sign in sign up
<<
Home , Ernest Titterton, Norris Bradbury, Tony Skyrme

BRITISH SCIENTISTS AND THE Also by Ferenc Morton Szasz

THE DIVIDED MIND OF PROTESTANT AMERICA RELIGION IN THE WEST (editor) THE DAY THE SUN ROSE TWICE: The Story of the Site Nuclear Explosion, July 16, 1945 THE PROTESTANT CLERGY IN THE GREAT PLAINS AND MOUNTAIN WEST British Scientists and the Manhattan Project The Los Alamos Years

Ferenc Morton Szasz Professor of History , Albuquerque

MMACMILLAN © Ferenc Morton Szasz 1992 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1992

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this pub1ication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any 1icence permitting 1imited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 33-4 A1fred P1ace, WClE 7DP.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liab1e to crimina1 prosecution and civil claims for darnages.

First published 1992 by MACMILLAN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL LTD. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS andLondon Companies and representatives throughout the world

ISBN 978-1-349-12733-7 ISBN 978-1-349-12731-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-12731-3

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. For Margaret and Maria Contents

Preface IX

Introduction Xlll Background 2 The British Mission at Los Alamos: The Scientific 16 Dimension 3 The British Mission at Los Alamos: The Social 32 Dimension 4 The Aftermath 46

5 Varieties of the British Mission Experience 56 6 The Strange Tale of 82 7 The British Mission and the Postwar Nuclear Culture 97 Notes 107 Appendix I The Postwar Careers of the British Mission 133 II The Frisch-Peierls Memorandum (March 1940) 141 III Ralph Carlisle Smith's Summary of the 148 British Mission at Los Alamos IV Otto Frisch's Eyewitness Account of the 152 July 16, 1945, Atomic Explosion at Trinity Site, Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico Bibliography 154 Index 163

VB Preface

This is a study of the British scientific mission to Los Alamos, New Mexico, from 1943 to 1947, and the impact it had on the early history of the atomic age. In retrospect, it is clear that this book had a dual origin. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, I researched and wrote an account of the world's first atomic explosion (July 16, 1945) at Trinity Site, on the Alamogordo Air Base in central New Mexico. In 1984, the University of New Mexico Press published this as The Day the Sun Rose Twice. The research for this project, especially the opportunity to interview many of the original participants of the Manhattan Project, lured me forever into the fascinating world of atomic history. During the academic year of 1985-6, I taught at the University of Exeter in Devon as a Visiting Fulbright Professor for the American and Common- wealth Arts Division. There my family and I became fascinated with British life, especially that of the West Country. This study of the British scientists who went to wartime Los Alamos is an attempt to combine these two themes. Any project that stretches over a decade acquires numerous obligations. Consequently, I would like to begin by thanking the following: Don Pierce, Gerald Lane, and Charles Bates, three Albuquerque book dealers who always kept their eyes open for anything that touched on atomic history; Brenda Spurlock Landstedt, who proved that an undergraduate work-study person could do graduate level research; Dennis Bilger of the Harry S Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, for gracious treatment during my visit there; the staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, for making available the "Atomic Bomb folder"; Edward J. Reese of the Modem Military Branch of the National Archives, Washing- ton, DC; the staff at the Public Record Office in Kew, London; Anna Broussard and Dorothy W onsmos of Zimmerman Library, the University of New Mexico; Mrs Ashley C. Oates for generously serving as a "broker" to put me in touch with her parents, Sir and Peggy Titterton; Sarah (Polly) Tuck for sharing memories of her parents, James and Elsie Tuck; Los Alamos veteran Robert Porton for loaning me his priceless collection of the Laboratory daily bulletins for 1943-5; Mrs Lorna Arnold of the Atomic Energy Authority for responding so splendidly to a stranger's phone call; and Professor W.N. Everitt of the Department of Mathematics, University of , for sending me materials on his late colleague, Tony Skyrme. Reference librarian Kate

