Appendix I—Constitutional Court Justices, 1991–2010

Appointed in 1991

Ernest Ametistov: Leading Researcher, All-Union Scientiﬁc Research Institute of Soviet Administration and Legislation; Doctor of Juridical Science. Boris Ebzeev: Professor, Faculty of Soviet State Law, Saratov Judicial Institute; Doctor of Juridical Science. Gadis Gadzhiev: Chairman, Permanent Commission of the Dagestan Supreme Soviet for Legislation, Law, and Law Enforcement; Candidate of Juridical Science; RSFSR People’s Deputy from Dagestan SSR. Anatolii Kononov: Deputy Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Clemency; Candidate of Juridical Science. Viktor Luchin: Senior Fellow, Russian Social and Political Institute (formerly Moscow Higher Party School); Candidate of Juridical Science. Tamara Morshchakova: Senior Researcher, All-Union Scientiﬁc Research Insti- tute of Soviet Administration and Legislation; Doctor of Juridical Science. Vladimir Oleinik: Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Free- dom of Religion, Confessions, Grace, and Charity; RSFSR People’s Deputy. Yurii Rudkin: Secretary, Russian Constitutional Court, Deputy Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation; Candidate of Juridical Science. Nikolai Seleznev: Prosecutor, Kemerov Oblast. Oleg Tiunov: Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee for Interna- tional Affairs and Foreign Trade; Doctor of Juridical Science; RSFSR People’s Deputy. Nikolai Vedernikov: Chairman, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Clemency; RSFSR People’s Deputy; Doctor of Juridical Science. Nikolai Vitruk: Deputy Chairman, Russian Constitutional Court, Chief of the Faculty of State and Law, MVD Higher Judicial Correspondence School. Valerii Zorkin: Chairman, Russian Constitutional Court, Professor, Faculty of State and Law, MVD Higher Judicial Correspondence School; member, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Constitution Drafting Commission; Doctor of Juridical Science.

Appointed in 1994

Marat Baglai: Chairman, Russian Constitutional Court, Graduate of the Institute of State and Law; Lecturer and Assistant Professor at the Institute of Interna- tional Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Head of the Department at the Institute of International Workers Movements at the Academy of Sciences; Assistant Dean of the Academy of Labor and Social Relations. Yuri Danilov: Graduate of the law faculty of Voronezh State University; judge of the Voronezh Regional Court; Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy

161 162 Appendix I—Constitutional Court Justices, 1991–2010

Chairman of the State Committee on Anti-Monopolistic Policy and Support of New Economic Structures. Olga Khokhriakova: Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law; Head of Department of Labor and Social Law. Vladimir Strekazov: Graduate of Military Political Academy in 1973; assistant to the Dean of the Military Academy of Economy. Valdimir Tumanov: Chairman, Russian Constitutional Court, Professor at the Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences since 1959; member of the International Academy of Comparative Law; President of the UNESCO International Association of Legal Science in 1994; Member of the Duma Committee on Legislation, Judicial and Court Reform. Vladimir Yaroslavtsev: Judge, St. Petersburg City Court.

Appointed 1997–2010

Liudmila Zharkova (1997): Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Karelia, and a Deputy Minister of Justice, Republic of Karelia. Anatolii Sliva (1998): Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Federation Council Chairman, State Duma Committee for Matters of Local Self-Government. Gennadii Zhilin (1999): Member, Supreme Court of the Russian Federation; Deputy Chairman, Sverdlovsk Regional Court. Nikolai Bondar (2000): Director of the Institute of State and Law, Rostov State University. Sergei Kazanstev (2002): Law Faculty, St. Petersburg State University; Chair- man of the St. Petersburg City Housing Committee. Larisa Krasavchikova (2003): Professor of Civil Rights, Urals State Legal Academy, Judicial Institute of Ekaterinburg. Mikhail Kleandrov (2003): Chairman of Arbitrazh Court, Tiumen Oblast. Nikolai Melnikov (2005): Prosecutor, Sakha Yakutiia Republic; Deputy Prose- cutor, Rostov Region. Sergei Mavrin (2005): Professor of Law, St. Petersburg State University. Alexander Kokotov (2010): Head of Department of Constitutional Law, Urals State University. Konstantin Aranovsky (2010): Head of the Elections Commission, Primorsky Region. Appendix II—Terms of Russian Constitutional Court Justices

Boris Ebzeev 30 October 1991–31 July 2008 Gadis Gadzhiev 30 October 1991– Anatolii Kononov 30 October 1991–1 January 2010 Yurii Rudkin 30 October 1991– Nikolai Seleznev 30 October 1991– Valerii Zorkin 30 October 1991– Vladimir Oleinik (died in ofﬁce) 30 October 1991–17 February 1999 Nikolai Vedernikov (mandatory 30 October 1991–16 February 2000 retirement age) Tamara Morshchakova (mandatory 30 October 1991–29 March 2002 retirement age) Oleg Tiunov (mandatory retirement age) 30 October 1991–12 February 2003 Nikolai Vitruk (mandatory retirement 30 October 1991–12 February 2003 age) Ernest Ametistov (died in ofﬁce) 01 November 1991–07 September 1998 Viktor Luchin (mandatory retirement 01 November 1991–25 February age) 2005 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ Vladimir Yaroslavtsev 24 October 1994– Olga Khokhriakova 25 October 1994– Vladimir Tumanov (mandatory 25 October 1994–20 February 1997 retirement age) Yurii Danilov 15 November 1994– Vladimir Strekazov 06 December 1994– Marat Baglai (mandatory retirement age) 07 February 1995–25 February 2005 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ Liudmila Zharkova 11 June 1997– Anatolii Sliva 14 October 1998– Gennadii Zhilin 18 May 1999– Nikolai Bondar 16 February 2000– Sergei Kazantsev 29 March 2002– Mikhail Kleandrov 12 February 2003– Larisa Krasavchikova 13 February 2003– Nikolai Melnikov 25 February 2005– Sergei Mavrin 27 February 2005– Konstantin Aranovsky 3 March 2010– Alexander Kokotov 3 March 2010–

163 Notes

1 The Russian Constitutional Court in Comparative Perspective

1. The power of a court to render binding decisions on the constitutionality of legislation or other government action. 2. Austria and Weimar Germany did have constitutional review mechanisms for brief periods prior to World War II. Austria reestablished its constitutional court in 1945, and Germany’s was formed in 1949. The French Conseil Constitutionnel was created in 1958 under the Fifth Republic Constitution. Other West European states with established review mechanisms include Italy (1948), Portugal (1976), Spain (1978), and Belgium (1985). See Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 3. Brazil and Colombia have constitutional courts, while there are also quite a few states like Costa Rica and more recently Mexico that have supreme courts with some judicial review powers. 4. Constitutional courts have been created in Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Russia, and are in the process of being established in still others. See Herman Schwartz, “The New East European Constitutional Courts”, in A.E. Dick Howard (ed.), Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges. 5. See, for example, Robert B. Ahdieh, Russia’s Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy, 1985–1996 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Herbert Hausmaninger, “From the Soviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision to the Russian Constitutional Court”, Cornell International Law Journal, 25 (1992), 305–37; Peter Maggs, “Enforcing the Bill of Rights in the Twilight of the Soviet Union”, University of Illinois Law Review, (1991), 1049–63; Peter Maggs, “The Russian Courts and the Russian Constitution”, Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, 8/1 (1997), 99–117; Robert Sharlet, Soviet Constitu- tional Crisis: From De-Stalinization to Disintegration (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992); Robert Sharlet, “The Russian Constitutional Court: The First Term”, Post Soviet Affairs, 9/1 (1993), 1–39; Robert Sharlet, “Russia’s Second Consti- tutional Court: Politics, Law and Stability”, in Victoria E. Bonnell and George Breslauer (eds.), Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder? (New York: Westview Press, 2001). 6. The only other book-length treatment of the constitutional court that focuses more on the judges and their interests than on the politicians who use the court. Alexei Trochev, Judging Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990–2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

