Heinig described as splitting the party),641 Heinig made a list of ‘loyal’ SPD exiles who had contacts with the Swedish press. Bromme’s name figured on the list, which included some 15 names, and his was the only one which appeared together with the name of his newspaper, indicating that the others did not have his status as a member of an editorial board with his own column.642 Heinig received positive coverage in ‘Örebro kuriren.’ On October 12, 1944 his picture was published on the first page of the paper together with his title as ‘Representative of the

639 See list in ‘Zur Information’ of December 1943 640 ‘Zur Information’ 30.3.1944 p 9 641 ‘Zur Information’ December 1944 p 7-8

228 So.Pa.De in Sweden’ and a description of the roles he played in the Weimar Republic SPD. The article itself dealt with reports of a rebellion in the Cologne area, which Heinig had received via a long telephone conversation with a friend in Germany. Bromme did not write the article but it can be assumed that, as an acquaintance of Heinig and a member of the So.Pa.De, he was involved in the publication of the article and in making sure that Heinig was correctly portrayed.

Bromme tried to have direct contact with the Hanover office from its very inception. The first letter sent by Bromme to the office dated from March 2, 1946. It was written on the official paper of Örebro kuriren, most probably in order to stress Bromme’s status in Sweden and was address to Heine. Bromme reported that the debate between supporters of a party uniting the labor movement in Germany and those who supported an independent SPD was covered extensively in the Swedish press but with little commentary. Bromme noted that, together with Heinig, he had called the main Swedish evening newspapers to explain the position of the independent SPD.643 Bromme clearly wanted, at this stage, to be seen as having close relations with Heinig whom he still viewed as being a political asset and a powerful man.

Regarding his own plans, Bromme wrote that he intended to return to Germany immediately as soon as it was safe to go there without being arrested (Bromme, unlike Brandt did not have Scandinavian citizenship, and like most other exiles his German citizenship had been cancelled by the Nazi regime). In the same context, he sent his regards to a senior party member from Lübeck, August Haut.644

On March 5, 1946 Bromme dedicated his column to Schumacher. He claimed that Schumacher was ready to work with all legitimate political parties including the Communists (the Social Democratic Government in Sweden at this time preferred to have the outside support of the small Communist Party instead of a coalition with the Farmers’ Party).645 Bromme described Schumacher’s brave personal history and the fact that he resisted the Nazis throughout the 12 years they were in power and spent more than six years in Nazi concentration camps. He also noted that Schumacher lost

642 ‘Zur Information’ January 1945 p 3 643 A letter from Paul Bromme to the Hanover office (Heine) dated 2.3.1946 AdsD M/-64 para. 2. 644 Ibid, para. 4.

229 an arm in WWI.646 Bromme ended his article by calling Schumacher the ‘unofficial leader of the German Social Democrats’ and described the re-launch conference of the SPD Party representing the British and American occupation zones, which was held in October 1945.647

Bromme received an answer to his letter of March 2, 1946 only on April 25, 1946. This was partly because his letter had been sent through a Swedish friend in the Red Cross648 and partly because correspondence with Bromme at this point was clearly not considered high priority. The letter stated that it was very important for the Swedish public to be well informed on the position of the SPD and this was a sign that Bromme’s work had some importance in the eyes of the Hanover office. Bromme was also informed that Haut and Ollenhauer received his regards and that he should send future letters through Sander in London because this was the most efficient way.649 It was clear from the letter that Bromme had not consulted Heinig, since he did not know that the best route was via Sander. Others like Sassnick, who were in less of a hurry to make immediate contact with Schumacher, waited till the new SPD Secretariat was established.

Bromme did not attend the first Congress of the renewed SPD which was held in Hanover in May 1946 and sent instead a telegram to Heine.650 He also wrote directly to Haut in Lübeck and informed the SPD Secretariat about this.651 In his next letter of May 21, 1946 Bromme again reported that he had sent a letter to Haut. He continued to reiterate that he had a good relationship with Heinig, noting that he did not have the opportunity to meet Heinig in recent weeks (following the Hanover conference) and describing Heinig’s work with the Swedish press.652 But he also reported on Brandt’s successful work on behalf of the SPD among Scandinavian Social Democrats and in the Swedish press.653 He maintained that he would continue to send his letters directly

645 BrommePaul ‘Örebro kuriren’ ‘Veckans profil’ of 5.3.1946 para. 2 646 Ibid, para. 3 647 Ibid, para. 4 648 See para. 1 in Bromme's letter to the Hanover office of 2.3.1946 649 A letter from the Hanover office Bromme dated 25.4.1946 AdsD /M-64. 650 A telegram from Bromme to Heine dated 16.5.1946 AdsD/ M-64. 651 A letter from Bromme to Heine dated 6.5.1946 and sent again on 17.7.1946 AdsD /M-64. 652 A letter from Bromme to the SPD Secretariat (Heine) dated 21.5.1946 AdsD/ M-64 paras. 2-3. 653 Ibid, para. 4

230 since the route via Sander was for personal matters. He ended his letter stating that he hoped to meet with Brandt in the near future and hear from him about Haut.654 Bromme clearly had good relations at this point with Brandt while describing himself also as being on friendly terms with Heinig, who was very critical of Brandt.

The answer by the Secretariat arrived a month later and showed that Bromme’s efforts to be considered as an important figure had been successful. Heine stated that it was possible for him, from now on, to correspond directly with the Secretariat and he requested Bromme, on this forthcoming trip to Norway (Bromme had mentioned the trip in his letter of May 21, 1946), to assess public opinion regarding the re-building of Germany, in view of the fact that Norway had suffered greatly during the war and the SPD feared that Norway would have a negative attitude towards Germany’s reconstruction.655

Writing after his visit to Norway, Bromme quoted a Gallop poll carried out in Norway on the subject of giving help to German children. The lowest support was among the Norwegian Social Democratic voters (65%) and Communist voters (60%). Bromme described Brandt’s activities in the Social Democratic press which aimed at improving this hostile attitude.656 In a letter to the SPD Secretariat dated July 8, Bromme wrote of his disappointment at the fact that the Swedish press had described the elections in the American occupation zone as a victory for ‘bourgeois parties,’ even though Baden, Württemberg and Bayern had always been areas which, due to their economic structure, tended to vote for ‘bourgeois parties’ and even though in Saxony the SPD emerged as the largest party.657 Since the letter was addressed to the SPD Secretariat rather than to the Swedish press, it represented an indirect criticism of Heinig’s work and his inability to ‘describe correctly’ the political developments in Germany.

On July 12, 1946 Heine told Bromme that he had mentioned his name as a possible candidate for a new SPD organ in Frankfurt.658 Sassnick had to request a similar

654 Ibid, para. 5-6 655 A letter from the SPD Secretariat (Heine) to Bromme dated 21.6.1946 AdsD/ M-64. 656 A letter from Bromme to the SPD Secretariat (Heine) dated 4.7.1946 AdsD /M-64. 657 A letter from Bromme to the SPD Secretariat (Heine) dated 8.7.1946 AdsD/ M-64. 658 A letter from Heine to Bromme dated 12.7.1946 AdsD /M-64.

231 position while Bromme, who was eleven years younger, was offered it freely. On the same day, Bromme wrote to the Secretariat describing decisions taken in Sweden and Denmark, which had relevance to Germany and adding that he still had not heard anything from Lübeck.659 On July 17, Bromme thanked Heine for his offer but went on to write on other matters. Understanding that the combination between his relatively young age (40) and his proven journalistic experience would make him a welcome recruit to the new SPD, Bromme played hard to get and the tactic paid off. On July 23, 1946 Heine wrote to Bromme about a meeting he had had with two party members from Lübeck (Albrecht and Pasarge) who had praised his work as a party member in Lübeck and had promised that there would be a place for him in the Lübeck SPD when he returned to Germany. 660

In another indication of his growing status, Bromme reported on July 27, 1946 that he had met with senior members of the Norwegian Labor Party (fulfilling an earlier request of the Secretariat). His report was not positive regarding the attitude in the Norwegian public towards Germany (they do not care about the future of Germany and, not surprisingly, they did not care about the harsh living conditions of the German people). The Norwegian Labor leadership had also not yet decided whether to support a united Germany, a Federal State or a Federation of Independent States. However the Norwegian Labor Party was ready to support financially the new SPD and their positive attitude towards the SPD was, in Bromme’s view, largely due to Willy Brandt’s work.661

Bromme could now impress the Secretariat with his contacts (partly the result of his positive writings on the Norwegian Labor Party and partly due to the period he had spent in exile in Norway). His support of Brandt’s standing in the Party was probably the reflection of a new political alliance that was replacing that with Heinig whose declining status made him less attractive to Bromme. Bromme’s letter was warmly received by the SPD Secretariat.662 Bromme also sent to SPD Secretariat a report on the attitude of the Communist Party in Sweden towards Germany and towards the SED. In his reply on August 21, 1946 Heine asked Bromme to use his contacts in

659 A letter from Bromme to the SPD Secretariat dated 12.7.1946 AdsD/ M-64. 660 A letter from Heine to Bromme dated 23.7.1946/ M-64 SPD archives Bonn. 661 A letter from Bromme to SPD Secretariat (Heine) dated 27.7.1946 AdsD/ M-64.

232 order to find a trustworthy person who could supply them with more information. 663 Bromme was now the most senior SPD exile in Scandinavia, as Brandt had returned to Germany and, consequently, the Secretariat approached Bromme, rather than Heinig, to implement sensitive tasks.

During 1947, Bromme was still most of the time in Sweden. He ceased writing his column in ‘Örebro kuriren’ but published through ‘Örebro kuriren’s’ publishing house a short book titled ‘Potsdam – Arvet’ containing articles on Germany which had been published in 1946. The introduction to the book was written in September 1947. The book aim was to raise the popularity of the SPD among supporters of the left block in Sweden at the expense of the SED and garner support for the reconstruction of Germany.

Bromme returned in Germany in 1948 and was immediately given the post of editor of the Lübeck SPD organ, the ‘Lübecker freie Presse.’ In the SPD Weimar period, the head of the party in Lübeck held the position of editor in the city’s main party organ. Julius Leber, head of the SPD in Lübeck during the Weimar period had remained in Germany during the war and taken part in the July 20, 1944 failed coup attempt and was executed in January 1945. Unlike Tarnow, Leber had always belonged to the right-wing of the SPD and had never ‘flirted’ with the Communists. He had taken a great risk, which cost him his life. Thus when Bromme succeeded him as editor of the main SPD organ in the city, he effectively became head of the Lübeck SPD. He was elected in 1949 to the Bundestag on behalf of the SPD. In the Parliamentary Party group meetings, Bromme tended to speak primarily on Lübeck issues, thus positioning himself as a local leader.664

662 A letter from Heine to Bromme dated 17.8.1946 AdsD/ M-64. 663 A letter from Heine to Bromme dated 17.9.1946 AdsD /M-64. 664Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag: Sitzungprotokolle 1949-1957 AdsD A93-1121;ARB 628 Q Frak p 4-127

233 Chapter-3.6 Kurt Heinig tries to convince the SPD that ‘reform should lead to a social revolution.’

By 1947, Heinig had given up his direct political involvement in the SPD but, almost until his death in 1956, he continued to try to influence the SPD from Sweden to adopt the party ideology of the Swedish Social Democrats. The SPD ‘action program’ of 1952/1954 showed that he failed in this task (the result was to be predicted in view of the fact that Heinig no longer had power in the Party and thus took no part in drafting the program, a task that was done mainly by Eichler and, to a lesser degree, by Ollenhauer and other members of the SPD who held non-egalitarian views).

The main element in Heinig’s campaign to promote Swedish Social Democracy was the publication of his book ‘Der schwedische Mittelweg,’ first in 1947 and then in an updated version in 1949. The title ‘The Swedish Middle Way’ was somewhat misleading since Heinig did not intend to describe the ‘Swedish way’ as a ‘compromise,’ which indeed reflected the policies of some Social Democratic movements including the post-1945 SPD. By ‘middle way,’ Heinig meant a position that stands between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘totalitarian Socialism,’ i.e. ‘true Socialism’ which is both democratic and egalitarian.

