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Home , Air Army (Soviet Union), Chen Hansheng, Chen Jian (diplomat), Chen Xiaolu, Chen Yun, Chinese Civil War

COLD INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Issues 6 - 7 Woodrow Wilson International Center Winter 1995/1996 for Scholars, Washington, D.C.

THE IN

DRAFT VERSION 2 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN The Cold War International History Project

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the of International Studies, headed by Ambassador Robert Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin Issues 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996) Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 1000 Jefferson Drive, SW Washington, D.C. 20560 Tel.: (202) 357-2967 Fax: (202) 357-4439 e-mail: [email protected]

Editor: James G. Hershberg Managing Editor: P.J. Simmons Associate Editor: Bonnie Southwick Researchers: Anne Chiorazzi, Helen Christakos, Andrew Grauer, Michelle King, Sara Kirchhoff, Mark Torok Special thanks to: Malcolm Byrne, Jian, Mark Doctoroff, Ilya Gaiduk, Maxim Korobochkin, Mark Kramer, Sasha Mansourov, Christian Ostermann, Priscilla Roberts, Danny Rozas, Kathryn Weathersby, Odd Arne Westad, Vladislav Zubok COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 3 Table of Contents

Stalin’s Conversations With Chinese Leaders Talks with and , 1949-53, with commentaries by , , Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok...... 3 Rivals and Allies: Stalin, Mao, and the Chinese , January 1949, introduction by Odd Arne Westad...... 7 New Evidence on the New Russian Documents on the Korean War, introduction and translations by Kathryn Weathersby...... 30 ’s Road to the Korean War, by Chen Jian...... 41 Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51, by Evgueni Bajanov...... 54 The Shtykov Diaries, by Hyun-su Jeon with Gyoo Kahng...... 69 Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives, article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov...... 94 Bruce Cumings and Kathryn Weathersby: An Exchange on Korean War Origins...... 120 Soviet Interrogation of U.S. POWs in the Korean War, by Laurence Jolidan...... 123 New Chinese Sources Constructing a History of Foreign Relations, by Michael H. Hunt...... 126 CCP Foreign Relations: A Guide to the Literature, by Michael H. Hunt...... 129 CCP Leaders’ Selected Works and the of the Chinese Communist , by Chen Jian...... 131 The Second Historical Archives of China, by Gao Hua with Scott Kennedy...... 147 New Evidence on Sino-Soviet Relations The Emerging Disputes Betwen and : Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents, 1956-1958, introduction, translations, and annotations by Shu Guang and Chen Jian...... 148 Mao on Sino-Soviet Relations: Two Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, introduction by Odd Arne Westad....157 The Soviet Foreign Ministry Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, by Mark Kramer...... 170 East German Documents on the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969, by Christian F. Ostermann...... 186 The Cold War in Asia: Conference Held on Russian Far East, by David L. Wolff...... 191 Soviet Reactions to the Sino-Soviet Border Rift, introduction and translations by Elizabeth Wishnick...... 194 Sino-Soviet Tensions, 1980: Two Russian Documents, introduction and translations by Elizabeth Wishnick...... 202 New Evidence on Sino-American Relations Mao Zedong’s Handling of the Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents, introduction, translations, and annotation by Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson...... 208 Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise to Beijing during the Crisis, introduction by Vladislav Zubok...... 219 Mao Zedong and Dulles’s “Peaceful Evolution” Strategy: Revelations from ’s Memoirs, introduction and translation by Qiang Zhai...... 228 New Evidence on the Vietnam/Indochina The and Soviet-American Relations, 1964-73: New Russian Evidence, by Ilya V. Gaiduk...... 232 Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence, article and translations by Qiang Zhai...... 233 Polish Secret Peace Initiatives in Vietnam, by Jerzy Michalowski...... 241 The Cambodian National Archives, by Kenton J. Clymer...... 260 Sources on the Khmer Rouge Years: The Cambodian Genocide Program...... 260 Research Notes Documenting the Early Soviet Nuclear Program, by Mark Kramer...... 266 Secret East German Report on Chinese Reactions to the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, by Mark Kramer...... 271 Book Reviews G.M. Kornienko, The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant, review by David R. Stone...... 272 Chen Hansheng, My Life During Four Eras, review by Maochen Yu...... 274 Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and Opposition in : The Workers’ Defense Committee “KOR”, and Ya.Ya. Grishin, Dramaticheskie sobytiya v Pol’she, 1980-1981 gg, review by Mark Kramer...... 277 Response: Sudoplatov Controversy (cont.), More on 1956 Polish & Hungarian Crises...... 280 Update...... 286 4 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN STALIN’S CONVERSATIONS Talks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950, And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952

with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok

This issue of the Cold War International History Project ter between these two communist titans and major figures of Bulletin leads off with translations of five meetings between 20th-century world history. Soviet leader and top leaders (Mao Zedong and Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscow Zhou Enlai) of the newly-created People’s Republic of between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in China (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of the August-September 1952, where issues on the table for discus- documents, which constitute some of the most intimate sion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and the glimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet and relationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcripts Chinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closed yield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind of archives of the communist world, are kept in the Russian Stalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), one Presidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of the of the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over the President, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. They USSR. were recently declassified by Russian authorities in connec- To assess the significance of these documents, the CWIHP tion with efforts to gather materials related to the Korean Bulletin has assembled four specialists familiar with Sino- War for presentation by the Russian Government to South Soviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, from Korea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as well various perspectives: Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Uni- as many other Russian archival records concerning the versity at Carbondale), author of China’s Road to the Korean Korean War which appear later in this issue of the Bulletin, War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New as a consequence of its cooperation with a research project York: Press, 1994); Prof. Vojtech Mastny involving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia Uni- (Bologna Center of the School of versity, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Advanced International Studies, currently at the University of of the Russian Federation. Hokkaido, Japan), author of The Cold War and Soviet Insecu- (Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained by rity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953 (Oxford University Press, CWIHP are available to researchers through the National 1996), a forthcoming sequel to his ’s Road to the Cold Security Archive, a non-governmental documents reposi- War, 1941-1945 (: Columbia University Press, 1979); tory, library, and research institute located on the seventh Dr. Odd Arne Westad (Director of Research, Norwegian floor of The Gelman Library at The George Washington Nobel Institute), author of Cold War and Revolution: Soviet University in Washington, D.C., and will also be made American Rivalry and the Origins of the , available through Columbia University.) 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and The documents that follow begin with transcripts of two Dr. Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), co- conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, author (with Constantine Pleshakov) of Inside the Kremlin’s which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22 Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cam- January 1950, during the Chinese leader’s two-month visit bridge, MA: Press, March 1996). to the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC in Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHP October 1949. Those conversations came as the two coun- by Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from Kathryn tries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alli- Weathersby and Chen Jian. ance following the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and also constituted the first and only personal encoun- —Jim Hershberg, Editor, CWIHP Bulletin COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 5 WITH CHINESE LEADERS

I: Conversation between Stalin and and mutual assistance between China and troops does not mean that Mao, Moscow, 16 December 1949 the USSR. refuses to assist China, if such assistance is Comrade Stalin: This question we can needed. The fact is that we, as communists, [Classification level blacked out: discuss and decide. We must ascertain are not altogether comfortable with station- “NOT SECRET” Stamped] whether to declare the continuation of the ing our forces on foreign soil, especially on current 1945 treaty of alliance and friend- the soil of a friendly nation. Given this RECORD OF CONVERSATION ship between the USSR and China, to an- situation anyone could say that if Soviet BETWEEN COMRADE nounce impending changes in the future, or forces can be stationed on Chinese territory, I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMAN to make these changes right now. then why could not the British, for example, OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S As you know, this treaty was concluded station their forces in , or the GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S between the USSR and China as a result of Americans in ? REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONG the Yalta Agreement, which provided for We would gain much in the arena of on 16 December 1949 the main points of the treaty (the question of international relations if, with mutual agree- the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port ment, the Soviet forces were to be with- After an exchange of greetings and a Arthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty was drawn from Port Arthur. In addition, the discussion of general topics, the following concluded, so to speak, with the consent of withdrawal of Soviet forces would provide a conversation took place. America and England. Keeping in mind this serious boost to Chinese communists in their circumstance, we, within our inner circle, relations with the national bourgeoisie. Ev- Comrade Mao Zedong: The most im- have decided not to modify any of the points eryone would see that the communists have portant question at the present time is the of this treaty for now, since a change in even managed to achieve what [Nationalist Chi- question of establishing peace. China needs one point could give America and England nese leader] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] a period of 3-5 years of peace, which would the legal grounds to raise questions about could not. The Chinese communists must be used to bring the economy back to pre- modifying also the treaty’s provisions con- take the national bourgeoisie into consider- war levels and to stabilize the country in cerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, ation. general. Decisions on the most important etc. This is why we searched to find a way The treaty ensures the USSR’s right to questions in China hinge on the prospects to modify the current treaty in effect while station its troops in Port Arthur. But the for a peaceful future. With this in mind the formally maintaining its provisions, in this USSR is not obligated to exercise this right CC CPC [Central Committee of the Com- case by formally maintaining the Soviet and can withdraw its troops upon Chinese munist Party of China] entrusted me to as- Union’s right to station its troops at Port request. However, if this is unsuitable, the certain from you, comr[ade]. Stalin, in what Arthur while, at the request of the Chinese troops in Port Arthur can remain there for 2, way and for how long will international government, actually withdrawing the So- 5, or 10 years, whatever suits China best. Let peace be preserved. viet Armed forces currently stationed there. them not misunderstand that we want to run Comrade Stalin: In China a war for Such an operation could be carried out upon away from China. We can stay there for 20 peace, as it were, is taking place. The ques- China’s request. years even. tion of peace greatly preoccupies the Soviet One could do the same with KChZhD Comrade Mao Zedong: In discussing Union as well, though we have already had [Chinese Railroad, which the treaty in China we had not taken into peace for the past four years. With regards to traverses ], that is, to effectively account the American and English positions China, there is no immediate threat at the modify the corresponding points of the agree- regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act present time: Japan has yet to stand up on its ment while formally maintaining its provi- in a way that is best for the common cause. feet and is thus not ready for war; America, sions, upon China’s request. This question merits further consideration. though it screams war, is actually afraid of If, on the other hand, the Chinese com- However, it is already becoming clear that war more than anything; Europe is afraid of rades are not satisfied with this strategy, they the treaty should not be modified at the war; in essence, there is no one to fight with can present their own proposals. present time, nor should one rush to with- China, not unless Kim Il Sung decides to Comrade Mao Zedong: The present draw troops from Port Arthur. invade China? situation with regard to KChZhD and Port Should not Zhou Enlai visit Moscow in Peace will depend on our efforts. If we Arthur corresponds well with Chinese inter- order to decide the treaty question? continue to be friendly, peace can last not ests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate to Comrade Stalin: No, this question you only 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhaps effectively fight against imperialist aggres- must decide for yourselves. Zhou may be even longer. sion. In addition, KChZhD is a training needed in regard to other matters. Comrade Mao Zedong: Since school for the preparation of Chinese cadres Comrade Mao Zedong: We would like Shaoqi’s return to China, CC CPC has been in railroad and industry. to decide on the question of Soviet credit to discussing the treaty of friendship, alliance Comrade Stalin: The withdrawal of China, that is to draw up a credit agreement 6 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN for 300.000.000 dollars between the gov- important here is not to give Americans a Comrade Mao Zedong: They have been ernments of the USSR and China. pretext to intervene. With regard to head- nationalized. Comrade Stalin: This can be done. If quarters staff and instructors we can give Comrade Stalin: In whose hands is the you would like to formalize this agreement them to you anytime. The rest we will have customs agency? now, we can. to think about. Comrade Mao Zedong: In the hands of Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, exactly Do you have any assault landing units? the government. now, as this would resonate well in China. Comrade Mao Zedong: We have one Comrade Stalin: It is important to focus At the same time it is necessary to resolve former Guomindang assault landing regi- attention on the customs agency as it is the question of trade, especially between the ment unit which came over to join our side. usually a good source of government rev- USSR and [Sinkiang], though at Comrade Stalin: One could select a enue. present we cannot present a specific trade company of landing forces, train them in Comrade Mao Zedong: In the military operations plan for this region. , send them over to Formosa, and and political sectors we have already Comrade Stalin: We must know right through them organize an uprising on the achieved complete success; as for cultural now what kind of equipment China will isle. and economic sectors, we have as yet not need, especially now, since we do not have Comrade Mao Zedong: Our troops have freed ourselves from foreign influence there. equipment in reserve and the request for approached the borders of Burma and Indo- Comrade Stalin: Do you have inspec- industrial goods must be submitted ahead of China. As a result, the Americans and the tors and agents overseeing foreign enter- time. British are alarmed, not knowing whether we prises, banks, etc.? Comrade Mao Zedong: We are having will cross the border or whether our troops Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, we have. difficulties in putting together a request for will halt their movement. We are carrying out such work in the study equipment, as the industrial picture is as yet Comrade Stalin: One could create a and oversight of foreign enterprises (the unclear. rumor that you are preparing to cross the Kailan [?] mines, electric power plants and Comrade Stalin: It is desirable to expe- border and in this way frighten the imperial- aqueducts in , etc.). dite the preparation of this request, as re- ists a bit. Comrade Stalin: One should have gov- quests for equipment are submitted to our Comrade Mao Zedong: Several coun- ernment inspectors who must operate le- industry at least a year in advance. tries, especially Britain, are actively cam- gally. The foreigners should also be taxed at Comrade Mao Zedong: We would very paigning to recognize the People’s Republic higher levels than the Chinese. much like to receive assistance from the of China. However, we believe that we Who owns the enterprises mining wol- USSR in creating air transportation routes. should not rush to be recognized. We must fram [tungsten], molybdenum, and petro- Comrade Stalin: We are ready to ren- first bring about order to the country, leum? der such assistance. Air routes can be estab- strengthen our position, and then we can talk Comrade Mao Zedong: The govern- lished over Xinjiang and the MPR [Mongo- to foreign imperialists. ment. lian People’s Republic]. We have special- Comrade Stalin: That is a good policy. Comrade Stalin: It is important to in- ists. We will give you assistance. In addition, there is no need for you to create crease the mining of minerals and especially Comrade Mao Zedong: We would also conflicts with the British and the Americans. of petroleum. You could build an oil pipe- like to receive your assistance in creating a If, for example, there will be a need to put line from western Lanzhou to [?], naval force. on the British, this can be done by and then transport fuel by ship. Comrade Stalin: Cadres for Chinese resorting to a conflict between the Comrade Mao Zedong: So far we have navy could be prepared at Port Arthur. You province and Hong Kong. And to resolve not decided which districts of China we give us people, and we will give you ships. this conflict, Mao Zedong could come for- should strive to develop first - the coastal Trained cadres of the Chinese navy could ward as the mediator. The main point is not areas or those inland, since we were unsure then return to China on these ships. to rush and to avoid conflicts. of the prospects for peace. Comrade Mao Zedong: Guomindang Are there foreign banks operating in Comrade Stalin: Petroleum, coal, and [] supporters have built a naval Shanghai? metal are always needed, regardless of and air base on the island of Formosa [Tai- Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes. whether there be war or not. wan]. Our lack of naval forces and aviation Comrade Stalin: And whom are they Comrade Stalin: Can rubber-bearing makes the occupation of the island by the serving? trees be grown in southern China? People’s Liberation Army [PLA] more dif- Comrade Mao Zedong: The Chinese Comrade Mao Zedong: So far it has not ficult. With regard to this, some of our national bourgeoisie and foreign enterprises been possible. generals have been voicing opinions that we which so far we have not touched. As for the Comrade Stalin: Is there a meteorologi- should request assistance from the Soviet foreigners’ spheres of influence, the British cal service in China? Union, which could send volunteer pilots or predominate in investments in the economic Comrade Mao Zedong: No, it has not secret military detachments to speed up the and commercial sectors, while the Ameri- been established yet. conquest of Formosa. cans lead in the sector of cultural-educa- Comrade Stalin: It should be estab- Comrade Stalin: Assistance has not tional organizations. lished. been ruled out, though one ought to consider Comrade Stalin: What is the situation Comrade Stalin: We would like to the form of such assistance. What is most regarding Japanese enterprises? receive from you a list of your works which COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 7

