Responsibility Without Power Discussing the Role of the British Government in the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 Kristian Hole Lønning
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Responsibility without power Discussing the role of the British government in the Cyprus crisis of 1974 Kristian Hole Lønning MA Thesis in History Department of Archaeology, History, Cultural- and Religious Studies University of Bergen Spring 2017 I Samandrag Denne masteroppgåva tek føre seg korleis den Britiske regjeringa handterte Kyproskrisa i 1974. Den 15. mai 1974 vart den kypriotiske regjeringa styrta av eit gresk-leia statskupp. Fem dagar seinare invaderte tyrkiske militærstyrkar øya, noko som førte til at den greske militærjuntaen kollapsa. Den tyrkiske invasjonen resulterte i FNs tryggingsråd sin resolusjon 353, som kravde at dei tre garantørmaktene - Hellas, Tyrkia og Storbritannia - måtte gå saman om å forhandle fram ei løysing på krisa som hadde utvikla seg på øya. To konferansar vart haldne i Geneve, men forhandlingane stoppa opp, og då den greske delegasjonen nekta å svare på eit tyrkisk ultimatum, vart konferansen oppløyst. Like etter byrja det tyrkiske militæret sin andre invasjon av Kypros, som førte til ein de facto deling av øya, ei deling som framleis eksisterer i dag. Masteroppgåva argumenterer for at delinga av øya i 1974 kom som eit resultat av ulike faktorar. For det fyrste var krisa ein kulminasjon av ei langvarig konflikt mellom Hellas og Tyrkia, der sistnemnde utnytta det gresk-leia statskuppet til å invadere øya. Dette var i utgongspunktet retta mot å beskytte den tyrkisk-kypriotiske minoriteten. For det andre var det ein konsekvens av mislukka forsøk frå den britiske og den amerikanske regjeringa på å forhindre ei eskalering av krisa. Britiske offentlege dokumentar frå 1974 tydar på at under krisa si fyrste fase undervurderte den britiske regjeringa det tyrkiske militæret og dei var vaklevorne i avgjerdene sine. Dette kan ha vore med på å leggja til rette for Tyrkia si fyrste invasjon av Kypros. Den andre fasen av krisa var prega av dårleg kommunikasjon og motstridande politiske interesser mellom den britiske og den amerikanske regjeringa, noko som førte til at dei ikkje var i stand til å gjennomføre ein felles politikk. Dette kan igjen ha lagt til rette for den andre tyrkiske invasjonen av Kypros. II Contents Samandrag....................................................................................................................................... II Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ V Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ VI Cast of characters ......................................................................................................................... VII 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Research questions and narrowing of thesis ......................................................................... 2 1.2 Historiography ...................................................................................................................... 3 1.3 Sources .................................................................................................................................. 8 1.4 Methodology and chapters .................................................................................................. 11 2. Historical background ............................................................................................................... 13 2.1 Anti-colonial uprisings........................................................................................................ 13 2.2 Events prior to the coup ...................................................................................................... 15 2.3 Britain’s involvement in Cyprus in the Cold War .............................................................. 16 2.4 Chronology of events: 1974 Cyprus crisis .......................................................................... 18 2.5 Map ..................................................................................................................................... 19 3. Conflicting theories about the cause of the crisis ..................................................................... 20 3.1 Arguments supporting an Anglo-American plot................................................................. 20 3.2 Ignorance intended? ............................................................................................................ 24 3.3 Britain reviews its position on Cyprus ................................................................................ 26 3.4 British contingency plans .................................................................................................... 28 3.5 Did Makarios fear a coup? .................................................................................................. 31 4. From coup to conference .......................................................................................................... 33 4.1 The British government’s reaction to the coup ................................................................... 34 4.2 Preventing a Turkish military reaction ............................................................................... 37 4.3 The British government’s reaction to the Turkish invasion................................................ 41 4.4 Differences between Kissinger and Callaghan ................................................................... 44 4.5 Chapter conclusion.............................................................................................................. 47 5. The First Geneva Conference ................................................................................................... 48 5.1 Setting a framework for the conference .............................................................................. 49 5.2 Early disagreements ............................................................................................................ 50 5.3 Impasse ............................................................................................................................... 52 III 5.3 Tackling the Turks .............................................................................................................. 54 5.4 US pressure and the question of demilitarisation ............................................................... 56 5.5 What was gained from the First Geneva Conference? ........................................................ 58 5.6 Chapter conclusion.............................................................................................................. 60 6. The Second Geneva Conference ............................................................................................... 61 6.1 Between the Conferences .................................................................................................... 61 6.2 Bi- and trilateral talks, 8 – 10 August ................................................................................. 62 6.3 The introduction of the Cypriot delegations to Geneva ...................................................... 66 6.4 Preparing for the worst........................................................................................................ 68 6.5 The Turkish ultimatum ....................................................................................................... 71 6.6 Aftermath and reflections ................................................................................................... 76 6.7 Chapter conclusion.............................................................................................................. 78 7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 80 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 84 Appendixes ................................................................................................................................... 88 Appendix 1: Treaty of Guarantee, 1960 ................................................................................... 88 Appendix 2: United Nations Security Council’s Resolution 353 ............................................. 91 IV Acknowledgements This thesis has required an enormous amount of effort to understand the Cyprus conflict in general, and the Cyprus crisis of 1974 in particular. I owe my gratitude to many individuals for helping me with my thesis. I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Harm S. Schröter, for guiding me on the right path when I have felt lost in my work. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Christhard Hoffman, Associate Professor Camilla Brautaset, Professor Rolf Hobson, and the students of the “Across borders”-seminar. Their feedback has been very helpful and greatly appreciated. I would also like to thank my tutors at the School of Oriental and African Studies, especially Gamon McLellan, who first introduced me to the Cyprus conflict, and who, because of my particular interest in the topic, allowed me to write customised assignments on the conflict. Next, I would like to thank the helpful staff at the National Archives in Kew, who taught me all I needed to know about archives and how to conduct archival research in the most effective