164 Notes 165

7. See, for example, Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller, “A Rational Choice The- ory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6/2 (1990); Roderick D. Kiewiet and Matthew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, “The Article I, Section 7 Game”, Georgetown Law Journal, 80 (1992), 523; John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, “A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation”, International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992); Cornell W. Clayton, “Separate Branches—Separate Politics: Judicial Enforcement of Congressional Intent”, Political Science Quarterly, 109/5 (1994–95). These works model the strategic nature of judicial decision making and its effect on interbranch relations in the US government. 8. See, for example, George Lee Haskins, “Law Versus Politics in the Early Years of the Marshall Court”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 130 (1981), 1–27; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Par- ticipation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (New York: Vintage Books, 1941); Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History Vol. 1, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1926); Edward S. Corwin, “The Establish- ment of Judicial Review-I”, Michigan Law Review, 9 (1910), 102–25; Edward S. Corwin, “The Establishment of Judicial Review-II”, Michigan Law Review,9 (1911), 283–316. 9. See, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “The Independent Judi- ciary in an Interest-Group Perspective”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975). 10. See Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Polit- ical Foundations of Secure Markets”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149 (1993), 1. Also see William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan, “The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions”, American Political Science Review, 87/1 (1993). They argue that the Supreme Court responds to public opinion, reﬂecting majority interests. Other interesting analyses of the US case are Jerold L. Waltman and Kenneth M. Holland (eds.), The Political Role of Law Courts in Modern Democracies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988); Eric Rasmusen, “Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game”, Law, Economics & Organization, 10/1 (1994); John Ferejohn, Jack Rakove, and Jonathan Riley (eds.), Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 11. See Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Martin M. Shapiro, “Comparative Law and Compar- ative Politics”, Southern California Law Review, 53 (1980), 537. 12. For a detailed analysis of the constitutional court in Germany, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); Donald P. Kommers, “The Federal Constitutional Court in the German Political System”, Comparative Polit- ical Studies, 26/4 (1994), 470–91; Philip M. Blair, Federalism and Judicial Review in West Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). In France, see 166 Notes

path-breaking work of Alec Stone, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1992); Alec Stone, “Judging Socialist Reform: The Politics of Coordinate Construction in France and Germany”, Comparative Polit- ical Studies, 26/4 (1994). In Italy, see Mary Volcansek, “Judicial Politics and Policy-Making in Western Europe”, West European Politics, 15/3 (1992); Mary L. Volcansek, “Constitutional Courts as Horizontal Arbiters: Govern- ing by Decree in Italy”, American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Washington, DC, 1997). In Hungary, see Kim Lane Scheppele, “The New Hungarian Constitutional Court”, Eastern European Constitutional Review,Fall (1999). 13. See, for example, Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges. 14. See, for example, Martin M. Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, “The New Con- stitutional Politics of Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, 26/4 (1994); Neal C. Tate and Torbjoern Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995), which discusses the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Malta, Israel, Namibia, the Philippines, and the post- Communist states of Eastern Europe. Sally J. Kenney, William M. Reisinger, and John C. Reitz (eds.), Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspec- tive (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) discusses Europe with speciﬁc treatment of the European Union, Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. 15. See, for example, Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, “Judi- cial Politics in the European Community: European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis De Dijon Decision”, Comparative Political Studies, 26/4 (1994); Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice and National Courts: Doc- trine and Jurisprudence (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998); Joseph H.H. Weiler, “A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors”, Comparative Political Studies, 26/4 (1994); Gregory Caldiera and James L. Gibson, “The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union”, American Political Science Review, 89/2 (1995). This work stresses the ECJ’s ability to manipulate its involvement with international actors in order to promote its own institutional power and increased authority. Also see Anne- Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration”, International Organization, 47/1 (1993). 16. Neal C. Tate, “Why the Expansion of Judicial Power?”, in Neal C. Tate and Torbjoern Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995). 17. Martin Shapiro, “The Success of Judicial Review”, in Sally J. Kenney, William M. Reisinger, and John C. Reitz (eds.), Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Martin Shapiro, “Some Con- ditions for the Success of Constitutional Courts: Lessons from the US Expe- rience”, in Wojciech Sadurski (ed.), Constitutional Justice, East and West (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 37–59; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). Notes 167

18. For example, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova, “The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government”, Law and Society Review, 117 (2001). 19. Shapiro, “Some Conditions for the Success of Constitutional Courts”, 26. Also see Nicos Alivizatos, “Judges as Veto Players”, in Herbert Doering (ed.), Parliamentary and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995). This argument may correlate with the analysis in George Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism”, British Journal of Political Science, 25/3 (1994), 289–326; George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 20. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1987). 21. Harold J. Berman, “The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat)”, The Harriman Institute Forum, 4/5 (May 1991), 3. 22. Sergei Pashin and B.A. Zolotukhin, “The Conception of Judicial Reform in the RSFSR”, Sovetskaia Iustitsiia (21–22 November 1991), 2. 23. Ibid. 24. F.J.M. Feldbrugge, “The Constitution of the USSR”, Review of Socialist Law, 16/2 (1990), 163–224. 25. John Ferejohn, “Independent Judges, Independent Judiciary: Explain- ing Judicial Independence”, Southern California Law Review, 72 (1999), 353–84. 26. See Eli Salzberger and Stefan Voigt, “On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe”, Constitutional Political Economy, 13 (2002), 25–52. 27. Shapiro and Sweet, “The New Constitutional Politics of Europe”. 28. Tate and Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. 29. Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism”; Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. 30. Alivizatos, “Judges as Veto Players”; Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conﬂict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 31. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 228. 32. Caldiera and Gibson, “The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union”; James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldiera, and Vanessa A. Baird, “On the Legitimacy of High Courts”, American Political Science Review, 92/2 (1998); Timothy Johnson and Andrew Martin, “The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions”, American Political Science Review,92 (1998), 299–310; Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, “Public Opin- ion and the United States Supreme Court”, Law and Society Review, 2 (1968), 357–82. 33. Georg Vanberg, “Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Pol- icy Compromise”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (1998), 299–346; Georg Vanberg, “Legislative–Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review”, American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 346–61. 168 Notes

2 Establishing Judicial Review in Russia

1. Peter H. Solomon, “Gorbachev’s Legal Revolution”, Canadian Business Law Journal, 17/7 (1990), 185. In the fall of 1989, Soviet leaders gave up the exclu- sive ruling position of the party, and in February of 1990 they forfeited the right to rule over government from posts in the party hierarchy. 2. “Resolution of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU on Legal Reform [Rezoliutsii XIX Vsesoiuznoi Konferentsii KPSS: O Pravovoi Reforme]”, Pravda, 7 May 1988, 3. 3. Mikhail Gorbachev, Izvestiia, 12 June 1989. 4. “Nineteenth Party Conference”, TASS, 28 June 1988. 5. “Congress of People’s Deputies”, TASS, 23 December 1989. 6. “Congress of People’s Deputies Debate in December 1989 on the Creation of the Committee for Constitutional Oversight”, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 27 February 1990. 7. “USSR Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR [Zakon CCCP Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora v CCCP]”, Izvestiia, 26 December 1989 (1989), Article 10. 8. TASS, 23 December 1989. 9. “USSR Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR [Zakon CCCP Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora v CCCP]”, Articles 12 and 13. 10. Ibid., Articles 21 and 22. 11. Izvestiia, 26 April 1990. Including Chairman Sergei S. Alekseev and Deputy Chairman Boris M. Lazarev, fourteen of the 21 members held doctorates, and ﬁve held candidate degrees in law: A.M. Abramovich, A. Agzamkhodzhaiev, S.S. Boskholov, F.G. Burchak, A.G. Bykov, R.I. Ivanova, G.Z. Intskirveli, S.A. Mirzoiev, I.Sh. Muksinov, M.I. Piskotin, A.I. Smokina, V.K. Sobakin, G.K. Tolstoi, R. Torgunbekov, O. Usmanov, V.D. Filimonov, and Sh.Sh. Yagudin. The other two, that is, L. Karpetian, Prorektor of Erevan Univer- sity, held a doctorate in philosophy, and M. Annanepesov, Vice President of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, held a doctorate in history. 12. “Union Treaty”, Moskovskie novosti, 18 August 1991, 8–9. 13. “Decrees of RSFSR President Yeltsin”, Rossiia, 19 August 1991. 14. Carla Thorson, “Constitutional Issues Surrounding the Coup”, Report on the USSR, 3/36 (1991), 19–22. 15. “Decrees of RSFSR President Yeltsin”. 16. Herbert Hausmaninger, “From the Soviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision to the Russian Constitutional Court”, Cornell International Law Journal, 25 (1992), 305–37. 17. Constitution of the Russian Federation: Draft with Commentary [Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Proekt s Kommentariiami] (Moscow and Krasnoyarsk, 1991). 18. “RSFSR Law on the Constitutional Court [Zakon Rossiiskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki o Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR]”, Gazette of the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR [Vedomosti, Sezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR], 25 July 1991, (30: 1991), Article 57. 19. Ibid., Article 1 and 32. 20. Ibid., Article 80. Notes 169

21. Ibid., Article 59. 22. Ibid., Article 1. 23. Ibid., Article 1. 24. Ibid., Article 1. 25. Ibid., Article 16. 26. Ibid., Articles 6 and 14. 27. Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Federation—Russia [Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi Zakon) Rossiiskoi Federatsii—Rossii] (Moscow: Izdaniie Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1993). 28. Mikhail Mitiukov, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996). 29. “Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Federalnii Konstitutsionnii Zakon o Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federa- tion [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 1 (1995), Chapter 1, Article 3. 30. This is analogous to the German court. Ibid., Chapter 1, Article 12. 31. Ibid., Chapter 15, Section 5. 32. Ibid., Chapter 1, Article 17. 33. Ibid., Article 18, Section 7. 34. Ibid., Article 11. 35. Ibid., Articles 21 and 22. 36. Ibid., Article 79. 37. Ibid., Article 100. 38. “Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Federalnii Konstitutsionnii Zakon o Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, Article 23. 39. Ibid., Article 50. 40. Ibid., Article 84. 41. Pravda, 6 January 1994. 42. Izvestiia, 27 January 1994. Also, the hunger strike was not widely reported in the press, but was conﬁrmed by the judge, Viktor Osipovich Luchin, “Interview with the Author”, (1996).

