Jim Walsh

SURPRISE DOWN UNDER: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

by Jim Walsh

Jim Walsh is a visiting scholar at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He is also a Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science program at MIT, where he is completing a dissertation analyzing comparative nuclear decisionmaking in Australia, the Middle East, and Europe.

ustralia is widely considered tactical nuclear weapons. In 1961, of state behavior and the kinds of Ato be a world leader in ef- Australia proposed a secret agree- policies that are most likely to retard forts to halt and reverse the ment for the transfer of British the spread of nuclear weapons? 1 spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons, and, throughout This article attempts to answer Australian government created the the 1960s, Australia took actions in- some of these questions by examin- Canberra Commission, which called tended to keep its nuclear options ing two phases in Australian nuclear for the progressive abolition of open. It was not until 1973, when history: 1) the attempted procure- nuclear weapons. It led the fight at Australia ratified the NPT, that the ment phase (1956-1963); and 2) the the U.N. General Assembly to save country finally renounced the acqui- indigenous capability phase (1964- the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty sition of nuclear weapons. 1972). The historical reconstruction (CTBT), and the year before, played Over the course of four decades, of these events is made possible, in a major role in efforts to extend the Australia has gone from a country part, by newly released materials Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of that once sought nuclear weapons to from the Australian National Archive Nuclear Weapons (NPT) indefi- one that now supports their abolition. and a set of unregistered documents nitely. In short, Australia is a coun- It is a remarkable story, and certainly released by Australia’s Department try whose nonproliferation credentials one of the untold successes of the of Foreign Affairs and Trade.2 are impeccable. nuclear age. The Australian experi- These materials provide an unusu- But there is another side to this ence also raises important questions ally detailed view of the internal pro- story. Newly declassified documents for theorists and policymakers. How cesses of a country wrestling with describe repeated attempts by ele- is it that Australia went from nuclear its nuclear future. Using these and ments within the Australian govern- aspirant to nonproliferation leader? other sources, this study attempts to ment to acquire nuclear weapons. In What factors influenced the Austra- explain why the Australian govern- 1958, for example, Australian offi- lian government’s nuclear ment first sought and then renounced cials approached the British govern- decisionmaking? What does the Aus- nuclear weapons. ment regarding the purchase of tralian case suggest about the nature

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 1 Jim Walsh

THE ATTEMPTED ments came from the Defence Com- ritory since 1952, though the Aus- PROCUREMENT PHASE mittee,5 which concluded in 1958 that: tralians were not privy to any weap- (1956-1963) In the absence of disarma- ons-related information coming from ment agreements, it is inevi- 10 From 1956 to 1963, Australia’s ef- table that the trend towards the tests. forts to acquire nuclear weapons fo- nuclear weapons will con- Developments in Europe did not tinue and intensify. Present cused on procurement, i.e., gaining indications are that in the go unnoticed in Australia, and access to nuclear weapons via a third near future countries other memos arguing for an Australian party. Procurement is thus distinct than the U.K. and the U.S., nuclear capability often cited devel- e.g., France and Japan, will from indigenous development. It also have the technological ca- opments in NATO.11 Nuclear differs from arrangements such as pacity to manufacture weapons proponents in Australia the North Atlantic Treaty nuclear weapons and can be knew that the Americans had no in- expected to develop this ca- Organization’s (NATO’s) dual key pacity successfully in the tention of selling nuclear weapons, system, since Australia’s intent was next few years.6 but the “nuclear sharing” controversy to acquire weapons that would be un- Evidence supporting these expec- itself seemed to confirm that nuclear der purely national control. tations was not difficult to find. The weapons were going to become an During this phase, there were at Australians had only to look at essential part of modern war-fight- least three initiatives pertaining to the NATO. Indeed, the actions of NATO ing and that any self-respecting ad- vanced, industrialized country would procurement of nuclear weapons by countries appear to have had a pro- elements within the Australian gov- found impact on nuclear thinking in have its own atomic arsenal. ernment. They included: 1) discus- Australia. At the time the Australian Australian officials expected more sions regarding the purchase of Defence Committee made its origi- and more countries to acquire nuclear tactical nuclear weapons; 2) the ac- nal recommendation to seek nuclear weapons, but they also believed that quisition of a nuclear capable deliv- weapons, the United States had be- nuclear weapons would play a grow- ery system; and 3) a proposal for gun stationing tactical nuclear weap- ing role in the force structure of their nuclear weapons on-demand. This ons in Europe, and a number of existing nuclear allies, the United section reviews each of these epi- American allies—including Britain, States and Great Britain. The De- sodes, but begins with a brief over- France, Italy, and West Germany— fence Committee report cited above view. were declaring their interest in gain- went on to note that: ing greater access to nuclear Nuclear weapons in various applications are being in- Australian Perspectives weapons and weapons-related infor- creasingly introduced into mation. The Eisenhower administra- In the 1950s, Australian thinking the armament of the great tion, in turn, signaled that it was open powers for employment in all about nuclear weapons, like much of to some kind of “nuclear sharing.”7 aspects of offensive and de- the thinking in Europe and the United fensive warfare. [ .] Mod- At a North Atlantic Council meet- States, included an expectation that ern weapon systems are ing, France, West Germany, and Italy becoming so complex and nuclear weapons would spread and even announced plans for the co-pro- costly that in many cases become a common feature of mod- their adoption would not be duction of nuclear weapons.8 Some ern military forces.3 Inside players justified unless they were years before, the United States had given maximum effective- in the world’s capitals had already endorsed its “New Look” doctrine, ness by the incorporation of been told that France would likely join nuclear warheads.12 which promoted nuclear weapons as the nuclear club, and many began to a way to counter the rising costs of The vertical proliferation of anticipate that China would also gain conventional forces, and the United nuclear weapons throughout the al- membership. The belief that nuclear Kingdom had announced that it lies’ force structure encouraged the weapons would spread and that this would reduce expenditures on con- Australians to seek their own nuclear spread would necessarily affect Aus- ventional weaponry in order to fo- weapons. At first glance, this might tralia could be seen in everything cus resources on its nuclear seem counterintuitive. After all, if from army training manuals to state- deterrent.9 Australia had, in fact, the allies had sufficient stocks of ments by the prime minister.4 One hosted British nuclear tests on its ter- nuclear weapons for every contin- of the more authoritative assess-

2 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh gency imaginable, Australia would 1958, and September 1958), the Min- cision to approach the United King- not need nuclear weapons of its own. istry of Defence—often at the urg- dom was not the first time Austra- Australian military and political lead- ing of the Air Service—sought to lian leaders had expressed an interest ers drew a different conclusion, how- revive the issue of nuclear weapons in nuclear weapons, but it did repre- ever, and they did so for two reasons. procurement. sent the first formal finding that Aus- 17 First, Australia’s military officers tralia should procure them. argued that if Australia were going Attempts to Buy the Bomb Following the Defence to be a full and respected participant Australia first formally considered Committee’s recommendation to in collective security arrangements the subject of “a nuclear weapons seek tactical nuclear weapons, the such as the Australian, New capability for Australian forces” in Defence Department pressed Aus- Zealand, United States security 1956.13 The initial proposal to seek tralian Prime Minister Robert treaty of 1951 (ANZUS) or the nuclear weapons came from Athol Menzies to follow through on the rec- Southeast Asia Collective Defense Townley, the minister for air, who ommendation.18 In March 1957, the Treaty (SEATO), then they had to wrote to the defence minister re- Australian government met with Sir be able to deploy and use the same questing that Australia procure Dermot Boyle, the British Air Chief, weapons as their allies or face being nuclear bombs for the RAAF’s and Lord Carrington, Britain’s For- relegated to a secondary role, with Canberra and Avon Sabre aircraft.14 eign Secretary for Commonwealth attendant diminution of status and While Townley and his successor Relations. Prime Minister Menzies political leverage. Second, if one pushed the idea among their minis- and the Commonwealth’s ministers believes that tactical weapons are terial colleagues, Air Marshal F. R. for defence and external affairs really high-end conventional weap- W. “Shug” Scherger lobbied his fel- asked the visiting delegation whether ons, then it becomes easier to imag- low service officers in Australia and Britain could “supply” Australia with ine their use as instruments for Britain. Marshal Scherger was chief atomic weapons. Boyle was pessi- war-fighting. And indeed, Australian of the air service and Australia’s mistic—”hardly a hope,” he said, but leaders espoused this view. In a most enthusiastic advocate of a he suggested to his hosts that the world of limited nuclear wars, Aus- nuclear weapons capability. Australian government “put in a for- tralia did not want to find itself at a mal request to see what would hap- The RAAF was not, however, the disadvantage. pen.”19 only service that favored a nuclear The Ministry of Defence’s inter- capability. Indeed, there seems to At this point, Prime Minister est in nuclear weapons was shared have been a general belief among Menzies and his minister for exter- by other elements within the Aus- military officers that Australia should nal affairs were probably happy to tralian government. Indeed, have access to nuclear weapons. As let the issue lie. Menzies had raised Australia’s efforts to acquire nuclear a memo by the secretary of the De- the question of atomic weapons with weapons were, first and foremost, a fence Department noted, the posses- the United Kingdom, but it is clear consequence of lobbying by the de- sion of nuclear weapons was “a that he had no enthusiasm for the fense establishment (particularly the question of very considerable impor- project. Menzies, Australia’s long- Royal Australian Air Force tance to the Australian Services.”15 est serving prime minister, was a tra- (RAAF)), the civilian atomic energy ditionalist, a man who had a strong In November 1956, the Cabinet’s authority, and the Ministry of Sup- affection for the status quo. He Defence Committee concluded that ply. It was the air service that first would have preferred that Australia “the effectiveness of all three Aus- recommended the procurement of continue as it always had, relying for tralian Services would be consider- nuclear weapons and shepherded the its defense on its “great and power- ably increased if they were equipped concept through the policy process. ful friends.”20 with low yield KT nuclear weapons.” Every time the proposal was derailed, The Defence Minute went on to rec- Given Menzies’s views, it is not it was the Ministry of Defence that ommend that “an initial approach be surprising that a decision to move took action to put it back on track. made to the United Kingdom for forward bogged down in the Prime On four different occasions (No- agreement to obtain such weapons Minister’s Department for eight vember 1957, February 1958, August to be held by Australia.”16 The de- months.21 The indefatigable Air

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Marshal Scherger was not content along the decision process,25 and in Instead of warheads, Macmillan of- to let matters languish, however. In all, two proposals, were considered. fered to make more information about August 1957, he made a direct, if in- One proposal was made by Philip nuclear weapons available to the 29 formal, request to the British air mar- Baxter, the chairman of the AAEC, Australian military. shal regarding the purchase of who presented a plan for the con- Refusing to Take “No” for an tactical nuclear weapons—a request struction of a facility at Mt. Isa for Answer that, in all likelihood, was made with- the production of weapons-grade plu- The Menzies-Macmillan meeting out the knowledge of the Australian tonium. Baxter argued that Britain prime minister.22 This time, the Brit- had produced no tangible results, but could collaborate in the project, that apparently did not discourage ish air marshal was much more opti- thereby providing the United King- mistic about Australia’s chances, and Australia’s bomb advocates. The dom with an independent source of Defense Committee, meeting eight Scherger quickly reported the news fissile material—while at the same to Canberra. In Scherger’s version days after the prime ministers’ meet- time enabling Australia to achieve the ing, recommended that the matter be of events, however, it was Boyle that basis for a nuclear weapons pro- suggested the purchase of atomic reopened with the British govern- gram. Baxter’s plan was rejected in ment.30 At the Defence Committee weapons: favor of the Defense Committee’s Sir Dermot stated that meeting, the services presented a ...[he] thought that the UK original proposal to purchase tacti- united front: would be able and glad to cal nuclear weapons from Britain.26 The three Chiefs of Staff all make such weapons avail- expressed the view that able to us. I suggested that... The British leader arrived in Aus- Australia should seek to ac- the United Kingdom would tralia in January 1958, and Prime quire nuclear weapons (as no doubt desire to keep such Minister Menzies dutifully raised the distinct from developing a weapons under their own nuclear production capac- control.... Sir Dermot’s re- issue of nuclear weapons for Aus- ity), either under our own ply to this was [that] it may tralia. As the memorandum of the control or by some arrange- be possible for us to buy the Menzies-Macmillan conversation ment whereby we could be weapons straight out.23 assured that nuclear weap- A month later, in September, the Brit- reveals, Menzies’s approach to ons would be available for ish air marshal wrote to Scherger, Macmillan was soft, even by diplo- our defence.31 promising him that the U.K. chiefs matic standards: Menzies and Macmillan met for Mr. Menzies raised for dis- of staff would back Australia’s re- cussion the desirability or the second time on February 11, 1958, quest: not of countries other than and again discussed nuclear weap- This is to confirm what I told the three major Powers hav- ons for Australia. The British prime you on the telephone today, ing their own nuclear capa- namely that the Chiefs of bility. He said it may be minister voiced the view that any Staff have agreed that, possible for Australia to de- transfer of nuclear weapons infor- should the Australian Gov- velop a capacity and that mation or technology should be post- ernment decide to build up a there may be internal pres- nuclear bomber force, the sures in that direction, e.g., poned until after the U.S. Congress Chiefs of Staff would sup- from the Atomic Energy au- had finished its revisions of the port the purchase of nuclear thority [sic]. He held con- McMahon Act. Macmillan feared weapons from this country siderable personal doubts by the Australian Govern- about the wisdom of any that British-Australian nuclear coop- ment....24 such action....27 eration might spook the Congress, With the change in the British po- Having finally broached the sub- leading it to renege on promises to sition, the Department of Defence ject with Macmillan, Menzies was loosen the law’s restrictions on the stepped up its interdepartmental lob- probably satisfied with the response sharing of nuclear information with bying efforts. The department’s cam- he received. The British prime min- allies. The British leader offered paign was aided by the fact that ister replied that the United States little beyond saying “that he saw no British Prime Minister Macmillan wanted no additional nuclear pow- objection to an examination between was scheduled to visit Canberra in ers and that the United Kingdom the two air forces of the technical January. This impending visit pro- eventually hoped to rely on Ameri- facilities side of using nuclear weap- vided a deadline that helped push can nuclear weapons through a “key ons in the South West and East Asian 32 [to] the cupboard” arrangement.28 area.”