Rivals and Allies: in the conflict; the exchange, recently de- backfired badly when Mao refused to play Stalin, Mao, and the Chinese Civil War, classified in the Russian archives, is printed along with the Soviet leader’s initiative. In January 1949 below. his telegram of January 13, Mao not only There are several likely reasons why turned down Moscow’s instructions on how Introduction by Odd Arne Westad Stalin did not want to turn the GMD appeal his party should respond to the GMD, but down forthright. He may genuinely have even had the temerity to suggest to Stalin In early 1949, as the communist-led seen the response he outlined to Mao as the how he ought to respond on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was win- best tactic in order to forestall a propaganda Soviet Union. In both cases Mao empha- ning decisive victories on the battlefield in victory for the GMD and Washington. Stalin sized that there was no need for negotiations the Chinese civil war, the Guomindang probably also wanted to impress on Mao and and that Stalin’s suggestions would only (GMD) government made a last attempt at a the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader- delay the final military victory. peace settlement through Great Power me- ship his status as the master tactician of the For the leader of a Communist party to diation. Stalin decided not to disregard world Communist movement—as someone respond in such a way to Stalin’s instruc- completely the GMD initiative, but to offer who immediately understood a political situ- tions was rather unusual in the late , Soviet mediation in case the Chinese gov- ation wherever it came up with more clarity and did not endear the CCP to the Soviet ernment accepted those harsh preconditions and breadth than “local” leaders. Thirdly, he leadership. On the Chinese side—even after spelled out in his January 10 telegram to may have wanted to remind the CCP leaders, Moscow basically accepted Mao’s reply— Mao Zedong. That telegram, in turn, in a not too subtle way, of their dependence there remained a suspicion that Stalin had prompted a brief but revealing exchange on Soviet political and diplomatic support really wanted to stop the PLA offensives between the two communist leaders over the notwithstanding the PLA’s victories. north of the Yangzi river and thereby createa merits of diplomatic versus military tactics Whatever his motives, Stalin’s scheme continued on page 27 could be translated into Russian. 1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll.) 9-17; translation they could be left intact. The existing agree- Comrade Mao Zedong: I am currently by Danny Rozas.] ments, including the treaty, should be reviewing my works which were published changed because war against Japan figures in various local publishing houses and which * * * * * at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war contain a mass of errors and misrepresenta- is over and Japan has been crushed, the tions. I plan to complete this review by II. Conversation between Stalin and situation has been altered, and now the treaty spring of 1950. However, I would like to Mao, Moscow, 22 January 1950 has become an anachronism. receive help from Soviet comrades: first of I ask to hear your opinion regarding the all, to work on the texts with Russian trans- RECORD OF CONVERSATION treaty of friendship and alliance. lators and, secondly, to receive help in edit- BETWEEN COMRADE I.V. STALIN Mao Zedong: So far we have not worked ing the Chinese original. AND CHAIRMAN out a concrete draft of the treaty, only a few Comrade Stalin: This can be done. OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S outlines. However, do you need your works edited? GOVERNMENT OF THE Stalin: We can exchange opinions, and Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, and I ask PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA then prepare an appropriate draft. you to select a comrade suitable for such a MAO ZEDONG Mao Zedong: Judging from the current task, say, for example, someone from CC situation, we believe that we should VKP/b/ [All-Union Communist Party of 22 January 1950 strengthen our existing friendship using the ]. help of treaties and agreements. This would Comrade Stalin: It can be arranged, if resonate well both in China and in the inter- indeed there is such a need. After an exchange of greetings and a national arena. Everything that guarantees short discussion of general topics, the fol- the future prosperity of our countries must Also present at the meeting: comrs. lowing conversation took place. be stated in the treaty of alliance and friend- Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinskii, Stalin: There are two groups of ques- ship, including the necessity of avoiding a [Soviet translator N.T.] Fedorenko and [Chi- tions which must be discussed: the first repetition of Japanese aggression. So long nese translator] Shi Zhe /Karskii/. of questions concerns the existing as we show interest in the prosperity of our agreements between the USSR and China; countries, one cannot rule out the possibility the second group of questions concerns the that the imperialist countries will attempt to Recorded by comr. Fedorenko. current events in Manchuria, Xinjiang, etc. hinder us. I think that it would be better to begin Stalin: True. Japan still has cadres [signature illegible 31/XII] not with the current events, but rather with a remaining, and it will certainly lift itself up discussion of the existing agreements. We again, especially if Americans continue their [Source: Archive of the President, Russian believe that these agreements need to be current policy. Federation (APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis (op.) changed, though earlier we had thought that Mao Zedong: Two points that I made 8 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN earlier are cardinal in changing our future while, in effect, allowing appropriate changes there, China must decide on its own the treaty from the existing one. Previously, the to take place. question of Dalny: will it remain a free port Guomindang spoke of friendship in words Mao Zedong: We must act so as to take or not. During his time Roosevelt insisted only. Now the situation has changed, with into account the interests of both sides, China that Dairen remain a free port. all the conditions for real friendship and and the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong: So the preservation of the cooperation in place. Stalin: True. We believe that the agree- free port would be in the interests of America In addition, whereas before there was ment concerning Port Arthur is not equi- and Britain? talk of cooperation in the war against Japan, table. Stalin: Of course. It’s a house with now attention must turn to preventing Japa- Mao Zedong: But changing this agree- open gates. nese aggression. The new treaty must in- ment goes against the decisions of the Yalta Mao Zedong: We believe that Port clude the questions of political, economic, Conference?! Arthur could serve as a base for our military cultural and military cooperation. Of most Stalin: True, it does—and to hell with it! collaboration, while Dalny could serve as a importance will be the question of eco- Once we have taken up the position that the base for Sino-Soviet economic collabora- nomic cooperation. treaties must be changed, we must go all the tion. In Dalny there is a whole array of Stalin: Is it necessary to keep the pro- way. It is true that for us this entails certain enterprises that we are in no position to vision, stated in article 3 of the current inconveniences, and we will have to struggle exploit without Soviet assistance. We should Treaty of friendship: “...This article shall against the Americans. But we are already develop a closer economic collaboration remain in force up until that time when, by reconciled to that. there. request of both High Participants in the Mao Zedong: This question worries us Stalin: In other words, the agreement Treaty, the is given the only because it may have undesirable conse- on Port Arthur will remain in force until a responsibility of preventing any future ag- quences for the USSR. is signed with Japan. After the gression on the part of Japan”? Stalin: As you know, we made the signing of the peace treaty the existing agree- Mao Zedong: I don’t believe it is nec- current agreement during the war with Ja- ment shall become invalid and the Russians essary to keep this provision. pan. We did not know that Jiang Jieshi would shall withdraw their troops. Did I sum up Stalin: We also believe that it is unnec- be toppled. We acted under the premise that your thoughts correctly? essary. What provisions do we need to the presence of our troops in Port Arthur Mao Zedong: Yes, basically so, and it specify in the new treaty? would be in the interests of Soviet Union and is exactly this which we would like to set Mao Zedong: We believe that the new in China. forth in the new treaty. treaty should include a paragraph on consul- Mao Zedong: The matter is clear. Stalin: Let us continue the discussion of tation regarding international concerns. The Stalin: In that case, would you deem the the KChZhD question. Tell us, as an honest addition of this paragraph would strengthen following scenario acceptable: declare that communist, what doubts do you have here? our position, since among the Chinese na- the agreement on Port Arthur shall remain in Mao Zedong: The principal point is that tional bourgeoisie there are objections to the force until a peace treaty with Japan is signed, the new treaty should note that joint exploi- policy of rapprochement with the Soviet after which the Russian troops would be tation and administration will continue in Union on questions of international con- withdrawn from Port Arthur. Or perhaps one the future. However, in the case of adminis- cern. could propose another scenario: declare that tration, China should take the lead role here. Stalin: Good. When signing a treaty of the current agreement shall remain in place, Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the friendship and cooperation, the inclusion of while in effect withdrawing troops from Port question of shortening the duration of the such a paragraph goes without saying. Arthur. We will accept whichever of these agreement and to determine the amount of Mao Zedong: That’s right. scenarios is more suitable. We agree with investment by each side. Stalin: To whom shall we entrust the both scenarios. Molotov: The conditions governing the preparation of the draft? I believe that we Mao Zedong: This question should be cooperation and joint administration of an should entrust it to [Soviet Foreign Minister thought through. We agree with the opinion enterprise by two interested countries usu- Andrei] Vyshinskii and [Chinese Foreign of comrade Stalin and believe that the agree- ally provide for equal participation by both Minister] Zhou Enlai. ment on Port Arthur must remain in force sides, as well as for alternation in the ap- Mao Zedong: Agreed. until a peace treaty is signed with Japan, after pointment of replacements for management Stalin: Let us move over to the agree- which the treaty shall become invalid and the positions. In the old agreement the adminis- ment on KChZhD. What proposals do you Soviet soldiers will leave. However, we tration of the railroad belonged to the Sovi- have on this question? would like for Port Arthur to be a place for ets; however, in the future we think it neces- Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should ac- military collaboration, where we could train sary to alternate in the creation of manage- cept as the guiding principle the idea of our military naval forces. ment functions. Let’s say that such an alter- making practical changes concerning the Stalin: The question of Dalny [Dairen; nation could take place every two-three years. KChZhD and the Port Arthur agreements, Dalian]. We have no intention of securing Zhou Enlai: Our comrades believe that while legally continuing them in their present any Soviet rights in Dalny. the existing management of KChZhD and state? Mao Zedong: Will Dalny remain a free the office of the director ought to be abol- Stalin: That is, you agree to declare the port? ished and a railroad administration commis- legal continuation of the current agreement, Stalin: Since we are giving up our rights sion be set up in their place; and that the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 9 offices of the commission chairman and of at the time did not even have its own govern- Stalin: We would like the central gov- the director should be replaced by Chinese ment. It seems that you should hasten some- ernment to sanction and take the responsibil- cadres. However, given comrade Molotov’s what to present the requisition list for indus- ity for the agreements with Xinjiang or Man- proposals, this question requires more trial equipment. It should be kept in mind churia. thought. that the sooner such a list is presented, the Mao Zedong: The agreement with Stalin: If we are talking about joint better for the matter at hand. Xinjiang must be signed in the name of the administration, then it is important that the Mao Zedong: We believe that the con- central government. replacements for the managing position be ditions of the credit agreement are generally Stalin: Right, since [a] provincial gov- alternated. That would be more logical. As favorable to China. Under its terms we pay ernment might not take many things into for the duration of the agreement, we would only one percent interest. account, whereas things are always clearer not be against shortening it. Stalin: Our credit agreements with to the central government. Zhou Enlai: Should we not change the people’s provide for two per- What other questions do you have? ratio of capital investment by each side, by cent interest. We could, says comr. Stalin Mao Zedong: At the present time the increasing the level of Chinese investment jokingly, increase this interest for you as main question is economic cooperation - the to 51%, instead of the current requirement well, if you would like. Of course, we acted reconstruction and development of the Man- for parity? under the premise that the Chinese economy churian economy. Molotov: This would go against the was practically in ruin. Stalin: I think that we will entrust the existing provision for parity. As is clear from the telegrams that we preparation of this question to comrs. Stalin: We do indeed have agreements have received, the Chinese government in- Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, Zhou Enlai, and [CCP with the Czechs and the Bulgarians which tends to use its army in the reconstruction of CC member and Vice Chairman of Finance provide for parity and equal-footing for both its economy. That is very good. In our time and Economics Commission] . sides. Since we already have joint adminis- we also made use of the army in our eco- Any other questions? tration, then we might as well have equal nomic development and had very good re- Mao Zedong: I would like to note that participation. sults. the air regiment that you sent to China was Mao Zedong: The question needs to be Mao Zedong: That’s right. We are very helpful. They transported 10 thousand further examined, keeping in mind the inter- drawing on the experience of our Soviet people. Let me thank you, comrade Stalin, ests of both sides. comrades. for the help and ask you to allow it to stay a Stalin: Let us discuss the credit agree- Stalin: You raised the question of China little longer, so it could help transport provi- ment. We need to officially formalize that receiving a certain amount of grain for sions to [CCP CC member and commander which has already been agreed to earlier. Do Xinjiang? of the PLA’s ] Liu you have any observations to make? Mao Zedong: Wheat and textile. Bocheng’s troops, currently preparing for Mao Zedong: Is the shipment of mili- Stalin: For this you need to come up an attack on . tary arms considered a part of the monetary with the necessary requests that include num- Stalin: It’s good that you are preparing loan? bers. to attack. The Tibetans need to be subdued. Stalin: This you can decide yourself: Mao Zedong: Very well, we shall pre- As for the air regiment, we shall talk this we can bill that towards the loan, or we can pare these. over with the military personnel and give formalize it through trade agreements. How shall we proceed with the trade you an answer. Mao Zedong: If the military shipments agreement? The meeting took two hours. are billed towards the loan, then we will have Stalin: What is your opinion? Up until Present at the meeting were comrs. little means left for industry. It appears that now we have only had a trade agreement Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, part of the military shipments will have to be with Manchuria. We would like to know Roshchin, Fedorenko and Mao Zedong, Zhou billed towards the loan, while the other part what sort of a situation we should look Enlai, Li Fuchun, [PRC Ambassador to the will have to be paid with Chinese goods. forward to in the future: will we be signing USSR] , [CCP CC member] Can’t the period of delivery of industrial separate agreements with Xinjiang, Man- , and Shi Zhe /Karskii/. equipment and military arms be shortened churia and other provinces, or a single agree- from 5 to 3-4 years? ment with the central government? [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38; Stalin: We must examine our options. Mao Zedong: We would like to have a translation by Danny Rozas.] The matter rests in the requisition list for our single, central agreement. But in time industry. Nevertheless, we can move the Xinjiang may have a separate agreement. * * * * * date that the credit agreement goes into Stalin: Just Xinjiang; what about Man- effect to 1 January 1950, since the shipments churia? III. Conversation between Stalin and should begin just about now. If the agree- Zhou Enlai: A separate agreement with Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952 ment specified July 1949 as the time for the Manchuria can be ruled out, since in the commencement of the loan, the international agreement with the central government [Classification level blacked out: community would not be able to understand China’s obligations would in essence be “NOT SECRET” stamped] how an agreement could have been reached fulfilled by shipments made from Manchu- between the Soviet Union and China, which ria. 10 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