Below are quotations from the Introductions to the two editions of ‘Der schwedische Mittelweg,’ which present Heinig’s main ideas on the party ideology of the Swedish Social Democrats, their policies and what he believed could be learnt from them. In the introduction to the first edition of October 1947, Heinig wrote the following: ‘Democracy in other countries and especially in Germany is not an adjective that can be attached automatically to any society but one can learn about it from others. The current work on Swedish middle way was written on this basis. I would like to report how in a country with a large Social Democratic movement, a new state was created, not by terror and subjugation or through the overthrow of the old but rather through fully planned reform of things old and out of date, giving the masses a better and brighter future. One should not conclude from this, however, that the Swedish middle

234 way does not encounter difficulties and that there are no internal political disagreements. Sweden is a land with tough political contrasts and it is therefore not exempt from difficult labor disputes.’665

On the one hand, Heinig eulogized the success of the Swedish Social Democrats in dramatically changing the lives of the Swedish masses without terror or violence. On the other hand, unlike Friedländer, he did not describe Sweden as a country whose social achievements were the result of consensus and of Sweden’s ‘unique nature.’ On the contrary, Heinig claimed that the SPD could learn from the Swedish Social Democrats and that their success was due, among other things, to tough political struggles and labor disputes.

In the extract quoted below, Heinig identified what he considered was the main feature of Swedish Social Democracy. ‘The important element in the swedish example is its geniune precepetion that Reform can become a revolution… In Sweden Radical-Reformism shapes the society’.666 Heinig did not agree with the description of Swedish Social Democracy as a ‘compromise.’ In his view, the Swedish Social Democratic policy of reform creates a social revolution. He therefore called the politics of the Swedish Social Democrats ‘radical reformism.’

In the Introduction to the second edition dated October 1948, Heinig expressed his disappointment at the reactions in Germany to the first edition of his book. ‘The Swedish Middleway was seen in Germany as just one out of many subjective information sources, while in Sweden it was seen as an objective description of the social reforms[in Sweden].‘667 Despite his disappointment at the fact that his book was viewed, in Germany, as just another information source, Heinig wrote that he had not given up on the German Social Democrats and had therefore written a new version which included the latest aspects of Swedish Social Democratic economic and social legislation. This is the version that will be described here, since there are only

665 Heinig Kurt, ‘Der schwedische Mittelweg’. (Hamburg 1949), p 5 666 Ibid, p 9 667 Ibid, p 9

235 minor differences relating mainly to the developments in Sweden after 1947 which were described naturally only in the second edition.

In the first chapter of the book, Heinig explained that the ‘social politics’ of the Swedish Social Democrats, since their rise to power in the early 30s, was based on an economy in which all firms come under public ownership or public supervision. Within this framework, labor regulations, taxation and social transfer laws aimed to create a higher standard of living for masses.668 Heinig described the nature of the transfer payments introduced by Sweden’s latest social legislation. Like Friedländer, Heinig viewed Sweden’s generous child benefits as a central part of this legislation. This ‘pre-productive living phase’ (his term) emphasized high allocations per child and significant financial supplements for children who had lost one of their parents. Heinig also described Sweden’s massive housing subsidies aimed at families with children. In his view, this was how to ensure a decent standard of living for children, irrespective of the parents’ income in the labor market.669

Heinig defined the next element of Swedish social policy as the ‘productive living phase,’ by which he referred to people of working age and capable of work. The key elements in this part of the Swedish Social Democratic policy were securing full employment, a ‘just’ income distribution and ‘industrial democracy’ with strong trade unions playing a central role in all these matters.670 The role of the government in achieving these goals, as described by Heing, was and economic supervision.671 The next part of the Swedish Social Democratic policy, which he described as the ‘past productive phase,’ included generous old age and disability pensions and housing support for these groups.672 Heinig then summarized the policy measures relating to the three phases, noting in the productive phase, policies of free job training, collective wage agreements, unemployment insurance and general public health insurance.673

668 Ibid, p 10-12 669 Ibid, p 12-23 670 Ibid, p 25-27 671 Ibid, p 28-29 672 Ibid, p 46-49 673 Ibid, p 54-58

236 By presenting the social policy of the Swedish Social Democrats as one comprehensive system comprising – money transfers for children aimed at reducing the income gap between families with children and those without, between children with two parents and those with single parents; housing subsidies with a similar role; ensuring an a wage for all workers and unemployment insurance in case of loss of this income and a ‘just’ distribution of wage income (the book was written before the introduction of the equal wage collective agreement policy of the LO); and care for the elderly and those unable to work – Heinig demonstrated how such social legislation could create a society ‘where everyone is taken care of and has a share in society.’ He also understood, as seen in his detailed presentation of statistics, that the amount of benefits given is as important as the type of benefit, since this is what differentiates a system of transfer payments, wages and workers rights that has no more than a symbolic value (or that only creates, as in Labor-ruled Britain, a minimum social security) from benefits such as those in Sweden that aim to create a classless society. However statistics that makes a comparison of the social payments in Sweden and the U.K. apeared only in Friedländer’s book which compared old age pension child benefits and famaly support.674The gap in 1947 between the two countries in GDP per capita were considerably smaller than the gaps in favour of the Swedish social payments which were on average higher by 50%.

Heinig was not writing here about the egalitarian vision of the Swedish Social Democrats – his support for the values behind this vision was clear from the Introduction to his book and from his declared support of the 1944 Program – he was describing the machinery aimed at achieving these values. Since he knew that existing social and workers’ rights and planned legislation in Sweden aimed to create more than just a social security net and ‘equal starting point’ policy that could be accepted by ‘moderate capitalists,’ he understood that the ‘socialization’ of the economy was essential for the success of these social policies and for the taxation needed to finance them. For this reason, he devoted the second part of the book to the ‘socialization’ means of the Swedish Social Democrats.

674 Friedländer Otto, ‘Die Schwedische Demokratie.’ (Stockholm 1948), p 84-85

237 Direct state ownership of firms was just one of several ‘socialization’ means in their policy. The ‘socialization’ program was achieved firstly through the purchase (by taxes collected from the affluent) of key firms in areas such as transport, communication and public utilities,675 secondly through the purchase of stocks in some 80 industrial companies,676 thirdly through the Swedish cooperative movement, which owned mainly retail chains,677 fourthly through government intervention in the economy. By this, Heinig meant the policies of manipulating the ‘market’ which the Scandinavian Social Democrats began to implement in the early 30.678

Under the category of future means of ‘socialization,’ Heinig noted joint committees of trade unions and employers and further nationalization plans for banks and credit institutions.679 Since he was writing only on existing steps or plans for the near future, he did not mention the means that were planned and implemented in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, such as transforming workers’ pension funds into large capital owners, compulsory workers’ trade union representation and worker’s voting rights in management which became embodied in the Swedish ‘company law’ and gave workers a 33.3%-50% share in the management of almost all Swedish firms. But as Heinig understood the ideal behind these future means, it was almost certain that he would have supported these means as well.

The third part of his book was devoted to elections results in Sweden and emphasized the fact that the ability of the Social Democrats to implement their policy derived from their success in ensuring that the majority of votes went to ‘Socialist parties’ while the Communist remained very small in comparison. Certain aspects of the Swedish Social Democrats policy, as described by Heinig, were included in future SPD programs (although not because of Heinig’s influence) but these programs did not have the comprehensiveness or radicalism found, as Heinig pointed out, in Swedish Social Democratic ideas and policies.

675 Ibid, p 77-80 676 Ibid, p 80-86 677 Ibid, p 87-92 678 Ibid, p 93-105 679 Ibid, p 105-109

238 Although not an active member of the SPD, Heinig still had access to the SPD and to the trade union press (Tarnow was no longer around). In the early 50s, he published a few articles in ‘Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte,’ the main theoretical organ of the DGB, all of which dealt with Swedish Social Democracy. In his article ‘Freie Preise,’ published in March 1950, Heinig praised Sweden’s almost automatic wage indexing, which protected Swedish workers from the negative effects of inflation.680 In May 1950, in the same organ, he explained why Swedish trade unions had agreed to a temporary wage freeze in order to secure ‘full employment,’ noting that with power (Social Democratic rule and trade unions for nearly all the workforce) comes responsibility and that Sweden, as a small Social Democratic country, could not ignore economic changes in larger countries such as Germany.681 In September 1950, Heinig reported that though Swedish trade unions were already large in relative terms, they continued to expand.682 He repeated his well-known views in two other articles ‘Die Sozialfinanzen’ and ‘Schwedische Gewerkschaften’ published in the same organ respectively in February 1951 and April 1953.

During this period, he tried unsuccessfully to obtain an honorary nomination from the SPD. In 1951 he tried to be appointed German Consul in Sweden but was rebuffed by the SPD, which granted a similar request to Raloff in Denmark, and the only outcome of the story was an article that made fun of Heinig in the new magazine ‘Der Spiegel.’683 While in Sweden Heinig was respected and was awarded an honorary doctorate by Stockholm University in 1955, in Germany, the main promoter of Swedish Social Democracy was, in his last years, considered a ‘political has been.’

680 Heinig Kurt ‘Freie Preise’ in ‘Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte’ March 1950 p 106 681 Heinig Kurt ‘Schwedische Gewerkschaftsprobleme’ in ‘Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte’ May 1950 p 216-219 682 Heinig Kurt ‘Schweden- neue Probleme und neue Mitglieder’ in ‘Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte’ September 1950 vol 9 683 ‘Der Spiegel’ 5.3.1951

239 Chapter-3.7 SPD ‘party ideology’ in the period 1945-1956 and the SPD ‘action programs’ of 1952/1954.

The central components of the SPD’s ‘party ideology’ in the period 1945- 1952 were the ‘guidelines of the SPD’ presented at the October 1945 conference by Schumacher, the uncontested leader of the SPD. In 1952, following Schumacher’s death, the ‘action program’ of 1952/1954 gave the SPD an official party program and were a pointer to the even more non-egalitarian Bad Godesberg program of 1959. Although Schumacher was involved, in the last year of his life, in the drafting of the action program Ollenhauer, who replaced Schumacher as head of the SPD, and Eichler played a greater role in its creation. The dominant SPD members who had been in exile in Swedish, Sassnick, Bromme, Brandt and Herbert Wehner, a former KPD member (not discussed in this work), were not opposed to the new program. Indeed, they supported it, which was not surprising given their background as shown in this dissertation. These men were careerists and those who, like Bromme and Brandt, had had membership in a ‘radical organization’ chose to side with those that gave a ‘minimalist’ interpretation to the term ‘Social Democracy’ (Wehner is a more complicated case).

Schumacher’s ‘Guidelines’ included the following: ‘Socialism without democracy is not Socialism, it is at best only state-run capitalism;’684 the Communist Party is no more than an arm of the Soviet State and there is therefore no basis for cooperation with it;685 the Russian occupation zone has become a different entity un-connected to the ‘Western occupation zones’ (Schumacher referred mainly to the British and American occupation zones), so the politics of the ‘Western areas’ must be separated from the politics of the Russian occupation zone;686 the various party programs and

684 Schumacher Kurt ‘Ziele und Richtlinien der Sozialdemokratischen Partei’ (Hanover 1946) Ms in AdsD, A-97-5470 p.1 685 Ibid, Chapter ‘Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten’ 686 Ibid, chapter ‘Die Voraussetzungen sozialdemokratischer Politik’.

240 proposals written in exile, together with the ‘Heidelberg Program,’ form the basis of the SPD’s future program but, at this stage, they are just proposals.687

Theoretically the new SPD was open to programs ranging from that of Ollenhauer and Eichler to Pankowski’s program which was close to that of the Scandinavian Social Democrates (supported by Heinig), to Heinig’s call to model the SPD program on the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic program.

The DGB’s principle declaration in 1949, the year of its founding, represented the maximum demands deemed possible in a SPD program, since the DGB was a trade union that did not pretend to represent medium sized self-employed and since it aimed to represent more ‘radical’ workers in order to prevent the growth of a competing pro- Communist trade union. The basic principles were: full employment; voting rights for organized workers in personal, economic and social issues of the workplace; the transfer of key industries, particularly mining, iron, steel, chemical, and energy industries, and important transportation services and credit institutions to the property of the community; through redistribution of the entire work product of the national economy; ensuring adequate living support for those who cannot work due to old age, disability or sickness.