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The Defense Committee met the in some detail...[and asked] British officials realized that the how the United Kingdom following day on February 12, and might respond to an Austra- transfer of nuclear weapons to Aus- concluded that Australia “require[s] lian approach for the supply tralia would raise a number of thorny additional information before [it] can of tactical weapons.35 issues, including the “4th power examine the practicability or the de- Jones answered that he thought problem” and the U.K.’s nuclear sirability of possessing a nuclear ca- the British “response would be very cooperation agreements with the pability....”33 This was a step down favorable,” but that American re- Americans. These agreements re- from the Committee’s original find- strictions associated with the quired U.S. approval before Britain ing two years earlier. What once was McMahon Act might still be a prob- could transfer American-related in- a request for nuclear weapons be- lem.36 Toward the end of his con- formation and technology. Despite came a request for information about versation with Aubrey Jones, these potential problems, the govern- nuclear weapons. Menzies returned to the subject of ment was disposed to helping the Ignoring these setbacks, senior fig- nuclear weapons: Australians. In part, this reflected ures in the Australian military per- Mr. Menzies remarked that Australia’s status as a Common- while he had no ambition to wealth cousin, but British sympathies sisted. They appear to have see Australia equipped with continued their back channel discus- strategic nuclear weapons... were also a consequence of more sions with British defense officials. he felt that possession of parochial interests, including a desire some tactical nuclear weap- to sell Australia the British airplanes These end runs so infuriated Menzies ons would be inescapable.37 that in April 1958, he had his defence that would deliver the a-bombs. Those who supported nuclear minister issue a rather remarkable The “bomber sales” argument was weapons procurement had to be edict barring further discussion of the first raised by British Air Marshal heartened. The British were back in matter: Boyle,38 who successfully persuaded play, and Prime Minister Menzies No further action is to be his fellow chiefs of staff to endorse, taken by the Defence Com- was pressing their cause with unex- in principle, a proposal to sell nuclear mittee or Chiefs of Staff pected vigor. Indeed, the situation weapons to the Australians. When Committee or the individual was more promising than the Aus- Chiefs of Staff to initiate dis- the Ministry of Defence rendered its cussions with United King- tralians realized. dom authorities concerning judgment on the proposal, the eco- the possibility of nuclear The British Position: Keeping it a nomic argument was explicitly cited. weapons being made avail- Commonwealth Affair From the viewpoint of Com- able to us until specific ap- monwealth relations there proval is given by me....34 When the procurement of tactical was advantage in our sup- nuclear weapons was first proposed, plying the bombs: it would In early July 1958, the U.S. Con- many officials in Australia doubted also be economically advan- gress passed its amendments to the tageous, since apart from the that Britain would share its atomic McMahon Act, thus clearing the bomb purchase, Australia assets. British archival documents would have to purchase a way for further discussions of U.K.- suggest, however, that the United bomber force and might Australian nuclear cooperation. A well be disposed to obtain Kingdom was favorably disposed to month later, Menzies and other mem- this from us if we supplied Australian requests for assistance the bombs.39 bers of the Cabinet raised the issue with nuclear weapons. Indeed, the with Aubrey Jones, Britain’s visiting The Commonwealth Relations Of- only thing more surprising than minister of supply. According to the fice (CRO), in a brief for the Cabi- Australia’s interest in nuclear weap- memorandum of conversation, net, also cited the benefit of bomber ons was Britain’s willingness to pro- Menzies asked about nuclear war- sales.40 The CRO’s main concern, vide them. In their dealings with heads for Australia. however, was the state of British- Mr. Menzies inquired Australians, British officials were Australian relations. Britain did not whether any scheme is con- cautious, preferring not to signal their want to lose leverage with Austra- templated whereby Austra- interest until the details were worked lia might secure vehicles and lia. After the Menzies-Macmillan warheads. Mr. Townley re- out, but, in fact, key ministries in Lon- meetings, the ministry wrote to the marked that this was a ques- don supported the transfer of nuclear Deputy High Commission for Aus- tion he proposed to take up weapons. tralia and described their concerns:

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 5 Jim Walsh

We know however that Sir than ever turn their eyes east- minister’s reluctance to acquire P. McBride and the Chief of 44 Air Staff... are quite keenly ward.” Following the Menzies- nuclear weapons and the Defence interested in starting up dis- Jones meeting in August 1958, the Ministry’s interest in pursuing them: cussions about nuclear ministry suggested that upcoming Our interest is in the tactical weapons either with us or weapons field and actual the Americans sooner rather British-Australian talks on nuclear possession of the weapon than later. There is certainly weapons should: does not arise at this stage. a risk that, if we make no ...be on the implied under- We are anxious, however, move ourselves, the Austra- standing that we shall in due for information which would lians may... come up with a course be prepared to sup- enable us to explore further proposal... [for] the Ameri- ply the Australians with the possibility of possessing cans. It is very important whatever it is that we have a nuclear capability and to that we should do whatever to offer. The discussions plan adequately our defense we can to ensure that the should be in terms of com- preparedness in the fu- Australians go British over plete weapons systems such ture.48 any equipment connected as O. R. 339 with Kiloton with nuclear weapons.... armament and develop- Menzies and Macmillan agreed [. ] In short, from the point ments of Bloodhound with that the next step would be discus- 45 of view of United Kingdom/ nuclear warhead. sions between the two air staffs. Air Australian relations, it would be a great pity if we ‘put this Across all three British minis- Marshal Scherger, who was already subject to bed’ for too tries—supply, defence, and common- scheduled to go to the United King- long.41 wealth relations—one sees a desire dom, departed for London to discuss The CRO view was succinctly for Australia to be seen as “a poten- nuclear weapons. The prime minis- stated by Secretary of State for Com- tial supplier.” To keep the Austra- ter was explicitly assured by the min- monwealth Relations in a letter to lians from shopping elsewhere, it was ister of air that Scherger would not Prime Minister Macmillan. “I am considered “very desirable to keep discuss the transfer of nuclear weap- sure it is right,” surmised the secre- the Australians in play.”46 Perhaps ons, but instead, would only collect tary, that “we should encourage this is why some two weeks after information about nuclear weap- [Australia] to look to us as their po- the August 1958 Menzies-Jones ons.49 These assurances were either tential supplier.”42 meeting, it was Prime Minister not passed on to Scherger or they Macmillan who contacted his Aus- were ignored. In Scherger’s meet- The Ministry of Defence and the tralian counterpart about nuclear ing with G. W. Tuttle, Britain’s deputy CRO were joined by a third ministry, weapons and not the other way chief of the air staff, he explicitly the Ministry of Supply. Writing to around. raised the issue of procurement. In the prime minister, the minister for I hear that when Aubrey fact, at one point in the conversa- supply explained that: Jones met your Cabinet, the I appreciate the many diffi- subject of nuclear weapons tion, Scherger suggested a possible culties in which the supply came up. [....] If you think pricing scheme, suggesting that the of these weapons would in- that the time has now come Australians “should pay for the volve us.... I do, however, to take matters further, I 50 think it desirable that the should be very glad to see weapons they used.” Australians should continue what could be done.”47 Scherger was probably encour- to regard us as their poten- tial supplier, and I would like In March 1957, the Australian gov- aged by his trip, but once back home, to inform their Minister for ernment first raised the issue of little seems to have come of it. In- Supply that we would look nuclear weapons with the United deed, it appears that by 1959, the sympathetically at any re- quest they might make and Kingdom. Remarkably, a year later, drive for Australian nuclear weap- do our best to overcome the it was the British who were raising ons had stalled.51 The government’s serious difficulties it would the issue with the Australians. reluctance to pursue the matter was involve.43 A Temporary Retreat evident in November 1959, when the As in other ministries, officials in Cabinet decided against asking the supply worried that in the absence Menzies responded to British to share information from a of a positive response “the Austra- Macmillan’s letter three days later new round of nuclear tests that were lians may feel that they are being with a note drafted by the minister planned for an Australian test site. brushed off altogether and will more of defence. It reflects both the prime The decision was based on the “gen-