RECORD OF CONVERSATION Stalin. We must also thank the Chinese this is indeed a long project. If the Chinese BETWEEN COMRADE people for carrying on the right struggle. comrades are interested in building a rail- I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI China also helps us by delivering us caoutch- way across Mongolia, we are ready to help in ouc [natural rubber]. Thus, we will have to its construction within Mongolian territory. 20 August 1952 thank China as well. This would be quicker. However, we be- Zhou Enlai says that, unfortunately, lieve that one cannot lose sight of a Xinjiang Present: China’s assistance to Soviet Union is insuf- railway, since this would be a very important ficient. railway which would pass through regions On the Soviet side Stalin. You came to power too late. You rich in oil. There should be oil there. comrs. Molotov, Vyshinskii, were late by more than 30 years. Mongolia doesn’t have much of it. Fedorenko. Zhou Enlai asks for permission to set Zhou Enlai notes that there are large forth the reason for the delegation’s visit. deposits of iron ore in the Pinditsiuan region, On the Chinese side comrs. Refers to the telegram from Mao Zedong and that it will become the center of the [Vice Premier] , Li Fuchun, which contains the Chinese government’s railroad and steel industries. Right now a [PRC Ambassador to the USSR] Zhang wishes. States three main topics to be dis- plan for the construction of the Xinjiang Wentian, [Deputy chief of staff] cussed. First question - the situation in railway is being drafted. In the course of the Korea. Second - the internal situation within first five year plan a railway will be con- Translated by PRC over the past three years and the five structed from Lanzhou to Khami. In the comrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe year plan for economic development. Notes second five-year plan a railroad will be built that a written report is under preparation. from Khami to the USSR border. Zhou Enlai sends comrade Stalin greet- The Chinese delegation would like to deal Stalin approves of this and reiterates the ings from Mao Zedong and inquires about with this question after the report has been significance of a Xinjiang railway with re- comrade Stalin’s health. presented. Third - the extension of the agree- spect to prospective oil mining. Stalin thanks Zhou Enlai and inquires ment on Port Arthur. Zhou Enlai affirms that there are oil about Mao Zedong’s health. Stalin notes that the initiative to extend deposits all along this route. Moves on to the Zhou Enlai announces that Mao Zedong the joint use of the military naval base at Port agreement on hevea [rubber] trees. has been feeling well during the past two Arthur must come from China. We are Stalin indicates that the question has years. Speaks of the enormous amount of guests there, and guests don’t ask such ques- been pretty much decided. attention being focused in China on the tions. Zhou Enlai agrees and shifts to the ques- upcoming [October 1952] XIX Congress of Zhou Enlai agrees with comrade Stalin tion of the five year plan for the PRC’s VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party of and offers to exchange diplomatic notes. economic development. Says that a written bolsheviks]. The Chinese government shall address the report on the subject is under preparation Stalin notes that there has not been a Soviet government with the necessary re- and that, as soon as the report is completed, convention for a long time, that in 1939 quest. he would like to visit comrade Stalin and there were only 1.5 mln. party members, The next question concerns the con- personally go over the report with him. while now there are about 6 mln.; even struction of the railway from Ulan-Bator to Stalin agrees to this. though we have been holding down the the Sino-Mongol border. Zhou Enlai requests assistance for work influx of new party members, the party is Stalin asks whether China is interested in geological exploration. still growing. in such a railway. Stalin promises such assistance. He asks about the delegation’s trip. Zhou Enlai notes that a railway to Zhou Enlai shifts to the question of Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the Xinjiang would be of greater importance. construction projects for various industrial attention and answers that the trip went But that would be a complicated and difficult enterprises in China. Says that there are 151 quite well and that the delegation travelled construction project. The Chinese govern- such enterprises planned to be constructed. in full comfort. In the name of Mao Zedong, ment is intent on first building a railroad to Points out that China needs the Soviet [he] thanks comrade Stalin, the party CC Mongolia which could then connect to So- Union’s help in procuring equipment. Asks [Central Committee] and the Soviet govern- viet Union. The length of this railroad on that the PRC’s written request be considered ment for the enormous help in both the Chinese territory would be approximately and that an answer be given as to whether development of the national Chinese 350 km. This railroad is projected to be and in what capacity the Soviet Union would economy and in the struggle with its en- completed by June 1955. Such a railroad render such assistance, and that time periods emies. serves Chinese interests as it opens a means be specified, and also that Soviet specialists Stalin. There is no need to thank. This of direct rail communication with Soviet be sent to China. Emphasizes that Soviet is our duty. Wouldn’t the Chinese comrades Union and eases the receipt of industrial specialists working in China have performed help us if we were in the same position? equipment from the USSR to China and the a great deal of work and have been of great Zhou Enlai agrees that this is true, add- export of Chinese goods to Soviet Union. help to China, especially in the area of train- ing that though assistance should be given, Stalin responds that a railway to Xinjiang ing work cadres and specialists. gratitude, obviously, should also be ex- is very important in the long term, and that Stalin. That is most important. China pressed. we could help China build this railway. But must have its own cadres in order to stand COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 11 strong on its own feet. Zhou Enlai says that they are beginning lery pieces. Zhou Enlai informs that they would like to understand this and are organizing main- Zhou Enlai repeats his request for assis- to receive an additional 800 specialists from tenance and assembly plants. He adds that if tance with . Emphasizes that for Soviet Union. comrade Stalin finds it necessary to hasten every Chinese shell fired, the Americans Stalin says that this request will be ex- the process, then they will take all appropri- answer with 9 shells of their own. amined and that we will try to send as many ate measures to comply. Stalin. That’s bad. Adds that if the as we can. Stalin asks whether divisions of some Americans are firing 9 shells, the Chinese Zhou Enlai asks also for assistance with sort have been organized in order to receive should be firing 20. We smothered the technical documentation (blueprints, etc.). the shipment of weapons for 60 divisions Germans with artillery. We had a gun sta- Stalin answers that this is, indeed, nec- which Soviet Union sent to China. tioned every 2 meters, while the Germans essary. Zhou Enlai explains that out of the 10 had a gun every kilometer. Artillery is Zhou Enlai asks if it will be possible to divisions’ worth of armaments that China important stuff. The Chinese government continue to educate students in the USSR has received, 3 have been given over to needs to get the munitions production going. and to send interns to Soviet enterprises. Korea and 7 have been earmarked for Chi- We will help you build these factories. Stalin expresses agreement. nese detachments in Korea. Zhou Enlai points out that they are reor- Zhou Enlai touches on the question of Stalin asks if he understands correctly ganizing existing factories and are planning the military five year plan. Informs that that all of the weapons will go to the Korean new factories. materials are under preparation and that a front. Stalin. That is necessary. Machine written report will be presented. Also wishes Zhou Enlai affirms that it will be so, tools are of utmost importance here. to receive military equipment. assuming that the war will continue. In- Zhou Enlai says that they have machine Stalin asks what Zhou Enlai has in mind: forms that, out of the total of 60 divisions’ tools, but old ones. shipments of weapons or equipment for mili- armaments, the Chinese government is in- Stalin says that machine tools are essen- tary factories. tent on sending 3 to Korea, preparing 42 tial in the production of ammunition for Zhou Enlai says that he meant ship- divisions [of Chinese soldiers] to serve in 122mm, three-inch and anti-aircraft guns. ments of weapons. Noting that since agree- Korea ..... [ellipsis in original] We can help in this matter. Adds that it is not ment has already been expressed with regard Stalin asks whether the Chinese have necessary to build large factories. We build to weapons for 60 divisions, he would like to gotten used to the new weapons. ammunition in different plants: one plant discuss shipments for naval forces. Asks Zhou Enlai explains that they are gradu- makes shell casings while another loads what sort of assistance could be received in ally becoming proficient with the new weap- them. It’s difficult to do everything in one the way of airplanes. ons, with 3-4 months of training. factory. Stalin asks whether the Chinese gov- Stalin. Under these circumstances we Zhou Enlai announces that the Chinese ernment is thinking of building aero-manu- operate in a way so as to allow soldiers to government will act upon the advice of the facturing plants. become familiar with the weapons and the Soviet government regarding its aviation Zhou Enlai says that this would be very overall organization of the division. This industry and take all measures to further its difficult to do in the course of the first five takes time - approximately 6 months. With- development. year plan, particularly with regard to jet out it one could lose the weapons. Besides, Stalin emphasizes the importance of airplanes. Notes that such construction is during this time we inspect the operation of first organizing assembly plants. not planned to begin until at least 5 years various mechanisms, and only then do we Zhou Enlai says that the Chinese gov- from now, and motor-building - in 3 years. send these units to the front. Of course this ernment plans to build tank-producing fac- Stalin points to the example of Czecho- preparation could be carried out behind the tories: one for light tanks with an output of 1 slovakia and Poland, which began with as- front, in Korea, for example. Half of the thousand tanks per year, and another for sembly plants. Says that the USSR could divisions receiving the new weapons should medium tanks, to be completed in 4-5 years. send China motors and other airplane parts, remain in China. Stalin advises to start here with assem- and China could organize the assembly of Zhou Enlai notes that the shipment of bly plans as well, pointing out that during the these airplanes. Cadres can be trained in this divisions to Korea results in losses, which war we converted automobile factories to way. We went through the same process. must be made up. produce tanks. Says that it would be good Such a process would be more beneficial for Stalin emphasizes that it is imperative for China to have 1-2 auto assembly plants. Chinese comrades as well. First you must to train the divisions, so as to make them Zhou Enlai says that they plan to build build 1-2 factories for motor assembly. We stronger. a factory in Changchun with an output of 20 will send motors and other airplane parts Zhou Enlai raises the question of assis- thousand cars and are organizing an assem- which would then be assembled in China. tance with artillery. bly plant with an output of 3 thousand cars a That’s how it was done in Poland, Czecho- Stalin asks whether China can produce year. Asks for assistance in the planning of slovakia, and . This ought to be ammunition. yet another factory. organized. Having organized assembly Zhou Enlai answers that they have not Stalin emphasizes that cadres must re- plants, you could then, in another 3 years, yet addressed this question. ceive training in assembly and maintenance build an airplane factory. That is the easiest Stalin notes that, all in all, it is more factories. This issue must be addressed. and the best way. difficult to transport ammunition than artil- Zhou Enlai agrees completely with this 12 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN observation and notes that the Chinese gov- would be a burden for the Soviet Union. defiance of all international laws. Under ernment is addressing this matter. They Stalin points out that this is because we international law the warring sides are obli- have maintenance factories and are cur- came to power earlier, that we were lucky. If gated to return all POWs, except those con- rently working to organize assembly plants; the Chinese comrades had come to power victed of crimes. What does Mao Zedong these plants will open next year. before us, then we would have had to ask the think regarding this matter: will he give in or Stalin inquires whether China has same of them. will he hold his own? worker education schools in their factories. To this Zhou Enlai responds that Mos- Zhou Enlai briefly relates the differ- Adds that we have such a school in every cow is the center from which all nations ences that separate them and the [North] factory. derive inspiration for their struggle for lib- Korean comrades in this matter. America Zhou Enlai admits that this is one of the eration. has agreed to return 83 thousand POWs, and weaker spots. They are taking measures to He goes on to give a short account of the [North] Korea was ready to accept the offer. rectify the situation. There are courses situation in Korea. He points out that up until However, they have not considered the crafty given in factories. They are trying to attract May 1951 the war in Korea was not static, but game that America is playing here - out of students and are selecting party members to was a war of movement. Since May 1951, a the 83 thousand, only 6400 are Chinese, and teach. front has been established, and the war has the rest Koreans. In truth, they are supposed Stalin points out that we have a special become static. Both sides are about equal in to return another 13,600 Chinese volunteers, ministry, the Ministry of Labor Resources. strength. The enemy is in no position to carry but the Americans don’t want to do this, There are vocational schools. It would be out an offensive. There is a certain equilib- though they are quite willing to return 76 good for China to establish something of the rium. But we are not carrying out large thousand Koreans. This clearly shows that sort. Every year these schools graduate offensives, either. Like the enemy which has they are out to provoke us, by trying to drive around 1 mln. young workers. reinforced its position 15-20 km. deep, so a wedge between China and [North] Korea. Zhou Enlai asks, what sort of institu- have we created our own fortified zone, and Stalin asks how many Korean POWs tions does Soviet Union have to train middle continue to dig even now. The enemy has not are there. management cadres[?] been able to destroy our fortifications. The Zhou Enlai answers - 96,600. Empha- Stalin explains that there are special front line extends for about 200 km and is sizes that the question of the number of technical schools for this purpose. completely fortified, as are the left and right Chinese and Korean POWs supposed to be Zhou Enlai says that he would like to flanks. returned is a matter of principle. Informs discuss the question of radar. Mao Zedong has put forth three ques- that the Chinese government is firmly com- Stalin promises to assist in this matter. tions. First - will we be able to repulse the mitted on having all 116 thous. POWs, in- Radio and radar are very important. enemy? We are convinced that we will. cluding 20 thous. Chinese, returned. But if Zhou Enlai says that they were thinking Second - will we be able to hold our present Americans were to agree on returning a few of building assembly plants for this pur- positions? This year has shown that we will less, then we would not strongly object, if pose. be able to hold and strengthen our positions. [they] promised that negotiations for the Stalin emphasizes that subsequently Third - will we be able to carry out an return of the other POWs will continue. they should build radar equipment manu- offensive, to attack the enemy? Earlier we Stalin affirms that this is the right posi- facturing plants. thought that we would hardly be able to carry tion. Zhou Enlai says that so far they are not out an offensive for more than 7 days. Now Zhou Enlai informs that Mao Zedong, capable of producing radar equipment. we are sufficiently strong to launch longer having analyzed the current situation re- Stalin promises to help. offensives and have entrenched ourselves garding this matter, believes that one should Zhou Enlai returns to the question of well enough to withstand bombing raids. stand firmly committed on the return of all specialists. Says that the Chinese govern- Stalin asks whether they are capable of POWs. The [North] Koreans believe that ment does not intend merely to ask us for widening the scope of the offensives. the continuation of the war is not advanta- help with specialists but also plans to pre- Zhou Enlai explains that they can launch geous because the daily losses are greater pare its own specialists. offensives to capture isolated positions, but a than the number of POWs whose return is Stalin approves of this, pointing out general offensive would be difficult to carry being discussed. But ending the war would that, in time, other countries will ask China out. Since the war acquired its static nature, not be advantageous to the USA. Mao for specialists: , Burma, Indo-China. the American command has been intent on Zedong believes that the continuation of the Adds that it would be wiser for the Chinese drawing out the negotiations and is not inter- war is advantageous to us, since it detracts government to send engineers and techni- ested in signing a truce. USA from preparing for a new . cians to Soviet factories, where they could Stalin says that apparently the Ameri- Stalin. Mao Zedong is right. This war hone their skills. cans want to keep more Chinese POWs. That is getting on America’s nerves. The North Zhou Enlai raises the question of de- would explain their refusal to return POWs. Koreans have lost nothing, except for casu- fraying the costs that China bears from the Perhaps they turned them over to Jiang Jieshi. alties that they suffered during the war. trade imbalance between the two countries. Zhou Enlai affirms that there are agents Americans understand that this war is not Says that the Chinese government would of Jiang Jieshi among the POWs. advantageous and they will have to end it, like to ask for a new loan. However, ob- Stalin observes that Americans want to especially after it becomes clear that our serves Zhou Enlai, we understand that this decide the POW question on their own, in troops will remain in China. Endurance and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 13 patience is needed here. Of course, one Every American soldier is a speculator, oc- fire. On the POW question [he] enumerates needs to understand Korea - they have suf- cupied with buying and selling. Germans three positions. First - announce from the fered many casualties. But they need to be conquered France in 20 days. It’s been beginning that they will hold back the same explained that this is an important matter. already two years, and USA has still not percentage of South Korean and American They need patience and lots of endurance. subdued little Korea. What kind of strength POWs as the percentage of North Koreans The war in Korea has shown America’s is that? America’s primary weapons, says and Chinese held back by America, and weakness. The armies of 24 countries can- comrade Stalin jokingly, are stockings, ciga- leave it at that. Second - resort to mediation not continue the war in Korea for long, since rettes, and other merchandise. They want to by a . Third - sign an armi- they have not achieved their goals and can- subjugate the world, yet they cannot subdue stice agreement by putting off the POW not count on success in this matter. Koreans little Korea. No, Americans don’t know question and resuming its discussion after- need our help and support. how to fight. After the Korean war, in wards. Asks about the bread situation in Korea. particular, they have lost the capability to Then Zhou Enlai returned to the ques- Says that we can help them. wage a large-scale war. They are pinning tion of military assistance and put forth the Zhou Enlai says that Korea is having their hopes on the atom bomb and air power. Korean comrades’ request for 10 anti-air- difficulties in this regard. The Chinese gov- But one cannot win a war with that. One craft gun regiments. We told the Koreans ernment knows that USSR has helped Ko- needs infantry, and they don’t have much that we don’t have such capabilities, but that rea. Says that they have also helped Korea infantry; the infantry they do have is weak. we would bring this up with the Soviet and have told Kim Il Sung that this is not an They are fighting with little Korea, and al- government. obstacle, that they will give them foodstuffs ready people are weeping in the USA. What Stalin. Kim Il Sung asked as for 5 and clothing and everything they ask for, but will happen if they start a large-scale war? regiments. We promised to send him these. that they cannot give weapons. Then, perhaps, everyone will weep. Perhaps China will also give 5 regiments? Stalin says that we can give Korea addi- Zhou Enlai states that if America makes Zhou Enlai repeats that they do not have tional weapons. We will begrudge nothing some sort of compromises, even if they are such capabilities and that this is new to them. to Korea. small, then they should accept. If America Stalin says that this question needs to be Zhou Enlai repeats that they cannot does not agree to return all POWs and pro- cleared up with Kim Il Sung. yield to the Americans during the negotia- poses a smaller number, then they should As for Zhou Enlai’s request to send 10 tions. accept the offer, under the condition that the regiments, irrespective of those promised Stalin observes that if the Americans question of the remaining POWs will be earlier, comrade Stalin answers that it will back down a little, then you can accept, resolved under mediation by some neutral have to be examined. assuming that negotiations will continue on country, like India, or the remaining POWs Zhou Enlai brings up the Korean com- questions still unresolved. transferred to this neutral country until the rades’ request for advice on whether they Zhou Enlai agrees, adding that if the question is resolved. should start bombing . They are Americans don’t want peace, then we must Stalin asks how many American POWs not sure whether it’s the right way to go. be prepared to continue the war, even if it there are. Stalin explains that the belongs were to take another year. Zhou Enlai explains that the overall to the state and that Chinese volunteers should Stalin affirms that this is correct. number of POWs in North Korean and Chi- not use state planes. Zhou Enlai emphasizes the truth of com- nese hands is 12,000, out of which 7,400 are Zhou Enlai informs that the Korean rade Stalin’s observations, namely that this South Koreans. comrades have asked about launching a new war is getting on America’s nerves and that Stalin does not exclude such a resolu- offensive, to which the Chinese government the USA is not ready for the world war. tion to the question, as proposed by Zhou replied that they cannot carry out a strategic Adds that China, by playing the vanguard Enlai. On his part, [he] proposes that they offensive. role in this war, is helping to stave off the war could announce to the Americans that if they Stalin points out that when for 15-20 years, assuming that they will are holding back a certain percentage of negotiations are taking place, they should succeed in containing the American offen- Korean and Chinese POWs, then North not be launching either strategic or tactical sive in Korea. Then the USA will not be able Korea and China will hold back the same offensives. They shouldn’t be launching to unleash a third world war at all. percentage of South Korean and American any offensives. Stalin says that this is true, but with one POWs until a final solution to the POW Zhou Enlai asks, referring to Mao stipulation: Americans are not capable of question is agreed upon. This needs to be Zedong’s question whether Kim Il Sung and waging a large-scale war at all, especially tried as a way of pressuring Americans by [Chinese military commander] after the Korean war. All of their strength publicizing it in the press. If America rejects should be invited to Moscow. lies in air power and the atom bomb. Britain this offer, then it should be declared that they Stalin. I would happily talk to them, but won’t fight for America. America cannot apparently want to send Chinese POWs to they are far away. Besides, we are not very defeat little Korea. One must be firm when Jiang Jieshi. If these proposals are unsuc- comfortable with inviting them. If they were dealing with America. The Chinese com- cessful, then you can resort to mediation. to bring up the question, then we would rades must know that if America does not The main thing here is to propose a . happily welcome them here. lose this war, then China will never recap- Zhou Enlai declares that, indeed, an Zhou Enlai informs that Peng Dehuai ture Taiwan. Americans are merchants. armistice agreement also involves a cease- would very much like to come, though he is 14 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN unsure of what Kim Il Sung thinks. Perhaps Transcribed by PRC five year plan does not. In addition, it it would be good to speak to them about this. A.Vyshinskii [signature] is necessary to have the complete picture of Stalin agrees. N.Fedorenko [signature] all expenditures provided by the plan. Zhou Enlai repeats that the Chinese We must know how much is required government believes that it is wise to con- [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 54- from us on a paragraph by paragraph basis. tinue the negotiations in Panmunjom. But 72; translation by Danny Rozas.] It is necessary to do the calculations. The China is preparing for the possibility of given documents do not contain such data. another 2-3 years of war. Again asks for * * * * * Hence we cannot give our final answer. We assistance with aviation, artillery, and am- need at least two months in order to do the munition, as China cannot deal with these IV: Conversation between Stalin and calculations and tell you what we can pro- matters on its own. Zhou Enlai, 3 September 1952 vide you. Stalin announces that everything we Usually it takes us at least a year to can give you, we will. RECORD OF MEETING prepare our five year plan. Then we analyze Asks how is the Korean morale. Is BETWEEN COMRADES the prepared draft for another 2 months, and there confusion? I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI still we manage to let mistakes go by. Zhou Enlai explains that, indeed, there We would like you to give us some two has been much destruction in Korea, espe- 3 September 1952 months to study your plan, so that we could cially after the bombing of the electric power answer your questions. station on the Yalu river. This has had an How do things stand in other matters? It impact on Korean morale and on their ef- Present: seems that the question of Port Arthur has forts to accelerate the struggle to achieve been examined. In that case we need to make peace. on the Soviet side a decision. If there are any sort of objections Stalin says that the American strategy comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, then they should be discussed right now. is fright. But they have not frightened Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, In addition, it seems that there are also China. Could it be said that they have also Vyshinskii, and Kumykin. no objections to the draft communiqué on failed to frighten Korea? the transfer of KChZhD. Zhou Enlai affirms that one could es- on the Chinese side The third question concerns hevea [rub- sentially say that. comrs. Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, ber] trees. We would like to receive from Stalin. If that is true, then it’s not too , and Su Yu you 15 to 20 thousand tons of caoutchouc bad. [natural rubber] each year. You, it seems, Zhou Enlai adds that Korea is wavering translated by object, citing difficulties. The fact is that we somewhat. They are in a slightly unsteady comrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe. have a tremendous need for caoutchouc, state. Among certain elements of the Ko- since automobiles and trucks, which are also rean leadership one can detect a state of After an exchange of greetings the dis- being sent to you, require large amounts of panic, even. cussion began with the question of the five rubber. We would like to receive at least 10- Stalin reminds that he has been already year plan of the People’s Republic of China. 15 thousand tons of caoutchouc. We have informed of these feelings through Kim Il Stalin. We have familiarized ourselves not much opportunity to buy caoutchouc, Sung’s telegram to Mao Zedong. with your five year plan for construction. since Britain keeps it to itself. We ask you to Zhou Enlai confirms this. You are setting the yearly growth at 20%. Is reexamine the question of purchasing for us Asks how should the Chinese delega- not the setting of yearly industrial growth at the necessary amount of caoutchouc. tion proceed further. 20% strained, or does the 20% provide for If all these questions get resolved, then Stalin proposes to start work immedi- some reserve margin? the remaining can be decided with other ately. Informs that Soviet Union has as- Zhou Enlai draws attention to the fact delegation members, as it seems that Zhou signed a commission under the chairman- that they do not yet have sufficient experi- Enlai is hastening to return. ship of comrade Molotov and consisting of ence in such planning. The experiences of Zhou Enlai says that it’s difficult for comrs. Bulganin, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii and the past three years has shown that the PRC him to remain here for two months, that he Kumykin, and that the Chinese delegation is underestimating its capabilities. The fea- would like to return to China in mid-Sep- can speak to Molotov about when to start sibility of the plan will depend on the efforts tember. [Vice chairman of the Northeast work. of the and on the assistance (China) People’s Government] Li Fuchun Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the that China is counting on receiving from the can remain here. information and asks comrade Stalin to name USSR. Stalin. Fine. the time when he can brief comrade Stalin Stalin. We draft the five year plan with There still remains the question of con- on the internal situation in the PRC. a reserve margin, as it is impossible to take structing the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan Stalin agrees to see Zhou Enlai as soon into account every instance. There are vari- railroad. The Mongolian Premier, who was as he receives a finished version of the ous reasons that may affect the plan in one just here in Moscow, has given his approval. written report. direction or another. We always include the In other words, four questions remain to civil and military industries in the plan. The be decided by Zhou Enlai: Port Arthur, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 15