In August 1949, the SPD published its list of demands regarding Germany’s future. These included: A) a policy of full employment; B) voting rights for workers in their workplace and equal rights for trade unions in the management of the economy (this could be interpreted as a veto right for trade unions in all major economic decisions and some sort of employees’ representation in the management of their workplace); C) depriving big capital and its management political and economic power through the socialization of natural resources and key industries (There was no explanation of how the SPD interpreted ‘socialization’ and no information in any other part of the list regarding the definition of ‘socialization’ in this context).688

In 1951, a document drafted by Social Democratic International and accepted by the Schumacher-dominated SPD, placed the SPD’s ‘party ideology’ midway between

687 Ibid, Chapter ‘Die organisatorische Arbeit in der Partei’ 688 ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1948/1949’ (Bonn 1950) p 18-20

241 radical Scandinavian Social Democracy and a non-egalitarian minimalist interpretation of Social Democracy. The document, titled ‘Declaration of Principles of the Socialist International,’ was debated during 1950-1951 and was accepted in July 1951 by the Social Democratic International founding Congress in Frankfurt. It stated that ‘Socialism is the liberation of man from dependence on a small minority of capital owners’ and its goal was that the entire community would have decision rights over the economy.’689 It was less concrete than the Scandinavian Social Democratic principle that ‘the entire community should have decision rights over production’ but it was near. Another element in the same clause that resembled the Scandinavian Social Democratic program was the call for a ‘societal system in which free people work together as equals.’690

With regard to income distribution, the declaration demanded a ‘society based on social justice, high level of welfare, freedom and world peace,’691 which was not as egalitarian as the Scandinavian Social Democratic program since the term ‘social justice’ did not necessarily entail a commitment to high or very high level of equality in income distribution or to a classless society, although this was how the Scandinavian Social Democrats interpreted the term (also influential members of the International). The section on ‘’ put forward the goals of full employment and just distribution of income and capital, rather than ‘equal distribution of income and capital’ as in the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic program.692

Clause five of this section stated that ‘socialization’ through collectivisation programs ought to leave room for private ownership by farmers, the self-employed in commerce and handcrafts, and by small and middle-sized industrial firms.693 This accorded with the Scandinavian Social Democratic position although it left much room for non-radicals to make their own interpretation of what was a small or middle- sized firm. The Swedish Social Democrats insisted, in the 70s, on workers’ share in the management of firms with a minimum of 25 workers (35 in Norway, 50 in

689 ‘Sozialistische Internationale Grundsatzerklärung vom 1951’ in Miller S ‘Kleine Geschichte der SPD’ (Bonn 1988) p 365-369 Clause 3 690 Ibid 691 Ibid, clause 11 692 Ibid, chapter on economic democracy 693 Ibid, chapter on industrial democracy clause 5

242 Denmark) while the SPD, in the same period, set a minimum of 2000 workers leaving the bulk of the economy and industry unaffected.

An SPD Committee began drafting the SPD’s first post-war official program in November 1951. The Committee included Ollenhauer and Eichler from the British exile group and Wehner, a political ally of Brandt from the Swedish exile group. Eichler headed the Committee debates. Schumacher was a member of the Committee but was already very ill. The new program was presented to the SPD Party Congress held in Dortmund on September 24-28 1952. It was approved and the approval was extended at the Party Congress held in Berlin on July 20-24, 1954. The SPD accepted the program following its limited political success in the 1949 General Elections when it achieved 29.2% of the votes compared to 31% for the CDU and 11.9% for Liberals.

The SPD could expect the election results to improve in the long run, when there would be fewer voters from the generation that supported or was educated by the Nazis. The SPD decision therefore to adopt a less radical platform could not be seen as a genuine consequence of the elections, particularly in light of the known views of the main Committee members. The new program adopted the most moderate interpretation possible of the ‘Declaration of Principles’ of the Social Democratic International. It defined the SPD as a party that aimed to create a society in which all people would be free of ‘social dependence’ and a society with ‘justice and freedom.’694 This was a major step to replacing the three declared values of ‘Freedom, Solidarity and Equality’ by ‘Freedom, Solidarity and Justice.’

Further on it stated that the SPD would fight for ‘equal rights’ for all people (without going into details) and for ‘political and economic freedom.’695 It also declared that the SPD, like other Socialist parties, desired ‘social justice, a higher standard of living, freedom and world peace’696 which was one of the more general and moderate phrases in the Declaration of the Social Democratic International. The latter’s call for ‘the entire community to have decision rights over the economy’ was missing.

694 Aktionprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschland: beschlossen auf dem Dortmunder Parteitag am 28 September 1952 AdsD.Fa96-7180, prg 2 695 Ibid, prg 5

243 The section on economic policy put forward a demand for ‘equal economic starting conditions for all’ while the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic program defined ‘equality in education and equal conditions for the development of children and youth’ as one of the essential ‘equalities’ ‘over and above fundamental equalities’ (the other equalities which did not appear in the SPD program were ‘equality in the possibility to participate in spiritual and material culture’). The SPD demands were less radical since a starting point does not necessarily cover everything that falls under ‘equality in education and equal conditions for the development of children and youth.’ It is possible, for example, to claim that only equal free education, basic health services, adequate food and clothing and basic shelter are the essential necessities for ‘equal economic starting conditions,’ while the other elements found in ‘equal conditions for the development of children and youth’ such as equality in the housing standards of children, equal access to more than basic food and clothing for children or equal access to entertainment for children are not essentials for an ‘equal starting point.’

Other SPD demands that had direct social relevance were: ‘security of work’ ‘just distribution of social products’ and ‘economic freedom to develop one’s personality’ which could be interpreted as ensuring no one would be left in such dire economic situations that they would be compelled to do things against their will. In contrast, the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic program (point 8) demanded the ‘securing for all citizens of a living standard inline with the average labor yield (per capita GDP) in the full extent needed to fulfil a representative household.’ This meant that all households would have a similar income according with the per capita GDP.

The section devoted to income distribution offered further explanations to the meaning of ‘just distribution’ and stated that: ‘The German Social Democratic Party rejects an automatic equalization of incomes: higher performances deserve higher incomes,’ a sentence which did not appear in any part of the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic program. The phrase ‘equality in economic starting conditions,’ it was explained, referred mainly to education. The other elements that made up ‘just income

696 Ibid, prg 9

244 distribution’ were ‘ combating poverty,’ ‘securing work for workers in economically weak areas’ (subsidies) and a tax policy to finance these goals.697

The demands put forward in terms of a specific economic policy included: ‘full employment,’ ‘an income policy to help the weak’ (a social security system), an unspecified level of ‘voting rights for workers,’ ‘supervision of the raw materials industries through community ownership’ (public ownership of public utilities, mining, steel and iron industries, and the railway service).698 There was no chance that the German program would accept ‘equalization of income and property’ as in point 10 of the 1944 Swedish Social Democratic program.

697 Ibid in the chapter ‘Einkommensverteilung’ 698 Ibid, economic policy chapter

245 Concluding Remarks

The SPD exiles in Scandinavia did not contribute to the adoption by the post-1945 SPD of the ‘party ideology’ of the Scandinavian Social Democrats due to a combination of reasons: firstly, the majority of the So.Pa.De leadership did not spend their exile period in Scandinavia. The leadership was happy to be assisted by the Scandinavian Social Democrats, but made no effort to learn from the Scandinavian parties. And, in what would be seen retrospectively as lack of judgment, it believed that the Scandinavian countries would become the next Czechoslovak Republic. The Secretariat thus preferred to concentrate So.Pa.De assets in Western Europe.

Secondly, the SPD exiles in Scandinavia were deeply divided between those who favored co-operation with the Communist majority and the pro-independent SPD minority, which consisted of the more senior SPD exiles. The ugly quarrel that erupted between Emil Stahl and the Stockholm So.Pa.De group broke all behavior norms and the hierarchy of the SPD exiles. This state of affairs aided the opportunistic Fritz Tarnow to make himself the strongest figure among the exiles, leaving Kurt Heinig, who held the formal leadership without real power. Heinig, the main admirer among the SPD exiles of the ‘party ideology’ of the Swedish Social Democrats, became unpopular with his fellow exiles because of his outspoken opposition to cooperation with the Communists and he fell victim to Tarnow’s manipulations.

In the post-war period, Kurt Schumacher clearly preferred young careerists such as Paul Bromme and Willy Brandt or figures with power such as Tarnow to Heinig who could have been a potential rival in the future. Naive idealists such as Otto Friedländer also did not have a chance in Schumacher’s new SPD. The other SPD exiles were either too close to the Communists for Schumacher’s taste or were not open to influence by the Scandinavian Social Democrats.

It seem that the prinicipel scholars on ‘the German Speaking exiles in Scandinavia’ tended to fall into the trap of seeing the rethoric of Brandt and some other senior figures in the post 1945 SPD, according to which they were influenced by the Scandinavian social democrats, as genuine. Therefore these scholars refrained from

246 trying to explain why the potential for a much more significant influence by the Scandinavian social democrats did not materialize. However Lorenz is critical towards Willy Brandt and Misgeld does mention Friedländer’s and Heinig’s lack of success in influencing the SPD. Misgeld also points to the refusal by the DGB to addopt the equal wage policy of the Scandinavian trade-unions.699 Still none of these scholars contested Müssener’s claim that Heinig remained in Sweden only due to personal reasons. Tarnow’s ‘dark past’ and his contacts with right wing elements are mentioned in the works of scholars such as August Winkler that do not write on the ‘Exil’ but they are not mentioned in the works of the scholars which deal with the ‘German speaking exiles in Scandinavia’. Paul Bromme was one of the young careerists coming from the Scandinavian exile. In this dissertation paper it is described how Bromme had no intention to addopt ideas that could become an obstacle for his future political career. Bromme was not dealt in an elaborate manner in any other research work on the ‘German speaking exiles in Scandinavia’ although he is the ‘classic’ example to the type of person that could be successeful in the post 1945 SPD.

The process of equalizing income and wealth distribution continued in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland during the 60s, 70s and 80s. By the mid 70s, these four countries had approx. a 90% rate of income distribution equality (taking public services into account) and this level of equality was sustained in these countries into the turn of the century.700 For the last 30 years, these four countries have had the most equal income distribution in the world (they are more or at least not less equal than

699 Misgeld K ‘Folgen des Exils’ in ‘Ein sehr trübes Kapitel?’ (Hamburg 1998) p 399-419 700The figure is calculated according to 100%-Atkinson measurement given that services such as public health and public education are distributed equally between all those who are insured or entitled to the services. The data comes from the LIS survey of Sweden (1975,1981, 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000) Finland (1987,1991,1995,2000) Denmark (1987,1992,1995,1997) and Norway (1979,1986,1991,1995,2000) and the yearly data onwards of the Swedish and Finnish national statistics, Norwegian tax statistics and the Danish national statistics on income distribution. With regard to equivalent incomes, OECD rules are used. The data appears also in the LIS project Internet site including the original database. The result is based on the following formula : the distribution of disposable income + public consumption and public investment divided equally among all residents. The result = 100%- the gap between the average total income and the actual income in percentage terms of all those who earn above-average incomes.

247 any ‘Communist country’ was during the 70’s and 80’ 701). In contrast, in the early 80s (after more than a decade of SPD /FDP rule) Germany had an 80%+ rate of equality income distribution, which was the European average. This figure rose during the late 80s and early 90s and another slight rise was attained in 2000 702. However, after taking into account public services and investment there is still a significant gap between Germany and the Scandinavian countries in terms of income distribution equality.

These results are not accidental. In all four Scandinavian countries and, particularly in Sweden, the tax level is approx. 50% of the GDP and almost all the money raised from taxes is redistributed through public investment, public services, and social transfer payments. In Germany, the tax level is approx. 40%. These figures (in both Germany and Scandinavia) do not include debit payments or interest payments and incomes, which have a neutral effect on income distribution. The wage policies of Scandinavian governments and Scandinavian trade unions created a very equal wage norm between all economic sectors and between management and workers. In Scandinavia there are almost no pockets of workers with income that is significantly lower than the average wage.703 In Germany, wage inequality is higher than in Scandinavia and it also has pockets of low-income workers.

Public control of the economy is a key element in making the equalization of incomes through tax transfer payments and wage policies, possible. All the Scandinavian countries followed similar policies although with slight differences. The Swedish trade unions cover more than 80% of the workforce and therefore have complete monopoly over work and immense power vis a vis local capital owners. The trade unions in Norway Denmark and Finland have similar power with membership levels respectively of 50% of the workforce, 80% and 80%. In Germany, the DGB covers less than 30% of the workforce, partly due to more limited government support (compared to Scandinavia) in its struggle against unorganized work.

701See C Morrison ‘Income Distribution in East Europe and Western countries’ Journal of Comparative Economics, June 1984 702See Stephenson ‘Income Distribution in 7 countries.’ review of income and wealth June 1989 on income distribution in 1981 and footnote number 663 with regard to income distribution for later dates. 703The percentage of workers with wages less than 2/3 of the average wage was around 5% in the 90s according to the national statistics of Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland.

248

The most significant step towards public ownership in Sweden was the creation of National Occupational Pension Funds in the early 60s, which cover the entire Swedish working population and are paid for primarily by employers (with the exception of the self-employed who are also included in the scheme as in the other social insurance funds but pay for themselves). Most European countries, including Germany, have national occupational pension funds. However, the Swedish funds did not have to finance existing pensioners who did not have pension rights because they had not paid into the funds. This role was assumed by the government through its main budget, thus enabling the pension funds to accumulate capital until all pensioners were people who had fully-earned rights. The Scandinavian pension funds have also a more equal nature compared to non-Scandinavian countries being based on a more equal wage structure. In addition to government bonds, the capital of the pension funds includes commercial bonds and stocks, making them the largest capital owners in Sweden.

