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Nuclear Weapons Databook Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I1 US. Nuclear Warhead Production Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I1 U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Milton M. Hoenig A book by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. BALLINGER PUBLISHING COMPANY Cambridge, Massachusetts A Subsidiary of Harper &Row,Publishers, Inc Copyright Q 1987 by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or trans- mitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording or otherwise, without the prior written consent of the publisher International Standard Book Number: 0-88730-124-X (CL) 0-88730-125-8 (PB) Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 82-24376 Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloghgin-Publication Data (Revised for vol 2) Cochran, Thomas B Nuclear weapons databook "A book by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc " Includes bibliographical references and indexes Contents: v 1 U S nuclear forces and capabilities-v 2 U S nuclear warhead production 1 Nuciear weapons I Arkin, William M I1 Natural Resources Defense Council I Title U264 C6 1984 355 8'25119 82-24376 ISBN 0-88410-172-X (v 1) ISBN 0-88410-178-8 (pbk : v 1) ISBN 0-88730-124-X (v. 2) ISBN 0-88730-125-8 (pbk : v 2) About the Authors About the Authors Thomas B Cochran is a Senior Staff Scientist and gic Affairs (Washington, DC: IPS, 1981), SlOP: The Director of the Nuclear Weapons Databook Project at the Secret US Plan for Nuclear War (with Peter Pringle] Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc He has served as (New York: W W Norton, 1983), Nuclear Battlefields: a consultant to numerous government agencies and non- Global Links in the Arms Race (with Richard W government organizations on energy and nuclear non- Fieldhouse] (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, proliferation matters, and was an Assistant Professor of 19651, and Nuked as a Jaybird: U S Military Strategy in Physics at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, the Pacific [with David Chappell) [Washington, D C : California, while on active duty in the Navy He is the IPS. 1986) author of The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An Robert S Norris is a Senior Research Associate at the Environmental and Economic Critique (Washington, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc He has taught D C : Resources for the Future, 1974) He has a Ph D in political science and international relations at several physics from Vanderbilt University universities and has been a Senior Staff Member of the William M Arkin is Director of the Arms Race and Center for Defense Information He has a Ph D in politi- Nuclear Weapons Research Project at the Institute for cal science from New York University - Policy Studies in Washington, D C He has been an intel- Milton M Hoenig is a consultant In the past he has ligence analyst with the U S Army in Berlin and a Senior been at the U S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Staff Member of the Center for Defense Information He is He has a Ph D in physics from Cornell University author of Research Guide to Current Military and Strate- Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I1 v Table of Contents Table of Contents List of Figures ix W47POLARIS SLBM List of Tables xii W5B/MINUTEMAN ICBM Preface xiv W45/TERRIER, MADM, LITTLE JOHN Acknowledgments XV W52iSERGEANT W68POSEIDON SLBM Volume 11 Weapons Effects Simulation Military Test Ranges CHAPTER ONE The Warhead Production Complex: An Overview CHAPTERTHREE Introduction Nuclear Materials: Production, Inventories, Custody and the Division of Responsibility Initiatives Numbers and Types Production of Nuclear Materials The Complex Plutonium and Tritium Production Current Decisionmaking Measuring Production From Laboratory to Assembly Line A Brief History of Reactor Operations Building the Infrastructure Savannah River Production Early Warheads Hanford Production New Technologies and the Proliferation of The Fuel Cycles Missions The Savannah River Fuel Cycle Thermonuclear Warheads The Hanford Fuel Cvcle Early Development of ICBMs and IRBMs Naval Reactor and Research Reactor Fuel Other Missions Cycles Stabilization Late 19608-1980 Plutonium and Tritium Inventories Qualitative Developments Weapon-grade Upward Bound-1980-1990s Fuel- and Reactor-grade Inventories Reviving the Production Complex Tritium Inventory Nuclear Warhead Technologies and Future Non Weapon Uses and Sources of Tritium Production The Production of Uranium Uranium Mining and Milling CHAPTER TWO Uranium Enrichment The Production Complex Today Uranium Inventories Laboratories HEU for Weapons [Oralloy) Los Alamos National Laboratory At Enrichment Plants Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory At Other Sites Sandia National Laboratories Production of Additional Uranium for Other DOE Laboratories