Vol 30 Issue 5
remewAIR U N I VE R S IT Y from the editor's aerie
Since I do not foresee that atomic energy is to be a great boondor a long time, I have to say that for the present it is a menace. Perhaps it is well that it should be. It may intimidate the human race into bringing order into its international affairs, which, without the pressure of fear, it would not do. Albert Einstein as quoted in Peter’s Quotations. Ideas for Our Time edited by Dr. Laurence J. Peter
Though we did not plan it that way, it seems quite fitting that the current crop of articles appears at the centennial of the birth of Albert Einstein. From his incomparable work in physics and through his celebrated letter warning President Roosevelt of the potential of nuclear devastation, there is a more or less straight line to our lead article on the strategic aspect of neutron weapons. Professor Don Snow’s fine article on that subject provided inspiration for our cover, which illustrates the serious complexities the enhanced radiation weapon holds for both humanity and our environment. It is also appropriate that the Einstein centennial and our cover accommodate two other articles: John Kohout’s analysis of the future of the manned bomber and Jill Heuer’s discussion of Soviet scientific and engineering manpower. We hope you find this collection stimulating, and any comments from you are welcome.
By now, the science of which Einstein was a founder has matured to the point where it has a rapidly growing history of its own. The bibliography of nuclear warfare and the associated arms control efforts are reaching gigantic dimensions that rival those of air power itself. One of the primary tools for such studies has been United Slates Air Force History— A Guide to Documentary Sources. A testimonial to the pace of this technological expansion is the fact that the book, published only in 1973, is already somewhat dated and a revision is under way. Any of our readers having suggestions or pertinent documents for the new edition should contact Lawrence J. Paszek of the Office of Air Force History (Autovon: 297-4548).
Writings on arms control, a topic much in the news, provide the subject for M.l.T. Professor Mark Katz’s fine review-article. For those who believe that generalship was invented before Hiroshima, Dr. I. B. Holley of Duke University has given us his analysis of the most recent biographies of one of the Army's great men, John J. Pershing. As a final word, readers who think they might like to get involved in this book reviewing effort have only to call Major Ted Kluz at Autovon 875-2773 (Commercial 205-293-2773) for more details. July-August 1979 Vol. X X X No. 5 articles
Strategic Implications of Enhanced Dr. Donald M. Snow 2 Radiation Weapons: A Preliminary Analysis
Interdependence, Specialization, Col. William J. Taylor, Jr., USA 17 and National Security': Problems for Diplomats, Soldiers, and Scholars
A Post B-l Look at the Manned Lt. Col. John J. Kohout III, USAF 27 Strategic Bomber 52 Military Justice: Is It Equal? Maj. Felix Fenton Moran III, USAF departments
MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD Soviet Professional Scientific Jill E. Heuer 62 and Engineering Manpower
BOOKS AND IDEAS
6 8 Generalship Maj. Gen. I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR
80 Debating Deterrence Herman S. Wolk 82 Ideals, Interests, and Arms Control Mark N. Katz 87 Potpourri 95 THE CONTRIBUTORS
N July 1977 the Carter administration an- Development Agency] failed to delete from nounced that it was prepared to arm the published testimony at a House public works IW70-3 Lancp missile with the so-called appropriations subcommittee hearing the fact “enhanced radiation” or “neutron” warhead for that the warhead . . . was to be produced.”4 theater use, primarily against Soviet armor in The technology underlying ER warheads is Europe. The announcement has caused a flurry thus “an old one,” as one author puts it.5 There of reaction and debate both within the United is, however, little knowledge about this kind of States and among members of the North device in the literature and little understanding Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) al- of how so-called “neutron bomb effects” liance. The debate has focused on several compare to other forms of nuclear reaction. issues regarding use of this type of warhead at Basically, there are three forms of nuclear the tactical level, while discussions of possible reaction in warheads: fission, fission-fusion, strategic implications of enhanced radiation and fission-fusion-fission.6 (ER) bombs have been missing from analysis. • Fission, which involves splitting atoms of The context of the current debate has unstable elements such as U-235 or plutonium focused on the short-range delivery (the Lance and creating energy from that process, is the missile has a 170-mile range) of small warheads simplest and most primitive. The result of supporting conventional forces. The fission, which was the basis of the original deuterium-tritium fusion reaction, which is the atomic bombs, causes many residual particles, basis of ER warfare, is not limited to small some of which are highly radioactive, to be warheads but can be extended to warheads of released into the atmosphere Many of these the megaton or larger yield; there are practical radioactive particles find their way back into but not theoretical limits to the size of a fusion the ecosystem, resulting in a high level of reaction. contamination or residual radiation and, thus, Although the original announcement of the the designation of fission bombs as “dirty” wedding of the ER warhead with the Lance weapons. missile created the impression that a new’ technological breakthrough in warhead design • In the fission-fusion form of reaction, had been achieved, the technology, in fact, is energy production results from fusing deuteri- not new at all. Rather, the “basic designs for the um and tritium atoms under high temperatures ‘enhanced radiation device’ . .. were complet- to form helium, with the emission of a “fast” ed at California’s Lawrence Livermore Lab- neutron as a by-product. As Legault and oratory in December, 1958,” and the first Lindsey describe it: experimental weapon was detonated in spring The main fusible nuclei are the heavy isotopes of 1963, according to a Los Angeles Times hydrogen: deuterium (H2) and tritium (H3) __ At account.1 Work on ER weaponry’ was largely temperatures of tens of millions of degrees, H2 associated with development of the antiballis- and H3 will fuse, liberating a very fast neutron and tic missile (ABM) system,2 an Army project a great amount of energy.7 that may help explain why, in its 1977 The process is called fission-fusion because reincarnation, ER weaponry has been associat- creation of the heat necessary to begin the ed with tactical battlefield applications. Ac- fusion process requires the use of a small fission cording to Washington Post reporter Walter explosion or trigger. Fusion itself does not Pincus, “the Ford administration ... originally create any residual radiation, although the requested funds for the enhanced-radiation freeing of neutrons by the process creates Lance,”3 public knowledge of which came enormous initial neutron and gamma radiation. about when ERDA [Energy Research and Some residual radiation is emitted by the
3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
fission trigger, and there is some concern about emission of neutrons. As Harold M. Agnew the physical properties of otherwise inert explains it: materials when they are subjected to neutron . . . the fusion process produces neutrons, heat, bombardment. There are no theoretical limits blast and fallout but produces many more on the size of a fusion reaction. Since the entire neutrons and, specifically, more high-energy reaction occurs in milliseconds and because of neutrons in relation to the other products than the randomness of neutron emission, not all the does the fission process.8 possible fusions of deuterium and tritium will Thus, the secret to enhancing the radiation occur, so that practical warhead designs place from this kind of weapon involves maximizing an upward limit in the one-megaton (MT) the proportion of neutron emission compared range. to other nuclear effects. Feld summarizes the • In the fission-fusion-fission process, the degree to which this can occur: reaction begins with a fission trigger, which in In principle, if it were possible to neglect the turn initiates a fusion reaction. The fission- effects of the fission trigger, a pure thermonuclear fusion-fission warhead, however, has an outer bomb . . . could release up to 80 percent of its coating of fissionable material, such as U-236 energy in the form of fast neutrons.9 or plutonium, the reaction of which is triggered The power of the reaction derives from the by the heat and neutron emission of the fusion fact that the so-called “fast neutrons” emitted process. To obtain very large (i.e., multiple in the thermonuclear reaction create more megaton) blasts requires use of fission-fusion- energy than neutrons produced in fission. fission; thus, the chain reaction associated with Frank Barnaby notes that “the neutrons it has a kind of multipler effect which allows produced during the fusion process have much very large yields (the Russians purportedly greater energy than fission neutrons. On have tested a 85-megaton device using this average, each deuterium-tritium fusion event process). Since the ultimate factor in the produces 14 MeV of free neutron energy, reaction is fission, however, there is the compared with 3 MeV for each fission event. 10 creation of the same kind of residual radiation Moreover, “fusion is a more efficient explosive as is associated with the simple fission process. process than fission. The complete fusion of, The ER weapon, obviously, falls into the for example, about 6 grammes of deuterium category of fission-fusion or thermonuclear and about six grammes of tritium would reactions. It is an extremely powerful and produce an explosion of one kiloton. 11 By efficient form of nuclear reaction that derives comparison, about 56 grams of plutonium are its effectiveness by suppressing certain of the necessary to create a one-kiloton fission reac- effects of nuclear blasts while enhancing tion. others. THe way in which these blast effects are The deadly effects of the explosion are “rearranged” in the thermonuclear (as opposed created both by heat and blast and neutron to the fission) reaction creates the rationale for radiation. According to Barnaby, within a 500- their utilization in battlefield conditions and meter radius of a one-kiloton ER blast, provides some properties that may give these everything would simply disappear (primar- weapons strategic applicability. ily from heat and blast effects). Within one As is well known, the basic lethal effects of kilometer (KM), there would be immediate nuclear explosion come from heat, pressure, incapacitation and early death (within hours and radiation (initial and residual). While from the neutron and gamma radiation) for all fission warheads rely heavily on all of these exposed individuals. Within two KM of ground effects to accomplish their deadly purpose, the zero, there would be severe radiation sickness, major effects of ER weapons occur through the and most exposed individuals would die within ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS 5
a few weeks.12 It might be emphasized that approximating what physicists refer to as a these effects would result from use of a mono-energetic beam of neutrons (making warhead one-fifteenth to one-twentieth the more uniform the speed of the stream of yield of the devices used at Hiroshima and irradiated neutrons). Nagasaki and that outside the immediate heat In terms of capability as a “people-killer,” and blast area (the 500-meter radius), very the effectiveness of these weapons depends on little collateral damage would occur. the penetrability of neutron radiation through Because “enhanced radiation ... is achieved various materials that might be used as not so much by increasing the output of protection against this weapon. Virtually no neutrons as by suppressing every thing else,”13 public information is available on this crucial heat and blast effects are limited to the point, but some less direct information is. For immediate blast area. Lethal effects occur instance, the weapons have been heralded for when neutrons penetrate and destroy tissue, a their use against Soviet armor, such as tanks. principle employed in radiation treatment of Since their kill-power derives from their cancer. As Agnew puts it, . . certain of thp radiation effects, apparently neutron radiation radiations such as neutrons have what the will penetrate Soviet armor plating efficiently medical profession calls a high LET (linear enough to contaminate the inhabitants. Ac- energy transfer). This means they interact with cording to Towell, “Data on regular nuclear living tissue in a strong manner.”14 blasts indicated that the lethal radius of any The lethality of neutron radiation occurs given amount of neutron radiation against because neutrons will penetrate any medium, troops in tanks or in foxholes was only 20-30 although with varying effectiveness depending per cent less than the effective radius for troops on the medium. Schematically, this relation- out in the open.”15 In addition, Feld maintains ship can be described by the formula that, “these neutrons can penetrate reasonable NM = MN e M X thicknesses of materials—up to, say', a meter of o concrete. . . .”16 This latter factor is of some where N is the number of penetrating neutrons, importance when dealing with the application N0 the initial number radiated, and e to the of ER warheads as a countermeasure to the minus mu X is an exponential factor wherein Soviet civil defense program. mu is the absorption coefficient (mu, in turn, is These weapons are thus very lethal. “A a function of the type of material and the workable neutron bomb would probably have energy of the radiation) and X the thickness of the same radiation (neutron)-killing capability, the substance being penetrated. The MX factor at a given range, as a ‘normal’ nuclear weapon is stated negatively to connote the degradation of about five times the explosive power.”17 If effect (active radiation is effectively limited to delivery capabilities allow it, the weapons can the period light is being emitted from the stem of the explosion and constantly decreases). The be used highly selectively. Herbert Scoville observes: relation between the absorption coefficient and thickness, obviously, is inverse; the greater Special designs to allow more and higher neutrons to escape from the bomb material enhance the the thickness of a given material, the more neutron effects, but even if ten times as many neutrons will be absorbed by it. Thus, reducing neutrons are released, the lethal range will only be radiation effects involves using protective increased by about one-third.18 substances that are highly' absorptive or of At the same time, since fusion produces no increasing thickness. Conversely, enhancing residual radiation, “the cleanest bomb would penetration involves improving the penetrabil- be a fission-fusion bomb with the minimum ity’ of the neutrons by devices such as amount of fission necessary to trigger the increasing their speed or by more closely thermonuclear reaction.”19 In the context of ALCM-34
Air-launched cruise missiles, in various wing and stabilizer con- figurations, being released by B- 52 bombers (artist’s concept) ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS 7 tactical utilization of these weapons as pro- The purported virtue of the ER-armed posed by the Carter administration, however, Lance missile is that it would be a useful tool there has arisen considerable controversy. for dealing with the overwhelming Warsaw Pact advantage in armor, and especially tanks, should war break out in Europe. This very usefulness is viewed by some, however, as a vice, in that such a weapon might be employed T HE Lance missile-equipped en- in situations where more conventional nuclear hanced radiation warhead has been advanced weapons would not. As one European observer as a theater weapon in Europe. The use of small puts it, “we believe that the only real motiva- ER warheads to attack Warsaw Pact armor and tion for the development of the neutron bomb incapacitate the crews through exposure to is the intention to use it in cases where existing intense neutron radiation is said to have at least nuclear weapons would not be employed.”21 three tactical advantages. First, Secretary of This argument basically says that the use of Defense Harold Brown maintains that, because ER warheads, because they do not present of reduced heat and blast damage, “they would many of the difficulties associated with other make our constraints policy of minimizing nuclear weapons (e.g., large-scale collateral collateral damage easier to achieve.”20 Since damage, residual radiation), is more “think- heat and blast are limited to the immediate able” and, thus, lowers the nuclear threshold. zone around the blast, it is thus argued that Feld states that, “by contributing to the illusion there would be less damage to buildings and that nuclear weapons are usable . . . the landscape than with other weapons. Second, deployment of neutron bombs could greatly since there is virtually no residual radiation enhance the chances o f . .. nuclear war,”22 and from the weapons (other than the radiation thus raises the possibility of unleashing the from the fission trigger), forces could occupy escalatory process. the attacked area within a matter of hours This line of argumentation is similar to the without special protective clothing and with- more general debate about whether the Dut fear of contamination. Third, if the armor doctrine of flexible response, by elaborating were attacked outside the limited area where contingency plans for controlled employment heat and blast effects occur but inside the zone of nuclear weapons, contributes to the likeli- of intense radioactivity (the one-kilometer hood of actual use and thus lowers the zone in the example above where radiation threshold. The essence of this general problem achieves the necessary 800 rad level), the tanks was captured by Alain Enthoven in 1965: themselves would be largely undamaged and could be appropriated for NATO use. There is and will remain an important distinction Despite these advantages, the use of ER . . . between nuclear and non-nuclear war, that weapons in the manner suggested has met both combatants can recognize and agree upon, considerable resistance. Reservations about if they want to agree upon one. And, in the nuclear age, they will have a very powerful incentive to the ER-Lance weapon have basically been agree upon this distinction and limitation because focused on two concerns: that the existence if they do not, there does not appear to be another and potential use of such weapons may easily recognizable limitation on weapons—no contribute to lowering the nuclear threshold; other obvious “firebreak”—all the way up the de- and that, since little is known about the long- structive spectrum to large scale thermonuclear war.23 er™ effects of neutron radiation on humans and some inert materials such as soil, their use Secretary Brown, writing in the 1979 Annual may be inhumane and even border on self- Report, recognizes this potential problem but imposed bans on radiological weapons. maintains that ER weapons do not lower the 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
firebreak: “These weapons would not lower their potential for causing unnecessary human the nuclear threshold: the consequences of suffering, are sufficient reasons for banning using any nuclear weapons are so uncertain them.”27 Senator H. John Heinz III (R-Pa.) that the decision to release enhanced radiation goes a step further: “To perpetrate death by weapons would be no easier than any other neutron radiation smacks of the sort of nuclear decision.”24 Regardless of the position chemical and biological warfare that has one takes on this issue, the problem is well historically outraged civilized nations.”28 summarized in the staff summary of the Arms The second concern involves the stimulation Control Impact Statement (ACIS) of the ER- of certain otherwise dormant elements in the equipped Lance: ‘T h e principal dilemma for soil that exposure to the massive neutron policy-makers considering the W70-3 is wheth- bombardment associated with detonation of er the perceived gains for deterrence outweigh an ER warhead would entail. Elements that the perceived risks of a lowered nuclear could be affected include carbon and cobalt,29 threshold.”25 and the commentary on the Arms Control Arguments opposing ER weapons on the Impact Statement carries the additional admo- basis of their effects focus on two elements: nition: “Neutrons emitted by the detonation their capacity for causing human suffering and would combine with nitrogen present in the their potential effects on the ecosystem. Those atmosphere to form Carbon-14 (C14) isotopes. opposing the employment of the weapons on C 14 is highly radioactive with a half-life of 5,720 humanitarian grounds in turn tend to argue on years.”30 one of two grounds. First, outside the area where instant (or nearly instant) incapacitation and death occur, W,IIILE the W70-3 proposal has little is known about the psychological and stimulated considerable controversy within the physiological impact of massive doses of limited confines of that program, there has neutron radiation. These opponents raise the been no public dialogue about potential hypothetical question of whether soldiers so strategic implications of this warhead. For exposed and knowing they were dying, but not instance, the analysis of the Arms Control yet physically incapacitated, would fight with Impact Statement states, “The ACIS does not more abandon and ferocity than a normal intimate whether it expects anyone will soldier. Since death, in the outer reaches of the perceive a strategic application for ER weap- affected area, can take weeks and be accom- ons ... It does not comment on whether the panied by a gradual and gruesome onset of LTnited States has plans for applying the ER radiation sickness, the capacity for destruction concept to strategic weaponry.”31 of such individuals could be quite high and This silence is strange because enhanced might cancel any advantages that the initial use radiation warhead technology does have of the weapons had created. potential strategic applications. While making Second, little is known about the genetic no pretense of being exhaustive or even implications of exposure to neutron radiation, representative about potential strategic impli- leading Miettinen to conclude, “No ‘deterrent’ cations of ER weapons, I perceive at least one which would have incalculable consequences possible strategic mission that is worthy of for future generations should be introduced to consideration, if not necessarily adoption. 1 hat the battlefield under the guise that the weapon application would involve arming a portion of is ‘small’ and ‘clean.’”26 Viewing the overall the cruise missile force (more specifically the effects of ER weapons on humans, Barnaby air-launched cruise missile or ALCM, and as says, “The high lethality of these weapons, and command and control and accuracy increase. ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS 9
possibly the submarine-launched cruise missile hold as significant a proportion of the Soviet population as a hostage to deter a Soviet attack.32 or SLCM) with ER warheads as a direct response to challenges to the hostage effect Much of this analysis arises from two sources. crucial to the doctrine of mutual assured First, stated Soviet nuclear strategy does not destruction (MAD) posed by the Soviet civil make the same sharp distinctions between defense program. If employed in a proper deterrence and warfighting that American manner, such a deployment could have a doctrine does. Indeed, the Soviets, at least beneficial effect on the strategic nuclear publicly, maintain that the basis of their balance by reducing the Soviet’s ability to deterrence of an American nuclear attack is calculate survivability and recovery in a American knowledge that the Soviets would general nuclear exchange. Because the neutron win such a war. From that mind-set, a war- radiation emitted by these weapons can winning strategy that includes civil defense penetrate passive defense structures (air raid follows.33 Second, the Soviets have talked shelters), Soviet survival plans would be increasingly of their ability to protect their compromised. By attaching these warheads to population. As Nitze points out: an obviously second-strike weapon such as the ALCM and withholding their use to the point In the Soviet Defense Manual issued in large numbers beginning in 1969 and 1970, the estimate where general countervalue exchange occurs, is made that implementation of the prescribed this deployment could have the simultaneous evacuation and civil defense procedures would effects of raising the nuclear threshold by limit the civilian casualties to five to eight percent reinforcing the assuredness of destruction and of the urban population and three to four percent preserving maximum flexibility of nuclear of the total population—even after a direct U.S. attack on Soviet cities.34 response. The effects of the Soviet passive defense The effect is “dangerously eroding the U.S. program, which includes elements such as deterrence posture.”35 evacuation plans for the Russian urban popula- These claims are hotly contested by other tion, air raid shelters to protect key personnel, observers, who point out that the Soviet and the conscious dispersal of industry and projections are almost entirely conjectural in population, have been the subject of consider- nature; the Soviets have never attempted the able debate. The discussion has encompassed evacuation of a major city, for instance, the both the effectiveness of the system in effectiveness of which would depend on such protecting the population and the implications unpredictable factors as weather.36 Statements of the program for strategic stability. Because about the level of civilian survival if proce- much of deterrence is psychological and thus dures are carried out doubtless have an based on perceptions of the utility of strategic exhortatory intention, and it is not clear that the programs, much conjecture has emerged about Soviets believe these pronouncements. Re- what the Russians think the effects of their civil garding Soviet strategic statements generally, defense program are. Jack L. Snyder avers that “the Soviets may be The literature on the subject is growing, but not only inscrutable, but also inveterate liars.”37 Paul H. Nitze summarizes the issue effectively Secretary Brown is also reported to be for our purpose: “skeptical of the utility of these programs for . .. the Soviet Union has adopted programs that either superpower and confident of the U.S. have much the same effect on the situation as an ability to overcome Soviet civil defense ABM program would have. And as the Soviet civil measures through retargeting and other expe- defense program becomes more effective it tends to destabilize the deterrent relationship for the dients.”38 same reason: the United States can then no longer Speculation on the effectiveness of Soviet The air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), when armed with an enhanced radiation warhead, is notable for penetration, accuracy, and second-strike capability. The artist’s concept shows the ALCM as released from a B-52. ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS 11
civil defense programs is not intended here. shelters, but that would be an expensive and The fact is that the Russians have engaged in an uncertain business. elaborate and expensive civil defense buildup This point is particularly important, consid- and that they would not have made such an ering the kinds of people the Soviets seek to investment without reason. The obvious protect in the shelters. Their calculation of purpose is the protection of the population or, winning a nuclear war apparently is premised at least in the shelter program, “protecting on saving the highly skilled portion of the essential cadres and key industrial person- population for which the shelters are designed. nel.”39 To the extent the Russians believe in the Since “our deterrent is based on the ability to effectiveness of this program (and it is not destroy what the Soviet leadership values particularly important if they are correct unless most—the Soviet state as a functioning entity, we can convince them otherwise), they can the economic base which is the pride of the begin realistically to calculate personal and Communist regime, and the nation’s ability to societal survival and recovery' from a nuclear recover from a nuclear war”40—the last war. In turn, such perceptions weaken the individuals one wants to release from the hostage effect that is vital to MAD and the hostage relationship are those who would be ultimate recourse under the policy of flexible the major architects of recovery. response and, thus, the basis of deterrence as it • The accuracy of the cruise missile makes it is understood by Americans and presumably an excellent delivery system for ER warheads. Russians. In order to best ensure that a target is within the The arming of ALCMs with ER warheads effective radius of the neutron radiation of an may be an effective way to alter Soviet ER warhead, it is necessary to ensure that there perceptions about survival arising at least from is a high level both of penetrability of the the shelter program. The combination of these weapon (to ensure that it gets to its target) and technologies may be appealing for at least accuracy of delivery. The cruise missile, whose three reasons: “terrain-comparison guidance allows pinpoint accuracy, sufficient to destroy many hard • The penetrating character of the neutrons targets,”41 can be fired accurately enough to emitted from ER warheads through substances ensure a high probability of kill adequate to like concrete obviates the protection from dissuade anyone who felt he could survive an lethal effects against which the shelters are attack. One author maintains, for instance, that designed. Reinforced concrete shelters can be versions of the weapon currently under hardened against both heat and blast effects of development have a circular error probable of nuclear weapons, but their protective capaci- 100 feet at a range of 2000 kilometers.42 This ties against neutron radiation is questionable. accuracy figure can be compared to the While undoubtedly there would be degrada- destructive impact of a one-KT neutron war- tion of the radiation effect due to absorption, head, to get some idea of lethal effect. uncertainty' about the level of contamination John J. McLucas further points out that the that people within the shelters would suffer has current cruise models are comparatively to force recalculation of any possible survival primitive and that the technology is available of inhabitants. As radiation properties are to produce “a future fleet of cruise missiles that enhanced and delivery capabilities reduce is tied together through data links at a control targeting errors to the point of near certainty of center, which keeps track of their position and hitting a target, the probability of lethality will performance.”43 Such a system could direct increase. In all likelihood, the Soviets would retargeting and evasive actions, among other take countermeasures better to shield the things. The ALCM is thus not only a very 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
effective attack weapon, but it will in all weapon, while its high pre-launch survivability likelihood improve significantly. deters an opponent’s first-fire decision.”45 Thus, the high lethality of these weapons, delivered • Because the cruise missile is obviously a with great accuracy above or near the shelters second-strike weapon, which can be used in (probably low air blasts), would put some of conjunction with the most controllable leg of the terror back into the “balance of terror,” Triad (the strategic bomber force), the use of while not being as provocative as they would if ER-tipped weapons can be withheld until the launched from other platforms such as ICBMs situation is sufficiently desperate to justify their (which, as they become more vulnerable, will use. Improved command and control associat- require progressively earlier launch). For ER ed with the Trident submarine may make the weapons to be effective tools, one must have $ea-launched version of cruise an attractive maximum control of them, and the enemy platform as well, given its high survivability. As must know this control exists: the terror they has been suggested, the strategic utility of ER engender can be allayed by an enemy’s warheads would be in re-establishing (or knowing the U.S. will use them only in reinforcing) the hostage effect against those desperate situations and knowing the U.S. has key personnel the Soviets seek to protect with the capacity to control them until such use is their shelter program. Thus, the weapons absolutely necessary. would serve the ultimate countervalue deter- rent purpose of threatening to kill people, a mission which is the logical extension of MAD. If most normal conceptions of how a nuclear war might be conducted are correct, the kinds of values against which ER warfare would be IN assessing the potential use of ER most effective are not targets one would wish warheads as strategic weapons, we need to to attack early in an exchange. Congruent with examine three additional points. First, are these Thomas C. Schelling’s analysis of the “diplo- weapons compatible with American strategic macy of violence,”44 one would want to doctrine and particularly the limited options/ withhold attacks on critical values such as MAD doctrinal debate? Second, what objec- population as long as possible in order to tions might be raised to these weapons? More maintain an ability to threaten increased and specifically, are the objections raised about unacceptable hurt on the enemy. Alternatively, tactical use of ER weapons as valid in the most Americans find the massive annihilation strategic context? Finally, w’hat, if any, arms of innocent civilians repulsive and would control implications do these weapons have? prefer not to do so unless the situation were Will they force a Soviet response that will add truly desperate, as in the case of a Soviet yet another spiral to the arms race? Because counter-cities attack on the U.S. these questions have not yet been discussed in These usage scenarios imply that the United the public literature, the analysis must be States would want to be in a maximal position somewhat tentative. to control and withhold these weapons as long I believe the addition of ER weapons to the as possible during an exchange. The ALCM American arsenal would be compatible with fired from SAC bombers (B-52s or converted the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and 747-type aircraft) or Trident-launched SLCMs would be supportive of the notions of limited seem to fit that need. As Ohlert states, “The options and essential equivalence. The com- cruise missile represents the ideal in offensive patibility with MAD is straightforward: the weaponry for a second-strike oriented nation. basis of that doctrine is the holding of the Its slow speed precludes its use as a first-strike Soviet population as the hostage of American ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS 13