KChZhD, caoutchouc, and the construction The publication of the plans is essential, if previous arrangement remain in force? of the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad. the people are to comprehend the scope of Stalin. Everything which we have Zhou Enlai referring to the hevea ques- development. There must be numbers. It is agreed to - military and naval-military ship- tion, says that they will take all measures in not advisable to limit oneself by publishing ments - will remain in force. But this must order to provide USSR with 15-20 thousand solely its general trends. There are people be taken into account when determining the tons a year, but they are apprehensive that who want to know and behold the entire total number of shipments. We are not the blockade and other measures directed scope of development as specified in the five repealing any loans nor rescinding any agree- against China by its enemies may prevent it year plan. That’s why it is necessary to ments. In general, we find it unconscionable from fulfilling this commitment in full. The provide for military production in this plan, to run from the responsibilities that one has delegation is apprehensive that this may be though without naming military enterprises taken upon himself. Once an agreement has seen as a breach of its commitments to the and such. It will be better thus. There must been signed, it is imperative to abide by it, Soviet Union. be a single, unitary plan that includes both and we will abide by it. [He] repeats that they will take all mea- civil and military development. Zhou Enlai says that comr. Mao Zedong sures to fulfill this commitment, but would As far as the USSR is concerned, we, as has entrusted him to present the general like to reserve the right to explain the rea- the provider, must also know in what capac- outline of the five year plan and to ascertain sons and not be held in breach of its commit- ity and what type of assistance will be re- how much will have to be ordered from the ments, if in extraordinary cases the shipment quired of us. There is but one source - the Soviet Union for the civilian and military falls short of what was promised. USSR. But we need a reckoning for both the industries. They project 7,700 mln. rubles Stalin says that he understands this. We civil and military sectors. We must know for the civilian industry, and 4,500 mln. can soften the wording in the agreement, by and calculate every portion of the entire rubles for the military. Mao Zedong asked to saying that China will strive in every pos- sum. ascertain if this is a suitable ratio, if the sible way to realize the shipments of the Let’s say that in 1953 we provide weap- military portion is not too great. stated amount. But if it is unable to deliver ons for 10-15 divisions. We need to know Stalin. This is a very unbalanced ratio. caoutchouc in the amount stipulated, then how much steel and other materials will be Even during wartime we didn’t have such we will have to decrease the number of needed to fulfill this order. During that same high military expenses. trucks ordered. year 1953 we must supply a certain amount Zhou Enlai says that the 4,500 mln. Asks jokingly whether President Ho of equipment for the civil sector. This must rubles earmarked for military orders are Chi Minh might not be able to help in this also be calculated. Then both sums, the composed of the following: weapons for 60 matter. civilian and the military, must be combined divisions - 985 mln. rbls., military-naval Zhou Enlai notes that China has many to determine whether we will be able to shipments - 2,126 mln. rbls., aviation - 1,200 options in this regard (mostly through con- supply the entire amount. This is how a plan mln. rbls., and others. traband). must be drafted for each and every year. Emphasizes that under normal condi- [He] returns to the question of the con- Perhaps our Chinese comrades believe that tions the ratio between the military and civil- struction of the new railroad. Notes that here all these weapons are lying around some- ian sectors is not so unbalanced. The mili- are no objections. where in a warehouse. No, they must be tary portion is smaller. Stalin notes that they can make public produced. Stalin. During wartime our military pro- announcements on Port Arthur and KChZhD, Zhou Enlai completely agrees with ev- duction constituted about 40-45%, but China but not on hevea, and only make announce- erything laid out by comrade Stalin, and will doesn’t have a real war on its hands. How- ments on the Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan rail- ascertain how the matter of the [weapons ever, shipments for the air and naval forces road once it has been completed. shipments for] 60 divisions will rest. If they are necessary. Perhaps Mao Zedong is right Zhou Enlai expresses agreement with will be billed to credit, then that will also about the ratio of 7.7 bln. rbls. to 4.5 bln. rbls. this and returns to the question of the five have to be specified. Zhou Enlai informs that in 1950 ex- year plan. Again emphasizes that they are Comr. Mao Zedong had an idea - if the penses for the military constituted 44% of underestimating their capabilities. He agrees war in Korea were to continue for another the entire budget (4.2 bln. rbls.), in 1951 - that it is difficult to perceive the five year year or two, then would it be possible to 52% (8 bln. rbls.), in 1952 - 27.9% (6.6 bln. plan as a general picture, as it does not extend the duration of shipments for 20 rbls.). Says that, according to the five year include the military, since they are having divisions to next year? plan, investments in the military industry difficulties with military planning. Overall, Stalin says that right now it’s difficult to (munitions arsenals, aviation, tank produc- they are unsure whether to include the mili- say. Perhaps it will have to be shortened, tion, military shipbuilding) constitute 12- tary in the general plan. As for publishing perhaps not. It needs to be calculated. The 13% of all industrial investments. If com- the five year plan, they were not intent on calculation will tell us. Nothing here can be rade Stalin believes that such a ratio is ac- publishing the plan itself, only its general determined beforehand. ceptable, then they will use that as the basis trends. Zhou Enlai turns to the question of when drafting their general requisitions list. Stalin explains that our five year plans naval-military shipments. Asks whether Stalin. Good. It is acceptable. are published and that we include incognito these need to be included in the plan or not. Zhou Enlai says that at first they pro- articles dealing with military technology Roughly speaking these shipments need to jected constructing 151 industrial enterprises, production, chemical and other industries. be delivered over the next six years. Will the but now they have dropped this number to 16 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

147, excluding military arsenals (aero-manu- 985 mln. rbls. - weapons shipments for 60 be a certain ratio maintained between fighter facturing enterprises, tank enterprises, ship- divisions; 2,126 mln. rbls. - military-naval jets and reciprocating engine planes. building enterprises). Explains that these shipments; 100 mln. rbls. - caoutchouc; 800 Stalin says that reciprocating engine 147 enterprises are not military, though they mln. rbls. - industrial equipment. fighter-planes should be gradually retired serve military needs. Stalin. We will have to give something, and replaced by jets. Fighter jets have a Stalin. We usually build few new en- though the exact amount must be calculated. speed of 800 kilometers. Pilots should be terprises; we try to expand existing ones. We cannot give four billion. trained on reciprocating engine planes and It’s more economical. However, China will Zhou Enlai says that this amount does then transferred to jet planes. Reciprocating have to build new ones, since there aren’t not include aviation. They intend to pay cash engine planes should be completely retired enough existing ones. During the war we for aviation. over the next two years. We will give you converted aero-maintenance shops into aero- Stalin. The question here is not in the new fighters with speeds of 1000-1100 km/ manufacturing plants, and automobile fac- monetary amount, but in whether we will be h. You must not fall behind in this matter. tories into tank factories. We frequently able to produce this much equipment. All Zhou Enlai raises the question of pro- resorted to inter-enterprise cooperation, pro- that will have to be determined, which will viding China with technical documentation ducing parts in various enterprises and then take some two months. for the manufacture of the following weap- assembling them. China ought to try this Zhou Enlai shifts to the question of ons: 122mm howitzers, 37mm guns and method. It is simpler than building special specialists. Says that beginning with 1953, 67.2mm field guns. factories. China will need new specialists in the fol- Stalin says that the blueprints can be Zhou Enlai says that during the civil lowing fields: financial and economic mat- provided. war years they also made use of cooperation ters - 190 people, military - 417, medical Zhou Enlai asks whether they should among enterprises in the manufacture of school instructors and others - 140. In addi- immediately begin the construction of tank light weapons, but now they are embarking tion, they will also need specialists for the factories or build automobile and tractor upon the manufacture of heavy weapons, military industry, though this matter is still factories first, and then convert them to tank and that requires creating a base. being studied. production. Shifts to the question of how to cover Stalin. This will have to be examined: Stalin responds that some sort of a tank the cost of the trade imbalance between the what specialists, in which fields and with manufacturing plant should be built. Such a Soviet Union and China. Says that there are what profiles. We will send some, though plant could be gradually expanded. As for 3 ways to cover this cost: 1) increase Chi- it’s difficult to say how many. automobile factories, you definitely need nese exports to the USSR; 2) receive pay- Have you found the Soviet specialists more of them. ments in foreign currency - dollars, pound currently working in China useful? Zhou Enlai says that they will redraft sterling, Hong Kong dollars, Swiss francs; Zhou Enlai responds that they are very their five year plan and will seek our advice; 3) credit. Asks which of the three options is useful. the redrafted materials will be submitted to most acceptable. Asks whether comrade Stalin has any comrade Molotov. Stalin. Perhaps it will be necessary to remarks to make on the recently submitted Stalin advises to fix the overall growth make use of all three. report. [rate] at 15%, and at 20% for yearly plans. Zhou Enlai says that they are planning Stalin. The impression is a positive one. Notes that that would be a plan with a reserve to increase exports to the USSR to 13 bln. China is growing. China must become the margin. Points out the importance of giving rubles. We can supply cattle, leather, fur, flagship of Asia. It must in its turn supply the workers a slogan for overfulfilling the wool, silk, mineral resources, and food- other countries with specialists. plan. Such a plan can be overfulfilled. Says stuffs: beans, fats, tea. Zhou Enlai notes that the report contains that this is exactly how we draft our plans, Notes that over five years they could a footnote, specifying that in the event the with a certain reserve margin, since there is collect up to 200 mln. American dollars, as war ends, we would like to create an army of a possibility of having unfavorable circum- well as 1.6 bln. British pound sterling, Hong 3,200 thousand people, with 102 divisions. stances. You can’t plan for everything. Kong dollars, and Swiss francs. Stalin. That’s good. But that’s the mini- Stalin expresses interest in the produc- Stalin. American dollars are preferable. mum. China must be well armed, especially tion of naval mines in the PRC. British pound sterling have limited circula- with air and naval forces. Zhou Enlai responds that plans for a tion. As for Hong Kong dollars, you should Zhou Enlai. We project on having 150 factory are being drafted. consult our Ministry of Finance. air regiments with 13,000 personnel. Stalin points out the importance of de- The Soviet Union needs lead, wolfram Stalin. That’s too few. You’ll have to fending Chinese sea ports. [tungsten], tin, and antimony. We would add some. You should have 200 air regi- Inquires about the situation in Macao. like you to increase the deliveries of these. ments. Zhou Enlai replies that Macao contin- Notes that we would also accept lem- Zhou Enlai. Then we will have to in- ues, as before, to be in Portugal’s hands. ons, oranges, and pineapples which the So- crease the number of flight personnel. Stalin says that this scum that has situ- viet Union buys from other countries. Stalin. That’s right. You will probably ated itself on the very entrance to China must Zhou Enlai says that the loan of 4 bil- have to shift to three-regiment divisions. be driven out. lion rubles that they would like to receive That’s more economical - less division staff. Zhou Enlai says that in their relations from the USSR consists of the following: Zhou Enlai asks whether there needs to with Southeast Asian countries they are COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 17 maintaining a strategy of exerting peaceful Chinese troops there. of a committee with participation of the influence without sending armed forces. He immediately concerned parties and other offers the example of Burma, where PRC At the end of the discussion a meeting countries, including those which did not has been trying to influence its government was arranged for 4 September, at 9 o’clock take part in the Korean war.” through peaceful means. The same in Tibet. in the evening. He adds that the question of which and Asks whether this is a good strategy. how many countries should take part in this Stalin. Tibet is a part of China. There Recorded by A. Vyshinskii committee can be further discussed and de- must be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet. [signature] cided. As for Burma, you should proceed carefully. N. Fedorenko Regarding the proposal of temporary Zhou Enlai says that the Burmese gov- [signature] withholding of 20% of POWs from each ernment is concealing its true position with side, and the return of the remaining POWs, regard to China, but is actually maintaining [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 75- the Soviet delegation will not involve itself an anti-China policy, orienting itself with 87; translation by Danny Rozas.] with this proposal, which will be left in Mao America and Britain. Zedong’s hands. Stalin. It would be good if there was a * * * * * ZHOU ENLAI asks, what is your opin- pro-China government in Burma. There are ion concerning the possibility of the Chinese quite a few scoundrels in the Burmese gov- V. Conversation between Stalin and government entering into a non-aggression ernment, who make themselves out to be Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1952 pact with India and Burma [?] Mao Zedong some sort of statesmen. thinks such a pact would be expedient. Zhou Enlai explains that Chinese troops [Classification level blacked-out: STALIN answers that we support com- were deployed in Tibet a year ago, and are “NOT SECRET” stamped] rade Mao Zedong’s opinion. Of course, now at the Indian border. The question of there are and there will not be any obstacles whether there should be Chinese troops in RECORD OF CONVERSATION here. Tibet is moot. BETWEEN COMRADE STALIN ZHOU ENLAI asks, is it possible to Emphasizes that maintaining commu- AND ZHOU ENLAI delay the introduction of the second posi- nication with Tibet is difficult. In order to 19 September 1952 tion, to wait 2-3 weeks[?] communicate with Lhasa one needs 4-motor STALIN answers that this is Mao transport planes, equipped with oxygen tanks Present: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Zedong’s business. If Mao Zedong wants, and de-icing devices. Could not the Soviet Beria, we can introduce in the Assembly the dis- Union provide such planes? 2-motor planes Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskii. cussion of the second position concerning can go 3/5 of the way, but that’s as far as the percentage of withheld POWs. they’ll go. Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian, ZHOU ENLAI introduces a question Stalin replies that Soviet Union can Su Yu, Shi Zhe about the third position - the possibility of assist with this. transferring POWs to neutral countries so Zhou Enlai. In that case could China STALIN, opening the conversation with that their subsequent fate can be decided request 20 4-motor planes from the USSR? the Mexican proposal concerning the ex- separately. He says that this is talked about Stalin replies that first we will provide change of POWs, says that we agree with in the international community, and asks 10, and then another 10. Mao Zedong, that the Mexican proposal is whether comrade Stalin considers it pos- Points out the importance of building a not acceptable, since it conforms with sible to support this position. road to Tibet. America’s position at the negotiations in STALIN answers, that we want the re- Zhou Enlai says that such a road is being Korea. If Mexico comes forward with its turn of all POWs. This also concurs with the built, but that its construction will take up all proposal at the UN, the USSR delegation Chinese position. If an agreement cannot be of next year and part of 1954. will reject this proposal as not conducive to reached on this basis, we cannot deliver the Stalin notes that without a road it’s the cessation of the war in Korea and will POWs to the UN [because the UN is a difficult to maintain the necessary order in strive towards the following: military participant in the war; he asks, in Tibet. Tibetan Lamas are selling themselves “1. Immediate cessation of military ac- China’s opinion, which country will the cap- to anyone - America, Britain, India - anyone tivities of the involved parties on land, sea tives be sent to[?] who will pay the higher price. and air. ZHOU ENLAI answers: Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai says that, indeed, the Lamas 2. Return of all POWs to their native entrusted me to say, that we had in mind are hostile. This year (February, March, land in accordance with international stan- India. April) they were planning a , but dards. STALIN asks who will be responsible, the Chinese People’s Government was able 3. Withdrawal of foreign armies, in- in this case, for the expense of maintaining to suppress the rebels. cluding the Chinese volunteer units, from POWs. It seems, every involved party? Notes that as a result of this, the Dalai Korea in the course of 2-3 months; a peace- ZHOU ENLAI answers that if the POWs Lama’s brother fled abroad. ful settlement of the Korean issue in the are transferred to India, then after some time Stalin says that a road to Tibet must be spirit of Korean unification, conducted by they will be transferred from India to China, built, and that it is essential to maintain Koreans themselves under the observation and then the Chinese and Korean parties will 18 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN pay for the maintenance of Chinese and observed the debate, but then Britain re- wish the conclusion of a peace agreement Korean POWs. jected its position and we supported the pro- with China and the Soviet Union. STALIN says that this proposal can be posal regarding the creation of the UN. STALIN adds—and is preparing for acceptable, but we must keep in mind that ZHOU ENLAI asks whether there will aggression. He underscores that our posi- the Americans will not want to deliver all be letters concerning this matter from com- tion was not directed against the Japanese the POWs, that they will keep some cap- rade Stalin to Mao Zedong. people. tives, with the intention to recruit them. STALIN explains that it will be better ZHOU ENLAI raises the question of This was the case with our POWs. Now we without a letter. He sees that Zhou Enlai is Formosa. He says that since the Japanese are capturing several of our POWs a day, taking notes and he fully trusts him. government has concluded an agreement who are being sent over by America. They ZHOU ENLAI mentioned the Peace with Jiang Jieshi, it thus has confirmed that are withholding POWs not because, as they Congress in Peking, scheduled in the end of it is ignoring the interests of the Chinese say, the POWs don’t want to return - America September, saying that now it will be neces- people. This excludes the possibility of often refers to this - but so that they could sary to move the Congress to the beginning concluding a peace agreement. So long as a use them for spying. of October. He adds that China is striving for peace agreement exists with Formosa, a peace ZHOU ENLAI concedes that this is the participation of Japan and India in this agreement between the PRC and Japan is not precisely so. Congress. possible. He introduces the following scenario: STALIN asks if Pakistan will partici- STALIN emphasizes that the note on to cease fire and resolve the issue of POWs pate. Port Arthur was directed against America later. He reminds that comrade Stalin agreed ZHOU ENLAI agrees that Pakistan and not against the Japanese people. America with this, if no agreement is reached regard- should participate as well and that Pakistan maintains a [naval] fleet around Taiwan and ing the percentage [of POWs] withheld. representatives are invited, but the Pakistan exploits Taiwan. He affirms the correctness STALIN acknowledges that this can be government is not issuing them passports. of Zhou Enlai’s point of view on the impos- considered as one of possible scenarios, but As for India, a part of the Indian delegation sibility of a peace agreement with Jiang America is not likely to agree to it. has already arrived, and the Japanese delega- Jieshi, and indicates that the fact of the ZHOU ENLAI says that perhaps tion will arrive via Hong-Kong. signing of an agreement by Japan with Jiang America will suggest this in the Assembly. STALIN says further that we should Jieshi only worsens its [Japan’s] position. STALIN. This would be good. aim for China to have the principal role [in ZHOU ENLAI asks, what will be the ZHOU ENLAI says that in the last the Congress], because: further development of events with regard to discussion comrade Stalin suggested that 1/ the initiative in assembling the Con- Germany [?] China take initiative in creating a continen- gress belongs to China; STALIN says that it is difficult to fore- tal or regional UN. He asks whether there 2/ it will be better this way, because the cast. It seems, America will not support would be any other instructions regarding USSR is only partly located in Asia, and German unification. They plundered Ger- this matter. China is entirely in Asia, therefore it should many; if the West Germany and East Ger- STALIN answers that he continues to have the principal role. many unite, then it will not be possible to hold his previous point of view. In addition ZHOU ENLAI asks what specific ac- plunder Germany any longer. That is why he says that, besides the current UN, it is tions will be taken by our delegation. America does not want German unification. necessary to create separate organizations STALIN answers: peace. ZHOU ENLAI says: in his opinion, for Asia, Europe, etc., not in lieu of the UN, ZHOU ENLAI talks about Nehru’s pro- even though America is rebuilding the mili- but parallel to the UN. Let America create posal concerning the conference of five coun- tary forces of West Germany and Japan, an American organization, Europe - a Euro- tries - the Soviet Union, China, England, hoping to use them, this can turn pean one, Asia - an Asian one, but parallel to France and USA. against them. the UN, not contrary to the UN. MOLOTOV explains that this was a STALIN says that it is quite possible, ZHOU ENLAI says that China has no proposal of the Committee of the National even though the German government will be interest in the UN and obviously it is neces- Congress Party. controlled by nationalists, Hitler’s follow- sary to take initiative in creating a continen- STALIN says, that this proposal should ers. tal organization. be supported. ZHOU ENLAI shifts to the situation in STALIN emphasizes that UN is an ZHOU ENLAI emphasizes that at such Xinjiang. He says that the work in Xinjiang American organization and we should de- a conference India, it goes without saying, is generally going well and that agricultural stroy it, while keeping up the appearance will speak [in agreement] with England, but, reforms are being instituted there. But, there that we are not against the UN; we should it would seem, that it would be advisable to are also some leftist excesses, which mani- conduct this with an appearance of respect utilize this proposal. fest themselves in unlawful confiscation of to the UN, without saying that it should be STALIN agrees with this. domestic animals, in the domain of religion, destroyed, weakened, but in reality weaken ZHOU ENLAI says, that in connection and the reduction of interest rates and land it. with the publication of the note about Port lease. To eliminate these excesses the CC He reminds, that during the war Arthur, the position which the PRC should Plenum was assembled, which released [PLA Churchill suggested to create a continental take with regard to Japan is completely clear. commander] from the office of UN, but America opposed this. We quietly The PRC should indicate that Japan does not Secretary of Xinjiang CC CPC sub-bureau, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 19 and a group of CC members was directed to rades want to discuss these issues, then of [Chinese] national bourgeoisie. take care of the excesses. In general discon- course we will have no contradictions, but if MOLOTOV, returning to the question tent was eliminated, and cases of defection, they do not want it, then we will not have to of military credit, the payment for weapons including those to USSR territory, have been discuss anything. for 60 Chinese divisions, asks whether he halted. ZHOU ENLAI answers that the Chi- understood Zhou Enlai correctly the last STALIN says, that the excesses resulted nese comrades will definitely want to talk. time, that the cost of deliveries for 60 divi- from the desire to obtain land and domestic STALIN answers that, in this case, we sions is not related to the military credit, animals faster, confiscating both from the shall find the time. granted by the Soviet government to China rich. ZHOU ENLAI says that it is possible from 1 February 1951, according to the ZHOU ENLAI notes that as soon as the that the comrades from Vietnam will also agreement. The deliveries of weaponry for rumors about reforms had spread, the hostile arrive. 60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid in elements began to slaughter domestic ani- STALIN notes that the Vietnamese com- full amount according to the credit, granted mals. rades are our friends and will be our wel- in a special agreement between China and STALIN notes that similar incidents come guests. the Soviet Union. took place at a certain time in our experience ZHOU ENLAI, ending the conversion, ZHOU ENLAI answers that comrade as well. It is necessary to hurry up with the says they would like to receive instructions Molotov understood him absolutely cor- reform. If the agricultural reform is not concerning all these issues. rectly, and again asserts, that the weapon instituted, such looting will continue to oc- STALIN asks - instructions or sugges- supplies for 60 Chinese divisions have to be cur. tions? paid in full, according to the rates estab- ZHOU ENLAI explains that the agri- ZHOU ENLAI answers that from com- lished for countries other than China, and cultural reform is being instituted in crop rade Stalin’s perspective perhaps this would not in half. farming regions, and redistribution and ex- be advice, but in their perception these would STALIN says that in this case we should cesses connected with it [are occurring] in be instructions. sign a special agreement. the animal farming regions. Since animal STALIN notes that we give only ad- He mentions the gifts presented to So- herders participated in the redistribution, the vice, convey our opinion, and the Chinese viet representatives by the Chinese govern- Chinese government has decided to improve comrades may accept it or not; instructions, ment, and notes that there have been very their condition, which should improve the on the other hand, are mandatory. many gifts. general condition as well. ZHOU ENLAI repeats that from the ZHOU ENLAI explains that they could STALIN says: of course, it is up to you. Chinese perspective these are instructions, not present gifts to comrade Stalin for the ZHOU ENLAI says that according to most valuable instructions. He notes that 70th anniversary [of Stalin’s birth]. They the report, two representatives they do not accept these instructions blindly, attended the museum of gifts, saw the gifts from the Indonesian communist party should but consider it necessary to understand and sent by other countries, and they feel they arrive at the XIX [Party] Congress, and he accept them deliberately. must make up for what they were not able to asks whether it would be timely to discuss STALIN emphasizes that we know do before. party issues in Moscow with them. China too little, and that is why we are STALIN says that we also would like to STALIN says that it is difficult to tell cautious in giving instructions. present the Chinese delegation automobiles yet. It depends on whether they will address ZHOU ENLAI says that comrade Stalin made in USSR. He says that we have auto- the CC. He points out, that when the repre- certainly is well familiar with the particular mobiles “ZIS”, smaller than “ZIM”, but sentatives from the Indian communist party issues they are addressing, and asks again very beautiful, and we would like to present arrived, they asked us to help in determining whether there will be any instructions. you with these “ZIMs.” the party policy, and we had to do it, even Comrade STALIN answers that our Then he mentions the question concern- though we were busy. advice is this: we should remember, that ing Song Qingling [also Soong Chingling; ZHOU ENLAI reports that the Japa- England and America will try to place their widow of Chinese nationalist Yat-sen nese comrades should arrive as well, and it is people into the apparatus of the Chinese and then Vice Chairperson of the Central likely they will also want to discuss party government. It does not matter if they are People’s Government of the PRC]. issues. American or French. They will work to ZHOU ENLAI says that he is working STALIN answers that older brothers undermine, try to cause decay from within, on getting her closer to him, that she is cannot refuse their younger brothers in such could even commit such crimes as poison- gradually shifting from bourgeoisie ideol- a matter. He says that this should be dis- ings. That is why we must be alert. He says ogy to our side, that she comes out with good cussed with Liu Shaoqi, who has substantial we should keep this in mind. Here - these are articles based on our ideology. She says that experience, and clarified how the Chinese all the instructions. Song Qingling is very proud of being the comrades perceive it. ZHOU ENLAI says that these are very winner of the International Stalin Peace ZHOU ENLAI points out that Liu valuable instructions. He agrees that not Award. Shaoqi intends to bring with him appropriate only Americans, English and French can The conversation started at 10:30, ended material, in order to discuss a number of commit such treacheries, but they also push at 12:30. questions. the Chinese into it. STALIN notes that if the Chinese com- STALIN adds - their agents from the 20 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Recorded by: [signature] /A. Vyshinskii/ the treaty, loans, Taiwan, and the publi- how to solve the treaty problem and [signature] /N. Fedorenko/ cation of my selected works. offer its opinions. (2) Stalin said that the Americans [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 97- are afraid of war. The Americans ask (See Pei Jianzhang et al., Zhonghua renmin 103; translated by Danny Rozas with other countries to fight the war [for them], gongheguo waijiaoshi [A Diplomatic His- Kathryn Weathersby.] but other countries are also afraid of tory of the People’s Republic of China] fighting a war. According to him, it is (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1994), pp.17- * * * * * unlikely that a war will break out, and we 18.) agree with his opinions. COMMENTARIES (3) With regard to the question of As far as the meeting between Mao the treaty, Stalin said that because of the Zedong and Stalin on 22 January 1950 is Comparing Russian Yalta agreement, it is improper for us to concerned, the Russian minutes are also and Chinese Sources: overturn the legitimacy of the old Chi- compatible with the information provided A New Point of Departure for nese-Soviet treaty. If we are to abolish by Shi Zhe’s memoirs. Shi Zhe relates that Cold War History the old treaty and to sign a new treaty, the Mao Zedong and Stalin discussed the prin- status of the Kurile Islands will be ciples underlying the new Chinese-Soviet By Chen Jian changed, and the will have treaty at this meeting. Mao emphasized that an excuse to take away the Kurile Is- the treaty should serve to increase the politi- These documents from the Russian lands. Therefore, on the question of the cal, military, economic, cultural, and diplo- Presidential Archives provide significant Soviet Union’s thirty-year lease of matic cooperation between China and the new insights into the making and develop- Lushun [Port Arthur], we should not Soviet Union, while at the same time paying ment of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1949- change it in format; however, in reality, special attention to the prevention of a re- 1950. They usefully complement the ac- the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops emergence of Japanese militarism. On the count contained in the memoirs of Shi Zhe, from Lushun and will let Chinese troops China Eastern Railway issue, Shi Zhe re- Mao Zedong’s interpreter, occupy it. I expressed [the view] that too calls that Mao agreed not to change its joint who has been one of the main sources of our early a withdrawal [of the Soviet troops administration structure, but proposed that knowledge about the relationship between from Lushun] will create unfavorable its administrative head be Chinese and that Beijing and Moscow during the early Cold conditions for us. He replied that the China’s investment in it should be increased War period. (See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren Soviet withdrawal of troops [from from parity to fifty-one percent. However, shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [Together with Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet the Soviets desired to retain a 50:50 ratio Historical Giants: Shi Zhe’s Memoirs] Union will stand by with folded arms [in between Chinese and Soviet investments. (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical a crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways On the issue of Port Arthur (Luda), Mao and Documents, 1992).) As the translator of Shi through which China will not become Stalin agreed to establish a deadline for the Zhe’s memoirs, I am deeply impressed by the first to bear the brunt. His opinion is withdrawal of Soviet troops to begin after the richness of the information in these that we may sign a statement, which will the signing of a peace treaty with Japan. On documents. I am also surprised, in spite of solve the Lushun problem in accordance the issue of Dairen (Dalian), Stalin claimed some discrepancies, by the extent to which with the above-mentioned ideas, and that that the Soviets had no intention to retain Russian and Chinese materials (including by doing so, China will also gain politi- rights there and that the Chinese should feel Shi Zhe’s memoirs and other sources) are in cal capital [zhengzhi ziben]. I said that it free to manage the city. Shi Zhe also men- accord. I will therefore focus my comments is necessary for us to maintain the legiti- tioned that Mao and Stalin discussed issues on comparing Chinese and Russian sources macy of the Yalta agreement. However, concerning Sinkiang (Xinjiang) and Man- on the same events as reflected in these the public opinion in China believes that churia, but some “unpleasant feelings” documents. as the old treaty was signed by the emerged on the Chinese side because the Let me start with the meeting between Guomindang, it has lost its standing with Chinese leaders believed that these issues Mao and Stalin on 16 December 1949. The the Guomindang’s downfall. He replied were their internal affairs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi Russian minutes of the meeting are highly that the old treaty needs to be revised, juren shenbian, pp. 445-446.) One finds a compatible with, but more detailed than, and that the revision is necessarily sub- similar record of the discussion of these Mao Zedong’s own summary of the meet- stantial, but it will not come until two issues in the Russian minutes. ing in his telegram to Liu Shaoqi on 18 years from now. Shi Zhe also covers in his memoirs December. Mao’s telegram reads as fol- (4) Stalin said that it is unnecessary Zhou Enlai’s visit to the Soviet Union in lows: for the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai] to August and September 1952, describing in fly here just for signing a statement. I detail Zhou’s meetings with Stalin on 20 (1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the told him that I will consider it. I hope that August and 3 September. Shi Zhe recalls 16th, and met with Stalin for two hours the commercial, loan and aviation agree- that at the first meeting Zhou Enlai ex- at 10 p.m. (Beijing time). His attitude ments will be signed at the same time, plained to Stalin the Chinese leadership’s was really sincere. The questions in- and Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come. assessment of the international situation in volved include the prospect of peace, It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss general and the Korean War situation in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 21 particular. The two leaders also discussed order to strengthen the Chinese-North Ko- Shi Zhe also confuses some important dates the agenda of Zhou’s visit, which included rean position at the negotiating table, Stalin in his memoirs. For example, Liu Shaoqi, the issues of Luda, Soviet support of China’s agreed to send five Soviet anti-aircraft artil- the Chinese Communist Party’s second most first Five-year Plan, Soviet technological lery regiments to Korea. However, he warned important person, visited the Soviet Union support to China in establishing rubber tree the Chinese not to send their air force across from 28 June to 14 August 1949, but Shi Zhe plantations in southern China, and the con- the 38th parallel. He believed that the Ameri- mistakenly states in his memoirs that Liu’s struction of a railway from Ji’nin, a city on cans were not in a position to continue a visit started on 8 July 1949. Access to the Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator. prolonged war in Korea. If the Chinese- original Russian documents will certainly The two leaders then had a long discussion North Korean side remained patient in nego- help scholars to establish a more compre- on the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlai tiations while at the same time maintaining hensive and accurate understanding of the told Stalin that China would be willing to a powerful position on the battlefield, the historical past. end the war on acceptable conditions but Americans would sooner or later yield to But even the original Russian docu- would not yield to unreasonable American one of the aforementioned three Communist ments could also contain important omis- terms. In Mao’s view, Zhou informed Stalin, designs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, sions. In describing Mao Zedong’s first if the Communists could demonstrate a more pp. 510-511, 520-522.) meeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949, enduring patience than the Americans, the Again, if one compares Shi Zhe’s de- for example, Shi Zhe consistently recalls enemy would sooner or later make addi- scription of the meeting with the Russian that when Stalin asked Mao about the goals tional concessions. Zhou particularly em- minutes, they are compatible even in some he hoped to achieve through the visit, Mao phasized that it was Mao’s belief that a firm small details. For example, in both records, replied, according to Shi Zhe, that “For this Communist stand in the armistice negotia- Stalin said that the Soviets would assist the trip we hope to bring about something that tions might prolong the war in Korea but Chinese in establishing a 20 to 9 superiority not only looks nice but also tastes delicious.” would not trigger a third world war. Rather, in artillery pieces on the Korean battlefield. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, p.436.) in Mao’s opinion, the conflict in Korea had Yet these Russian documents do raise Indeed, this was the single most important the weakness of the United States, questions about existing Chinese sources in message Mao tried to deliver to Stalin at and delayed the coming of a new world war. several aspects. While these Russian docu- their first meeting. The Russian minutes, Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese did ments are declassified by the Presidential however, do not include this statement. Why have difficulties in continuing war opera- Archives in their original format, existing not? A possible answer could lie in the tions under the current conditions, espe- Chinese sources are usually released on a cultural differences between Chinese and cially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superi- selective basis, and published in compila- Russian interpreters. In Shi Zhe’s memoirs, ority in artillery pieces over the Communist tions rather than made available in their he mentioned that Mao made the statement forces. Stalin expressed his full agreement original form to scholars working in ar- at the beginning of the meeting, and that the with Mao Zedong’s assessment of the situa- chives. As a result, serious omissions exist Soviets did not quite understand Mao’s mean- tion, offering to increase Soviet military in the Chinese sources. In the Russian min- ing. Shi Zhe recalled that Lavrenti Beria, a equipment delivery to China so that the utes on the meeting between Zhou Enlai and Soviet Politburo member, even laughed at Chinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superi- Stalin on 20 August 1952, for example, the Mao’s expression. Is it possible that N.T. ority in artillery fire power against the Ameri- two leaders discussed the differences be- Fedorenko, who took the Russian minutes, cans. Stalin also advised that the Chinese- tween Chinese and North Korean leaders missed the importance Mao attached to this North Korean side should take three steps in over the Korean armistice issue. In Shi statement and treated it only as a part of dealing with the Americans on the prisoner Zhe’s memoirs, although he implied that “greetings” or an insignificant “discussion issue. First, if the enemy insisted on holding problems existed between Beijing and of general topics”? (See the first paragraph thirty percent of Chinese-North Korean pris- Pyongyang, he does not explain what the of the Russian minutes.) oners, Beijing and Pyongyang could suggest problems were and why and how they This discrepancy or omission reminds holding a comparable proportion of the emerged. Further, the accuracy of the infor- scholars that the post-Cold War access to enemy’s prisoners in exchange. The pur- mation provided by memoirs is subject to previously unavailable Communist docu- pose of this suggestion was to force the the limits of human memory. In the case of mentary sources do not offer automatic an- Americans to change their position. Second, Shi Zhe’s memoirs, even with his marvelous swers to all remaining scholarly questions. if the first design failed to work, the Chinese- memory of historical events (enhanced by They provide us with new research opportu- North Korean side could propose a ceasefire his experience of writing “confessions” sev- nities, but they also require us to be more to be followed by an exchange of prisoners. eral hundred times during the Cultural Revo- careful in treating our sources and more Third, if the second proposal was unaccept- lution and assisted by his privileged access creative in establishing our perspectives. In able to the Americans, the Chinese-North to archival sources), ambiguities exist and this sense, this is a new point of departure in Korean side could make the following pro- mistakes occur. For example, comparing the study of the Cold War history. posal: if some prisoners did not want to be Shi Zhe’s account of Mao Zedong’s meeting returned, they might be temporarily main- with Stalin on 16 December 1949 with both * * * * * tained by a neutral third country, and then, the Russian records and Mao’s own tele- after their intentions were ascertained, they gram summarizing the meeting, one finds it From Consensus to Strains would either be released or returned. In too general and ambiguous in some places. in the Sino-Soviet Alliance— 22 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

