DOCSLIB.ORG

China's Evolving Nuclear Posture

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China's Evolving Nuclear Posture China’s Evolving Nuclear Posture Part II – The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy Donald A. Neill Strategic Analysis Section DRDC CORA TM 2011-156 September 2011 Defence R&D Canada Centre for Operational Research and Analysis China Team Sponsor: Strategic Joint Staff &KLQD VHYROYLQJQXFOHDUSRVWXUH Part II - The evolution of China's nuclear strategy D.A. Neill DRDC CORA The reported results, their interpretation, and any opinions expressed herein, remain those of the author and do not represent, or otherwise reflect, any official position of DND or the government of Canada. Defence R&D Canada – CORA Technical Memorandum DRDC CORA TM 2011-156 September 2011 Principal Author Original signed by D.A. Neill, Ph.D. D.A. Neill, Ph.D. Strategic Analyst Approved by Original signed by G. Smolynec, Ph.D. G. Smolynec, Ph.D. Section Head, Strategic Analysis Approved for release by Original signed by P. Comeau P. Comeau Chief Scientist This paper has been produced under Thrust 10a as part of the China/Asia ARP. Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA) © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011 © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011 Abstract …….. This paper is the second part of a larger study the principal purpose of which is to determine the trajectory of China’s nuclear weapons policy, strategy, capability and doctrine. Building on the first paper, which provided a benchmark for comparative analysis in the form of an overview of the evolution of US nuclear strategy since the end of the Second World War, this paper discusses the origins of China’s nuclear strategy; its view of deterrence; what certain elements of its declaratory policy reveal about Beijing’s nuclear strategy; and where that strategy appears to stand at present. The paper concludes that while the evolution of China’s nuclear strategy bear some resemblance to Western patterns of nuclear evolution, the process has been largely unique; and that although Beijing will probably maintain an official commitment to minimal deterrence, China’s nuclear strategy has progressed well beyond its declaratory policy, and is continuing to change rapidly. Further papers in this study will examine China’s strategic nuclear forces, and investigate the principal drivers of China’s declaratory policy, nuclear strategy, and nuclear doctrine. The study will conclude with a comprehensive report discussing the apparent trajectory of China’s nuclear posture and the implications thereof for Canada and its allies, and suggesting directions for future research. Résumé …..... Ce document est le deuxième volet d’une étude plus large dont l’objet principal est de déterminer la trajectoire de la Chine en matière de politique des armes nucléaires, la stratégie, la capacité et la doctrine. S’appuyant sur le premier document, qui a fourni un point de repère pour l’analyse comparative sous la forme d’un aperçu de l’évolution de la stratégie nucléaire américaine depuis le fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, cet article discute les origines de la stratégie nucléaire de la Chine; son point de vue de la dissuasion; ce que certains éléments de sa politique déclaratoire révéler sur la stratégie nucléaire de Pékin, et où cette stratégie semble se tenir à l’heure actuelle. Le document conclut que, bien que l’évolution de la stratégie nucléaire de la Chine ont quelque ressemblance aux modèles occidentaux de l’évolution nucléaire, le processus a été en grande partie unique, et que, bien que Pékin va probablement maintenir un engagement officiel à la dissuasion minimale, la stratégie nucléaire de la Chine a progressé bien au-delà de ses politique déclaratoire, et continue d’évoluer rapidement. D’autres documents dans cette étude examinera la Chine forces nucléaires stratégiques, et d’enquêter sur les principaux moteurs de la politique déclaratoire de la Chine, la stratégie nucléaire, et la doctrine nucléaire. L’étude se terminera par un rapport complet discuter de la trajectoire apparente du dispositif nucléaire de la Chine et ses conséquences pour le Canada et ses alliés, et à suggérer des orientations pour la recherche future. DRDC CORA TM 2011-156 i This page intentionally left blank. ii DRDC CORA TM 2011-156 Executive summary &KLQD V evolving nuclear posture: Part II - The evolution of China's nuclear strategy D.A. Neill; DRDC CORA TM DRDC CORA TM 2011-156; Defence R&D Canada – CORA; September 2011. Introduction: This paper is the second part of a larger study the principal purpose of which is to determine the trajectory of China’s nuclear weapons policy, strategy, capability and doctrine. Building on the first paper, which provided a benchmark for comparative analysis in the form of an overview of the evolution of US nuclear strategy since the end of the Second World War, this paper examines the