nuclear might. The Soviet shelter program, Without dealing with the merits of the against which it has been suggested ER limited options/MAD debate, it is sufficient to weapons might be an effective response, is say that the ultimate option within the doctrine dangerous to the stability' of the strategic of limited options is the threat of massive balance because it represents (or can be countervalue attack that is the centerpiece of perceived to represent) a loosening of the MAD. LNO seeks to limit nuclear war beneath hostage effect by promising the survival of key the level of general exchange, but central to Soviet personnel and, thus, the capacity for doing so requires the maintenance of adequate postwar recovery'. The ability' to calculate and appropriate forces to guarantee the survival in turn makes calculation of the suicidal nature of general exchange. Thus, fighting of a nuclear war less irrational and, ultimately the hostage effect holds as a control thus, potentially more “thinkable.” To the over general exchange even in a limited nuclear extent that ER weapons remove the ability to environment. To the extent that holding in calculate survival, they make MAD-based reserve the ER-cruise option contributes to the deterrence more credible. hostage effect, it is compatible with the general MAD as a basis for deterrence doctrine has, flexible response position. of course, been criticized as lacking credibility' The second question involves the objections as a deterrent against anything but an all-out that can be raised about strategic, as opposed nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. Many to tactical, use of ER warheads. To address observers view' such an attack as the least likely these objections requires looking again at the form of Soviet nuclear aggression, both objections to the W70-3, though these objec- because it would be suicidal and because tions are largely obviated in the strategic Soviet doctrine appears to favor a counterforce context. strategy. The dilemma in American MAD The first objection to battlefield ER weap- strategy has been described as the ex post-ex ons is that they potentially lower the nuclear ante problem: the all-out countervalue destruc- threshold because of their tactical utility. In the tion prescribed in MAD may provide maxi- kind of potential strategic use suggested where mum deterrence, but it might leave the U.S. these warheads would be held back as an with a single fighting option should deterrence ultimate countervalue weapon only to be fail.46 The result has been the re-emphasis of employed when exchange had degenerated to flexible nuclear response, operationalized the general level, this argument loses its force: through the notion of limited nuclear options the threshold would long since have been (LNO) and the force characteristics of essential crossed before use of ER weapons is even equivalence. contemplated. In the strategic context, it is The heart of the new doctrine is that, should rather possible to argue that such weapons nuclear exchange occur, the United States raise the threshold by reinforcing the awful should have appropriate and symmetrical human consequences of nuclear exchange: the means to respond, rather than the single option hostages recognize they are still (or once again) of leveling Soviet cities. Thus, as former prisoners and, thus, certain victims. Secretary' of Defense James Schlesinger point- The second objection is more delicate to deal ed out, the U.S. should be able to respond to a with because it deals essentially with the limited Soviet counterforce strike in kind, inhumanity of systematically subjecting peo- rather than having the dual options of launch- ple to lethal doses of neutron radiation. Certain ing a massive countervalue response that aspects of the argument are probably not would invite the destruction of American cities germane (the question of the fighting tenacity or of doing nothing. of contaminated soldiers, for instance), but 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
others are. Radiation death, particularly for arms control and, more specifically, whether those who would die slowly, is obviously cruel deployment would place the Russians in a and inhumane. It is also true that the genetic position where they feel compelled to respond mutations that might occur in the survivors are in such a manner as to harm arms control not clearly understood, nor are ecological efforts. Setting aside the impact of cruise per se impacts such as the creation of C 14 isotopes. (which, because of size and ease of conceal- A response to these objections can take two ment, raises serious verification problems that interrelated forms. First, the use of nuclear apparently will be addressed in SALT II with weapons against humans is awful to contem- a launcher sublimit of 70-120 bombers), the plate under any circumstances and could decision to deploy strategic ER warheads can hardly ever be couched in humanitarian terms. be examined. Killing people with neutron radiation is cruel, As has been pointed out, the technology to but so is extinction through fire, overpressure, produce these weapons has been available to and residual radiation. As has been pointed out, the United States for twenty years, and there is in one sense ER weapons are “clean” bombs: little reason to believe the Soviets cannot the residual radiation they emit is limited to produce them as well. At the same time, that produced by the fission trigger. Conven- deployment of the warheads would be impos- tional fission-fusion-fission warheads, while sible to verify, and, to the extent that verifica- not as “dirty” as early versions, inevitably tion remains a sticking point in ongoing include residual radiation, the consequences of discussions, deployment limits remain a prob- which for humans and the ecosystem are also lem. largely speculative. In other words, this The most important question concerns objection may amount to little more than Soviet motivation to deploy, and the answer is asking what kind of postwar nuclear wasteland mixed. On the one hand, Soviet pronounce- one prefers. ments emphasize counterforce and war- The answer to that theoretical question, winning. Implicit in this strategy is, at the end quite obviously, is that the most preferable of a successful war, having something left that nuclear wasteland is no wasteland at all, was worth winning (Soviet manuals, for leading to the second form of response. Since instance, include occupation plans for Eu- the consequences of the use of nuclear weap- rope). In that context, a warhead that mini- ons are so unpredictable but potentially cata- mizes collateral damage is appealing in that it strophic, the “best” nuclear weapons to have would preserve a maximum value at war’s end. are those that contribute most to the unlike- On the other hand, the Soviets have empha- lihood that any nuclear weapons will ever be sized very large warheads, generally above the used. To the extent that ER weapons would practical one-MT limit apparently imposed on add to the stability of the nuclear system, they ER warheads. Doubtless this preference results may, through an admittedly somewhat con- partially as compensation for lower Soviet voluted sort of logic, be viewed as “humani- accuracy in delivery. If the argument regard- tarian,” in that they make the use of any nuclear ing the utility of ER weapons is valid, they are weapons less likely. most useful when delivered with extreme accuracy. Until the Soviets have developed delivery systems with the kind of accuracy attributed to American cruise missiles (how far away they are is conjectural), they may find T he final consideration is the them undesirable as a component in their impact the ER-cruise option would have on arsenal. If the history of arms control is a guide, ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS 15
they will probably object to them (the Russians hoped, begin to stimulate public debate. The have generally objected to limits on anything combination of ER warheads with cruise they do not have or technologically cannot missile technology' as a means to counter Soviet produce that the U.S. has for fear of cutting off civil defense programs is but one possible future options). application of this technology. There may be Obviously, this analysis, particularly as it important technological or policy difficulties relates to possible objections to ER warheads to this potential application that need critical and arms control implications, is very tentative examination, and there are doubtless other and incomplete. The purpose here has not been potential applications that should be explored. to produce a definitive statement or advocacy Regardless of the conclusions regarding stra- of the strategic application of enhanced tegic implications of ER warheads, the tech- radiation warheads but rather to raise the veil nology is available, and the options need to be of consideration of this option and thereby, it is analyzed. University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa
Notes
1 Robert Gillette, "Neutron Bomb Is Almost 20 Years Old; Was Focus of 16 Feld, p 11. Heated Controversy in 1961." Los Angeles Times. July 13, 1977, p 10 17. Barnaby, p. 151. 2 Alton Frye, "The High Risks of Neutron Weapons." Washington Post. 18. Herbert Scoville, "A New W'eapon to Think (and Worry) About." New July 17. 1977. p B! York Times. July 12, 1977, p. 29. 3 Walter Pincus. "Neutron Arms Deemed Dangerous to SALT." Washing- 19. Legault and Lindsey, p. 33 ton Post, July 6. 1977, p A ll. According to Pat Towell, this occurred in a 1975 20 U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report. Department of Defense, report by then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to Congress on tactical Fiscal Year 1979, 2 February 1978, p. 72. weapons. See "Neutron Bomb Poses Dilemma for Congress," Congressional 21. Brent Sorenson, “No Neutron Bomb for Us, Please," Bulletin of the Quarterly Weekly Report, July 9. 1977. p 1405. Atomic Scientists. December 1977. p. 7. Italics in original 4. W alter Pincus, "Production of Neutron Arms Backed." Washington Pott, 22 Feld, p. 11 July 12, 1977. p A1 Thu report is confirmed by Towell, op cit. 23. "American Deterrent Policy " in Problems of National Strategy. A Book 5 Bernard T Feld, "The Neutron Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, of Readings, ed Henry A Kissinger (New York: Frederick A Praegcr, 1965), September 1977, p. 11. p. 124 6 The basic phynet. in a readable format for the nonphy sitist. can be found 24 Annual Report, Department o f D efense, Fiscal Year 1979, p. 72 in Albert Legault and George Lindsey. The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance 25 “The Neutron Bomb Arms Control Impact Statement." Congressional (Ithaca. New York Cornell University Press. 1974) Record, August 3, 1977, p. H8500. 7 P 30 28. Miettinen, p. 35. 8 Harold VI Agnew. "A Primer on Enhanced Radiation Weapons,” Bulletin 27. Barnaby, p. 151. of the Atormc Scientists. December 1677. p. 7 28. Quoted by Towell, p 1407. _ 8 FeW. p 11 The same 80 percent figure u used in Jorma K Miettinen. 29. This concern is raised by Pincus. "Production of Neutron Arms Backed," Enhanced Radiation Warfare." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September p. A2. 1977. p 33. 30. "The Neutron Bomb Arms Control Impact Statement," p H8499. 10 Frank Barnaby. "Crossing the Nuclear Threshold," New Scientist. 31. Ibid . p. H8500 January 19. 1978, p. 151 32 Paul H Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of DFlente," 11 Ibid Foreign Affairs, January 1976, p 223 A detailed analysis of these problems is 12. Ibsd found in Leon Court War Survival In Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense 13. Gillette, p. 10 (Washington: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 14 Agnew. pp 7-8. 1976). See also Richard Pipes. "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight 18 Towell. pp 1404-06 and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, July 1977, pp. 21-34 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
33. For a thorough discussion and analysis of Soviet pronouncements on 40. John C. Culver, "The Future of the Strategic Bomber," A£I Defente strategy, see Leon Court. Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey. The Role of Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (1978), p. 11. Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami, Florida: Center for 41. Ibid., p. 8. Advanced International Studies, 1974). 42. Edward J. Ohlert, "Strategic Deterrence and the Cruise Missile," Naval 34. Nitze, pp. 211-12. War College Review, Winter 1978, p. 28. 35. Christopher Leeman and Peter C. Hughes, “‘Equivalence' and SALT 43. “The Case for a Modern Strategic Bomber," AE l Defense Review, vol. II." Orbit, vol. 20. 1976. p. 1053. 2. no. 1 (1978). p. 19. 36. A particularly skeptical analysis can be found in Representative Les 44. Arms and Influence (New Haven, Connecticut Yale University Press, Aspin, "Soviet Civil Defense: Myth and Reality," Arms Control Today, 1966). September 1970, pp. 1-2, 4-5. 45. Ohlert, p. 13. 37. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options, 46. Richard Rosecrance has written extensively on this problem. See a project Air Force report prepared for the United States Air Force (Santa particularly Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered, Adelphi Papers No. 116 Monica. California: Rand Corporation, September 1977), p. 5. (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1975); and his edited 38. See William H. Kincade, “The View from the Pentagon," Arms Control volume. The Future of the International Strategic System (San Francisco: Today, October 1977. p. 2. Chandler Publishing Co., 1972). 39. Aspin, p. 2.
I i Our air-launched cruise missile program has our highest near-term strategic priority and we will soon modify aircraft from which to launch these new missiles if it becomes necessary. I Maj. Gen. James B. Currie Director of Programs DCS/Programs and Analysis
In Major Thad A. Wolfe’s article “Soviet-United States Civil Defense: Tipping the Strategic Scale?” which appeared in our March-April 1979 issue, the annual civil defense dollar comparison in Table I (page 48) is incorrect. For the U.S. it should read: Estimated $0.1B (i.e., decimal 1 billion or approximately $100 million). For the U.S.S.R. it should read: Estimated $1-2B (i.e., between one and two billion dollars). We regret the error and any confusion it may have caused our readers. The Editor INTERDEPENDENCE, SPECIALIZATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY problems for diplomats, soldiers, and scholars C olonel Wil l ia m J. T aylor. J r ., LISA ATIONAL security studies have been national seurity or national defense could be concerned principally with geostrategic conceptualized rather narrowly in strategic interests, goals and objectives, policies and structural terms. In those days, one might and programs, and domestic systems haveand depicted the relationship between for- processes that underpin strategy. Littleeign policy and national security policy as two enoughN attention has been given to the large tangential spheres, one sphere concerned numbers of people involved in large govern- generally with the diplomacy of international ment bureaucracies that shape policy. Begin- political, organizational, economic, and legal ning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Richard relationships, and the other sphere focused on Neustadt, Graham Allison, Morton Halperin, the more specific features of military strategy and others expanded our analytical net to and the domestic politics of defense budgets. include organizational process and bureaucrat- (See Figure 1.) The area of tangency between ic politics. This helped us understand better the two resided principally in alliance politics how people in the aggregate act and interact in and Cold War diplomacy. The latter 1960s and the policy process and served to shed light on early 1970s—the period including the end of the political bargaining that takes place more the Cold War and the beginning of detente— or less among individual actors at the top drew the two spheres of foreign policy and federal agency levels. national security closer together (Figure 2), as In 1977, Allison and Peter Szanton reiterated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and that “organization matters” in remaking for- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions eign policy, defining organization to include (MBFR) discussions began and as international the combined effect of three factors: public trade and finance and multinational (1) the structure of government, which is to say business became increasingly linked in the the existence of agencies having particular international politics of detente. The sudden- missions, authorities, and competencies and the ness with which the 1973 oil embargo impelled nonexistence of others; (2) the processes by which interdependence into the consciousness of issues are identified and assessed, decisions made and put into effect; and (3) the people whose academicians and diplomats alike has all but energy, skills, and values more nearly than any fused the spheres of foreign policy and national other factor determine whether government security policy so that, as noted in Figure 3, it is works.1 difficult to conceptualize most aspects of the They continue: two apart. Processes . . . and people (as everyone knows) have fully as pronounced an effect on perfor- Those involved in teaching separate, one- mance as does formal structure.2 semester courses in foreign policy or national security policy have been confronted increas- This article suggests that too little attention is ingly by a fundamental problem of pedagogy. being accorded “what everyone knows.” In Given the increasing numbers of formerly this age of rapidly increasing interdependence, national security issues involved in foreign job qualifications and the performance of policy and vice versa, it is difficult to find middle- and higher-level public servants sufficient time to do justice to the important constitute an increasingly important element of issues subsumed by either course. ‘ Linkage national power and a legitimate area of presents as many problems for the academi- academic inquiry. cian as it does tor the diplomat. In its simplest definition, linkage is “an international political Understanding National Security strategy relating two or more issues in negotia- There was a time, when national security tions, and then using them as tradeoffs or studies emerged as a discrete field,3 that pressure points, much as in a ‘carrot and stick
18 Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3
technique.”4 The facts of interdependence tional trade and finance fall exclusively in the facilitate policies of linkage. Although linkage realm of the economist. The demands on strategy' was ostensibly dropped by the Carter interdisciplinary' understanding have become administration in 1977, its potential uses are large indeed. The problem is not solely a legion. Finding solutions to the problems of function of the requirements of a world interdependence and linkage may be more accelerating in interdependence. It is also a portentous (in terms of the national interest) function of the revolutions in information and for the diplomat, but teachers are nonetheless technology.5 concerned about the responsibilities of serv ing Most would agree that the answer resides in well in the front line trenches of academia—the specialization. The Department of State was classrooms. the first federal agency to recognize and act on It is not news that it is practically impossible the trends. As early as 1954 the Wriston to do justice in contemporary discussions of committee endorsed the principle of function- human rights policy, arms control policy, or al specialization. Reindorsed in 1962 by the trade policy without pointing out the actual or Herter committee, the principle was put into potential relationships among them; the Jack- practice in 1963 when State’s Board of son amendment and recent revisions in Ameri- Examiners began admitting candidates into can arms transfer policy remain too fresh in our one of three basic specialties or “cones” minds. identified as political, economic, and adminis- trative. The practice was endorsed once again in 1970 by the Macomber Report, “Diplomacy Diplomats and Scholars: for the 1970’s: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State.” But, by Common Problems 1970, this ty'pe of functional specialization was A second problem that flows from the already outmoded. Alvin Toffler told us why. realities of international interdependence and Despite much loose talk about the need for the requirements of linkage politics resides in “generalists,” there is little evidence that the the people who conduct diplomacy or teach. technology of tomorrow can be run without Both the study and the practice of foreign armies of highly trained specialists. We are policy and national security policy place rapidly changing the types of expertise needed. We are demanding more “multispeeialists” (men enormous demands on the intellects of practi- who know one field deeply, but who can cross tioners. Nuclear strategy is no more the sole over into another as well) rather than rigid, province of the political scientist than interna- “mono-specialists.”6
19 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
How much education is required for multi- an era of skyrocketing personnel costs in public specialization? Almost all career public offi- and private programs, will our public and cials must have a bachelor’s degree before private institutions accept the opportunity entry into a particular service. Even in the costs involved? Each of us can make relevant Army, 96 percent of all officers have bache- predictions for the institutions and groups of lor’s degrees. But is that enough? More than people we know best. One can hazard some a decade ago Jerome B. Wiesner, educator more-or-less-informed predictions for the and communications engineer, observed: armed services.9 The need in this present decade for more A study of the backgrounds and preparation individuals with superior graduate training was of the people involved in foreign policy the central thesis of the [President’s Science decision-making and implementation (sub- Advisory Committee’s] first report. The role of suming most of national security policy) the inventory with limited education, no matter would, no doubt, be revealing. Although the how inspired, has diminished; on-the-job training has become a poor subsdtute for advanced formal separate systems (Civil Service, Foreign education; and today the requisite background in Service, Armed Services) have their own data, fundamentals cannot be crowded into the under- to my knowledge no study exists that examines graduate curriculum. Apart from adding to a all or most agencies involved in foreign policy. student’s substantive knowledge, graduate educa- We have good data on levels of education tion and research provide a discipline of mind that fosters objectivity and a capacity to continue the (degrees) at the executive level (GS 16-18 learning process independently. Even one year and levels I—V; FS Class 2 and above, and beyond the baccalaureate strengthens the stu- Armed Services flag or general ranks).10 We dent’s capacity to contribute in all fields of have good data at entry level. Thus, we can get employment.7 a clear picture of input (entry) and output In 1973 William McGill, the president of (executive level). Except for the Civil Service, Columbia University, commented: data on throughput (between entry and executive level) are more difficult to acquire. There is now good reason to doubt that a college level major prepares a student for anything. It Data on specialization, except for the Civil may whet an intellectual appetite, but not much Service Executive Inventory, are even more else is achieved.8 difficult to acquire. This information gap has implications for higher level selections to Through what media does one acquire “multispecialization”? How does the nation executive positions. Apparently, there is cause for concern. For produce the required numbers and appro- example, Frederick T. Van Dyk, who resigned priate mix of public servants and academi- in 1977 as Director of Intragovernmental and cians who have a mastery of one field and a sufficient understanding of another or others? International Affairs, Agency for International What signifies “mastery”? W’hat signifies Development, explained his resignation partly “sufficient understanding”? Are our universi- on the grounds that: ties or our federal agency schools up to the . . . many agency employees lacked adequate challenge? Do prospective candidates have the skills for managing development assistance, were too fond of the comforts of Washington and time, patience, and, not least, the personal consequendy too reluctant to accept the discom- funds required? Do our federal agencies have forts of the field, and consequendy were too available, or can or will they make available, inured of the old use of aid as a diplomatic and for people in government and academia the political weapon.11 time away from productive work required for The armed forces may have fared no better. multispecialization? Will candidates accept the The current president of the National Defense possible career-opportunity costs involved? In University, Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard INTERDEPENDENCE, SPECIALIZATION. AND NATIONAL SECURITY 21
(USA), recognized the problem early in his were first-class professionals who developed tenure and took steps to remedy the situation. through years of command and staff duty in However, my experience with more than a peacetime and were tested ultimately in com- hundred students while I was a visiting bat. Some of them are glowing exceptions to professor at the National War College (NWC) my observations concerning interdisciplinary, in 1975-76 tends to confirm my impression analytical capability, but I am talking about the that we may lack the expertise required for rule, not the exception. sound foreign policy. These students were Many of these NW;C officers, historically Army, Air Force, and Marine lieutenant about 40 percent, will be promoted to flag rank colonels and colonels and, Navy lieutenant or its equivalent, where their own analysis, commanders and commanders, Foreign Ser- their decisions resulting from the analysis of vice officers fourth through second class, and others, and their advice may weigh heavily in General Schedule 14 and 15 civilians. Most foreign policy decision-making and implemen- were selected to attend NWC because they tation. Perhaps they will not be up to the had proved themselves during 16 years of challenge. But, then, even former secretaries of service to be consummate operators, and state have been chided for their lack of because a selection board judged they had understanding of such disciplines as econom- shown potential for positions of greater public ics. In sum, we do not know very much across trust and responsibility. About 70 percent had federal agencies about how well we are graduate degrees. Yet, in my judgment more preparing our public servants to perform the than half of them lacked the knowledge and increasingly complex foreign policy tasks skills required for multivariate analysis across required of them, and we need to know. We several fields. In particular, most of those with also need to develop a consensus concerning backgrounds in the physical sciences were the requirements of specialization: a consensus sorely lacking in understanding of the social that clearly does not exist.12 sciences. The proposition advanced here is not that each person in the foreign policy decision- The National War College curriculum of making bureaucracy should be an intellectual academic year 1975-76 did not help much. (a term notorious for its diverse connotations). There was no attempt to discover student The need is to determine what tools of analysis academic backgrounds before the academic are needed by people required to perform year began and no mechanism for determining certain complex tasks and to develop programs individual strengths, weaknesses, and needs. to provide them appropriate skills. The core curriculum included a smattering of everything taught to everyone, regardless of background, over the ten-month period. The Public Officials elective program was totally voluntary, with- and Job Performance out regard to individual student needs as It might be argued that the concrete test of determined by the faculty. Two basic conclu- adequacy should be based on actual job sions were inevitable. First, the rewards of performance rather than a preliminary judg- interservice socialization notwithstanding, a ment concerning qualifications. Unfortunate- major educational opportunity had been ly, there has been a long-term trend in most missed. Second, the majority of the graduating large federal bureaucracies toward inflation in class were woefully unprepared for the performance evaluations. The trend is not interdisciplinary demands in positions of peculiar to government. Large business corpo- greater responsibility. And this was the last rations have experienced the same phenome- formal education for almost all them. These non. Our colleges and universities, too, have 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
experienced inflation in performance evalua- embraced centralized personnel systems with tions of faculty members, not to mention emphasis on functional specialization. Proba- inflation in student grades. There are many bly the most extensive of these studies resulted explanations for this, some the result of the in the 1970 Macomber Report, which exam- human condition, some the result of organiza- ined the entire management system of the tion. First, few superiors enjoy the interperson- Department of State. The energies of 13 task al conflict inherendy involved in writing forces produced 505 recommendations, 345 of evaluations that indicate performance in- which were devoted to personnel questions.13 adequacies. Most, if not all, evaluation systems Although the personnel system has been have for some time required that superiors recentralized, many of the reform proposals both counsel subordinates and provide a copy have been stymied through legal action by of written evaluations. The Freedom of AFSA and AFGE. Proposals for lateral entry Information Act requires that subordinates into the Foreign Service for qualified special- have access to evaluations. Second, the general ists have met strong resistance. level of performance evaluations has organiza- All the military services have centralized tional impact that can affect organizational their personnel management systems and have morale. Despite the confidentiality of individ- moved quickly into functional specialization. ual performance evaluations, “the word gets For example, the Army’s Officer Personnel out," especially among the dissatisfied. Third, Management System was created in the early there is a tendency for rating supervisors to 1970s. Its basic concept is to increase profes- take care of their own. Fourth, aware of the sional competence, improve productive com- general tendency to inflate performance petition, and provide greater satisfaction by evaluations, raters realize that “honest” evalua- encouraging officers to focus their careers tions of their subordinates would be “unfair” according to individual talents and interests. under the present system. And, fifth, there has Officers may focus on command and spend a been an enormous growth in the power of large share of their time serving with troop public employee unions over the past decade, units. Those who perform best with such units especially among civilian public servants. The are selected for successively higher com- American Federation of Government Em- mands. Other officers focus their careers along ployees (AFGE) and professional associations, functional lines, e.g., personnel, operations, such as the American Foreign Service Associa- plans, recruiting, project management. Still tion (AFSA), have served as deterrents to others eventually become specialists in such objective performance evaluations. The same fields as automatic data processing (ADP), holds for academia, where such organizations research and development (R&D), logistics, or as the American Association of University information. Professors have exerted escalatory pressures There has been a fundamental problem for on faculty evaluations. In brief, current all federal executive agencies seeking person- systems for evaluating job performance ap- nel reforms that might further multispecializa- pear inadequate. tion for the most qualified and productive public servants—rapidly increasing personnel costs. The first personnel programs to be cut Attempts at are always those where costs are quantifiable Personnel Policy Reform and clear and benefits judgmental. Education- Most federal executive agencies have con- al programs fall in this category and have fallen ducted extensive periodic studies of their under the meat-ax of cost-benefit analysis. For personnel systems. In the early 1970s most example in the Department of Defense, the INTERDEPENDENCE, SPECIALIZATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 23