A Palpable Deterioration agreement indispensable to safeguard Soviet failed, Mao had learned the bitter lesson of territorial acquisitions in the Far East, by Stalin’s reneging on his promise to provide by Vojtech Mastny January 22 he was ready to send Yalta “to Soviet air cover for the Chinese intervention hell” and dispense with the treaty on the force, and the botched war had reached a The two sets of documents about high- ostensible grounds that it had merely been a stalemate. Its burden was weighing ever level Sino-Soviet conversations, separated temporary expedient required by the war more heavily on the Chinese and North in time by less than three years, illustrate the against Japan. He proved amenable to Mao’s Koreans, though not on Stalin, who could palpable deterioration of relations between insistence that the new pact must be stronger, relish the sight of the United States being the two communist powers under the strain including the obligation for the two signato- pinned down on the Far Eastern battlefield— of the Korean war. Yet the nature of the ries to consult with each other on all impor- unless, to be sure, Washington would decide deterioration, as well as its extent—not to tant international matters. to expand hostilities in trying to force a mention the personalities of the principles— This proposed provision is one of the decision. appear quite different from these contempo- few possible hints in the record at the im- The kind of underlying consensus per- rary Russian records than they do from the pending communist aggression in Korea, meating Stalin’s conversations with Mao is retrospective Chinese accounts which have whose preparation also provides the most no longer evident in the record of his talks so far been the main source of information compelling reason for Stalin’s reversal on with Zhou. These are businesslike talks, on the subject and which project the later the Sino-Soviet treaty. During their Decem- where bargaining takes place, though within Sino-Soviet rift into a period when a funda- ber meeting, the two chieftains still gave no the limits of propriety, and conflict of inter- mental conflict of interest was neither present inkling of plotting the Korean adventure, est matters, even if it is not allowed to come nor anticipated. despite ’s Kim Il Sung’s persis- into the open. Considering Stalin’s rapidly Even with the allowance made for a tent entreaties to obtain Moscow’s support deteriorating physical and mental condition, tendency of the Russian note taker to embel- for his plan for a forcible reunification of the he still shows an impressive command of lish the atmosphere prevailing at the meet- country. If in December they knew of the economic and military facts; only in the later ings, there cannot be a doubt that Mao plan but did not yet consider it topical, the sessions does his reasoning get muddled Zedong on his first visit to Moscow treated thrust of their January conversation suggests when he tackles the larger questions of di- Stalin as the supreme authority of world that by then they had begun changing their plomacy and war. For his part, Zhou lives up , with a reverence that was not minds. Their assessment, in view of recent to his reputation of a cool and deft negotia- merely pretended but rooted in a perception U.S. public statements and behavior imply- tor, never losing sight of what he wants to of common interests, to which the Chinese ing a diminished likelihood of effective accomplish, his deliberate obfuscations not- leader repeatedly and cogently alluded. The American opposition, offers the most plau- withstanding. same perception determined Stalin’s un- sible explanation of the change. Zhou’s aim was the achievement characteristically considerate, even gener- Besides the decision to proceed toward of an armistice in Korea as quickly as pos- ous, attitude toward his junior partner, so a tighter Sino-Soviet alliance, the subject of sible while maximizing Soviet economic much in contrast with the condescension he the January conversation most relevant to the and military assistance to his ravaged coun- usually displayed in dealing with his eastern prospective North Korean action was the try. Yet he never states these goals so clearly European lieutenants. The Russian docu- presence of Soviet forces at the naval base of and sometimes even seems to be contradict- ments hardly bear out the self-serving Chi- Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. Unani- ing them. He affirms China’s refusal to nese descriptions of his stinginess and boor- mous in their view that the forces should entertain any concessions to the Americans. ishness, an image that Mao himself—no remain there as a deterrent to any possible Indeed, the two conversation partners outdo doubt retrospectively embarrassed by the American military move against China, Stalin each other in their professions of intransi- extent of subordination he had once been and Mao anticipate keeping the place under gence toward the “imperialists” although willing to accept in regard to Moscow— Soviet control until the conclusion of what not all that they say is to be taken at face later tried to disseminate. they look forward to as a satisfactory peace value. Of course not everything was sweet settlement with Japan; in the final agreement Stalin lectures the Chinese visitor—as and smooth between the two ruthless and signed three weeks later, the transfer to Chi- if both did not know better—about the sup- devious dictators; still, their ability to dis- nese was to be fixed to take place posed military flabbiness of the Americans pose of potentially contentious issues was in two years’ time. It is difficult to avoid the and their inability to subdue even little Ko- remarkable. Of these, none was more im- conclusion that the only reason why they rea. He expresses his expectation that even- portant than the question of whether the could possibly expect to achieve a Japanese tually the United States would be compelled treaty Moscow had concluded with China’s peace treaty to their liking was the crushing to end the war on terms agreeable to the previous government should remain in ef- effect that a successful unification of Korea communists; accordingly, as a deterrent to fect or be replaced by a new one. During the by the communists, presumably within that any American attempt to expand the war, he month that elapsed between his two meet- particular time span, would have on the United complies with the Chinese request to keep ings with Mao, Stalin reversed himself, and States. Soviet forces in Port Arthur beyond the on both occasions Mao readily followed * * * * * previously agreed time limit. It is difficult to suit. Whereas in mid-December Stalin con- By the time Zhou Enlai came to Mos- tell whether Stalin’s expectation was an- sidered the treaty an outgrowth of the Yalta cow in August 1952, the Korean gamble had other example of his frequent wishful think- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 23 ing, rooted in the ideologically motivated tends are merely “suggestions.” cow, Mao and Zhou Enlai guarded them- belief that sooner or later “objective” forces Not even Zhou’s diplomatic skills suf- selves well against bringing up regional prob- would compel the capitalist enemies to be- ficed to overcome the disparity of power lems unless invited to do so by their hosts. have that way he wanted them to behave. It between China and its Soviet protector. The most interesting part of the conver- is also possible, and not mutually exclusive, When later in 1952 he publicly signaled sations concerns Sino-Soviet relations. Stalin that he was making a disingenuous argu- Chinese interest in the option of transferring initially turned down Mao’s wish for a new ment to persuade the Chinese to go on fight- the prisoners to India, the Soviet delegation treaty between the two countries, and in- ing, thus perpetuating their dependence on at the United Nations preventively torpe- stead proposed limited changes to the 1945 him while keeping the United States en- doed the idea. The Korean War was eventu- treaty, using U.S. and British complicity at gaged. He is certainly not helpful in advanc- ally ended in July 1953 by applying Zhou Yalta in wrestling Soviet concessions from ing any practical proposals to induce an Enlai’s other formula—but only after Stalin’s Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] regime armistice, insisting instead on demands that death in March removed the major obstacle as his main reason to leave the main part of he knew were unacceptable to the U.S. side. on the road to an armistice. that treaty intact. Only after Mao’s long and Playing a weak hand as a demandeur, idle wait in Moscow over the New Year Zhou has the difficult task of convincing the * * * * * holidays and the Chairman’s increasingly Soviet ruler to provide enough material as- desperate conversations thereafter with vari- sistance for both the prosecution of the war Unwrapping the Stalin-Mao Talks: ous Soviet officials—Molotov, Vyshinski, and China’s economic development while Setting the Record Straight Mikoyan, and ambassador Roshchin—did dissuading him from blocking a compro- Stalin relent. mise that alone could lead to the termination by Odd Arne Westad The January 22 conversation, held just of hostilities. By dwelling on China’s deter- after Zhou Enlai had arrived in Moscow and mination to fight on for several more years, The records of the 1949/50 Stalin-Mao talks on a new treaty had started, showed if necessary, rather than to make any conces- conversations—the only face-to-face meet- Stalin at his magnanimous best. “To hell sions, Zhou secures Stalin’s promises of ing between the two dictators—have topped with” the Yalta treaty, Stalin said. He was huge military and economic assistance. He the secret documents wish-list of many a willing to restore to China some of the con- makes good use of the Soviet leader’s fasci- Cold War historian. As often happens in cessions Chiang had given him five years nation with turning China into the “arsenal such cases, when the parcel is finally un- earlier, even if the imperialists undoubtedly of Asia” and his support for the Chinese wrapped the contents prove to be somewhat would such an altruistic act on Stalin’s conquest of Tibet, though he sidetracks disappointing. Gone is the high drama of behalf. (It would have been interesting to Stalin’s unsolicited advice to expel the Por- various memoirs, according to which the know how this absurd line of argument struck tuguese “scum” from the enclave of . monologues of the two giants circled each the Chinese on that winter’s night 45 years At the same time, they both agree not to other but never touched, each too preoccu- ago.) We can still only guess about Stalin’s provoke the Americans by acceding to the pied with his own agenda to address the real motives. A wish to keep the advanta- North Korean request for the bombing of concerns of the other. On the contrary, these geous provisions of the 1945 treaty? Very South Korea—an escalation Stalin refuses conversations are rather businesslike, not likely. An unwillingness to proclaim the to authorize with the priceless explanation unlike discussions recorded when the head Sino-Soviet alliance to the world (and espe- that the air force belongs to the state and of the new subsidiary is visiting the com- cially to the United States)? Quite possibly, could therefore not be used by the Chinese pany president. although Stalin’s fears of a confrontation “volunteers.” But the transcripts help us to set the with the Americans seem to have been at an Zhou Enlai fares less well in trying to record straight. They show the Soviet leader ebb that winter. break the deadlock in the armistice negotia- in the role of the cautious statesman, whose The rest of the conversation really tions caused by the disputes about the dispo- experience in international relations and the formed the start of the detailed negotiations sition of the Chinese and North Korean building of enabled him to dis- of a new treaty which Zhou Enlai and Andrei prisoners of war unwilling to be repatriated. pense “advice” to his Chinese friends. On Vyshinski continued and which ended in the While professing China’s insistence on the foreign affairs, Stalin told the Chinese not to Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual complete repatriation of all prisoners, he engage the United States or other imperial- Assistance and other agreements signed on nevertheless outlines to Stalin his plan for ists in armed conflict, not on Taiwan nor February 14. Throughout these negotiations the transfer of the unwilling ones to a neutral anywhere else. The reference here goes the Soviets held to a hard bargain, insisting country, such as India; noting the inconsis- back to Stalin’s unfortunate remarks to Chi- on getting new advantages in return for their tency, Stalin demurs. Nor does Zhou suc- nese communist emissary Liu Shaoqi the economic and military assistance and their ceed any better with his alternative proposal previous summer on the Chinese taking up relinquishing of old prerogatives. The So- that the armistice be concluded first and the “the leading position” in making revolution viet negotiating strategy both offended and question of the captives be settled later. The in the East. When Mao took Stalin on his puzzled the Chinese—on the one hand they inconclusive outcome of the discussion about word, and in October-November 1949 had were treated like “a vassal, not an ally,” on this key issue was a victory for Stalin, which presented plans for a Chinese intervention in the other hand they just could not make Zhou papers over by gratefully accepting his Indochina, he had had his fingers slapped by economic sense of many of the Soviet de- “instructions,” which the Soviet leader pre- the vozhd (supreme leader). While in Mos- mands. What really hurt Mao and his col- 24 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN leagues were Soviet references to Xinjiang, Far East. Many other issues involving Chi- changes” to the treaty, or (without announce- Mongolia, and (to a lesser extent) Manchu- nese and Soviet interests were also on the ment) to proceed with changes “right now.” ria: in Mao’s image six years later these table. In other words, Stalin had flatly reneged on areas were “turned into spheres of influence But the delicate and complicated ques- his commitment—relayed to Mao via of the USSR.” (See Mao’s conversation tion of establishing a personal relationship Mikoyan the previous February4—to dis- with Yudin, 31 March 1956, reprinted else- between Stalin and Mao also mattered greatly, card what the Chinese regarded as an “un- where in this issue of the Bulletin.) and the tacit struggle between the two great equal” treaty. Stalin reminded Mao that the The centerpiece of Stalin’s conversa- revolutionary personalities is as important in 1945 treaty “was concluded between the tions with Zhou Enlai in Moscow in the understanding the talks between them in USSR and China as a result of the Yalta summer of 1952 is the search for an armi- Moscow as their substance. At first, Stalin Agreement which provided for the main stice in Korea, a solution which at this stage seems to have succeeded in impressing Mao points of the treaty (the question of the both allies wanted, but which was held up by with his posture as world leader and mag- Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur, Stalin’s ceaseless maneuvering on the is- nanimous emperor. Shi Zhe, Mao’s inter- etc.). That is, the given treaty was con- sue. The Soviet leader most likely wanted preter, recalls that at the welcoming banquet cluded, so to speak, with the consent of the Chinese to go firmly on record in re- Stalin seemed strongly interested in devel- America and England. Keeping in mind this questing a ceasefire (possibly to be arranged oping a new relationship with China. “The circumstance, we, within our inner circle, by Moscow) and to back away from their victory of the Chinese revolution will change have decided not to modify any of the points position from the previous summer, when the balance of the whole world,” he quoted of this treaty for now, since a change in even Stalin had wanted an end to the war and Mao Stalin as saying. “More weight will be added one point could give America and England had turned him down. In his conversations to the side of international revolution.”1 the legal grounds to put forward a proposal with Zhou, Stalin paid lip-service to Mao’s According to the official Soviet record of the to raise questions about modifying also the previous position, while underlining that 16 December 1949 conversation, Mao asked treaty’s provisions concerning the Kurile the Chinese and the North Koreans should what was the likelihood that a peaceful Islands, South Sakhalin, etc.” not undertake further offensives and could “breathing spell” would last for the next 3-5 Why this sudden change of mind? One postpone the contentious POW issues until years. Stalin seemed to sound even more plausible explanation is that the cautious after an armistice had been signed. But optimistic than the previous July, when Liu Soviet leader still wanted to know more neither Stalin nor Zhou would admit to the Shaoqi had asked a similar question. There about the American reaction to the creation other that they were looking for a way out of was no immediate threat to China, he said, of the People’s Republic of China and to the the war against the United States and its because “Japan has yet to stand up on its feet Sino-Soviet talks. While the Truman Ad- allies. and is thus not ready for war; America, ministration and the U.S. Congress coped though it screams war, is actually afraid of with the “” and nervously moni- * * * * * war more than anything; Europe is afraid of tored the news from Moscow, Stalin pre- war; essentially, there is nobody to fight with ferred to wait. However, his last argument “To hell with Yalta!”— China....” In the most significant breach with shows that there were not only immediate Stalin Opts for a New Status Quo the framework of Yalta, Stalin suggested concerns at play. Even in late 1949, after the that “peace depends” on the alliance between Cold War had unmistakably broken out, by Vladislav Zubok the two communist powers. “If we continue Stalin still found it pyschologically difficult to be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10 to part decisively with the Yalta agreements, The two transcripts of conversations years, but 20-25 years and perhaps even which had represented a cornerstone of So- during the Stalin-Mao talks in December longer.” viet diplomacy. He understood that the issue 1949-February 1950 provide a unique in- Shi Zhe recalls that the conversation of new Soviet borders in the Far East and the sight into Stalin’s doubts and second became uneasy, because Mao avoided speak- existence of Soviet outposts in Manchuria thoughts about the creation of the Sino- ing about the terms of a future Sino-Soviet constituted one facet of an indivisible for- Soviet alliance. Although the groundwork treaty, waiting for Soviet initiative. Mao eign policy package, linked to the peace for holding the summit meeting had been presented a different version to the USSR treaty with Japan. To destroy this package, laid during an exchange of secret high-level ambassador to the PRC, Pavel Yudin, six which was the crowning achievement of missions over the previous year (Anastas years later: “During my first meeting with Stalin as a statesman and a foundation of the Mikoyan’s visit to China in February 1949 Stalin I submitted a proposal to conclude a USSR’s international legitimacy, was not an and Liu Shaoqi’s trip to Moscow in July- [new] state treaty, but Stalin evaded a re- easy thing to do. For decades after Stalin’s August), there were still unresolved issues sponse. Subsequently, Stalin avoided any death, Soviet leaders from Molotov and and obstacles on the path to the new alli- meetings with me.”2 The official Soviet Khrushchev to Brezhnev and Gromyko con- ance. One issue was the matter of Soviet record of the meeting provides a much more sidered themselves duty-bound to safeguard interests in . Another was vivid picture of this episode.3 and confirm “the results of Yalta” which the invisible presence of the Americans at When Mao asked about the treaty, Stalin signified international recognition and ac- the Sino-Soviet negotiating table and the immediately presented him with three op- ceptance of Soviet legitimacy and the bound- possible consequences of the alliance for tions: to announce the preservation of the aries of its “external empire.” vital Soviet broad interests, not only in the 1945 treaty, to announce “impending The Soviet leader must have known COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 25 from previous months of contacts and corre- vene.” At the same time, Stalin encouraged Beijing: “Comrade Stalin has agreed to Com- spondence that it would be hard for the the Chinese to “frighten the imperialists a rade Zhou Enlai’s arrival here and to the Chinese, and Mao in particular, to retain the bit” by probing the positions of the British signing of a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of old treaty which Stalin had concluded with and French in Hong Kong, Burma, and Friendship and Alliance, as well as agree- the Guomindang (GMD). Therefore, he Indochina, i.e. in the South and far from the ments on credit, trade, civil aviation, and tried to sweeten the bitter pill by telling Mao Soviet security perimeter. others.”7 that it would be possible to preserve the Eventually, in their initial conversation, In Mao’s estimate, the crucial factor existing treaty only “formally,” while chang- both leaders decided to drop the issue of the was that Great Britain and India recognized ing it “in effect,” that is, “formally maintain- treaty, and moved to discuss other issues. the PRC in January. In fact, a more impor- ing the Soviet Union’s right to station its When Mao inquired whether Zhou Enlai tant development was the conclusion of the troops in Port Arthur while, at the request of should travel to Moscow concerning the Truman Administration’s reassessment of the Chinese government, actually withdraw- treaty, Stalin replied benignly and crypti- its Far Eastern strategy. Washington de- ing the currently sta- cally that this was a question that “you cided to keep a hands-off policy toward tioned there.” (He quickly added, however, should decide for yourselves. Zhou may be Taiwan and to focus instead on the defense that if the Chinese desired the Soviet troops needed in regard to other matters.” The of its essential interests in other Pacific areas to remain, they could do so “by request of the ambiguity of this response, perhaps aggra- it deemed critical, particularly Japan and Chinese government” for the next 2, 5, 10, or vated by translation, may well have contrib- Southeast Asia, including , Ma- even 20 years.) Stalin also expressed will- uted to Mao’s impression that Stalin did not laya, and Indonesia. The new American ingness to alter some points concerning the want to discuss a new treaty. The meeting policy was enshrined secretly on 30 Decem- ownership and exploitation of the Chinese- ended without any specific proposals from ber 1949 in a classified document, NSC-48/ Changchun railroad. either side, and in the coming weeks Stalin 2, announced by Truman in a press confer- Stalin’s new position must have struck and Mao engaged in a tacit war of nerves. ence on 5 January 1950, and spelled out Mao like a bolt of lightning (the final proof, Some other factors intervened as well, par- publicly a week later by Secretary of State though, will come only in the Chinese ticularly a report from Soviet advisor I.V. Dean G. Acheson in his “defense perimeter” leader’s correspondence surrounding the Kovalev (who had been a Stalin emissary to speech at the National Press Club.8 One meeting). But Mao did not explicitly object. Mao) stating that Mao was neither a real may speculate that Stalin learned about the Instead, he humbly admitted that during the “Marxist” nor strong enough to resist pres- essence of this new policy before these offi- discussions in Beijing of a future Sino-So- sure from “the right- of the [Chinese] cial pronouncements, from various leaks viet treaty the Chinese Communist Party national bourgeoisie, which has pro-Ameri- and intelligence sources in Washington and (CCP) leadership had “not taken into ac- can inclinations.”5 London. It is even possible that, as with his count the American and English positions For whatever reason, Stalin decided to reversal of the initial Soviet response to the regarding the Yalta agreement. We must act let Mao cool down (and cool his heels), and in the spring of 1947,9 an in a way that is best for the common cause,” to gain more time himself to gauge the intelligence coup might have been a pivotal Mao said, according to the Soviet record. international response to their meeting, and factor in prompting Stalin to reassess his Far “This question merits further consideration. suggested resuming talks only on 2 January Eastern strategy. However, it is already becoming clear that 1950, more than two weeks later. Before From Stalin’s perspective, all this ap- the treaty should not be modified at the calling Mao, however, Stalin sent Molotov peared as a new American doctrine for the present time.” Mao also admitted that So- and Mikoyan for a reconnaissance to his Far East, a crucial change in the interna- viet control over Port Arthur (Lushun) and Blizhnita dacha where Mao was quartered. tional situation which seemed to signify a the Chinese-Changchun railroad “corre- Molotov recalled that “Stalin hadn’t received U.S. retreat from the Asian mainland and sponds to the interests of China.” him [Mao] for some days after he arrived. implicit of the Sino-Soviet alli- No language, however, could conceal Stalin told me, ‘Go and see what sort of ance as a new geopolitical fait accompli. the divergent priorities of the two leaders. fellow he is.’” Molotov returned and alleg- Stalin might also have suspected that he no When Mao indirectly asked the Soviet leader edly reported that it would be a good idea to longer had anything to lose if he openly “to send volunteer pilots or secret military receive Mao for another meeting. “He was rejected a now-outmoded “spirit of Yalta.” detachments to speed up the conquest of a clever man, a leader, a kind of On the other hand, Stalin knew from many Formosa [Taiwan],” Stalin promised only Chinese Pugachev [a Russian peasant revo- sources (Kovalev among them) that other “to consider” such assistance and advised lutionary]. He was far from a Marxist, of members of the CCP leadership, such as Mao to “organize an uprising” on the GMD- course....”6 The concerns about Mao’s po- Zhou Enlai, had been enthusiastic about the controlled island as a possible alternative to litical and ideological face played, however, prospect of balancing Soviet influence in a military assault. Stalin was careful not to a secondary role in Stalin’s change of mind— China with an American presence. By stick- indicate that he wished to curb the national- the international situation was far more im- ing to the old treaty, Stalin could only play ist ambitions of the Chinese revolutionaries, portant. Finally, as Molotov informed Mao into the hands of the British and of Acheson, yet in essence that was what his words im- on January 2, Stalin decided to jettison the who eagerly sought to discover an opening plied. Again and again, Stalin repeated that old Sino-Soviet treaty and with it his com- through which to drive a wedge between the “most important” thing was to avoid mitment to the Yalta arrangements in the Far Stalin and his most promising and signifi- giving the Americans a “pretext to inter- East. Mao jubilantly reported the news to cant potential ally in the Far East. 26 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Interestingly, Stalin did not tell his sub- treaties, we must go all the way. It is true benefitted the USSR) in times of upheaval. ordinates about this turnabout in his attitude that for us this entails certain inconve- It also made the CCP leadership feel more toward signing a new treaty. On January 6, niences, and we will have to struggle secure in its international isolation. At the Mao met with Soviet Foreign Minister against the Americans. But we are al- same time, the treaty created a new revolu- Andrei Vyshinsky, in the presence of ready reconciled to that. tionary-imperial synergy in the Far East. Kovalev, the Chinese ambassador in Mos- Mao Zedong: With regard to this matter, The Chinese communists, backed by Mos- cow, and interpreters Nikolai Fedorenko we are only concerned by the fact that it cow, wanted to complete the reunification of and Shi Zhe, to discuss joint Sino-Soviet could lead to undesirable consequences the country and to carry the banner of revo- tactics at the United Nations, where the for the USSR. lution further, to Burma and Indochina. For Nationalists continued to occupy China’s Stalin the alliance marked the end of the seat on the Security Council. When Mao Stalin sought to convince Mao that the status quo strategy of Yalta and the opening mentioned the necessity of a new treaty, Soviet Union would risk a conflict with the of a against the United Vyshinsky repeated the official line that any United States for the sake of its new Asian States in the Far East. Notwithstanding the change in the 1945 treaty “could be used by ally. Yet, he wanted to extract from the fact that in both countries hundreds of mil- the Americans and the British as a pretext Chinese a proper price for this willingness, lions of people yearned for peace and recon- for revision of those parts of the treaty, primarily in the form of recognition of Soviet struction, the new alliance in reality sig- whose change would hurt the interests of the security interests in Manchuria. This time nalled military and confronta- Soviet Union and China. This is undesir- Stalin did not miscalculate. Mao now ac- tion—as events in Korea would soon dem- able and must not happen.”10 Soviet ac- cepted Stalin’s proposal, put forth at the first onstrate. tions at the United Nations, however, had meeting, that the Soviet Union would retain already begun to reflect Stalin’s new line: its legal rights in Port Arthur, at least until a 1. Shi Zhe’s account is quoted in Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino- the alliance with communist China against peace treaty with Japan was signed. The American Confrontation (New York: Columbia Uni- the U.S.-led coalition of capitalist states. Chinese leader also agreed to keep the Dairen versity Press, 1994), 79-80. At the second official meeting with port closed to the Americans. 2. P. Yudin, “Zapis besedy s tovarischem Mao,” Mao (now accompanied by Zhou Enlai, The Chinese attempted to bargain when Problemi Dalnego Vostok [Problems of the Far East] 5 (1994), 105-106. who had arrived in Moscow two days be- it came to Soviet rights to control the Chinese 3. This difference was previously noted in Sergei N. fore), on 22 January 1950, Stalin sounded Changchun railroad, the main strategic ar- Goncharov, John Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain like a changed man. “We believe that these tery between the USSR and Liaotung (the Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, agreements [of 1945] need to be changed, Port Arthur peninsula). But Stalin and CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 85-86, as one of the authors, Sergei Goncharov, had seen the minutes of although earlier we had thought that they Molotov defended those rights tooth and the Stalin-Mao talks, which were then still classified, in could be left intact,” he said. “The existing nail. During the talks on the ministerial the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow. agreements, including the treaty, should be level, the Soviet side succeeded in imposing 4. In an undated cable sent to Stalin during the 31 changed, because war against Japan figures on the PRC several secret agreements. The January-7 February 1949 talks with Mao, apparently near the end of the discussions, Mikoyan reported that at the very heart of the treaty. Since the war Additional Agreement to the treaty stipu- he had told the Chinese leader that the Soviet govern- is over and Japan has been crushed, the lated that “on the territory of the Far Eastern ment had decided “to repeal this unequal [nespravedlivii] situation has been altered, and now the region and the Central Asian republics, as treaty and withdraw its troops from Port Arthur as soon treaty has become an anachronism.” The well as on the territory of Manchuria and as the peace [treaty] with Japan will be concluded. But if the Chinese communist party ... would find expedient most salient feature of the discussion was Xinjiang,” both the USSR and the PRC an immediate withdrawal of [Soviet] troops [from Port the omnipresence of the Japanese threat and “would not provide to foreigners the rights Arthur], then the USSR was ready to do so. As to the a virtual absence of discussion of the United for concessions, and would not tolerate ac- accord on the Chinese-Changchun railroad, we [the States and the new American policy; nor did tivities of industrial, financial, trade and other Soviet] do not consider this treaty unequal, since this railroad had been built primarily with Russian means. anybody then raise Acheson’s speech of enterprises, communities and organizations, Perhaps ... in this treaty the principle of equal rights is January 12. Only later, during the discus- with the participation, directly or indirectly, not fully observed, but we are ready to consider this sion of the specific provisions of the new of the [financial] capital of the third countries question and decide it with the Chinese comrades in a treaty, did the following exchange occur: or the citizens of those countries.”11 The fraternal manner.” See Archive of the President, Rus- sian Federation (APRF), f. 39, op. 1, d. 39, ll. 78-79, as Chinese also signed a “Protocol on the unim- quoted in Andrei Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia missiia A.I. Mao Zedong: We must act so as to take peded transportation of Soviet troops and Mikoyana v Kitai” [Secret Mission of A.I. Mikoyan to into account the interests of both sides, military property on the Chinese Changchun China], Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 3 (1995), 94-105, China and the Soviet Union. railroad in case of the threat of war in the Far quotation on p. 100; see also Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia missiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai,” Problemy Dalnego Stalin: True. We believe that the agree- East.” This secret agreement allowed the Vostoka 2 (1995), 97-111. ment concerning Port Arthur is not eq- Soviets to transport troops and military equip- 5. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Part- uitable. ment and supplies quickly, without paying ners, 91, 247-249. Mao Zedong: But changing this agree- any tariffs to the Chinese and without any 6. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Con- 12 versations with Felix Chuev, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago: ment goes against the decisions of the Chinese customs control. Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 81; for the original Russian see ?! The Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed on 14 Felix Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovim [One hun- Stalin: True, it does—and to hell with February 1950, satisfied Stalin’s search for dred and forty conversations with Molotov] (Moscow: it! If we make a decision to revise the preservation of the status quo (where it TERRA, 1991), 114. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 27