evolution of China’s nuclear strategy over the course of its half-century as a nuclear weapon state. The present study looks at the origins of China’s nuclear strategy in classical military and political philosophy; the influence of Mao and his successors; how China has, over the course of its nuclear tenure, gradually come to grips with the concept of deterrence; what certain elements of China’s declaratory nuclear policy (notably its no first-use policy, its approach to strategic arms control, and its stand on ballistic missile defences) reveal about its nuclear strategy; and where that strategy stands at present. Results: China’s nuclear strategy is grounded in classical military theory and informed by classical Chinese military philosophy to a greater degree than was the case in the US, and has been heavily influenced by Mao and his successors; by their ideological commitment to People’s War; and by unique adaptations of Marxist-Leninist military theory. China’s relationship with deterrence has been complex, ranging from disdain for nuclear “paper tigers” to an “existential” deterrent capability; then to a “minimal” deterrent based on a small number of inaccurate missiles carrying high-yield warheads; and finally, more recently, to what appears to be a “limited deterrent” based on some capacity for nuclear war-fighting. China has, for all intents and purposes, achieved a state of “essential equivalence” in nuclear capacity vis-à-vis potential adversaries, and as a consequence of its strategic force expansion and US strategic force reductions, is evolving towards parity. Elements of China’s declaratory policy (specifically, Beijing’s no first-use (NFU) pledge; its approach to strategic arms control; and its view of ballistic missile defences) demonstrate a significant gap between Beijing’s words and its deeds. China’s NFU pledge is undermined by elements of strategy and doctrine that appear likely to permit first-use under circumstances where it would be strategically advantageous for China to do so; its arms control efforts appear to be designed less as instruments of international altruism than as a means of minimizing both China’s strategic lacunae and the strategic advantages enjoyed by potential adversaries; and its strong opposition to missile defences as “destabilizing” is somewhat diluted by China’s recent tests of anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile weapons. China’s nuclear evolution is more rapid and comprehensive than many observers appreciate. While China does not appear to be attempting to develop a genuine counterforce capability, Beijing is attempting to increase the number of options – including nuclear options – available to counter attempts by the US and others to interfere with realization of its strategic objectives within its area of interest and influence. Although it is not DRDC CORA TM 2011-156 iii clear at present where the trajectory of China’s nuclear posture may be leading, Beijing is clearly no longer satisfied with its long-standing posture of minimum deterrence – if indeed it ever was. For the sake of diplomacy, Beijing will likely continue to maintain a declaratory policy of “minimal deterrence”. Its nuclear posture, however, is already well beyond that, and is continuing to change. While aspects of the transformation are likely to resemble (at least in part) some aspects of America’s strategic nuclear evolution since 1945, the trajectory of China’s strategic nuclear evolution since its first detonation nearly fifty years ago has been comparatively unique to date, and likely will continue to be so. Significance and Future plans: With its enormous population and rapidly-expanding economy, and given present trends in US economic choices, China is widely expected to be one of the most important and influential states in the world over the coming decades. While China is and will almost certainly remain an important trading partner, however, China’s political regime is both antithetical and antipathetic to Western liberal democracy, and China’s regional (and perhaps eventually global) aspirations are a matter of some concern. The future trajectory of China’s nuclear posture is therefore a matter of critical interest to the Department of National Defence and, more broadly, to the Government of Canada. The next (third) paper in this study will examine and assess the current status of China’s strategic nuclear forces, looking both at extant systems and their capabilities and the programmes that are currently under way to update, upgrade or augment them. The fourth paper will attempt to discern the factors and influences that constitute the fundamental drivers of China’s declaratory policy, strategy and doctrine in the nuclear domain. All of the papers produced in the course of this study will be compiled in a capstone paper that will offer an assessment of the likely trajectory of China’s nuclear posture; propose recommendations for Canada and for allied states as they attempt to come to grips with the challenges and opportunities offered by China in the years ahead; and identify useful directions for further research into China’s strategic intentions and capabilities.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Spring/Summer 2017 • Image