number of officers annually provided full- can be made to work, in the national interest. time, fully funded graduate education fell by National security interests of the United States 38 percent over the period FY 1972 to FY will be very much affected by balance of 1978.H However clear the needs of multispe- payments considerations. The military mobili- cialization, there has been insufficient progress zation potential of the United States will be in programs for lateral entry to acquire existing critically affected by economic arrangements expertise or for programs to develop expertise for secure energy resources. The ability of the for career public servants. United States to fight limited but protracted subnuclear wars to protect vital security interests will be conditioned by its balance of The Challenge in Foreign Policy payments position. The reputation of the Although access to quantity and quality of United States as a world leader will be affected tangible resources and geostrategic position by the understanding of complex issues in will continue to figure largely in the capabili- other countries and the approach demonstrat- ties of nations, a nation’s capability to influence ed by our public servants in hundreds of others in international relations will reside foreign countries and diverse international increasingly in the ability of nations to forums. coordinate policy and control in an incredibly Citing a number of prominent failures in complex web of economic, political, and American foreign policy, some have suggested military considerations. The demands for that the principal key to central decision and coordination of U.S. policies and programs coordination in foreign policy resides in will be as important at home as abroad, for the government reorganization.16 It is to be traditional distinction between domestic poli- expected that, given the relatively new and tics and foreign policy has eroded. The politics urgent demands of increasing interdepend- of public and electoral pressures under the ence and linkage politics, reorganization impact of a resurgent welfare ethic demands would be in order. But the new demands on absolute gains in domestic prosperity, which analytical capability (properly organized) are may not be bargained away as “chips” in any equally great. international balance.15 It cannot be argued with confidence that the Domestic prosperity is measured largely in United States is confronted with no greater terms of the health of corporate enterprises at problems in this respect than other nation- home and abroad. On their prosperity hinge states. First, because of its position in world such critical variables as the rates of employ- affairs, the United States carries far greater ment, range, quantity, and prices of consumer responsibilities than most states. Second, goods available, and the vitality of stock although relatively free of domestic con- markets. The involvement of corporate enter- straints, the U.S.S.R., the leading competitor prise in national, international, multinational, for world power and responsibility, appears to and transnational operations is growing rapid- do at least as well as the United States in linkage ly. Every day there are countless meetings and politics. There are several possible explana- transactions on financial and trade matters tions for this. One might be couched in which, considered in the aggregate, have a indications that the Soviets understand the great deal to do with the power positions of requirements of specialization and, perhaps, nation-states. The great challenge to govern- multispecialization. Although the Soviet edu- ments is to assess the infinite number of cational system is not comparable to that of the linkages involved in these transactions and U.S., and although the Soviet drive for gradu- determine the extent to which they work, or ate level education for its government officials 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
came later, there appears to be considerable In the Foreign Service, the commission effort to provide specialized graduate educa- concluded, “the cone system as an administra- tion. For example, in Soviet armed forces: tive device does appear to encourage and . . . military officers may study in civilian nurture a limited degree of special competence institutions for a particular specialty. Although it at least for the short run. But it hardly produces is not entirely clear how this program works, it the full range of special knowledge at posts does help to train teachers for the military overseas, or more importantly, in Washing- academies and schools, and it probably provides ton.”22 specialists in areas where the military institutions have either no graduate programs or only weak For the Foreign Service, the commission ones. In the case of the Moscow Finance Institute, recommended that: a military department has been established in this otherwise civilian institution. Third, officers who The cone system should be continued (although hold advanced degrees may be employed in the program direction cone would be rendered civilian institutions for research purposes or superfluous by the executive development rec- activities in which their training is needed. ommendations). Its basic purpose is to protect Throughout the prestigious USSR Academy of the consular and administrative activities as viable Sciences, for example, one may find generals, career specialties and to continue to upgrade the admirals, and officers with advanced degrees economic competence of the Service. Its con- working in their particular fields of expertise. tinued effectiveness should be reviewed from Administratively they are usually on “reserve” time to time. status, receiving only part of their pay from the All political officers should have the 26-week military and the remainder from the institution in FSI course in economics or its equivalent. The which they work. Clearly the civil sector is quite techniques, as well as substance, are essential to porous, permitting the military to move in and out good policy analysis. of almost all educational and research activities.17 Over time, the distinction between political and economic cones should be dropped. Economics today provides a major context to all international relations. Defining Needs Intercone assignments should be increased The general thrust of the foregoing discus- where the purpose is to broaden experience, sion is certainly not new. In addition to the rather than to accommodate an excess of political studies cited already, Harlan Cleveland’s The officers. The exchange should be a two-way street where Consular and Administrative officers Future Executive focused on the problems of receive political assignments. complexity.18 Recommendations for identify- Officers should be given incentives to pursue ing and securing the services of gifted manag- deeper substantive issues of foreign policy. They ers at the top level of federal government were should be rewarded for initiative (self study) and proposed in 1964 by the Committee for excellence in their chosen fields through promo- tions, assignments in their chosen fields, awards, Economic Development.19 More recently, and and mid-career work study programs.23 closely related to the subject of this article, the Murphy Commission has examined the re- Those in the Foreign Service and other quirements for personnel in foreign affairs.20 agencies involved in foreign affairs who Indicating that all federal agencies might look surface as multispecialists in agency Executive to management practices in private corpora- Development Programs would be identified tions and the military and supporting the and designated as members of a Foreign leading role of state in foreign affairs, the Affairs Executive Service (FAES), about 2155 commission examined functional competence strong.24 in Washington. It “found widespread agree- The concept, similar to that proposed in 1964 ment that the effectiveness of State Depart- by the Committee for Economic Develop- ment personnel in a number of functional areas ment, appears to be sound organizationally. . . . is at a low e b b .”21 However, there are huge gaps in guidance. INTERDEPENDENCE, SPECIALIZATION, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 25
First, beyond insistence that a greater degree overseas. Some were full time on Personal of specialization in economics is required,25 the Service Contracts, and others were direct hire proposal does not address the requirements for employees on leave from universities under the other specialties. For example, one might Intergovernmental Personnel Act.27 develop an argument for increasing numbers One can think of a wide variety of policies of anthropologists for agencies involved in and programs that require social soundness foreign policy. Such a case might be made for analysis—from development assistance, to most overseas programs. A 1973 survey of private capital investment, to arms transfers, to anthropologists in U.S. government identified human rights. The point is that we need to 55, none of them assigned to the Agency for define requirements for multispecialists. International Development.28 (See table.) Second, the commission’s proposals are not It might be suggested that “social soundness based on even a gross estimate of the current analysis” (the societal impact of programs inventory of people with specialties related to abroad) should be an inherent part of proposed foreign policy. One cannot forecast what aid programs and essential to the evaluation education and training are required over the function. Burdick and Lederer’s The Ugly long term without a reasonable idea of what is American told us why; so did David Halber- now available and can be made available in the stam’s The Best and the Brightest. Evidendy, near term. Depending on the degree of the Agency for International Development multispecialization involved, this information (AID) has recognized the need. In June 1977 might be difficult to acquire because: there were 22 anthropologists working full • Although all personnel systems have come time with AID, 20 with Ph.D.s and 2 with a long way in their ability to identify people M.A.s. Ten were in Washington and 12 with specialties (e.g., the Civil Service “Execu-
Positions Identified Agency by the CSC* by the survey replies received Total 55 50 33 Health, Education, and Welfare 5 9 7 Transportation 3 22 State 18 1 1 Agency for International Development 0 Commerce 0 1 1 National Science Foundation 1 2 0 National Endowment for the Humanities 0 1 1 Army 7 7 5 Air Force 4 3 2 Veterans Administration 1 1 1 Smithsonian Institution 16 23 13
•Data were made available by the Bureau ot Manpower Information Systems, United States Civil Service Commission, in a letter dated January 6,1975. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
tive Inventory” and the ArmyOPMS), there is a culture, religion, politics, and geography; long way to go in identifying subspecialties and international law; international and regional multispecialties. organization; international peacekeeping; in- • Talented people are an organization’s telligence; arms limitations; technology scarcest resource, and information about the transfers; arms transfers; international trade; most talented, by name, can be considered an comparative ideologies; theory of revolution; important element of organizational power. It and multinational corporations. The interface would be only natural for an organization to of the implied specialties develops the linkages husband for itself the most talented people among competing interests in the international who might be in high demand in another, system and between domestic politics and perhaps higher, organizational echelon. foreign policy related to all of the foregoing. Whether viable policy toward international The task of identifying requirements for terrorism has or can be developed is couched in multispecialization, determining the available the “art to the possible.” inventory, projecting requirements, and secur- ing budgets to support programs to develop specialists is a large undertaking. However, it is Interdependence is with us. The necessities of an important undertaking. There appear to be linkage politics cannot be wished away by gaps at the interface of specialties in some “removing the term from our official rhetoric.” foreign policy areas. For example, policies The question is: are we—academicians and toward international terrorism should involve diplomats alike—up to the tasks involved? analysis which integrates through multispecial- United States Military Academy ization understanding of regional history, West Point, New York
Notes 12 There is no consensus among the systems that develop public officials, 1 Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The within the executive agencies which employ public officials or.for that matter, Organizational Connection (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 14. within our universities concerning the proper training for and education for 2. Ibid. public executives. See Robert Presthus, Public Administration, sixth edition 3. The first course in national security was taught at Harvard in the mid- (New York: Ronald Press, 1975), pp. 225-26, 228, 231. See also Lawrence J. 1950s. The second was designed by an Army officer, then Captain (now Korb, editor. The System for Educating Military Officers in the United States Lieutenant General) Robert G. Card, who pursued graduate studies at (Pittsburgh: The International Studies Association, 1976). How well prepared Harvard in preparation for teaching in the Department of Social Sciences at are our public servants who are involved in foreign policy? Allison and Szanton West Point. conclude that "The agencies engaged in foreign relations contain large numbers of skilled and devoted people. But the capacity for performing 4. International Relations Dictionary, Department of State, 1978, p. 25. Although James R. Schlesinger and Secretary Cyrus Vance pointed out in 1977 certain limited but crucial tasks is clearly inadequate." (p. 41) that the concept of "linkage” has disappeared from our official rhetoric, the 13. William I. Bacchus, “Diplomacy for the 70’s: An Afterview and concept remains critical to our understanding of contemporary international Appraisal,” American Political Science Review. June 1974, pp. 740-45. relations and foreign policy. See Schlesinger's foreword to Defending 14. Allan V. Burman. "Officer Craduate Education: Costs and Benefits, a America: Toward a h ew Role in the Post-Detente World (New York: Basic draft paper in the Office of Defense Education. April 21, 1977, p. 2. Books, 1977), p. xii and "Vance Jettisons Kissinger’s Linkage," Washington 15. Robert O Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and Interdepend- Postv February 5. 1977, p. A10. See also Gregory Grossman’s article, “The ence," Survival, July/August 1973, p. 162 Economics of Detente and American Foreign Policy” in Defending America, 16. Allison and Szanton. which makes a strong argument for an active policy of linkage while pointing 17. William E. Odom, "The ’Militarization’ of Soviet Society, ’ Problems of out the major difficulties in devising a consistent strategy and suitable tactics Communism, September-October 1976, p. 39. 5. Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Military Man in 18. See Harlan Cleveland, The Future Executive (New York: Harper & Academia," The Annals, March 1973, p. 131. Row, 1972). 6 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 228. 19. See Committee for Economic Development, Improving Executive 7. Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet (New York: Management in the Federal Government (New York: GED Publications, McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 111. 1964). 8. New York Times, January 8, 1973, p. 56. 20. Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for 9. See, for example, Sam C Sarkesian and William J. Taylor, Jr., “TheCase the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Washington: Government Printing Office, for Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers (The Impact ot 1975). Graduate Education on the Profession and Its Relationship to Society),” 21. Ibid., p. 168. American Defense Policy, John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., editors, 22. Ibid., p. 178 fourth edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977), pp. 567-72. 23. Ibid., p. 179, 10 For example, see U.S. Civil Service Commission, Executive Manpower 24. Ibid., pp. 186-88. in the Federal Service, September 1975, p. 35; W'illiam J. Taylor, Jr., and 25 Ibid , pp. 168, 179. Donald F. Bletz, “A Case for Officer Graduate Education," Journal of Political 28 Bela C. Maday, "Anthropologists in the U.S. Government, Human and Military Sociology, Fall 1974, p. 261. Organization, Spring 1977, p. 89, 11. Clyde E. Farnsworth, “Now U.S. Overseas Aid Seems Less Political," 27 Allan Hoben, "Anthropologists in AID.” Anthropology Newsletter, New York Times, September 18, 1977, p. 4E. September 1977, p. 30 A POST B-1 LOOK AT THE MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBER
Lieu t en a n t Colonel John J. Kohout III 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
This has been one of the difficult decisions that successes, meeting the technological cnallenge I’ve made since I've been in office. In the last few that had been set and providing sound flyable months, I’ve done my best to assess all the factors airframes that could have filled the originally involving production of the B-l bomber. My perceived strategic need. Yet none was decision is that we should not continue with deployment of the B-l’s. And I am directing that procured in strategically significant numbers. we discontinue plans for production of this The pouring of vast resources into these weapons system.1 redundant development programs to update our manned bomber force, only to have each ITH these words President Carter of them stillborn in terms of a refusal to make ended the B-l development proj- the final production decision, has been one of ect, the only continuing large-scale the real tragedies of our strategic arms effortW to inject modern technology and new procurement policy. W;hile one can explain the vitality into our rapidly aging manned bomber refusal to produce a given weapon at a given fleet. To gain the full import of the President’s time in terms of competition for scarce decision, we must look back to three similar economic resources against more acutely felt statements made earlier by responsible domestic imperatives or alternative defense members of the executive branch. needs, the multiple failures to achieve the Former Secretary of the Air Force Robert sought-for production of a new manned Seamans, speaking before the House Commit- strategic system demand a more clearly tee on Armed Services, 4 May 1971, said, focused analysis. The FB-111 does not have the capability of the The demise of the B-l sets a benchmark from B-l as projected by a significant factor. It doesn’t which a retrospective review of efforts to have the bomb-carrying capability to be a really establish and improve our manned strategic competitive airplane that does not require tremendous tanker force, that can really penetrate offensive force is imperative in order to into Soviet targets.2 determine the best response to these ever more Ten years earlier, in March 1961, before the crucial questions: Is there a need for a new same committee of the Congress, General manned bomber? If a new manned vehicle is Thomas D. White, then Chief of Staff of the Air necessary, what should be its characteristics? Force, admitted, To answer these questions it will be neces- I say, there is nothing wrong with the B-58 sary to consider the changing role of the except that it has generally been overtaken by manned strategic system, its characteristics events . . . It is a very expensive weapons system and how they contribute to our strategic . . . And with a finite budget, let us say, other posture, and the costs that such weapons incur. programs are more important than continuing the Then we will project these factors into the B-58.3 . future to evaluate the potential for future And only three weeks earlier Secretary of manned bomber utility and discuss character- Defense Robert McNamara had testified: istics of such vehicles that would make a After weighing all of the advantages and contribution to our strategic posture meriting disadvantages, we have concluded that the B-70 their inescapably high expense. should not, at this time, be carried forward as a full-scale weapon system development.4 These decisions marked the termination, or Evolving Role of the decisive reduction by the executive branch, of each of the manned strategic bomber develop- Manned Bomber ment programs intended to replace or augment We cannot begin with any assumptions that the early 1950’s technology of the B-52. In each the manned bomber has an unchallengeable instance the aircraft involved were engineering place within our strategic arsenal. It is there MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBER 29
because it is perceived to fill a need. It was erosion of primacy there ten and twenty years ago because it filled The unquestioned primacy of the manned needs then. The needs of the past are not the strategic aircraft began to be eroded by the same as today’s needs, however, and the needs debate over the capability of manned aircraft that the manned bomber should be evaluated to penetrate increasingly potent enemy de- against for the future may well not be the same fenses and the embryonic development of as those of today. ballistic missile technology. The B-29 had easily outperformed World War II fighter opposition. The B-50 and B-36 could give good exclusive nuclear capability assurance of successful penetration against the At the beginning of the atomic era, the manned first generation of jet aircraft with limited bomber had a clear and unequivocal role to range and firepower. But as the Soviets proved play. It was the only technologically feasible their tenacity in building and rebuilding way to transport the awkwardly heavy weap- effective antiair defenses to blunt any manned ons of the day to their eventual targets. The bomber attack, the creation of an unstoppable essential performance parameters were range ballistic missile force became the obvious and load-earning ability. The nuclear bomber pathway to the preservation of unquestioned in its initial form of the World W ar II-proven strategic offensive capability. Boeing B-29, regardless of the narrow margin So even while we were building and by which it could meet these parameters, had operating large forces of B-47 and B-52 no existing competition. Because it depended bombers, the tone of Defense Department on forward bases or air refueling techniques spokesmen began to change noticeably. The then in their infancy, the B-29 was soon heretofore unchallenged role of the manned supplanted by larger and more capable bomber was couched with qualifiers. In aircraft, but no other type of vehicle could February 1959, Secretary of Defense Neil perform the mission. Thus, in the beginning, McElroy introduced his request for manned there was no debate over whether an air bomber funding with these words: “Recogniz- vehicle was destined to deliver the nuclear ing that manned bombers will continue to be weapon, only debate over the nuclear weapons an important element of our retaliatory forces themselves and the contribution they would for some years to come . . .”5 Two years later, make to modern warfare. with substantial progress in the ICBM pro- However, the manned bomber was quick to gram, Secretary McNamara said: find itself at the center of a hornet’s nest of Even though the revised Defense budget controversy. The high cost of successor aircraft provides for a substantial increase in our long- to the B-29 and the organizational problem of range missile capabilities, we still foresee the need carving out a separate Air Force from the living for a large manned bomber force, at least over the and protesting bodies of the pre-existing next several years.8 services exacerbated the bitter competition As these statements indicate, the manned over drastically reduced postwar defense bomber and the ICBM were perceived, at least resources. The technological inability to for a certain period, by a certain number of predict accurately the performance of new people within the defense establishment to large aircraft, such as the B-36, which were perform the same missions to such a degree pushing back the frontiers of flight, complicat- that the utility of the manned bomber was ed the problem and ensured that all sides of the clearly approaching its term. argument were well equipped with equally Missile forces continued to grow in both ambiguous data. numbers and reliability. Today, while the
Continued on page 32
Bombers, Ca. 1945-55 The bombers of the later World War II era were designed to accommodate the long-range, heavy bomb- load requirements of the day. That the B-29 Super- fortress, which continued its heavy-bomber role in the Korean War also, became the first nuclear bomber was more by chance than by design. Subsequent bombers of the early postwar era—notably the huge B-36 and the B-50—extended the capacity and capability of the B-29. By the advent of the speedy B- 47 Stratojet (ca. 1953). with its billowing drogue chute, the role of manned bomber was being redefined. 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
technology of the missile continues to soar, we manned bomber in these terms in his forceful are in the era of stabilization of numbers under letter to Senator Barry Goldwater in February the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 1976: and the manned bomber is not only still with us A hardened, long-range, manned penetrating but a whole new explanation for its continued bomber offers a uniquely capable and dependa- validity has been assembled. At first the ble strategic delivery system that spreads itself payload advantage of the heavy bomber over reliably and capably across the broadest possible the missile was cited. Then, as Soviet missilery spectrum of those required military capabilities. When completely modernized and manned with became more redoubtable, it was the ability of skilled, ingenious military crews, such a penetrat- the bomber to launch under positive control to ing bomber offers the United States an overall escape a Soviet counterforce attack.7 Next flexibility of choice and application that is came the theme of flexibility. Perception of the unmatched by any other weapons system. It can: role of the manned bomber has thus changed Carry a larger number of weapons (convention- al or nuclear) than any other strategic delivery from one of finite duration, to be assumed in system—to any fixed targets, anywhere, under a due course by the ballistic missile, to one of wide variety of circumstances. indefinite duration, which supplements missile Achieve unequalled accuracies in long-range technology. delivery under all circumstances; and, through A whole conceptual framework for the self-contained sensors, offer our only long-range capability against mobile or imprecisely located integration of the three major strategic delivery targets. vehicles—the manned bomber, intercontinen- Provide a highly visible deterrent force, one tal ballistic missile (ICBM), and the submarine- that can be used as a recognizable expression of launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—was creat- national determination and resolve in either ed in the form of the “Triad.” The Triad refers preplanned or ad hoc contingency situations. to the insistence on a mix of ICBMs, SLBMs, Accommodate (or readily be adapted to) the delivery' of multiple types of conventional and and SAC bombers that exploit the inherent nuclear weapons—highly accurate gravity deliv- characteristics of each of the three systems to ered, standoff-launched cruise, ballistic, semi- compound targeting and defense problems ballistic or defensive weapons—in large quanti- faced by a potential enemy. In theory the ties, for multiple or selective delivery. combination of three types of systems results in Through design growth characteristics, adapt rapidly in tactics and/or avionics to negate or deterrent effect superior to that which would avoid unanticipated defenses and other threats. result from even a superior force based on any Drive an enemy requirement for extensive one or two of the systems.8 diversion of his resources to defensive (vice offensive) systems—but still can be designed with the flexibility to penetrate those defenses if perception today penetration is required for assurance. Provide us the most effective and economical As the manned bomber force has aged, wav to redress the already serious (and worsen- increasingly effective Soviet defenses have ing) imbalance in deliverable megatonnage vis-a- complicated the penetration problem, and vis the Soviet Union. Provide a simultaneous capability for long- increasingly capable missile forces have been range, real (or near real) time strike assessment placed in operation. The need to procure more deep within enemy territory with the flexibility of modem manned strategic systems has become striking alternate planned targets or withholding more acute. This trend has seen increasingly unnecessary attacks and retaining weapons. insistent and elaborate voicing of the role of the Be launched as a visible expression of active deterrence, yet be recalled without expenditure manned bomber. General Russell E. Dougher- of ordnance, even after launch, should the ty, then Commander in Chief of the Strategic deterrent objectives be achieved. Air Command, defended the role of the Provide our nation an assured capability to MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBER 33
extract severe penalties on an enemy society, If the manned bomber force is allowed to regardless of any unexpected degradation or decline through age to a point where it is blunting of our SLBM or ICBM forces; thus manifestly ineffectual in the strategic balance, providing insurance against unexpected defenses or failure of any aspect of our strategic missile and the functional strategic balance between systems. the United States and the Soviet Union does Be used repeatedly. Depending on the nature of not change perceptively, the days of the conflict, substantial recovery can be manned bomber will be over. anticipated—thus enabling rearming and reuse for any required strategic purpose in subsequent war fighting or war terminating activities. Exploit superior U.S. technology and capabili- Manned Bomber Performance ty; for we can build, maintain and operate a flexible, modern delivery system of this type The specific performance characteristics better than any potential adversary. designed into manned strategic vehicles have Be applied across the spectrum of military often overshadowed all other design or capabilities—and is uniquely useful for an infinite procurement considerations. Airframe perfor- number of lesser contingency missions; without mance of a given weapon system has repeated- loss of ultimate capability as a major delivery system for large nuclear payloads. ly been confused with the contribution that Survive blunting and reliably be protected that aircraft can make to our strategic capabili- from destruction on the ground through tried, ties. This phenomenon has sometimes clouded proven launch procedures of Strategic Air decision-making as well as the rationalization Command adapted to reasonable expectations of of system development by military and our modem detection and warning systems.9 industry alike. A sound analytical approach to The role of the manned bomber is clearly at a the design of manned bombers as elements of critical juncture. Those who defend the future our strategic offensive forces requires continu- need for a manned bomber have marshaled ing emphasis. sound arguments. They feel strongly that the bomber contributes significantly to the flexi- function and characteristics coincide bility and responsiveness of our forces as well as the effectiveness of our deterrence. They This situation can be explained by the fact that argue that the manned bomber can be kept the development of early manned bombers viable in the face of increasingly elaborate and was characterized by the search for perfor- effective defenses. The success of the manned mance characteristics identical in statement to bomber in its role as a part of an effective the strategic capabilities being sought. The B- deterrent to this point is a central theme. 29, B-50, and B-36 aircraft had payloads that The Achilles’ heel of the manned bomber reflected almost exacdy the nuclear weapon Force as well as the question of its rejuvenation dimensions of the day. Their range defined the is the suspicion that the Air Force and the strategic “reach” that the United States could supporters of a new penetrating strategic claim. European bases and air refueling were aircraft are voicing the type of intellectual bias directly additive to enable the first two of these Jiat would have the United States buying an aircraft to reach intercontinental range. jxpensive weapon system after it is no longer The first phase of the assembly of our jf any objective utility.10 strategic force was a direct outgrowth of The opposition to the manned bomber has World War II aircraft procurement. The B-29 lemonstrated its strength by the defeat of the had seen operational service in World War II; 5-1. The opposition will continue to increase its the B-50 was an improved, re-engined B-29; itrength as the debate drags on, and the and the B-36 design concept had been devel- jomber force declines in relative importance. oped by the air plans section of the Depart-
Continued on page 36
Air Refueling With the introduction of midair refueling, flying range has be- come much extended Since World War II the technique has been widely used—over Europe, Korea, and Southeast Asia—but never more consistently than in Strategic Air Command's use of the KC-135 Stratotanker to refuel B-52s and FB-llls on a daily basis in training exercises. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
ment of War nine months before Pearl aircraft mentioned to this point were highly H a r b o r . 11 T h e d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n t h e u n i - successful weapon systems; they not only formed services and the aircraft industry, served their intended purpose but were effective as it may have been, was cloaked in modified to perform missions that had not secrecy and came under scrutiny of the highest existed when they were designed, and they levels of decision-makers and the Congress lasted far beyond their intended service life. only late in the process and then in the most Indeed, the B-52, first delivered on 29 June general terms. The House Committee on 1955,12 is still the mainstay of the manned Armed Services hearings on the B-36 bomber bomber force and may well perform a useful program were conducted while the aircraft strategic role for decades to come. Each of were actually being delivered. Evidently the these aircraft has been designed to perfor- Congress felt better able to influence the mance criteria that mirrored simple, straight- development of the new Air Force in terms of forward strategic concepts. Range and pay- the number of “Groups” authorized and the load were the key. Once they could meet this amount of military construction to be accom- standard, all progress was in terms of flying plished. Aircraft design was a fait accompli by higher and faster, characteristics that seem to the time Congress had its say. Congress had to hold a certain fascination for the American consider a specific aircraft in terms of how well spirit. it met the specifications that had been set by the Air Force. Selection of one design from among competing alternatives had been long basic relationships confused since decided by the uniformed service. The introduction of complexity into the The first steps of the manned bomber into strategic bomber equation had begun. Range, the jet age followed a similar pattern. The which had started as a constant, became a Congress was at least informed of the develop- variable. Air refueling could extend range ment of the B-47 and B-52, but the direction of almost indefinitely, or forward bases could that development was kept under wraps. Basic make range a less exacting criterion. As speed characteristics of both aircraft were deter- and altitude were perceived to be more mined by the obvious need to increase speed necessary to penetrate increasingly effective and altitude to ensure penetration against defenses, speed and altitude were attained at improved Soviet fighters. The momentum of the expense of range. It is central to note that the strategic arms build-up was not to be progress in aircraft design is not all in terms of denied. The manufacturer was of proven advances in technology; much progress is in competence, the engines were the only ones of terms of the trade-off of a characteristic less demonstrably adequate performance. Other- desired, range, in exchange for one deemed wise the complexity of the design effort closed more acutely necessary, speed. The reduction off any real opportunity for criticism. These of payload may also serve to increase both two systems reinforced the tendency to think range and speed. of strategic systems in terms of aircraft The costs of these trade-offs are not always performance rather than strategic contribu- as obvious as are the desired characteristics tion. A weapon system was perceived to be a obtained in return. Use of European and North single closed system and not a collection of African bases was an obvious constraint on desirable and less desirable capabilities that U.S. unilateral operation of its strategic decision-makers could tailor to fit within cost bomber force. Hence, these bases were used constraints. for a time and then phased out as both political It must be noted, though, that all of the circumstances and technical alternatives al- MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBER 37