7. See the text of Mao’s cable to Beijing of 2 January not received any answer from these governments We are waiting for your answer. 1950, as reprinted in Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, yet. Neither has the Soviet government given its Uncertain Partners, 242. answer. Obviously, the government’s proposal Filippov [Stalin] 8. Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, had been inspired by the Americans. The aim of 98, 101; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the this proposal is to present the govern- [Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, ment as the advocate of the termination of war Federation (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 95- 1992), 336-337. and a peaceful settlement, while the Communist 96.] 9. On the importance of espionage data in the reversal party of China would be presented as the advo- of Soviet policy toward the Marshall Plan, see Mikhail cate of the continuation of war, if it would directly M. Narinsky, “The Soviet Union and the Marshall reject peace negotiations with Nanjing. * * * * * Plan,” in Cold War International History Project Work- We think we will give the following answer: ing Paper No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson the Soviet government was and continues to be in Stalin to Mao Zedong, 11 January 1949 International Center for Scholars, 1994), 45-46. 10. See record of meeting in f. 0100, op. 43, d. 8, papka favour of the termination of war and the establish- 302, ll. 4-6, Archive of , Russian Federa- ment of peace in China, but before agreeing to As you can see from what you have already tion (AVPRF), Moscow, cited in B. Kulik, “Kitaiskaiia mediation it would like to know whether the other received, our draft of your reply to the Narodnaiia Respublika v period stanovleniia (1949- side—the Chinese Communist party—agrees to Guomindang proposal is aimed at the undermin- 1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politik RF)” accept Soviet mediation. Therefore the USSR ing of the peace negotiations. Clearly, the [“The Chinese People’s Republic in the founding pe- wishes that the other side—the Chinese Commu- Guomindang would not agree to peace negotia- riod (Materials from the Archive of foreign policy of nist party—would be informed of the peace ac- tions without foreign powers’ mediation, espe- the Russian Federation”], Problemi Danego Vostoka 6 tion by the Chinese government, and that the cially that of the USA. It is also clear that the (1994), 77. 11. AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 235, papka 18, l. 134; also other side would be asked for its agreement to the Guomindang will not agree to negotiate without in SSSR-KNR (1949-1983): Dokumenti i materiali mediation by the USSR. That is how we are the participation of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai- [Documents and materials on USSR-PRC relations, planning to answer and we ask you to inform us shek] and other war criminals. We assume there- part one (1949-1983)] (Moscow: Historico-Documen- whether you agree to this. If you do not, give your fore that the Guomindang would reject peace tary Department and Far Eastern Department, Ministry advice for a more expedient answer. negotiations on CCP terms. The result will be of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1985), 31-32; see also We also think that your answer, in case you that the CCP agrees to the peace negotiations and Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, 121. will be asked for it, should be something like this: it will be impossible to accuse it of being eager to 12 . SSSR-KNR (1949-1983), p. 35. continue the civil war. The Guomindang, how- The Chinese Communist party has al- ever, will receive the blame for breaking the WESTAD ways been a supporter of peace in China, peace talks. Thus, the peace maneuver of the continued from page 7 because the civil war in China had not Guomindang and the USA will be frustrated, and been started by it, but by the Nanjing you will be able to continue your victorious war a divided China. The visit of Soviet Polit- government, which should bear all re- of liberation. buro member Anastas Mikoyan to the CCP sponsibility for the consequences of the We are waiting for your answer. war. The Chinese Communist party is headquarters later that winter did not do in favour of talks with the Guomindang, Filippov [Stalin] much to mitigate mutual suspicions; indeed, but without the participation of those Mao on several occasions during the dec- war criminals who provoked the civil [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 97-99.] ades to come referred to this episode as an war in China. The Chinese Communist example of Soviet duplicity. party is in favour of the direct negotia- * * * * * The documents were translated from tions with the Guomindang, without any Russian by Maxim Korobochkin; see also foreign mediators. The Chinese Com- Mao Zedong to Stalin, 13 January 1949 S.L. Tikhvinskii, “Iz Prezidenta RF: munist party especially finds it impos- Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v sible to accept the mediation by a for- Comrade Filippov, eign power which takes part in the civil yanvare 1949 g.”, Novaya i noveisha istoriya war against the Chinese Popular Libera- I received your telegram of January 10. 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40. tion forces with its armed forces and 1. We think that the government of the navy, because such a power cannot be USSR should give the following answer to the * * * * * regarded as neutral and impartial in the note by the Nanjing government proposing that liquidation of the war in China. the USSR accepts mediation in the termination of Stalin to Mao Zedong, 10 January 1949 the civil war in China: We think that your answer should be ap- The government of the USSR has Comrade Mao Zedong. proximately like this. If you do not agree, let us always wished, and still wishes, to see know of your opinion. China as a peaceful, democratic and On January 9 we received a note from the As for your visit to Moscow, we think that in united country. But it is for the people Nanjing government, proposing that the Soviet the view of the abovementioned circumstances of China itself to choose the way to government act as a mediator between the Nanjing you should, unfortunately, postpone your trip achieve peace, unity and democracy in government and the Chinese Communist party again for some time, because your visit to Mos- China. The government of the USSR, [CCP] in the termination of war and the conclu- cow in this situation would be used by the en- relying on the principle of noninterfer- sion of peace. A similar proposal was sent emies to discredit the Chinese Communist party ence in the other countries’ internal simultaneously to the governments of the USA, as a force allegedly dependent on Moscow, which, affairs, cannot accept mediation be- Britain and France. The Nanjing government has certainly, could bring no benefit to the Commu- tween the two sides in the civil war in nist party of China or to the USSR. China. 28 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