Weapons DOD Laboratories Deuterium and Heavy Water Production Air Force Weapons Laboratory Enriched Lithium Production Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Non-Nuclear Materials Pmduction Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency Brryllium Pruduutiun Materials Production Facilities Other Non-nuclear Materials Warhead Production Facilities Initiatives to Increase Production Warhead Fabrication Facility Restoration New Production Blending Maintenance, Modification, Reliability N-Reactor Conversion and PUREX Reactivation Final Disassembly L-Reactor Restart Testing Nuclear Weapons High Productivity Cores and U-236 Recovery Nevada Test Site New Production Reactor Types of Tests Special Isotope Separation (SIS] Stockpile Reliability PUREX Process Facility Modification vi Nuclear Weapons Datahook, Volume II -- - Table of Contents CHAPTER FOUR CHAPTER FIVE Nuclear Warhead Acquisition Policy Nuclear Materials Production Technologies and Predecessor Oreanizations Processes Manhattan ~ngineerDistrict Uranium Mining and Milling Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and the Atomic Mining Energy Commission Milling Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Heap Leaching Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Chemical Conversion ERDAJDOE Uranium Enrichment Nuclear Weapon Decisionmaking Documents Enrichment Concepts joint strategic Planning Document Material Balance Defense Guidance and Consolidated Guidance Separative Work Program Objective Memorandum Enrichment Technology joint ~ro~ri&~Assessment Memorandum Stage Nuclear Weaoons Stockoile Memorandum Separation Factor Nuclear weapons ~eveiopmentGuidance cascade Materials ~ana~ernentplan Enriching and Stripping Sections Warhead Develonm~nl.Stock~iline. A -. and Ideal Cascade Retirement Enrichment Processes DOD and DOE Agreements Gaseous Diffusion Process Phase 1ÑConcep Definition Studies Gas Centrifuee Process Phase 2-Joint Feasibility Studies Atomic vapor Laser Isotope Separation Phase 2A-Joint Design Definition and Cost (AVLIS) 131 Studies Molecular Vapor Laser Isotope Separation Phase 3-Development Engineering Project [MLIS) 133 Phase &Production Engineering Plasma Separation Process [PSP) 133 Phase 5-Initial Production Chemical Enrichment 134 Phase 6ÑQuantit Production Aerodynamic Processes Phase 7-Retirement Production Reactors Organizations Nuclear Processes Executive Office of the President Categories of Plutonium National Security Council Plutonium Equivalence Office of Management and Budget Reactor Operations Office of Science and Technology Policy Reactor Fundamentals Department of State Fuel Processing Department of Defense Early Methods Office of the Secretary of Defense PUREX Process Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Heavy Water Production [Atomic Energy) 108 Dual-Temperature Water-Hydrogen Sulfide Military Liasion Committee 109 Exchange (GS Process] Joint Chiefs of Staff 109 Water Distillation Process Defense Nuclear Agency 109 Military Services 110 APPENDICES The Air Force 110 Appendix A The Army Ill DOE Contractors Performing Nuclear Weapons The Navv and Marine Corns 113 Related Work Department of Energy 115 Appendix B Assistant Secretary Defense Programs 115 Known U S Nuclear TestsÑJul 1945 to 31 Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military December 1985 Application Appendix C Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Tritium Inventory Materials Appendix D Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Inventory of Highly Enriched Uranium .Affairs-. -- - Allocated for Warheads Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence 118 Assistant Secretary Nuclear Energy l8 Glossary of Terms .. .. .. .. 193 Operations Offices 119 Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms . .. 205 Congressional Committees Index. .. .... .. ........ .......... ... 214 Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 11 vii Table of Contents Volume 111 13 Pantex Plant [Amarillo Plant) 14 Pinellas Plant FACILITY PROFILES 15 Rocky Flats Plant Areonne National Laborato~2 16 Sandia National Laboratories ~shtabulaplant' 17 Savannah River Plant Feed Materials Production Center Savannah River Laboratory Hanford Reservation Savannah River Production Reactors Hanford Eneinerine- - Develo~mentLahoratorv Savannah River Fuel and Target Fabrication N-Reactor Facilities PUREX, Uranium Oxide. B, and Z Plants Savannah River Chemical Separations Pacific Northwest Laboratory Facilities Idaho National Engineering ~aborator~ Savannah River Heavy Water Plant Idaho Chemical Processing Plant 18 Tonopah Test Range Kansas City [Bendix) Plant 19 Uranium Enrichment Enterprise Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant Los Alamos National Laboratory Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Mound Laboratory Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Nevada Test Site Oak Ridge Reservation Oak Ridge
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