lowed. Note, though, that several of the former that affected the strategic bomber function European bomber bases are still operational around 1959 and 1960. At the time when the for air refueling forces. number of SAC aircraft was at its all-time high, The cost of air refueling is more complex. two aspects of the future problem of penetrat- The early uncertain techniques applicable to B- ing Soviet defenses became painfully clear. 29s and B-50s were the subject of slow Flying high and fast to outrun opposing refinement. Profiting from this early expe- fighters and saturate their radar controllers was rience, FB-111 and B-52 air refueling is today a thing of the past. Surface-to-air missiles could an accepted part of the Strategic Air Com- attain any speed and altitude possible for the mand (SAC) function, and it is practiced on manned bomber, and continued missile devel- daily training missions. SAC’s mastery of air opment would only increase the margin by refueling, even complex multiple aircraft which defensive missiles were superior. The operations, is a unique capability in the world other half of the penetration problem was the today. However, the effectiveness of the realization that the integration of radar and bomber that relies on air refueling depends other sensors, computers, and communications directly on the survival and reliability of its into the enemy defenses made electronic mated tanker or tankers. The less air refueling warfare a key function of any penetrating the better. More reliance can be placed on a force. It meant that electronic warfare capabil- bomber that can complete its mission, or at ity had to be extensive and continually least a degraded mission, without a refueling responsive to electronic changes in the enemy than on a bomber that must have one or even threat. more refuelings to even reach its target. SAC’s operational response to these revolu- The design of the Convair B-58 marked a tionary changes was to develop the low-level pronounced departure from the established penetration tactic. In 1959 SAC started low- trend in manned bomber development. In- level training in earnest.13 Both the B-47 and the tended to improve penetrating ability radical- B-52 were capable of low-level penetration. ly, the mach 2 B-58 obtained its impressive They incurred a penalty in terms of increased speed at the expense of range and load- fuel consumption as well as long-term structu- carrying ability. It was absolutely dependent ral fatigue problems which, while proving on air refueling, usually multiple air refuelings, costly in terms of eventual modification of to accomplish even the shortest strategic aircraft structure, did not detract from the mission. It could normally carry only a single overall effectiveness of the tactic. Low-level compact nuclear weapon. The B-58 was flight works by keeping the penetrating planned to replace the B-47 as a complement to aircraft below optimum radar coverage, in the the B-52 force. It would have used its great shadow of intervening high terrain, as well as at speed to penetrate to the most heavily an altitude where effective interception is protected targets. While pushing forward the difficult for both fighters and missiles. state of the art in both aerodynamic and avionic equipment design for its day, it An effective response to the challenge of possessed minimal capacity for additional increasingly exigent electronic warfare was equipment or engineering changes in response facilitated by the large volume of the B-52, to the evolving Soviet defenses. which permitted the addition of extensive countermeasures equipment and the large diverging function and characteristics electrical power generation capacity required to drive powerful jamming transmitters. The The B-58 program, however, was severely B-47 design largely predated the electronic disrupted by a pair of revolutionary changes warfare threat, but some modifications were
Continued on page 40 Numerous modifications over the years have enabled the venerable B-52 to continue as the mainstay of our bomber force today. However, in the future, further modification of the B-52 may become impractical or too expensive. The mach 2 B-58 was planned as a replacement for the B-47 to complement the B-52 force The delta-winged B-58 was the Free World's first supersonic bomber, but it was overtaken by time and technology. Its phase-out was announced just three years after the delivery of the last production model late in 1965. 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW possible. Further, the large number of B-47s would have to be flown, and flown at available made it possible to devote significant extremely low altitudes, and the latest electron- numbers entirely to an electronic warfare ic countermeasures equipment would have to mission. In place of weapons certain of these be employed to augment the low-level tactic. aircraft carried not only extensive electronic High penetration speeds incurred great penal- equipment but also additional crew members ties in terms of range and stress on both to operate it. equipment and crews. Low-level penetration The B-58, however, could not be adapted in speed higher than the mach 0.53 to 0.55 either direction. At low level its fuel consump- attainable by B-47 and B-52 and the mach 0.85 tion was prohibitive and there was no way to of theFB-lllA andB-1 appear to be of dubious attain even token low-level range. The B-58 utility because they would result in penetration had a respectable electronic warfare capabili- at higher altitudes. ty, but the elaborate engineering that squeezed Significantly, the transit time, and hence the required equipment into a small supersonic efficient cruise speed from the launch base to airframe did not permit the continual modifi- the beginning of the penetration of enemy cation which would have been needed to keep defenses, is without direct correlation to up with the changing threat. Added to these bomber effectiveness. A mach 2 bomber has problems, the aircraft was found to be no significant advantage over a subsonic extremely costly to maintain and operate. bomber if both must penetrate at subsonic Phase out of the operational force was airspeeds. Indeed, the durability of the announced on 8 December 1965, only three manned bomber as a strategic threat is due in years after delivery of the last production no small measure to the fact that its arrival in aircraft.14 the target area occurs after several hours of Even as this revolution in penetration tactics degradation of enemy defenses by ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear armed tactical aircraft was occurring and the B-58 was being placed operating from forward bases. Whether or not in operation in reduced numbers, the Air Force and North American Aviation were developing defenses are specifically targeted, the cumula- the B-70. This large canard-configured aircraft tive effects of a massive nuclear exchange was to fly so high and fast that it would would inescapably reduce the cohesion and completely overwhelm any defenses. It could effectiveness of any antibomber defense. carry extensive electronic countermeasures Endurance required to orbit while waiting equipment, but it was structurally incapable of for an executive decision after a launch under efficient low-altitude flight. The political and positive control is a real asset possessed by the organizational support behind the evident manned bomber and no other strategic progress in terms of altitude and speed weapon. This characteristic also facilitates the embodied in this unique aircraft built up a assumption of a sustained airborne alert posture which is a highly visible demonstration momentum that kept the B-70 program going long after all involved should have realized that of resolve that places a significant portion of these capabilities were strategically irrelevant. the force in a position where it is secure from a By 1961, President Kennedy and Secretary of surprise counterforce action. Defense McNamara were finally forced into the decision to cancel the B-70 development program. recent cases At this point it had becom e clear that for any With these considerations in mind, it is manned bomber to successfully penetrate enlightening to evaluate the two most recent undegraded defenses, the low-level tactic strategic bomber candidates as to their effi- MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBER 41
ciency in adding to the strategic offensive rationalized production version. In view of potential of the United States. The FB-lllA ’s these excessive capabilities, the unprecedented good low-level penetration ability profited unit and program costs of the B-l made it as from relatively compact airframe dimensions uniquely vulnerable to its domestic critics as it and excellent avionics to achieve extremely was supposed to be invulnerable to Soviet low penetration altitudes. It also possesses defenses. relatively small radar cross section, radar Thus, as a general trend, we have seen the energy reflectivity, which facilitates the elec- design of strategic manned systems emphasiz- tronic warfare aspect of penetration. Unfortu- ing aerodynamic characteristics of speed and nately, its range is extremely restricted, forcing altitude long after those characteristics ceased it to depend entirely on multiple refuelings to to contribute to the strategic utility of the accomplish a nominal mission. Its small size manned bomber. To attain these no-longer also compounds the problem of updating or relevant abilities, strategically useful charac- adding to electronic equipment. The FB- teristics such as range, load-carrying ability, or lllA ’s mach 2 cruise capability' is a very system flexibility were given up, or the cost of expensive fringe benefit, helpful under only the weapon system was inflated to unaccept- unique circumstances. The cost of the mach 2 able, or at least unpalatable, levels. ability in terms of weight penalty for the swing- In order to reinforce the argument that the wing configuration is high. The two-man crew manned bomber development.in recent years of the FB-111A also forces dependence on w'as unique among strategic systems in retain- automatic function to a degree not true of ing excessive, obsolete performance character- larger aircraft. These considerations contrib- istics, it is noteworthy to consider the ballistic uted to the decision made public by Defense missile in comparison. The range of a given Secretary Melvin Laird on 19 March 1969 to missile, determined by launch point and target, reduce the planned FB-111A force from 210 to defines the speed and trajectory that the missile 60 aircraft.15 The FB-111A, with its total must follow. Consequently, there has never dependence on extensive tanker support, is a been the confusion between technological tactical aircraft straining to perform a strategic characteristics and strategic utility that exist mission. with aircraft. ICBM evolution has been in terms of warhead weight or megatonnage, the The B-l was indeed the highest state of the addition of multiple warheads, the develop- strategic bomber art. Excellent low-level ment of greater accuracy, the addition of penetration ability, coupled with good elec- terminal tactics to evade defenses and protec- tronic warfare capability and large payload, tion of the missile before launch. All of these equipped it admirably to perform the strategic are directly applicable factors to the determi- mission. Air refueling was essential, but not to nation of strategic utility. This is not to imply the degree necessary for the FB-111. Good that missile development may at some future growth potential was provided for avionics time diverge from strategic needs, but for the advances that might be anticipated in years to present the ICBM seems to have remained come. But again the aircraft was overdesigned more closely related to true strategic capabili- in terms of its supersonic cruise capability. The ties than the manned bomber. excessive structural strengthening and elabo- rate swing-wing carry-through structure neces- sary for mach 2 flight were obvious to critics and, being integral elements of the basic Costs of the Manned Bomber airframe design, could not be discarded in The inexorable rise in the cost of all defense order to reduce weapon system cost of a hardware has sensitized the public and policy- 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
makers alike to the need to ensure that progress in strategic weaponry is attained in the most cost-effective manner. The manned bomber has seen this issue becom e a crucial obstacle standing between it and continued existence as a viable part of our strategic posture. Aircraft unit costs and anticipated program costs ($88 million and $21.6 billion in the case of the B -l16) have soared to levels that merit headline notice in any media treatment of the question. At the same time it is paradoxical to note that the overall annual expense for all strategic forces has held steady at approximately 10 to 15 percent of the defense budget for recent years.17 Still, the manned bomber absorbs a high percentage of the annual cost of the strategic- program. A figure projected for 1974 to 1980 shows 35 percent of the strategic program going to the manned bomber (including some of the B-l program), 27 percent to the SLBM force, and only 10 percent to the ICBM force.18 Since this period includes very little new aircraft production, it is indicative of the high operation and maintenance costs associated with the manned bomber force. Unlike the missile force, where missiles are on alert in their silos while the crews receive training in classrooms, simulations, or procedural drills, the bomber force must fly to keep effective. This requires immense expenditures for fuel, maintenance support, facilities operation, and personnel support. It is a continuing cost diat cannot be eliminated without a precipitous decline in readiness. This also makes it extremely difficult to keep a high percentage
Another alternative to the Stratofortress was the XB-70A, shown taking off on its second flight, 5 October 1964. Al- though it flew at great heights and at a speed of mach 3, these capabilities were insufficient to balance its other limi- tations, and only two of the experimental aircraft were com- pleted: One was destroyed in a midair collision, and the other is at the Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
of the force on alert for any length of time quantity. Cartridge starters were put on all without incurring extreme penalties in terms of eight engines to decrease reaction time at a cost costs and proficiency. Quanbeck and Wood of $35 million; the electro-optical viewing estimate the direct operating cost for a system was being installed on all 269 G and H squadron of B-52s, of which we have 20,19 to models, $269 million; Phase VI electronic be approximately $40 million annually with countermeasures were going on all G and H indirect support costs nearly equal to this models, $296 million; short range attack missile amount.20 (SRAM) launchers were being added, $359 Operating and maintenance costs are a million; structural strengthening of 80 B-52Ds, fertile area for potential cost reductions, but many of which were at double their original these costs are only very partially sensitive to design life of 5000 airframe hours, $208 million. actions aimed at rationalizing operations in the These ongoing changes totaled more than $1.1 field. Increased efficiency permitting small billion just to keep the B-52 force functioning.21 reductions in personnel or savings in flying Indeed, it is reasonable to estimate that the hours could be effected at unit level with cumulative costs of all modifications of B-52 appropriate encouragement from higher aircraft now flying well exceed the unit costs of echelons. The institution of personnel proce- the aircraft when purchased. dures making the mission more attractive in In any evaluation of the future of the manned order to reduce turnover and, hence, reduce bomber, costs are a prime consideration, the need to train replacements would be whether in dollars, defense manpower, or possible at command level. But the basic technology. Not only must any manned characteristics of the weapon system being bomber force be cost-effective but it must be addressed still drive the great majority of the perceived to be so by the nation. Development costs. Fuel consumption is a function of the size and production costs must be held to reasona- and efficiency of the aircraft. Complexity, ble levels, with longevity of the system a prime state of the art, and eventually system age drive consideration at the outset. many of the maintenance costs. An FB-111 unit with smaller, more modern aircraft with only a two-man crew is more fuel and aircrew efficient than a B-52 unit. Likewise mainte- The Future of the nance man-hours and spare parts costs fora B- Manned Bomber 52 unit today may be significantly less expen- The Carter decision to discontinue develop- sive than they will be ten years from now ment of the B-l was met by rapid aerospace because of the increasing difficulty of keeping industry response. Rather than undertake the old systems operating. design of a single strategic system to perform Beyond the increased costs of day-to-day the manned strategic mission, two separate maintenance, a significant cost of an aging systems were proposed. The operational FB- manned system is the requirement to modify 111A would be redesigned, adopting B-l aircraft to operate beyond their designed technology to provide a new manned penetra- lifetime, to perform missions for which they tor. Concurrently, proven wide-body trans- were not originally intended, and to overcome port engineering would combine with rapidly new threats. The B-52 fleet, for example, has advancing cruise missile technology to pro- undergone constant modification for years. In duce a cruise missile carrier large enough to mid-1976, B-52s were undergoing five differ- provide mass to an attack. This bifurcation of ent modifications, all of which were required the strategic bomber function provides a even if the B-l had entered the force in simplification of the engineering challenge, Since the discontinuation of B-l development, some of the advanced technology of the B-l has been applied to the FB-111A two-seat, variable-geometry strategic bomber (above). The resulting FB-111H manned penetrator will have improved range and payload, while retaining the essential structure and subsystems of the FB-111A.
but, more significantly, it could, in the view of The FB-111H proposed as the manned aerospace industries, represent a tactic more penetrator offers a modest improvement over likely to get an affirmative production decision the FB-111A in terms of range and payload. B-l through the machinery of government for at engine technology enabled an increase in least one of the two approaches. The B-52 force airframe capacity for an airframe that had could continue to perform the part of the otherwise approached its limits of useful mission not possible for whichever of these growth. The new aircraft should retain the systems goes into production. excellent low-level penetration characteristics Continued on page 48 45 Proposals for a New Manned Strategic Bomber In the Innovative Strategic Aircraft Design Study, a recent Air Force-sponsored program, the aircraft industry produced several advanced-bomber con- cepts that incorporate significant technological advancements. These “paper airplanes” were designed against typical B-52 strategic mission requirements and carried double the nominal B-52 payload, without refueling. Additional design requirements included resistance to nuclear effects, payload and mission flexibility, low initial and life- cycle cost, low gross weight, survivability, and tanker independence. The designs incorporate technological advances in materials, propulsion, and aerodynamics. The greatest advances projected were the use of advanced composite materials, exotic forms of fiber glass. The composite aircraft design gross weights ranged from 250,000 to 350,000 pounds (compared with 488,000 pounds for the B-52). Advanced aerodynamic concepts included a fully skewable wing for good high- and low-speed performance, ride-control canards to assure a comfortable ride at high-dash speeds, advanced super-critical airfoil shape, fly by wire, and relaxed static stability. Initial projections show evolutionary improvements in engine thrust and efficiency for subsonic speeds; however, innovative approaches, such as a multi- mode variable-cycle propulsion system, promise significant improvements for future supersonic aircraft. The designs ranged from relatively conventional- looking wing-fuselage turbojets, through prop-fan (large six-blade turboprop) designs, to supersonic aircraft with wings that swing flush with the fuselage during high-speed penetration. In the second phase of the study, which is just drawing to a close, extensive analyses have shown the relative merits of these various technological advances, and program plans have been outlined to Among advanced-bomber concepts, the long, achieve these advances—a technology roadmap for high-aspect-ratio icing gives this design long range and good takeoff and landing performance. future research and development. Its unique characteristic—the wing is skewed Directorate of Strategic Planning or rotated flush with the fuselage (below)— Deputy for Development Planning provides for supersonic dash to the target. Body ASD/AFSC lift alone will sustain flight of this aircraft. Sot all economy efforts are successful. The aircraft below was designed with an advanced high-efficiency prop-fan propulsion system and high-aspect-ratio wing to reduce fuel consumption, gross weight, and life-cycle cost, but savings were offset by development and maintenance costs. . . . Another innovation that is simple and inexpensive to manufacture is the forward sweep airfoil, (bottom), based on aerodynamics research by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory. 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
of the FB-111A and may even increase its same limitations that caused its predecessor, capabilities incrementally by employing some the FB-111A, to be held to one-third of the avionics designed for the B-l. The FB-111H originally intended production run. Its payload would still rely on significant air refueling to is clearly subject to an unfavorable trade-off complete most missions and will probably not with range, with most missions probably have the mission flexibility and electronic limited to internal SRAMs or, at most, partial warfare expandability of the B-52 or B-l. The underwing stores. The FB-11111, just as theFB- FB-111H would not be a practical cruise 111A, bears the burden of structural design missile carrier because of bomb bay volume intended for supersonic flight not essential or constraints and range degradation if they are usable in its primary mission profile. The FB- carried externally. 111H, even if it possesses a respectable degree The FB-111H suffers from essentially the of capability today, would be at the limits of its
A possible future bomber (shown in artist’s concept) blasts surface-to-air missiles using a high-energy laser. MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBER 49
design and would respond to tomorrow’s fuel consumption resulting from large fuselage missions and threats only with the greatest diameter unnecessary for this mission. The difficulty and expense. cruise missile carrier is, however, essentially The wide-bodied cruise missile carrier, on not a war-fighting aircraft and must stay well the other hand, profits from the great potential clear of enemy defenses. Consequently, its growth in capability of the air-launched cruise deployment is rigidly constrained at the outset. missile (ALCM) and the immense payload Past experience indicates that Soviet response potential of existing commercial transport. to deployment of such a system will be quick. Using an existing wide-bodied transport as the Development of the ability to detect, identify, basic airframe will reduce development costs and destroy such a basically vulnerable aircraft and lead time, but it may saddle the operation- is strictly within the current state of the art. The al vehicle with the range limitation and high- uniquely large size of this aircraft may even
The 30-year-old ad-wing concept is extremely attractive of late because of its low structural weight and its simplicity (no fuselage). 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
enable the Soviets to monitor its presence to Will the m anned bom ber remain viable facilitate interception by long-range missiles or through the remainder of this century as an fighters well before reaching optimum firing effective weapon system? Yes, as long as we position. apply to it available advances in technology. If indeed these two systems were to be We must depend on SRAMs, the ALCM, procured, yet another problem would surface. decoys, and other more advanced munitions or The operations and maintenance costs of two aids to penetrate defenses too potent for the parallel systems would necessarily be higher bomber alone. The bomber will be able to than costs of a single capable aircraft design. penetrate a modern defensive system only in Production runs of both would be lower than conjunction with the combined effects of a optimum, and training expenses would be nuclear exchange where missile-borne weap- higher. Any savings effected by purchase of ons will have degraded defenses during the two specialized aircraft based on existing relatively long transit time of the bomber. The designs would be lost later on through bomber will then have particular utility in the unnecessarily complex operations. Neither of subsequent phases of a nuclear war where the these two aircraft possesses a usable conven- aircrew’s judgment would be essential and tional capability; consequently, at least some defenses much less of a factor. Any manned B-52s would have to be retained indefinitely. bomber, even if primarily intended for a stand- This would place the United States back in the off launch of relatively long-range missiles in inefficient situation of the 1950s with an early phases of a conflict, must retain an ability excessive number of strategic aircraft types to to defend itself against interception and a maintain and operate. residual penetration ability against degraded or limited defenses. When should new manned systems be fundamental questions procured? When we perceive the need to These observations on the past of the manned replace an obsolescing system in order to retain bomber and on present attempts to design new our capability and modification of the old aircraft as well as projections of its future lead system is no longer practical or cost-effective, to a number of key questions that may offer a or when it becomes apparent that operating useful sketch of what the manned bomber will and maintenance costs of the old system can be have to be in order to survive and serve to the so drastically reduced that capital outlay for a year 2000 and beyond. new system is more sound. Thus the decision to Why, in spite of its inescapable costs, would purchase a new system could be advanced we find it necessary to retain and improve the significantly by industry proposals showing manned bomber as a part of our strategic particularly good cost performance. Careful inventory? Because it would continue to projections must be made in order to allow for stabilize our deterrent posture by providing the long lead time characteristics of large the only system that can be manipulated before strategic systems. a nuclear strike is executed in order to signal What should we buy? Any new manned resolve or perception of a threat of war or to bomber must first possess the basic character- eliminate prelaunch vulnerability. It comple- istics required to qualify as a war-fighting ments the characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs machine. It must have generous range, payload in this way, and it is the only vehicle with and inherent growth potential, and the ability strategic range and payload that can actually to employ a variety of munitions and tactics. It be used to apply nonnuclear firepower in would be unwise to select a vehicle so lower level conflicts. constrained in these areas that responsiveness MANNED STRATEGIC BOMBER 51
to an evolving threat would be limited. Any graded defenses, but able to penetrate in later serious candidate must be at the state of the art stages of a conflict where defenses have lost for subsonic technology: supercritical wing, their cohesion and effectiveness or when used efficient high bypass ratio turbofan engines, in a nonnuclear role in a more permissive reliable avionics, perhaps much of the sturdy environment. structure of contemporary airliners but with- out the large volume fuselage. It must have the If manned bomber development is held tightly type of fuel efficiency and dispatch reliability to these objectives and within these constraints, that characterize the best airliners. It should be the manned strategic vehicle will continue to easy to fly and ideally so similar to transport or offer considerable potential for strategic utility tanker type aircraft in handling characteristics far into the future. As long as our position in the that crews could be rotated from one type to world is one where, as a democracy, we are the other to sharpen skills. It must be well likely to be in the role of a reacting power in engineered to protect crew and avionics from international conflict, the manned bomber the effects of nuclear detonation. It must gives a dimension to that reaction which incorporate technology aimed at maximum greatly complicates any opponent’s plan of structure of contemporary airliners but with- attack while avoiding any appearance of out the large volume fuselage. It must have the threatening or aggressive advantage. flexible, able to function as a stand-off ALCM launcher in the face of concentrated unde- Strategy Division DCS Operations, Plans and Readiness Hq USAF
Note* S. 2965, 94tli Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 2831, 2832 10. Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign 1. “Transcript of the President's News Conference." New York Times, July Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p, 41. 1. 1977. p 10. 11. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigation of 2. L'.S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on the B-36 Bomber Program, Hearings on H. Res. 234,81st Cong.. 1st sess.. 1949, Military Posture and H R. 3818 and H.R 8687 to Authorize Appropriations p. 34. response by Secretary for Air Lovett. During Fiscal Year 1972 for Procurement of Aircraft. Missiles, Naval Vessels. 12. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Strategic Air Command, Command Tracked Combat Vehicles, Torpedoes and Other Weapons and Research, Historian, Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1976. March 21, Development. Text and Etxiluation for the Armed Forces and to Prescribe the 1976, p. 49. Authorized Personnel Strength for Each Active Duty Component and the 13. Ibid., p. 77. Selected Reserve of Each Reserve Component of the Armed Forces and for 14. Ibid., pp. 101, 122. Other Purposes. 92d Cong.. 1st sess., 1971, p. 3534. (Statement of Secretary of 15. Ibid., p. 144. the Air Force Seamans. May 4. 1971.) 16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1977 3. U S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services. Military Posture Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Briefings. 87th Cong.. 1st sess., 1961, p 1124. (Statements of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General White, on March 21.1961, hereafter cited as H. CAS, Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths. Hearings on Posture Briefings. 1961.) S. 2965,94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 3007. (Statement by Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Jones.) 4. U S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels for the Armed Forces, 17. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Hearings Pursuant to H R 6151.87th Cong . 1st sess., 1961, p. 1245 (Statement Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget and Its Implications for the of Secretary of Defense McNamara on April 11. 1961; hereafter cited as H. FY 1978 Authorization Request and the FY 1977-1981 Defense Programs, CAS. Hearings on H R 6151.) January 27, 1976, p. 41. 5 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Military Posture 18 Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman, Strategic Forces: Issues for Briefing, 86th Cong.. 1st sess.. 1959, p 792. (Statement of Secretary* of Defense the Mid-Seventies (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1973), p. 66. McElroy on February 2, 1959.) 19. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. 6 H, CAS. Hearings on H R. 6151, p. 1242 Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget, FY 1979 Authorization 7. H. CAS. Posture Briefings, 1961, p 1087 Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs. January 17, 1977. p. C-5 8. U S Department of the Air Force, Strategic Air Command. Directorate (Twenty-four strategic bomber squadrons less four squadrons of FB -llls.) of Information. Strategic Air Command Background Information, July 1 20. Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing the Strategic 1975. p. ia Bomber Force: Why and How (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), 9. I S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Fiscal Year 1977 p. 26. Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development. and 21. "B-52 Lifetime Extension Effort Pushed," Aviation Week 0 Space Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths. Hearings on Technology. May 10. 1976, pp. 140, 141. MILITARY JUSTICE: IS IT EQUAL?