    SPRING/SUMMER 2017 • IMAGE Publisher — OCA - Asian Pacific American Advocates Executive Editor — Miriam Yeung Managing Editor — Nick Lee Contributors — Ezra Calado, Roland Hwang, Daphne Kwok, Nick Lee, Morales Lo, Elizabeth OuYang, Linda Ching Sledge, Medona Samuel, Lavinia Clara Tamoepeau-Latu, About OCA – Asian Susie Y. Wong Contact: IMAGE with comments or sponsorship inquiries: Pacific American OCA - Asian Pacific American Advocates ATTN: IMAGE magazine Advocates 1322 18th St NW Washington, DC 20036 OCA - Asian Pacific American Advocates is a national membership-driven organization of community Telephone: 202.223.5500 advocates dedicated to advancing the social, political, Fax: 202.296.0540 and economic well-being of Asian Pacific Americans Email: [email protected] (APAs) in the United States. Website: www.ocanational.org To fulfill its mission, OCA has adapted the following OCA Executive Council goals to: President — Leslie Moe-Kaiser Advocate for social justice, equal opportunity and Executive Vice President — Edward Lew fair treatment; Treasurer — Astria Wong Promote civic participation, education, and Secretary — Michael Head leadership; Advance coalitions and community building; and Vice Presidents of: Foster cultural heritage Communications — Miriam Yeung Chapter Development — Eric Lin Founded as Organization of Chinese Americans in Economic Development — Linda Ng 1973, OCA has since grown to a robust national Education and Culture — Stan Lou advocacy organization to advance the civil rights of Finance — William (Bill) Kaung Public Affairs — Vicki Shu Asian Pacific Americans and aspiring Americans. The Membership Services — Thong Tarm organization presently has over 100 chapters, affiliates, Immediate Past President — Sharon Wong and partners, impacting more than 35,000 individuals General Counsel — Ada Loo all across the country through local and national programming.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990'S UNIDIR/93/26
    Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990's UNIDIR/93/26 UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Geneva Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990's Edited by Serge Sur UNITED NATIONS New York, 1993 NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. * * * The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat. UNIDIR/93/26 UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. GV.E.93.0.16 ISBN 92-9045-084-3 UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNIDIR is an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations. It was established in 1980 by the General Assembly for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. The work of the Institute aims at: 1. Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race, and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and toward the economic and social development of all peoples; 2. Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts; 3. Assisting ongoing negotiations in disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses; 4.
    [Show full text]
  • Bob Farquhar
    1 2 Created by Bob Farquhar For and dedicated to my grandchildren, their children, and all humanity. This is Copyright material 3 Table of Contents Preface 4 Conclusions 6 Gadget 8 Making Bombs Tick 15 ‘Little Boy’ 25 ‘Fat Man’ 40 Effectiveness 49 Death By Radiation 52 Crossroads 55 Atomic Bomb Targets 66 Acheson–Lilienthal Report & Baruch Plan 68 The Tests 71 Guinea Pigs 92 Atomic Animals 96 Downwinders 100 The H-Bomb 109 Nukes in Space 119 Going Underground 124 Leaks and Vents 132 Turning Swords Into Plowshares 135 Nuclear Detonations by Other Countries 147 Cessation of Testing 159 Building Bombs 161 Delivering Bombs 178 Strategic Bombers 181 Nuclear Capable Tactical Aircraft 188 Missiles and MIRV’s 193 Naval Delivery 211 Stand-Off & Cruise Missiles 219 U.S. Nuclear Arsenal 229 Enduring Stockpile 246 Nuclear Treaties 251 Duck and Cover 255 Let’s Nuke Des Moines! 265 Conclusion 270 Lest We Forget 274 The Beginning or The End? 280 Update: 7/1/12 Copyright © 2012 rbf 4 Preface 5 Hey there, I’m Ralph. That’s my dog Spot over there. Welcome to the not-so-wonderful world of nuclear weaponry. This book is a journey from 1945 when the first atomic bomb was detonated in the New Mexico desert to where we are today. It’s an interesting and sometimes bizarre journey. It can also be horribly frightening. Today, there are enough nuclear weapons to destroy the civilized world several times over. Over 23,000. “Enough to make the rubble bounce,” Winston Churchill said. The United States alone has over 10,000 warheads in what’s called the ‘enduring stockpile.’ In my time, we took care of things Mano-a-Mano.