2. We think that although the USA, En- Chinese people. party and its troops, and that would lead to the gland, and France, and especially the USA, are We are deeply concerned by the fact that this political death of the Guomindang leaders and the very willing to take part in mediation to termi- deception will have a large influence on the people total disintegration of the Guomindang army. nate the war in China and thus achieve their and make us start another political detour, i.e. to Second, because they know that the Communist goal—to preserve the Guomindang regime—the refrain from rejecting peace negotiations with the party will not make peace with the Guomindang, governments of these countries, especially the Guomindang. We are delaying the creation of the as it cannot abandon its principal policy of liqui- US government, have already lost their prestige . Our principal objective is dation of the Guomindang and its troops. among the Chinese public, and as the victory of to make the Americans and the Guomindang put So what does Nanjing want after all? It the PLA nationwide and the downfall of the all their aces on the table, while we keep our aces wants not peace with the Communist party, but an Guomindang regime is already in sight—it seems until the last moment. armistice, a temporary termination of hostilities questionable whether they still wish to continue We have recently published a list of war to use the armistice as a respite to restore order their assistance to the Nanjing government and criminals, 43 persons, unofficially (a statement by among Guomindang troops, to fortify the south thus further offend the PLA. a person of authority). The PLA has not yet issued bank of the Yangzi, to ship armaments from the Only the USSR has a very high prestige an order to arrest these war criminals. USA, to reinforce and then to break the truce and among the Chinese people, so if the USSR in its On January 1 Jiang Jieshi delivered his peace deliver a blow on the People’s Liberation forces, reply to the note by the Nanjing government will proposal. We gave an unofficial answer to this, blaming the Communist party for the breakdown take the position outlined in your telegram of too (an editorial article by a journalist). To sum of negotiations. Their minimal wish is to prevent January 10, it would make the USA, England and up, we have left some room for a volte face, to see the total defeat of the Guomindang forces by the France assume that participating in mediation is how the Chinese people and international opinion Communist party. an appropriate thing, and give the Guomindang a would react to the Guomindang’s deceptive nego- This is the basis of the current deception pretext for scolding us as warlike elements. tiations. policy of Nanjing and the USA. And the broad popular masses, which are But now we are inclined towards rejecting 3. How can one respond to this maneuver by displeased with the Guomindang and hope for an the peace deception by the Guomindang with full Nanjing and the USA? Two replies are possible. early victory of the PLA, would find themselves righteousness, because now, as the balance of First reply: to reject the Nanjing peace proposals in despair. class forces in China has already changed irre- openly and directly, thus declaring the necessity If therefore it is possible for the USSR, in versibly and the international opinion is also of the continuation of civil war. But what would view of overall international relations, to make unfavourable to the Nanjing government, the PLA that mean? That means, first, that you had put its reply along the lines which we are proposing, will be able to cross the Yangzi this summer and your principal ace on the table and surrendered a we would wish very much that you approve of start the offensive towards Nanjing. very important weapon—the banner of peace— our proposals. By doing so, you will help us It looks like we do not have to make one more into the hands of the Guomindang. It means, enormously. political detour. In the present situation this second, that you are helping your enemies in maneuver would be damaging rather than benefi- China and outside China to accuse the Commu- 3. One should think thoroughly whether it is cial. nist party as the advocate of continuing the civil possible to let people from the Nanjing govern- 4. Thank you for asking for our opinion on war, and to praise the Guomindang as the de- ment, including war criminals, take part in peace such an important issue. If you do not agree with fender of peace. It means, third, that you are negotiations with us. As of now we are inclined my opinion as expressed here or would introduce giving the USA an opportunity to brainwash toward the following position: the unconditional corrections, please let me know. public opinion in Europe and America on the surrender of the Nanjing government is neces- lines that no peace is possible with the Commu- sary to give the people of China a real peace as Mao Zedong nist party, because it does not want peace, and soon as possible. that the only way to achieve peace in China is to By starting the war, the Nanjing govern- * * * * * organize an armed intervention by foreign pow- ment committed a great crime—it has lost the ers like the intervention which had taken place in confidence of the nation. To reach an early Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 January 1949 Russia for four years from 1918 to 1921. termination of war and a peace settlement the We think that a direct and overt answer is Nanjing government should surrender its powers To Comrade Mao Zedong. good when you are dealing with honest people, to the people. It has no reason for procrastinat- but when you have to deal with political swin- ing. We received your long telegram on the dlers, like the Nanjing people, a direct and overt We think that if we now would start peace Nanjing peace proposal. answer can become dangerous. negotiations with people like or 1. Certainly it would be better if the Nanjing But a different answer is also possible. i.e.: Shao Lizi and enter into a coalition government government’s peace proposal did not exist at all, a) to accept the desirability of a peace settlement with these people, that would be the exact fulfill- if this whole peace maneuver by the USA was in China; b) to conduct negotiations without ment of the US government’s wishes. nonexistent. Clearly, this maneuver is disagreable, foreign mediators, as China is a sovereign coun- And that would bring much dissent among because it can bring some trouble to our common try and has no need for foreign mediators; c) to the people of China, the democratic parties and cause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver does conduct negotiations between the Communist popular organizations and even within the CCP, exist, it is a fact and we cannot close our eyes on party and the Guomindang as a party, not with the and would be very damaging for our current this fact, we have to accept it. Nanjing government, [which is] bearing the blame position of having all virtue on our side. 2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal by for starting the civil war and thus has lost the Starting from July 1946 we have been cau- Nanjing and the USA is a manifestation of a confidence of the people; d) as soon as the parties tiously paying attention to the deceptive charac- policy of deception. First, because Nanjing does come to an agreement on the problems of peace ter of the negotiations which the US government not really want peace with the Communist party, and of the , the hostilities and the Guomindang would inevitably start after as the peace with the Communist party would would be terminated. the military defeat of the latter, and to the degree mean the rejection by the Guomindang of its Can the Guomindang accept these condi- of influence which this deception has on the principal policy of liquidation of the Communist tions? We think it cannot. But if the Guomindang COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 29 will not accept these conditions, the people will [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 110-113.] The Official Statement on the Soviet realize, that the Guomindang and not the Com- Government’s Answer to the Note by the munist party is to blame for the continuation of * * * * * Nanjing Government (, 18 January civil war. The banner of peace in this case rests 1949) in the hands of the Communist party. This issue Mao Zedong to Stalin, 14 January 1949 is especially important now, when a lot of people On January 8 the Chinese Foreign Ministry in China are tired of the civil war and are ready to Comrade Filippov, presented a memorandum to the Soviet Embassy support the advocates of peace. in China, containing an appeal by the Chinese But let us assume the impossible and imag- 1. I was glad to receive your supplementary government to the Soviet government to act as a ine that the Guomindang had accepted these telegram of January 11. On the principal line (the mediator in the peace negotiations between the terms. What should the Communist Party’s plans breakdown of large scale negotiations with the Chinese government and the Chinese Commu- of actions be like? Guomindang [GMD], the continuation of the nist party. As the Soviet Ambassador was in- First, it would be necessary to refrain from revolutionary war to the end) we agree with you formed, the Chinese government had sent a simi- terminating the hostilities and then to create the completely. lar appeal to the governments of the United States central coalition government organs in such a Today we published eight conditions under of America, Great Britain and France. way that approximately three fifths of seats in the which we [would] agree to enter into peace nego- On January 17 the Deputy Foreign Minister Consultative Council and two thirds of the posts tiations with the Guomindang. These conditions of the USSR cmrd. Vyshinsky A. Ya. received in the government would be retained by the are put forward against the five reactionary con- the Chinese Ambassador in the USSR Mr. Fu Communists, and the other seats and posts would ditions which Jiang Jieshi mentioned in his peace Bing Ciang and gave him the answer of the Soviet be distributed between other democratic parties proposal of January 1. government, which points out that the Soviet and the Guomindang. Several days ago already the Americans government, always loyal to the principle of non- Second, it is necessary that the posts of the sounded out our opinion—whether we would interference in the internal affairs of other coun- prime minister, Commander in Chief, and, if wish to conduct peace negotiations with the tries, does not regard it expedient to accept the possible, that of the president, be occupied by Guomindang without the 43 war criminals. So mediation mentioned in the memorandum. Communists. this sole condition—negotiating without war The answer of the Soviet government notes Third, the Consultative Council should de- criminals—is no longer sufficient to undermine that the restoration of China’s integrity as a demo- clare this coalition government the only govern- the intrigue of the Guomindang peace negotia- cratic peace-loving state is the affair of the Chi- ment of China, and any other government, pre- tions. nese people itself and that this integrity could be tending to be the government of China, should be 2. [This point dealt with the work of the CCP probably best achieved by the direct declared a rebel group, subject to be disbanded. radio station.] negotiatiations between the internal forces of And, finally, the coalition government should 3. Since the publication of the Guomindang’s China, without foreign interference. order both your troops and the Guomindang troops peace proposals there has been much fuss in the to swear allegiance to the coalition government GMD-controlled areas and the population is en [Source: Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-57. Col- and that hostilities against the troops which had masse demanding peace from the Guomindang, lection of documents (Moscow, 1959), p. 209.] given the oath would be terminated immediately, reproaching the Guomindang that its peace con- while they would be continued against the troops ditions are too severe. which had refused to give the oath. The agitation and propaganda organs of the CARTER-BREZHNEV CONFERENCE It seems unlikely that the Guomindang would Guomindang are hastily explaining why the HELD ON SOVIET INTERVENTION agree to these measures, but if they would not, it Guomindang needs to preserve its legal status IN , 1979 would be also detrimental for them, because they and its army. We think that this disorder in the would be totally isolated, and these measures Guomindang-controlled regions will be increas- On 17-20 September 1995, in Lysebu, would be carried out without them. ing further. , the Norwegian Nobel Institute hosted 4. This is our understanding of the issue and an oral history conference on the 1979 Soviet our advice to you. Maybe we were not able to Mao Zedong intervention in Afghanistan. The gathering, present our advice clearly enough in our previous which included scholars and former Soviet telegram. [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 104-105.] and American officials, was a continuation of We ask you to regard our advice as advice the Carter-Brezhnev Project (see CWIHP only, which does not impose any obligations on * * * * * Bulletin 5 (Spring 1994), p. 140) to explore the you and which you can accept or turn down. You collapse of superpower detente in the late can be sure that your rejection of our advice will Stalin to Mao Zedong, 15 January 1949 1970s and its possible implications for Rus- not influence our relations and we will remain sian-American relations. The principal orga- your friends as we have ever been. To Comrade Mao Zedong. nizer of the Project is Dr. James G. Blight, 5. As for our answer to the Nanjing media- Center for Foreign Policy Development, Tho- tion proposal, it will be in the spirit of your We have just received your last short tele- mas J. Watson Institute for International Stud- proposals. gram, which shows that we now have unanimous ies, Brown University. Efforts to obtain de- 6. We still insist that you postpone tempo- opinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace pro- classified documentation from U.S., Russian, rarily your visit to Moscow, as your presence in posal and that the Communist party of China has and other sources has been led by the National China is essential now. If you want we can already started its “peace” campaign. Thus, the Security Archive and CWIHP. A report on the immediately send an authoritative member of the matter is now closed. results of the conference, including transla- Politbureau to Harbin or some other place to tions of newly-available East-bloc documents negotiate on issues of interest to you. Filippov [Stalin] on Afghanistan, will appear in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. Filippov [Stalin] [Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, p. 118.] 30 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN NEW EVIDENCE ON