In 1984 ‘nationalization’ public funds were established in Sweden and companies had to contribute part of their profits to them. The funds accumulated capital until 1990 and since then, their value stands at approx. 10% of the capital of the Stockholm Stock Exchange (in the mid 90’s they were merged with the public pension funds). The Swedish Company Law of 1976 made it compulsory for every company with more than 25 workers to have two trade union representatives on its board of directors (in Denmark and in Norway the law calls for trade union representation at the rate of one third in the board of directors of companies with more than 50 workers, and in Finland there are 1 - 4 union representatives which makes 20% of the board of directors in companies with more than 150 workers). Furthermore, all issues regarding work hours and work conditions became the prerogative of the trade unions in Sweden. According to a binding agreement signed between trade unions and employers in 1983, one third of the board of directors of every workplace with more than 100 workers must consist of trade union representatives. Due to the small size of the Boards of Directors in medium-size firms and almost all Limited companies (with more than 25 workers) in Sweden, trade union representatives make up one third to half of the Boards of Directors.

249 Similar legislation passed in Germany in 1976/1972 calls for one half of the committee that chooses the board of directors (‘the supervisory board’) to be made up of worker representatives. However the head of the committee which must come from the owners side have a double vote which ensures a majority for the owners. This law applies only to companies with more than 2000 workers (according to a law from 1952 workers have a representation of one 1/3 in the ‘supervisary board’ of companies with more than 500 employees.) and thus covers a relatively small part of the German workforce. The supervisory board have a very limted control on the real board of directors which is definded in the German company law as the ‘managment board of directors’. The German Occupational Pension System was reformed in 1957 under a CDU government and had to finance from its inception pensioners who had not earned rights by contributing to the fund. These funds, as a result, did not accumulate significant capital. A reform passed in 1972 by an SPD government did not change the basic elements of the system although it created a more flexible retirement age.

The difference between Sweden and Germany can be explained, in part, by the fact that the Swedish Social Democrats have been in power much longer and have been less dependent on coalition partners not of the ‘left’. But one should note that the SPD was in government with the CDU from 1966 to 1969 and was the senior partner in a coalition government with the FDP from 1969 to 1982. The FDP had a much more pro-social legislative policy during the 60’s and 70’s than today and the CDU also supported many elements of social legislation and cannot be defined as a purely pro- market party. There is also the interesting fact that income distribution equality in West Germany was higher in the early 90’s following ten years of CDU/FDP government than in 1981 after more than ten years of SPD /FDP governments led by Brandt and Schmidt.

Thus the explanation for the difference in income distribution equality between Sweden and Germany can be found, in part, in the differences between the ‘party ideology’ of the Swedish Social Democrats as expressed in their political programs of 1960, 1975, and 1990 and the SPD’s ‘party ideology’ as is expressed in the 1959 ‘Bad Godesberg program’. The three Swedish Social Democratic programs of 1960, 1975 and 1990 put forward the same basic goal: ‘to have, instead of a societal order based

250 on economic classes, a community of people living on a free and equal basis.704 The 1960 Program states that: ‘Social Democrats will bring freedom to many new areas… a condition for this higher degree of freedom is a higher degree of equality’.705 The 1975 Program states that: ‘Social Democrats will fight for equality in the distribution of income, property and power’.706 And the 1990 Program states that: ‘The Social Democrats fight for equality in the distribution of resources that are needed to enable people to influence society and their lives. To these resources belong freedom of choice (equality in the freedom to fulfil one’s wishes, meaning in income) economic power, education and culture’.707

The ‘Bad Godesberg program’ of the SPD put forward an even more diluted form of ‘socialism’ than the ‘Action program’ of 1952/1954. The words ‘freedom, solidarity and equality’ are replaced in the opening section with the words ‘freedom, solidarity and justice’. The program does not mention ‘workers’ representation in their workplace’, nor is there any mention of ‘income distribution.’ The only point relating to a ‘Social Democratic Economy’ is the proposal to give workers the opportunity of ‘accumulating part of their growing income as property’. The program includes the SPD’s famous new economic formula: ‘intervention as much as is needed; competition as much as is possible’.708 The SPD’s new leader, Willy Brandt, stood firmly behind this program.

In 1969, Brandt (then Prime Minister) published an article on Swedish Social Democracy in which after displaying an impressive knowledge of Swedish Social Democratic politics and economic policies and after complimenting their policies, Brandt offered an original and false explanation of the Swedish Social Democratic ‘party ideology’. The Swedish Social Democrats use the word Equality instead of Justice because, in Swedish, the word justice (rättvisa) has meaning only in a judicial

704 Opening Statement of : ‘Program för Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (Stockholm 1960) and ‘Socialdemokratin partiprogram (Stockholm 1975/1990) 705 1960 Program,op.cit p7 706 1975 Program, op.cit., p5 707 1990 Program, op.cit p6 708 SPD ‘Grundsatzprogram der Sozialemokratischen Partei Deutschland: beschlossen vom ausserordentlichen Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschland in Bad Godesberg vom 13 bis 15 November 1959’ (Bonn 1959) ‘Wirtschaft und Sozialordung’

251 context.709 Brandt’s exposition demonstrates how little the Scandinavian Social Democrats influenced the most senior member of the new SPD which had returned from Scandinavian exile.

709Brandt Willy ‘Schwedens Sozialdemokraten wie andere sie sehen und was sie für andere bedeuten’ ‘Neue Gesellschaft’ 1969 p 341

252

Appendix

A-The SPD and the Swedish social democrats from 1871 to 1956 (important dates)

1871- The new German constitution gives equal voting rights to the Lower House of parliament for all man above the age of 25.

1875 – The SPD is founded as a union of Marxists and Lassaleans and adopts the ‘Gotha Political program’.

1878 - The SPD political activity in Germany is outlawed.

1889 – The Swedish social democratic party is founded and adopts a translation from Danish of the ‘Gotha Program’.

1891 – The SPD is refounded after the lifting of the ban on his political activity. The SPD adopts a new political program ‘The ‘Erfurt Program’’. The program calls for the ‘abolition of class rule’ and ‘the socialization of means of production’. It has a deterministic view on the social changes that the ‘capitalist production system’ is going to bring (A society made up of only two classes, a huge ‘ proletariat class ‘ and small ‘class of capitalists’ accompanied with a massive poverty.)

1892 – The ADGB ‘the free German trade union organization’ is founded

1897 – The Swedish social democrats adopt their first original political program. The program is based on the ‘Erfurt Program’ with few important differences. The program does not claim that the ‘capitalist production system’ is going to create a mass poverty, there is a call for gradual ‘socialization of all means of production’ while in the ‘Erfurt Program’ there is no description of how the ‘socialization’ ought to be fulfilled. Both programs have similar social demands with regard to the near future but the demands regarding the agriculture sector are more detailed in the Swedish program.

253 1898 – The LO, the Swedish trade union organization that is connected to the Swedish social democratic party, is founded.

1898 – Eduard Bernstein presents his criticism on the ‘orthodoxy’ of the SPD ‘party ideology’. This is the beginning of the ‘revisionist’ position within the SPD. The main arguments: ‘capitalism is not going to destroy itself by himself’ and there should be a gradual process in the creating of a ‘socialist society’ that will start from the immediate future.

1909 - The LO have 231,000 members 11.5 % of the Swedish workforce.

1909- free and equal voting rights to the Swedish Lower House of Parliament for all the man who pays community taxes and does their military services, in the voting to the upper house there are still no equal voting rights.

1910 - The “freien Gewerkschaften” have 1,832,000 members 10% of the German workforce.

1910 – 51% of the Swedish workforce works in non-agricultural jobs.

1911 – the Swedish social democrats get 28% of the votes in the elections to the Lower House of Parliament.

1911 – The new political program of the Swedish social democrats calls for ‘The liberation of all the oppressed classes’ and not just the ‘working class’. It explains that small holders and craftsmen are considered, as a case in which there is no need to change the relationship between labour and capital, meaning they are part of the ‘oppressed classes’. The program adds to the goals of the Swedish social democracy the ‘elimination of mass poverty’.

1912 – The SPD gets 34.8% of the votes in the elections to the Lower House of Parliament. The SPD is the largest political party in Germany.

1914 – The Swedish social democrats gets 36.4% of the votes in the elections to the Lower House of Parliament.

4 of August 1914 – The SPD vote for the ‘War budget’.

2 of December 1914 – Karl Liebknecht votes against the ‘war budget’ and starts a split in the SPD parliamentary group.

March 1916 – A split in the Swedish social democrats over the party descision to support the pro German policy of the Swedish government and what is seemed as a breach of Sweden neutrality.

254

March 1916 – A split in the SPD over the support of the war effort.

16 of January 1917 - The founding of the USPD.

9 of November 1918 – A ‘soliders and workers council’ is formed in Berlin and takes control of the city. Philip Scheidemann from the SPD declares that Germany is a republic.

15 of November 1918 – The LO declares that if the democratization process of Sweden will be blocked in the parliament by the conservatives ‘The Swedish workers will take steps similar to those of the German revolution’.

15 of November 1918 – The ‘Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft’ agreement is signed between the ADGB and the Employers union. In the agreement the unions are formally recognized, there is a decision, which was not implemented of workers taking part in the managing of their work place and there is an agreement on maximum 8 hours working day to be legalized in the near future.

23 of November 1918 – after all the Swedish social democrats newspapers declared that if the democratization legalization will not pass ‘Revolution is inevitable’ the legalization passes.

5 of January till 15 of January 1919 –The revolt of the radical left in Berlin and the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

19 of January 1919 – Elections to the “Nationalversammlung” (the new parliament); The SPD get 37.9% of the votes the USPD get 7.6% of the votes. The coalition Government (the SPD together with the catholic Zentrum party and the DDP liberal party) main social achievements were: a) an 8 hours maximum working day. B) The social points in the Weimar constitution of August 1919, (point 124 - the right to organize points 142 till 145 – compulsory education point 153 which gives a legal possibility for transforming capital into public ownership and point 151 which demanded that all economic laws and regulations will be inline with the purpose of ensuring all human conditions of living).

November 1918 till March 1920 –The social achievements of a coalition government that included the Swedish social democrats and the liberals are: an 8 hours ‘normal’ working day and a 48 maximum working week.

February 1920 – the Swedish social democrats congress adopt a new program the main writers are Sandler Möller and per Albin Hansson. The program has the same principals of the 1911 program and a very detailed list of demands for social legalization and legalization that is aimed at helping the small farmers.

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13 till 16 of March 1920 – The workers trade unions save the republic from the ‘Kapp putsch’.

March 1920 – end of the coalition of the Swedish social democrats and the liberals. A minority government of only the Social democrats is in place till the elections of September 1920. The Swedish social democrats will not take part in any coalition government till 1932.

June 1920 – in the elections the SPD is becoming weaker and the USPD becomes stronger and get almost the same amount of votes. The whole ‘left block’ (the SPD the USPD and the communist party of the radical left the KPD) is weaker and goes down from 45.5% of votes to 41.7% of the votes.

September 1920 – Elections in Sweden, The ‘left Block’ is getting weaker. It goes from 38.2% of votes to 36.2% of the votes. The Swedish social democrats go to the opposition.

September 1921 – The SPD adopts a new political program at the Görlitz congress. The program defines the SPD as the party of ‘all those who do work with their body or minds’ a definition similar to that of the Swedish social democrats but less concrete. There is still the long-term goal ‘the abolition of class rule ‘ which appears also in the Swedish programs but there is no call for a more immediate goal ‘the elimination of mass poverty’. The proposals for social legalization are much less detailed than those in the Swedish program. There are no detailed proposals for legalization aimed at helping small farmers.

October 1921 – In the elections to the Lower House of parliament in Sweden the ‘left Block’ gets stronger and receives 44% of votes. The support for the social democrats among the Swedish ‘lower middle class’ grows from around 25% in the 1917 elections to around 40%. Among very small farmers and farming workers support for the social democrats grows from 60% in 1917 to 70% in 1921.

5 of November 1921- the beginning of the Otto Braun SPD led ‘Grand coalition’ in Prussia.

1921- 1922 – Economic crisis in Sweden following inflation in 1920, a fall in the GDP, Unemployment rate among industrial workers is 27%, only in 1924 the GDP attain back to its 1920 level.

1920 –1923 - Inflation in Germany followed by a short recession in 1924.

October 1921 till April 1923 – a minority social democratic government in Sweden, the Government resigned after its failure to pass a law which prevents withholding of unemployment benefits from workers who refuse to ‘break a strike’.

4 of June 1922 – an assassination attempt on the life of Philip Scheidemann from the SPD.