M ajor Fel ix Fen t o n Moran III It is a shameful fact that this nation, which prides itself on offering “liberty and justice for all/' fails to provide a first rate system of justice for the very citizens it calls upon to defend those principles. More than three m illion Am ericans now under arms are being denied rights fundamental to all members of a free society. Senator Birch Bayh1
HIS supposed lack of justice in the experienced in both military and civilian trial armed forces is caused, some legal work will acknowledge that the military trial writers believe, by the simple fact that offers the accused the better advantage.5 Many T the military system is different. Charlesrights, just recently held by the Supreme Court Morgan, of the American Civil Liberties to be vital to due process of law and essential to Union, states that “the Uniform Code of safeguard individual liberty, have been part of Military Justice is uniform, is a code, and is military justice for as long as 40 years.6 This military—and therefore has nothing to do with system has prompted Senator Sam Ervin to justice.”2 Unfortunately, criticism of this state that “. . . military justice [has] attained caliber is often an outgrowth of the now virtual parity with civilian criminal justice.”7 popular rhetoric condemning the military in This unique system of law has been created general.3 If often ignores the actual realities of by Congress to enforce certain standards of the military justice process and cites as its proof conduct, some identical to standards enforced isolated incidents not at all representative of in civilian life, which have importance in that process.4 maintaining discipline and public respect for It is significant to note that most criticism of the military service. The administration of this military justice comes from legal theoreticians system is placed in the hands of various rather than practitioners: most attorneys military courts because these courts are more 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
familiar than a civilian court would be with the Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military problems of maintaining discipline and assess- Justice. A format that lends itself easily to an ing appropriate punishment. Also, in some examination of these rights is a comparison situations, a military court may be more between the military and civilian systems. convenient or may be the only feasible alternative.8 Although many supporters of this system base their belief on the idea that the search and seizure peculiar requirements of military discipline The right of the people to be secure in their make such a system necessary,9 military justice homes and possessions as guaranteed by the is regarded by the Department of Defense and Fourth Amendment is no less applicable to the most field commanders as a system of justice military than it is to the civilian justice system. whereby fair and impartial trials are provided In two decisions, the Supreme Court eliminat- for military personnel accused of criminal ed as evidence the use of material obtained conduct; discipline is an incidental effect since through an illegal search. First in 1914 with the guilty are punished and the innocent are Weeks v. United States,12 and then in 1961 with exonerated.10 Mapp v. Ohio,13 the high court established the My primary purpose in this article is to basic dimension of the exclusionary rule for the compare the military and civilian justice federal and state courts, respectively. systems by reviewing the fundamental rights The military, on the other hand, adopted the afforded the criminal offender in each system. exclusionary rule shortly after the Weeks I hope the reader will be able to draw a decision, but it was not expressly sanctioned in reasonable conclusion as to whether the service manuals until the 1949 Manual for administration of justice in the armed forces Courts-Martial.H Today, the admissibility of substantially protects or endangers the consti- such evidence depends on much the same rules tutionally guaranteed rights of individual citi- as prevail in the civilian system.15 zens. There are, to be sure, basic differences between the civilian and military mechanisms for safeguarding this right. Probable cause is Military Justice basic to any lawful search.16 In the civilian and the Bill of Rights court system, probable cause is set out in a For many years the Bill of Rights was not written application for a warrant, and the recognized as applicable to members of the determination of sufficient proof is made by an armed forces. This policy was changed when independent magistrate.17 This rule is obvious- the United States Court of Military Appeals ly inoperable in a foreign jurisdiction. The decided United States v. Jacoby, in which the United States Court of Military Appeals has new standard became that “the protections in recently defined the limits of admissibility of the Bill of Rights, except those which are evidence seized by foreign police officials and expressly or by necessary implication inappli- used to prosecute United States servicemen in cable, are available to members of our armed courts-martials in deciding United States v. forces.”11 Thus, for the first time, it was Jordan.18 In its decision, the court ruled that expressly held that the Bill of Rights did have evidence produced by a search conducted by application in the military justice system. Since host-nation police officials is admissible in an 1960, the Military Court has expanded this American military trial so long as there is no concept through its decisions so' that there is United States involvement or presence, and the now a clear understanding of the rights and search and seizure are conducted in accor- protections afforded the serviceman by the dance with the host-nation’s laws and do not, in MILITARY JUSTICE 55
the view of the judge, “shock the conscience of States v. Tempia,2’’ that a suspect in the military the court.”19 must also be advised of his right to hire a Probable cause, as set out in a written civilian attorney and told that, if he desires, a application for a warrant, has been held by military lawyer will be provided free of implication to be inoperative in areas under charge. He can consult with his attorney before control of the armed forces. Consequently, the any interrogation takes place, have his attorney Manual provides that a search of property on a present during questioning, and terminate the military installation may be authorized by a interview at any time. Further, he is advised commanding officer, based on probable that any statement he makes must be voluntary cause.20 Further, the military practice does not and with a full understanding of his rights.28 require that the application for search be in There can be little doubt that the warnings writing, nor does it require that the application provided in Article 31 and Tempia are broader be on oath or affirmation.21 The Court of than those provided the civilian accused. Military Appeals has, however, encouraged the Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in use of written applications, and many com- Miranda pertains to custodial interrogations, mands have adopted this practice as a local while Article 31 is applicable regardless of rule.22 custodial status.29 Additionally, case law These concepts of military search and established by the Court of Military Appeals seizure are clearly based on the belief that the has expanded the gap even further, going far commanding officer can always be impartial beyond the protections afforded civilian toward his men. Unfortunately, this is not defendants. Under military law, an accused always the case.23 The armed forces have serviceman cannot be compelled to speak for already begun the practice of allowing military voice identification, give handwriting exam- judges to issue search warrants, but the ples, urine or blood specimens.30 Thus, the practice is not widespread nor is it mandato- Military' Court has brought within Article 31 ry.24 Only when this trend is brought to its actions which the Supreme Court has held are logical conclusion will the serviceman be not protected by the Fifth Amendment and, afforded the fullest protection of the Fourth therefore, are not applicable to civilians.31 Amendment of the Constitution.
grand jury indictment self-incrimination The Fifth Amendment right to indictment by The serviceman’s privilege against self- grand jury is the only right expressly inapplica- incrimination is well established. Not only does ble to the military accused.32 Again, however, the Fifth Amendment apply but the right is the military has a substitute procedure for the further protected by Article 31 of the Uniform grand jury indictment. Article 32 of the code Code of Military Justice. It is interesting to note requires that prior to referring charges to a that the warnings codified in Article 3125 general court-martial, a commander must contain most of the elements required by appoint a commissioned officer to conduct a Miranda v. Arizona,20 which it predated by 16 thorough and impartial investigation of the years. In addition to requiring that a suspect facts. Although the two procedures are analo- must be advised of the nature of the offense, gous, their differences are rather distinct. that he has the right to remain silent, and that Grand jury proceedings are conducted in any statement which he makes can be used secret. The defendant is barred from all against him, the Court of Military Appeals, proceedings, and, consequently, he does not expanding the Miranda rule, ruled in United have counsel and cannot confront the witnesses 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
against him. The defendant is not permitted to summary court-martial can adjudge a maxi- introduce evidence or witnesses in his own mum sentence of one month’s confinement,42 it behalf. Further, the grand jury indictment has was foreseeable that the decision could have an not been considered an essential element of implication within the military system. Follow- Fourteenth Amendment due process so long as ing the Supreme Court’s decision, the Army the state provides a suitable substitute.33 and the Air Force promptly announced that On the other hand, Article 32 investigations counsel would be provided in a summary are open proceedings. The accused is always court-martial as a condition of adjudging a present and represented by counsel and can sentence of confinement. The Navy and confront and cross-examine the witnesses for Marine Corps chose not to extend this protec- the government. The accused can call wit- tion to their members.43 nesses and introduce evidence in his own This decision, however, was short-lived. The behalf.34 Further, at an Article32 investigation, United States District Court for the district of the government makes almost its entire case Hawaii decided in Daigle v. Warner44 that available to the defense.35 counsel must be provided in summary courts- Because of these differences, even the martial. In reaching this decision, the court harshest critics of military justice have ac- rejected the government’s notion that the knowledged the superiority of Article 32 accused had waived his right to counsel by his investigations. By contrast, substantial criti- failure to demand a special court-martial. cism has been leveled at the civilian grand jury. Relying on United States v. Jackson,45 the Consequently, little support can be given to the district court found that the possibility of the notion that the military accused would benefit greater punishment that can be adjudged by a procedurally if they were under a grand jury special court-martial “chilled” the defendants’ system.36 exercise of their Sixth Amendment rights.46 The court did recognize that, because of the exigencies of military operations, the armed right to counsel forces may not be able to provide a lawyer as At present, as provided by the code, a military counsel.47 attorney must be appointed for a defendant in A year later the same issue reached the Court all general and special courts-martial,37 except of Military Appeals. In deciding United States on the rare occasion when counsel is not v. Alderman,48 the high military court held that available for a special court-martial because of the Supreme Court’s Argersinger decision does “physical conditions and military exigencies.”38 in fact require that counsel be provided in The Manual, in defining physical and military summary courts-martial, unless military exi- exigencies, has virtually eliminated special gencies prevent it. The issue was confused courts-martial without benefit of counsel.39 three years later when the United States Thus, the only trial situation where counsel is Supreme Court decided Middendorf v. Hen- not required by the code is the summary court- ry,4® holding that neither the Sixth Amendment martial.40 Recent court decisions and depart- nor the due process clause of the Fifth ment regulations, however, have negated this Amendment required that counsel be provided practice. The Supreme Court, in a civilian case, at a summary court-martial proceeding.50 The Argersinger v. Hamlin,41 held that counsel Court stated that a summary court-martial must be provided whenever criminal proceed- differed from customary civilian criminal ings may result in a sentence of imprisonment. proceedings since most of these trials were for The decision extends the Sixth Amendment purely military offenses and the penalties right to counsel to misdemeanor trials. Since a allowed were very limited.51 MILITARY JUSTICE 57
Finally, the United States Court of Military The reason for this exclusion is threefold. First, Appeals in applying the Middendorf ruling courts-martial are not courts within the mean- restricted the use of the summary court- ing of Article III of the Constitution and are martial. United States v. Booker52 e s t a b l i s h e d therefore not directly bound by that article’s that a summary' court-martial should be limited requirement that all trials be by jury. Second, to disciplinary action involving minor military the purpose of Article III, paragraph two, and offenses unknown to civilian society. Such the Sixth Amendment was to ensure trial by hearings, in the absence of counsel are not jury' only for those cases in common law where “criminal convictions” for any purpose. Coun- a trial by jury was the rule. Since military trials sel must be made available, and if the at the time did not provide for a jury, neither defendant waives counsel, the waiver must be Article III nor the Sixth Amendment can be in writing.53 Thus, without representation of construed to include juries for military trials counsel or a valid waiver of counsel, imposition today. Finally, the Fifth Amendment expressly of discipline by summary' court-martial cannot excludes members of the armed forces from be used to escalate sentences in a subsequent the right to a grand jury indictment. It is felt court-martial (Booker), nor can a sentence of that this exception extends, by implication, to confinement be rendered (Alderman). the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.56 This sequence of cases clearly shows that the Although not required, the armed forces military justice system is responsive to the were provided with a form of jury trial by the tenets of justice as decided by the Supreme Congress. A jury of at least five members is Court and practiced in the civilian community. required for a general court-martial, and at The military' requirement for counsel during least three members are necessary for a special trial is identical to that in the civilian courts, court-martial.57 with application of the rules coming at about The military jury has been the brunt of much the same time. criticism. Two practices frequently criticized Military' right to counsel in some situations have been the less than twelve-man size and the actually goes beyond civilian practice. For fact that the jury does not require a unanimous example, military counsel is provided during verdict for a finding of guilty. Both of these the Article 32 pretrial investigation. There is no criticisms, however, have been negated by such provision in the civilian grand jury system, recent Supreme Court decisions. The Court where the accused has no opportunity to ruled in Williams v. Florida5S that state felony defend himself. Also, military counsel is trials with six-man juries were constitutional. In provided free of charge throughout the entire another important decision, Apodaca v. Ore- military appellate process,54 regardless of the gon,59 the Supreme Court ruled that the financial status of the accused. Civilians, on the practice of requiring a unanimous verdict was other hand, enjoy neither of these benefits. not constitutionally guaranteed. On these two In addition to appointed military counsel, issues, the military’s jury procedures would the accused, in all proceedings, has the right to certainly survive constitutional scrutiny. civilian counsel, provided at his own expense. Even though these two decisions, in the An accused ’can req’uest a specific military civilian courts, have seemingly brought the two attorney if reasonably available.55 jury systems closer together, there still remains one glaring fault with the trial by jury as trial by jury practiced by the military courts. The code provides for the selection of the jury by the It has long been held that the right to trial by convening authority.60 The jury usually con- jury does not extend to military courts-martial. sists of officers: only on written request by an 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
enlisted defendant will enlisted personnel be members, could do much to dispel the fears of assigned to serve on courts-martial, and even many lower-ranking servicemen that the then he is only guaranteed that one-third of the courts-martial is an arbitrary tool of the court members will be enlisted personnel.01 It commander rather than a viable system of is widely accepted that such requests usually justice.09 result in senior noncommissioned officers being appointed to the jury. These senior enlisted men are often more strict disciplinar- The Present as a ians and have even less in common with the Prologue to the Future young enlisted man than do young officers.02 In the past, criticism of the military judicial Even though the commander has wide discre- process has been harsh. Typical are the tion in the selection of the court members, this remarks of Mr. Justice William O. Douglas power is not without some limits. For example, when he characterized military justice as being the convening authority is prohibited from “singularly inept in dealing with the nice selecting members favorable to the govern- subtleties of constitutional law [and] . . . ment,03 and he cannot systematically exclude marked by the age-old manifest destiny of identifiable groups.04 These two restrictions retributive justice.”70 With equal conviction, have questionable value, however, when the others have taken an opposite view. overall selection process is considered. While Senator Sam Ervin, the noted constitutional- military procedures are not subject to the usual ist, observed that “military justice has attained constitutional restraints on civilian juries, the virtual parity with civilian criminal justice.”71 jury selection practice nevertheless appears to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Warren lack the basic fairness necessary to ensure an Burger believes that the system is “the most impartial hearing.05 enlightened military code in history.”72 Although this practice is unjustified, there Three circumstances provide a relatively seems to be little foundation for the many objective basis from which to judge these two overly broad statements made by the critics of extremes of opinion and thereby determine the military justice. For example, one writer has essential character and quality of military stated that “the American public has viewed justice. The first was noted by Yale law with growing distaste a process where ninety- professor James Bishop. He observed that four percent of its sons are convicted by hand- since the adoption of the Uniform Code of picked juries.”00 Unfortunately, “conclusions Military Justice, the Supreme Court “has yet to such as these are all too often accepted as find a fatal denial of constitutional rights in a irrefutable fact without any pretense of court-martial.”73 The second is a comparison of independent inquiry as to their foundation.”07 the rights and protections provided for the Not only do the facts fail to support the broad accused in a court-martial with those of a generalities of such statements but most critics defendant in a civilian court. While the military would probably be surprised to learn that the accused is afforded somewhat different search great majority of Army officers today are and seizure protections, and only partial themselves overwhelmingly in favor of some protections of a jury trial, he enjoys broader system of random selection of courts-martial rights to counsel, rights of discovery and members.08 securing of witnesses, and protections against There can be little doubt that a random self-incrimination than his civilian counterpart. selection of jury members is essential to a fair The final basis for an objective judgment of trial. This reform, coupled with the possible military justice lies in the American Bar increase of enlisted men among the court Association Standards for the Administration MILITARY JUSTICE 59 of Criminal Justice. While many states fall far have random selection, totally without regard short of these standards and, in fact, consider to the rank of the accused. This is the view of some of them quite revolutionary, the military, Senator Bayh in the military justice reform bill for the most part, is already up to the level of that he proposed several years ago. The the American Bar Association standards.™ senator’s bill, which was not passed, had only Even though the military judicial process one requirement for jurors: that each had equals and in many cases surpasses that of the served at least one year on active duty.77 civilian community, it is by no means perfect. Military justice would undoubtedly be more It is only after the single most glaring defi- civilianized, as was Senator Bayh’s intent, if this ciency is corrected that servicemen will be able approach were adopted. However, most to have the highest confidence in and respect military legal experts, both in and out of the for military justice and the armed forces in service, hold that such a utopian view is not general. practical. They feel that military discipline cannot be effectively maintained if superiors Without doubt, the most fundamental deficiency in the military judicial system is the are made directly answerable to their subordi- military jury. The philosophy behind the right nates.78 Regardless, it is essential that more to trial by a jury of one’s peers chosen at enlisted men serve on military juries so that the random is that there is a better chance of a fair accused can be more nearly judged by a jury of and impartial hearing if the jury represents his peers. different economic groups, occupations, and In light of this view of military discipline, the perspectives within society. The all-officer solution that seems the most promising is that jury, appointed by the convening authority, on the accused serviceman, whether he is an the other hand, is composed of a small, select officer or enlisted man, should be entitled to group who by their very positions, generally one-half of the court being composed of reflect the attitudes of the command. As such, persons of his own or higher rank. The balance military juries do not reflect the wide spectrum of the court would be made up of officers. In of attitudes and biases basic to the jury system. no case would the court have as a member a Consequently, many lower-ranking enlisted person lower in rank than the accused. The men believe that the court-martial is simply an court members, regardless of rank, would be instrument of the commander; its members, selected on a random basis without the the jury, are there to respond to his wishes. influence of the convening authority.79 Whether this belief is founded in fact is Another possible solution to this dilemma irrelevant to the obvious lack of faith in the would be to establish a fixed number of system.75 members for each type court, with greater This lack of faith and the fact that the enlisted representation if desired by the military jury, as it is now constituted, fails to defendant. Random selection of the jury would meet the accepted standards of a traditional follow the guidelines set by the Federal Jury jury make reform an absolute necessity. There Selection and Service Act and the Uniform can be little doubt that the key to this reform Jury Selection Act.80 lies in the removal of authority to appoint a jury Such representative juries would go a long and the adoption of a system of random way in improving military law. Rather than selection. It is interesting to note that the great reduce discipline, randomly selected and more majority of military officers today are over- representative juries might well play a major whelmingly in favor of some system of random role in increasing the integrity and effective- selection of court-martial members.76 ness of military justice. The ultimate solution would obviously be to This deficiency and the proposed reforms 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
are by no means all that is necessary.81 It is quirements of discipline and duty in the important to remember that since the adoption military society, and the tenets of fairness and of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in justice as set forth by the Constitution. If the 1950, continuing efforts have been exerted to code is to continue as an enlightened system, make the present code a truly enlightened these efforts must not cease. system, carefully balanced between the re- National Defense University
Notes
I Senator Birch Bayh, Parade Magazine, 1971, cited by Kenneth J. Hudson, through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may 'The Manual for Courts-Martial—1984," in Military Law Review, Summer be received in evidence against him in a trial by a courts-martial. 1972, p. 2. 26. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) Miranda actually praised the Article 31 warnings. 2. Charles Morgan, Jr.. "Justice on Trial," Newsweek, March 8,1971, cited 27. 16 USCMA 629, 37 CMR 249 (1967). by Hodson, p. 3. 28. Schrader, p. 45. 3. George D. Schrader. "Military Justice—A System for the Seventies," Air 29. Ibid. University Review, May-June 1972, p. 44. 30. Moyer, pp. 357-73. See also Quinn, pp. 89-90. 4 Henry B Rothblatt. “Military Justice: The Need for Change," William 31. See Randall R. Riggs, "Self-Incrimination in the Military Justice and Mary Law Review. Spring 1971, pp. 455-56. System," Indiana Law Journal, Fall 1976, pp. 203-22. The USCMA has 5. Homer E. Moyer, Justice and the Military (Washington: Public Law continued to involve itself in this critical area. Recent decisions have gone far to Education Institution, 1972), p. 19. secure the rights of the military accused. In U.S. v. Dohle, 24 CM A 34, the court ruled thaf the suspect's perception of his questioner's authority is enough to 6. Merlin H. Staring, "Foreword," San Diego Law Review. December 1972, require activation of the Art. 31 warning. The high military court also ruled that pp. 1-8. the issuance of any order that would result in the self-incrimination of the 7 Sam J. Ervin, “The Military Justice Act of 1968." Military Law Review, suspect violates Art. 31, U.S. v. Kinane, 24 CMA 120. Finally, in U.S. v. July 1969, p. 77. McOmber, 24 CM A 207, the court held that once an investigator is aware of the 8. Moyer, pp. 14-15, citing Robinson O. Everett's Military Justice in the accused's desire for counsel, he may not in the future question the suspect Armed Forces of the United States (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Military without affording counsel reasonable opportunity to be present. Service Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 4-7. 3 2 U.S. Constitution, Amendment V. in part, “No person shall be held to 9. Ibid., pp. 11-19. answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime unless on a presentment or 10 Charles M. Schiesser and Daniel H. Benton, "Modern Military Justice," indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land and naval Catholic University Law Review, Summer 1970, p. 492. forces. . . II 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960). 33. Homer E. Moyer. "Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: 12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Advantages over a Civilian Defendant," Maine Law Review, vol. 22.1970, pp. 13 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 110-12 14. Mover, p. 245. 34. Ibid., pp. 112-14. 15. MCM, par. 152. For an excellent description of current permissible 35. Schiesser and Benton, p. 513. search and seizure rules across the broad spectrum of the issue, see Murl A. 36. Moyer, "Procedural Rights," pp. 113-14. Mr. Justice Douglas suggested Larkin and Joe H. Munster, Jr., "Military Search and Seizures," JAG Journal, this in O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). SeeaLso Jon W Bruce, “The Fall 1976, pp. 1-64. Pretrial Investigation: Some Practical Considerations," JAG Journal, Sep- 16. For a thorough review of the military concept of probable cause, see tember 1972, pp. 225-38. Moyer, pp. 254-64. 37. UCMJ. Art. 27; MCM. par. 48. 17 John F Munger, "Procedural Due Process in the Civilian and Military' 38. UCMJ. Art. 19 Justice Svstems," Arizona Law Review, vol. 14. p. 357. 39. MCM. par. 6c. provides: "Physical conditions and military exigencies, as 18. 24 CMA 156. the terms are here used, may exist under rare circumstances, such as on an 19. Burrus M. Carnahan. "U.S. v. Jordan: Foreign Searches, Military Courts isolated ship on the high seas or in a unit in an inaccessible area, provided and the Act of State Doctrine," Air Force Law Review, vol. 19. no. 4,1978, p. compelling reasons exist why trial must be held at that time and at that place. 414. Mere inconvenience does not constitute a physical condition or military 20. Robert E. Quinn. "Some Comparisons between Courts-Martial and exigency and does not excuse a failure to extend to an accused the right to Civilian Practice," Military Law Review. October 1969, pp. 91-92. MCM, par. qualified counsel." 152. provides that a search "may be authorized by commanding officer 40. UCMJ. Art. 27; MCM, par. 48. (including an officer in charge) having jurisdiction over the place where the 41. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). property or person searched is situated. . . ." This practice has been upheld by 42. UCMJ, Art. 20. the USCMA in United States v. Carter, 16 USCMA 277, 36 CMR 433 (1966). 43. D. A. Message 101236Z (August 10, 1972) and AFM 111-1, par. 3c. 21 Ibid., p. 92 The practice of allowing oral application was upheld in (August 30, 1972), cited by Moyer, Justice and the Military, p. 389. United States v. Hartsook. 15 USCMA 291. CMR 263 (1965). 44. 348 F. Supp. 1073 (1972). 22. Ibid., pp. 92-93. 45. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 23. Munger, pp. 361-62. 46. .348 F. Supp., at 1080. 24. Ibid., p. 360, citing Army Regulation 27-10. 47. Ibid. For a criticism of this decision, see James Stroud. "Military Law— 25. UCMJ, Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited: Right to Counsel," American Journal of Criminal Law, February 1972.1 hold (a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate that the possibilities of greater punishment by a special court-martial are no himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate more chilling to the defendant's exercise of his rights than the extensive civilian him. practice of plea bargaining. (b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any 48. 22 USCMA 298. 46 CMR 298 (1973). statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first 49. 425 U.S. 25. informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not 50. In reading its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Sixth have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or Amendment right to counsel did not apply since a summary court-martial was suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence not a “criminal proceeding" as required in the Amendment (425 U.S. 25,34). against him in a trial by courts-martial. The due process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment was also rejected by (c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a reasoning that it was not the intent of Congress in establishing the military statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or court system to grant counsel at a summary’ court-martial (425 U.S. 25,43). For evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him. an excellent discussion of what 1 see as the fallacy of the Supreme Court s (d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or decision, see Jeffrey A. Bell. " Middendorfv. Henry, the Right to Counsel at a MILITARY JUSTICE 61
Summary Court-Mamal' Arkansas Law Review. Summer 1977, pp. 345-57 Army general and special courts-martial during FY 1971, it was found that of 51. V .S. 25, 38 the 30.646 defendants, 93 percent were convicted; of that figure, 43.4 percent 52. 3 MJR 443 (CMA 1977). pleaded guilty Considering the 91.5 percent that opted for a trial by the 51 Ibid. military judge alone, and discounting the guilty pleas, only 6.5 percent of all 54 UCMJ. Art 70; MCM. par 102. cases involved a jury where there was even the possibility that command 55. UCMJ. Art 38. Use of civilian counsel in no way affects the right to selection could affect the outcome; pp. 85-87. appointed military' counsel. 68. Ibid., pp. 88-89 56. Murl A. Larkin. "Should the Military Less-Than-Unanimous Verdict of 69. Joseph Remcho, "Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need Guilt Be Retained." Hastings Law Journal, January 1971, pp. 239-42. for Reform." Indiana Law Review, Winter 1972. p 223. 57 UCMJ, Art 16 70. OCallahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258. 265 and 266 (1969). 58. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 71. Ervin, p. 77. 59 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 72 Cuaqlairdo v. McElroy, 259 F2d 927, 940 (1958). 60. UCMJ. Art 25. 73. James W. Bishop. "The Quality of Military Justice," New York Times 61 Ibid. Magazine. February 22,1970, p. 37, cited by Robert E. Quinn, "Courts-Martial 62. Munger, p. 369. citing Benson. "Military Justice in the Consumer Practice: A View from the Top," Hastings Law Journal, January 1971, p. 211. Perspective,' Arizona Law Review, voL 13, 1972 pp. 607-8. 74. Hodson, p. 7. 61 United States v. Hedges, 11 USCMA 642 29 CMR 458 (1960) 75. Remcho, p. 223. 64 United States v. Crawford, 15 USCMA 31. 35 CMR 3 (1964) 76. Brookshire, pp. 88-89. 65. For an excellent discussion of current issues relating to the military jury, 77. U.S., Congressional Record, p. S 3142 see Cary C. Smallbndge, "The Military Jury Selection Reform Movement," 78. Rothblatt, pp. 468-69. Air Force Law Review, voL 19, no. 4, 1978, pp. 343-82 79. Edward F. Sherman. "The Civilianization of Mihtary Law," Maine Law 86. G. Edward Rudloff, Jr., "Comments—Stacked Juries: A Problem of Review, vol. 2 2 1970, pp. 98-99. Military Justice," Sonia Clara Lawyer. Spring 1971, p. 363. 80. Smallbridge, p. 382 67. R. Rex Brookshire, "Juror Selection under the Uniform Code of Mihtary 81. For an excellent discussion of the possible reform measures of the Justice Fact and Fiction." Military Law Review, Fall 1972 p. 85. In a study of future, see Hodson. “MCM . . . 1984."