6 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh eral policy that it is desirable to limit ers—the Valiant, Victor, and volves the British Bloodhound. The nuclear weapons capabilities to the Vulcan—constituted the United Bloodhound, described as a surface- few major powers.”52 Kingdom’s main nuclear strike to-air guided missile, was developed 54 Undaunted, the Ministry of De- force. Australia’s inquiry, Boyle by the British at the Woomera test fence pushed on. In lieu of a politi- noted, made “no specific mention of range in Australia. As originally con- cal decision favoring acquisition, atomic bombs,” but “was an indica- ceived, there were to be three stages military advocates of nuclear weap- tion of current Australian inter- of development. The Mark I and 55 onry shifted their focus to an area est....” Scherger, the Australian Mark II would be carry conventional over which the Cabinet had less con- air marshal, again raised the issue of warheads, and the Mark III would 61 trol: the procurement of delivery sys- a V bomber in September of 1958, carry a nuclear warhead. Indeed, tems. when visiting London on his nuclear the Bloodhound Mark III was de- fact-finding trip.56 Australian inter- signed as “a weapon which is only est was sufficiently serious that Brit- effective with a nuclear warhead.”62 The Search for Nuclear- ish officials even discussed the Capable Delivery Systems In 1960, Australia was shopping possibility of leasing the aircraft to for missiles to shore up its northern Australian proponents of nuclear 57 the RAAF. defenses. The air and defence min- weapons had, from the beginning, By 1960, interest in nuclear ca- istries narrowed the choice to two sought not only warheads but also pable aircraft shifted from the V options: the American Nike and the their means of delivery. The original bomber to the TSR-2.58 The TSR-2 British Bloodhound. According to idea was to retrofit the RAAF’s fleet was supposed be Britain’s most so- British documents, the Australians of Sabres and Canberra bombers phisticated plane, and Australian de- were disposed to the Nike because with tactical nuclear weapons, but fence officials were inclined to favor it was already nuclear-capable and like any air force, the RAAF had al- it over its competitor, the American less expensive than the Blood- ready begun planning for future, F-111. When the Australian and Brit- hound.63 nuclear-capable platforms. It hoped ish defence ministers met in July 1961, to acquire new bombers, strike air- The British Ministry of Defence Australia made clear the reason for craft and surface-to-air guided mis- was anxious to sell the Bloodhound its interest in the plane: to the Australians. U.K. officials siles—each with an ability to deliver [Australian Defence Minis- nuclear weapons. Some British ob- ter] Townley’s point was feared that if the Australians rejected servers speculated that the govern- that, if Australia were to buy the Bloodhound, other potential cus- the T.S.R.II, they would wish tomers would do likewise. After all, ment was seeking nuclear-capable to be sure that nuclear delivery systems because their ac- weapons would be available the weapon had been designed in quisition would increase the chances for use from it if the need Australia, although without Austra- 59 that the United Kingdom would trans- should arise. lian participation.64 In London, the fer nuclear weapons.53 This section In time, the TSR-2 ran into tech- Ministry of Defence decided to details Australia’s search for a nical and financial difficulties, and the mount a full-court press in order to nuclear delivery system. As Aus- British government eventually can- save the program.65 tralian documents make plain, the air celed the project in 1965. Perhaps The Australians were eventually service’s efforts to acquire a nuclear- sensing these problems, the Austra- persuaded to go with the Blood- capable delivery system were directly lians opted for the F-111 and signed hound. Within the year, however, the linked to their hopes for acquiring a deal with the United States in 1963. British Treasury put the Bloodhound nuclear weapons. The F-111 could carry nuclear weap- on its hit list, declaring that Mark III Bombers and Strike Aircraft ons, a fact not lost on the Australian (the nuclear version) would be ter- 60 buyers. minated. British Defence officials In January 1958, the British air Missiles protested. They argued that the Aus- marshal reported to his fellow chiefs tralians bought into Bloodhound pre- of staff that Australia had inquired Perhaps the most interesting epi- cisely because the third stage about the purchase of a “V” bomber. sode in Australia’s search for a consisted of a nuclear missile.66 To In the 1950s, the British V bomb- nuclear weapons delivery system in-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 7 Jim Walsh cancel the program, they suggested, ally armed country with conven- event of important countries in the general Pacific and might seriously damage British-Aus- tional aspirations. What neither the India Ocean areas acquiring tralian relations. Defence lost the bomb advocates nor opponents an- nuclear capability.71 ticipated, however, was that world argument, and the Mark III was can- On June 13, 1961, the Cabinet en- events would soon put the nuclear celed. dorsed Menzies’s recommendation The British Ministry of Defence issue back on the agenda. (Decision 1383), authorizing a reply now worried about possible reper- to the British request that sought cussions. Their concern was that Nuclear Weapons on-Demand “recognition now of the United Australia would no longer purchase Trying to Beat the Test Ban Kingdom’s obligation to provide Aus- U.K. defense items, and that it might In 1961, negotiations over a tralia, if ever necessary, with a 72 adversely influence negotiations over Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) nuclear capability.” In his letter to continued use of the Woomera test again put the nuclear question before Macmillan, Menzies suggested that 67 range. To make up for the Blood- the Australian Cabinet. Work on the Britain either supply “full manufac- hound incident, members of the De- test ban had begun in the late 1950s, turing data for the production of op- fence Ministry’s Strategic Exports but by 1961, negotiations between the erational weapons” or “a more Committee suggested that Australia three nuclear powers—the United practical arrangement... for the sup- 73 be allowed to participate in British States, the Soviet Union, and Brit- ply of ready-made weapons.” research and development of atomic, ain—had stalled. In an effort to re- To the Edge and Back biological, and chemical weapons. A vive the talks, London asked In his reply, the British prime min- similar proposal had been suggested Canberra for permission to offer lis- by the CRO the year before. In fact, ister expressed sympathy for the tening posts in Australia to the So- Australian position but explained that when the chair of the exports com- viet Union as part of a new round of mittee visited Washington, he various British-American agree- diplomatic proposals. Earlier in the ments precluded him from granting “sounded the Americans about Aus- negotiations, the Soviet Union had tralian association with Anglo/U.S. the Australian request without first insisted that the treaty include listen- consulting the Americans. He of- co-operation in development, but the ing posts in Australia, since Austra- 68 fered to go to the Americans on Americans had not reacted.” It is lia had hosted a number of British unclear what became of the pro- Australia’s behalf and suggested that, nuclear tests.70 posal. What is clear, is that the in the meantime, the British govern- Bloodhound affair did not dissuade The Australian Cabinet took up ment could provide a briefing on Australian officials from seeking the issue of the NTBT and listening nuclear strategy and tactics.74 nuclear weapons. Not a year had posts in Australia at the behest of On its face, the message was en- passed since the Bloodhound affair Prime Minister Menzies. Interest- couraging, but vague. It is not known when Australians again began can- ingly, Menzies—who three years how the message was interpreted by vassing British officials for help in earlier had been reticent to raise the the Australians. In all likelihood, the the nuclear field.69 subject—now argued that Australia Australians again underestimated should insist on a nuclear weapons Yet, despite of all these efforts, Britain’s willingness to help Austra- on-demand agreement in return for Australia was no closer to acquiring lia secure access to nuclear weap- joining the NTBT. a nuclear weapon. Efforts by de- ons.75 fence, supply, and the AAEC did not Menzies then suggested that Aus- After receiving Macmillan’s mes- alter a basic political reality: tralia: sage, the Cabinet proceeded with its ...secure now from the Australia’s Cabinet, and most par- United Kingdom recognition plan to send the same proposal to the ticularly Prime Minister Menzies, of an obligation to allow United States, in the person of Sec- had backed away from the nuclear Australia the right of access retary of State Dean Rusk. Before option. In spite of the efforts of to United Kingdom nuclear weapon ‘know how’ (or the letter could be delivered, how- nuclear proponents, it appeared that preferably... the right to ever, outside events intervened. On Australia had returned to its previ- draw on the U.K. nuclear the first day of September—the very weapons stockpile) in the ous posture—that of a convention- week that the letter to Rusk was to

8 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh

be delivered—the Soviet Union re- facture. Beginning in 1964, the Aus- this regard was Johnson’s announce- sumed atmospheric testing. The tralian government began to think ment of a unilateral halt in the bomb- United States and the Soviet Union seriously about what it would take to ing of North Vietnam and his decision continued to participate in test ban develop an Australian bomb. This not to seek reelection. American negotiations, but the prospect of an section describes the government’s documents from the period describe agreement looked dim.76 After the initial steps to strengthen its nuclear the effect this way: Soviet test, the Australian govern- option. One of Australia’s ‘power- ful friends,’ the U.K., was ment immediately decided to stop preparing to leave the scene. delivery on the letter to U.S. secre- Australian Perspectives Would the other, the U.S. tary of state.77 The demise of the also drift away? [ .] In the decade between 1963 and test ban meant there would be no lis- [Prime Minister] Gorton told 1973, Australia’s security declined in the Liberal Party caucus and tening posts on Australian territory, relative terms as a consequence of the press that he was con- and thus no threat to Australia’s vinced there would be a three major changes in the interna- nuclear option. major U.S. retrenchment in tional environment. The first was Asia—possibly amounting to Five days after the Soviet test, on China’s entry into the nuclear club. a return to pre-World War II isolationism—under the September 6, 1961, Menzies wrote Australian defense analysts believed next U.S. administration, and back to the British prime minister. that it would be years before China that this might well necessi- After acknowledging the constraints could deploy a “serious” nuclear ar- tate abandonment of ‘the Menzies concept of forward posed by British-American cooper- senal, but found the development dis- defense’ in favor of ‘an ative arrangements, Menzies replied turbing nonetheless. Australia Israeli-type defence to Macmillan’s offer to lobby the considered China the most alien and scheme.’84 Americans. Menzies suggested that potentially menacing of the area’s In less than five years, Australia’s the British prime minister put off the regional players.80 At the level of the most feared great power threat matter for now, and instead wait for formal decisionmaking process, it (China) had acquired nuclear weap- a time “when circumstances are was the presence of a Chinese ons, and its two most important al- more propitious.”78 nuclear capability that became the lies (Britain and the United States) From September 1961 until after entry point for arguments about Aus- had reduced their regional security the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, it tralian nuclear weapons. commitments, with the former with- appears that the Australian govern- The second event of consequence drawing completely. Most Austra- ment took no additional steps to ac- in this decade was Britain’s decision lian leaders did not see an immediate quire access to nuclear weapons. It to withdraw its troops from the Pa- threat to Australian security, but did reaffirm its right to possess cific. No forces “east of the Suez” many felt more uncertain and anx- nuclear weapons, however. In early meant that nuclear and convention- ious about Australia’s future. 1962, for example, when a U.N. ally equipped British military units in These changes in the security en- General Assembly resolution called Malaysia and Singapore would no vironment coincided with changes in on countries to publicly renounce longer be available for the defense political leadership, in particular the atomic arms, Australia demurred. of Australia. The move represented retirement of Prime Minister Menzies The best the government could of- a major change for the worse in and the eventual ascension of John fer was that it “had no plans to manu- Australia’s strategic position.81 Gorton. Gorton represented a signifi- facture or acquire the weapons.”79 The third and potentially most cant change in the defense views of threatening change in Australia’s Australia’s executive. Gorton was THE INDIGENOUS security environment was American a supporter of nuclear weapons for CAPABILITY PHASE (1964- disengagement from Vietnam.82 Australia, and it was he who first 1972) Australia’s participation in the Viet- announced plans to expand From the mid-1950s to early 1960s, nam War was intended to keep the Australia’s nuclear infrastructure. Australian interest in nuclear weap- United States in Asia, but the Ameri- Nuclear weapons fit well with ons centered on the procurement of cans had grown weary of wars in Gorton’s grand strategy, and they weapons, not on indigenous manu- far-off jungles.83 The key event in were favored by politicians who sup-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 9 Jim Walsh ported his bid for power.85 indifferent, this scientific bu- posed itself on the Cabinet’s agenda. reaucracy would probably What had not changed during this have determined policy.91 Early in 1966, the United States sub- period was the fact that important mitted a request to the Australian gov- These three elements—changes in ernment, asking that its bilateral constituencies within the Australian the security environment, the rise of government were still lobbying for an safeguards arrangements with Aus- Gorton, and continued lobbying by tralia be transferred to the Interna- Australian nuclear weapons capabil- pro-nuclear government officials— ity. The institutions that had favored tional Atomic Energy Agency spurred Australia’s interest in an in- (IAEA). Australia maintained a nuclear weapons acquisition in the digenous capability. It also set the 1950s and early 1960s—the Minis- small nuclear infrastructure includ- stage for an intense intra-govern- ing two research reactors: a 10 try of Defence, the Department of mental struggle over the one issue Supply, the AAEC—were again at megawatt (MW) heavy-water that would forever determine moderated, enriched-uranium re- work supporting a nuclear option in Australia’s nuclear future: the NPT. the late 1960s and early 1970s. Com- search reactor (HIFAR) and a mentators at the time pointed to what smaller graphite and water moder- Rethinking the Australian ated reactor for physics experiments they called a “bomb lobby” and of- Bomb ten described the debate over nuclear (MOATA). technology as a battle between min- After the Chinese atomic test and Holt’s government opposed the istries or departments.86 Britain’s first substantive steps to move “for fear [that] it would com- reduce its presence in Asia, Austra- By the mid-1960s, the AAEC be- promise a future nuclear weapons lian decisionmakers revisited the program.”96 In particular, the Aus- came the leading voice on nuclear question of nuclear weapons, and for 87 tralians feared the prospect of IAEA affairs. The chair of the AAEC the first time, seriously considered the was Sir Philip Baxter, credited by inspectors roaming the country at development of an indigenous will—a concern that later resurfaced friend and critic alike for his bureau- 92 nuclear weapons capability. China during the debate over the NPT.97 cratic acumen and influence over detonated its first nuclear device on government policy. He was said to Australia’s opposition to the safe- October 16, 1964. Three years ear- guards transfer was not expressed be “the dominant bureaucratic lier, Prime Minister Menzies had ex- 88 to the Americans, but it was suffi- nuclear policy advisor.” Baxter plicitly identified nuclear weapons personally supported the concept of ciently strong that members of the acquisition by a regional power as a Cabinet thought it would be prefer- an Australian nuclear weapons ca- condition that could trigger an Aus- pability and, perhaps more impor- able to close the Lucas Heights re- tralian decision to seek nuclear search reactor rather than comply tantly, viewed the military’s interest 93 weapons. The official Australian with the request.98 The Holt in nuclear weapons as consonant response to the Chinese test was with the AAEC’s need to expand its government’s initial strategy was one muted, but a year later, in October of delay, until it could conduct a study programs and budget.89 A Defence- 1965, the Cabinet ordered a study re- of the likely impact of the change. AAEC alliance in support of a examining the nuclear option. Part nuclear weapons capability repre- Finally, in June, the Cabinet agreed of the study, a cost estimate of an to the request, but “only after being sented, therefore, a “co-incidence of indigenous weapons program, was desires.”90 Looking back, George reassured by defence officials that conducted by the Department of acceptance of the IAEA safeguards Quester described the role of the Supply and the Australian Atomic AAEC this way: ‘would not directly affect a weap- Energy Commission.94 99 Australia was thus close to ons program.’” becoming a country in which When Menzies retired three a small group of nuclear About the same time, the minister physicists could physically months later, in January 1966, Harold of national development proposed to prepare a de facto nuclear- Holt became prime minister. the Cabinet that Australia construct weapons option and veto a Menzies’s retirement gave bomb legal renunciation of such a nuclear power reactor. The plan weapons. If the country’s advocates a new opportunity to press was opposed by the Prime Minister’s political climate had re- their cause.95 Indeed, it was not long Department, which was most likely mained favourable or even before the nuclear issue again im- joined by the Treasury.100 On its face,