ix x Preface Luger deserves special commendation for devising increasingly intricate ways of tracking down missing British scientists. Thanks to her, I was eventually able to account for every member of the British Mission who came to Los Alamos from 1943 to 1947. Research in the early history of the atomic era is ever entwined with current matters of state. On both sides of the Atlantic, national security measures are such that certain World War II materials still remain closed to historians. This is especially true for the British side of the story, where numerous documents are unlikely to be available within the foreseeable future. On the American side, materials that had been declassified in the 1950s have suddenly been reclassified again. (The rise of international terrorism prompted this move. While the nuclear technology of the World War II years may be outdated, it still works.) Consequently, a special word of thanks must go to Roger A. Meade, head ArchivistIHistorian at the Los Alamos National Laboratories. Meade did yeoman work in uncovering virtually everything in the archives that pertained to the British experience in New Mexico. In addition, he and his staff provided invaluable assistance in transcribing the many interviews that I conducted over the years. I would also like to credit my colleague, Dr Donald Skabelund, and Paul W. Henricksen of Los Alamos for their aid; the late Dr Ralph Carlisle Smith, who read an earlier draft; and Professors A.P. French and Janet Roebuck, who read through the entire manuscript. After almost thirty years, I am still indebted to Richard W. Smith, Professor Emeritus at Ohio Wesleyan University, for his inspiration and guidance. Richard G. Robbins, Barton J. Bernstein and Robert Del Tredici were all most generous in sharing primary documents. Two anonymous reviewers for St. Martin's Press saved me from a number of potentially embarrassing errors. The typing skills of Pat E. Devejian and Penelope P. Katson were at their usual level of excellence. So, too, were Margaret Connell Szasz's highly valued editorial skills. Special mention should also be made to our colleagues and friends at the University of Exeter: Mick and Nancy Gidley, Richard Maltby, David and Gillian Hom, Ron and Anne Tamplin, and Peter and Louisa Quartermain. They patiently answered all our questions about British life, even the foolish ones, without a hint of embarrassment. I could not have completed this study without the courtesy of those who graciously allowed me to interview them regarding their knowledge of the British Mission to Los Alamos: Ms Ellen Bradbury, Dr , Mrs Hanni Bretscher, Ms Judy Florence, Dr Anthony P. French, Dr D.J. Littler, Dr Donald C. Marshall, Dr J. Carson and Kathleen Mark, Dr John Manley, Dr P.B. Moon, Sir , Lord William George Penney, Dr M.J. Poole, Mrs Mollie Rodriguez, Dr Joseph Rotblat, Dr Alice Kimball Preface xi

Smith, Dr Cyril Stanley Smith, Dr Ralph Carlisle Smith, Sir Ernest and Peggy Titterton. Of course, all scholarship treating these issues must begin with the works by Margaret Gowing, the official historian of the British atomic world: Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deter- rence, Vol. I, P olicy Making; Vol II, Policy Execution (London: Macmillan, 1974); and her American counterparts, who wrote the official history of the Atomic Energy Commission: Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 193911946: Vol. I of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 194711952: Vol. II of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Penn., and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969); Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Com- mission: Volume III of A History of the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: Press, 1989). Finally, I would like to thank all the members of my family. My father, Ferenc P. Szasz, Ing. (1906-1984), introduced me to both the world of science and that of emigre life. My mother, Mary Szasz, received updates on this project almost every week for the last five years. Chris, Scott and Eric also heard about it with regularity. And I would especially like to thank Margaret and Maria for listening so patiently to the endless stories about the British Mission to Los Alamos. In an academic household, the gift of listening is far more precious than can ever be imagined.

