© Copyright 2016 Michael R. Lehman NUISANCE TO NEMESIS: NUCLEAR FALLOUT AND INTELLIGENCE AS SECRETS, PROBLEMS, AND LIMITATIONS ON THE ARMS RACE, 1940-1964 BY MICHAEL R. LEHMAN DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral Committee: Professor Lillian Hoddeson, Chair Professor Kristin Hoganson, Co-Chair Professor Michael Weissman Professor Robert Jacobs, Hiroshima City University Abstract Fallout sampling and other nuclear intelligence techniques were the most important sources of United States strategic intelligence in the early Cold War. Operated as the Atomic Energy Detection System by a covert Air Force unit known as AFOAT-1, the AEDS detected emissions and analyzed fallout from Soviet nuclear tests, as well as provided quantitative intelligence on the size of the Russian nuclear stockpile. Virtually unknown because the only greater Cold War secret than nuclear weapons was intelligence gathered about them, data on the Soviet threat produced by AFOAT-1 was an extraordinary influence on early National Intelligence Estimates, the rapid growth of the Strategic Air Command, and strategic war plans. Official guidance beginning with the first nuclear test in 1945 otherwise suggested fallout was an insignificant effect of nuclear weapons. Following AFOAT-1’s detection of Soviet testing in fall 1949 and against the cautions raised about the problematic nature of higher yield weapons by the General Advisory Committee, the Atomic Energy Commission’s top scientific advisers, President Harry Truman ordered the AEC to quickly build these extraordinarily powerful weapons, testing the first in secrecy in November 1952. In spring 1954, the second test of an American thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb, CASTLE BRAVO, produced more than 7,000 square miles of potentially lethal fallout deposition near its ground zero, as well as contaminating people and fish in a notorious fallout radiation exposure incident. These tests also produced residual fallout that intensified every spring as it returned from the stratosphere. In April 1954, J. Robert Oppenheimer, formerly scientific director of the Manhattan Project and chair of the AEC’s GAC, was permanently stripped of his clearance to handle classified information, ostensibly for failing to display sufficient enthusiasm during development of this weapon. This hearing was effectively a sham that served as a proxy for Air Force efforts to silence his concerns and those of a secret AEC study named GABRIEL, warnings that in the event of war the problematic nature of the cumulative fallout from these weapons would afflict the populations of both the victim and the aggressor as they contaminated the global environment. The transnational public outcry in the years that followed the CASTLE BRAVO fallout incident put intense pressure on political leaders to end testing. The deciding factor at the White House proved to be several instances of fallout contamination of the food supply involving wheat and milk. Tellingly, this was due to the limited fallout from testing alone. This data provided an empirical basis to underwrite earlier cautions that general nuclear war would yield no winner, ii only varying degrees of loss. Utilizing the high-altitude capabilities of the U-2, the data that proved the need for caution was provided to researchers by the Air Force. No longer as useful a secret, the military, too, came to see fallout as an issue that unnecessarily problematized their reliance on nuclear weapons. To blunt efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban, the Air Force pursued underground testing to forestall continuing fallout that would raise deeper questions about the viability of nuclear war itself. Rather than a mere propaganda problem, as it was often seen by officials, fallout proved to be a practical limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty that resulted ended most atmospheric testing, but not the possibility that fallout could some day contaminate the planet. iii Acknowledgements In Memoriam Mark Leff was with this project from the beginning. The subject matter was attractive to him for its compelling public policy dimension. A thorough and thoughtful partisan in the Enola Gay controversy, here Mark clearly hoped more for a good discussion than historical certainty. I think he would have been thrilled to finally find a pretty good effort at both. Thanks for keeping “why is it important?” in front of me. There were few better in any classroom, thus a great loss to every student Mark might have taught that he left us too soon. Gratitude, Thanks, and Appreciation To Maiko, whose place in my life gave me a place to live life. Thank you for your immense emotional and material support over many years. Your faith gave me faith in myself. Lillian Hoddeson could not have been more ideal as my primary adviser throughout the more than decade long genesis of this project. Her grasp of a difficult subject matter was inherent, her patience through my several personal travails exceeded my own, her willingness to stand by the project at even its most discouraging moments was indefatigable, and her gentle urging forward exactly the tone a harried and sometimes embattled researcher needed. I could always count on Lillian for support, expecting me to settle for nothing less than the best I could manage, even when that was often more difficult than it seemed. Kristin Hoganson’s compelling teaching and insightful demeanor were always a helpful and welcome aid to my work. Michael Weissman added an important extra eye on the science and history of physics and its often fraught relationship with the quest for real national security. Robert “Bo” Jacobs stepped in at short notice and long distance to provide the unique insights made possible by living and teaching in Hiroshima along with the exacting perspective of similar research interests. The committee members were supportive, insightful, and gracious in helping me assess the value of my research to the global community for which it is intended. Many others contributed to what I learned here, too numerous to list, except I must mention Jim Barrett, who encouraged me to come aboard and at several difficult moments. To my father and mother, who supported me again late in life for what I couldn’t have done the first time they encouraged my scholarly ambitions. Thank you and my siblings, Dave, Susan, and Greg, who had faith their big brother would come up with something interesting to read. Thanks to Mike Stone, Rosemary Braun, Paul Kennedy, and David Gehrig for being my iv eager crowd of discussants in helping convince me I figured out some of the secrets of fallout. And thanks to all my many friends and colleagues, inside and out of the History Department and the several other academic units who provided vital support in a timely manner. The Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, whose great people always made me feel welcome, taught me much, especially Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, who taught me exactly what I needed to know about actor-network theory. Likewise, my colleagues in the interdisciplinary Human Dimensions of Environmental Systems program were a great help in developing and articulating my research. A special thanks to the Library’s Government Documents librarians, who were always helpful in obtaining crucial and frequently obscure documents. Thanks to all my fellow students, undergraduate and graduate, most especially those willing to engage in discussion in too many classes to possibly list. My own students, who were as variable as humans can be, always reminded me of the need to remember the consequential past now in the present if we want a better future. Our History Department support staff deserves special mention, as their often hidden hand keeps us on track in a supportive environment. Thank you to Thomas Siebel for support of my research year. The staff at the Eisenhower and Kennedy Libraries, as well as at NARA College Park, were all helpful and encouraging. The American Institute of Physics and its Niels Bohr Library welcomed me and were instrumental in aiding me with vital oral history sources, as well as quickly responding to my permission request. The American Meteorological Society was likewise responsive and gracious with permission to use their holdings. The National Security Archive, in particular William Burr, went the extra mile in helping unearth a couple of key unit histories in their holdings and encouraged me to obtain more, which I did. The Air Force Technical Applications Center was, as expected, mostly silent, but was responsive and even forwarded me a much appreciated bound copy of their tantalizingly opaque 1997 Commemorative History. While this is not the history they would write, I hope they find it useful, too. There’s more to say, I’m sure. Thanks to my several informants, named in the text and anonymous, who made quite useful contributions in every case. I hope this work will inspire others to say what they’re v comfortable with, as this is reasonably possible now and once recorded will help others in the future to escape the shadows of doom that the personnel of AFOAT-1/AFTAC have helped hold in check so far. Let’s all wish for further success in preventing those clouds from ever storming on our planet and, perhaps one day, eventually dissipating the fears that underwrite the need for this