10 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh

the objective of the plan was to gen- Phillip Bay near Melbourne (and was key regional actors would not join the erate electricity, but according to one never found). The struggle to suc- treaty. report, the “sub-plot of the struggle ceed the prematurely departed prime Prime Minister Gorton asked the centered on the nuclear weapons minister was primarily a battle be- Defence Committee to convene a 101 possibilities of the technology.” In tween two mainstream Liberal Party special “senior level Working Group” the end, the proposal was rejected leaders, Paul Hasluck and William to recommend an Australia re- by the Cabinet. McMahon. When neither minister sponse.107 Interestingly, as consid- Despite the rejection of the power could muster the required votes, the eration of the NPT made its way up plant proposal, the issue of nuclear Liberal-Country Party coalition the organizational ladder, it met ever weapons would not die. In January turned to John Gorton. greater resistance. The 1967 study 1967, the chairman of the U.S. Gorton would become Australia’s requested by Holt and conducted by Atomic Energy Commission, Glenn most pro-nuclear prime minister.105 the Department of Defence’s Joint Seaborg, visited Canberra. As his As a senator, Gorton had given Planning Committee (JPC) was com- diary records, nuclear weapons were Gallois an Aussie twist, asking if pleted in February 1968 and was thus still a live option: Americans would be willing to trade available to the Working Group. The At dinner, Sir Leslie Martin San Francisco for Sydney. He ar- JPC study had concluded that “Aus- (Australian AEC member and scientific adviser to the gued that the government should tralia should be prepared to sign such Department of Defense) “...secure for this country some mea- a treaty.”108 told me that the Government sure of atomic or hydrogen de- But the Working Group report, of Australia was struggling 106 with the decision of whether fense.” Gorton’s doubts about which was completed a month later, to produce a nuclear American and British security guar- was more cautious. It recommended weapon.102 antees had likely grown since his that Australia should indicate “a will- Later the following year, in April early days as a senator. As Gorton ingness to sign the treaty subject to 1967, the minister of national devel- took office, the British informed the understandings, qualifications and Australians that they would acceler- opment announced restrictions on the possible amendments.”109 When the export of Australian uranium. The ate their withdrawal from Asia, and decision reached the Cabinet’s De- minister defended the restriction by U.S. President Johnson stunned the fence Committee, it was anything but saying that Australia needed the ura- world with his March 1968 an- settled. Sir Henry Bland represented nium so that it could pursue a mili- nouncement that he would de-esca- the Department of Defence and tary option without interference from late the bombing of North Vietnam chaired the Committee’s delibera- outside suppliers.103 and not seek another term as presi- tions. Bland took a position very dif- dent. A month later, Holt and the ferent from his own Joint Planning Cabinet’s Defence Committee com- But, as fate would have it, Committee. According to notes missioned a study to assess the pos- Gorton’s ascent and Australia’s taken at the meeting: worsening security position coincided ...it became clear that [Sir sibility of an “independent nuclear Henry] Bland was against capability by manufacture... as well with the arrival of the treaty. Six Australia becoming party to as possible arrangements with our months into Gorton’s tenure, in mid- the Treaty, and was trying 1968, Australia was asked to sign the to steer the discussion ac- allies.” Two reasons were given for cordingly. There was also a the study: “the possibility of the emer- NPT, and thus renounce nuclear disturbing tone from Bland gence of additional nuclear powers,” weapons. that we ought to stand up to and the probability that Australia the Americans more. Baxter [head of the AAEC], would be asked to “subscribe to a Gorton and the NPT took much the same line.110 non proliferation treaty.”104 Like the earlier test ban treaty, the As the Australian government’s How seriously Holt would have NPT was negotiated by the super- attitude evolved, it appears that the pursued the nuclear option is hard to powers and asked the non-nuclear focus increasingly became one of assess. In December 1967, however, countries to give up their nuclear how to get around the Treaty. A the prime minister, an avid sportsman, weapons option. And once again, it then-classified U.S. study from 1968 disappeared while swimming off Port appeared that China, India, and other

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 11 Jim Walsh reported, for example, that: an enrichment facility so that Aus- culed Gorton for making the an- Australia was reluctant to tralia would not have to depend on nouncement in “the most grudging give up her nuclear option, 115 123 and Prime Minister Gorton foreign supplies of nuclear fuel. and graceless manner possible.” expressed concern about the During this same period, Australia As it was, Australia was the second treaty during [Secretary of signed a secret nuclear cooperation to last country to sign the treaty be- State Dean] Rusk’s April 116 124 visit to Canberra. A group agreement with France. It also fore it entered into force. of ACDA and AEC offi- embarked on a project to use peace- At the time, the move was con- cials was sent out, and they ful nuclear explosions for the con- found the Australians very sidered a conspicuous reversal of interested in just how far struction of a harbor at Cape policy. This was not the first time 117 they could go under the Keraudren. Gorton had switched his public posi- treaty toward developing a nuclear-weapons capabil- Gorton’s public skepticism about tion on a major defense and foreign ity....111 the NPT, the government’s plans for policy issue, but it was unexpected, For the next two years, from nuclear expansion, the peaceful nonetheless. Several explanations March 1968 to February 1970, divi- nuclear explosions initiative, and have been offered, all of which are sions over the treaty prevented the France’s reputation in the nuclear based on limited evidence. Some Cabinet from taking any action. By field led some to speculate that Aus- journalists and NPT opponents sug- mid-1969, a majority in the Cabinet tralia had made a decision in favor gested that it was U.S. pressure that 118 125 opposed the treaty, but the apparent of the bomb. That conclusion compelled Australia to sign. Oth- strategy of the NPT opponents was seems unwarranted, but it is fair to ers point to a change of heart within simply not to sign the treaty rather say that 1969 represented a peak the AAEC, the leading opponent to 126 than openly reject it.112 The internal point in efforts to pursue an indig- the treaty. A third explanation 119 debate over the treaty represented a enous nuclear weapons capability. maintains that Gorton’s decision to conflict between two major coali- Reversing Course sign was a matter of intra-party poli- tions. On one side were the prime tics, i.e., a consequence of changes On October 9, 1969, Prime Min- within the ruling Liberal-Country minister, the minister of supply, the ister Gorton officially kicked off his minister of national development (in- Party coalition after the Australian election campaign. In the speech elections of 1969.127 cluding the AAEC), and the minister announcing his candidacy, Gorton of defence. They favored: 1) not declared his opposition to the NPT More persuasive, but far from con- signing the NPT; and 2) building an and promised that, in the absence of clusive, explanations point to two indigenous fuel cycle that would per- major changes, his government would other factors. One is the momen- mit—at some point—the manufac- not sign.120 Four months later, how- tum effect of late NPT signatures ture of nuclear weapons. Their ever, on February 19, 1970, the prime by Switzerland, Italy, Japan, and efforts were opposed by the minis- minister announced that Australia West Germany, “near-nuclear” states ter of external affairs, the minister would in fact sign the NPT.121 His that had been highly critical of the of treasury, as well as dissident ele- announcement, and the subsequent treaty and had been reluctant to re- ments within the Department of De- signature a month later, emphasized nounce their nuclear option.128 Of 113 fence. his reservations about the treaty and particular significance was the Japa- With the issue of the NPT still un- called attention to the withdrawal pro- nese decision: Australia’s announce- resolved, the government launched vision. Gorton went on to explain ment that it would sign came a week 129 a program to build Australia’s nuclear that: after the Japanese signature. The infrastructure. The cornerstone of ...we wish to make it plain West German and Japanese signa- that our decision to sign is this effort was a planned 500 MW tures no doubt strengthened the hand not to be taken in any way of treaty proponents within the Cabi- nuclear power reactor at Jervis as a decision to ratify the Bay.114 In putting the project out for treaty, and of course the net, particularly the Ministry of Ex- treaty is not binding on us un- ternal Affairs, which could argue that bid, government officials insisted that til it is ratified.122 the reactor use natural uranium or, Australia was becoming isolated on 130 alternatively, that it be packaged with Gough Whitlam, leader of the op- the issue. When Japan and West position Australia Labor Party, ridi- Germany signed the NPT, they ver-

12 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh

bally reiterated their concerns about the nuclear infrastructure. maintained Australia’s commitment the treaty and attached a formal set McMahon did not act on NPT ratifi- to abstain from nuclear weapons. of reservations with their signature. cation, but he indefinitely delayed In a four-year period from Prime When Gorton announced that Aus- plans for the nuclear reactor at Jervis Minister Gorton to Prime Minister tralia would sign the treaty, he cited Bay, citing the NPT and cost as rea- Whitlam, Australian nuclear policy 136 the Japanese and German example, sons for suspending the project. had shifted from one of autonomy to declared that the treaty was non-bind- one of renunciation. It would be some ing until ratification, and included a FROM NUCLEAR OPTION years before Australia became a set of reservations with Australia’s TO NUCLEAR ABSTINENCE leader in nonproliferation, but, look- 131 signature. (1972-1973) ing back, the ratification of the NPT Another factor contributing to the McMahon’s tenure as prime min- marked a turning point, a decisive step reversal may have been the particu- ister was short-lived. In a year’s away from nuclear weapons. After lar provisions of the NPT. Language time, McMahon and the Liberal- 1973, the subject of nuclear weap- in the treaty may have given Gorton Country Party were out of office, ons was occasionally discussed, but a reason to sign in order to maintain defeated by Labor in the 1972 elec- it appears that no substantive action his nuclear options. At the time, in- tions.137 The Australia Labor Party was taken in support of a nuclear ternational law stipulated that a treaty had for years, as a matter of opposi- weapons capability.142 Moreover, was not binding until a country rati- tion policy, supported NPT ratifica- Australia’s civilian nuclear infrastruc- fied it.132 According to the NPT, tion, and Labor entered office “with ture remained limited.143 those countries that signed the treaty a well-developed and unequivocal before it went into force were not policy on nuclear proliferation.”138 LEARNING FROM bound by the treaty until ratification, The new prime minister wasted no AUSTRALIA while those that signed the NPT af- time, moving to ratify the treaty and ter it came into force were bound announcing that the Jervis Bay re- Australia and the Conventional from the time of signature.133 Un- actor was officially dead.139 Wisdom derstood from this vantage point, The following year, India detonated Gorton’s signature less than a month Few scholars would have guessed a nuclear device. The test sent po- that Australia wanted nuclear weap- before the treaty came into force, litical shock waves throughout the ons. The surprise elicited by the was a way to preserve the country’s world’s capitals. Australia consid- nuclear options: Australia could sign, Australian case illuminates the fact ered India a key regional power, and that we have certain expectations not be bound by the treaty, and be in India’s entry into the nuclear club— a better position to pursue a nuclear about how states behave. These like China’s a decade earlier—was expectations are based on our core capability.134 unsettling to Australian officials.140 assumptions about international re- Regardless of the reason, it is clear The policy consequences, however, lations. The fact that the Australian that Gorton had no intention of bring- were quite different. The govern- case runs counter to our expectations ing the NPT up for ratification, and ment, led by Labor, did not alter may suggest that there is something he continued with plans for building Australia’s nuclear posture, and, if amiss with those assumptions. In a new power reactor.135 Within the anything, publicly recommitted itself particular, it raises questions about year, however, he was ousted as to the goal of nonproliferation. how we think about nuclear prolif- prime minister by forces within his In elections the following year, the eration. own party. He continued in the gov- Liberal Party won back the govern- ernment as minister of defence, but Most thinking about nuclear pro- ment. Some Liberal leaders had pub- liferation subscribes to a conventional was succeeded as prime minister by licly discussed maintaining a nuclear McMahon, the former minister of the wisdom. The conventional wisdom option, but the change in government treasury and minister of external af- explains a country’s decision to seek did not produce a change in policy.141 or abstain from nuclear weapons in fairs. Despite the Indian test, the new Lib- terms of two analytic categories, McMahon had supported the NPT eral government, led by Malcolm motivation and capability.144 Moti- and was skeptical of plans to expand Fraser (a former minister of defence) vational explanations stress the im-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 13 Jim Walsh portance of security threats and pres- the issue of an indigenous nuclear (e.g., China’s nuclear test) or inter- tige.145 Explanations based on ca- capability. Still, threat does not ex- nal (e.g., a prime minister’s resigna- pability contend that proliferation is plain the earlier procurement efforts tion) were used by bureaucratic a consequence of advances in a from 1956 to 1958. Nor does it ex- actors as opportunities to advance country’s nuclear infrastructure. plain Australian moves away from a their policy preferences. States with little or no technical ca- nuclear weapons capability: i.e., the pability do not consider the develop- Australians did not renounce nuclear Lessons from Down Under ment of nuclear weapons, while weapons because the Chinese gave Whether in history, theory, or states with more advanced nuclear up theirs or because the United policy, Australia’s experience pro- infrastructures find themselves Kingdom canceled its withdrawal vides issues for further consideration. drawn to nuclear weapons—in a (neither of which occurred). As history, it demonstrates the po- moment of crisis or as a result of The motivational model does not tential value of looking in unexpected technical momentum. Motivation perform as expected, but the techni- places. As theory, it highlights the and technical capability are the touch- cal model fares no better. Australia role of people and politics, of the pro- stones for virtually all thinking about maintained only a modest nuclear in- cess tucked in between wanting and nuclear proliferation. The most com- frastructure. It was not pushed to- making a bomb. As policy, the Aus- mon explanations for why states go wards the bomb because it tralian case recommends a broaden- nuclear, or why they remain non- possessed an advanced nuclear ca- ing of the nonproliferation policy nuclear, combine arguments about pability, but neither did its limited tech- agenda beyond its focus on security motivation and capability. nological development dissuade it threats and capability (i.e., security The Australian case raises seri- from aspiring to nuclear weapons. guarantees and export controls), so ous questions about both aspects of Instead, it appears that other in- that other points of leverage—like conventional wisdom. While secu- fluences—bureaucratic politics, bureaucratic politics—can be used rity threats played an important role changes in executive leadership, and to reduce the chance of proliferation. in the government’s deliberations, a the perception of nuclear weapons— The curious case of Australia also longitudinal analysis reveals that provide a better account of Austra- represents one of the more interest- Australia made some of its most per- lian nuclear decisionmaking. Of ing transformations in the history of sistent efforts to acquire nuclear particular importance is the role of nuclear politics. In its own way, it weapons during the period when— bureaucratic politics. Early theories demonstrates the tremendous capac- by all accounts—it enjoyed its high- of nuclear proliferation sometimes ity of states to change their behavior est level of security, that is, from emphasized the role of bureaucratic and beliefs, even on matters as cen- 1956-1961. Moreover, all of politics, but it is a factor that has, until tral as nuclear weapons and national Australia’s moves towards a nuclear recently, been largely ignored.146 survival. weapons option came in spite of the The Australian case provides an in- ANZUS Treaty. Australia then gave Finally, the Australian story illus- structive example of how bureau- trates the extent to which security up the nuclear option and ratified the cratic alignments can either NPT even as its security situation dominates contemporary thinking encourage or discourage the acqui- about proliferation. American schol- deteriorated and grew more uncer- sition of nuclear weapons. Indeed, ars, with rare exception,147 never tain. In short, level of threat and the story of Australian nuclear nuclear policy do not correspond to thought to investigate the Australian decisionmaking can be understood, case. It was assumed that Australia one another. in large measure, as a contest be- had no reason to want nuclear weap- This is not to say that security tween two powerful coalitions: the ons. The issue is not simply that the threats played no role in Australian military and the civilian atomic en- security model fails to explain decisionmaking. It is clear that the ergy agency pushing the nuclear Australia’s experience. A singular Chinese nuclear capability, the Brit- weapons option and the combined focus on security has misled schol- ish withdrawal, and concerns about forces of the Department of Exter- ars, encouraging them into overlook the American commitment did, in nal Affairs and Treasury opposing it. all but theory-confirming examples fact, lead the government to take up Macro events, whether external of nuclear ambition.148 In retrospect,