3 The Politics of Judicial Review in Russia, 1989–2010

1. These figures are based on the actual delimitations (Opredeleniia)obtained by the author from Deputy Chairman Morshchakova’s office in 1996. There is reason to believe that the number of petitions (obrashcheniia) was actu- ally much higher. At the time Zorkin quoted the figure as “hundreds” and other sources, including the court itself, have subsequently put the number at 30,000. Many petitions were weeded out by court staff because they did not comply with the filing requirements or did not raise a constitutional issue. Those petitions that were reviewed by the court in camera and then rejected resulted in the issuance of a formal determination, or delimitation (Opredelenie). 2. Tamara Georgievna Morshchakova, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996). 170 Notes

3. The new law on the court promulgated in 1994 contained provisions for such records and more accurate data on petitions is now available for sub- sequent years. Nonetheless, the information on petitions is incomplete, and the court itself has given conﬂicting numbers. For the best information available today, see ofﬁcial website of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation: www.ksrf.ru. 4. Ernest Mikhailovich Ametistov, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996); Gadis Abdulaevich Gadzhiev, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996).

4 USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, 1989–91

1. The committee’s work in the area of civil rights, while significant and interesting in its own right, was entirely taken up on its own initiative, and is therefore not directly relevant to the analysis here. 2. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On the Decree of the USSR President of 20 April 1990, ‘On the Regulation of Mass Demonstrations in Moscow Inside the Ring Road’ [Ob Ukaze Prezidenta SSSR ot 20 Aprelia 1990 Goda ‘O Reglamentatsii Provedeniia Massovykh Merpriiatii Territorii Moskvy Predelakh Sadovogo Koltsa’]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (39: 1990), 774. 3. Elizabeth Teague, “Constitutional Watchdog Suspends Presidential Decree”, Report on the USSR, 42 (1990). 4. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On the Prohibition of Dual Appointments for Leaders of State Organizations and Administrators [O Zaprete Sovmeshcheniia Dolzhnostei Rukovoditeliami Gosudarstvennykh Organov Vlasti i Upravleniia Ustanovlennom Zakonodatelstve RSFSR]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (47: 1990), 1002. 5. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On Normative Acts Regard- ing the Use of Force for Maintaining Social Order [O Normativnykh Aktakh po Voprosam Ispolzovaniia Voennosluzhashchikh dlia Ochrany Obshchestvennogo Poriadka]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (6: 1991), 48. 6. In the course of its inquiry into the decree, the committee not only challenged the use of the Soviet military domestically but also showed a willingness to delve into an even more difficult political question—namely, Communist Party predominance in Soviet institutions. The committee challenged the continued existence of military regulations requiring officers to carry out Communist Party policy, arguing that these regulations violated amendments to the USSR Constitution (the removal of Article 6) which ended the party’s monopoly on power. See Stephen Foye, “Oversight Com- mittee Rejects CPSU Control over Armed Forces”, Report on the USSR, 16 (1991). 7. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On the Ability of the USSR President to Institute the USSR Law of 24 September 1990, ‘On Executive Measures for the Stabilization of the Economic and Political Life in the Coun- try’ [O Polnomochiiakh Prezidenta SSSR po Zakonu SSSR ot 24 Sentiabria Notes 171

1990 Goda ‘O Dolpolnitelnykh Merakh po Stabilizatsii Ekonomicheskoi i Obshchestvenno-Politicheskoi Zhizni Strany’]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (29: 1991), 856. 8. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On Normative Acts of Union Republics Making Provisions for or Organizing Activities of Military Forces within These Republics [O Normativnikh Aktakh Soiuznykh Respublik, Predusmatrivaiushchikh Priostanovlenie ili Ogranichenie Deistviia na Territorii Etykh Respublik Pravovykh Polozhenii ob Obespechenii Zilem Voennosluzhashchikh]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (47: 1990). 9. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On the Declaration by the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic of 4 August 1990 [O Postanovlenii Verkhovnogo Soveta Latviiskoi Respubliki ot 4 Avgusta 1990 Goda]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (4: 1991), 89. 10. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On the Legality of Provi- sions Criminalizing Activities in Connection with the Formation and Activities of Socio-Political Organizations [O Zakonodatelstve Litovskoi Respubliki Predusmatrivaiushchem Ugolovnuiu Otvetstvennost za Deistviia, Sviazannye s Sozdaniem i Ichastviem v Deiatelnosti Obshchestvenno- Politicheskikh Organizatsii]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (9: 1991), 206. 11. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On Various Legal Provisions for Citizenship in the Lithuanian SSR [O Nekotorikh Polozheniiakh Zakona o Grazhdanstve Litovskoi SSR]”, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR] (26: 1991), 741. 12. USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, “On the Legality of Actions Taken in Connection with the Conducting of the Referendum on the USSR [O Zakonodatelnykh Aktakh, Priniatykh v Sviazi s Provodeniem Referenduma SSSR]”, Union Legislation [Soiuz Zakonodatelstva] (17: 1991), 499. 13. Herbert Hausmaninger, “From the Soviet Committee of Constitutional Supervision to the Russian Constitutional Court”, Cornell International Law Journal, 25 (1992), 305–37.

5 The First Russian Constitutional Court, 1991–93

1. “RSFSR Law on the Constitutional Court [Zakon Rossiiskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki o Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR]”, Gazette of the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR [Vedomosti, Sezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR], 25 July 1991, (30: 1991), Article 41. 2. Ernest Mikhailovich Ametistov, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996); Anatolii Leonidovich Kononov, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996); Gadis Abdulaevich Gadzhiev, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996); and Tamara Georgievna Morshchakova, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996). 3. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Russian Presidential Decree of 19 December 1991, ‘On the Creation of 172 Notes

the RSFSR Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs’ [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ukaza Prezidenta RSFSR ot 19 Dekabria 1991 Goda No 289 ‘Ob Obrazovanii Ministerstva Bezopastnosti i Vnutrennikh Del RSFSR’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], (1: 1993), 11. 4. “RSFSR Law on the Constitutional Court [Zakon Rossiiskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki o Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR]”, Article 84. 5. Herman Schwartz, “The New East European Constitutional Courts”, in A.E. Dick Howard (ed.), Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 6. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Russian Federation Presidential Decree of 15 March 1993 Relating to Kazkah’s in the Military [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 15 Marta 1993 Goda, Kasaiushchikhsia Neseniia Voennoi Sluzhby Kazakami]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii] (6: 1994), 2. 7. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the RSFSR Law of 22 November 1991 On Changes to Article 3 of the RSFSR Law ‘On the Organization of Monopoly Activities in the Market Econ- omy’ [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Zakona RSFSR ot 22 Noiabria 1991 Goda O Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Statiu 3 Zakona RSFSR ‘O Konkurentsii i Organichenii Monopolisticheskoi Deiatelnosti na Tovarnykh Rynkakh’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 20 May 1992, (2/3: 1993), 13. 8. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of Normative Acts Outlining the Differences in Authority between the Legislative and Executive Organs of Power in Moscow [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Riada Normativnykh Aktov, Kasaiushchikhsia Opredeleniia i Razgranicheniia Polnomochii Predstavitelnykh i Ispolnitelnykh Organov Vlasti Goroda Moskvy]”, Gazette of the Constitu- tional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 2 April 1993 (2/3: 1994), 2. 9. Carla Thorson, “Has the Communist Party Been Legally Suspended?”, Report on the USSR, 40 (1991). 10. Supreme Soviet Peoples Deputies, “Petition on the Veriﬁcation of the Con- stitutionality of the 6 November 1991 Decree of B.N. Yeltsin, RSFSR Pres- ident, ‘On the Activity of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party’ ”, Constitutional Gazette [Konstitutsionnii vestnik] (13: 1992). 11. “CPSU Activity or What Kind of Organization Are We Losing”, Izvestiia, 3 July 1992. 12. Oleg Rumyantsev, “Petition on the Recognition of the Unconstitutionality of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party and Conﬁrmation, in this Connection, of the Constitutionality of the RSFSR Presidential Decrees”, Constitutional Gazette [Konstitutsionnii vestnik] (13: 1992). 13. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Request by Deputies Volkov, Yushenkov, and Ponamarev, on the Constitutionality of Declarations by the eighth Congress of People’s Deputies on 12 March 1993, No. 4626-1, Notes 173