Our nuclear policy basically is one of deterrence; to take actions that are well known by the American people and well known by the Soviets and other nations, that any attack on us would result in devastating destruction by the nation which launched an attack against us. So the basic policy is one of deterrence. President Jimmy Carter 30 November 1978 *i > military UrL affairs Ml m abroad
SOVIET PROFESSIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING MANPOWER
J il l E. H eu er
of a nation, its I ability to solve future scientific and tech- nological (S&T) development problems, is an important measure of its industrial and military strength. This scientific potential depends largely on the degree to which a nation developed four aspects of its scientific anc technical community. • A nation must have enough research and development (R&D) institutions and the specialized equipment required for tne perfor- mance of research. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 63
• The research establishment must be in this field (275,500 in the U.S.S.R. versus manned by adequate numbers of qualified 39,100 in the U.S. in 1976). professional R&D scientists and engineers in There is at present no reliable way of the critical areas of research endeavor. estimating the number of students in specialties • The research and development pro- that are inputs into military-related R&D. The grams of the nation and the efforts of Soviet reporting system aggregates large individual R&D personnel must be organized groups of related specialties under single and managed in the most effective and headings for statistical purposes. Some of these efficient manner and focused on the most specialties clearly have military applications; important problems. others are of doubtful relevance to military • The scientists and engineers must be interest. Five out of 11 Soviet engineering kept informed of the S&T achievements of the specialties have at least potential application rest of the world through a highly developed scientific and technological information sys- tem. Underlying these parameters are those original ideas, the amount of scientific creativi- ty possessed by scientists and engineers, which ultimately determine the extent to which a nation’s scientific potential is realized.
ONCERN has been expressed repeatedly that the Soviet Union is exceeding the United States in scientific and engineering manpower and, hence, may eventually surpass Sources: U .S — Division ol Science Resources Studies/STIA us in R&D achievements. There is no difficulty U.S.S.R — Updated information based on methodology In "Soviet Professional Scientltic and Technical Manpower," R Talley, in finding statistics that support such concerns. DST-1830S-049-76 The number of full-time-equivalent scien- tists and engineers employed in R&D in the Figure 1. U.S./U.S.S.R. full-time-equivalent research Soviet Union surpassed the analogous figure and development scientists and engineers (U.S.: 1961, 1965, 1969-77; U.S.S.R.: 1960-1976) Note: The U.S. for the U.S. in 1969-70 and stood well above data for 1962-1964 and 1966-1968 are interpolated. the U.S. total in 1976 (755,000 versus 566,000) The number of kandidat nauk degrees trough- ly equivalent to the U.S. Ph.D.) conferred in the Soviet Union reached a record level in 1976, within the defense industry: metallurgy; while awards of Ph.D. degrees in the U.S., machine and instrument building; electronics, though exceeding the Soviet figure (about electrical equipment building, and automa- 33,000 versus 31,000), were on the decline from tion; radio engineering and communications; a peak in 1973. In the field of engineering, the and chemical engineering. Between 1971 and comparisons are striking. In 1972 the Soviet 1976, enrollments in defense-related engineer- Union employed 2,820,000 diploma engineers, ing fields increased at a slightly higher rate (1.0 while the U.S. employed only 1,243,000. This percent) than between 1966 and 1970 (0.8 gap will probably widen, given relative percent). Soviet graduates with these special- numbers of first-level degrees being awarded ties comprise a manpower pool available for 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
use in the defense industry as needed. Since ogy, meteorology, and agriculture,® which these specialties represent fields with broad would not be considered engineering in the economic application, it cannot be hypothe- U.S. Many engineers in the U.S.S.R. have received their undergraduate degrees through evening or correspondence programs, which are acknowledged to be inferior to full-time —1— “Z programs. It has been noted, for example, that 1 —— j correspondence program students typically
rra ti lion,ru n >ther can devote only 25 percent as much time to en Bine 1 M e l / i reading technical literature as can full-time | □ 1 1 i— r - LJ_ / LJ students.1 Furthermore, one may ask why the ____ J r - r Soviet Union needs so many more engineers / 21■ ■■■ than the U.S., when it has a smaller economy. rt □ a Doubts on the wisdom of training so many n rt _ engineers have even been expressed by Soviet HI _____ j commentators. In 1974, after a tour of West r_ r German and Japanese tool manufacturing □ Z plants, G. Kulagin, director of the Machine- 1*0 1*2 11*4 1*0 1*9 1070 072 1074 1979 Tool Association imeni Sverdlov, stated that Source Narodnoya Khozyaystvo and Narodnoya Obrazovanlye. Nauka, i Kullura. “one can hardly find justification for the fact that having 2.7 times the number of engineers as the US, we continue to train them in Figure 2. U SS R, graduations in defense-related and other quantities several times higher than the Ameri- engineering fields (1960-1976) Note: Adjusted for con- cans,” and that “for equivalent volumes of gruency with US. conception of engineering specialties. production and introduction of new technol- ogy they use 3 to 4 times fewer designers and researchers than we do. Is this not simply a waste of precious engineering labor on our part?”2 sized that all students in these specialties will The point, of course, is not that one should enter the defense industry. Again, these dismiss these Soviet manpower figures as students will enter a pool of professional hopelessly exaggerated. Rather, one must be manpower available for use in the defense cautious in drawing conclusions about Soviet industry. and American potential for scientific advance- Comparisons such as these may be mislead- ment based on simple comparisons of a few ing, as can be illustrated with the often-cited manpower series at a point in time. Manpower example of engineers. Statistics on the numbers series should be examined in the light of what is of engineers employed in the Soviet economy known of other indicators used to assess R&D give an inflated impression of the amount of capabilities. One such indicator is the number engineering activity going on in the U.S.S.R. of Nobel Prizes received by various nations. A Such impressions result because the Soviets pertinent fact is that from 1946 to 1976 the U.S. count all persons who have received an accounted for 85 Nobel Prize laureates in engineering degree as engineers, regardless of chemistry, physics, and physiology/medicine,* their employment. Also, the Soviet definition of “engineering” includes such fields as cartography, geodesy, exploration for mineral *In 1975 approximately 20 percent of all Soviet engineering graduates were deposits, forestry, wood-technology, hydrol- trained in these fields. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 65
out of a total of 171, while the U.S.S.R. better employment of engineers who are now accounted for only 7.3 In short, this Soviet army in administration. of scientists and engineers may be a sign of Shortages and surpluses of scientific and systemic weaknesses as well as strengths.
T h E U.S.S.R. continues to expe- rience both surpluses and shortages of profes- sional scientific and engineering manpower in several fields of training. Disproportions occur due to the changing demands of science and industry' for specialists, misuse of available manpower, reliance during planning on staf- fing tables that unnecessarily inflate manpow- er needs, and shortages of material and staff support for professional manpower. The Soviets’ unusually high definition of their scientific and technical manpower de- mand has increased the number of these Source: U S — National Center lor Educational Statistics and Division of Science people being trained over the years. Since Resources Studies/STIA and Science Indicators 1976. National Science Board. 1977. science and technology enjoy top priority in U S.S.R.—Narodnoye Khozyaystvo and Narodnoye Obrazovamye. Nauka. i Kultura. the Soviet Union, it follows that most profes- sional manpower shortages would occur in new technologies. Shortages of qualified Figure 3. U.S./U.S.S.R. engineering graduates an- faculty are also reported, especially in Siberia nually (1960-1976) Note: Adjusted for congruency and rural areas. with U.S. conception of engineering specialties. Industrial production enterprises still report acute shortages of advanced degree holders,-1 and experienced plant engineers and scientists continue to leave industry for the research technological manpower are also caused by' institutes, where the work is more attractive individual enterprise employment practices. and the pay higher.5 The pressures to hire more professional S&T An additional problem, which aggravates cadre than needed at an enterprise are strong, shortages of engineers because it leads to their as is the reluctance to fire personnel in these misuse, is a deficit of business and industrial categories. This practice can be partly attribut- administrators and executives. The Soviet ed to the existence of an incentive to increase Union has not trained adequate numbers of the enterprise’s wage bill or the total amount of economists and administrators for industry. money allocated for wages and salaries. Many W ithout the economists to participate in regulations governing the organization of economic and planning functions, the Soviets wages and bonuses continue to reward enter- have often been compelled to use engineers in prises that employ the largest possible staff. administrative positions that require no techni- Premiums, including those affecting the direc- cal education. Several institutes of manage- tor personally, are calculated, using the wage ment have been set up recently to remedy this bill as a basis. situation. Eventually, new cadres will permit Another factor that causes disproportions of 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
manpower and which has contributed to the instruments and laboratory equipment, as well steady growth in the numbers of scientists and as an enormous amount of equipment down- engineers is the common practice of organizing time in research institutes, cause delays and new departments, either directly or through periods of relative inactivity. reorganization of existing departments, em- Other misuses of S&T manpower have ploying these people in order to increase the further aggravated the surplus/shortage prob- wages and salaries for people in these occupa- lem such as the employment of diploma tional categories. Once a new department has engineers outside their fields of specialization been created, an experienced engineer or or as technicians or skilled labor and the scientific worker is then promoted to head the employment of praktiki0 in engineering and department, and new personnel are hired to technical positions. staff it. An underlying reason for this practice is Thus, while definite specialist shortages exist the relative deterioration in the salaries of such in the U.S.S.R., the main problem appears to people in recent years compared with most be in the effective planning and use of the vast industrial workers and state farm employees. manpower pool, which, if corrected, would The reduction in wage and salary differentials eliminate disproportions currently expe- since the late 1950s has not been a turn to rienced. egalitarian principles of distribution; rather it is a reflection of shifts in economic priorities in Notwithstanding the tremendous strides the favor of traditionally neglected and low-paid Soviet Union has made in R&D over the past 20 sectors. As a result, the overall number of years, the economy remains essentially labor- engineers and scientists in the country has intensive, as opposed to capital-intensive, grown continuously. despite generous and regular capital improve- Misuse of engineers’ time also creates a need ments. Analysis of present trends in Soviet S& T for additional cadre. Time spent in typing, manpower and educational policies indicates drawing graphs, attending meetings, compos- that the current requirement is to turn from ing correspondence, and engineering adminis- extensive (e.g., growth in the numbers of tration is considerable and often leaves as little workers and increase in investments) to as 10 percent of the work week for substantive intensive factors (e.g., raising the productivity engineering activity. In addition, absenteeism and improving the organization of work due to personal leave, responses to summonses involving research workers, professors, and from courts and investigative agencies, and students). As Western students of Soviet R&D party obligations is a serious problem; at many efforts try to gauge future R&D achievements industrial enterprises, losses of working time in the Soviet Union, it will be important for run as high as 15 to 20 percent of the total.6 them to keep in mind both the qualitative and Thus, for fear of finding themselves short- quantitative aspects of professional R&D handed, managers commonly try to keep as manpower and put these factors in perspective many employees as possible in reserve. Losses with other R&D indicators. of substantive working time also result from Dayton, Ohio interruptions in material and technical supply necessary for the performance of scientific •Persons employed in a job for which they have no formal training but are research. Difficulties in obtaining scientific qualified by on-the-job experience. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 67
4. S. Zhitnitikiy, Ekonomlchetkaya Caret a. August 1975, p. IS. .NoU* 5. D Orechldn, Izveetiya, 21 October 1972, p. 1. 1. M. Anuchin, Izoeitiya. 8 January 1973, p. 5. 2. G. Kulagin, Trud, 10 January 1974, p. 2. 6.. Ekonomiko I OrgantzaUiyo Promythlennogo Ptoizvodetva. Man h April 3. National Science Board. National Science Foundation, Science ItuUco- 1978, pp. 75-87. Source: Current Digest of the Soviet Frees, vol. 30. no. 18,1978. ton 1976,1977, p. 195 p. 5.
If w e are to retain in the T riad the recognized flexibility which the manned penetrator provides, we must continue to modernize our current fleet and develop a new manned strategic penetrator for the 1990’s and beyond. ... We must continue the various upgrade programs now scheduled for the B-52 fleet. The most extensive of these will be equipping 170 B-52G aircraft w ith the high technology air-launched cruise m issile [A LCM ]. . . . The ALCM achieves its greatest effectiveness when combined w ith the m anned penetrator. T h e A L C M -bom ber com bination brings together the best values of the b o m ber— flexibility, predictability and dependability— w ith the needed values of the ALCM — cost-effectiveness, added penetrativity, and great accuracy. Together, the ALCM-bomber partnership represents a significant advancem ent in our deterrent capability. General Richard H. Ellis, Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command Remarks to AFA symposium, Los Angeles, 1978 any unique sensitivity to the larger implications of the airplane as a weapon. But to neglect two recent biographiesf of a highly successful leader of men for that reason would be to miss an unusual opportunity for professional en- hancement. As Montgomery of Alamein observes in his History of Warfare,1 general- ship is the art and science of command; a science because it must be studied theoreti- cally, an art because the theory must be reduced to practice. Great captains are made, not born, and the making involves hard study, wide reading, and self-conscious introspec- tion; nobody becomes a truly great com- mander who has not first studied and pon- dered the art and science of war. Ambitious officers who aspire to the upper reaches of command will find the two biographies under review here a treasure-trove of insights on the making of a leader. The two authors approach their task in quite different fashion: Vandiver, a widely published histori- an who is chancellor of Rice University, loves a good story and tells it with brisk enthusiasm; Smythe, a Jesuit scholar who has written eighteen articles on Pershing as well as this first volume of his as yet unfinished biography,2 is GENERALSHIP more spare in his prose but has a knack foi capturing remarkably revealing facets of his Major Gener a l I. B. Holley, J r ., USAFR man in capsule episodes sensitively perceived. Read these volumes, then, pencil in hand, and make a record for future reflection. There is HY should Air Force officers bother much to be harvested here. For example, after to read biographies of an Army officer describing Pershing’s boyish awe on seeing whoW died before many of them were born? General Grant at West Point, Vandiver re- General of the Armies John J. Pershing, what- marks: “Few things reveal more about a man ever his stature in history, never displayed than the hero he will follow.”
tFrank E . Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing, 2 vols. (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press- 1977, $35.00), vol. I, xxii and 594 pages, vol. II, 584 pages, maps, illustrations, bibliography. Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing (N ew York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973, $10.95), ix and 370 pages, m aps, illustrations, bibliograp hy.
68 BOOKS AND IDEAS 69
Both authors recognize that Pershing’s tour million dollars worth of unvouehered equip- as professor of military' science with the ROT C ment charged against him as quartermaster; he at the University' of Nebraska was a profound- was more interested in seeing that his troops ly formative period of his life. In retrospect the had what they required than he was in general himself concluded that “every officer protecting his flanks with a mass of paper should have some experience at a university.” receipts.) He was avowedly ambitious, but as a There he met people who were seriously truly professional soldier he sought the oppor- interested in ideas, he broadened his horizons tunities and responsibilities of high command by studying law in addition to his regularly and not merely promotion. When tempted assigned duties, and he acquired a circle of with a jump to flag rank by filling a position in friends in political life who enhanced his the War Department’s Bureau of Insular education substantially in that sphere. Above Affairs, he opted instead for a field command all, he came to appreciate how important it was in the Philippines at his current grade. for regular officers to serve with citizen At Zamboanga, on the edge of the wild soldiers in peace, the better to cope with hinterland of unsubdued Moro tribesmen, wartime armies where such soldiers provide Pershing plunged in and studied his new the bulk of the manpower. In contrast to his subjects with zeal. He soon demonstrated such success at Nebraska, as a tac officer® at West a grasp of native folkways that he was Point Pershing was a failure. In his zeal for entrusted, though only a captain, with com- perfection, he drove too hard. But the expe- mand of an expedition of 700 men, a force rience was not all loss; he learned that there are normally led by a colonel. In a few brief forays limits beyond which men will not be pushed. during which he subdued a number of He never made the same mistake again. renegade Moro chieftains, Pershing demon- Very early in his career Pershing recognized strated that he possessed that rare gift, the the importance of cultivating a wide circle of ability to lead men in battle. His secret was acquaintances. Typically, after a chance certainly not charisma, for he was often encounter with a rising young New York described by subordinates as cold and aloof, a politician, Theodore Roosevelt, he took the man not given to praise. But he was economical trouble to keep the friendship green. But this with lives, a leader who measured success not studied effort was not confined to influential in the number of battles won but those figures above him who might advance his avoided. He became a master at psychological career; he was no less alert to those below. At warfare, subduing the enemy’s will before he West Point, for example, he began noting those launched his assaults. cadets who held promise for future appoint- One episode that perfectly illuminates why ments, a practice which paid off twenty-odd Pershing’s men admired him, if they did not years later when the assignment of so many love him, occurred at the close of his expedi- commanders in the American Expeditionary tion to disperse the dissident Moros around Forces (AEF) was his responsibility. Lake Lanao. On returning with his exhausted In Cuba Pershing grew still further, demon- troops to his base at Camp Vicars, he was strating a capacity for sustained hard work denied entry because his men had been even when ill, coolness under fire, and a exposed to cholera. With characteristic dis- willingness to stick his neck out when it served patch, Pershing resolved that difficulty' by a genuine military purpose to do so. (At the ordering all the stay-at-homes into a separate close of hostilities, Captain Pershing had over a tent camp while his weary veterans took over the more comfortable regular quarters.
Editor % note. Tactical (or tac) officer an officer responsible for the Duty as an official observer in the Russo- military side of a cadet's education. Japanese War in 1905 afforded Pershing a
Continued on jmge 72 Cadet John ]. Pershing (above) was appointed to the United States Military Academy from Missouri in 18H2. . . . Nearly two decades later (1901), Pershing was an Army captain in the Philippines. In 1916. Pershing, by then a brigadier gen- eral. teas in command of the expeditionary force sent to Mexico in pursuit of Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Promoted to major general that same year and sent to France the next, Iflack Jack" Pershing here leads U.S. aijylry tsoops across the Rio Grande. + % ______72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
unique opportunity to acquire an appreciation details. Or, again, the reader is given pause by for the logistical implications of modern the suggestion that early in his career Pershing warfare as he watched Japanese staff officers recognized that “inefficiency is inevitable direct an enormous volume of color-coded where human beings are concerned.” (Smythe, supply containers in a steady stream from p. 58) wharfside transports to the front lines. On the Vandiver’s determination to dig out every battlefield he saw large formations of all arms last shred of evidence at times may seem to engaged in operations on a scale impossible in surfeit the reader with detail, but woven into the tiny peacetime U.S. Army. Although those details one finds a multitude of revealing Vandiver tells us Pershing observed the insights. For example, as a cadet Pershing widespread use of barbed wire and machine found French difficult, and he had never really guns, he fails to provide his readers with a mastered the tongue. Then, in 1910 when on documented assessment of just how fully leave in France, he had an unexpected layover Pershing actually comprehended the momen- of a month because of a sudden change in tous implications of these and other similar orders. Instead of confining this unanticipated technological innovations which received a gift of time to sightseeing, he applied himself to thorough testing in the Russo-Japanese theater an intensive course in French conversation. His of action. The experience did shape Pershing’s objective was to improve his capacity to tactical thinking profoundly, however. When perform as an observer; he could not have promoted to flag rank and given a brigade at anticipated that his application would make a Fort McKinley in the Philippines, he insisted on vital difference when President Wilson select- combined arms maneuvers to develop that ed him as commander of the AEF some seven sense of teamwork so necessary to combat years later. readiness. In the rainy season he gave examina- Pershing’s selection to command the Mexi- tions on tactical problems to all of his officers can Punitive Expedition in 1916 not only gave and had their work graded. him opportunities to enlarge his experience as Don Smythe’s sensitivity to subtle nuances in an operational commander, it also provided a depicting human relationships is nicely illus- useful test for technological advances such as trated in his account of Pershing’s behavior the field radio, the motor truck, and the after his promotion from captain to brigadier airplane, which were still novelties to the over the heads of many former superiors. Army. In addition, the Mexican terrain af- Instead of waiting for his old colonel to call on forded a brutal arena for service tests. Al- him, as protocol would require, he telephoned though the few available underpowered and asked if he, Pershing, could come pay a 10,000-foot-ceiling airplanes soon failed when visit. This gracious gesture, trivial in itself, was confronted with 12,000-foot mountain passes, genuinely appreciated and helped soften the Pershing saw enough of them to learn that they blow implicit in their sudden reversal of status. could be decidedly valuable in reconnoitering For thoughtful readers, such episodes are what during the pursuit of an elusive enemy. make biography worthwhile. Again and again Not the least significant aspect of Vandiver s Smythe reveals facets of Pershing’s mind as he treatment of the Mexican episode is the matured into an effective leader of men. We account he provides of the relationship be- are riot surprised to learn that he was a glutton tween Pershing and his aide, Lieutenant for hard work; more helpful is the information George S. Patton. For those who aspire to high that he habitually boned up on the minutiae of command, it is certainly worth noting that even a new assignment so as to impress his new while enduring the rigors of a winter campaign superior with his command over the smallest in Mexico, Patton, ever the dedicated profes- BOOKS AND IDEAS 73
sional, found time to write papers on tactics effectively. So, too, an army which seldom which Pershing, no less the true professional, assembled formations larger than a regiment in took time and trouble to criticize with care. peacetime would be hard put to develop Perhaps the most fruitful by-product of leaders, both commanders and staff officers, Pershing’s Mexican adventure was the forbear- capable of employing divisions, corps, and ance and loyal silence he observed in the face armies operationally against the enemy. Just of shifts in administration policy. This loyalty moving a division (28,000 men and some 8000 doubtlessly weighed in the balance when animals) from point A to point B and supplying Wilson selected Pershing soon after the them without faltering posed problems enough declaration of war in 1917 to head the to tax veteran campaigners, let alone a hastily American Expeditionary Forces in France. assembled army of largely inexperienced Vandiver reproduces in full Secretary of War citizen soldiers. The solution, Pershing real- Newton D. Baker’s directive to Pershing ized, was to establish a system of schools akin outlining the scope of his duties. Unfortunate- to the Command and General Staff College at ly, he fails to do the same for an overlapping set Fort Leavenworth, even if it meant drawing of instructions prepared by General Tasker off large numbers of desperately needed Bliss, thus foregoing an opportunity to contrast officers for training after the AEF divisions military and civilian conceptions of the task at arrived in France and prepared to move into hand. Indeed, one of the criticisms this place on the front. The high value Pershing reviewer would lay against Vandiver is his placed on schooling as opposed to other forms tendency to assess Pershing’s peers through the of training at a time when he was under great general’s eyes rather than objectively from pressure not to divert scarce officer strength alternative sources. This is notably so in his from the operational units affords a good index treatment of Generals Leonard Wood and of his true appreciation for professionalism. Tasker Bliss, who are condemned by innuendo One of the great challenges confronting rather than evidence. Similarly, when the War officers in a rapidly expanding army in Department undertook the necessary but wartime is the need to grow intellectually and politically unpopular task of closing down a adjust psychologically to an abruptly altered multitude of obsolete company-sized Indian way of life. Major James G. Harbord was a frontier bases, Vandiver describes the effort as student in the Army War College in April 1917. a “monstrous blunder” when it hit the bailiwick One month later he was Chief of Staff of the of Senator Frances E. Warren of Wyoming, AEF. Overnight promotions required signifi- Pershing’s father-in-law. But these occasional cant shifts in attitude and in habits of thought. lapses are quickly forgiven as one reads on in Officers who had spent weeks in tracking the rich tapestry of detail the author provides down a fifteen cent shortage in their peacetime for serious students of the chemistry of com- property accounts were now expected to plan mand. the expenditure of millions without batting an Vandiver is particularly effective in sketch- eye. Moreover, as the scale of everything grew ing the problems confronting a commander larger, old, familiar, tried and true techniques who must preside over the expansion of an of personal leadership would no longer work as army of thousands as it grows to one of they did in the company or battalion. Vandiver millions. A supply system geared in time of skillfully brings out Pershing’s perception of peace to the needs of company-sized garrisons this shift and describes his efforts to restructure scattered about the nation would manifestly his staff to take account of the new conditions. require a massive overhaul and infusions of The need to delegate ever more authority imaginative leadership before it could function did not, of course, diminish the importance of
Continued on fniuv 76 General Pershing and his staff (left), accompanied by French General Pelletier, disembark from a channel transport on their arrival in France, 1917. . . .General Pershing, Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), along with Major General B. B. Buck and Brigadier General F. W. Sladen, inspects Seventh Infantry troops at Vaucouleurs, France, 7 September 1918. Generals John J. Pershing and Peyton C. March. AEF artillery commanderand laterchiefof staff (1918). attend a ceremony welcoming arriving airmen at Bollmg Field. D.C , on 21 October 19It). 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
personality or the human dimension of com- short by one of Siebert’s staff, Captain George mand, although it may have limited the Marshall, who rebutted the attack in cold number of individuals who came into direct anger, pointing to the unfairness of criticizing contact with the man at the top. Vandiver Siebert, who had been away from the division offers the reader a whole series of revealing on orders. Instead of retribution, which episodes in which we see the mind of the everyone present expected, Marshall earned supreme commander in action. His strength of Pershing’s respect as a man of character. An character is deftly implied in an account of aspiring commander might well ask himself, Pershing’s excoriation of General Siebert for “Would I have accepted such contradiction the manifold deficiences in his newly arrived from a junior before a roomful of observers— First Division. His chewing out was brought up even if he were right?” That he probably
Pershing, with spurs properly in place, inspects the balloon hangar at Brooks Field, Texas, 1922. BOOKS AND IDEAS 77
would not is strongly suggested by Marshall’s major outlines of the contest are well known; comment years later, “I never had another his contribution is to show the personal commander I could do that with. (\ andiver, qualities Pershing brought to bear in this vol. II, p. 798) running battle with the French and British In all studies of the AEF, the theme of military and civil authorities. He shows how amalgamation, which is to say the efforts of the skillfully the general appropriated the ideas of French and British to absorb American man- others and made them his own, an essential of power into their armies rather than allow the high command. He also shows how Pershing AEF to function as an independent command, wisely based his case on the need for an is a dominant one. V7andiver traces Pershing’s independent American army as essential to the battles for autonomy with great care. The proper motivation of his troops rather than his
General John J. Pershing, with ever-impeccable military bearing even though in mufti, poses beside his equestrian portrait in February 1929, age 69. 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW own understandable pride in personal com- sometimes need to be replaced when the crisis mand. There are insights, too, on Pershing’s is over. technique within the conference room; his Vandiver effectively depicts the crushing formula for successful negotiations seemed to emotional and moral burdens on the supreme involve, first, a lucidly clear conception of the commander himself. These ranged from objective sought and, second, unfailing cour- hardening his heart when reflecting on the tesy combined with inscrutable patience. 100,000 hospital beds scheduled to receive Pershing’s relations with his division com- casualties from the Meuse-Argonne offensive manders also provide subject matter of great to stiffening his resolve when flady refusing to interest. When the first fourteen commanders obey an order from Marshal Foch that would came over ahead of their troops to get a have handed the main American forces over to preview of the war by visits to the French and a French general while transferring Pershing to British fronts, he required each of them to write an unimportant quiet sector of the Front. One a report on how he planned to improve senses something of the general’s secret for divisional training back home in the light of his successful command in Vandiver’s account of experiences on the front. The character of the his ability to dismiss all worry on retiring at replies received helped him decide which of night and thus assure himself a refreshing sleep. these generals were suited to lead divisions into Above all, Pershing struggled against that battle. infectious disease, inflated ego, which threat- As long as Pershing believed a general was ens so many who achieve lofty rank. His helpable, he did what he could to further his formula, when beset by the adulation of abilities as a commander. Those who appeared cheering crowds, was to remind himself that beyond redemption he relieved, even when the honors were not really for him personally; they were lifelong friends and classmates. he was but a symbol for the debut of the United Sometimes his efforts at cultivating a better States as a world power. A real hero recognizes quality of generalship took bizarre forms. To that pride goeth before fall, as Pershing had one diligent but intellectually rigid command- occasion to remember when given a skittish er he gave a copy of Tolstoy’s War and Peace, horse to ride in the victory parade through the suggesting that it might “develop your imagi- streets of London and again when the “Persh- nation.” His faith in the value of reading history ing for President” boom quickly faded back was apparently substantial. His sarcastic home. dismissal of one failing commander was to Inevitably, Pershing’s career after 1919 was observe that “he has not yet gone as far as anticlimactic, but Vandiver’s treatment of his Caesar’s Commentaries in studying the history role as Chief of Staff is somewhat disappoint- of war.” For all his ruthlessness in removing ing. While the author asserts that the general failing commanders, when dealing with men wanted to accept the office to put across his who broke under the strain of combat, ideas for a “democratic army,” we are never Pershing showed remarkable sensitivity, tak- told just what he meant by this. Nor do we find ing great pains to protect their dignity. From any real assessment of how adequately he filled direct personal experience he knew that battle the office. Vandiver does bring out, however, consumes generals as well as frontline soldiers; Pershing’s most important, if seldom recog- after each major push, he would visit his nized, contribution to national defense long divisional commanders in their headquarters after retirement: in 1939 on the eve of World and scrutinize them closely for manifestations War II he urged Roosevelt to make George of crippling exhaustion, emotional let-down, Marshall Chief of Staff and later to retain him and the like. Even successful commanders in that office for the duration rather than place BOOKS AND IDEAS 79
him over the armies invading Europe, a field concern with Pershing the man; the cumulative command Marshall sorely wanted. “I know of impact of the many vignettes he has assembled no one at all comparable to replace him as is a real human being, very much alive and a far Chief of Staff.” (II, pp. 1093, 1095) The cry from the stick figure which emerges from captain who spoke up in defense of General Pershing’s own far less skillful published Siebert and the commander who accepted the autobiographical effort. This reviewer found rebuke were clearly both professional soldiers the two studies taken together a well-rounded who recognized quality when they saw it. portrait of a complex human being as well as Both these biographies under review merit significant contributions to the art of general- the attention of thoughtful professionals. ship. Smythe has so much to offer one can only hope Duke University he will soon publish the concluding volume of his biography. His treatment is quite different from Vandiver’s; the two authors complement Notes one another more than they compete. The 1. Genera] Sir Bernard Montgomery. History of Warfare (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Company. 1968), pp. 19-21. strength of Vandiver’s treatment lies in his 2 Smythe's book ends with the declaration of war in 1917.