    [Show full text]
  • Uranium-238 Which Inhibits Fission by Absorbing Neutrons Not Emitting Them
    The Mushroom Farm By Joseph Cleveland Brown, III U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Fellow of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, (Retired Civil Works Project Engineer, (Retired) CONTENTS Introduction Chapter 1: Einstein’s Legacy. Chapter 2: The Stars of Nuclear Physics. Chapter 3: Nuclear Energy Explained. Chapter 4: Our Race for the Bomb. Chapter 5: Our Bombs. Chapter 6: The Weapon Delivery Systems. Chapter 7: Our Nuclear Warheads. Chapter 8: Our Missiles. Chapter 9: Our Nuclear Powered Navy. Chapter 10: The Anatomy of a Nuclear Explosion. Chapter 11: U. S. Military Nuclear Safety record! Chapter 12: The Cuban Missile Crisis! Chapter 13: Our Testing. Chapter 14: Our Atomic Power Generation versus the World. Chapter 15: Our Planned Nuclear Waste Repository. Chapter 16: Our Cost so far. Chapter 17: How to prepare for the future. Glossary References and Sources Introduction OOPS! In 2007 I watched a one hour documentary on TV. I was shocked to learn that our government, Yes, You guessed it, the same government that looses all of our money in the Stock Market and Mortgage Market and puts space shuttles up, launches missiles that attack and kill other missiles and builds Nuclear Submarines so sophisticated that they are impossible to detect underwater has lost a Hydrogen Bomb close to a major American city and can’t find it! And as a middle manager in the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers for over 30 years I was never officially informed of this fact! I had to learn of this disturbing event on TV! It was on The Discovery Channel one day and titled, “America’s Lost H- Bomb” and was indeed an eye opener.
    [Show full text]
  • DOE-OC Green Book
    SUBJECT AREA INDICATORS AND KEY WORD LIST FOR RESTRICTED DATA AND FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUGUST 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................... 2 Where It All Began .................................................................................................................................... 2 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RD/FRD and NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (NSI) ......................................... 3 ACCESS TO RD AND FRD ................................................................................................................................ 4 Non-DoD Organizations: ........................................................................................................................... 4 DoD Organizations: ................................................................................................................................... 4 RECOGNIZING RD and FRD ............................................................................................................................ 5 Current Documents ................................................................................................................................... 5 Historical Documents ...............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The End of MAD? Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press the Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy
    The End of MAD? The End of MAD? Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy For nearly half a cen- tury, the world’s most powerful nuclear-armed countries have been locked in a military stalemate known as mutual assured destruction (MAD). By the early 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed such large, well- dispersed nuclear arsenals that neither state could entirely destroy the other’s nuclear forces in a ªrst strike. Whether the scenario was a preemptive strike during a crisis, or a bolt-from-the-blue surprise attack, the victim would al- ways be able to retaliate and destroy the aggressor. Nuclear war was therefore tantamount to mutual suicide. Many scholars believe that the nuclear stale- mate helped prevent conºict between the superpowers during the Cold War, and that it remains a powerful force for great power peace today.1 The age of MAD, however, is waning. Today the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy vis-à-vis its plausible great power adversar- ies. For the ªrst time in decades, it could conceivably disarm the long-range Keir A. Lieber, author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, author of Calculating Cred- ibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Univer- sity of Pennsylvania. The authors thank Richard Betts, Stephen Brooks, Matthew Bunn, Geoff Forden, Charles Glaser, David Kang, Christopher Layne, George Lewis, Jennifer Lind, Daniel Lindley, Michael Mastanduno, John Mearsheimer, Robert Pape, Theodore Postol, Gideon Rose, Stephen Rosen, Anne Sa’adah, Alan Stam, Benjamin Valentino, and William Wohlforth for helpful comments on previous drafts of this article.