FMS Introduction

The first weeks of August, 1945, proved the most decisive in the history of humankind. Or so thought Isaiah Berlin, then head of the Special Survey Section of the British Embassy in Washington, DC. Berlin would later go on to become an internationally famous philosopher/historian, but in 1945 he was drafting manuscript dispatches for the British home front. On August 11, he wrote of America's astonishment at a week of "earth shatter- ing events": Potsdam, Hiroshima, the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, Nagasaki, and President Harry S Truman's radio address to the nation disclosing the secret of the atomic bomb. These revelations, Berlin noted, had combined to make the United States "more breathless than jubilant." A weapon culled from the pages of Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon had entered into history. The morality of using it on innocent civilians, plus the immediate necessity for arms control, had both become widespread subjects of popular discussion. Berlin's dispatches from Washington also noted that the success of the atomic bomb was widely recognized as a joint American-British-Canadian enterprise. President Harry S Truman praised the British efforts, and comments from both British scientists and former Prime Minister Winston Churchill were widely publicized. As one American scientist observed, "There is no need to talk of an Anglo-American federation - it is here. " the day of Hiroshima, a prominent Washington journalist wrote Truman's private secretary to suggest that because the atomic weapon had been a joint American-British-Canadian enterprise, it should henceforth be termed the "ABC" bomb. Truman seems to have toyed with the idea.2 This, however, was not to be. Within a few weeks, the "A" in "A bomb" came to symbolize not only "atomic" but also "American." Film-makers, journalists and writers soon forgot about the British and Canadian contri- butions to the greatest industrial and scientific enterprise of the twentieth century. On August 9, 1945, the day of Nagasaki, President Truman approved the release of the official, semi-technical account of the building of the bomb, the "" (so named for its author, Princeton professor Henry D. Smyth). Written without consultation with either the British or Canadians, the Smyth Report circulated as a litho- printed document for about a month. Then, on September 10, Press rushed an inexpensive cloth-bound version into print. To everyone's surprise, sales topped 100,000 within a year. It was not

Xlll XIV Introduction long before the Smyth Report was translated into every major language - including a Russian printing of 30,000 copies. This book provided the world with its first account of the most incredible scientific discovery of the modem age. Officially entitled Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, the subtitle reflected its emphasis: "The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940--1945. "3 Simultaneously, the government of Great Britain issued its own version of this momentous scientific breakthrough, entitled Statements Relating to the Atomic Bomb. A pamphlet of forty pages, this booklet described the British role in the quest for atomic weapons.4 The pamphlet contained a brief statement by current Prime Minister , a longer, previously prepared comment by fonner Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and a concise summary of the major events of atomic history. This last section was written in a twenty-four hour period by Tube Alloys secretary Michael Perrin. Perrin closed his twenty-page account with the movement of the British atomic scientists to join the American Manhattan Project in late 1943. British Philip B. Moon was so eager to distribute Statements Relating to the Atomic Bomb to his American colleagues at Los Alamos that he offered to cover personally the expense of 500 copies if they were sent to him there. 5 The British forty-page pamphlet, however, could never compete with Smyth's 260-page book. For several years the Smyth Report remained the primary popular account of the making of the atomic bomb. Several British scientists expressed dismay when they first read their copies of the Smyth Report. They argued that Smyth had slighted their role in the atomic enterprise. Eventually the British converted the editors of the Princeton University Press to their cause. Starting with the November 1945 printing, the press added Statements Relating to the Atomic Bomb (plus a brief comment by the Canadian government) as an "Appendix" to the Smyth Report.6 This forty-page addendum, however, did little to alter the general impression that the development of the atomic bomb had been primarily an American enterprise. British pique was not easily mollified. Immediately after the war, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) engineer W.A. Akers, an early leader of the United Kingdom nuclear effort, observed that because the British accom- plishments could not be calculated in tenns of money, it was impossible to make them appear as large as the Americans'.7 Two years later, a reviewer in the British joumal Nature complained that MGM's hastily shot film version of the atomic story, "The Beginning or the End," had left the erroneous impression that almost all the atomic scientists had been American.8 Introduction xv Not until fifteen years later did British historians move to correct this imbalance. In 1961, science writer Ronald W. Clark subtitled his popular study, The Birth of the Bomb, "The Untold Story of Britain's Part in the Weapon That Changed the World."9 Three years later, Margaret Gowing published the first volume of her defmitive official history, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945. Gowing's account received rave reviews in the British press, but it reached a largely academic audience. Her study had little impact on the popular mind, especially in the United States. When Professor Gowing visited the Norris in Los Alamos in 1983, she expressed considerable dismay. References to the British con- tribution to the Project were either misleading or completely ignored. \0 Over the years, American scholars have continued along the path blazed by the Smyth Report. James Phinney Baxter III's Scientists Against Time, which won the 1947 Pulitzer prize in history, praised the British scientists for their accomplishments in the creation of radar and other technical items. But Baxter concentrated almost exclusively on the American role in the development of the bomb itselfY In 1949, former Manhattan Project head, General Leslie R. Groves, wrote a four-page letter devoted to the British role in the Manhattan Project. Arguing against the proposed plan to share nuclear data with them, Groves downplayed their impact. "I cannot recall any direct [British] contribution to our success in achieving the bomb," he said. When he wrote his memoirs in 1962, Now It Can Be Told, Groves termed the British contribution "helpful but not vital."12 Perhaps the most extreme statement appeared in the thirty-five-volume Official History of the Manhattan Project (written in 1946/7 but not widely available until 1977). This study suggested that the British scientists involved were of "moderate attainments" and that they crossed the Atlantic primarily to obtain nuclear information from the Americans. The British effort, the anonymous author concluded:

... was in no sense vital and actually not even important. To evaluate it quantitatively at one percent of the total would be to overestimate it. The technical and engineering contribution was practically nil. Certainly it is true that without any contribution at all from the British, the date of our final success need not have been delayed by a single day. 13

This is absurd. The British contributions to the development of the atomic bomb were crucial. Had the members of the British Mission at Los Alamos not done what they did when they did it, the atomic bomb would not have been available to end the war in August of 1945. An atomic xvi Introduction weapon surely would have been discovered later - 1947, perhaps, or 1955, or whenever. But the world would have been vastly different in any case. As numerous historians have reminded us, the battles of World War II were not waged exclusively on the fields of combat. World War II also drew forth a clash of scientific minds. In their respective laboratories, the Allied scientists raced their German counterparts for a wide variety of technical secrets. World War II was "A Wizard War" with "Scientists Against Time" involved in "a race on the edge of time."14 As Margaret Gowing has noted, scientific discoveries cannot be hidden forever; but they can be delayed. In many cases - certainly World War II was one of them- the time sequence proved of utmost importance. IS British Mission wife Peggy Titterton phrased the issue for her generation: ''I'm glad Hitler didn't get it first." 16 The program to build an atomic weapon eventually grew into, perhaps, the largest organized effort since the construction of the ancient pyramids. It employed over 200,000 workers and cost over two billion dollars. The giants of American industry, DuPont, Kellex, Stone and Webster, plus the nation's major universities, joined both American-born and emigre scient- ists in "one of the greatest military-industrial adventures in history."I? Within this massive operation, however, a historian may single out three factors that were absolutely critical to its success: the leadership of J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of Los Alamos; the supervision of General Leslie R. Groves, overall head of the Project; and the contributions of the British Mission to Los Alamos. The story of Oppenheimer is widely known. A child prodigy, Oppenheimer graduated from Harvard magna cum laude in three years instead of four, and then embarked on four years of study in Europe. He earned his PhD from Gottingen in 1927. In 1929, Oppenheimer assumed a joint appointment in physics at the University of California in Berkeley and the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, where he dazzled stu- dents in both schools with his wit and brilliance. His colleague, 1.1. Rabi, often declared that Oppenheimer had the best mind in physics for his generation. Although he seemed an unusual choice as director of Los Alamos - he had strong left-wing political connections and no prior ad- ministrative experience - he soon proved his detractors wrong. Not only did he keep abreast of all the scientific progress of the lab, his sensitivity to the needs of his fellow workers led him to numerous acts of personal kindness. "We just worshipped him," Peggy Titterton recalled. "We would have done anything for that man."18 Even Oppenheimer's fall from grace in 1954, when he lost his security clearance after the famous Oppenheimer hearings, has not tarnished the Introduction XVll accomplishments of his Los Alamos years. Oppenheimer's haggard appear- ance and characteristic "porkpie" hat rose to almost mythic proportions in postwar America. When one thinks of the Manhattan Project, one invari- ably thinks of Oppenheimer first. "A lesser man couldn't have done it," remarked Norris Bradbury, his successor as Los Alamos Lab director. 19 The name of Leslie R. Groves is almost as widely known as that of Oppenheimer's. Son of a Presbyterian Army chaplain, Groves ran the sprawling Manhattan Project as his personal fiefdom. Unlike Oppenheimer, Groves proved rather difficult to get along with. While he never raised his voice or used foul language, he criticized constantly and often ran rough- shod over his subordinates. In addition, he lacked any trace of a sense of humor. Groves' brusque and heavy handed manner, combined with his rotund shape and aloofness, made him a convenient target for disparaging comment. Even those who criticized him, however, respected his organiz- ing skills. And those who worked closely with him held him in the highest esteem. Los Alamos patent lawyer Ralph Carlisle Smith marvelled at how Groves