Acknowledgment The photographs accompanying the article are used through the courtesy of the U.S. Army Military History Institute. To Take Offense is a significant contribution to DEBATING DETERRENCE a field that historically has attracted more than its share of polemics and diatribes. The author’s argument for a strategic nuclear Her ma n S. Wolk deterrent that does not rely on hair-trigger response and that can react to a variety of challenges would appear to appeal to a wide N the mid-1960s, Soviet leaders initiated a segment of the American public. Isubstantial buildup of strategic nuclear weapons. In February 1978, Secretary of His unemotional, tighdy reasoned analysis— Defense Harold Brown, in his annual defense written and published prior to the cancellation report to the House Armed Services Commit- of the B -l—argues that the strategic trend in tee, noted that a “standoff or stalemate” existed favor of the Soviet Union can be ultimately in the strategic nuclear balance between the checked by development, production, and United States and the Soviet Union.1 employment of a new manned bomber and air- Numerous essays, monographs, and books launched cruise missiles. The B-52, Hoeber have been published dealing with the subject emphasizes, was developed in the post-World of alleged strategic parity between these two War II period and cannot last beyond the superpowers. Western military analysts have 1980s, even if upgraded. The long-range expressed fear that, if the present trend strategic bomber is the only part of the Triad continues, the Soviet Union will eventually (bombers, land-based ICBMs, and missile- gain strategic superiority. Such a situation, they launching submarines) with a conventional contend, could be potentially disastrous for the capability. This ability to deliver conventional United States because it would give the Soviets weapons could conceivably abort conflict tremendous leverage in international political escalation in various confrontation situations. and military confrontations. Nuclear blackmail Also, the manned penetrating bomber could become a reality. possesses a counterforce ability—as opposed In early 1977, Georgetown University’s to countervalue targeting, which threatens the Center for Strategic and International Studies civilian population—and is recallable. The published Francis P. Hoeber’s monograph, threat of assured destruction (primarily de- Slow To Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise structionof enemy cities), according to Hoeber, Missiles, and Prudent D eterrence.f As a result “is not adequate to the deterrent needs of the of the cancellation of the B-l bomber, Hoeber’s country, since such an apocalyptic response monograph may appear obsolete, but such would be inappropriate in many cases.” (p. 11) happens not to be the case. Aside from the Thus, the quick reaction of ICBMs could be an possibility that at some time in the future a important disadvantage. The bomber has successor to the B-52 may yet materialize, this flexibility in limited strategic operations and in effort provides an excellent discussion of the conventional use and complicates enemy characteristics of the air-launched cruise planning for a surprise or pre-emptive attack. missile (ALCM) and the land-based intercon- The air-launched cruise missile, Hoeber tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Hoeb- notes, should not be considered a potential er’s competence and rationality prevail over substitute for the bomber. However, a strong the complexity of the issues he confronts. Slow ALCM research and development program
fRobert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, SALT II: Promise or Precipice? (M iam i, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976, $2.50), 45 pages, appendices.
80 BOOKS AND IDEAS 81
should be emphasized. He observes that power could eventually symbolize a shift in advanced bomber deployment and develop- strategic superiority to the U.S.S.R. This ment of the ALCM should go forward, circumstance might portend developments in unencumbered by a Strategic Arms Limitation international political and diplomatic affairs Talks (SALT) agreement “that is not verifiable highly unfavorable to the United States. with high confidence and does not insure The hard truth as seen by these authors is that equivalence.” (p. 121) the Soviet Union, rather than accepting The question of a potential SALT II strategic parity, is driving hard toward super- agreement is the subject of an important iority in strategic military power, an objective monograph by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and set by Russian leaders in the 1960s. They argue Jacquelyn K. Davis, SALT II: Pormise or that the United States requires a determined PrecipicePf The authors contend that the strategy to redress the balance and provide for Soviet’s deployment of heavy ICBMs (SS-17, effective American and Western security. SS-18, and SS-19) means that any SALT II About 25 years ago, the late, distinguished agreement must provide the United States with American military and strategic authority the ability to develop strategic programs Bernard Brodie wrote that in the decades necessary to prevent additional erosion of the ahead the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent American strategic position.2 Pfaltzgraff and would have to be the “constant monitor.” He Davis favor deployment of a supersonic meant that it must be refurbished and always bomber; equipping B-52s with cruise missiles, be the best. This is because it is the single air-launched ballistic missiles, or short-range capability that if allowed to seem to deteriorate attack missiles; and development and deploy- in relation to the Soviets’, the result could ment of an advanced missile such as MX. conceivably be catastrophic to the United Hoeber, Pfaltzgraff, Davis, and numerous States. other American and European defense experts Hoeber, Pfaltzgraff, and Davis have drawn and observers are gravely concerned over the the issues and sounded a cautionary signal, significant increase in the Soviet’s strategic warning of what they believe to be drift in nuclear capability—and also, it might be American strategic policy and programs. noted, in the vast increases in Soviet and Office of Air Force History Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Particular Headquarters USAF concern has focused on the Soviet’s SS-18, an ICBM with a throw-weight about six times as large as Minuteman III. The SS-18 poses a severe threat to the U.S. land-based missile Notes force. 1. New York Times, February 3, 1978. 2. For a useful, selective SALT bibliography, see Richard Dean Bums and The continued growth of Soviet strategic Susan Hoffman, The SALT Era: A Selected Bibliography (Los Angeles, California: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament. 1977), $2.50, nuclear forces in relation to U.S. strategic 43 pages.
tFrancis P. H oeber, Slow To Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Prudent Deterrence (Washington, D .C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977. $3.95), 136 pages, appendix, tables. IDEALS, INTERESTS, AND ARMS CONTROL
Mark N. Katz
HE only legitimate reason for a nation to domination. To pursue arms control as an ideal T pursue arms control measures is because divorced from political reality is to sacrifice its national security would thereby be en-one’s interests and security. If the United hanced. As a consequence, no nation can States, then, is to pursue arms control, those expect other nations to pursue arms control responsible for conducting our foreign policy measures unless their national security is must have a clear understanding of the political enhanced also. In order for arms control reality that such agreements are to operate in agreements to succeed, then, the interests of all and must be vigilant to ensure that American parties must be advanced. It would be folly for security is indeed enhanced. any nation to agree to an arms control measure The motivations for American foreign that would harm its security, and hence no policy, however, are mixed. While the U.S. government would knowingly sign an agree- consciously seeks to safeguard its security and ment against its own interests. Nor is it wise for economic interests abroad, only the most one state to try to deceive another by calling for cynical would deny that one of the primary arms control agreements but actually prepar- motivations for American foreign policy is ing for war; with satellites and other modern idealism. Especially in this century, Americans surveillance techniques, a state’s true intentions have repeatedly tried to change the nature of and capabilities cannot long be concealed. The world politics, and of the world itself, by nation attempting deception would quickly convincing the world of the justness of our find that its intended victim’s euphoric sense of values not only for ourselves but for all nations. security- would give rise to a deeper sense of Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations, Frank- insecurity than before the arms control agree- lin Roosevelt’s United Nations, and even ment was signed. The betrayed party would Jimmy Carter’s human rights campaign are soon build up arms, and further invitations for only a few examples of the hope of recasting arms control negotiations would only lead to the world in our own form. Three recent books increased distrust. continue this American ^tradition. One is a In short, arms control agreements will be Council on Foreign Relations 1980's Project successful only if they are based on mutual study entitled Controlling Future Arms Trade trust and serve to enhance the national security by Anne Cahn, Joseph Kruzel, Peter Dawkins, of all nations involved. Arms control, then, can and Jacques Huntzinger. Another is NPT: serve as a means to further national security. It Current Issues in Nuclear Proliferation, com- cannot, however, serve as an end goal of piled by Susan Ridgeway of the Center for the international politics. The nature of mankind is Study of Armament and Disarmament at such that a part of it will always seek California State University at Los Angeles. The domination over the rest. Pursuit of arms third is the Stockholm International Peace control as an end by one well-meaning nation Research Institute’s Weapons of Mass Destruc- will only encourage more aggressive nations to tion and the Environment, actually written by- use it as a means to greater power and even Arthur H. Westing, an American botanist.
82 BOOKS AND IDEAS 83
events in the Horn of Africa have shown that I n the section of Controlling the lack of U.S. assistance to Somalia did not Future Arms Traded written by Anne Cahn prevent massive Soviet arms shipments to and Joseph Kruzel, the outcome of continued Ethiopia. Colonel Dawkins proposed that heavy flows of conventional arms to the Third economic incentives be rearranged in the West World from the major powers is discussed. to diminish the desire to supply arms. He They see this trend eventually leading to believes that an ambitious NATO standardiza- widespread conflict that the U.S. would be tion program could absorb all the weapons that unable to control. Particularly ominous, they would otherwise be sold to the Third World. believe, is the transfer of new technologies This, however, does not take into account the such as precision-guided munitions (PGMs) tremendous economic dislocations that would and possibly even cruise missiles. The weapons result in Western European economies, the fact now being transferred are highly complex, and that the Soviets sell weapons for primarily supplier assistance is required to maintain them political and not economic reasons, and the in operating order. A Third World state basic desire of Third World nations to buy presumably would not undertake military arms. Jacques Huntzinger’s proposals for action that its supplier found objectionable. arms-import restraint by developing nations The withdraw^ of supplier assistance would themselves depend on the cooperation of all lead to an immediate and long-term decline in regional actors. Yet, in every region there is at military power, as occurred when Egypt and least one actor, feared by others, who refuses to Somalia split with the Soviet Union. New limit the acquisition of arms. technology weapons, however, are much Another proposal is to link security assist- simpler to operate, the authors believe. Third ance with economic assistance. A recipient World states could maintain them on their own. would receive more of the latter as a rew'ard for This might be an inducement to more aggres- accepting less of the former. However, it sive action. Further, a threat to cut off should be clear by now that there are relatively assistance by the supplier may not be as few governments in the Third World that are credible if resupply from another major power more concerned with their nation’s develop- of similar weapons was readily available and ment than with their own survival and strength. could be integrated more easily. While development funds are considered Cahn and Kruzel present a persuasive case desirable, arms are considered essential. The that increased arms shipments to the Third one solution that might be effective in control- World make undesirable conflict there much ling Third World conflict over the next more likely if only because these nations did generation or two—an agreement among the not previously have the means to fight more supplier nations to strictly control arms and create crises that the superpowers might transfers—is avoided because the authors unwillingly be drawn into. However, the consider a solution by the great powers solutions that they, along with Dawkins and imposed on smaller ones to be immoral. The Huntzinger, offer to avoid such conflict are reader is led to doubt the authors’ sincerity rather less than convincing. Cahn and Kruzel since they obviously would not support feel that unilateral American restraint would conventional arms control at the expense of induce other powers to act similarly. Yet recent Third Worid sovereignty.
JA n n e H essing Cahn, Josep h K ruzel, P eter D aw kins, and Jacq u es Huntzinger. Controlling Future Arms Trade (N ew York: M cG raw -H ill, 1977, 55.95), 210 pages. 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
None of the authors recognize that the of technical and legal approaches to halt the problem of arms transfers is only part of the spread of nuclear weapons. It should be much greater problem of growing conflict in apparent by now, though, that technical the Third World. For the U.S., the only major constraints hardly pose a barrier to any state politico-military competition for them is not determined to acquire nuclear weapons. The with the superpowers but with one another and knowledge required to construct an atomic with internal opposition. This is a fact that the bomb is becoming increasingly widespread, U.S. cannot change, but should American thanks primarily to Western publishers. The foreign policy-makers choose to ignore it, then restrictions that the International Atomic they must be charged with actually encourag- Energy Agency hopes to enforce can hardly ing the Soviet Union to become the major stop any nation determined to obtain the arbiter of Third World disputes. And if a halt in necessary material for a bomb. Indeed, if a U.S. security' assistance programs only serves nation is patient, it can take away small to encourage the more rapid development of quantities of plutonium waste from nuclear indigenous Third World arms industries, then power plants operating within its borders the U.S. may not be able to regain any of its without detection. While technical limitations influence among these nations at all and be might deter some states that are not really forced to live in a considerably more disor- interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, they dered world than we would like. are not an effective means of halting nuclear These are problems that have not been dealt proliferation. with at all in Controlling Future Arms Trade, Nor do legal limitations promise to halt for they have not yet even been recognized as nuclear proliferation. Even the Nonprolifera- problems. If the U.S. is to prevent growing tion Treaty (NPT) allows any signatory state to conflict in the Third World, though, American withdraw from its provisions by merely foreign policy must address the underlying declaring its intentions to do so only three political reasons for such conflict. Third World months in advance. Further, the treaty pro- conflict will not go away if we naively cut off vides for no sanctions against nations with- arms shipments in the hope that nations will not drawing from it either legally or illegally. The fight if they cannot have our weapons. The threat of not having nuclear energy plants sold entire problem requires much more thorough to a nonsignatory is hardly credible. Indeed, a study than has yet been given to it. nation determined to acquire nuclear weapons might possibly sign the treaty to give the impression of peaceful intentions in order to obtain greater access to nuclear material. Even N P T : Current Issues in Nuclear nations such as Brazil and Pakistan, which insist Proliferationf is not a monograph but a on not signing the NPT, have been successful in selected bibliography. Nevertheless, it is useful purchasing all manner of nuclear technology. to examine because the compiler, Susan The legal approach to nuclear nonprolifera- Ridgeway, has included works representing tion, then, can only give a false sense of security virtually every aspect covered by the growing to those who unwisely place their faith in literature on nuclear proliferation. Most strik- unenforceable utopian measures. ing in the bibliography are the extensive listings What the literature on nonproliferation has
tSusan R idgew ay, com piler, NPT: Current Issues in Nuclear Prolifera- tion (Los Angeles: California State University, 1977, $2.00), 57 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 85
not addressed at all are the political motiva- must do this also, unlike the multitude of tions for a nation to acquire nuclear weapons. technical and legal proposals that do not and as On reflection, it will he found that there are a result are completely unworkable. only two basic motivations: 1) a government fears that its national security will be endan- gered unless it obtains nuclear weapons, or 2) a government has aggressive desires that are so |.N Weapons of Mass Destruction ambitious that the possession of nuclear and the Environment,t Dr. Arthur Westing weapons is necessary to fulfill them. No other speculates on the damage that would occur to motivations can exist other than these two plant and animal life if nuclear, chemical, basically offensive and defensive political biological, geophysical, and other weapons ones. While technical or legal approaches to were used in forested and other wilderness nonproliferation may marginally affect them, areas. W hile the author makes a compelling they do not reach the heart of nations’ case that the damage would be overwhelming, concerns, which are political. he does not address the obvious question of Nevertheless, a world with even more how likely a nation taking part in nuclear war nuclear powers than exist now would not be in would be to target an opponent’s forests. It America’s interests, especially if an irrational would appear that if two nations were ever so government could launch a nuclear war that enraged by each other as to risk their own the U.S. might be drawn into. But to prevent destruction through engaging in nuclear war, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the U.S. more valuable targets such as population, must direct its foreign policy to the political industry, and military installations would be motivations of those nations likely to acquire destroyed first. Dr. Westing implies that the them. To prevent the acquisition of such most important burdens of a future major war weapons by nations that fear their security or would fall on plants and animals, and hence even surv ival might be at risk without them, the weapons of mass destruction should be U.S. could guarantee the defense of such banned. His lack of attention to the human nations from attack. For those nations with costs seems strange. aggressive designs on others, the U.S. could Dr.' Westing believes that the more nuclear make clear to them that any nuclear attack they and other highly destructive weapons that the might launch on anyone would be considered superpowers possess, the more likely it is that as sufficient grounds for the U.S. to retaliate in they will be used in war. Hence, the best means kind. These are strong proposals—ones which of preventing a major war would be to are not to be found in the writings on eliminate nuclear weapons. This sort of nonproliferation listed in this bibliography. proposal to end war, which has been advanced V\ hile they may not be the best ones possible by many others also, deserves critical examina- and would require the exercise of will in U.S. tion. The absence of nuclear weapons did not foreign policy that has been noticeably lacking prevent such highly destructive wars as the recently, they do at least address the basic Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic wars, the political causes of the nuclear proliferation American Civil War, World War I, and World problem. Any solution that is to be effective W'ar II, to mention but a few. Since 1945,
fSto ckh o lm International P eace R esearch Institute, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment (N ew York: Crane, Russak, & C o., 1977, $12.95), 95 pages. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
however, no major war has occurred. Nuclear that even aggressive nations would willingly weapons have been in existence for only a short avoid it. Nuclear weapons, it cannot be denied, period historically, so one cannot say defini- have instilled this fear of war to an intense tively that they have deterred a major war. But degree and thus have served a useful purpose what would the world be like if there were no in preventing the all-out war that they have the nuclear weapons? Without them, the two potential to unleash. superpowers could not threaten each other, or All three of these works seek to point out anyone else, with total and immediate destruc- potential dangers to the interests of American tion in return for undertaking unacceptable foreign policy that will occur unless something aggressive actions. If the U.S. could not is done to eliminate them. Yet the solutions they threaten the Soviet Union in such a manner, all propose are highly idealistic, the authors how could we hope to prevent aggressive displaying both insensitivity to their effect on actions on their part? In fact, such actions could American interests and ignorance of their not be prevented as easily and would probably inappropriateness to the political reality that have to be stopped through a massive commit- exists in the world. The problems posed by the ment of men and materiel such as was transfer of conventional weapons, the prolifer- necessary to halt a much smaller Germany in ation of nuclear weapons states, and the two world wars. Without nuclear weapons, the growth of the nuclear arsenals that already ability to prevent a major war is greatly exist will not be solved through naive proposals reduced, and, if such a war were to come calling for the halt in transferring or the about, the destruction to population, industry, elimination of such weapons. The conflicting military installations, and even forests would goals that exist among nations will doom the very likely be greater than through nuclear idealistic pursuit of such solutions to failure. war. The problems these weapons pose is an outgrowth of this conflict in international relations, which has proved to be insoluble. O nce again, a proposal has been made to Only through the recognition that this basic enhance peace that does not address the basic conflict is a permanent factor in international political problems it hopes to solve. Nuclear relations can arms control negotiations hope to weapons are to be eliminated in order to orchestrate the mutuality of fear that exists into prevent war. But nuclear weapons are a means agreements mitigating some of the common of conducting war and not the cause of it. dangers that various weapons present. It is a Eliminating them will not alter the political fact curious phenomenon that Americans continue that nations have conflicting goals for which to advance highly idealistic and woefully they would prefer to go to war rather than unrealistic solutions to the world’s problems meekly allow other nations what they desire in when the pursuit of such solutions in American order to avoid violence. To eliminate war the foreign policy has repeatedly resulted both in basic causes of conflict among nations must be failure to achieve our ideals and in harm done eliminated. Historically, this has proved im- to our interests. The history' of this century has possible, and wars continue. But if the causes of shown that only through a foreign policy that war cannot be eliminated, the best means of advances American interests can we hope to decreasing their likelihood is to instill such a transform some of our ideals, such as the tremendous fear of the consequences of war control of arms, into reality. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Inspector General, which they hope to see enacted. POTPOURRI In a word, they want to see honor restored to the officer corps. Because o f its unrelenting criticism o f the A rm y officer corps, this work of Gabriel and Savage will be dism issed as m ere carp and cavil by a few soi- disant defenders of the Army. And that is too bad Crisis in Com m and: M ismanagement in the Army because this book deserves a wide audience and a by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage. New fair hearing. Soldiers and scholars alike will find York: Hill and W ang, 1978, 242 pages, $10.00. Crisis in Command a provocative and seminal book.
Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage are form er U.S. Dr. James H. Toner Army officers who now teach political science at Department of History and Government Saint Anselm's College in New Hampshire. Their Norwich University book, Crisis in Command, is a searing, iconoclastic appraisal of the Army during and after the Vietnam W ar. They regard the United States Arm y in Vietnam as having bordered on “an undisciplined, D ecent Interval by Frank Snepp. New York: ineffective, alm ost anom ic mass of individuals who Random House, 1977, 590 pages, $14.95. collectively had no goals and w ho, individually, sought only to survive the length o f their tours.” It is never easy to look defeat in the eye, adm it They contend that the Army failed to maintain unit failure, and learn from the exp erience. In Decent cohesion, and they cite as evid ence of that atrophied Interval Frank Snepp provides a painfully detailed condition a high rate of drug use among troops, account of the fin d tortured w eeks of the Saigon attem pts to assassinate officers, com bat refusals, regim e as it collapsed w hile W ashington lay and skyrocketing desertion rates. paralyzed by W atergate. Having lived the expe- W hat will delight som e and enrage others, rience as chief CIA strategy analyst in Saigon, Snepp how ever, is that G abriel and Savage indict the describes both the failings of South V ietnam ese officer corps for the Arm y’s enervation. They argue leadership and, of m ore im m ediate con cern to us, that too few officers shared com bat risks with their the interaction betw een the deteriorating m ilitary troops and that too many officers refused to protest situation and the residual A m erican presence in certain stupid, dangerous, or unethical m ilitary South Vietnam . practices. Principally, because the Army officer The distended United States Embassy in Saigon corps is suffused with an “entrepreneurial disposi- was the um bilical cord that sustained South V ietnam tion” or w ith m anagerial behavior that m ay be and passed vital information concerning the course “pathological to the m ilitary system ," they conclu d e of events there back to U.S. decision-m akers. Under that “there is no form al code of m oral behavior the sternly anti-Com m unist leadership of Am bassa- which defines acceptable behavior for a mem ber of dor Graham Martin, State Departm ent, Departm ent the officer corps”; thus, the officer corps is “unsure of D efense, and C entral Intelligence Agency staffs of itself and its standards of conduct, unable to (both in Saigon and at isolated consular posts) enforce basic discipline, overm anaged with super- labored to respond to the im pending disaster. The fluous staff, and held in contem pt by their troops.” stirring successes and glaring failures of the Clearly, there are problem s with the book. It is at individuals and groups who m ade up this U.S. times simply too polem ical; at other times it is presence form the heart of this book. needlessly repetitive. G abriel and Savage are not It cuts across the warp and w oof of bureaucratic entirely clear about the relationship betw een society responses. Snepp describes CIA grow th in Vietnam and the military, although they appear to subscribe from gross inadequacy in the early years of U.S. to Sam uel H untington’s view s. Essentially, they involvement to the opposite extrem e with some m aintain that the A m erican m ilitary m ust develop agents on the scen e skillfully con cealed from pu blic an officer corps "w hose standards of honor, duty, view in their bright red Ford Pintos. He describes and responsibility transcend, but do not threaten, the flow of misinformation designed to make Saigon the social values of the larger social order.” seem m ore worthy of aid. He cites the am bassador’s T h e authors contend that the Arm y m ust undergo refusal to start contingency planning for the a moral renaissance" but that it cannot reform itself. evacuation in order to avoid panic and for the U.S. Accordingly, they make some recom m endations— D efense Attach^ O ffice’s seizure o f the initiative at principally, an officer’s code and a revam ped the eleventh hour.