14 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh

the surprise Down Under says as 5 The Defence Committee was Australia’s most for most of the government’s internal docu- important defense policy making body, “the ments on this subject. much about the contemporary study supreme co-ordinating committee,” and its 14 Townley maintained that tactical nuclear of nuclear decisionmaking as it does recommendations were typically endorsed by weapons were needed for the RAAF’s Canberra about Australia. the Prime Minister and Cabinet. J.L. bombers because the Canberra had “limited Richardson, “Australian Strategic and Defense conventional bomb carrying capacity and, Policies,” in Gordon Greenwood and Norman therefore, limited hitting power. [ .] Hence, Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs 1966- if conventional bombs were used, a large num- 1970 (Vancouver: University of British Co- ber of Canberra sorties would be necessary.” lumbia Press, 1974), p. 267; Alan Reid, The Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13 186- Gorton Experiment (Sydney: Shakespeare Head 5-3; Memo from Athol Townley, Minister for 1 My thanks to a number of people who pro- Press, 1971), p. 191. On the Defence Com- Air, to Philip McBride, Minister for Defence vided helpful comments and support including mittee, see T. B. Millar, Australia’s Defense September 12, 1956, p. 1. William Potter, Ron Lehman, David Fischer, (New York: Melbourne University Press, 1965), 15 Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13 186- Scott Sagan, George Bunn, Kevin Clements, p. 180. 5-3; Memo from the Acting Secretary, to the Chris Wilson, Desmond Ball and Andrew Mack, 6 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/80 58/ Minister [of Defence], Undated, [1958], Not and Clay Moltz. Michael Barletta, in particu- 5155; Memorandum by the Defence Commit- Submitted (Top Secret). lar, was generous with his time and insights. tee, Nuclear Weapons for the Australian Forces, 16 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/23, 57/ Financial support for this research was pro- February 6, 1958, p. 3 (Top Secret - Guard). 4067; Procurement of Nuclear Weapons from vided by the Center for International studies 7 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 20-58, the United States, Report by the Defence Com- at MIT and the Center for Global Security The Outlook for Western Europe, July 29, mittee, Defence Minute 233/1956, November Research at Lawrence Livermore National 1958, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1956, pp. 2-3 (Top Secret). Laboratory. Comments or requests for docu- 1958-1960 (hereafter, FRUS, 1958-1960), 17 Interest in both the military and civilian ments can be sent via e-mail to Volume VII, Part 1, Western European Inte- applications of nuclear technology was first “[email protected].” gration and Security; Canada, (Washington: expressed by Dr. H. Evatt, Minister for Exter- 2 I am deeply indebted to Australia’s Depart- Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 63; nal Affairs under the Chifley government. J. ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and in par- and Editorial Note, in FRUS, 1958-1960, pp. L. Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests ticular, to its highly professional staffs in the 355-356. in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Nonproliferation Section and the Archives 8 Leopoldo Nutti, “Italy and the Nuclear Publications Service, 1985), p. 4. In 1954, Office. The Department’s commitment to Choices of the Atlantic Alliance, 1955-63,” the government asked the United States if openness and scholarship marks an important in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill, eds., Australia would be eligible to participate in the change from past policy. On Australia’s ear- Securing Peace in Europe 1945-62, (New York: kind of “nuclear sharing” initiatives that were lier penchant for secrecy, see Desmond Ball, St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 230. More gen- being discussed within NATO. Alice Cawte, “Australian Defense Decision-Making: Actors erally, see George-Henri Soutou, “Les Accords Atomic Australia: 1944-1990 (Kensington: and Process,” in Desmond Ball, ed., Strategy de 1957 et 1958: Vers une Communaute New South Wales University Press, 1992), pp. and Defense: Australian Essays (London: Strategique et Nucleaire entre la France 106-107. Army documents from that same George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 292-294. L’Allemagne et L’Italie?” in Maurice Vaisse, year indicate that the Australian army was con- Ball, commenting on the “extraordinary closed ed., La France et L’Atome: Etudes d’Histoire ducting defense planning on the assumption nature of the decision-making process,” ob- Nucleaire (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1994), pp. 123- that it would, at some point, have its own served that “Virtually everything pertaining 162. nuclear weapons and would have to fight on a to defence policy in Australia is classified...” 9 On Eisenhower’s “new look,” see, for ex- nuclear battlefield. See for example, Austra- (p. 294). See also B. D. Beddie, “Some Inter- ample, Mark Trachtenberg, History and Strat- lian Archives (ACT): A6456/3 R79/1; The nal Political Problems,” in Australia’s Defense egy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Australian Military Forces Minute Paper, AHQ and Foreign Policy, Australian Institute of Po- 1991), pp. 160-168. On the British strategy Directive - Nuclear Warfare, 1954. In 1956, litical Science (Proceedings of 30th Summer of emphasizing nuclear weapons, see Andrew the Australian military went to their Ameri- School)(Sydney: Angus and Roberston, 1964), J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experi- can counterparts for information regarding the p. 143. ence with an Independent Nuclear Force, 1939- use the atomic weapons by Australia’s Avon 3 Belief that nuclear weapons would spread was 1970 (London: Oxford University Press, Sabre aircraft. Australian Archives (ACT): also common among nuclear advocates during 1972), pp. 95-100. A1945/13 186-5-3; Memo from Athol the indigenous capability phase (1964-1973). 10 On the British nuclear tests in Australia, see Townley, Minister for Air, to Philip McBride, For example, Alan Fairhall, minister of supply Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship: Minister for Defence, September 12, 1956, p. and later minister of defence during this pe- British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia (Lon- 1. riod, expressed the “that the forces of scien- don: HM Stationery Office, 1987); Brian 18 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/23-57/ tific development will ineluctably lead to the Cathart, Test of Greatness (London: John 4067; Letter from Sir Philip McBride, De- spread of nuclear technology and that no Murray, 1994). fence Minister, to Prime Minister Menzies, Treaty can prevent it from being diverted to 11 See, for example, Australian Archives Procurement of Nuclear Weapons for the Aus- possible military use.” The Bulletin (Sydney), (ACT): A1209/23 57/4067, Draft Letter from tralian Forces, December 20, 1956 (Top Se- June 29, 1968, p. 18. the Ministry of Defence, to United Kingdom cret). Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13 4 The Australian army believed that widespread High Commissioner, Canberra, 1957 (Top Se- 186-5-3; Letter from Mr. Casey, Minister for possession of tactical nuclear weapons by en- cret). External Affairs to Sir Philip McBride, Minis- emy and ally alike would require new training. 12 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/80 58/ ter for Defence, Procurement of Nuclear Training would be designed to address the tricky 5155; Memorandum by the Defence Commit- Weapons for the Australian Forces, February “problem of avoiding danger to our own troops tee, Nuclear Weapons for the Australian Forces, 21, 1957, p. 1 (Top Secret). from our own atomic weapons....” Australian February 6, 1958, p. 3 (Top Secret - Guard). 19 Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13,186- Archives (ACT): A6456/3 R79/1; The Aus- 13 The phrase “a nuclear weapons capability 5-3; Extracts from Notes of Meeting in Cabi- tralian Military Forces Minute Paper, AHQ for Australian forces” is the title of the file net Room at Parliament House, Canberra at Directive—Nuclear Warfare, 1954, p. 1. folder series and the key word descriptor used 10:30 AM on Friday, March 15, 1957 (Top