‘On Measures to Ensure Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation’, and on a Declaration by the seventh Congress of People’s Deputies, ‘On the Stabilization of the Constitutional Structure of the Russian Federation’, and Various Parts of Article 12, Parts 27 and 31 of the Russian Federation Law of 9 December 1992, No. 4061-1, ‘On Changes to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Federation-Russia’ [Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Postanovleniia Vosmogo Sezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 12 Marta 1993 No. 4626-I ‘O Merakh po Osushchestvleniiu Konstitutsionnoi Reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, O Postanovlenii Sedmogo Sezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ‘O Stabilizatsii Konstitutsionnogo Stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, a Takzhe Polozhenii Abzatsa 12, Stati 27 i Stati 31 Zakona Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 Dekabria 1992 Goda No. 4061-I, ‘Ob Izmeneniiakh i Dopolneniiakh Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo Zakona) Rossiiskoi Federatsii – Rossii’]” (8-0; 1995). 14. “Yeltsin’s Defense Team Press Conference”, ITAR-TASS, 3 July 1992. 15. “RSFSR Law on the Constitutional Court [Zakon Rossiiskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki o Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR]”, Articles 1 and 2. 16. “USSR Law on Public Associations”, Izvestiia, 16 May 1990. 17. “CPSU Activity or What Kind of Organization Are We Losing”. 18. “Constitutional Court Press Release”, Komsomolskaia pravda, 9 October 1992. 19. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Decrees of the Russian Federation President of 23 August 1991, ‘On Sus- pending the Activity of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation’; of 25 August 1991, ‘On the Property of the CPSU and the CP RSFSR’; and of 6 November 1991, ‘On the Activity of the CPSU and CP RSFSR’ and Other Constitutional Issues of the CPSU and CP RSFSR [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ukazov Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 23 Avgusta 1991 Goda ‘O Priostanovlenii Deiatelnosti Kommunisticheskoi Partii RSFSR’; ot 25 Avgusta 1991 Goda ‘Ob Imushzhestve KPSS i Kommunisticheskoi Partii RSFSR’; i ot 6 Noiabria 1991 Goda, ‘O Deiatelnosti KPSS i KP RSFSR’, a Takzhe o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti KPSS i KP RSFSR]”, Gazette of the Constitu- tional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 30 November 1992, (4/5: 1993), 21. 20. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Presidential Decree of 28 October 1992, ‘On Measures to Defend the Constitutional Structure of the Russian Federation’ [Delo O Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 28 Oktiabria 1992 Goda, ‘O Merakh po Zashchite Konstitutsionnogo Stroia Rossiiskoi Federatsii’]”, 12 February 1993, (1: 1994), 12. 21. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of a Dec- laration by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on 3 February 1992, ‘On the All-Russian Agency for Authors’ Rights’ [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Postanovleniia Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 3 Fevralia 1992 Goda, ‘O Vserossiiskim Agentstve po Avtorskim Pravam’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Fed- eration [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 28 April 1992, (1: 1993), 58. 174 Notes

22. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Declaration by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet of 17 July 1992, ‘On the Newspaper Izvestiia,’ [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Postanovleniia Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 17 Iiulia 1992 Goda ‘O Gazeta Izvestiia’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 19 May 1993, (2/3: 1994), 60. 23. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Declaration of Russian Federation Deputies on 29 March 1993, ‘On Mea- sures to Defend Freedom of Speech and the State Television and Informa- tion Service’ [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Postanovleniia Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 29 Marta 1993 Goda, ‘O Merakh po Obespecheniiu Svobody Slova na Gosudarstvennom Teleradioveshchanii i v Sluzhbakh Informatsii’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 27 May 1993, (2/3: 1994), 75. 24. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Declaration of State Sovereignty and Laws Amending the Tatar Republic Constitution and on the Referendum Authorized by the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar Republic [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Deklaratsii o Gosudarstvennom Suverenitete i Riada Zakonodatelnykh Aktov Respubliki Tatarstan o Provedenii Referenduma]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 13 March 1992, (1: 1993). 25. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of a Dec- laration by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on 19 December 1991, ‘On Inter- preting Article 183 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the RSFSR’ [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Postanovleniia Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR ot 18 Dekabria 1991 Goda, ‘O Tolkovanii Stati 183 Konstitutsii (Osnovnogo Zakona) RSFSR’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Fed- eration [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 19 May 1992, (2/3: 1993), 2. 26. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Decision by the Uglegorskii City People’s Court of Sakhalin from 22 June 1992, at the Request of B.N. Kupryashin, Deputy Mayor of Uglegorsk Raion of Sakhalin Oblast [Po Individualnoi Zhalobe Vitse-Mera Uglegorskogo Raiona Sakhalinskoi Oblasti B.N. Kuprashina na Reshenie Uglegorskogo Gorodskogo Narodnogo Suda Sakhalinskoi Oblasti ot 22 Iiunia 1992 Goda]”, (1993); Russian Fed- eration Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of: The Ingush Supreme Soviet Declaration of 20 June 1933, ‘On the Inclusion of the City of Ordzhonikidze in the South Caucasus Regional Ispolkom, and the Creation of the Autonomous Oblast’ of Southern Osetia’; RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 9 January 1957, ‘On the Creation of the Chechen—Ingush ASSR and the Establishment of the Groznyi Oblast’ ”; RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 7 March 1957, ‘On the Cre- ation of a Border between the North Osetian ASSR and the Chechen— Ingush ASSR’; the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 29 April 1957, ‘On the Inclusion of the Chechen—Ingush ASSR and the North Osetian ASSR in the Georgian SSR’; Article 72 of the North Osetian SSR Notes 175

Constitution Consolidating Rural Districts and Deﬁning the Status of Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz) as Subordinate to the Republic [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Postanovlenii Verkhovnogo Soveta Severo-Osetinskoi SSR, Kasaiushikhsia Problemy Bezhentsev]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 16 September 1993, (6: 1994). 27. For example, see Robert Sharlet, “The Russian Constitutional Court: The First Term”, Post Soviet Affairs, 9/1 (1993), 1–39; and Lilia Shevtsova, “Parliament and the Political Crisis in Russia, 1991–1993”, in Jeffrey Hahn (ed.), Democ- ratization in Russia: The Development of Legislative Institutions (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). 28. “RSFSR Law on the Constitutional Court [Zakon Rossiiskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki o Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR]”, Article 1. 29. In particular, Ametistov, Morshchakova, and Vitruk, while others objected privately but did not give public statements. 30. For example, Sharlet, “The Russian Constitutional Court: The First Term”. 31. The text of the draft was published in Argumenty i fakty, 12 March 1992. 32. Valerii Zorkin, “On the State of Constitutional Law and Order in the Russian Federation”, Address to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (Moscow, 1993). 33. ITAR-TASS, 20 March 1993. 34. For the text of the decision, see Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Russian Federation Presidential Decree of 20 March 1993, ‘On the Activity of Executive Organs to Overcome the Crisis of Power’ [Po Khodataistva Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 20 Marta 1993 Goda ‘O Deiatelnosti Ispolnitelnykh Organov do Preodoleniia Krizisa Vlasti’]”, (1993). 35. For the dissents, see Ibid. 36. See ITAR-TASS, 24 March 1993. 37. There were four referendum questions: (1) Do you support the President of the Russian Federation? (2) Do you support the social and political policies of the government? (3) Do you advocate early elections for the president? (4) Do you advocate early elections for the parliament? 38. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “At the Request of People’s Deputy Mironov, on the Constitutionality of the Decisions of the 9th Congress of People’s Deputies from 27 March 1993, When He Was Deprived of His Deputorial Powers [Po Khodataistvu Narodnogo Deputata Rossiiskoi Federatsii V.N. Mironova o Proverke Konstitutsionnost Resheniia Deviatogo (Vneocherednogo) Sezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 27 Marta 1993 Goda, Kotorym On Byl Lishchen Deputatskykh Polnomochii]”, (1993). 39. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of a Declaration by the Congress of People’s Deputies on the Hold- ing of an All-Russian Referendum on 25 April 1993 [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Postanovleniia Sezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Provedenii Vserossiiskoi Referenduma 25 Aprelia 1993 Goda]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 21 April 1993, (2/3: 1994), 33. 176 Notes

