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Capture and Reuse of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) for a Plastics Circular Economy: a Review
processes Review Capture and Reuse of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) for a Plastics Circular Economy: A Review Laura Pires da Mata Costa 1 ,Débora Micheline Vaz de Miranda 1, Ana Carolina Couto de Oliveira 2, Luiz Falcon 3, Marina Stella Silva Pimenta 3, Ivan Guilherme Bessa 3,Sílvio Juarez Wouters 3,Márcio Henrique S. Andrade 3 and José Carlos Pinto 1,* 1 Programa de Engenharia Química/COPPE, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Cidade Universitária, CP 68502, Rio de Janeiro 21941-972, Brazil; [email protected] (L.P.d.M.C.); [email protected] (D.M.V.d.M.) 2 Escola de Química, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Cidade Universitária, CP 68525, Rio de Janeiro 21941-598, Brazil; [email protected] 3 Braskem S.A., Rua Marumbi, 1400, Campos Elíseos, Duque de Caxias 25221-000, Brazil; [email protected] (L.F.); [email protected] (M.S.S.P.); [email protected] (I.G.B.); [email protected] (S.J.W.); [email protected] (M.H.S.A.) * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +55-21-3938-8709 Abstract: Plastic production has been increasing at enormous rates. Particularly, the socioenvi- ronmental problems resulting from the linear economy model have been widely discussed, espe- cially regarding plastic pieces intended for single use and disposed improperly in the environment. Nonetheless, greenhouse gas emissions caused by inappropriate disposal or recycling and by the Citation: Pires da Mata Costa, L.; many production stages have not been discussed thoroughly. Regarding the manufacturing pro- Micheline Vaz de Miranda, D.; Couto cesses, carbon dioxide is produced mainly through heating of process streams and intrinsic chemical de Oliveira, A.C.; Falcon, L.; Stella transformations, explaining why first-generation petrochemical industries are among the top five Silva Pimenta, M.; Guilherme Bessa, most greenhouse gas (GHG)-polluting businesses. -
Report: the New Nuclear Arms Race
The New Nuclear Arms Race The Outlook for Avoiding Catastrophe August 2020 By Akshai Vikram Akshai Vikram is the Roger L. Hale Fellow at Ploughshares Fund, where he focuses on U.S. nuclear policy. A native of Louisville, Kentucky, Akshai previously worked as an opposition researcher for the Democratic National Committee and a campaign staffer for the Kentucky Democratic Party. He has written on U.S. nuclear policy and U.S.-Iran relations for outlets such as Inkstick Media, The National Interest, Defense One, and the Quincy Institute’s Responsible Statecraft. Akshai holds an M.A. in International Economics and American Foreign Policy from the Johns Hopkins University SAIS as well as a B.A. in International Studies and Political Science from Johns Hopkins Baltimore. On a good day, he speaks Spanish, French, and Persian proficiently. Acknowledgements This report was made possible by the strong support I received from the entire Ploughshares Fund network throughout my fellowship. Ploughshares Fund alumni Will Saetren, Geoff Wilson, and Catherine Killough were extremely kind in offering early advice on the report. From the Washington, D.C. office, Mary Kaszynski and Zack Brown offered many helpful edits and suggestions, while Joe Cirincione, Michelle Dover, and John Carl Baker provided much- needed encouragement and support throughout the process. From the San Francisco office, Will Lowry, Derek Zender, and Delfin Vigil were The New Nuclear Arms Race instrumental in finalizing this report. I would like to thank each and every one of them for their help. I would especially like to thank Tom Collina. Tom reviewed numerous drafts of this report, never The Outlook for Avoiding running out of patience or constructive advice. -
Extragalactic Sources of Rapidly Variable High Energy Gamma Radiation
Dario Hrupec Extragalactic sources of rapidly variable high energy gamma radiation Doctoral Thesis submitted to the Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, University of Zagreb, for the academic degree of Doctor of Natural Sciences (Physics) Zagreb 2008. This thesis was done at Ruder Boˇskovi´c Institute under the supervision of Professor Daniel Ferenc from the University of California at Davis. ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank my mentor Dr. Daniel Ferenc from the University of California at Davis for his great professional and personal support during my work on this thesis. I have received precious inspiration from him. Finally, he encouraged me to read a lot. It was an invaluable advice. I am thankful to my co-mentor Dr. Silvio Pallua from the Faculty of Science at Zagreb for his support and for the thesis review. I am also thankful to Dr. Kreˇsimir Pavlovski from the Faculty of Science at Zagreb for the thesis review. I am particularly thankful to him for his valuable support. In addition, his terminological arguments impressed me a lot. Many thanks to Dr. Matko Milin from Faculty of Science at Zagreb for the time he spent on reading and commenting my thesis. I really appreciate his being my committee member. I owe many thanks to Dr. Eckart Lorenz from the University of California at Davis and ETH-Zurich who made possible my observations with the Cerenkovˇ telescope 1 (CT1) at La Palma in 2003. His donation of two Cerenkovˇ telescopes to Ruder Boˇskovi´c Institute established a base for the Cosmic Ray Observatory At The Eastern Adriatic (CROATEA) and also for my work in astroparticle physics in Croatia. -