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 15 Jim Walsh

Secret). The problem, Boyle explained, was 5155; Minute by Defence Committee at Meet- 45 Ibid., p. 1. Britain’s limited supply of weapons. ing Held on Thursday, 6th February, 1958, No. 46 Ibid. 20 On Menzies famous phrase, see Alan Watt, 18/1958, Nuclear Weapons for the Australian 47 Australian Archives (ACT): A 18338/269, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy Forces—Plutonium Production in Australia, TS680-10-1; Memorandum from H. D. Ander- 1938-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Agendum No. 16/1958 & Supps 1 & 2 (Top son, External Affairs, to Mr. Heydon, Austra- Press, 1967), pp. 168-169, 245; Desmond Secret). lian Development of Nuclear Weapons and Ball and J. O. Langtry, “The Development of 31 Australian Archives (ACT): A1838/269 Australian Access to Information on Nuclear the Australian Defense Force,” Desmond Ball, TS680-10-1; Memo from H. D. Anderson, Weapons, 8th July, 1959, p. 2 (Top Secret). ed., Strategy and Defense: Australian Essays Defence Liaison Branch to Mr. Heydon, Ex- 48 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/23, 57/ (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. ternal Affairs, Australian Development of 4067; Letter from Prime Minister Menzies to 263. Nuclear Weapons and Australian Access to Prime Minister Macmillan, September 4, 1958. 21 The Defence Department proposal to open Information on Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 49 See, for example, Australian Archives talks with the High Commissioner for the Com- 1959, p. 1 (Top Secret). (ACT): A1945/13 186-5-3, Memo from F. M. monwealth languished in the Prime Minister’s 32 Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13, 186- Osborne, Minister of Air, to P. McBride, Min- Department for eight months, from April 1957 5-3; Minute Paper, Department of Defence, ister for Defence, US and UK Arms Relations to November 1957. Australian Archives (ACT): From the Secretary [Hicks] to the Minister, with Australia, August 26, 1958, p. 1. A1838/269, TS680/10/1; Memo from J. P. Overseas Visit by the Chief of the Air Staff - 50 PRO: D0 35/8287; Note of Conversation Quinn, External Affairs, to Mr. James Plimsoll, Discussions of Atomic Weapons, September between Air Marshal Sir Geoffrey Tuttle and Assistant Secretary of External Affairs, Pro- 3, 1958 (Top Secret). Air Marshal Scherger, [1957], pp. 1-2 (Top curement of Nuclear Weapons for Australian 33 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/23, 57/ Secret). Forces, December 20, 1957, p. 1. 4067; Department of Defence, Inwards Tele- 51 Australian Archives (ACT): A 7941/2, N15; 22 PRO: D0 35/8287; Cabinet: Prime Minister’s printer Message, from Hicks, Secretary of the Note by Defence Department, Question of Commonwealth Tour, Brief by the Common- Department of Defense, to Sir Allen Brown, Nuclear Capability for the Australian Forces, wealth Relations Office, Supply of Kiloton Prime Minister’s Department, Nuclear Weap- June 2, 1961, p. 4 (Top Secret). See also Aus- Bombs to Australia, January/February 1958, ons, September, 4, 1958, p. 1 (Top Secret and tralian Archives (ACT): TS680-10-1; Austra- GEN 622/1/60, December 18, 1957, p. 1. Personal). lian Archives (ACT): A 18338/269; 23 Australian Archives (ACT): A7942/1 N78- 34 Australian Archives (ACT): A 7941/2, N15; Memorandum from H. D. Anderson, External 1; Memo from F. R. W. Scherger, Air Marshal, Note by Defence Department, Question of Affairs, to Mr. Heydon, Australian Develop- C. A. S., to Minister of Defence (Through Nuclear Capability for the Australian Forces, ment of Nuclear Weapons and Australian Ac- Secretary), September 27, 1957, p. 1 (Top June 2, 1961, p. 1 (Top Secret). cess to Information on Nuclear Weapons, 8th Secret). 35 Australian Archives (ACT): A1838/269, July, 1959 (Top Secret). 24 Australian Archives (ACT): A7942/1, N78- TS680-10; Record of Discussions with Mr. 52 Australian Archives (ACT): A 7941/2, N15; 1; Letter from Air Chief Marshal Sir Dermot Aubrey Jones, Minister of Supply in the United Note by Defence Department, Question of A. Boyle, Air Ministry, to Air Marshal F. R. Kingdom Government, 13th August, 1958 (Top Nuclear Capability for the Australian Forces, W. Scherger, Chief of Air Staff, Royal Austra- Secret). June 2, 1961, pp. 2-3 (Top Secret). lian Air Force, September 10, 1957 (Top Se- 36 Ibid. 53 PRO: DO 35/8288; Inward Telegram to Com- cret). 37 Ibid. monwealth Relations Office, No. 621, 13th 25 Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/13, 186- 38 PRO: D0 35/8287; Chiefs of Staff Commit- August , 1959 (Secret). 5-3; Memo from the Acting Secretary [De- tee, Confidential Annex to C.O.S. (57)70th 54 In 1956, the RAAF approached the US air partment of Defence], to Secretary of the Meeting Held on Tuesday, September 10, 1957, force for information regarding the use of tac- Defence Committee, Procurement of Nuclear p. 1 (Top Secret, Specially Restricted Circula- tical nuclear weapons with the Avon Sabre air- Weapons for Australian Forces, January 28, tion). craft. The USAF declined to respond, but about 1958 (Top Secret). 39 PRO: D0 35/8287; Ministry of Defence, a year later, the Americans did agree to study 26 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/80, 58/ Supply of Nuclear Weapons to Australia, the nuclear potential of the Sabre and Canberra 5155; Minute by Defence Committee at Meet- Record of a Meeting held November 18, 1957, bomber. Australian Archives (ACT): A1945/ ing Held on Thursday, 6th February, 1958, No. p. 1 (Top Secret UK Eyes Only, 12/4/57). 13 186-5-3; Memo from Athol Townley, Min- 18/1958, Nuclear Weapons for the Australian 40 PRO: D0 35/8287; Cabinet: Prime Minister’s ister for Air, to Philip McBride, Minister for Forces - Plutonium Production in Australia, Commonwealth Tour, Brief by the Common- Defence, September 12, 1956, p. 1. On the Agendum No. 16/1958 & Supps 1 & 2 (Top wealth Relations Office, Supply of Kiloton American study, see Cawte, Atomic Australia, Secret). Bombs to Australia, January/February 1958, p. 108. On the V bombers, see Pierre, Nuclear 27 Australian Archives (ACT): A7942/1, N78- GEN 622/1/60, December 18, 1957, p.1. Politics: The British Experience with an Inde- 1; Meeting between Mr. Macmillan and Mr. 41 PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from CRO to N. pendent Nuclear Force, 1939-1970, pp. 148- Menzies at Parliament House, Canberra on 29th Pritchard, [Deputy U. K. High Commissioner, 157. January, 1958, Supplementary record for Australia,] May 21, 1958 (s/o Top Secret). 55 PRO: D0 35/8287; Chiefs of Staff Commit- strictly limited circulation, Nuclear Weapons 42 PRO: D0 35/8287; Draft Letter from the tee, Confidential Annex to C.O.S. (58) 4th (Top Secret). Secretary of State for Commonwealth Rela- Meeting Held on Monday, January, 13, 1958 28 Under a “key of the cupboard” arrangement, tions to Prime Minister Macmillan, [Undated] (Top Secret). Great Britain would draw on the American (Top Secret). 56 PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from F. R. Carey, stockpile of atomic weapons as the situation 43 PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from Aubrey Jones, UK Joint Service Liaison Staff, to William S required. Minister of Supply to Prime Minister Bates, Office of High Commissioner for the 29 Australian Archives (ACT): A7942/1, N78- Macmillan, September 10, 1958 (Top Secret). United Kingdom, Canberra, October 31, 1958, 1; Meeting between Mr. Macmillan and Mr. 44 PRO: D0 35/8287; Inward Telegram to Com- p. 2; Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 108. Menzies at Parliament House, Canberra on 29th monwealth Relations Office, from [Brian] 57 PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from Clark, CRO, January, 1958, Supplementary record for Humphrey-Davies, [Air Ministry], to [L. J.] to William S. Bates, Office of High Commis- strictly limited circulation, Nuclear Weapons Dunnet, [Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of sioner for the United Kingdom, Canberra, Janu- (Top Secret). Supply], No. 713, August 14, 1958, pp. 1-2 ary 8, 1959. 30 Australian Archives (ACT): A1209/80, 58/ (Top Secret). 58 PRO: DO 35/8288; Committee Minutes,

16 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh

Ministry of Defence, Co-operation with Aus- to T. W. Keeble, [Head of Defence and West- ert Menzies to the Cabinet, Nuclear Tests Con- tralia in the Development of New Weapons, ern Department, CRO,] Bloodhound, June 9, ference: Control Posts in Australia, Submis- (S.E. (0)C / P(60)25) July 19, 1960, pp. 1, 5 1960, p. 2. sion No. 1156, V6, p. 13 (Secret). (Secret). 67 Memo from N. Pritchard, [Deputy U. K. 72 Australian Archives (ACT): A5818/2; Cabi- 59 PRO: D0 35/8287; Memo from N. Pritchard, High Commissioner, Australia], to S. Scott Hall, net Minute, Canberra, June 13, 1961, Deci- [Acting Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Head of UKMOAS, January 12, 1960, p. 1 sion No. 1383, Submission No. 1156, Nuclear CRO], to the Secretary of State for Common- (Secret). Tests Conference: Control Posts in Australia, wealth Relations, July 20, 1961. pp. 1-2. 68 PRO: DO 35/8288; Committee Minutes, V6 (Secret). 60 Peter Howson, The Howson Diaries: The Life Ministry of Defence, Co-operation with Aus- 73 Australian Archives (ACT): A1838/269, of Politics, Don Aitkin, ed. (Ringwood, Victoria: tralia in the Development of New Weapons, TS852/10/4/2/3; Letter from Prime Minister Viking Press, 1984), p. 386. Beale is more (S.E. (0)C / P(60)25), July 19, 1960, p. 3 (Se- Menzies to Prime Minister Macmillan, June oblique in his explanation for the F-111 pur- cret). On the proposal from the CRO, see 29, 1961, p. 2 (Secret). chase, but a reader familiar with Beale’s efforts PRO: DO 35/8288; Inward Telegram to Com- 74 PRO: DO 164/17; Letter from Prime Minis- to procure nuclear weapons can decipher his monwealth Relations Office, No. 621, August ter Harold Macmillan to Prime Minister Rob- meaning. Beale, This Inch of Time: Memoirs 13, 1959 (Secret). ert Menzies, August 14, 1961. of Politics and Diplomacy, pp. 170-176. By 69 In 1961, Sir Ernest Titterton, visited Lon- 75 For example, see PRO: DO 164/17; Memo choosing the F-111 over the TSR-2, Australia don on behalf of the Ministry of Supply. The from the Secretary of State for Foreign Af- hoped to avoid potential technical and cost purpose of the visit was, in part, to jump-start fairs to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, problems, but the F-111 turned out to be a British-Australian cooperation on nuclear [August 1961], pp. 1-2. huge political headache. The F-111’s devel- weapons. Titterton first met with Roger 76 Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and oped their own technical problems, which led Makins, the head of the United Kingdom Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton to delays, rising costs, and embarrassment for Atomic Energy Authority. According to University Press, 1962), p. 253. a number of ministers. In the end, Australia Makins, Titterton had been “asked by the 77 Australian Archives (ACT): A1838/269, got the planes, but the experience was widely Australian minister of Supply, Mr. Hulme, and TS852/10/4/2/3; Cablegram for Despatch to perceived as an object lesson in how not to by Mr. Knott, the Permanent Secretary at the AUSEMBA Washington, Department of Ex- procure foreign defense technology. On the Ministry of supply” to explore the issue of ternal Affairs, For Ambassador from Minister, F-111 saga, see also Gregory Pemberton, All military nuclear cooperation. Titterton told August 30, 1961 (Top Secret, Guard). the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam (Sydney: Makins that “Depending on the advice Pro- 78 PRO: DO 164/17; Inward Telegram to Com- Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 207-208; Reid, fessor Titterton received, Mr. Hulme might or monwealth Relations Office from Canberra, The Gorton Experiment, pp. 283-285; Craig might not raise matters with Mr. Townley, the No. 808, September 6, 1961 (Top Secret). Skehan, “Strike Bombers Lacked Hitting minister of Defence, and Sir Leslie Martin, the 79 T. B. Millar, “Australia: Recent Ratifica- Power,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 1, Chairman of the Australian Defence Policy tion,” in Robert Lawrence and Joel Larus, eds., 1997 (http://www.smh.com.au/index.html). Committee.” Titterton speculated, however, Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II (Wichita: Uni- 61 PRO: DO 35/8288; Draft Minute from Sec- that the minister of Supply “feels so strongly versity Press of Kansas, 1974), p. 72. retary of State to Prime Minister, March 21, about the matter he that he might in any case 80 On Australia’s fear of China, see Alan Watt, 1960; PRO: DO 35/8288, Outward Telegram see Mr. Menzies and urge that the U.K. should The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, from Commonwealth Relations Office, be approached.” Titterton also cited “...high 1938-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Canberra, No. 471, March 30, 1960 (Top Se- ranking Australian service officers, and De- Press, 1967), pp. 247-248; Gregory Clark, In cret). fense officials [who] were extremely restless Fear of China (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 62 PRO: DO 35/8288; Outward Telegram from about their defence position.” The Australian The Crest Press, 1967), p. 161-206, Alan Commonwealth Relations Office to Canberra, emissary then put the matter directly to Dupont, Australia’s Threat Perceptions: A No. 415, March 15, 1960 (Top Secret). Makins: “Would the United Kingdom react Search for Security (Canberra: Strategic and 63 PRO: DO 35/8288; Memorandum from N. favourably to an official but strictly confiden- Defense Studies Center, Research School of Pritchard, [Deputy U.K. High Commissioner tial approach from Australia requesting infor- Pacific Studies, The Australian National Uni- Australia] to T. W. Keeble, [Head of Defence mation about U.K. nuclear weapons, to enable versity, 1991), pp. 58-59. At the United Na- and Western Department, CRO], Bloodhound, Australia to make certain military studies? Any tions, Sir James Plimsoll explained Australia’s June 9, 1960, p. 2; PRO: DO 35/8288; Inward information given would be kept to a very reservations about a nonproliferation treaty Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, small committee of four or five people.” PRO: by noting that “The authorities in Peking show No. 601, August 5, 1959, pp. 1-2; PRO: DO DO 164/17; Memo from Roger Makins, Chair no repugnance for nuclear war and, in fact 35/8288; Inward Telegram to Commonwealth of the UKAEA, to [E. W.] Playfair, [Perma- flaunt before other countries of the region the Relations Office, No. 621, August 13, 1959 nent Secretary, Ministry of Defence], July 19, willingness to contemplate nuclear war.” Sir (Secret). 1961, p. 1. One day after Titterton met with James Plimsoll, First Committee of the UNGA 64 The British feared that the broader percep- Makins, the CRO reported that the Ministry on March 25, 1965; Current Notes on Interna- tion would be that the Australians had declined of Defence received a letter requesting for in- tional Affairs 36 (October 1965), p. 636. to purchase Bloodhound because they had in- formation about nuclear weapons. It is un- 81 On the impact of the U.K. withdrawal, see side knowledge of the missile’s shortcomings. clear whether the letter came from Titterton T.B. Millar, ed., Britain’s Withdrawal from Asia: 65 PRO: DO 35/8288; Brief for Minister of and the Department of Supply or from an- It’s Implications for Australia, Proceedings of State, Defence Committee Meeting, March other quarter within the Australian govern- a Seminar conducted by the Strategic and De- 9,1960, D. (60)(9), Anti-aircraft Missiles, p. ment. PRO: DO 164/17; Memo from N. fense Studies Centre 29-30 September 1967 1 (Top Secret). PRO: DO 35/8288; Memo from Pritchard, [Acting Deputy Under-Secretary of (Canberra: The Australian National Univer- N. Pritchard, [Deputy U. K. High Commis- State], CRO, to the Secretary of State for Com- sity, 1967). sioner, Australia], to S. Scott Hall, Head of monwealth Relations, July 20, 1961. pp. 1-2. 82 Australia’s military was also concerned, es- UKMOAS, January 12, 1960, p. 1 (Secret). 70 Australian Archives (ACT): A5818/2; Rob- pecially during the first half of the 1960s, with 66 PRO: DO 35/8288; Incoming Telegram, No. ert Menzies to the Cabinet, Nuclear Tests Con- a potential threat from Indonesia. The Sukarno 357, April 1, 1960 (Top Secret); PRO: DO 35/ ference: Control Posts in Australia, Submission government, before it was toppled in 1965, 8288; Memorandum from N. Pritchard, No. 1156, V6, pp. 1-6 (Secret). was perceived as erratic, anti-imperialist (i.e., [Deputy U.K. High Commissioner, Australia], 71 Australian Archives (ACT): A5818/2; Rob- anti-British), and anti-status quo. It declared