256 13 of November 1922 – A more ‘leftist’ SPD (after the unification with part of the USPD) decides to breakup the coalition with the Zentrum and DDP parties. The SPD was ready to negotiate his past social achievements like the 8 hours working day law in order to satisfy the demands of the DDP and the Zentrum for a coalition with the right wing liberal party the DVP. However in the end the demands of the DVP were to extreme for the SPD.

11 of January 1923 - France and Belgium invade the Rúhr area in order to pressure Germany to pay them the war reparations to which they are initialed according to the Versailles accord.

12 of August 1923 – The SPD agree to join the first ‘Grand coalition’ in order to solve the extreme political and economic crisis.

26 of September – The German government decides to stop the passive resistance.

13 October 1923 – the SPD prefers to vote for the emergency economic laws from within the government. Therefore the SPD have to go again through the ordeal of voting for these laws on the 16 of April 1924 from the opposition following the collapse of the first ‘Grand coalition’.

18 till 29 of October 1923 – The Saxony crisis.

2 of November 1923 the SPD abandon the government in protest of the different treatment of the ‘right wing’ government in Bavaria in comparison to the treatment of the ‘left wing’ government in Saxony.

May 1924 - Elections in Germany, the SPD gets only 20.5% of votes, the whole ‘left wing block’ gets only 33.1% of votes.

October 1924 – In the elections to the Lower House of Parliament the Swedish social democrats cross the 40% of the votes line for the first time. The social democrats get 41.1% of the votes. The whole ‘Left wing block’ gets 46.2% of the votes. A minority social democrat government is formed. Its social achievements includes: a) a law which gives lease holders the possibility to gain a house that was built on the leased land without payment. B) A possibility to give state land to landless farming workers. C) Extension of the 8 hours maximum workday law and implementing it on more sectors of the economy.

December 1924 – Elections in Germany, improvement in the SPD elections result due to being in opposition (26% of votes) the whole ‘left wing block’ gets 35% of votes.

13 till 18 of September 1925 – The congress of the SPD in Heidelberg adopts a new political program. The program is more inline with the Swedish social democrats political programs. It claims that ‘ capitalism oppresses all working classes’ a very similar term to the term ‘the oppressed classes’ which appears in the Swedish programs. The social demands in this program are more elaborated than in the

257 previous programs but they are still very few when compared to the Swedish social democrats political programs list of social demands.

9 of June 1926 – the Swedish social democrat minority government resigned because of its inability to pass the law that prevents the withholding of unemployment benefits from workers who refuses to ‘break a strike’. There will be no more governments in Sweden with social democratic participation till 1932.

1926 – Nils Karleby’s book ‘Socialismen inför verkligheten’ is published shortly before Karleby’s death. Karleby the co- editor of ‘Tiden’ the Swedish social democrats theoretical organ explains in his book that what is important is not the formal ownership of capital but who controls the decision rights over this capital and who enjoy’s the fruits of the productions means. Profits are exploitation when they are used for the benefit of the ‘capitalist class’ and a planning tool when they are used for the benefit of the public. A redistribution policy through taxes; transfer payment, extended workers and trade unions management rights at their work place and a large public ownership of sectors of the economy are the best means to achieve ‘socialism’ according to Karleby.

1927 – Rudolf Hilferding in his lecture on ‘Late capitalism’ describes central planing as a ‘Socialist principle’ and hints that the SPD should work as an interest group.

January 1928 – Per Albin Hansson (the head of the Swedish social democrats) gives in parliament his famous ‘Folkhem’ address. In the address Hannson portray’s the vision of the Swedish social democrats. The creation of a society in which there are no poor and no rich people.

20 of May 1928 – Success to SPD in the general elections, the SPD receives 29.8% of votes. The whole German ‘Left’ block gets 40.4% of Votes.

28 of June 1928 ‘Müller Grand coalition’ is formed. The SPD takes the posts of Prime Minister (Müller) and finance minister (Hilferding) but becomes part of an impossible coalition with the party of the ‘big capital’ the DVP and the right wing party the BVP.

1928 – in the elections to the Swedish Lower House of Parliament the Swedish social democrat gains more votes that in the 1924 elections. However a high participation rate of right wing supporters in the elections leads to a smaller success in percentage terms in comparison with the 1924 elections.

27 of March 1930 – the Müller ‘Grand coalition’ collapses when the SPD refuses to agree to changes in the unemployment benefits law that will put all the burden of the growing unemployment on the ‘workers shoulders’.

14 of September 1930 – elections in Germany the SPD support falls to 24.5% of the votes.

258

Autumn 1931 – a committee of the Swedish social democrats headed by the Swedish social democrats financial expert Ernst Wigforss proposes as a solution to Sweden’s mass unemployment; public works financed with taxes and government deficit, public works with ‘normal wage’ to those that will be employed in them. The plan includes also support for small farmers that were harmed by the economic crisis.

Autumn 1931 – The SPD rejects the program of Wladimir Woytinski Fritz Baade and Fritz Tarnow to solve the German unemployment through public works financed by a loan from the Reichsbank.

22 of December 1931 – The SPD organizes the ‘Iron league’.

September 1932 – June 1936 in the elections to the Swedish Lower House of parliament the Swedish social democrats get 41.7% of votes. The whole ‘left wing block’ gets 50% of votes although not 50% of the seats in the Lower House. The physiological momentum of the ‘left wing’ success and the ‘pro farmers’ policy of the social democrats lead to a coalition government of the social democrats and the ‘farmers party’ with clear dominance of the social democrats. The government has success in implementing its program to reduce unemployment and it also passed through parliament in 1934 an unemployment insurance law to be financed mainly by the employers and taxes.

31 of July 1932 – the SPD gets 21.6% of votes and the KPD 15.4%.

August 1932 – the ‘flirt’ between the trade unions and the Nazi party NSDAP. Fritz Tarnow the head of the ‘German wood industry workers trade union’ plays the central role.

November 1932 – the SPD gets 20.4% of votes and the KPD 16.6%.

30 of January 1933 – Hitler becomes the German ‘Kanzler’.

5 of March 1933 – in the last elections of the ‘Weimar Republic’ the SPD gets only 18.3% of the votes.

23 of March 1933 – with opposition of only the SPD the ‘Reichstag’ gives Hitler emergency powers.

Second of May 1933 – the ADGB the German trade union organization is outlawed.

22 of June 1933 - the SPD is outlawed.

24 of June 1933 – the SPD secretariat is reorganized in Prague with Otto Wels and Hans Vogel at its head.

259 28 of January 1934 – the So.Pa.De (the SPD in exile) accept the ‘Prague manifest’. The manifest has a ‘radical’ rhetoric but the same guidelines of the ‘Weimar SPD’ political programs.

30 of January 1935 – the representatives of the ‘left wing’ of the So.Pa.De are expelled from the secretariat over alleged contact with ‘Neu Beginnenen’ (a ‘left wing’ group of So.Pa.De members that took upon themselves the task of uniting the So.Pa.De and the KPD using conspiratorial means).

September 1936 – after 3 month without a social democratic government due to the refusal of the ‘farmer party’ to support the social democrats proposal for a general old age pension law there are new elections to the Swedish Lower House of parliament. The Swedish social democrats get 45.9% of votes and the whole ‘left wing block’ gets 53.6% of votes. Because there is no left wing majority in the Upper House of parliament there is a new coalition of the social democrats and the ‘farmers party’. However the social democrats dominance is clear and the Swedish parliament accepts the new pension law in its full form.

June 1937 – the Czechoslovak government under German pressure shuts its border for anti nazi activity and tells the So.Pa.De to find itself a new home.

1938 – The Swedish trade union (the LO) and the Swedish employers federation agree that only the LO will represent workers. The employers’ commit themself to refrain from any one-sided actions. Meaning they will have to get the consent of the trade unions for any major decision that can effect workers.

Early 1938- the So.Pa.De has around 4000 members of whom 1000 are in France (the new So.Pa.De center) 400 are still in Czechoslovak and 300 are in the Scandinavian countries.

1.9.1939 Germany invades Poland.

16.9.1939 – Otto Wels the General secretary of the SPD and the So.Pa.De since 1913 dies in Paris.

1940 – in the elections to the Swedish Upper House of Parliament there is for the first time a ‘left wing block’ majority. However due to the situation of general war in Europe a ‘national unity’ government is formed.

1940- with the occupation of Denmark and Norway all the So.Pa.De members and other ‘left wing’ German exiles in Scandinavia are concentrated in Sweden. Their total number is around 350, about half of the number of the ‘left wing’ exiles in the U.K. The majority of the exiles are So.Pa.De members. They include Fritz Tarnow who is now the head of the ‘Exile German unions’ and Kurt Heinig the SPD expert for financial matters from 1928, a member of the Reichstag from 1928 till 1933 and the economic editor of Vorwärts (the main SPD organ) in 1923-1924. Among the exiles there are also

260 successful future politicians of the SPD like Paul Bromme and Walter Sassnick, and future leaders of the SPD like Willy Brandt and Herbert Wehner.

1940 – with the occupation of France many of the So.Pa.De members there flee to the U.K including most of the remaining members of the So.Pa.De secretariat.

19.3.1941 – The members of The So.Pa.De, the German SAP, the ISK and ‘Neu Beginnen’ in the U.K are reunited and form the ‘united socialist German union’.

22.6.1941 – Germany invades the USSR

6.12.1942 – In a lecture by Erich Ollenhauer of the So.Pa.De secretariat and the last SPD secretariat; the new social demands of the ‘united socialist German union’ are only ‘Equal starting point for all and social security for all’.

March 1943 – Heinig in appointed as ‘the representative of the So.Pa.De secretariat in Sweden’.

Summer 1943 – The forum of ‘democratic socialists in Sweden’ operates. This forum includes ‘left wing’ exiles from Germany and Austria like Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, many members of the So.Pa.De in Sweden (the most senior among them is Fritz Tarnow) and important members of the Norwegian Labour party and the Swedish social democrats. There is an effort to influence the ‘future leadership’ of the German Labour movement by the Swedish social democrats.

April 1944 – The congress of the Swedish social democrats accepts a new political program. This program expresses officially the Swedish social democrats combination of an egalitarian society as the goal and welfare system, taxes and ‘industrial democracy’ as the means. This combination appears in all the next political programs of the Swedish social democrats including the programs of 1990 and 2001.

June 1944 – Heinig claims that the new political program of the Swedish social democrats ought to be the guideline for all the future political programs of the social-democratic parties in Europe.

17 of September – a big success for the Swedish social democrats in the elections to the parliament; after 1945 a socialist only Government implements in Sweden extensive social legalization. The social legalization together with the putting in place of high direct taxes, the equal wages policy of the trade unions, the trade unions becoming ever stronger and an indirect transfer of capital into public ownership makes Sweden like Norway Denmark and Finland the most egalitarian industrialized nation with income equality of around 90% (Atkinson measurement).

261 9 of May 1945 – Nazi Germany capitulates, Kurt Schumacher an SPD member of the last Reichstag and a very active figure in the resistance against the nazi regime (a fight for which he paid for with years of imprisonment) starts to reorganize the SPD in Germany’s Western occupation zones. Schumacher is an anti-communist and he is very successful in his efforts to prevent a ‘united socialist party’ in the Western occupation zones .In early 1946 he have success in this area also in the Western occupation zones in Berlin.

October 1945- Hans Vogel dies in London

9 of May till 11 of May 1946 – the first conference of the new SPD is held in Hanover. Schumacher is elected as head of its secretariat with votes of almost all the delegates but one. Erich Ollenhauer from the secretariat of The So.Pa.De in London and the last Weimar SPD secretariat is voted to the new secretariat with the next largest amount of votes (230 out of 245 possible).

1946- Schumacher makes efforts to attract from the Swedish exile young figures into the SPD like Paul Bromme and later on Willy Brandt. He keeps his distance from figures with high posts in the Weimar SPD like Kurt Heinig. He has no problem with opportunist figures which do have political influence like Fritz Tarnow that became in 1947 one of the two general secretaries of the new trade unions in the American and British occupation zones (almost the entire future Federal Republic).

1946 – It becomes compulsory in Sweden for every firm with more than 100 workers to have workers representation in its directory board.

1947 – National Health insurance law and very generous children benefits law are passed in the Swedish parliament.

1948 – The old age pension in Sweden is tripled. Income tax on high incomes grows significantly (a higher level of property tax and a higher corporate tax).

1947 – 1949 The ‘Swedish propaganda’ of SPD exiles in Sweden. Heinig publishes his book ‘Der Schwedische Mittelweg’ in two editions in 1947 and in 1949. Otto Friedländer publishes in 1948 his book ‘Die Schwedische Demokratie’. These books have no influence on the SPD.