could cut through any red tape to get things done; Kenneth D. Nichols, Groves' chief assistant, labelled him an excellent administrator; and his private secretary, Jane O'Leary, absolutely adored him.20 Groves' role in the Manhattan Project can hardly be overestimated. More than any other person, Groves provided the needed focus for all 1942-45 nuclear-related activity. This was crucial because the potential for atomic power and/or atomic weapons was born from the splitting of the same atom. In 1942, the nuclear world contained a variety of still unproven possibilities: individual power sources for ships, tanks or airplanes; large- scale power plants for urban areas; a fission weapon; radio isotopes for medical experiments; a radioactive "poison" to halt the invasion of enemy armies (an issue that was seriously discussed in the planning for D-Day); unlimited fusion (hydrogen) power; or the possibility of a fusion (hydrogen) weapon. Groves realized that all these goals could not be accomplished simul- taneously. Thus, he established a set of priorities that instituted a clear hierarchy. While the Army would consider other issues as they arose, everything had to be subordinated to the production of an atomic bomb. As Australian physicist Marcus L. Oliphant remembered, "It was emphasized again and again that the prime object was the production of a military weapon in the shortest possible time."21 Groves' reputation also plummeted after the war. For seventeen months after V-J day, he presided over the nation's atomic matters as a lame duck commander. His conservative political views, which were of minor importance during the war itself, began to loom much larger afterwards. xviii Introduction In 1946, he banished all French scientists from the Canadian nuclear instal- lations because he felt them too left-wing. From 1945 to 1948, he insisted that the American military should remain the sole custodian of the nation's nuclear arsenal. In private he spoke disparagingly about the British. In 1954, at the height of the Cold War, he told Congress that "Russia was our enemy and ... the [Manhattan] project was conducted on that basis."22 When he wrote his autobiography in 1962, he did so to counter the ambigu- ity he sensed in the popular understanding of the history of the atomic bomb.23 Groves' ego proved almost as annoying to postwar nuclear administra- tors as his politics. The general not only took credit for all past events, he also gave advice on all present events, too. In early 1946, when the "first team" of Los Alamos scientists was preparing to leave for their regular, peace-time university assignments, Groves rushed to Los Alamos to persuade them to remain. Loudspeakers were set up for the address, which everyone assumed would be a call to stay for patriotic reasons. But, as engineer Ray Powell recalled, "what we heard instead was a monologue of how great General Groves was; as a result the exodus from Los Alamos accelerated."24 Once the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) took command of the nation's nuclear operations in January of 1947, they made no secret of wanting Groves out. 25 In a later reminiscence, Harry Truman recalled the postwar Groves as "a pain in the neck" (surely a euphemism).26 In 1948, Groves finally retired from the Army to go to work for Remington Rand Corporation. He died in 1970. Although Leslie R. Groves never achieved the popular reputation of the other military figures of his era, Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, or Viscount Montgomery, he has fared somewhat better with historians. Without Groves, all agree, the Manhattan Project would never have succeeded.27 The story of the British Scientific Mission to Los Alamos forms the third "indispensable" factor in the complex and tragic tale of the building of the first atomic bombs. But it is considerably harder to define. These twenty scientists have never had the high profile or controversial lives of either Oppenheimer or Groves. The foremost members of the British team - Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch - were basically shy men. The most no- torious, Soviet spy Klaus Fuchs, was shyer still. The most visible figure, Danish Nobel Laureate , failed in his quest to internationalize the atom. Another prominent British scientist, Joseph Rotblat, voiced opposi- tion to nuclear weapons and nuclear power for years. Consequently, the saga of the British Mission to Los Alamos has proven difficult to highlight. The impact of the British Mission lay primarily in three areas, all linked by continuity of personnel. First, the initial research and reports of the Introduction xix