    [Show full text]
  • The New Nuclear Forensics: Analysis of Nuclear Material for Security
    THE NEW NUCLEAR FORENSICS Analysis of Nuclear Materials for Security Purposes edited by vitaly fedchenko The New Nuclear Forensics Analysis of Nuclear Materials for Security Purposes STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. GOVERNING BOARD Sven-Olof Petersson, Chairman (Sweden) Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia) Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia) Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Professor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) The Director DIRECTOR Dr Ian Anthony (United Kingdom) Signalistgatan 9 SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Fax: +46 8 655 97 33 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org The New Nuclear Forensics Analysis of Nuclear Materials for Security Purposes EDITED BY VITALY FEDCHENKO OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © SIPRI 2015 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Army Lawyer, July 2012
    THE ARMY LAWYER Headquarters, Department of the Army July 2012 ARTICLES A Justi ce Manager’s Guide to Navigati ng High Profi le Cases Major Nathan J. Bankson TJAGLCS FEATURES Lore of the Corps An Offi cer Candidate School for Army Lawyers? The JAG Corps Experience (1943–1946) USALSA REPORT Trial Judiciary Note A View from the Bench: Claiming Privilege Against Self-Incriminati on During Cross-Examinati on Lieutenant Colonel Fansu Ku BOOK REVIEWS The Good Soldiers Reviewed by Major Thomas L. Clark CLE NEWS CURRENT MATERIALS OF INTERESTS Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-470 Editor, Captain Takashi Kagawa Technical Editor, Charles J. Strong The Army Lawyer (ISSN 0364-1287, USPS 490-330) is published monthly The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army. The Army Lawyer by The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, welcomes articles from all military and civilian authors on topics of interest to Virginia, for the official use of Army lawyers in the performance of their military lawyers. Articles should be submitted via electronic mail to legal responsibilities. Individual paid subscriptions to The Army Lawyer are [email protected]. Articles should follow The available for $45.00 each ($63.00 foreign) per year, periodical postage paid at Bluebook, A Uniform System of Citation (19th ed. 2010) and the Military Charlottesville, Virginia, and additional mailing offices (see subscription form Citation Guide (TJAGLCS, 17th ed. 2012). No compensation can be paid for on the inside back cover). POSTMASTER: Send any address changes to The articles. Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 600 Massie Road, ATTN: ALCS-ADA-P, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1781.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I 3 Stockpile
    3 Stockpile Chapter Three USNuclear Stockpile This section describes the 24 types of warheads cur- enriched uranium (oralloy) as its nuclear fissile material rently in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. As of 1983, the total and is considered volatile and unsafe. As a result, its number of warheads was an estimated 26,000. They are nuclear materials and fuzes are kept separately from the made in a wide variety of configurations with over 50 artillery projectile. The W33 can be used in two differ- different modifications and yields. The smallest war- ent yield configurations and requires the assembly and head is the man-portable nuclear land mine, known as insertion of distinct "pits" (nuclear materials cores) with the "Special Atomic Demolition Munition" (SADM). the amount of materials determining a "low" or '4high'' The SADM weighs only 58.5 pounds and has an explo- yield. sive yield (W54) equivalent to as little as 10 tons of TNT, In contrast, the newest of the nuclear warheads is the The largest yield is found in the 165 ton TITAN I1 mis- W80,5 a thermonuclear warhead built for the long-range sile, which carries a four ton nuclear warhead (W53) Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and first deployed equal in explosive capability to 9 million tons of TNT, in late 1981. The W80 warhead has a yield equivalent to The nuclear weapons stockpile officially includes 200 kilotons of TNT (more than 20 times greater than the only those nuclear missile reentry vehicles, bombs, artil- W33), weighs about the same as the W33, utilizes the lery projectiles, and atomic demolition munitions that same material (oralloy), and, through improvements in are in "active service."l Active service means those electronics such as fuzing and miniaturization, repre- which are in the custody of the Department of Defense sents close to the limits of technology in building a high and considered "war reserve weapons." Excluded are yield, safe, small warhead.
