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Report: the New Nuclear Arms Race
The New Nuclear Arms Race The Outlook for Avoiding Catastrophe August 2020 By Akshai Vikram Akshai Vikram is the Roger L. Hale Fellow at Ploughshares Fund, where he focuses on U.S. nuclear policy. A native of Louisville, Kentucky, Akshai previously worked as an opposition researcher for the Democratic National Committee and a campaign staffer for the Kentucky Democratic Party. He has written on U.S. nuclear policy and U.S.-Iran relations for outlets such as Inkstick Media, The National Interest, Defense One, and the Quincy Institute’s Responsible Statecraft. Akshai holds an M.A. in International Economics and American Foreign Policy from the Johns Hopkins University SAIS as well as a B.A. in International Studies and Political Science from Johns Hopkins Baltimore. On a good day, he speaks Spanish, French, and Persian proficiently. Acknowledgements This report was made possible by the strong support I received from the entire Ploughshares Fund network throughout my fellowship. Ploughshares Fund alumni Will Saetren, Geoff Wilson, and Catherine Killough were extremely kind in offering early advice on the report. From the Washington, D.C. office, Mary Kaszynski and Zack Brown offered many helpful edits and suggestions, while Joe Cirincione, Michelle Dover, and John Carl Baker provided much- needed encouragement and support throughout the process. From the San Francisco office, Will Lowry, Derek Zender, and Delfin Vigil were The New Nuclear Arms Race instrumental in finalizing this report. I would like to thank each and every one of them for their help. I would especially like to thank Tom Collina. Tom reviewed numerous drafts of this report, never The Outlook for Avoiding running out of patience or constructive advice. -
Phillip Saunders Testimony
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Nucle ar Force s June 10, 2021 Phillip C. Saunders Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. Introduction The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of an ambitious strategic modernization that will transform its nuclear arsenal from a limited ground-based nuclear force intended to provide an assured second strike after a nuclear attack into a much larger, technologically advanced, and diverse nuclear triad that will provide PRC leaders with new strategic options. China also fields an increasing number of dual-capable medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles whose status within a future regional crisis or conflict may be unclear, potentially casting a nuclear shadow over U.S. and allied military operations. In addition to more accurate and more survivable delivery systems, this modernization includes improvements to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) and strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems that will provide PRC leaders with greater situational awareness in a crisis or conflict. These systems will also support development of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) and enable possible shifts in PRC nuclear -
Radiation Poisoning , Also Called Radiation Sickness Or a Creeping Dose , Is a Form of Damage to Organ Tissue Due to Excessive Exposure to Ionizing Radiation
Radiation poisoning , also called radiation sickness or a creeping dose , is a form of damage to organ tissue due to excessive exposure to ionizing radiation . The term is generally used to refer to acute problems caused by a large dosage of radiation in a short period, though this also has occurred with long term exposure. The clinical name for radiation sickness is acute radiation syndrome ( ARS ) as described by the CDC .[1][2][3] A chronic radiation syndrome does exist but is very uncommon; this has been observed among workers in early radium source production sites and in the early days of the Soviet nuclear program. A short exposure can result in acute radiation syndrome; chronic radiation syndrome requires a prolonged high level of exposure. Radiation exposure can also increase the probability of contracting some other diseases, mainly cancer , tumours , and genetic damage . These are referred to as the stochastic effects of radiation, and are not included in the term radiation sickness. The use of radionuclides in science and industry is strictly regulated in most countries (in the U.S. by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ). In the event of an accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material, either evacuation or sheltering in place are the recommended measures. Radiation sickness is generally associated with acute (a single large) exposure. [4][5] Nausea and vomiting are usually the main symptoms. [5] The amount of time between exposure to radiation and the onset of the initial symptoms may be an indicator of how much radiation was absorbed. [5] Symptoms appear sooner with higher doses of exposure. -
A Roadmap for America's Nuclear Policy and Posture