1939-1941 period (the unjustly neglected Otto Frisch-Rudolf Peierls Memorandum, plus the Maud Reports) convinced American scientists that an atomic weapon could be constructed before the probable end of hostilities. Second, after the British and American projects were merged in 1943, the contributions of the twenty scientists stationed at Los Alamos (including both Frisch and Peierls, plus and Philip Moon from the Maud Committee) insured that the bomb was available "in the shortest possible time." Without either contribution, World War II would not have ended as early as August of 1945. But the story does not stop there. Not only did the members of the British Mission determine the date that hostilities ended, they also shaped the contours of the immediate postwar world. There is a direct British Mission link to the emergence of the first three nuclear powers: the United States in July and August, 1945; the Soviet Union in August, 1949; and the United Kingdom in October, 1952. In addition to this technical legacy, the men from Los Alamos moved slowly into politics. There they helped create a still wider legacy: the establishment of the Pugwash Conferences in 1955; a growing debate over nuclear power; and a deeper understanding of the dilemmas of the "nuclear culture" they had done so much to create. Thus, the score of scientists whom the British sent to Los Alamos helped forge the nuclear boundaries of the mid-twentieth century. Their story is worth telling. Depending on how one counts, the British Mission to Los Alamos included approximately two dozen scientists. In alphabetical order, they were: Egon Bretscher, James Chadwick, Anthony P. French, Otto R. Frisch, Klaus Fuchs, James Hughes, Derrik J. Littler, William G. Marley, Donald G. Marshall, Philip B. Moon, RudolfE. Peierls, William G. Penney, , Michael J. Poole, Joseph Rotblat, Harold Sheard, Tony H.R. Skyrme, Ernest W. Titterton, and James L. Tuck.28 In addition, several other scientists also fell under the umbrella of the British Mission. Although officially under the auspices of the Canadian government, J. Carson Mark's salary was paid by the British, and Carson and Kathleen Mark were generally considered as part of the British Mission. The most famous member was Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who arrived with his son Aage. The Bohrs never lived permanently on "the Hill" as Los Alamos was called, but, beginning in December, 1943 they made several extended visits to the lab as "consultants." One might also mention Sir Geoffrey Taylor, an expert in the theory of blast waves, who visited Los Alamos in May of 1944; and Lord Cherwell (Frederick Lindemann), Winston Churchill's chief scientific adviser, who also visited the lab for a day in October, 1944. xx Introduction The average person is not likely to recognize these names. This situation may be fairly summarized by an incident that occurred while I was re- searching this study in the Zimmerman Library of the University of New Mexico. When a reference specialist asked me what I was working on, I replied: "The British Mission to wartime Los Alamos." She seemed puz- zled. "I never realized that the Church of England was so concerned about its scientists," she said.29 The following story is an attempt to clarify this situation.