Phillip Saunders Testimony
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on China’s Nucle ar Force s June 10, 2021 Phillip C. Saunders Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. Introduction The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of an ambitious strategic modernization that will transform its nuclear arsenal from a limited ground-based nuclear force intended to provide an assured second strike after a nuclear attack into a much larger, technologically advanced, and diverse nuclear triad that will provide PRC leaders with new strategic options. China also fields an increasing number of dual-capable medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles whose status within a future regional crisis or conflict may be unclear, potentially casting a nuclear shadow over U.S. and allied military operations. In addition to more accurate and more survivable delivery systems, this modernization includes improvements to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) and strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems that will provide PRC leaders with greater situational awareness in a crisis or conflict. These systems will also support development of ballistic missile defenses (BMD) and enable possible shifts in PRC nuclear -
A Roadmap for America's Nuclear Policy and Posture
NTI Paper MARCH 2018 A Roadmap for America’s Nuclear Policy and Posture SUMMARY NTI co-chairs Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn call on the United States and the other states with nuclear weapons to take immediate action to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident, mistake, or miscalculation. In six related policy papers, NTI provides an alternative vision and roadmap for America’s nuclear policy and posture, as well as a template for Congress and the American people to evaluate the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Introduction by Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn Papers by Steve Andreasen, Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Leon Ratz, Brian Rose, and Lynn Rusten Contents Three Steps to Avert an Accidental Nuclear War ........................................1 Preventing Nuclear Use ............................................................3 Engaging in Nuclear Dialogue .......................................................5 Increasing Warning and Decision Time ...............................................7 Moving to a Safer, More Secure, More Credible Nuclear Posture in Europe. 9 Arms Control—Extending New START, Preserving INF, Supporting Further Reductions, and Strengthening Verification .......................................... 11 Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials ........................................... 14 About the Authors ............................................................... 16 “Three Steps to Avert an Accidental Nuclear War” Copyright © 2018 by Bloomberg L.P. Roadmap for America’s Nuclear Policy and Posture policy papers Copyright © 2018 by the Nuclear Threat Initiative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the copyright holder. For permissions, send an e-mail request to [email protected]. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the NTI Board of Directors or institutions with which they are associated. -
Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space
Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space Pavel Podvig and Hui Zhang © 2008 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences All rights reserved. ISBN: 0-87724-068-X The views expressed in this volume are those held by each contributor and are not necessarily those of the Officers and Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Please direct inquiries to: American Academy of Arts and Sciences 136 Irving Street Cambridge, MA 02138-1996 Telephone: (617) 576-5000 Fax: (617) 576-5050 Email: [email protected] Visit our website at www.amacad.org Contents v PREFACE vii ACRONYMS 1 CHAPTER 1 Russia and Military Uses of Space Pavel Podvig 31 CHAPTER 2 Chinese Perspectives on Space Weapons Hui Zhang 79 CONTRIBUTORS Preface In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an interna - tional treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of space are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the parties have not been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were to pursue the programs laid out in its planning documents. This makes prob - able the eventual formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 was prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revi - sion. -
National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? a CDI ISSUE BRIEF