NTI Paper MARCH 2018 A Roadmap for America’s Nuclear Policy and Posture SUMMARY NTI co-chairs Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn call on the United States and the other states with nuclear weapons to take immediate action to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident, mistake, or miscalculation. In six related policy papers, NTI provides an alternative vision and roadmap for America’s nuclear policy and posture, as well as a template for Congress and the American people to evaluate the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Introduction by Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn Papers by Steve Andreasen, Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Leon Ratz, Brian Rose, and Lynn Rusten Contents Three Steps to Avert an Accidental Nuclear War ........................................1 Preventing Nuclear Use ............................................................3 Engaging in Nuclear Dialogue .......................................................5 Increasing Warning and Decision Time ...............................................7 Moving to a Safer, More Secure, More Credible Nuclear Posture in Europe. 9 Arms Control—Extending New START, Preserving INF, Supporting Further Reductions, and Strengthening Verification .......................................... 11 Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials ........................................... 14 About the Authors ............................................................... 16 “Three Steps to Avert an Accidental Nuclear War” Copyright © 2018 by Bloomberg L.P. Roadmap for America’s Nuclear Policy and Posture policy papers Copyright © 2018 by the Nuclear Threat Initiative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the copyright holder. For permissions, send an e-mail request to [email protected]. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the NTI Board of Directors or institutions with which they are associated. -
Nuclear Fallout and Intelligence As Secrets, Problems, and Limitations on the Arms Race, 1940-1964
© Copyright 2016 Michael R. Lehman NUISANCE TO NEMESIS: NUCLEAR FALLOUT AND INTELLIGENCE AS SECRETS, PROBLEMS, AND LIMITATIONS ON THE ARMS RACE, 1940-1964 BY MICHAEL R. LEHMAN DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral Committee: Professor Lillian Hoddeson, Chair Professor Kristin Hoganson, Co-Chair Professor Michael Weissman Professor Robert Jacobs, Hiroshima City University Abstract Fallout sampling and other nuclear intelligence techniques were the most important sources of United States strategic intelligence in the early Cold War. Operated as the Atomic Energy Detection System by a covert Air Force unit known as AFOAT-1, the AEDS detected emissions and analyzed fallout from Soviet nuclear tests, as well as provided quantitative intelligence on the size of the Russian nuclear stockpile. Virtually unknown because the only greater Cold War secret than nuclear weapons was intelligence gathered about them, data on the Soviet threat produced by AFOAT-1 was an extraordinary influence on early National Intelligence Estimates, the rapid growth of the Strategic Air Command, and strategic war plans. Official guidance beginning with the first nuclear test in 1945 otherwise suggested fallout was an insignificant effect of nuclear weapons. Following AFOAT-1’s detection of Soviet testing in fall 1949 and against the cautions raised about the problematic nature of higher yield weapons by the General Advisory Committee, the Atomic Energy Commission’s top scientific advisers, President Harry Truman ordered the AEC to quickly build these extraordinarily powerful weapons, testing the first in secrecy in November 1952. -
National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? a CDI ISSUE BRIEF
National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? A CDI ISSUE BRIEF CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? A CDI ISSUE BRIEF CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION © September 2000 Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 332-0600 • Fax: (202) 462-4559 www.cdi.org DESIGN BY CUTTING EDGE GRAPHICS Contents v Foreword 1 Why Should We Care? 2 A Brief History of “Missiles” and Ballistic Missile Defense 5 The Ballistic Missile Threat 10 Technological Challenges in National Missile Defense 17 The Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense 20 Impact of NMD on Russia, Nuclear Security 24 U.S. National Missile Defense: Views from Asia 33 Europe’s Role in National Missile Defense 39 Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs 47 Acronyms 49 Glossary Foreword THE FUTURE OF U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE remains in limbo at the time of this writing. We find ourselves in the midst of a presidential campaign in which defense programs often gain momentum from boosterism. At the same time, a string of missile interceptor failures has raised doubts about the feasibility of national missile defense to new heights. On September 1, 2000, President Clinton deferred NMD deployment, delaying—but not killing—the program. Extensive press coverage of this politically charged program during an election year makes for a noisy dispute that the Center for Defense Information seeks to quell with a dispassionate survey of the potential costs and consequences of national missile defense. This Issue Brief covers the four major desidarata that should, in a rational world, determine the decision on whether or not to build the NMD system. -