1949- in the first elections to the ‘Bundestag’ (the new parliament of the Federal Republic) the SPD gets only 29.2% of the votes.

1952 – The SPD accepts an action program, which is reconfirmed in 1954. Unlike the Swedish social democrat political program of 1944 the SPD program has no egalitarian goal or spirit. In its opening the term ‘justice’ replace the term ‘equality’, the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘solidarity’ stays. This attitude

262 will become even stronger in the SPD political program of 1959 shortly before Willy Brandt becomes the head of the SPD.

1952 – Kurt Schumacher dies Ollenhauer becomes the head of the SPD

1955 - The national public health insurance system in Sweden starts its full operation.

1956 – Kurt Heinig dies in Stockholm

1959- The SPD accepts the Bad – Godesberg Political Program, Willy Brandt is the head of the SPD

1969- Willy Brandt becomes the first German Prime Minister on behalf of the new SPD

263

B - ‘The Prague manifest’ from ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ of the 28.1.1934

264

265

266

267

268

269

270 C-Abbreviations of organizations names ADGB Allgemeine Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund – the name of the ‘socialist’ German trade union federations between 1919 and 1933. BVP Bayrische Volkspartei – a conservative party from Bavaria a member of the SPD grand coalition in 1928. DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund – The German trade union’s federation. Founded in 1949. DVP Deutsche Volkspartei – A modarate conservative party which oprated in Germany from 1918 till 1933. FDKB Frieier Deutscher Kultur Bund – a cultural organization of the German speaking exiles in Sweden. The organization had about 400 members between 1943 and 1945. ISK International Sozialistische Kampfbund. A political organization which emerged from the philosophical school of Leonard Nelson. Held views similar to those of the post war SPD. Founded in 1925. KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands – The German communist party founded in 1919. KPD(o) Kommunistische Partei Deustschlands (opposition) – The independent German communist party. Its members refused to get directives from Moscow. Tended to be Trotskyites. Founded in 1928. LO Landsorganisationen I Sverige. The Swedish ‘blue collar’ Trade Unions organization founded in 1898. Neu Beginn A group within the SPD and the So.Pa.De, which tried between 1931-1939 to reunite the SPD and the KPD. NSDAP Nationalsozialistisch Deutsche Arbeiterpartei-the Nazi party. TCO Tjänstemän Centralorganisation. The Swedish White collar Trade Unions organization. Founded in 1944. SAI Sozialistischen Arbeiter Internationale. The Social Democratic international. SAP (German) Sozialistischen Arbeiter Partei Deutschlands. A party left of the SPD founded in 1931 by the left wing of the SPD. SAP (Swedish) Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti. The Swedish Socialist Democratic Party. So.Pa.De

271 The Exile SPD between 1933 and 1945. SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. The German Social Democratic party. Founded in 1875. USPD Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. The Left wing of the SPD that left the party in 1917 and reunited with the main SPD in 1922.

272 Sources

Abbreviations

Archiv der sozialen Demokratie Bonn- AdsD Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek Stockholm- ARAB Kungligen. Biblioteket (The Swedish royal library) –S.K.B Det Kongelige Biblotek (The Danish royal library) –D.K.B Mappe (portfolio)- M Manuscript –Ms System number -s

1-Primary sources

1.1-Correspondence

Correspondence and reports of the So.Pa.De secretariat during 1933 AdsD/M-6 Correspondence of Fritz Abicht 1935-1939 AdsD/ M-15 Correspondence of Willy Brandt 1933-1945 AdsD/M-58, M-69 Correspondence of Paul Bromme 1938-1940 and 1945-1946 AdsD/M-24, M-64 Correspondence of Henry Dittmer 1938 AdsD/M-148 Correspondence of Theodor Hartwig 1933-1944 AdsD/M-50 Correspondence of Kurt Heinig 1935-1946 AdsD/M-35, M-52,M-65 Correspondence of Richard Hansen 1933-1941 AdsD/M-47 Correspondence of Peter Hass 1939-1945 AdsD/M-142 Correspondence of Erich Lindstaedt 1934-1945 AdsD/M-72 Correspondence of Siegfried Ortloff 1939-1945 AdsD/M-85 Correspondence of Erich Ollenhauer 1933-1945 AdsD/M-81, M-182 Correspondence of Ernst Paul 1934-1945 AdsD/M-87 Correspondence of Carl Polenske 1937-1945 AdsD/M-88 Correspondence of Karl Raloff 1933-1945 AdsD/M-89 Correspondence of Walter Sassnick 1935-1946 AdsD/M-68, M-112 Correspondence of Emil Stahl 1933-1945 AdsD/M-131 Correspondence of Fritz Tarnow 1935-1945 AdsD/ M-58, M-134 Correspondence of Kurt Weck 1936-1940 AdsD/M-148 Correspondence of Hans Vogel with the Stockholm So.Pa.De group 1944 AdsD/M-148 Correspondence between Otto Wels and Per Albin Hansson 1936 AdsD/M-50

273 Correspondence between the So.Pa.De secretariat and the secretariat of the Danish social democrats1933-1940 AdsD/M-50 Correspondence between the So.Pa.De secretariat and the secretariat of the Swedish social democrats 1934-1945 AdsD/M-135

1.2-Protocols, party programs and special documents

Aktion Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands: beschlossen auf dem Dortmunder Parteitag am 28 September 1952 AdsD, Fa96-7180

SPD, ‘Grundsatzprogram der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands: beschlossen vom ausserordentlichen Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands in Bad Godesberg vom 13 bis 15 November 1959’ (Bonn 1959)

SPD, ‘Grundsatzprogram der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschland, Beschlossen vom Parteitag in Leipzig vom 12 bis 14 Januar 1990’ (Bonn 1990)

SAP, ‘Program för Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti’ (Stockholm 1944)

SAP, ‘Program för Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti’ (Stockholm 1960)

SAP, ‘Socialdemokraternas partiprogram’ (Stockholm 1975)

SAP, Socialdemokraternas partiprogram: Allmänna grundstatser (Stockholm 1990)

Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1921,1924, 1927, 1931 AdsD, X-2096

Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag : Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1957 AdsD, A93-1121;ARB 628 Q Frak

SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 1926’ (Berlin 1927)

SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 1927’ (Berlin 1928)

SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 1928’ (Berlin 1929)

SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 1929’ (Berlin 1930)

SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 1930’ (Berlin 1931)

274

SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands vom 1931’ (Berlin 1932)

SPD, ‘Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands 1948/1949’ (Bonn 1950)

Per Albin Hanssons tal om – medborgarhemmet i riksdagens remissdebatt 1928 [Stockholm 1989] ARAB, SAP 6,B20/9-

State department records of the U.S.A delegation to Sweden information on German exiles 1943-1945 (Washington 1985) on microfilms.

1.3-Newspapers and periodicals

‘Das Wort’ 1938-1940, 1946

‘Deutschland Berichte der So.Pa.De’ 1933-1940

‘Der Spiegel’ 1951-1953

‘Die Gesellschaft’ 1924-1933

‘Freier Deutscher Kulturbund in Schweden’ 1945-1946

‘Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte’ 1950-1953

‘Lübecker Volksboten’ 1932-1933

‘Neuer Vorwärts’ 1933-1940

‘Örebro Kuriren’ 1941-1946

‘Sozialistische Tribüne’ 1945-1946

‘Tiden’ 1918-1946

‘Vorwärts’ 1891-1933

‘Sozialistische Mitteilungen’ 1941-1947

275 ‘Zur Information’ 1943-1947

1.4-Writings

Brandt Willy

‘Efter segern.’ (Stockholm 1944), Ms in S.K.B s. 001329548

‘Förbrytare och andra Tyskar.’ (Stockholm 1946), Ms in S.K.B s. 001329547

‘Mein Weg nach Berlin.’ (Berlin1960)

‘Erinnerungen.’ (Berlin 1993)

Bernstein Eduard

‘Evolutionary Socialism.’ (New York 1961)

Paul Bromme

‘Ett år efter sammanbrottet.’ (Örebro 1946), Ms in S.K.B, s. 000508835

‘Potsdam arvet.’ (Örebro 1947), Ms in S.K.B, s. 000508834

Friedländer Otto

‘Makt och magi.’ (Stockholm 1942)

‘Panslavismen.’ (Stockholm 1944)

‘Tyskland efter Hitler.’ (Stockholm 1944)

‘Thomas Mann als Politiker.’ (Stockholm 1945)

‘Die schwedische Demokratie.’ (Offenbach/Main 1948)

‘Reiseandenken.’ (Stockholm 1951)

276 Heinig Kurt

‘Die grose Ausrede von der erdolchten Front.’ (Berlin 1920)

‘Stinnes und seine 600,000 Arbeiter.’ (Stuttgart 1921)

‘Das notleidende Kapital’ (Berlin 1922)

‘Die deutsche Steúergesetsgebúng.’ (Berlin 1923)

‘Die industriel Dividende.’ (Berlin 1923)

‘Der Werkmeister und die Wirtschaft.’ (Düsseldorf 1924)

‘Das Gutachten.von Dawes’ (Berlin 1924)

‘Die Goldbilanz.’ (Berlin 1925)

‘Die Finanzskandale des Kaiserreichs.’ (Berlin 1925)

‘Wie lese ich die Vierteljahrshefte der Aktiengesellschaften.’ (Berlin 1926)

‘Was sind Kartelle.’ (Jena 1927)

‘Der Osthilfe Skandal. ‘ (Berlin 1933)

‘Krigsgaeld-Rustningomkostninger.’ (Copenhagen 1937), Ms in D.K.B, s.001101283

‘Dagligven socialøkonomi.’ (Copenhagen 1938), Ms in D.K.B, s.001099903

‘Vardagens nationalekonomie.’ (Stockholm 1942)

‘Det tyske problemet i dag.’ (Copenhagen 1946), Ms in AdsD, A-54501

‘Der schwedische Mittelweg soziale Sicherheit.’ (Hamburg 1947, 1949)

Karleby Nils

‘Socialismen inför verkligheten.’ (Stockholm 1926)

277 Kautsky Karl

‘The agrarian question.’ (London 1988)

‘Etichs and the Materialist Conception of History.’ (London 1907)

‘The Social Revolution.’ translation by Simons M.W (Chicago 1916)

Laski Harold Joseph

‘Democracy in crisis.’ (London 1933)

‘The state in theory and practice.’ (New York 1935)

‘Program for victory.’ (London 1941)

‘Reflections on the revolutions of our time.’ (New York 1943)

Marx Karl

‘Marx und Engels Werke.’ Band 19 Dietz Verlag (Berlin 1962)

Polenske Carl

‘Die Gewerkschaft.’ (Braunschweig 1952), Ms in AdsD, AKO1809

Raloff Karl

‘Et bevaeget Liv.’ (Copenhagen 1969)

Schumacher Kurt

‘Ziele und Richtlinien der Sozialdemokratischen Partei.’ (Hannover 1946), Ms in AdsD, A-97-5470

Tarnow Fritz

‘Neue Aufgaben des Verbands in der neuen Zeit.’ (Berlin 1919)

‘Gewerkschaft Zeit und Streitfragen.’ (Berlin 1921)

278

‘Wirtschaftliche Zeit Fragen.’ (Kassel 1923)

‘Das Organisationsproblem im ADGB.’ (Berlin 1925)

‘Gegenwärtige Aufgaben Deutscher Wirtschaftspolitik.’ (Berlin 1926), Ms in AdsD, A80-4397

‘Warum Arm sein?’ (Berlin 1928)

‘Die Stellung der freien Gewerkschaften zur Frage der wirtschaft Demokratie.‘ (Jena 1929)

‘Die letzte Chance des Kapitalismus.’ (Berlin 1932)

‘Von der Wirtschaftanarchie zur Planwirtschaft.’ (Reichenberg 1932), Ms in AdsD, SEL AA 1755

‘Wirtschaft und Gewerkschaft.’ (München 1947)

‘Die Gewerkschaft im den neuen Staat.’ (Hamburg 1947)

Secondery sources

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279

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282 תקציר

מטרתה של עבודת מחקר זו היא להראות ולהסביר מדוע השפעתם של הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים על המפלגה הסוציאל דמוקרטית הגרמנית ה-SPD שלאחר המלחמה היתה מוגבלת מאוד למרות ריכוזם הגדול יחסית של גולים סוציאל דמוקרטים גרמנים בסקנדינביה ולמרות הקשרים הטובים בין הנהגת ארגונם ה מרכזי ה-So.Pa.De .