87 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
The crescendo of the narrative is in the evacua- rather, it was “to observe an unknown young man at tion. Concern was less for the Americans; they one moment in history, and to examine the forces would either make it out or risk internment until the that led him to act as he did.” end o f hostilities, w hich was all too im m inent. T h e Gill expends considerable effort to correct what life and death issue was the fate of the thousands of he perceives to be mistaken public impressions of Vietnamese who had helped the Americans and, by Lindbergh; even fifty years after the event itself, it their com m itm ent to us, signed their death warrants seems that Lindbergh’s passion for self-fulfillment in the eyes of the Com m unists. H ere, with the heroic and his private personal nature are still m isunder- exception of a few individuals, the American record stood by those who adm ired him so intensely. A was deplorable. Most of the Vietnam ese who had considerable portion of the book, for exam ple, is worked for the U.S. were left behind, and, in the devoted to Lindbergh’s acrimonious relationship evacuation panic within the CIA station, records with the press. “Not only would reporters favor a w ere left intact that identified many of them. good story over an accurate one,” the author writes, Frank Snepp wrote Decent Interval as an “after- “their idea of a good story often prom pted them to action report,” but the CIA refused to let him invent a new Lindbergh, different from one day to undertake it in an official capacity. He, thus, the next. . . .” Though he was hounded throughout published it without permission and was sued by the his life by the press and for a tim e chose to leave the Justice Departm ent for breach of contract and country because of it, Lindbergh’s approach to violation of trust. publicity was far from naive. W hile he opposed Despite the controversy about its publication, the personal aggrandizement of any kind, Lindbergh fact rem ains that, once the reader gets past the slight w elcom ed publicity for the causes he chose to aroma of sour grapes, Decent Interval is a valuable champion. study of a bureaucracy’s response to an unanticipat- Gill draws extensively on Lindbergh’s own ed emergency. w ritings and relies heavily in m any sections on a Lieutenant Colonel John J. Kohout III, USAF copious exchange of letters between Lindbergh and Strategy Division his m other. In doing so Gill illum inates an aspect of DCS Operations. Plans and Readiness Lindbergh’s character that few other authors, Hq USAF including Davis, M osley, Van Em ery, and Tracy, seem to have seen. Though he sought public attention for aviation and a number of other causes, Lindbergh remained an intensely private man, Lindbergh Alone by Brendan Gill. New York: portrayed by Gill as a classic loner. In his moments Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, 216 pages, alone, the aging aviator, who was once the best $11.95. known and most admired person alive, would write “It is a paradox,” writes Brendan Gill, “character- alm ost continuously and nearly all of it about istic of great men that the nearer we com e to them himself. the more mysterious they seem to be." Though the Charles Lindbergh’s three autobiographies reveal mystery of Charles A. Lindbergh was not of his own little about his inner self; though they are well making, the man who found himself at the center of w ritten, they are strangely superficial and evasive in American controversy and adulation for nearly fifty nature. His diaries, journals, and letters, how ever, years is as m uch an enigm a as ever. are another matter. And it is Brendan Gill who, for Gill, however, has done as much as any author perhaps the first tim e, allows the aviation enthusiast since Lindhergh’s transatlantic achievement to and Lindbergh-adm irer to examine the boy-hero's make the man seem a bit more lucid and real. In a character and personality through his own writings. delightful narrative of few m ore than 200 pages, Gill Gill himself admits, though, that there is much that provides his reader with an intim ate glim pse at the rem ains unclear about the man who was first to fly man whose energy and accom plishm ent have been the Atlantic alone. And until the million or so pieces the m arvel of the w estern w orld for m ore than half a of Lindbergh’s personal memorabilia are carefully century. exam ined and catalogued at Yale’s Sterling Library In a very readable prose style reminiscent of his and a half dozen other places, no definitive New Yorker journalism , Gill reveals a substantial biography can be written. amount about a man who chose to reveal so little What Gill has produced for the aviation historian about him self. It was not the author’s intention to as well as for the laym an who thrives on twentieth- write another biography of Charles Lindbergh— century nostalgia is a minor literary masterpiece. better than half a dozen of those already exist— H e blends a m arvelous w orking know ledge of Charles A. Lindbergh (left) was sworn in as brigadier general. United States Air Force Reserve, by Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott, at the Pentagon on 7 April 1954. 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
Lindbergh’s writings and achievements with more more than seven decades. The book is not an than seven dozen photographs— many of them autobiography in the chronological sense; rather it previously unpublished— into a handsom e collec- records Lindbergh’s philosophical responses, his tor's volum e. W hile it is neither exhau stive nor “values,” as aviator, scientist, adviser to enterprise definitive in biographical terms. Lindbergh Alone is and government, soldier, conservationist, and unquestionably the finest addition to a growing writer. Much of it is fascinating, as were the mind body of Lindbergh literature in recent years. and range of the man, but it is an exceptional book of this length that delights from beginning to end; here Captain James S. O'Rourke, USAF Department of English each reader or skimmer can be his own anthologist, United States Air Force Academy for there is surely a plenty for all interests and tastes of those who adm ired the great man. Charles A. Lindbergh: An American Life is in effect both a symposium proceedings and an academic-type festschrift (i.e., a collection of learned articles in honor of an esteemed colleague); Autobiography of Values by Charles A. Lindbergh, the book commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of edited by William Jovanovich and Judith A. the transatlantic flight, as presented at the National Schiff. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Air and Space Museum (NASM ) on 20 May 1977, 1978, 423 pages, $12.95. and it celebrates the achievements of the flyer in Charles A. Lindbergh: An American Life edited by informed, documented essays. Typical of the Tom D. Crouch. W ashington, D .C .: N ational Air festschrift, it also presents a selected 15-page and Space Museum, 1977, 119 pages, $7.95 bibliography, including four tight pages of the hardback, $2.95 paperback. “selected” writings of Lindbergh himself. If it all sounds rather form idable, it is not in the U ndoubtedly, Brendan Gill's is Lindbergh Alone least. Indeed, it is a slight book of only 120 pages, the most attractive and probably the best written of many of which are devoted to photographs of that spate of books precipitated by the fiftieth Lindbergh covering perhaps 60 years of his life and anniversary of Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight. wide-ranging activities; Lindbergh must have been Indeed, Lindbergh Alone is h an d so m e enough in the most photographed man of his time, and the layout and design— if not in bulk and gloss— to serve selection here is good if not always as fully as a coffee-table book. However, two others from captioned as one could w'ish. The essays are well that anniversary flow of books deserve at least presented and predictably laudatory; several of the passing attention. writers (notably John Grierson, Richard Hallion, As Gill makes clear, Lindbergh for all his and W ayne S. Cole) reflect a personal working insistence on privacy was almost constantly writing, relationship with Lindbergh him self, as do the of himself and of his enthusiasms. Nearly to the day feeling introductory comments of NASM Director of his death he was turning out reams of manuscript, M ichael Collins. the bulk of which is attested to in part by the Probably the book contains as much as one would voluminous Lindbergh archive at the Sterling care to absorb through a one-day sitting, but, Memorial Library, Yale University (“over six typically, it gives only a fractional image of the man hundred linear feet of letters, business papers, himself. If one would see Lindbergh at his best— family records, photographs, etc.”). Autobiography certainly at his writing b est— it is still necessary to is a gathering from that vast lode but of Values return to his Pulitzer Prize-w inning autobiography derives principally from the m ore than tw o of 1954, The Spirit of St. Louis. thousand pages of manuscript that Lindbergh J.H.M. turned over to his publisher-editor William Jovano- vich during the last month of his life, just before he returned to his hom e in M aui, H aw aii, to die in late August 1974. Jovanovich and his coeditor, Judith A. Schiff, have done quite a w orkm anlike job with the burden The United States since 1945: The Ordeal of Power they accepted and compressed that mass into a 400- by Dewey W. Grantham. New York: McGraw- page tom e. O ne likes to think that, had he lived to Hill, 1976, 298 pages, $6.95. complete the task himself, Lindbergh would have com pressed still m ore and inflicted greater order on In his survey of recent United States history, The these wide-ranging musings on a multifaceted life of United States since 1945: The Ordeal o f Power. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91
Dewey Grantham writes that “the United States had Lauren Elder’s nightmare experience of pain, entered a new and radically different stage in its horror, fear, and excitem ent is vividly depicted by historical developm ent.” The author then proceeds, Miss Elder herself and Shirley Streshinsky. Although essentially in outline form , to organize and interpret the reader knows the fate of the three Cessna the years since 1945, the goal of which is to give the passengers from the outset, the story of the plane reader a “better understanding of history.” crash on a peak of the H igh Sierra is told w ith a N otw ithstanding the fact that any survey book is spellbinding flair. just that—a survey—the author does manage to T he tw o-day adventure contains suspenseful cover the m ajor political, econom ic, diplom atic, rising action, dram atic crisis, and a gradual lull as social, and cultural events of the era. D om estic facts are explained in the falling action. The style is politics, such as cam paigns and elections, is w ell as crisp and clear as the cold, sharp air of the High covered as are other m ajor internal events. Dr. Sierra. T h e tone is excitem ent: “. . . carefully, M artin Luther King, Jr., and the entire civil-rights slow ly, [I] low ered m yself over the edge. I slam m ed movement are treated with clarity, accuracy, and my boot toe through the ice and felt a surge of perception. The Kennedy years, especially the excitement as it held.” The language fluctuates with assassination, are handled w ith dignity and com pas- the tone to build a feeling of detachm ent and yet a sion. Johnson and the antiw ar m ovem ent as w ell as strange cam araderie with the heroine of the drama: Nixon and W atergate are experdy treated. “T h e gash was deep. Layers of flesh parted, neatly, Regretfully, valuable bits of inform ation that to reveal the unm istakable glistening whiteness of might spark a student’s interest are left out, as is bone and gristle. My bone. My gristle.” The tension usual in a survey. One exam ple, Grantham accurate- is eased at cru cial p oin ts b y c o m ic re lief: ” . . . a gust ly discusses G eorge F. Kennan's containm ent o f c o l d a ir b l e w u p u n d e r m ,y s k ir t . . . c h i ll in g m y doctrine of the Cold War era. The famous long bare behind. . . . What if somebody across the way cable and his anonymous article in Foreign Affairs has binoculars and is wondering what this silly are m entioned, but the reader is never told that woman is doing crawling bare-assed down the face Kennan used a pseudonym or that in later years he of one of the highest mountains in the West?" rejected this position. The book will provide enjoyable reading if O ther, m ore significant m aterial w as om itted accepted at face value as a real-life adventure. The from this survey, also. W ith the exception of Air Force reader may be disappointed if he expects Vietnam, there is very limited coverage of U.S. details of the rescue efforts by the Fed eral Aviation involvem ent w ith the Third W orld. In Latin Administration or Air Force Rescue Coordination A m erica the C uban m issile crisis, the Panam a riots, Center or data about the plane, its flight, or flight and the Dom inican fracas of the 1960s are highlight- path. Although the survivor has som e flying ed, but our relations w ith other nations including know ledge, she is not a pilot and does not tell her Brazil and M exico are disregarded. Africa fares even story from a pilot’s point of view . Rather, focus is worse. W hile A m erican involvem ent w ith A frica has placed on the survival actions of Lauren Elder been somewhat limited, Grantham chooses to through the long freezing night and her thoughts and ignore our grow ing com m itm ent. Surely our actions during the descent from the 12,360-foot relations with the em erging nations are w orthy o f a m ountain crest. few pages. Lauren Elder’s rudimentary survival knowledge One final objection must be made and that is with saved her life because she had the will to survive. the paucity of m aps in the book. In essence, this Tw o facts are em phasized: the will to survive is of volum e of the trilogy called the M odem A m erican param ount im portance in any fight for existence; Series is an ad equate but not particularly inspiring and w hatever survival and first-aid skills one survey text that requires supplem ental materials. possesses should b e refreshed occasionally.
Dr. Robert H. Terry Roberta Chambers Associate Professor of Air University Review International Relations York College of Pennsylvania
Aspects of Sino-Am erican Relations since 1784 And I Alone Survived by Lauren Elder with Shirley edited by Thom as H. Etzold. New York: New iStreshinsky. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1978, xi + Viewpoints, 1978, 173 pages, $10.00 hardback, 0188 pages, 57.95. $5.95 paper. 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
China’s acceptance of full diplomatic relations entrepreneur (his Law rence Sperry Aircraft Com - with the United States on 1 January 1979 certainly pany “spun o ff' from his father’s company in 1917), marks the beginning of something new. J ust what, and pilot. Among Lawrence Sperry’s patents, some one cannot say, but this book contributes much to of which are shown in the 50+ pages of appendices general understanding of our past relations. of the book, are the first bank-and-turn indicator, Dr. Thomas Etzold, Professor of Naval Strategy autom atic pilot, pack parachute, and retractable at the Naval War College, has here edited six landing gear. During W orld W ar I, Law rence scholarly essays on aspects of Sino-U .S. relations, Sperry w orked extensively on and patented a each of which can be read usefully, separate from weapon then called an “aerial torpedo.” Today, we the others. T h e initial essay on nineteenth-century would call it a cruise missile. contacts suggests that A m ericans then “overideal- Author W illiam D avenport has written a well- ized and overcriticized C hina,” an observation researched, insightful, personal biography of Law- equally apt for today. A second chapter, “Almost rence Sperry. The book is necessarily m ore anecdot- U nw elcom e Im m igrants,” traces the unconsciona- al than exhaustive because of its brevity and pos- ble discrimination against Chinese immigrants from sibly also because of the relative dearth of detailed exploitation to enclosure in urban ghettoes, the inform ation available in the 1970s about a successor response to institutionalization of racism man who died at age 30 in 1923. Nevertheless, the in the plantation and the reservation. book is absorbing and extremely readable. It is also How the U.S. reacted to earlier and fundamental rem arkably free of technical errors. Furtherm ore, shifts in p ow er in E ast Asia is treated in chap ters on Davenport has succeeded in bringing to life the the Open Door and Sino-Japanese-U.S. relations at personalities of Law rence Sperry, his parents, his the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, a study of sister and tw o brothers, his w ife, and som e of his limited com m itm ent and uncertain policy. close associates. Law rence Sperry was a contem po- Asserting that the Korean W ar “led to an American rary of and knew Eddie Rickenbacker, Billy military stance that was at once unexpected, M itchell, and Jim m y D oolittle, w ho w rote the unintended, and unwanted,” Professor Etzold’s Forew ord to the book. T h e tw enty pages of chapter on U.S. strategy 1948-1951 concludes that photographs add to an already expertly developed U.S. actions during these three years did, in fact, sense of the period in which the events described in increase the liability of the U .S. in Asia for the the book occurred. ensuing three decades. The final chapter is an T h e book’s one defect is that it tends to leave the incisive and insightful analysis o f U .S.-C h in ese reader hanging. It stops rather abruptly with relations over the past sixty years, a period marked Lawrence Sperry’s funeral and some of the tributes by “self-absorption" on the Chinese side and “fear- published at the time. Sperry was survived by both filled confusion and ignorance” on the American his parents, his sister and two brothers, and by his side. wife and two children—all of whom had become Recommended reading. real persons to the reader. This review er would have appreciated an epilogue giving a little more Dr. James H. Buck Air War College inform ation about these relatives than their death Maxwell Air Force Base dates. Lieutenant Colonel M. Bruce King, USAF Air War College Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Gyro! The Life and Tim es of Law rence Sperry by W illiam W yatt D avenport. N ew York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978, xi + 282 pages, index + Tanks and Other Tracked Vehicles in Service by appendices, $12.95. B. T . W hite with illustrations by John W. W ood. London: Blandford Press, 1978, 155 pages, $8.95. Lawrence Burst Sperry, who was sometimes called “G yro” (particularly by Glenn Curtiss), is o f- Tanks and Other Tracked Vehicles in Service ten confused in the public mind with his also-f amous provides a less expensive substitute for Jane’s father, Elm er A m brose Sperry, founder of the Weapon Systems and Brassey’s Artillery of the Sperry Gyroscope Com pany, But Law rence Sperry World. It is a survey of “the more important or made significant contributions to the early develop- interesting military tracked vehicles today’ and lists ment of aviation in his own right—as an inventor, equipm ent by country and type: main battle tanks, BOOKS AND IDEAS 93
light tanks, armored personnel carriers, self- The George C. Marshall Research Foundation, propelled guns (both field and air defense artillery-), headquartered at Virginia Military Institute, has and combat support vehicles. recently ventured into publishing. Through its The author presents an account of what he library, museum, student/scholar aid, and now the considers to be current trends in tank armament, publication of books, this foundation at Marshall’s mobility, and armor protection. This introduction is alma mater serves to perpetuate interest in the man followed with colored drawings of each piece of and his era. Evolution of the American Military equipment and a single page, double column Establishment since World War II is its first account of the history, operation, and description of publication. This short volume results from a the significant characteristics for each item. There conference held at the Marshall Foundation in 1977, are three appendices: the first gives a “few cross- to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the National sectional drawings of modem tracked fighting Security Act. vehicles”; the second, a brief description of the latest Editor Paul R. Schratz has capably organized this camouflage colors and tactical markings in use; and volume to provide either a memoir or an analysis for last, tabulated data on a majority of the vehicles in each element of the military establishment. With its the book, including their weight, length, height, superb prologue by Dr. Schratz and a provocative armament, engine type, horsepower, speed on road epilogue by the conference chairman, General and in water, range, and crew size. Andrew J. Goodpaster, the book is complete and The principal shortcoming of the book is that the lends itself to use in military staff and war colleges. author gives physical descriptions of the vehicles In his prologue, Dr. Schratz urges the reader to rather than those characteristics that directly affect examine the thought and experience of the past .30 their combat capabilities. For example, the gun sizes years on the basis of today’s needs. Only then, he for the main battle tanks are given but not their argues, can good history be useful. range, muzzle velocity, or ammunition types. As to some of the details, G eneral M ax well Taylor Although the tabulated data compensate somewhat reflects on the entire defense scene while General for the superficial descriptions in the text, this Lauris Norstad interprets the National Security Act. information is provided only for selected vehicles. Taylor’s comments on the Joint Chiefs under Consequendy, the information given on some Charles W’ilson are fun to read. It appears that the important items, such as the Roland missile system chiefs pined away during the Eisenhower era, (which will be the principal short-range missile longing for some of that Forrestal or Marshall system in France, Germany, and the U.S.), is decisiveness. Comparing Wilson’s lack of confi- incomplete. The cross-sectional drawings are of dence with McNamara’s assertiveness is part of the little value because there are only seven of them and wit in Taylor’s “Reflections.” because the main battle tanks selected (the M48 and General Norstad reminisces about the National the T54A) are obsolete. Security Act and the incessant staffing of papers and The colored drawings are excellent. Also, this positions that took place during the battles over the book is one of few that includes anything on the unification issue. But Norstad is at his best describ- important recovery and combat support vehicles. ing relations with the Europeans while he headed Its main selling point, however, is the cost, which is NATO, particularly one day when he convinced 25 to 33 percent that of its competitors. Tanks and Harold Macmillan to change Her Majesty’s Other Tracked Vehicles would be a useful addition "defence-cuts” plans over a platter of Dover sole to any line officer's library, but its limitations may and Colchester oysters. Norstad credits much to the necessitate frequent trips to the library to consult strength and wisdom of the frustrated and troubled Jane’s or Brassey's. Forrestal. Major E. Paul Semmens, USA Dr. Rudolph Winnacker examines evolution in the Department of History role of the Secretary of Defense, while the historical United States Air Force Academy growth of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines is effectively presented by Dr. Robert W. Coakley, Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, Herman S. Wolk, and Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons. In his article on the Army, Dr. Coakley aptly Evolution of the American Military Establishment describes the full circle taken from preparing for a since World War II edited by Paul R. Schratz. European war to fighting localized insurgencies and Lexington, Virginia: George C. Marshall Research back to the European scenario. From the triangular Foundation, 1978, 125 pages, $4.00. to the pentomic to the Reorganized Army Division 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
(ROAD),* the web of Army doctrine is traced, and Curtis LeMay, and closes with chauvinistic referen- flexible response provides the beam to which the ces to air power as the decisive phalanx of war. web clings. Dr. Robert J. Watson also deals with the Joint Admiral Hooper fairly discusses the Navy in a Chiefs of Staff while Paul H. Nitze considers the period when trauma was the order of the day and roles of the past seven presidents. urges us to examine our bureaucratic structures and General Goodpaster concludes the volume opti- other sacred cows carefully. mistically with an eye toward a second thirty years, Mr. Wolk considers the golden age of the Strategic which may hold even greater opportunity and Air Command (SAC) and the extraordinarily promise than the first. I can recommend this book as successful marriage of the Air Force to technology. a commemorative yet functional addition to the Wolk reserves a few kind words for General Thomas reading lists at the staff and war colleges as well as to D. White, saving a few less-kind ones for General the libraries of all students of the U.S. military.
*To give more artillery support and hence more conventional staying Major Theodore M. Kluz, USAF power. Air University Review
“We obviously, constandy assess the quality of our own nuclear weapon systems as times change, as technological advances are made, and as a change takes place in the Soviet Union’s arsenal. W’e keep our weapons up to date; we improve our communications and command and information systems, but we will maintain, basically, a deterrent policy rather than to change the policy itself.”
President Jimmy Carter 30 November 1978 the contributors
and Director of the Debate Council and Forum at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York His service has been with reconnaissance, tank, and rifle battalions in Germany. Korea, and Vietnnm. He has been an assistant professor of Middle Eastern Studies. West Point; Visiting Academy Profes- sor to the National War College; Instructor, International Law and History of Modem Europe and America; and Associate Professor and teacher. National Security Seminar, 1970- 74,1978-77 Colonel Taylor is the author or co- author of many publications and policy papers.
Major Felix F. Moran HI (B.S., Washington State University; M.A., California State University, Sacramento) was an instructor pilot for C-5s at Dover AFB, Delaware, prior to his present assignment at Air Command and Staff College as a student Most of his Air Donald M. Snow (B.A., M.A., University of Force career has been in flying C-14ls. with Colorado; Ph.D., Indiana University) is assignments at Laredo AFB, Texas, for pilot Associate Professor of Political Science and training, Robins AFB. Georgia, Norton AFB, Director of International Studies, University California, and in Thailand; he also served of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. Dr. Snow is the with Security Police at Griffiss AFB. New author of The Shadow of the Mushroom- York. Major Moran is a graduate of Squadron Shaped Cloud: Basic Ideas and Problems of Officer School. Nuclear Deterrence and Introduction to Came Theory, both published by the Consor- tium for International Studies Education.
Lieutenant Colonel John J. Kohout III (USAFA; Diplome de l'lnstjtut, Institut d £tildes Pohtiques, Paris), prior to his recent assignment to Hq USAF, was USAF Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. He was Chief, Mission Development Branch, 42d Bomb Wing, Loring AFB, Maine, and has flown B-52s, C- Jill E. Heuer (B.A., M.A., Northwestern and EC-47s, and T-29s. Selected an Olmsted University) is an analyst in the Foreign Scholar in 1965, he subsequently served at Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Clark AB. Philippines, and Tan Son Nhut AB, Force Base. Ohio, where she previously Republic of Vietnam. Colonel Kohout taught served as a translator of Russian. She is at the USAF Academy, serving as chairman of currently completing a major study on Soviet French courses and executive officer of the manpower to be published this year. She has Department of Foreign Languages and liaison studied and traveled in the Soviet Union with Colonel William J. Taylor, Jr., USA, (B.A., officer at the French Air Force Academy. He the Foreign Study League and formerly, University of Maryland; M.A., Ph.D., Ameri- is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff worked with the Central Intelligence Agency. can University) is Professor of Social Sciences College. Washington, D.C.
95 Herman S. Wolk (M.A., American Interna- tional College) is Chief, Ceneral Histories Branch, Office of Air Force History, Head- quarters USAF. Formerly a historian at Headquarters Strategic Air Command, in 1974-75 he was a member of the Office of the Secretary' of Defense Special Project on the History of the Strategic Arms Competition. Major Ceneral Irving B. Holley, Jr., USAFR. He has published many articles and essays on (Ph.D., Yale University) has taught in the military history and is a contributing author to Duke University Department of History since Evolution of the American Military Establish- 1947 He is a visiting professor at the National ment since World War II (Ceorge C. Marshall Defense University, and serves as mobiliza- Research Foundation) Mr. Wolk is a Fellow tion assistant to the Commander, Air U niversi- of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed ty (ATC). After serving in the Army Air Forces and Society. Forces during World War U, he taught for two years at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He has also been Visiting Professor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy, 1974-75. Professor Holley is a Mark N. Katz (M.A., Johns Hopkins Universi- member of the advisory boards of Aerospace ty School of Advanced International Studies) Historian, South Atlantic Quarterly, and Air is a graduate fellow in defense policy and arms University Review; a trustee of the American control at the Massachusetts Institute of Military Institute; a member of the NASA Technology. He has held positions with the advisory committee on history; and chairman Department of State, the Arms Control of the advisory committee on history to the Association, and, most recently, the Depart- Secretary of the Air Force. His published ment of theTreasury. His article “How Should works include Ideas and Weapons, a study of the U.S. Respond to the Spread of Soviet doctrine, and Buying Aircraft: Air Materiel Influence in the Third World?” appeared in Procurement for the Army Air Forces. Air Force Magazine (August 1978).
The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Who Are Those Guys?” by Donald L. Clark, Assistant to the President and a lecturer in political science at Montana State University, Bozeman, as the outstanding article in the May-June 1979 issue of the Review. editorial staff advisers
L ie u t e n a n t Colonel D avid R. M et s. I 'S A F C olonel Robert J O 'B rien. J r . Editor Hq Aerospace Defense Command M ajorT heodore M. Kia z . I ' S A F M ajor G en er a l J ohn W. H uston, Chief .Associate Editor Office of Air Force History J ack H M ooney C olonel Ric h a r d K K in g Managing Editor Hq Air Force Systems Command J ohn A. VVest c o t t L ie u t e n a n t C olonel David J. S hea .Art Director and Provluction Manager Hq Air Training Command E nrioce G aston D r . K en n et h J. G roves .Associate Editor. Hq Air University ,ATC) Spanish Language Edition L ie u t e n ant C olonel Louis A. T orraca, J r . L la Mid o si M.av Patterson Hq Military Airlift Command .Associate Editor F rancis W. Jennings Portuguese Language Editum Air Force Service Information 0 .W in Center W il l ia m J D e P aul a C olonel D avid O. Schillerstrom Art Editor and Illustrator Hq Strategic Air Command RUDOLPH W M organ L ie u t e n ant C olonel Stephen B H in d e r l it e r hnatuial and Administrative Manager Hq Tactical Air Command L ie u t e n a n t C olonel Robert W H i nter Hq t inted States Air Force Academy C olonel G lenn E W a sso n Hq Cnited States Forces. Japan P rokessor 1 B H ollei Jr .. Duke University Major General. Air Force Reserv e attention The Air University Review is the professional journal of Ihe Unifed Slales Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is lo present innovative thinking concerning Air Force dextrine, strategv, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Training Command, or Air University Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed.
Address manuscripts to Editor Air University Review to Superintendent ot Documents. GPO, Washington DC Division Bldg 1211. Msawetl AF8. AL 36112 Printed 20402; yearly (13 00 domestic, $16.25 foreign, single by Government Printing Office Address subscriptions copy $2.25 Air force Recurring Publication 50-2. The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force