Reuleaux2019 Vol.1 Iss.1.Pdf (12.49Mb)
t t REULEAUX 2019 REULEAUX Reuleaux Undergraduate Research Journal Colorado School of Mines Volume 1 Issue 1 Reuleaux McBride Honors Colorado School of Mines Golden, Colorado 80401 ©2019 Reuleaux, Colorado School of Mines Copyright Information Reuleaux is an Open Access journal. All authors retain the copyright work published by Reuleaux. All works are licensed to be shared and used under the Creative Commons CC-BY License or the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC License. The Creative Commons CC-BY License and the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC License permit works to be copied, published, and shared without restrictions as long as the original author(s) is credited with full citation details. The Creative Commons CC-BY-NC License also requires permission for the copyright owner (authors) for any commercial use of the original work. All works in Reuleaux can be shared without restrictions. Proper credit should be given. The Editorial Board can be contacted at [email protected]. T bl o Co e t 1 Demons of Los Alamos 20 Evaluating Eribulin 5 Editor Analysis: Demons of Los Alamos 23 Evaluation of the Paris Agreement 6 Three Years in the CFCC 26 Editor Analysis: Paris Agreement 9 Carreon Lab Spotlight 27 Colorado Fuel Cell Center Spotlight 13 Lunar Ice Extraction 30 Exploring Fractional Derivatives 18 Editor Analysis: Lunar Ice Extraction 32 Meet the Editors 19 Dr. Jeffrey King Spotlight 35 Call for Submissions Peer Review Shit Message from the Editor in Chief As scientific research continues to propel humanity further into the future, the problems facing scientists and engineers become increasingly complex. -
Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo
NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL FIREBREAKS AND THE NUCLEAR TABOO BARRY D. WATTS NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL FIREBREAKS AND THE NUCLEAR TABOO BY BARRY D. WATTS 2013 Acknowledgments The idea of exploring systematically why the leaders of various nations have chosen to maintain, or aspire to acquire, nuclear weapons was first suggested to me by Andrew W. Marshall. In several cases, the motivations attributed to national leaders in this report are undoubtedly speculative and open to debate. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the rulers of at least some nations entertain strong reasons for maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons that have nothing to do with the nuclear competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union, either before or after 1991. Eric Edelman provided valuable suggestions on both substance and sources. At the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Abby Stewart and Nick Setterberg did the majority of the editing. I am especially grateful to Nick for vetting the footnotes. Last but not least, Andrew Krepinevich’s suggestions on the narrative flow and the structure of the paper’s arguments greatly clarified the original draft. © 2013 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 5 THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES TO GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR 5 Context 7 Atomic Blackmail and Massive Nuclear Retaliation 11 Flexible Response and Assured Destruction 15 The Long Range Research and Development Planning Program 19 Selective Nuclear Options and Presidential Directive/NSC-59 23 The Strategic Defense Initiative 26 The Soviet General Staff, LNOs and Launch on Warning 29 POST-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 29 Evolving U.S. -
Nuclear-Conventional-Firebreaks
NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL FIREBREAKS AND THE NUCLEAR TABOO BARRY D. WATTS NUCLEAR-COnVEnTIOnAL FIREBREAKS AnD THE NUCLEAR TABOO BY BARRy D. WATTS 2013 Acknowledgments The idea of exploring systematically why the leaders of various nations have chosen to maintain, or aspire to acquire, nuclear weapons was first suggested to me by Andrew W. Marshall. In several cases, the motivations attributed to national leaders in this report are undoubtedly speculative and open to debate. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the rulers of at least some nations entertain strong reasons for maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons that have nothing to do with the nuclear competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union, either before or after 1991. Eric Edelman provided valuable suggestions on both substance and sources. At the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Abby Stewart and Nick Setterberg did the majority of the editing. I am especially grateful to Nick for vetting the footnotes. Last but not least, Andrew Krepinevich’s suggestions on the narrative flow and the structure of the paper’s arguments greatly clarified the original draft. © 2013 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. COnTEnTS 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 5 THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES TO GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR 5 Context 7 Atomic Blackmail and Massive Nuclear Retaliation 11 Flexible Response and Assured Destruction 15 The Long Range Research and Development Planning Program 19 Selective Nuclear Options and Presidential Directive/NSC-59 23 The Strategic Defense Initiative 26 The Soviet General Staff, LNOs and Launch on Warning 29 POST-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 29 Evolving U.S. -