יצויין, כי מספר לא מבוטל מגולי ה- SPD בסקנדינביה היו בעלי עמדות בכירות ב SPD של 'רפובליקת וימאר'. בנוסף לכך הנהגת ה-So.Pa.De ראתה בסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים בני ברית חשובים, בני ברית שסיעו ל So.Pa.De בכסף באירוח ובשמירה על חלק מנכסיו. למרות זאת לאחר שנת 1945 לא אימץ ה SPD את מטרותיהם השוויוניות של הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים ואת גישתם המנסה לבצע מהפכה כלכלית וחברתית באמצעות רפורמות מבניות ובמסגרת כללי המשחק של דמוקרטיה פוליטת. הפוליטיקאים המצליחים ביותר של ה SPD החדש, שבעברם היו גולים בסקנדינביה Willy Brandt (ראש הממשלה הגרמני מטעם ה SPD בשנים 1969-1974 ) ו Herbert Wehner (יושב ראש הסיעה ושר בממשלת ה SPD ) לא היו חברי ה SPD לפני הגעתם לסקנדינביה.

בנוסף לתאור מטרת העבודה כולל המבוא תאור מפורט למדי של ה SPD עד 1914 ושל הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים עד 1956 . שני הפרקים העוסקים בכך במסגרת המבוא, דנים בנושאים שאינם חלק אינטגרלי מהמחקר. מדובר ב – SPD בתקופה שקדמה לראשית פעילותם הפוליטית של הדמויות בהן עוסק מחקר זה ןכן בהסטוריה של הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים. למרות שאינו חלק אינטגרלי מהמחקר המידע שנמסר בפרקים אלו הכרחי לצורך הבנת הטענות המרכזיות של הדסטציה.

הפרק הראשון בין השניים עוסק בהתפתחות ה'פרגמטיזם' של ה SPD עד לשנת 1914 ןבהתפתחות 'הסוציאליזם הרפורמיסטי' של המפלגה הסוציאל דמוקרטית השוודית, המרכזית מבין המפלגות הסוציאל דמוקרטיות הסקנדינביות, עד 1914 . הפרק השני מתאר את הבשלתו הסופית של ' הסוציאליזם הרפורמסטי' בקרב הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים ובראשם השוודים, ואת ישומו של 'הסוציאלזם הרפורמסטי' עד שנת 1956 . (המחקר אינו עוסק בשנים שלאחר 1956 ). מטרתם של שני פרקים אלו להבהיר את ההבדלים בין ה SPD לבין הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים בכל הנוגע לרעיונתיהם הפוליטיים והכלכליים וכן למדיניותם בפועל בתחומים אלו. ההבדלים, שניתן היה לצפות שיצתמצמו לנוכח מספרם הגדול של אנשי ה SPD, ששהו כגולים בסקנדינביה ולאור הקשרים הקשרים בין הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים ובין ה SPD .

א הרעיונות של ,הסוציאליזם הרפורמסטי' החלו להןפיע רשמית אצל הסוציאל דמוקרטים השוודים מ 1911 ואצל הסוציאל דמוקרטים הדנים מ 1913. באמצע שנות ה- 30 של המאה ה20- אומצו רעיונות אלו גם ע"י מפלגת העבודה הנורבגית. לאחר 1945 היתה זו מדיניותם המוצהרת והמדיניות בפועל של כל המפלגות הסוציאל דמוקרטיות בסקנדינביה לרבות הסוציאל דמוקרטים הפינים אשר שיתפו פעולה במספר ממשלות עם המפלגה הקומוניסטית הפינית. המאפיינים העקריים של 'הסוציאליזם הרפורמסטי' הם: א- שאיפה להשגת חברה ללא מעמדות וחלוקה שוויונית של ההון ושל ההכנסות. ב- הטלת מיסים גבוהים על ההון ובעלי הכנסות, מיסים הממנים תשלומי העברה נדיבים ושירותים ציבורים מפותחים, כאמצעי מרכזי להשגת שוויון בחלוקת ההכנסות. ג- חברות באיגודים מקצועיים של כלל כח העבודה במשק, כאשר האיגודים עצמם נוקטים במדיניות של השגת שכר שווה לכל חבריהם. ד- שימוש במדיניות קינסיאנית על מנת להשיג 'תעסוקה מלאה' ואי מתן עדיפות למדיניות של תכנון מרכזי. ה- שליטה של האיגוד המקצועי על חלק ניכר מהפונקציות הניהוליות במקומות העבודה והעברת חלק גדול מהמשק לבעלות ציבורית. ו- יצירת ברית בסיס תמיכה רחב למפלגה הסוציאל דמוקרטית המבוסס בנוסף לפועלים העירוניים גם על חקלאים בעלי משקים קטנים ועצמאים זעירים. ה SPD פעל עד 1914 במסגרת חוקה פוליטית 'אורתודוכסית'- 'תוכנית ארפורט' ולא נתן תשובה לצרכיהם של החקלאים בעלי המשקים הקטנים והעצמאים הזעירים הגרמנים. מאידאות ה'רוויזיוניזם' שהתפתחו בתוך ה SPD בתקופה זו נעדרה המטרה השוויונית הרדיקלית של הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים. האיגודים המקצועיים היו הגוף הפרגמטי ביותר ב SPD , אבל הם היו קטנים יותר באופן יחסי ממקביליהם בסקנדינביה.

חלק I

החלק הראשון עוסק בגולי ה SPD והסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים עד ל 1940 . פרק מספר אחד מוקדש לעמדתם 'בתקופת רפובליקת וימאר' של הגולים המרכזים בסקנדינביה ולמדיניות והרעיונות של ה SPD באותן שנים. הפרק כולל גם השוואה בין מדיניות ורעיונות אלו ומקביליהם אצל הסוציאל- דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים. השנים 1920 עד 1933 היו התקופה שהוליכה את ה SPD למעמד של מפלגה גולה, מאחר שלא הצליח לבלום את עלית הימין הקצוני לשילטון ואת קץ הדמוקרטיה הגרמנית. תהליך זה הסתיים בהוצאת ה SPD אל מחוץ לחוק בגרמניה ב 22 ליוני 1933 . בסקנדינביה המפלגות הסוציאל-דמוקרטיות נהייו בראשית שנות ה 30 הכח הפוליטי המרכזי. הפרק מתאר גם את חוסר האסרטיביות של ה SPD שהיה נכון לקואליציות עם מפלגות בעלות מדיניות אנטי-חברתית מובהקת דוגמאת 'מפלגת הלבראלים הלאומיים' (ה-DVP ) אפילו כאשר הדבר לא היה הכרחי להצלת הדמוקרטיה הגרמנית. מודגש בפרק שמדיניות זו היתה הפוכה מהמדיניות של הסוציאל-דמוקרטים

ב הסקנדינבים. ההשוואה הנערכת בפרק בין החוקות הפוליטיות של ה SPD בתקופה זו והחוקה הפוליטית מ 1920 של הסוציאל-דמוקרטים השוודים מראה שחוקות הSPD בניגוד לזו של השוודים לא כללו תוכנית מקיפה של מיסוי ותשלומי העברה, הוסיפו לא להציעה פתרונות מפורטים ל בעיות האכרים בעלי המשקים הקטנים והעצמאים הזעירים,היו כללים מאוד ביחס לשאלת הבעלות הציבורית וביחס למטרה הסופית של המפלגה. בסוף שנות ה 20 החל ה SPD לראות את עצמו במידה רבה כמיצגם של העובדים המאורגנים וכיריבם של החקלאים. הSPD כמפלגה לא תמך במדיניות קינסיאנית והתאורטיקן המרכזי של ה SPD בתחום הכלכלי Rudolf Hilferding הגדיר את התכנון המרכזי כ'עקרון סוציאליסטי מהותי' אפילו כאשר תכנון מרכזי זה התבצעה ע"י מונופולים וקרטלים פרטים. שני גולי ה SPD המרכזים בסקנדינביה היו Fritz Tarnow ו Tarnow .Kurt Heinig היה יושב ראש איגוד פועלי תעשית העץ מ 1921 ועד 1933, חבר הפרלמנט הגרמני ( Reichstag ) מטעם ה SPD מ 1928 ועד 1933, חבר המזכירות הראשית של האיגודים המקצועיים הגרמנים והמומחה הרשמי של האיגודים המקצועיים הגרמנים לעיניי כלכלה. Kurt Heinig היה העורך הכלכלי של Vorwärts (העיתון המרכזי של ה SPD ) במהלך 1924, עורך כתב העט התאורטי המרכזי של האיגודים המקצועיים הגרמנים מ 1925 ועד 1933, חבר הפרלמנט הגרמני מטעם ה SPD מ 1928 ועד 1933 והמומחה הרשמי למדינות פיננסית של הסיעה הפרלמנטרית של ה Tarnow . SPD תמך במדיניות קינסיאנית ובמערכת מיסוי ורווחה מפותחת, עמדה שהיה בה דמיון מסוים לרעיונות של הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים. לעומתו Heinig היה איש הזרם המרכזי בסוציאל-דמוקרטיה הגרמנית והוא נתן עדיפות למדיניות תיכנון מרכזי, עם זאת שלא כמו Hilferding היה Heinig בקורתי מאוד כלפי קרטלים ומונופלים פרטים, לדעתו שום דבר טוב לא יכול היה לצמוח מגופים אלו. התפקיד המרכזי שמלא Tarnow ב'פלירט' בין האיגודים המקצועיים והמפלגה הנאצית העיד על אופיו האופורטיונסטי ומעמיד בספק את משמעותן או חשיבותן של עמדותיו ה'רפורמיסטיות'.

במאי 1933 עם הוצאת האיגודים המקצועים בגרמניה אל מחוץ לחוק עזב Tarnow את גרמניה והגיע לדנמרק. אולם בנו Reinhold Tarnow נותר בגרמניה ונעשה חבר במפלגה הנאצית. Heinig בדומה לגולה חשוב נוסף בסקנדינביה Karl Raloff (חבר הפרלמנט הגרמני מטעם ה SPD במהלך שנת 1933 ומראשי הSPD ב הנובר) נותרו בגרמניה במהלך חודש יוני ובדומה ל Kurt Schumacher נטלו חלק ביזמתו של Paul Löbe להמשיך לקיים את ה SPD בגרמניה תוך אי קבלת מרותם של בכירי מזכירות ה SPD שהחלו לפעול ממחוץ לגרמניה כבר בראשית יוני 1933 (הפיצול תם עם הוצאת ה SPD אל מחוץ לחוק ב 22 ביוני Heinig .(1933 נמלט באוגוסט 1933 מברלין ל דנמרק לאחר גל מעצרים של פעילי SPD בברלין במהלך חודש זה. Raloff ברח לדנמרק בספטמבר 1933 לאחר הצקות מתמשכות של ה SA לו ולמשפחתו. Richard Hansen ראש ה Reichsbanners (המליציות הפרו רפובליקאיות שלמעשה הורכבו כמעט אך ורק מאנשי SPD ) ב שלזויג-הולשטין (המדינה הצפונית ביותר בגרמניה) יצא לדנמרק כבר במאי 1933 בשליחות מזכירות ה SPD אשר הטילה עליו את ארגון הפעילות המחתרתית של הSPD בצפון גרמניה ממפקדה שתשב בדנמרק. גולים חשובים אחרים שהיגעו לדנמרק

ג בשלב זה היו Otto Buchywitz חבר הפרלמנט הגרמני מטעם ה SPD וחברו הטוב Philip Scheidemann (חבר הפרלמנט הגרמני מטעם ה SPD וראש הממשלה הראשון של גרמניה מטעם ה SPD ) שהצטרף ל Buchwitz בשנת 1934. שני גולים אלו היו המבוגרים ביותר בקרב הגולים הבכירים בדנמרק.