40. The results were as follows: 64.05 per cent of the population voted; (1) Do you support the President of the Russian Federation? 58.5 per cent in favor; (2) Do you support the social and political policies of the government? 52.88 per cent in favor; (3) Do you advocate early elections for the president? 32 per cent in favor; (4) Do you advocate early elections for the parliament? 41.4 per cent in favor. 41. Presidential draft, Izvestiia, 30 April 1993; translated in FBIS Central Eurasia Daily Report Supplement, FBIS-SOV-93-083-S, Article 80. 42. Ibid., Article 25. 43. Vitruk, Morshchakova, or Ametistov were not willing to discuss this meeting with the president during interviews with the author in 1996. 44. Wendy Slater, “Valerii Zorkin under Fire”, RFE/RL Research Report (1993). 45. For the text of the preliminary Constitutional Conference draft, see Rossiiskie Vesti, 15 July 1993; translated in FBIS Central Eurasia Daily Report, 26 July 1993. 46. For a discussion of the history of the various drafts, see Vera Tolz, “Russia’s Constitutional Debate”, RFE/RL Research Report, 2/29 (16 July 1993). For the text of the last presidential draft see, Izvestiia, 30 April 1993; translated in FBIS Central Eurasia Daily Report Supplement, FBIS-SOV-93-083-S, 3 May 1993. For the text of the last parliamentary draft, see FBIS Central Eurasia Daily Report Supplement, FBIS-SOV-93-091-S, 13 May 1993. 47. Boris Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1994). 48. Anonymous, Moscow Fall 1993 Chronicle of Events [Moskva Osen-93 Khronika Protivostoianiia] (Moscow: Respublika, 1995). 49. Ibid., 11–17. 50. During the summer of 1993, the president had negotiated constitutional provisions favoring the constituent members of the Federation in order to gain support from the republic and regional leaders in his campaign against the Supreme Soviet. After the storming of parliament, the president no longer needed their support, so many of the summer concessions were diluted or removed from the ﬁnal draft of the constitution. 51. Article 125, presidential draft, Izvestiia, 30 April 1993. The president would oversee this assembly made up of the chief justices of the several branches of the judiciary and representatives chosen by the president. 52. Article 125, Russian Constitution, Izvestiia, 10 November 1993. 53. Slater, “Valerii Zorkin under Fire”. 54. Mikhail Mitiukov, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996).

6 The Second Russian Constitutional Court, 1994–2010

1. Robert Sharlet, “Russia’s Second Constitutional Court: Politics, Law and Sta- bility”, in Victoria E. Bonnell and George Breslauer (eds.), Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder? (New York: Westview Press, 2001). 2. The Tumanov court administration instituted procedures for handling petitions to the court, and after 1994 there is much better documentary evidence of the actual petitions ﬁled. See Ofﬁcial Court website, www.ksrf.ru. 3. Gadis Abdulaevich Gadzhiev, “Interview with the Author”, (Moscow, 1996). Notes 177

4. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “Declaration of the Russian Fed- eration Constitutional Court on the Interpretation of Part 4, Article 105 and Article 106, of the Russian Federation Constitution [Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Delu o Tolkovanii Chasti 4 Stati 105 i Stati 106 Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, Gazette of the Constitu- tional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 23 March 1995, (2/3: 1995), 2. Note that this case is also the first instance where a dissenting opinion was published. 5. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider a Request by the Federation Council of the Russian Federation Federal Assem- bly on the Interpretation of Article 106 of the Russian Federation Constitu- tion [Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Soveta Federatsii Federalnogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Tolkovanii Stati 106 Konstitutsii]” (1995). 6. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “Declaration of the Russian Feder- ation Constitutional Court on the Interpretation of Articles 103 (Part 3), 105 (Parts 2 and 5), 107 (Part 3), 108 (Part 2), 117 (Part 3), and 135 (Part 2) of the Russian Federation Constitution [Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Delu o Tolkovanii Statei 103 (Chasti 3), 105 (Chasti 2 i 5), 107 (Chasti 3), 108 (Chasti 2), 117 (Chasti 3) i 135 (Chasti 2) Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Feder- ation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 12 April 1995, (2/3: 1995), 17. 7. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “Declaration of the Russian Fed- eration Constitutional Court on the Interpretation of Article 136 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation [Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po Delu o Tolkovanii Stati 136 Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Fed- eration [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 31 October 1995, (6: 1995), 10. 8. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “Declaration of the Russian Federa- tion Constitutional Court on the Interpretation of Several Parts of Article 107 of the Russian Federation Constitution”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 22 April 1996, (2/3: 1996), 5. 9. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of Legal Acts Taken in Connection with the Regulation of Military Conflict in the Chechen Republic [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Riada Pravovykh Aktov, Priniatykh v Sviazi s Uregulirovaniem Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v Chechenskoi Respublike]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 31 July 1995, (5: 1995), 3. 10. Ibid. 11. Sharlet, “Russia’s Second Constitutional Court”. 12. Dissenting opinions were authored by Justices Ametistov, Vitruk, Gadzhiev, Zorkin, Kononov, Luchin, Morshchakova, and Ebzeev, all of whom were among the original 13 judges and all of whom were critical of the court’s position with regard to the presidential actions. Zorkin in particular noted that the court had “become hostage to political emotion”; 178 Notes

see Court, “On the Constitutionality of Legal Acts Taken in Connection with the Regulation of Military Conflict in the Chechen Republic [Delo o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Riada Pravovykh Aktov, Priniatykh v Sviazi s Uregulirovaniem Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v Chechenskoi Respublike.]” 13. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider a Request by a Group of Deputies of the State Duma to Verify the Consti- tutionality of a Russian Presidential Decree of 15 October 1993, No 1633 ‘On the Carrying Out of a Popular Vote on the Draft Russian Federa- tion Constitution’ Ratified in Part by the Position of the Popular Vote on the Draft Russian Constitution on 12 December 1993 [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Gruppy Deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniia o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 15 Oktiabria 1993 Goda No 1633 ‘O Provedennii Vsenarodnogo Golosovaniia po Proektu Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ v Chasti Utverzhdeniia Polozheniia o Vsenarodnom Golosovanii po Proektu Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 12 Dekabria 1993 Goda]”, 1996. 14. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider the Request of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly on the Constitutionality of the Federation Council Declaration of 4 May 1995, No 465-I FC, ‘On the Federal Law Declaring a Moratorium on the Unilateral Reduction of the Black Sea Fleet’ [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmostreniiu Zaprosa Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniia ot 4 Maia 1995 No. 465-1 SF ‘O Federal- nom Zakone O Moratorii na Odnostrannee Sokrashcheniie Chernomorskogo Flota’]”, (1995). 15. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider a Petition by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly on Constitu- tionality of a Decree by the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet from 29 October 1948 No. 761/2 ‘On Designating Sevastopol an Inde- pendent Administrative-Economic Center’, and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Declaration of 9 July 1993 No. 5359-I ‘On the Status of the City of Sevastopol’ [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniia o Sootvetstvii Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Ukaze Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR ot 29 Oktiabria 1948 Goda No. 761/2 ‘Ovydelenii Goroda Sevastopolia Samostoiatelnii Administrativno-Khoziaistvennyi Tsentr’ i Postanovleniia Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 Iiulia 1993 Goda No. 5359-I ‘O Statuse Goroda Sevastopolia’]”, (1995). 16. See Robert W. Orttung, “Battling over Electoral Laws”, Transition, 25 August (1995), 35. 17. State Duma, “Declaration to Ask the Russian Federation Constitutional Court to Determine the Correspondence with the Constitution of the Presidential Decree of 3 October 1994, No 1969 ‘On Measures to Strengthen the Sin- gle System of Executive Power in the Russian Federation’ [Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ob Obrashchenii i Federatsii]”, Legislative Record of the Russian Federation [Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii] (26: 1995). 18. Segodnia, 6 July 1995. 19. ITAR-TASS, 27 July 1995. Notes 179

20. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Ceasing of Activity on the Interpretation of Article 95, Part 2, Article 96, Points 7 and 8 of the Second Section ‘Concluding and Transition Provisions’ of the Russian Feder- ation Constitution Requested by the President on 2 August [O Prekrashchenii Proizvodstva po Delu Tolkovanii Polozhenii Stati 95, Chasti 2 Stati 96, Punktov 7 i 8 Razdela Vtorogo ‘Zakliuchitelnye i Perekhodnye Polozheniia’ Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, (80-0; 1995). 21. ITAR-TASS, 13 November 1995. 22. ITAR-TASS, 17 November 1995. 23. ITAR-TASS, 20 November 1995. 24. Russian TV, 28 November 1995. 25. ITAR-TASS, 5 December 1995; Interfax, 6 December 1995. 26. Court, “On the Ceasing of Activity on the Interpretation of Article 95, Part 2, Article 96, Points 7 and 8 of the Second Section ‘Concluding and Transition Provisions’ of the Russian Federation Constitution Requested by the President on 2 August [O Prekrashchenii Proizvodstva po Delu Tolkovanii Polozhenii Stati 95, Chasti 2, Stati 96, Punktov 7 i 8 Razdela Vtorogo ‘Zakliuchitelnye i Perekhodnye Polozheniia,’ Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”. 27. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider a Request by a Group of Federation Council Deputies on the Constitu- tional Compliance of the Federation Council Declaration of 9 December 1995, No 713-1SF ‘On the Ending of the Term of the First Session of the Federation Council’ [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Gruppy Deputatov Soveta Federatsii o Sootvetstvii Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Postanovleniia Soveta Federatsii Federalnogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 9 Dekabria 1995 Goda No 713-ISF ‘O Poriadke Prekrashcheniia Polnomochii Soveta Federatsii Pervogo Sozyva’]” (1995). 28. Izvestiia, 26 January 1995; Interviews with Justices Ametistov, Vitruk, Morshchakova, and Gadzhiev by the Author, 1996. 29. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider a Request by a Group of Deputies from the State Duma and a Request by the Russian Federation Supreme Court to Verify the Constitutionality of the Federal Law of 21 June 1995, ‘On the Election of Deputies to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’ [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Gruppy Deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniia i Zaprosa Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Proverke Konstitutsionnost Riada Polozhenii Federalnogo Zakona ot 21 Iiunia 1995 Goda ‘O Vyborakh Deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii’]”, (1995). This is also the ﬁrst time a delimitation was later published in the gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (Vestnik, No. 6, 1995), a practice that subsequently became more common when controversial political issues are challenged. 30. Izvestiia, 4 December 1995. 31. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Take under Consideration, a Petition from the Legislature of the Orenburg Region on the Constitutionality of Point 4.9 of the State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation after 1 July 180 Notes

1994 [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Zakonodatelnogo Sobraniia Orenburgskoi Oblasti o Konstitutsionnost Punkta 4.9 Osnovnykh Polozhenii Gosudarstvennoi Programmy Privatizatsii Gosudarstvennykh i Munitsipalnykh Predpriiatii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii Posle 1 Iiulia 1994]”, (123-0; 1995); and Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Take under Consideration, a Petition from the Orlov Regional Duma on the Constitutionality of Points 4.2, 4.9, and 4.10 on the State Pro- gram for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation after 1 July 1994 [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Zaprosa Orlovskoi Oblastnoi Dumy o Sootvetstvii Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Punktov 4.2, 4.9, i 4.10 Osnovnykh Polozhenii Gosudarstvennoi Programmy Privatizatsii Gosudarstvennykh i Munitsipalnykh Predpriiatii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii Posle 1 Iiulia 1994 Goda]”, (102-0; 1995). 32. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Appeal by the Tambov Regional Administration to Verify the Constitutionality of the Tambov Regional Charter [Po Obrashcheniiu Administratsii Tambovskoi Oblasti s Zaprosom o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ustava (Osnovnogo Zakona) Tambovskoi Oblasti]”, (5-0; 1995); and Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Take under Consideration, the Petition by the Belgorod Regional Duma for Not Complying with the Requirements of the Federal Constitutional Law, ‘On the Constitutional Court’ [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Belgorodskoi Oblastnoi Dumy kak ne Sootvetstvuiushchego Trebovaniiam Federalnogo Konstitutsionnogo Zakona ‘O Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii’]”, (32-0; 1996;) and Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Take under Considera- tion, the Petition by the Moscow Regional Duma to Interpret the Meaning of Section One of Article 131 of the Russian Federation Constitution [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Moskovskoi Oblastnoi Dumy o Tolkovanii Chasti 1 Stati 131 Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, (67-0; 1995); and Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Veriﬁcation of the Constitutionality of the Tambov Regional Charter [Po Delu Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Ustava (Osnovnogo Zakona) Tambovskoi Oblasti]”, (7-0; 1995). 33. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider a Request by the Head of Administration Saratov Oblast, Yu.V. Belykh [Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Glavy Administratsii Saratovskoi Oblasti Yu.V. Belykh]” (1995); and Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Discontinuation of Plans to Consider the Constitutionality of the Saratov Regional Law ‘On Local Self-Government in the Saratov Region’ [O Prekrashchenii Proizvodstva po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Zakona Saratovskoi Oblasti ‘O Mestnom Samoupravlenii v Saratovskoi Oblasti’]”, (78-0; 1995). 34. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Discontinuation of Plans to Consider the Request by Mariel President Zotin on the Constitutionality of Sections 2 and 13 of the Marei El Republic Law ‘On the Central Electoral Commission in the Republic of Marei El’ [O Prekrashchenii Proizvodstva po Notes 181

Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Stati 2 i 13 Zakona Respubliki Marii El ‘O Tsentralnoi Izbiratelnoi Komissii Respubliki Marii El’]”, (48-0; 1995). 35. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Consider, the Petition by the Legislative Assembly of Krasnodarsk District to Evaluate the Constitutionality of the Decree by the Russsian Federa- tion President of 22 December 1993, No 2266 ‘On Russian Federation Legislative Activity Regarding Government Bodies in the Regions, and Autonomous Districts of the Russian Federation’ [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Zakonodatelnogo Sobraniia Krasnodarskogo Kraia o Proverke Konstitutsionnost Ukaza Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 22 Dekabria 1993 Goda No. 2266 ‘O Deistvii Zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob Organakh Gosudarstvennoi Oblasti, Avtonomnykh Okrugov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’]”, (101-0; 1995); Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On Discontinuing Preparations of a Petition by the State Council of the Chuvash Republic to Consider the Constitutionality of the Decree by the Chuvash Republic President on 4 May 1994, No. 50, ‘On the Representative Organs of State Power and Local Government in the Chuvash Repub- lic’ [O Prekrashchenii Proizvodstva po Zaprosu Gosudarstvennoi Soveta Chuvashskoi Respubliki o Proverke Sootvetstviia Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii Ukaza Prezidenta Chuvashskoi Respubliki ot 4 Maya 1994 Goda No. 50 ‘O Predstavitelnykh Organakh Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti i Mestnogo Samoupravleniia v Chuvashkoi Respublike’]”, (1995); Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On Discontinuing Preparations to Consider the Con- stitutionality of the Vologda Region’s Law of 5 September 1994, ‘On Local Government in the Vologda Region’ [O Prekrashchenii Dela Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Zakona Vologodskoi Oblasti ot 5 Sentiabria 1994 Goda ‘O Mestnom Samoupravlenii vo Vologodskoi Oblasti’]”, (71-0; 1995); Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Take under Consider- ation, the Petition by the Legislative Assembly of the Vladimir Region on the Disciplinary Actions against the Head of the Vladimir Administration Undertaken by the Russian Federation Presidential Decree of 7 August 1992, No. 828 [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Zaprosa Zakonodatelnogo Sobraniia Vladimirskoi Oblasti o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Polozheniia o Ditsiplinarnoi Otvetstvennosti Glav Administratsii, Utverzhdennogo Ukazom Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 7 Avgusta 1992 Goda, No 828]”, (6-0; 1996); and Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Refusal to Take under Consideration, the Petition of the Legislative Assembly of Kemerov Oblast to Resolve a Dispute Regarding Competences as Not in Com- pliance with the Requirements of the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation’ [Ob Otkaze v Priniatii k Rassmotreniiu Khodataistva Zakonodatelnogo Sobraniia Kemerovskoi Oblasti o Razreshenii Spora o Kompetentsii kak ne Sootvetstvuiushchero Trebovaniiam Federalnogo Konstitutsionnogo Zakona ‘O Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii’]”, (20-0; 1996). 36. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Second Part of Article 42 of the Chuvash Republic Law ‘On the Election of Deputies to the State Council of the Chuvash Republic’ [Delo 182 Notes