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 17 Jim Walsh itself in “confrontation” with Britain over the 1972. 107 Archives of the Department of Foreign federation of Malaysia, and also claimed that 91 George Quester, Politics of Nuclear Prolif- Affairs and Trade: Unregistered document; it would soon possess nuclear weapons. More- eration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Defence Committee, Agendum No. 9/1968, over, with the “liberation” and absorption of Press, 1973), p. 164. Non-Proliferation Treaty, G. L. Prentiss, Sec- West Irian, Indonesia now shared a land bor- 92 Howson, The Howson Diaries..., pp. 181- retary Defence Committee, March 18, 1968 der with Australian territory. 183. (Top Secret). 83 Hedley Bull, “Australia and the Great Pow- 93 Australian Archives (ACT): A5818/2; Rob- 108 Archives of the Department of Foreign ers in Asia,” in Gordon Greenwood and Norman ert Menzies to the Cabinet, Nuclear Tests Con- Affairs and Trade: Unregistered document; Harper, eds., Australia in World Affairs 1966- ference: Control Posts in Australia, Submission Report by the Joint Planning Committee at 1970 (Vancouver: University of British Co- No. 1156, V6, pp. 7-8 (Secret). Meetings Concluding 2nd February, 1968, De- lumbia Press, 1974), p. 348. 94 Archives of the Department of Foreign Af- partment of Defence File No. 67/1017, Re- 84 Scope Paper, Visit of John Gorton, Prime fairs and Trade: Unregistered document; Pa- port No. 8/1968, An Independent Australian Minister of Australia, April 1, 1969, pp. 2, 4, per by Department of Supply and A.A.E.C., Nuclear Capability - Strategic Considerations, attached to Memorandum for Mr. Henry Costs of a Nuclear Explosives Programme, p. Annex, p. 21 (Top Secret AUSTEO). Kissinger, the White House, Subject: Prepara- 3 (Top Secret). 109 Archives of the Department of Foreign tory Meeting for the Visit of Prime Minister 95 Carr, “Australia and the Nuclear Question: Affairs and Trade: Unregistered document; Gorton of Australia, March 14, 1969, Depart- A Survey of Government Attitudes, 1945- Consolidated paper prepared for the Defence ment of State Central Files, 1967-1969, Folder 1975.” Committee, Non-Proliferation Treaty, March Pol 7, 3/1/69, Australia, Box 1842, U.S. Na- 96 “A-Bomb Option Was Prized by Canberra,” 1968, p. 35 (Top Secret), attached to Defence tional Archives. Daily Telegraph, January 1, 1997, p. 16. I am Committee Agendum No. 9/1968, Non-Pro- 85 Gorton’s pro-nuclear views found strong sup- indebted to John Simpson for providing me liferation Treaty, G. L. Prentiss, Secretary port among young and conservative members with the articles related to this episode. Defence Committee, March 18, 1968 (Top of the Liberal Party and with the Democratic 97 Don Greenless, “Options Stay Open on Secret). Labor Party (DLP), a junior member of the Nuclear Arsenal,” Australian, January 1, 1997. 110 Archives of the Department of Foreign Liberal-Country Party coalition. On the DLP 98 “A-Bomb Option Was Prized by Canberra,” Affairs and Trade: Unregistered document; —its views and influence—Lt. Col. F.L. Skin- Daily Telegraph, January 1, 1997, p. 16. Memo from James Plimsoll to Minister of Ex- ner, “An Alternative Defense and Foreign 99 Australian archival documents quoted in Don ternal Affairs, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 21 Policy,” in Max Teichmann, ed., Aspects of Greenless, “Options Stay Open on Nuclear Ar- March 1968, [cover page] (Top Secret). Australia’s Defense (Melbourne: The Politi- senal,” Australian, January 1, 1997. 111 The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament cal Studies Association, Monash University, 100 Don Greenless, “Options Stay Open on Agency During the Johnson Administration 1966); Reid, The Gorton Experiment, pp. 140- Nuclear Arsenal,” Australian, January 1, 1997. (U), Volume I, Summary and Analysis of Prin- 150, 300-332; T. B. Millar, Australian For- 101 Ian Henderson, “Weapons a Sub-Plot in cipal Developments, [1968], pp. 90-91, Ad- eign Policy (Angus and Robertson, 1968), pp. Nuclear Power Plant Story,” Australian, Janu- ministrative History of U.S. ACDA, Box 1-2, 28-29. ary 1, 1997. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library. 86 On the “bomb lobby,” see S. Encel and Allan 102 Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide (Lex- 112 The Bulletin (Sydney), August 2, 1969, p. McKnight, “Bombs, Power Stations, and Pro- ington, MA: Lexington, 1987), p. 252. 23; “About Turn, Nuclear Quick March,” The liferation,” Australian Quarterly 42 (March 103 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, HR, Bulletin (Sydney), February 28, 1970, pp. 21- 1970), p. 15; and Ball, “Australia and Nuclear Vol. 54, April 13, 1967, p. 1214. One news- 22. Policy,” p. 321. On nuclear policy as a fight paper commented that the “Federal Cabinet 113 Ian Fitchett, “Government Split on Signing between ministries, see for example, Millar, appears to have decided in principle that Aus- of Nuclear Agreement,” Sydney Morning Her- “Australia: Recent Ratification,” p. 78; Sydney tralia should edge its way into the world nuclear ald , March 3, 1969 p.1; Jonathan Gaul, “Aus- Morning Herald, February 28, 1970, p. 5; club, or at least insure that it is not going to be tralia Holds Back on Nuclear Treaty,” Canberra Jonathan Gaul, “Politics,” Canberra Times, relegated to minor power status in this part of Times, March 4, 1969, p. 2; The Bulletin March 4, 1969, p. 2. the world if Japan and India seek admission to (Sydney), “Australia (At Last) Goes Nuclear,” 87 For a history of the AAEC, see A. M. Moyal, the club. ...This is the only rational conclusion August 2, 1969, p. 23. “The Australian Atomic Energy Commission: to be drawn from the remarkable statements 114 On the Jervis Bay reactor, see Jonathan A Case Study in Australian Science and Gov- in parliament this week by the Minister for Gaul, “Cabinet Considers $100m Nuclear Sta- ernment,” Search 6, (September 1975), pp. National Development, Mr. David Fairbairn.” tion,” Canberra Times, October 12, 1968, p. 365-383, Cawte, Atomic Australia; Michael Australia Financial Review, April 14, 1967, p. 1. Several people have contended that interest Carr, “Australia and the Nuclear Question: A 6. See also Canberra Times, July 14, 1969, p. in the reactor was motivated, in large measure, Survey of Government Attitudes, 1945-1975,” 9. because of the desire to develop a nuclear weap- Master’s thesis, University of New South Wales, 104 Archives of the Department of Foreign ons option. Carr, “Australia and the Nuclear 1979, p. 110. Affairs and Trade: Unregistered document; Question: A Survey of Government Attitudes, 88 Alan Wood, “Nuclear Differences in Report by the Joint Planning Committee at 1945-1975,” p. 128; Encel and McKnight, Canberra,” Australian Financial Review, July Meetings Concluding 2nd February, 1968, De- “Bombs, Power Stations, and Proliferation,” 15, 1969, pp. 1, 4. partment of Defence File No. 67/1017, Re- p. 16; Ian Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear 89 For a thorough, if decidedly partisan, review port No. 8/1968, An Independent Australian Age: National Defense and National Develop- of Baxter’s statements, see Brian Martin, Nuclear Capability - Strategic Considerations, ment, (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972), Nuclear Knights (Fyshwick: Union Offset Co., p. 1 (Top Secret AUSTEO). pp. 81-82, 110. One newspaper maintained 1980). For an example of his views on nuclear 105 On Gorton’s interest in nuclear weapons, that “Defence was, in fact, the basic justifica- weapons, see Robert Mundle, “We Must Have see Alan Trengove, John Grey Gorton, an In- tion for the project at the time, and received Best Weapons, Says Atom Chairman,” Aus- formal Biography (North Melbourne: Cassel Cabinet support for this reason.” Robert Sorby, tralian, March 20, 1968, p. 3. Australia LTD, 1969), pp. 204, 210; Cawte, “Jervis Bay’s A-Day Deferred Again,” Austra- 90 On the “coincidence of desires,” see Austra- Atomic Australia, p. 116. lian Financial Review, June 23, 1972, p. 1. lian Financial Review, May 14, 1967, p. 6 and 106 Desmond Crowley, ed., “On the Nuclear The Minister of Defence declared in 1968, for Robert Sorby, “Jervis Bay’s A-Day Deferred Threshold,” Current Affairs Bulletin, 45, De- example, that he was “interested in the possi- Again,” Australian Financial Review, June 23, cember 15, 1969, p. 24. bilities of atomic reactors to provide [energy