ב 28 לינואר 1934 פרסם ה So.Pa.De את 'מניפסט פראג' שהיה בעל סטטוס של מצע מפלגה הגם שניתן היה לראותו כהצעה למצע אפשרי משותף לכלל תנועות השמאל הגרמניות. המניפסט לא כלל יעדים שוויונים מובהקים דוגמאת אלו של מצעי המפלגות הסוציאל-דמוקרטיות הסקנדינביות. המניפסט קרא ל'הכפפה לחברה' של התעשיות הכבדות ומוסדות האשראי בלא להסביר מה אמור להיות אופיה של הכפפה זו. המניפסט כלל גם קריאה לפיקוח על יתר חלקי המשק. דרישות אלו היו פחות רדיקליות, מתביעת הסוציאל-דמוקרטים השוודים בחוקתם הפוליטית מ 1944 'זכויות ההחלטה על הייצור בידי הכלל', ומתביעת הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הדנים בחוקתם הפוליטית מ 1913 'להעביר את כל אמצעי היצור לידי החברה'. המניפסט הוסיף לתת עדיפות למדיניות של תכנון מרכזי ולא כלל תוכנית מפורטת למיסוי ומדיניות רווחה עבור גרמניה שלאחר הפלת השילטון הנאצי. ה RSD ('סוציאליסטים גרמנים מהפכניים') שכלל את רוב האגף השמאלי של ה So.Pa.De היה בשנים 1933 ו 1934 מפלגה בתוך מפלגה. היו לRSD מוסדות אוטונומיים משל עצמו ושני נציגים במזכירות ה So.Pa.De . חברי ה RSD תמכו בשיתוף פעולה עם הקומוניסטים הגרמנים מתוך אמונה שאלו יהיו מסוגלים, לאור החשיבות שבהפלת המשטר הנאצי, לפעול ללא קבלת הוראות מברה"מ. ל RSD היו גם קשרים טובים עם מפלגת ה SAP הגרמנית ('מפלגת העובדים הסוציאליסטית') מפלגה קטנה שהיתה ממוקמת מבחינה פוליטית בין הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הגרמנים ובין המפלגה הקומוניסטית הגרמנית (KPD ). באוקטובר 1934 בפראג, פרסם ה RSD בשיתוף עם Max Seydewitz מייסד הSAP הגרמני מצע פוליטי. שלושה מבין כותבי המסמך הפכו בשלב מאוחר יותר לגולים בסקנדינביה (Siegfried Aufhäuser, Fritz Bieligk, Max Seydewitz ) מה שיכול להעיד על קשר עם הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים ואולי גם על השפעתם על כותבי המסמך. מצע ה RSD בדומה לחוקות הפוליטיות של של הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדיבים הגדיר את מטרת התנועה כחברה ללא מעמדות, ולא שם דגש על מדיניות תיכנון מרכזי. בראשית 1935 הדיחו ראשי ה Otto Wels ) So.Pa.Deו Hans Vogel ) את נציגי הRSD ממזכירות ה So.Pa.De באשמה של קשר ללא אישור עם הקומוניסטים דרך קבוצת ‘Neu Beginnen’ . כתוצאה מכך הפך ה RSD לארגון נפרד. הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים והאיגודים המקצועיים הסקנדינבים הוסיפו להעניק תמיכה פיננסית לגולים משני הארגונים, אולם מאחר ולא היה להם רצון לממן את התחרות בין שני הארגונים היריבים התמיכה הפננסית למוסדות נתנה בעיקר ל ארגון הגדול יותר, שהיה ה So.Pa.De . אחד השירותים החשובים שניתנו ל So.Pa.De ע"י הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים היה מתן משכן לארכיון ה SPD. ארכיון זה שימש מקור הכנסה חשוב ל So.Pa.De שהשאיל לחוקרים תמורת תשלום מסמכים מארכיון זה. הארכיון היגיע לקופנהגן במהלך השנים 1933 ו 1934 ונותר בה עד סוף 1938

ד למרות שכבר ב1936 מכר אותו ה So.Pa.De למכון להסטוריה חברתית באמסטרדם. הארכיון כלל בין השאר את הטיוטות המקוריות וכתב היד המקורי של ה ‘Das Kapital’ מאת קרל מרכס.

לקראת סוף 1937הובהר ל So.Pa.De שעליו להעביר את מטהו מצ'כוסלובקיה למדינה אחרת. צרפת נבחרה כמיקום החדש של הנהגת ה So.Pa.De . ה So.Pa.De בחר להעביר את כל נכסיו ומוסדותיו לחלקה המערבי של אירופה (צרפת, בלגיה והולנד). מעיתונו המרכזי של ה So.Pa.De ה ‘Neuer Vorwärts’ עולה בבירור שהנהגת ה So.Pa.De סברה שמדינות הסקנדינביות הן מטרתו הבאה של היטלר ושגורלן יהיה דומה לגורל צ'כוסלובקיה. חשיבותם של הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים בעיני הנהגת ה So.Pa.De ירדה, כמו כן לא השתכנעה הנהגת ה So.Pa.De בחשיבות הלימוד מהסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים למרות היישגהם החברתים והפוליטים בתקופה זו. למרות זאת נשלח במאי Emil Stahl 1938 חבר מזכירות ה So.Pa.De אל שוודיה במטרה 'לעשות סדר' ולארגן את הגולים הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הגרמנים . מזכירות הסוציאל- דמוקרטים התלוננה ב 1934 שלדעתה רבים מהגולים הפונים אליה בבקשת עזרה פיננסית ומציגים עצמם כסוציאל-דמוקרטים גרמנים הם למעשה קומוניסטים גרמנים הפונים למפלגה הסוציאל-דמוקרטית מאחר ולקומוניסטים השוודים אין די אמצעים כלכלים לתמוך בהם. במקביל בדנמרק היה Kurt Heinig היחידי מבין בכירי הזרם המרכזי ב So.Pa.De שהושפע בבירור מהסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים והחל לאמץ חלק מעמדותיהם.

הRSD התאחד מחדש עם ה So.Pa.De בסוף 1937, למרות זאת העדיפו רוב אנשי ה RSD שהיגיעו לסקנדינביה להתרכז בנורבגיה הרחק מהשג ידו של Stahl שישב בשוודיה ושל הקבוצה היחסית אנטי- קומוניסטית של אנשי הSo.Pa.De בדנמרק. הנהגת הSo.Pa.De באוסלו הורכבה כולה מאנשי ה RSD וכללה את Fritz Bieligk את Otto Friedländer (ראש ארגון הסטודנטים הסוציאל-דמוקרטים בגרמניה בראשית שנות ה 30) ואת Paul Bromme (סוציאל-דמוקרט צעיר שהגיעה העיר הגרמנית לובק בדומה ל Willy Brandt שגם שהה בנורבגיה).

חלק 2

בין אביב 1940 וסוף 1945 התרכזו כמעט כל הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הגרמנים הגולים בסקנדינביה במדינה אחת שוודיה. למעט Buchwitz שנעצר בדנמרק ע"י הגסטפו ו Scheidemann שניפטר בדצמבר 1939 הגעו כל יתר הגולים הסוצאל-דמוקרטים גרמנים הבכירים בדנמרק אל שוודיה (Hansen עזב ב 1941 ל ארצות-הברית). מספרם הכולל של חברי ה SPD לשעבר ששהו כעת בשוודיה הייה כעת כ 300 איש. זה היה הריכוז השני בגודלו באירופה של גולי SPD (הריכוז הגדול ביותר בין 1940 ל 1945 היה בבריטניה ומנה כ 600 איש).

ה מה שנותר ממזכירות ה So.Pa.De ברח מצרפת והתמקם בלונדון. הדמויות הדומיננטיות במזכירות זו היו Vogel ו חבר המזכירות Otto Wels) Erich Ollenhauer נפטר בפריז ב1939). 'מזכירות לונדון' אמצה עמדות מאוד לא רדיקליות בתחום הכלכלי-חברתי. הגולים הסוציאל-דמוקרטים בשוודיה היו מפוצלים מאוד בינם לבין-עצמם. תחילה היה חעימות בין הנהגת ה So.Pa.De בשטוקהום וביןStahl שהסתיים בהתפטרותו של Stahl מתפקידו כממונה מטעם מזכירות ה So.Pa.De בשוודיה. מחליפו החל מראשית 1943 היה Heinig שמצא את עצמו בעימות חריף עם Tarnow .

במהלך שהותו בשוודיה הפך Heinig לחסיד אדוק של 'הסוציאליזם הרפורמיסטי' השוודי. קבוצתו שהתפצלה מייתר הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הגרמנים בשוודיה (על רקע התנגדות Heinig לכל שיתוף פעולה עם הקומוניסטים) פרסמה בפבואר 1945 הצעה לחוקה פוליטת עתידית עבור הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הגרמנים. הצעה זו היתה רדיקלית מאוד בתחום הכלכלי-חברתי והיה דמיון רב בינה ובין החוקה הפוליטית מ 1944 של הסוציאל-דמוקרטים השוודים (חוקה ש Heinig טען שעליה לשמש כמודל לכל המפלגות הסוציאל-דמוקרטיות באירופה). Friedländer שהשתיך דווקא לאלו שכן תמכו בשיתוף פעולה עם הקומוניסטים תמך אף הוא ב 'סוציאליזם הרפורמסטי' השוודי. אבל הוא חטא בתיאור אידאליסטי ונאיבי מדי של הסיבות להצלחת הסוציאל-דמוקרטיה השוודית ושל ההסטוריה השוודית. Bromme שהיה לאחד הפוליטיקאים המצליחים ביותר ב SPD של לאחר 1945 אמץ בשוודיה דווקא עמדות פשרניות ביותר בתחום הכלכלי-חברתי. תופעה דומה התרחשה גם אצל Brandt למרות שגם הוא וגם Bromme היו בעלי קשרים מצוינים עם הסוציאל-דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים.

חלק 3 Fritz Tarnow האופורטיוניסט היה הגולה בעל ההשפעה הרבה ביותר בקרב גולי ה-SPD בשבדיה בין השנים Tarnow . 1940-1945 קיים בו זמנית קשרים עם חברים בכירים במפלגה הנאצית שהיו מעורבים בקשר נגד היטלר (הקשר הכושל לחיסול היטלר ב 20.7.1944 במטרה לשאת ולתת על כניעה גרמנית שלא תהיה כניעה מוחלטת ותיתן רהביליטציה לחלק מראשי הצבא הגרמני) ובמקביל קיים Tarnow קשרים עם הקומוניסטים הגרמנים בשוודיה. בתכתובת שלו עם מזכירות ה-So.Pa.De בלונדון הציג עצמו 'כסוציאל דמוקרט נאמן' והסתיר הן את קשריו עם הנאצים והן את קשריו עם הקומוניסטים. Tarnow הצליח גם להשאיר רושם טוב על המודיעין האמריקאי בשבדיה. ב 1946 חזר Tarnow לגרמניה וב 1947 הצליח להגיעה למעמד של ראש האיגודים המקצועיים הגרמנים באיזור הכיבוש האמריקאי (איזור הכיבוש הגדול ביותר בגרמניה). בשבדיה הצליח Tarnow להחליש את מעמדו של Heinig שדעותיו האנטי- בולשוויקיות גרמו לו להיות לא פופולארי בקרב רוב הגולים.

ו Heinig ראה ב Tarnow אויב אישי הוא נרתע מלחזור ולהשתלב ב SPD החדש בגרמניה לנוכח הצלחתם של Fritz Tarnow ו Willy Brandt שאותו ראה כקריריסט נטול ערכים. יחסו הקריר של ראש SPD בגרמניה להצעתו לברית פוליטית הבהירה ל Heinig סופית שמוקומו אינו ב SPD .

Raloff, Friedländer , ו Stahl נותרו מחוץ ל SPD מסיבות אישיות. Bromme , המצליח מבין גולי ה SPD , היטיב להשתמש בפטרוניו הפוליטים ולהחליף נאמנויות בעיתוי הנכוןץ גם גילו הצעיר יחסית היה יתרון מבחינתו של Schumacher .

ב 1952 ופעם נוספת ב 1954 אימץ ה SPD חוקת מפלגה זמנית לא אגליטרית. בכירי ה SPD שבעברם היו גולים בשבדיה תמכו בחוקה זו.

ז מילות מפתח

סוציאל דמוקרטים גרמנים סוציאל דמוקרטים סקנדינבים הגולים הגרמנים

ח

מדוע לא היצליחו הגולים הסוציאל דמוקרטים הגרמנים בסקנדינביה להביא לאימוץ הרעיונות והאידאלים של הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים ע"י המפלגה הסוציאל דמוקרטית הגרמנית לאחר 1945. הגולים הסוציאל דמוקרטים הגרמנים והסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים בשנים 1933-1956 .

מחקר לשם מילוי חלקי של הדרישות לקבלת תואר "דוקטור לפילוסופיה"

מאת

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הוגש לסינאט אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב

אישור המנחה ______אישור דיקן בית הספר ללימודי מחקר מתקדמים ע"ש קרייטמן ______

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העבודה נעשתה בהדרכת

פרופסור פרנק שטרן

במחלקה להסטוריה בפקולטה למדעי הרוח והחברה

מדוע לא היצליחו הגולים הסוציאל דמוקרטים הגרמנים להביא לאימוץ הרעיונות והאידאלים של הסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים ע"י המפלגה הסוציאל דמוקרטית הגרמנית לאחר .1945 הגולים הסוציאל דמוקרטים הגרמנים והסוציאל דמוקרטים הסקנדינבים בשנים 1933-1956 .

מחקר לשם מילוי חלקי של הדרישות לקבלת תואר "דוקטור לפילוסופיה"

מאת

עמיחי וטורי

הוגש לסינאט אוניברסיטת בן גוריון בנגב

יג באלול תשס"ד 30.8.2004

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