o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Chasti Vtoroi Stati 42 Zakona Chuvashskoi Respubliki ‘O Vyborakh Deputatov Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Chuvashskii Respubliki’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 10 July 1995, (4: 1995), 2. 37. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of the Second Part of Article 10 of the Republic of North Ossetia’s Law of 22 Decem- ber 1994, ‘On the Parliamentary Elections in North Ossetia-Alania’ [Po Delu Proverke Konstitutsionnost Chasti Vtoroi Stati 10 Zakona Respubliki Severnaia Osetiia ot 22 Dekabria 1994 Goda ‘O Vyborakh v Parlament Respubliki Severnaia Osetiia-Alaniia’]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 24 November 1995, (6: 1995), 31. 38. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of Point 2 of the Russian Federation Presidential Decree of 3 October 1994, No. 1969, ‘On Measures to Strengthen the Uniﬁed System of Executive Power in the Russian Federation’ and Point 2.3 of the Provision on the Administrative Heads of the Districts, Regions, Federal Cities, Autonomous Regions and Areas of the Russian Federation, Supported by This Decree [Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionnosti Punkta 2 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 3 Oktiabria 1994 Goda No. 1969 ‘O Merakh po Ukrepleniiu Edinoi Sistemy Ispolnitelnoi Vlasti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ i Punkta 2.3 Polozheniia O Glave Administratsii Kraia, Oblasti, Goroda Federalnogo Znacheniia, Avtonomnoi Oblasti, Avtonomonogo Okruga Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Utverzhdennogo Nazvannym Ukazom]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Feder- ation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 30 April 1996, (2/3: 1996), 15. 39. Russian Federation Constitutional Court, “On the Constitutionality of Point 1 of Article 58 and Point 2 of Article 59 of the Federal Law of 28 August 1995 ‘On General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation’ (with amendments from 22 April 1996) [Po Delu Konstitutsionnosti Punkta 1 Stati 58 i Punkta 2 Stati 59 Federalnogo Zakona ot 28 Avgusta 1995 Goda ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii Mestnogo Samoupravleniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ (S Izmeneniiami ot 22 Aprelia 1996 Goda)]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Feder- ation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 30 May 1996, (2/3: 1996), 37. 40. Peter H. Solomon, “Threats of Judicial Counterreform in Putin’s Russia”, Demokratizatsiia, 13/3 (2005), 325–45. 41. Trochev discusses this possibility in some detail in Alexei Trochev, Judg- ing Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian Politics 1990–2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 89–90. 42. Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 31 May 2009. 43. State Duma (ofﬁcial website), http://www.duma.gov.ru, 7 October 2010. 44. El Pais, 31 August 2009. 45. Sobesednik, 27 October 2009. 46. “Forgotten Verdicts”, Novosti Gazeta, 21 February 2008 (website), http:// www.gzt.ru/topnews/politics/-zabytyi-verdikt-/169280.html. Notes 183

7 Three Attempts to Establish Judicial Review in Russia

1. One of the measures of the judicialization of politics discussed in Neal C. Tate and Torbjoern Vallinder (eds.), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New York: New York University Press, 1995). 2. The two prime examples of how political interests have shifted toward fair rules are areas where the constitution was unclear: the formation of the Federation Council and the Duma electoral rules. Bibliography

Russian News Services and Newspapers

Argumenty i fakty ITAR-TASS Izvestiia Komsomolskaia Pravda Moskovskie Novosti Nezavisimaia Gazeta Novosti Gazeta Pravda President of Russia (ofﬁcial website), http://eng.special.kremlin.ru/news). Rossiia Rossiiskaia Gazeta Segodnia Sobesednik

Russian Laws and Constitutions

Constitution of the Russian Federation: Draft with Commentary [Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii: proekt s kommentariiami] (Moscow and Krasnoyarsk, 1991). Constitution (Basic Law) of the Russian Federation—Russia [Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi Zakon) Rossiiskoi Federatsii—Rossii] (Moscow: Izdaniie Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1993). “Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Feder- ation [Federal’nii Konstitutsionnii Zakon o Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii]”, Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 1995, 1. “RSFSR Law on the Constitutional Court [Zakon Rossiiskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki o Konstitutsionnom Sude RSFSR]”, Gazette of the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR [Vedomosti, Sezda Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR], 1991, (30). “USSR Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR [Zakon CCCP Konstitutsionnogo Nadzora v CCCP]”, Izvestiia, (26 December 1989).

Legal Publications

Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (ofﬁcial website), http://www.ksrf.ru Constitutional Gazette [Konstitutsionnii vestnik].

184 Bibliography 185

Gazette of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation [Vestnik Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii]. Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet [Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR]. Legislative Record of the Russian Federation [Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii]. State Duma (ofﬁcial website), http://www.duma.gov.ru.

Authored Publications and Interviews

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Alekseev, Sergei Communist Party appointment of, 33 ban, 82–91, 94 departyization case, 71–2 political party, 40, 72 joint military/police patrols Soviet institutional reform, 7–9, 28, case, 69 30–4 Ametistov, Ernest see also, CPSU appointment of, 40 compliance, 24–6, 42–4, 55, 69, 118, decision making, 59, 78 153, 159 political questions, 109, 113, 116 see also, enforcement mechanisms Tatarstan, 97 Congress of People’s Deputies arbiter of disputes, 5–6, 43–4, 118, 157 dissolution by Yeltsin, 101–12 arena for political bargaining, 17–20, ﬁrst constitutional court, 92–4 83, 93–5 new constitution (1993), 115 authoritarian political system, 4, 13 referendum on elections and new constitution, 112 Congress of People’s Deputies, 9–11, Baburin, Sergei, 81 30–2, 35–9, 69 Baglai, Marat see also, Russian Congress of appointment of, 49 People’s Deputies; Soviet (USSR) as chairman of the constitutional Congress of People’s Deputies court (chief justice), 63, 111, Conseil Constitutionnel, 4, 148 119, 145–51 see also, French Constitutional Chechnya case, 146 Council see also, chairman of the Constitutional Assembly, 112–13, constitutional court (chief 118 justice) Constitutional Commission, 84, 97, Baltic deputies, 31, 69 102–5 Bundesverfaßungsgericht, 4, 16, 35–46, constitution, new (1993), 41, 101–2, 78, 139 108, 120, 134 see also, German Constitutional Council of the Federation, 11, 42, 58, Court 60, 127, 137 appointment procedures of justices, chairman of the constitutional court 147–53 (chief justice), 55–63, 76–80, 96, formation of, 134–9 100, 111, 119, 121–9, 134, 150–3 fourteen-day legislative review see also, Baglai, Marat; Tumanov, period, 126–8 Vladimir; Zorkin, Valerii powers, 43–9 Chechnya, 97, 127–33, 146 Sevastopol, 133 Chukotsk, 96 see also, Federation Council civil law tradition, 3–7, 16 coup d’état, attempted (1991), collegiality, 152 10–11 common law tradition, 3 CPSU ban, 83–7

194 Index 195

new all-Union Treaty, 35 petitioner to the second war of laws, 34–5 constitutional court, 123–34 court packing, 48–50 relocation of court to St Petersburg, see also, expansion of court (1994) 150 CPSU standing with the second ban, 82–91, 94 constitutional court, 47 political party, 40, 72 tenure and appointment rules for Soviet institutional reform, 7–9, 28, justices, 147–8 30–4 see also, Russian parliament; State see also, Communist Party Duma credibility of court, 5, 28, 41, 102 Ebzeev, Boris Danilov, Yuri, 48 appointment of, 40 decision-making constitutional crisis (1993), 116 first Russian Constitutional Court, CPSU ban, 90 55, 76–9; CPSU ban, 82–91; enforcement mechanisms, 24–6, 42–4, extrajudicial behavior, 100–17; 55, 69, 118, 153, 159 Izvestiia, control of, 93; see also, compliance KGB/MVD merger, 79; Moscow, European Court of Justice, 5 status of the city, 81; National expansion of the court (1994), Salvation Front, 91; VAAP, 93 48–50 second Russian Constitutional see also, court packing Court, 58–64, 121–5; extrajudicial behavior Chechnya, presidential decrees first Russian Constitutional Court, on war, 129–32; Chuvash 100–17 republic elections, 142; electoral second Russian Constitutional law, 139; Federation Council, Court, 152 formation of, 134–9; USSR Constitutional Oversight fourteen-day legislative review Committee, 72–4 by the Federation Council, 126; Komi republic elections, 143; North Ossetia franchise rules, fairness, 23, 62, 120–2, 157 142; quorum, definition of, federalism, 62–3, 121–2, 141–6 127; Sevastopol, status of the see also,regions city of, 133 Federal Treaty, 97, 105, 108–9 USSR Constitutional Oversight Federation Council, 2, 11–12, 30, 42, Committee, 53–62, 66; 58, 60, 93, 127, 137 departyization, 71; extrajudicial appointment procedures of justices, behavior, 72–4; joint 147–53 military/police patrols, 69; formation of, 134–9 military housing in republics, fourteen-day legislative review 70; Moscow demonstrations, period, 126–8 66; referendum on the USSR, 71 powers, 43–9 democratization, 19, 23, 30, 75–6, 155 Sevastopol case, 133 design of courts, 2, 12, 29, 49, 53 see also, Council of the Federation; Duma, State, 2, 11–12, 30, 42–3, 93 Russian parliament electoral rules, 139 first Russian Constitutional Court petitioner to the first constitutional appointments, 33, 39 court, 58–9, 62, 64 authority, 36–44 196 Index