National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? A CDI ISSUE BRIEF CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? A CDI ISSUE BRIEF CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION © September 2000 Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 332-0600 • Fax: (202) 462-4559 www.cdi.org DESIGN BY CUTTING EDGE GRAPHICS Contents v Foreword 1 Why Should We Care? 2 A Brief History of “Missiles” and Ballistic Missile Defense 5 The Ballistic Missile Threat 10 Technological Challenges in National Missile Defense 17 The Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense 20 Impact of NMD on Russia, Nuclear Security 24 U.S. National Missile Defense: Views from Asia 33 Europe’s Role in National Missile Defense 39 Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs 47 Acronyms 49 Glossary Foreword THE FUTURE OF U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE remains in limbo at the time of this writing. We find ourselves in the midst of a presidential campaign in which defense programs often gain momentum from boosterism. At the same time, a string of missile interceptor failures has raised doubts about the feasibility of national missile defense to new heights. On September 1, 2000, President Clinton deferred NMD deployment, delaying—but not killing—the program. Extensive press coverage of this politically charged program during an election year makes for a noisy dispute that the Center for Defense Information seeks to quell with a dispassionate survey of the potential costs and consequences of national missile defense. This Issue Brief covers the four major desidarata that should, in a rational world, determine the decision on whether or not to build the NMD system. -
Íítefuid*/;Or. Ríe %Urna,Mrn'
No. 28605-A Gaceta Oficial Digital, miércoles 05 de septiembre de 2018 1 ÍÍtefuid*/;or. rÍe %urna,mrn'. Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Dirección General de lngresos Despacho del Director RESOLUC¡Ótrl trlo. 201 -5734 De 29 de agosto de 2018 "Por la cual se publica la lista de personas jurídicas con una morosidad de tres (3) años consecutivos del tributo de Tasa Unica, en cumplimiento de los parágrafos 2, 3 y 4 del ar1ículo 318-A del Código Fiscal, reformado por Ia Ley No.6 de 2 de febrero de 2005, Ley 49 de 17 de septiembre de 2009 y Ley 52 de 27 de octubre de 2016" EL D¡RECTOR GENERAL DE INGRESOS, ENCARGADO CONSIDERANDO: Que el Decreto de Gabinete No. 109 de 7 de mayo de 1970 y sus modificaciones establece en sus aftículos 5 y 6, que el Director Generalde lngresos es responsable por la permanente adecuación y perfeccionamiento de los procedimientos administrativos y lo facultan para regular las relaciones formales de los contribuyentes con el Fisco, en aras de mejorar el servicio y facilitar a los contribuyentes el cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias. Que el artículo 318-A del Código Fiscal, modificado por la Ley No. 6 de 2 de febrero de 2005, Ley No. 49 de 17 de septiembre de 2009 y Ley No. 52 de 27 de octubre de 2016, establece el pago del tributo denominado tasa única por las sociedades anónimas, sociedades de responsabilidad limitada y cualesquiera otras personas jurídicas al momento de su insóripción y en los años subsiguientes para mantener plena vigencia. -
Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo
NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL FIREBREAKS AND THE NUCLEAR TABOO BARRY D. WATTS NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL FIREBREAKS AND THE NUCLEAR TABOO BY BARRY D. WATTS 2013 Acknowledgments The idea of exploring systematically why the leaders of various nations have chosen to maintain, or aspire to acquire, nuclear weapons was first suggested to me by Andrew W. Marshall. In several cases, the motivations attributed to national leaders in this report are undoubtedly speculative and open to debate. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the rulers of at least some nations entertain strong reasons for maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons that have nothing to do with the nuclear competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union, either before or after 1991. Eric Edelman provided valuable suggestions on both substance and sources. At the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Abby Stewart and Nick Setterberg did the majority of the editing. I am especially grateful to Nick for vetting the footnotes. Last but not least, Andrew Krepinevich’s suggestions on the narrative flow and the structure of the paper’s arguments greatly clarified the original draft. © 2013 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 5 THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES TO GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR 5 Context 7 Atomic Blackmail and Massive Nuclear Retaliation 11 Flexible Response and Assured Destruction 15 The Long Range Research and Development Planning Program 19 Selective Nuclear Options and Presidential Directive/NSC-59 23 The Strategic Defense Initiative 26 The Soviet General Staff, LNOs and Launch on Warning 29 POST-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 29 Evolving U.S. -
Nuclear-Conventional-Firebreaks
NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL FIREBREAKS AND THE NUCLEAR TABOO BARRY D. WATTS NUCLEAR-COnVEnTIOnAL FIREBREAKS AnD THE NUCLEAR TABOO BY BARRy D. WATTS 2013 Acknowledgments The idea of exploring systematically why the leaders of various nations have chosen to maintain, or aspire to acquire, nuclear weapons was first suggested to me by Andrew W. Marshall. In several cases, the motivations attributed to national leaders in this report are undoubtedly speculative and open to debate. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the rulers of at least some nations entertain strong reasons for maintaining or acquiring nuclear weapons that have nothing to do with the nuclear competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union, either before or after 1991. Eric Edelman provided valuable suggestions on both substance and sources. At the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Abby Stewart and Nick Setterberg did the majority of the editing. I am especially grateful to Nick for vetting the footnotes. Last but not least, Andrew Krepinevich’s suggestions on the narrative flow and the structure of the paper’s arguments greatly clarified the original draft. © 2013 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. COnTEnTS 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 5 THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES TO GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR 5 Context 7 Atomic Blackmail and Massive Nuclear Retaliation 11 Flexible Response and Assured Destruction 15 The Long Range Research and Development Planning Program 19 Selective Nuclear Options and Presidential Directive/NSC-59 23 The Strategic Defense Initiative 26 The Soviet General Staff, LNOs and Launch on Warning 29 POST-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 29 Evolving U.S. -
Nuclear Threat Reduction
Nuclear Threat Reduction Angela Di Fulvio Nuclear, Plasma, and Radiological Engineering Department 03/24/2020 Presentation developed within the framework of the APS Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction 1 Some technical aspects • Bombs, the world arsenal, and their effects Policy aspects • The long peace and close calls The current nuclear threat and how to reduce it Outline Engagement of the scientific community and the public in nuclear threat reduction • Past efforts • The APS Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction - https://sgs.princeton.edu/physicistscoalition 2 Reuters Photo AP photos Nuclear Threat Reduction The number of nuclear weapons is declining at a slow pace. The US, Russia, and the UK are reducing their nuclear arsenals, France and Israel have stable inventories, while China, Pakistan, India, and North Korea are developing new capabilities. Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan after signing the Figures depicting Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. breaking the INF Treaty during the Rosenmontag parade in Dusseldorf, 2019. 3 The Discovery of Nuclear Fission Dual-use of nuclear energy started in the early days Lise Meitner, Otto R. Frisch • August 2, 1939 Albert Einstein sent a letter to President Roosevelt, advising him to fund research to explore the possibility of using nuclear fission as a weapon. • October 21, 1939 Otto Hahn, Fritz Strassmann The Advisory Committee on achieved fission in Berlin, 1938 Uranium budgeted $6,000 for neutron experiments led by Performed the first Fermi and Szilárd. The fission reaction of uranium with slow Manhattan project has neutrons, 1932-33. officially started. -
Appendix 15B. Tables of Operational Military Satellites TED MOLCZAN and JOHN PIKE*
Appendix 15B. Tables of operational military satellites TED MOLCZAN and JOHN PIKE* Table 15B.1. US operational military satellites, as of 31 December 2002a Common Official Intl NORAD Launched Launch Perigee Apogee Incl. Period name name name design. (date) Launcher site (km) (km) (deg.) (min.) Comments Navigation satellites in medium earth orbit GPS 2-02 SVN 13/USA 38 1989-044A 20061 10 June 89 Delta 6925 CCAFS 19 594 20 787 53.4 718.0 GPS 2-04b SVN 19/USA 47 1989-085A 20302 21 Oct 89 Delta 6925 CCAFS 21 204 21 238 53.4 760.2 (Retired, not in SEM Almanac) GPS 2-05 SVN 17/USA 49 1989-097A 20361 11 Dec 89 Delta 6925 CCAFS 19 795 20 583 55.9 718.0 GPS 2-08b SVN 21/USA 63 1990-068A 20724 2 Aug 90 Delta 6925 CCAFS 19 716 20 705 56.2 718.8 (Decommissioned Jan. 2003) GPS 2-09 SVN 15/USA 64 1990-088A 20830 1 Oct 90 Delta 6925 CCAFS 19 978 20 404 55.8 718.0 GPS 2A-01 SVN 23/USA 66 1990-103A 20959 26 Nov 90 Delta 6925 CCAFS 19 764 20 637 56.4 718.4 GPS 2A-02 SVN 24/USA 71 1991-047A 21552 4 July 91 Delta 7925 CCAFS 19 927 20 450 56.0 717.9 GPS 2A-03 SVN 25/USA 79 1992-009A 21890 23 Feb 92 Delta 7925 CCAFS 19 913 20 464 53.9 717.9 GPS 2A-04b SVN 28/USA 80 1992-019A 21930 10 Apr 92 Delta 7925 CCAFS 20 088 20 284 54.5 717.8 (Decommissioned May 1997) GPS 2A-05 SVN 26/USA 83 1992-039A 22014 7 July 92 Delta 7925 CCAFS 19 822 20 558 55.9 718.0 GPS 2A-06 SVN 27/USA 84 1992-058A 22108 9 Sep 92 Delta 7925 CCAFS 19 742 20 638 54.1 718.0 GPS 2A-07 SVN 32/USA 85 1992-079A 22231 22 Nov 92 Delta 7925 CCAFS 20 042 20 339 55.7 718.0 GPS 2A-08 SVN 29/USA 87 1992-089A