18 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 Jim Walsh and]...fissionable products on which the future explosives...will provide a basis from which an tions, but Baxter, the predominant force at security of this country might depend.” Australian government, at any future date feel- the AAEC continued to oppose the NPT, and Jonathan Gaul, “Cabinet Considers $100m ing that nuclear weapons were essential to pro- maintained this position even after resigning Nuclear Station,” Canberra Times, October 12, vide this nation’s security could move with the from the Commission in 1972. See Martin, 1968, p. 1. minimum delay to provide such means of de- Nuclear Knights, p. 50, which cites Baxter’s 115 On the desire for an independent fuel cycle, fence.” Australian, July 14, 1969, p. 3. opposition to the NPT as late as 1976. Quester see Alan Wood, “Nuclear Differences in 11 8 On the government’s objections to the NPT reports that the AAEC remained opposed to Canberra,” Australian Financial Review, July as a cover for its nuclear ambitions, see Bull, the Treaty even as it was ratified by a Labor 15, 1969, pp. 1, 4; Alan Wood, Australian “In Support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” government in 1973. See Quester, Politics of Financial Review, July 18, 1969, p. 21. On the p. 27; Richardson, “Australian Strategic and Nuclear Proliferation, p. 165. link between an interest in an independent fuel Defense Policies,” pp. 251-252; Bellany, Aus- 127 Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 128. cycle and an interest in nuclear weapons, see tralia in the Nuclear Age: National Defense 128 Stan Hutchinson, “Australia to Sign Atom Michael Symons, “Who Will Get our Nuclear and National Development, p. 109; David So- Treaty,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 19, Contract?” Sydney Morning Herald, January lomon, “N-treaty: Now Is the Time to Sign,” 1970, p. 1; Robert Howard, “Foreign Policy 2, 1970, p. 2; “Atom Body ‘Pressure’ Allega- Australian, February 10, 1970, p. 9. Skeptics Review,” Australian Quarterly 42 (September tion,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 16, 1969, pointed out that Australia’s objections con- 1970), pp. 115. These four signatures came p. 10. Arguing that natural uranium reactors cerning, for example, the threat of industrial after Gorton’s October election speech op- were obviously uneconomical compared with seemed especially strange from a country that posing the NPT but before the Australian an- the alternative reactor types, Richardson main- did not possess a single power reactor. On the nouncement. tained that “There is little room for doubt suspicion stemming from Australia’s multiple 129 Sydney Morning Herald, May 12, 1969, p. that the real reasoning behind the demand for nuclear initiatives, see “Heading for the 2; Crowley, ed., “On the Nuclear Threshold,” natural uranium reactors is not economic, but Bomb?” Nation, July 12, 1969, pp. 12-14; S. p. 30. West Germany’s signature came after a the unstated desire for a ‘bomb option.’” J. L. Encel, “To Sign or Not to Sign,” Australian, change in government following elections in Richardson, “Nuclear Follies,” Quadrant 13 July 17, 1969, p. 11; A. L. Burns, “Australia 1969. Crowley, ed., “On the Nuclear Thresh- (May-June 1969), pp. 69-70. and the Nuclear Balance,” in H. G. Gelber, ed., old,” p. 24. 116 The Sydney Morning Herald reported that Problems of Australian Defense (Melbourne: 130 Geoffrey Hutton, “Nuclear Pact’s Odd Man the agreement covered cooperation in the field Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 146. Out,” The Age, February 13, 1970, p. 2; “About of fast breeder reactors, and interpreted the 119 Bull, “Australia and the Nuclear Problem: Turn, Nuclear Quick March,” The Bulletin move as an effort by the government to se- Some Concluding Comments,” p. 139; Burns, (Sydney), February 28, 1970, pp. 21-22; cure access to nuclear technology in the event “Australia and the Nuclear Balance,” p. 147; Baxter, in an interview with Carr, says as much: that it did not sign the NPT. “France-Austra- Desmond Ball, “Australia and Nuclear Policy,” “the fear of conspicuous isolation was the fac- lia in Nuclear Energy Pact,” Sydney Morning in Desmond Ball, ed., Strategy and Defense: tor which most prompted the interdepartmen- Herald, June 18, 1969, p. 5. Alan McKnight, Australian Essays (London: George Allen & tal committee to eventually recommend a former Assistant Secretary of the Depart- Unwin, 1982), p. 321. signature.” Carr, “Australia and the Nuclear ment of the Prime Minister and Executive 120 Geoffrey Hutton, “Nuclear Pact’s Odd Man Question: A Survey of Government Attitudes, Member of the AAEC (1958-1964) (and a Out,” The Age, February 13, 1970, p. 2. 1945-1975,” p. 140. Baxter critic) later speculated that “in the ab- 121 Current Notes on International Affairs 41, 131 John Bennetts, “Australia to Sign Nuclear sence of other evidence, it is probable that the (February 1970), pp. 70-72. Treaty,” Canberra Times, February 19, 1970, explanation [for the agreement] lies in the 122 Stan Hutchinson, “Australia to Sign Atom p. 1; Current Notes on International Affairs, continuing desire of the present Australian Gov- Pact,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 19, 41, (February 1970), pp. 70-72. ernment to manufacture nuclear weapons and 1970, pp. 1, 6. 132 This changed with the Vienna Convention. the willingness of the French to connive at 123 Ibid. 133 One interesting aspect of the NPT episode this.” Carr, “Australia and the Nuclear Ques- 124 W. J. Hudson, “The United Nations,” in is the role of “deadlines,” which focus the tion: A Survey of Government Attitudes, Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds., policy process and push political leaders to- 1945-1975,” p. 169. Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970 (Van- wards decisions. In 1957, Macmillan’s im- 117 In February of 1969, the United States and couver: University of British Columbia Press, pending visit to Australia created an artificial Australia announced a joint program to study 1974), p. 212. deadline, the consequence of which was a deci- the feasibility of using peaceful nuclear explo- 125 Crowley, ed., “On the Nuclear Threshold,” sion to have Menzies raise the issue of nuclear sives for the construction of a harbor at Cape p. 21; Millar, “Australia: Recent Ratification,” weapons procurement. In 1970, the immi- Keraudren. The project was initiated by the p. 75; Allan Barnes, “Scientists Had a Change nent entry into force of the NPT created an- United States, but American documents sug- of Heart,” The Age, February 23, 1970, p. 7; other artificial deadline that forced a gest that interest in Keraudren was not one- Bennetts, “Australia to Sign Nuclear Treaty,” governmental response. Indeed, the newspa- sided. Background paper, Peaceful Nuclear Canberra Times, February 19, 1970, p. 1; The pers of the day as well as Treaty advocates Explosion Projects, Attachment to Memo for Bulletin (Sydney), June 29, 1968, p. 18; Alan explicitly talked about “the coming deadline” Mr. Henry Kissinger, The White House, May Wood, Australian Financial Review, January and the need for Gorton to take action. See, 1, 1969, p. 2 (Secret/Exdis), p. 3, Department 24, 1969, pp. 1, 7. for example, Geoffrey Hutton, “Nuclear Pact’s of State Central Files, 1967-1969, Folder Pol 126 Allan Barnes, “Scientists Had a Change of Odd Man Out,” The Age, February 13, 1970, 7, 5/1/69, Australia, Box 1842, U.S. National Heart,” The Age, February 23, 1970, p. 7; Carr, p. 2; David Solomon, “N-treaty: Now Is the Archives. See also Memo from Clay T. White- “Australia and the Nuclear Question: A Survey Time to Sign,” The Australian, February 10, head to Richard L. Sneider, [NSC], May 5, of Government Attitudes, 1945-1975,” p. 143; 1970, p. 9; “Treaty Signature Now Urgent 1969, Nixon White House Central Files, CO “Signing the Treaty,” Sydney Morning Her- Issue,” Canberra Times, February 9, 1970, p. 10, Folder: Ex CO 10, Australia, Begin 5/6/69, ald, February 20, 1970, p. 2; “About Turn, 3. Box 10, U.S. National Archives. Interest in Nuclear Quick March,” The Bulletin (Sydney), 134 Cawte, Atomic Australia, p. 129. The gov- peaceful nuclear explosions may have may February 28, 1970, pp. 21-22; Richardson, ernment had previously considered the sign- have reflected a desire to acquire a nuclear “Australian Strategic and Defense Policies,” and-pursue-the-bomb strategy, but rightly weapons capability. The head of the AAEC, p. 251. Some members of the Commission, or feared that signing might be the first step on a himself, pointed out the connection: “Nuclear lower level scientists may have shifted posi- slippery slope. According to one newspaper,

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 19 Jim Walsh

“Some of the Government’s advisers believe explanations, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dy- that this would give us sufficient protection so namics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (Chicago: that we could sign the treaty and retain our University of Chicago, 1984); Stephen M. option. But the majority believe that to sign Meyer, “A Statistical Risk Model for Fore- the treaty would certainly make this more dif- casting the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” ficult.” Sydney Morning Herald, May 12, in Dagobert L. Brito et al., eds., Strategies for 1969, p. 2. Australia’s interest in the sign-and- Managing Nuclear Proliferation (Lexington, pursue option is reflected in the government’s MA: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 225-226; focus on the meaning of the word “manufac- William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Non- ture.” On this point, External Affairs argued proliferation (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, that it was “. . .possible for a non-nuclear sig- Gunn & Hain, 1982), pp. 131-144; Peter natory of the treaty to carry its nuclear tech- Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of nology to the brink of making a nuclear Nuclear Proliferation,” in Zachary S. Davis explosive device” and still not contravene the and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Treaty. Archives of the Department of For- Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and eign Affairs and Trade: Unregistered document; What Results) (London: Frank Cass, 1993), Memo from M.R. Booker, First Assistant Sec- pp. 193-199. retary, Division II, External Affairs, to the 145 On security threats, in particular, as a cause Minister for External Affairs, Draft Treaty of proliferation see, Scott Sagan, “Why Do on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap- States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models ons, March 7, 1968, pp. 2-3 (Secret). in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 135 On Gorton’s disinterest in ratification, see 21 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 54-63; Michael John Bennetts, “Australia to Sign Nuclear M. May, “Nuclear Weapons Supply and De- Treaty,” Canberra Times, February 19, 1970, mand,” American Scientist 82 (November- p. 1. December 1994), pp. 526-537; Benjamin 136 Letter to the editor from William McMahon, Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic In- Sydney Morning Herald, September 3, 1975, centives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” p. 6. in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation 137 On McMahon’s opposition to Gorton Puzzle , pp. 37-78; Bradley A. Thayer, “The nuclear initiatives, see Ball, “Australia and Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Non- Nuclear Policy,” p. 322. proliferation Regime,” Security Studies 4 138 On Labor’s support of NPT, see Sydney (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519. Thayer asserts Morning Herald, March 11, 1969, p. 12; Ball, that “security is the only necessary and suffi- “Australia and Nuclear Policy,” p. 322. cient cause of nuclear proliferation” (p. 486). 139 Millar described the NPT decision as largely 146 Studies of nuclear proliferation that have ideological. Millar, “Australia: Recent Ratifi- mentioned the potential contribution of bu- cation, p. 81. reaucratic politics include Richard Rosecrance, 140 Draft Cabinet Submission from Paul Hasluck, “International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion,” Minister of External Affairs, Draft Treaty on in Richard Rosecrance, ed., The Dispersion of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia Press, February 19, 1968, Attachment to memoran- 1964); Richard K. Betts, “Incentives for dum from M. R. Booker, First Assistant Secre- Nuclear Weapons,” in Joseph A. Yager, ed., tary, Div II, External Affairs, to Paul Hasluck, Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy Minister of External Affairs, Non-Prolifera- (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. tion of Nuclear Weapons, 919/10/5, February 135-144; Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonpro- 21, 1968, p. 13 (Top Secret). liferation, p. 143. More recently, scholars have 141 Henry Albinski, Australian External Policy combined bureaucratic politics with historical under Labor (St. Lucia: Queensland Ress, sociology. See for example, Steven Flank, 1977), p. 251, footnote 71. “Nonproliferation Policy: A Quintet for Two 142 In 1984, the issue was raised by Labor For- Violas?” The Nonproliferation Review 1 eign Minister Bill Hayden. See Bill Hayden, (Spring-Summer 1994); Steven Flank, “Ex- Hayden, An Autobiography (Sydney: Angus ploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociol- and Robertson, 1996), pp. 422-423. ogy of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 143 Australia did, however, embark on an ag- 3 (Winter 1993-1994). See also Tanya Ogilvie- gressive uranium export program. See for ex- White, “Is There A Theory of Nuclear Prolif- ample, Richard Leaver, Australian Uranium eration? An Analysis of the Contemporary Policy and Non-Proliferation, Australian Na- Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall tional University Peace Research Centre, Work- 1996). ing Paper #45 (Canberra: Australian National 147 One of the few Americans to discuss Austra- University, 1988); Russell Trood, “Australian lia is Quester, Politics of Nuclear Prolifera- Uranium Exports: Nuclear Issues and the Policy tion, pp. 159-166. Process,” in Boardman, Robert, and James 148 I am indebted to Michael Barletta for first Keeley, eds., Nuclear Exports and World Poli- suggesting this idea to me. tics: Policy and Regimes (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983); Cawte, Atomic Austra- lia, pp. 135-170. 144 For a review of motivational and capability

20 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997