The Manhattan Project John Kenneth Christopher Hunt a Thesis in The
The Manhattan Project John Kenneth Christopher Hunt A Thesis in The Department of English Presented in Partial Fulfllment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in English at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada Dr. Darren Wershler, Project Supervisor April 2017 © John Kenneth Christopher Hunt 2017 1 2 ABSTRACT The Manhattan Project is a book of lyric poetry that chronicles the discovery of nuclear energy and its subsequent use as both a weapon and a fuel source. The book is grounded in the aesthetic positionality contained in scholar Joyelle McSweeney`s concept of the `necropastoral`, a liminal zone where disparate spaces, such as the classical `urban` and `pastoral`, become blurred. The Manhattan Project examines the enduring impossibility of sufciently responding to the continuing repercussions of the nuclear age and its post-nuclear contaminants through a kind of `resurrection` of lyric meditation, further mutated by both formal constraints and conceptual frameworks. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE ATOMS WE CLEAVE 8 II. THE ARMS RACE Below Oklo 14 Radioactivity 18 The World Set Free 20 Ideal Isotopes 22 Critical Mass 38 Thuringia 40 III. TRINITY 44 IV. GHOSTS OF LOS ALAMOS Valles Caldera 50 Industrial Complex 54 The Demon Core 56 V. MILITARY INCIDENTS Dull Swords 66 Broken Arrows 68 Bent Spear 72 Empty Quivers 73 Faded Giants 75 Nucflash 77 4 VI. RAIN OF RUIN Clear Skies 80 Testimony 84 Operation Epsilon 88 VII. CONTAMINATION Christmas Island 92 Plutonium Valley 94 The East Ural Reserve 96 The Argonne Incident 98 The Human Factor 100 The Elephant’s Foot 102 Caveat Clepta 109 Rising Water 110 VIII. -
Critical MASS Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East N I the M N the Iddle E Iddle Ast Andrew F
CRITI C AL MASS: NU C LEAR PROLIFERATIO CRITICAL MASS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIddLE EAst N I N THE M IDDLE E AST ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH F. ANDREW 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20006 Tel. 202-331-7990 • Fax 202-331-8019 www.csbaonline.org ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH CRITICAL MASS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH 2013 About the Authors Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which he joined following a 21- year career in the U.S. Army. He has served in the Department of De- fense’s Office of Net Assessment, on the personal staff of three secretar- ies of defense, the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Defense Policy Board. He is the author of 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century and The Army and Vietnam. A West Point graduate, he holds an M.P.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Eric Edelman, Evan Montgomery, Jim Thomas, and Barry Watts for reviewing and commenting on earlier ver- sions of this report. Thanks are also in order for Eric Lindsey for his re- search and editorial support and to Kamilla Gunzinger for her copyedit- ing. Eric Lindsey also provided graphics support that greatly enhanced the report’s presentation. Any shortcomings in this assessment, however, are the author’s re- sponsibility and the author’s alone. © 2013 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. -
Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk
SIPRI ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, Policy Paper STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK VINCENT BOULANIN, LORA SAALMAN, PETR TOPYCHKANOV, FEI SU AND MOA PELDÁN CARLSSON June 2020 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Ambassador Jan Eliasson, Chair (Sweden) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Espen Barth Eide (Norway) Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Dr Radha Kumar (India) Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra (Algeria) Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/United Kingdom) Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews (United States) DIRECTOR Dan Smith (United Kingdom) Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: + 46 8 655 9700 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk vincent boulanin, lora saalman, petr topychkanov, fei su and moa peldán carlsson June 2020 Contents Preface v Acknowledgements vi Abbreviations vii Executive Summary ix 1. Introduction 1 Box 1.1. Key definitions 6 2. Understanding the AI renaissance and its impact on nuclear weapons 7 and related systems I. Understanding the AI renaissance 7 II. AI and nuclear weapon systems: Past, present and future 18 Box 2.1. Automatic, automated, autonomous: The relationship between 15 automation, autonomy and machine learning Box 2.2. Historical cases of false alarms in early warning systems 20 Box 2.3. Dead Hand and Perimetr 22 Figure 2.1. A brief history of artificial intelligence 10 Figure 2.2.