    [Show full text]
  • Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: an Overview
    UNCLASSIFIED MINIMUM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POSTURES IN SOUTH ASIA: AN OVERVIEW FINAL REPORT OCTOBER 1, 2001 DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY ADVANCED SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS OFFICE PREPARED BY: RODNEY W. JONES PPoollliiiccyy AArrcchhiiitteeccttss IIInntteerrnnaattiiioonnaalll RReessttoonn,,, VVAA 2200119911 The publication of this document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of the sponsoring agency. 1 Table of Contents Summary of Key Findings ..............................................................................................................................2 I. Introduction..............................................................................................................................................................5 II. Existing and Emerging Nuclear Force Capabilities ............................................................................................7 A. Asymmetries .....................................................................................................................................................7 B. Nuclear Weapon Inventories.............................................................................................................................8 C. Nuclear-Capable Delivery Systems ................................................................................................................13 D. Nuclear Force Structure..................................................................................................................................23
    [Show full text]
  • 04 Zafar Khan
    International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 25, No. 1, 2016, 95–128 China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy and its Consistency with the Chinese Leadership’s Perception of Minimum Deterrence Zafar Khan China is one of the recognized nuclear weapons states since it first tested its nuclear capability in 1964. Amongst major ingredients of its evolving nuclear strategy, China has been consistent with its small number of deterrent forces, an official no-first use doctrinal option, and policy of assured retaliation. This article argues that although China modernizes some parts of its key deterrent capability to enhance the credibility of its force precision, ranges and penetrability, this may not be considered a dramatic transformation in Chinese nuclear strategy. Modernization, which enhances the credibility and survivability of China’s deterrence forces, is an essential part of minimum deterrence conceptualized here. However, the possible greater transformation within doctrinal option of no-first use, increase of its deterrent forces including that of tactical nuclear weapons, and rescinding its strategy of assured retaliation would become inconsistent with what is conceptualized here. Keywords: China’s nuclear strategy, the minimum means of reprisal, no- first use, essentials of minimum, Chinese strategic force modernization, Chinese conceptualization of minimum deterrence Introduction China became one of the five major and recognized nuclear weapons states after it successfully tested a nuclear device in 1964. The Chinese leadership developed a strong confidence in the small number of Chinese nuclear weapons. It is notable how China remained consistent in their adherence to the essentials of minimum deterrence that it conceptualized in the early days of its nuclear weapons development and how the Chinese founding leadership at the time of its nuclear 96 Zafar Khan weapons acquisition shaped Chinese nuclear policy architecture in the years to come.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Weapons FAQ (NWFAQ) Organization Back to Main Index
    Nuclear Weapons FAQ (NWFAQ) Organization Back to Main Index This is a complete listing of the decimally numbered headings of the Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions, which provides a comprehensive view of the organization and contents of the document. Index 1.0 Types of Nuclear Weapons 1.1 Terminology 1.2 U.S. Nuclear Test Names 1.3 Units of Measurement 1.4 Pure Fission Weapons 1.5 Combined Fission/Fusion Weapons 1.5.1 Boosted Fission Weapons 1.5.2 Staged Radiation Implosion Weapons 1.5.3 The Alarm Clock/Sloika (Layer Cake) Design 1.5.4 Neutron Bombs 1.6 Cobalt Bombs 2.0 Introduction to Nuclear Weapon Physics and Design 2.1 Fission Weapon Physics 2.1.1 The Nature Of The Fission Process 2.1.2 Criticality 2.1.3 Time Scale of the Fission Reaction 2.1.4 Basic Principles of Fission Weapon Design 2.1.4.1 Assembly Techniques - Achieving Supercriticality 2.1.4.1.1 Implosion Assembly 2.1.4.1.2 Gun Assembly 2.1.4.2 Initiating Fission 2.1.4.3 Preventing Disassembly and Increasing Efficiency 2.2 Fusion Weapon Physics 2.2.1 Candidate Fusion Reactions 2.2.2 Basic Principles of Fusion Weapon Design 2.2.2.1 Designs Using the Deuterium+Tritium Reaction 2.2.2.2 Designs Using Other Fuels 3.0 Matter, Energy, and Radiation Hydrodynamics 3.1 Thermodynamics and the Properties of Gases 3.1.1 Kinetic Theory of Gases 3.1.2 Heat, Entropy, and Adiabatic Compression 3.1.3 Thermodynamic Equilibrium and Equipartition 3.1.4 Relaxation 3.1.5 The Maxwell-Boltzmann Distribution Law 3.1.6 Specific Heats and the Thermodynamic Exponent 3.1.7 Properties of Blackbody
    [Show full text]