ﬁrst Russian Constitutional interregional reform group, 31, 69 Court – continued Izvestiia, 93–4 caseload, 55–9; CPSU ban, 82–91; extrajudicial behavior, 100–17; judicialization, 5, 86 Izvestiia, control of, 93; judicial review, 1–6 KGB/MVD merger, 79; Moscow, abstract vs concrete, 16–17, 18, 37 status of the city, 81; National concentrated vs diffused, 16 Salvation Front, 91; VAAP, 93 a posteriori vs a priori, 20 jurisdiction, 36 legitimacy, 55, 86, 102 KGB (State Security Bureau), 35, 87, petitions, 76, 99 89, 95 French, Constitutional Council, 4, Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 10, 40, 100–1, 148 106–8, 110, 113, 117 see also, Conseil Constitutionnel Khokhriakova, Olga, 48 Kononov, Anatolii Gadzhiev, Gadis appointment of, 40 appointment of, 40 constitutional crisis, 113, 116 decision making, 59, 78 CPSU ban, 90 political questions, 116 resignation, 152 Gaidar, Yegor, 103, 106 German Constitutional Court, 4, 16, legitimacy, 8–13, 25 35–46, 78, 139 Luchin, Viktor see also, Bundesverfaßungsgericht appointment of, 40 Gorbachev, Mikhail constitutional crisis, 113, 116 coup d’etat, attempted (1991), 11 hunger strike, 47–8 legal reform, 6–7 suspension, 47–8 perestroika,9 USSR Constitutional Oversight Matvienko, Valentina, 150 Committee, 28, 30–3 Medvedev, Dmitry, 50, 121, 145, Yeltsin, 34–6 151–2 guarantor of fair rules of the game, see also, Russian President 120, 144 Mironov, Vladimir, 81, 110 Mitiukov, Mikhail, 48, 118 higher arbitrage court, or arbitration Morshchakova, Tamara and court, 37, 42, 47, 112, 150 appointment of, 40 higher judicial assembly, 112, 118 constitutional crisis, 109, 113, 116 decision making, 78, 99 impeachment, 44–5, 108–15 deputy chairman of constitutional in camera deliberations, 46, 147 court, 49, 57 independence, judicial, 145, 149 retirement, 147–8 Ingushetia, 142 MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 95 initiative provision, 32, 37, 41, 44 ﬁrst Russian Constitutional Court, National Salvation Front, 82, 91 56–7, 74–7, 96, 100–1 Nikonov, Viacheslav, 139–40 USSR Constitutional Oversight North Ossetia, 142 Committee, 53–5, 66–74 institutionalist approach, 2–5 Oleinik, Vladimir interpretive function, 25–6, 44, 50, appointment of, 40 125–8 constitutional crisis (1993), 113, 116 Index 197

Patriarch Alexei II, 116 Rumyantsev draft, 102, 105 political questions, 19, 38, 44, 59, Shakhrai draft, 105 84–8, 109, 113 see also, Constitution, new (1993) pravovoe gosudarstvo, 6–7, 13–14, Russian Council of Judges, 152 28–30, 83, 148 Russian parliament, 2, 11–12, 30, see also, rule of law vs law-based 42–3, 58, 60, 93, 127, 137 state; rechtsstaat see also, Duma, State; Federation presidential decree No. 1400, 114, Council 116, 118 Russian President, 9–12, 33–40, 44–50, Procurator, 32, 37 85–91, 100–19, 121, 145, 151–2 Putin, Vladimir, 12, 50, 121, 144–50 see also, Medvedev, Dmitry; Putin, see also, Russian President Vladimir; and Yeltsin, Boris Rutskoi, Aleksander, 40, 108, 110, 114 rechtsstaat, 6–7, 13–14, 28–30, 83, 148 second Russian Constitutional Court see also, rule of law vs law-based appointments, 41 state; pravovoe gosudarstvo authority, 44–6 referendum caseload, 58–64, 121–5; Chechnya, April 1993, 105–16 presidential decrees on war, new Russian Constitution, 41, 129–32; Chuvash republic 132–3 elections, 142; electoral law, Tatarstan, 96–7 139; Federation Council, USSR, 71 formation of, 134–9; regions, 62–3, 121–2, 141–6 fourteen-day legislative review see also, federalism by the Federation Council, 126; republics (Russian), 42, 44, 53–4, 63, Komi republic elections, 143; 95–8, 105, 113, 118, 121, 127–8, North Ossetia franchise rules, 136, 144, 150 142; quorum, deﬁnition of, republics (Soviet), 9–12, 29–37, 127; Sevastopol, status of the 69–74 city of, 133 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 80, 93, 95 jurisdiction, 44 rule of law vs law-based state, 6–7, legitimacy, 117–18 13–14, 28–30, 83, 148 petitions, 58–63 see also, rechtsstaat; pravovoe Seleznev, Nikolai gosudarstvo appointment of, 40 Rumyantsev, Oleg constitutional crisis (1993), 116 CPSU ban, 84–5, 88–91 self-determination, 96–7 draft Russian constitution (1993), separation of powers, 69, 91, 93–4, 102–5, 111 109, 112, 117, 121–2 Tatarstan referendum, 97 Shakhrai, Sergei, 80 Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, CPSU ban, 87 9–11, 30–2, 35–9, 69 presidential draft constitution, 105 see also, Congress of People’s shock therapy, 103–4 Deputies; Soviet (USSR) Shumeiko, Vladimir, 136, 139 Congress of People’s Deputies Sobchak, Anatolii, 105 Russian Constitution (1993), 11, 41, socialist legal philosophy, 3, 6–7 94, 101–14, 120, 134 Soviet Union, 1–4, 9–11, 28–36, 41 Constitutional Assembly, 112–13, Soviet (USSR) Congress of People’s 118 Deputies, 9–11, 30–2, 35–9, 69 198 Index

Soviet (USSR) Congress of People’s Tiunov, Oleg Deputies – continued appointment of, 40 see also, Congress of People’s constitutional crisis (1993), 113, 116 Deputies; Russian Congress of Treaty, all-Union, 10, 31–5, 72 People’s Deputies Treaty, Federation, 97, 105, 108–9 special rule, 108–9 see also, Federal Treaty standing before the court, 15–18, 22 Tumanov, Vladimir standing compared appointment of, 48–9 first Russian Constitutional Court, as chairman of the constitutional 33–6, 56 court (chief justice), 58–62, second Russian Constitutional 121–9, 134, 139–40, 145–6 Court, 47, 49–50, 59–62 see also, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight constitutional court (chief Committee, 32 justice) State Duma, 2, 11–12, 30, 42–3, 93 electoral rules, 139 USSR Constitutional Oversight petitioner to the first constitutional Committee court, 58–9, 62, 64 appointments, 33 petitioner to the second authority, 30–4 constitutional court, 123–34 caseload, 53–62, 66; departyization, relocation of court to St Petersburg, 71; extrajudicial behavior, 72–4; 150 joint military/police patrols, 69; standing with the second military housing in republics, constitutional court, 47 70; Moscow demonstrations, tenure and appointment rules for 66; Referendum on the USSR, 71 justices, 147–8 jurisdiction, 32 see also, Duma State; Russian legitimacy, 30, 98 parliament US Supreme Court, 2–5, 73, 98, 148 St Petersburg, 149–50, 158 Strekazov, Vladimir, 49 Vedernikov, Nikolai Supreme Court (Russian or RSFSR), 37, appointment of, 40 42–3, 47, 54–62 constitutional crisis (1993), 113, 116 Supreme Court (Soviet or USSR), 32 Vitruk, Nikolai Supreme Soviet (Russian or RSFSR), as acting chief justice, 44, 47–8 10–11, 37–40, 55–7, 66–72, 88–93 appointment of, 40 Supreme Soviet (USSR), 9–10, 31–3, constitutional crisis (1993), 109, 53–4 113, 116, 118–19 swamp, legislative, 104 war of laws, 11, 31, 34–5, 102–4 Tatarstan, 96–8, 128 telephone justice, 90 Yaroslavtsev, Vladimir, 48, 152 tenure, judicial appointments Yeltsin, Boris compared constitutional crisis (1993), 100–19 first Russian Constitutional coup d’état (1991), 34–6 Court, 39 CPSU ban, 85–91 second Russian Constitutional first Russian constitutional court Court, 50, 58, 145, 147–51 establishment, 33–4, 36–40 USSR Constitutional Oversight political institution reform (1991), Committee, 33 9–11 Index 199

second Russian constitutional court (1991–1993), 55–8, 76–80, reestablishment, 44–9 96, 100 see also, Russian President as chairman of the constitutional court (chief justice) Zorkin, Valerii (2003–2010), 63, 150–3 appointment of, 39–40 CPSU ban, 85–90 as chairman of the constitutional extrajudicial behavior, 45, 47–50, court (chief justice) 101–18