NEW RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON THE KOREAN WAR

Introduction and Translations significant first months of the conflict. (Un- Vasilevsky on February 23 (document #4) fortunately, some key materials from this supports accounts given by former DPRK by Kathryn Weathersby period, particularly the months immediately military officers that Stalin began taking preceding the war, have not yet become steps to strengthen the North Korean mili- In the previous issue of the Cold War available; for key documents from mid-Sep- tary forces even before Kim Il Sung’s secret International History Project Bulletin (Issue tember to mid-, covering events trip to Moscow in April, by appointing Ma- 5, Spring 1995 pp. 1, 2-9), I described the from the Inchon landing to China’s decision jor-General Vasiliev, a Hero of the Soviet collection of high-level documents on the to intervene in the war, see the article by Union and chief for War Experience Korean War that Russian President Boris Alexandre Y. Mansourov elsewhere in this Analysis in the Soviet General Staff, to re- Yeltsin presented to President Kim Young issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.) It then offers place Shtykov as principal military adviser Sam of South Korea in June 1994. I also a more selective sample of documents from to the Korean People’s Army (KPA).3 presented translations of six key documents spring 1951 through the end of the war, From Shtykov’s telegram to Foreign from that collection that illuminate the deci- focusing primarily on Stalin’s approach to Minister Andrei Vyshinsky on February 7 sion-making behind the outbreak of full- the armistice negotiations. As the reader will (document #2), we see how closely Stalin scale war in Korea in June 1950. Since the quickly discover, these documents of high- supervised events in North Korea, deciding publication of the Spring 1995 Bulletin, the level decision-making within the Soviet gov- whether the DPRK could issue a bond, form base of documentary evidence on the Ko- ernment and within the Moscow-Beijing- an additional three infantry divisions, con- rean War has been enriched even more by Pyongyang alliance shed light on many ques- vene the Supreme People’s Assembly, or the release of virtually the entire collection tions about the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet send textile workers to the Soviet Union for of high-level documents on the war declas- alliance, Soviet relations with North Korea training. Documents #5-9 indicate the rea- sified by the Presidential Archive in Mos- (the Democratic People’s Republic of Ko- son why the highly nationalistic Korean cow, which numbers approximately 1,200 rea, or DPRK), Soviet attitudes toward the communists allowed such interference in pages. Through a joint project of the Center United States, and the making of Soviet their country’s affairs. As I discussed in the for Korean Research of Columbia Univer- foreign policy in general in the last years of previous Bulletin, prior to the Korean War, sity and the Cold War International History Stalin’s life. In this brief commentary I will North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Project, these documents are now available therefore not attempt to provide a close ex- Union for the substantial quantities of goods to all interested researchers.1 amination of these documents, as I have in and the broad range of expertise needed to The Presidential Archive (known offi- two previous Bulletin articles (and a related construct a new socialist state out of an cially as the Archive of the President, Rus- article in The Journal of American-East Asian abruptly truncated portion of the former sian Federation, or APRF) is the repository Relations).2 Instead, I will point out some of Japanese empire. From 1945-1950, the only to which, during the Soviet era, the Kremlin the most important questions these new place to which the DPRK could turn for this leadership sent its most sensitive records for sources address, provide additional back- support was the Soviet Union. Though many safekeeping and ready access. Its holdings ground information drawn from my research North Korean communists had close ties to are therefore more selective than those of in other Soviet archives, and offer some the Chinese communist party, the latter was the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, preliminary conclusions. not in a position to aid its Korean comrades. the Central Committee of the Communist The documents presented below begin In early 1950, the new People’s Republic of Party (CC CPSU), and the General Staff of where the records published in the previous China (PRC) government in Beijing led by the Soviet Armed Forces, the other major Bulletin left off, with Stalin’s telegram to the Mao Zedong was itself forced to turn to repositories used by historians of the Cold Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang on 30 Janu- Moscow for economic and military aid. As War. The release of a large portion of the ary 1950 informing Kim Il Sung that he documents #11 and #13 indicate, in the spring APRF’s documents on the Korean War con- would “assist” him in the matter of reunify- of 1950 Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung were sequently provides a critical addition to ing Korea by military means. Document #1 both interested in the possibility of develop- available evidence on the high-level deci- reveals that Kim Il Sung and Soviet Ambas- ing wider trade and closer communications sions and deliberations of the communist sador T.F. Shtykov interpreted Stalin’s mes- between the PRC and the DPRK. Close side during this pivotal conflict. sage as approval to plan an offensive cam- economic and military ties between This article presents translations of and paign against South Korea. The North Ko- Pyongyang and Beijing developed after the commentary on a sizable portion of this rean leader received Stalin’s telegram with Chinese entered the Korean War; they were recently-released APRF collection on the “great satisfaction” and informed Shtykov not in place prior to October 1950.4 Korean War. It begins with most of the that he would begin preparations for a meet- At Stalin’s insistence, after secretly re- released documents covering February 1950 ing with Stalin at which the details of the ceiving the Soviet leader’s conditional green through January 1951, providing a close campaign would be worked out. Shtykov’s light for an attack against South Korea dur- look at the Soviet role in Korea during the telegram to Soviet Defense Minister A.M. ing a secret summit in Moscow in April (for THE KOREAN WAR COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 31

which records still, alas, remain unavail- prescribed in the General Staff’s plan, and Stalin’s rather rude message to Mao able), Kim Il Sung traveled to Beijing in that Soviet advisers participated in recon- Zedong on July 8 (document #21) appears to May 1950 in order to secure Mao Zedong’s naissance and in planning the operation at have been a further attempt to prod the approval for the planned offensive. Docu- the divisional level. However, Soviet advis- Chinese to move toward entering the war. ments #11 and #13 show that in his discus- ers were apparently withdrawn from the Stalin was also quite brusque in his message sions with Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong was front line before the attack began, with nega- to Mao on July 13, indicating that he had not considerably less worried about the possi- tive consequences for the efficiency of the been informed whether the Chinese had de- bility of military conflict with the United operation. This accords with Khrushchev’s cided to deploy troops on the Korean border States than was the Soviet leadership, argu- recollection that Stalin pulled back Soviet and offering again to provide air cover. He ing that “the Americans will not enter a third advisers from the front at the last minute, out also informed Beijing that he intended to world war for such a small territory.” It also of fear that they might be taken prisoner and train Chinese pilots in two to three months appears that in May 1950 Kim Il Sung, thus expose Soviet participation in the op- and to transfer the necessary equipment to perhaps to counter the oppressive Soviet eration.6 them, presumably for use in Korea. On influence in North Korea, took a tentative Consistent with his withdrawal of So- August 27, Stalin informed PRC Foreign step toward the strategy he later used so viet advisers from the front, Stalin’s queries Minister Zhou Enlai (document #26) that he extensively of playing China and the Soviet to Shtykov on July 1 (document #15) indi- would send 38 air force and air defense Union against one another. He reported to cate that he was agitated and nervous about specialists to China. These advisers and the Soviet Ambassador Shtykov that he had at the situation in Korea following the Ameri- large amounts of equipment that accompa- first intended to ask Mao for ammunition for can entry into the war. Shtykov’s reply nied them were the first installment of what the Korean troops that had recently been (document #16) cautiously raises the ques- became massive Soviet support in construct- transferred from China to North Korea tion that was at the root of the Soviet leader’s ing an air force for the PRC, a process which (whose weapons were of Japanese and anxiety, namely the possibility that a disas- continued throughout the Korean War. American manufacture rather than Soviet) ter in Korea might draw Soviet troops into Stalin’s message to Kim Il Sung on 28 but he decided not to raise the issue after all, combat against American armed forces. (document #27) is particularly since he was informed that the KPA had Shtykov reports that Kim Il Sung and North revealing of the Soviet leader’s approach to sufficient ammunition. Furthermore, he had Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hon Yong the difficult situation created by American no other requests to make of Mao “since all “understand the difficulties for Korea elic- entry into the Korean War. While North his requests were satisfied in Moscow and ited by the entrance of the Americans into Korea was suffering saturation bombing by the necessary and sufficient assistance was the war” and “are taking the necessary mea- American planes, Stalin exhorted Kim Il given him there.” sures to stabilize human and material re- Sung to take courage from the example of Shtykov’s telegram to Vyshinsky on sources,” though some in the DPRK leader- the ’s triumph against great odds May 12 (document #13), reveals that before ship were inquiring about possible Soviet in the civil war of 1918-20 and the great war departing Pyongyang the following day for entry into the war. against Germany of 1941-45. He offered to Beijing, Kim Il Sung reported to Shtykov We see that as early as the first week of send additional aircraft for the small North that he had ordered the chief of the general July, Stalin began the strategy toward the Korean air force, but did not suggest sending staff to prepare his forces for the military war in Korea that he was to continue for the Soviet air force units or ground forces. operation against the South and that he wished remainder of the conflict. In order to avoid Avoiding military confrontation with the to begin the operation in June, though he did committing Soviet troops to fight the Ameri- United States remained the Soviet leader’s not know if they would be ready by then. cans in Korea, he encouraged the Chinese foremost concern. Unfortunately, the documents from the Presi- leadership to take steps toward entering the Stalin’s difficult and dramatic negotia- dential Archive in Moscow are quite sparse war should the tide of turn against the tions with the Chinese leadership in October for the crucial period of April-June 1950 and DPRK. Chen Jian revealed in his recent 1950 over the entry of Chinese armed forces prospects for gaining access to those records book7 that the Chinese leadership decided into the war in Korea is the subject of a in the near future are not encouraging.5 Many on July 7 and 10 to send troops to the Korean separate article in this issue by Alexandre important questions about how the North border to prepare for possible intervention in Mansourov. I have therefore omitted those Korean offensive was planned thus remain Korea; discussion about sending troops to documents from this selection, but will point obscure. However, a British Broadcasting Korea thus began well before the UN ad- out that the terms of Chinese entry—that the Corporation documentary team that con- vance into North Korea in early October. PRC would provide troops, the USSR mate- ducted research on the Korean War in Russia Stalin’s telegram to the Soviet ambassador riel and advisers, and China would pay the in 1994 has discovered a revealing report on in Beijing on July 5 (document #18) reveals Soviet Union for all military supplies—en- the preparations for the attack and the first that in advance of those mid-July meetings, gendered considerable bitterness on the part day of the operation. Written by Shtykov the Beijing leadership consulted with Stalin of the Chinese leadership. Stalin’s approach and addressed to the head of the special about the proposed troop transfer. Stalin to the armistice negotiations, which will be Soviet military mission sent to North Korea informed PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai discussed below, and his insistence on timely to oversee the operation, this report (docu- on July 5 that he approved of the plan and and high payments for military supplies to ment #14) reveals that troop concentration also promised to try to provide air cover for China during the Korean War, thus consti- was carried out from June 12 to June 23, as the Chinese troops. tuted an important cause of the eventual 32 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Mao, S.E. Zakharov, reported on 2 Novem- These documents corroborate the im- Resuming the story in late October 1950, ber 1950 (document #35) on the results of the pression produced by recently-disclosed document #31, the Politburo decision of 25 first day of combat between Soviet and Chinese sources that Mao Zedong and Peng October 1950, suggests that the Soviet lead- American pilots. Zakharov’s report also Dehuai played the central role in operational ership worried that the United States might reveals that Korean pilots were still flying in planning during the Korean War (e.g. docu- use the war in Korea as a pretext for rearm- November 1950, from bases in Manchuria,9 ments #50, 54-57). They kept Stalin in- ing Japan. Stalin’s continued fear of a and that American planes were bombing air formed of the military situation and of pro- resurgent Japan may seem surprising, but in bases in Manchuria as well as targets in posed operations and asked his advice when- 1947 the U.S. military had considered re- North Korea. ever a question of the “international situa- arming Japan to buttress the forces available Soviet air force units in Korea proved to tion” was involved, such as in planning the along the Soviet Pacific border, a move be highly effective against American bomb- “fourth operation”—a possible offensive— vigorously opposed by the Soviet represen- ers and fighter planes.10 On 15 November in late January 1951 (document #56) or in tative to the Far Eastern Commission. Fur- 1950 (document #38), Mao expressed his general strategic planning in early June 1951 thermore, two weeks after the North Korean appreciation to Stalin for the heroism of the (documents #66, 67). The documents also attack on South Korea, U.S. Gen. Douglas Soviet pilots guarding the Yalu crossings, reveal that Stalin offered advice on military MacArthur ordered the Japanese prime min- who had shot down 23 American planes in planning whenever he wished, such as on 5 ister to create a “National Police Reserve” the previous 12 days. Mao’s message also June 1951 (document #65), and that he inter- of 75,000 men, some of whom were, in fact, reveals that Stalin reinforced Soviet air sup- vened more often and more directly with the deployed to Korea. (At the same time, port by sending additional MiG-15’s to China command of North Korean troops than with analogous moves toward constituting a West and creating a command apparatus for the air the Chinese (documents #19, 58, 59, 61). German military contribution to the West- corps. Over the next few months Soviet air While the Chinese leadership had pri- ern alliance were stepped up.) We have no force involvement in Korea grew to quite mary responsibility for managing the battle- record of Japanese participation in the substantial proportions.11 Nonetheless, Stalin field, the Soviet leadership played the cen- referred to in the Soviet statement cited continued to attempt to minimize the damage tral role in formulating diplomatic strategy here, but forty-six with 1,200 to Soviet interests that might ensue from the for the communist side during the war. We Japanese military personnel were dispatched presence of Soviet pilots in Korea by order- see that in November and to the eastern coast of North Korea between ing the Soviet Air Force to train Chinese the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised Zhou 2 October and 10 December 1950, to clear pilots as quickly as possible so that they Enlai regarding the best approach to take to the way for an amphibious assault by UN could be sent to the front to replace Soviet air the question of Chinese participation in the forces.8 Japanese participation never be- crews (documents #68, 74, 76). UN Security Council (document #37) and to came a major issue during the Korean War, In addition to providing air cover against a response to American proposals declaring either militarily or diplomatically, but it American planes along the Korean-Manchu- China an aggressor in Korea (document #46). does appear that one of Stalin’s reasons for rian border, the Soviet Union also played the When UN representatives asked Chinese taking the risks associated with a North critical role of providing military supplies representatives in New York in December Korean offensive against South Korea was and advisers for the Chinese and North Ko- 1950 to inform them under what conditions to eliminate the possibility that a resurgent rean war effort. In this selection of docu- China would accept a cease-fire in Korea, Japan would be able to use southern Korea ments I have included the requests for sup- Zhou Enlai reported to Stalin his proposed as a beachhead for an attack on the Soviet plies and advisers from November 1950 terms and asked for the opinion of the Soviet Union. (This argument also animates through February 1951 (documents #36, 39, government before responding (document Stalin’s arguments to Mao in early October 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 53, 62, 64), and then have #48). 1950 in favor of Chinese entry into the war limited the selection to only a few such Stalin’s reply to Zhou and the Politburo to save the North Korean regime; see docu- requests for the remainder of the war (docu- directive the same day to UN Ambassador ments accompanying Alexandre ments #72, 73, 91, 92, 106, 111). I should Vyshinsky suggest that the success of the Mansourov’s article.) emphasize, however, that Chinese and North Chinese People’s Volunteers in turning back Despite Stalin’s concern to avoid direct Korean requests for supplies and advisers the American advance in November 1950 military conflict with the United States, he constituted a large part of Stalin’s correspon- sharply altered Stalin’s approach to the war. finally agreed to provide air cover for Chi- dence with Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung On the Politburo informed nese ground troops crossing into Korea. until his death in March 1953. It is interest- Vyshinsky (document #47) that his draft Given the intensity of American bombing, ing to note that Stalin himself negotiated proposal for a cease-fire in Korea was “in- Chinese troops could hardly have entered with Mao and Kim over the amounts of the correct in the present situation, when Ameri- the war without such cover and they did not various supplies that would be delivered, the can troops are suffering defeat and when the have the means to provide it for themselves. schedule of delivery, and the terms of pay- Americans are more and more often advanc- On 1 November 1950, Soviet air force units ment. Stalin’s personal attention to the sup- ing a proposal about the cessation of military first engaged American planes in air battles ply issue probably reflects the severity of the activity in Korea in order to win time and over the Yalu River bridge that was the burden this role placed on Soviet production prevent the complete defeat of the American route for Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) capacity, which was still rebuilding from the troops.” With the and undoubt- entering Korea. Stalin’s military envoy to devastation of World War II. edly welcome sight of the supposedly fear- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 33

KOREA MAP This page 34 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN some American armed forces retreating be- ment wanted peace and wanted a peaceful greater need to conclude an armistice, the fore the troops of his junior ally, Stalin solution of the Korean question—at the ear- Chinese and North Koreans should “con- ordered Vyshinsky to propose instead terms liest possible moment” and advised the United tinue to pursue a hard line, not showing haste that the Americans would surely reject. In States “to get in touch with the North Kore- and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the same vein, Stalin replied to Zhou (docu- ans and the Chinese Communists in this the negotiations” (document #95). ment #49) that it was not yet time “for China matter.”13 A few days later Kim Il Sung and The evidence presented below suggests to show all its cards, while Seoul is still not , a Chinese leader with close ties to that as the fighting dragged on through 1952, liberated,” and advised him to adopt the the Soviet Union, went to Moscow to discuss the North Koreans became increasingly de- more cunning strategy of requesting US and the situation with Stalin (documents #67, 69- sirous of ending the war (documents #102, UN opinions on conditions for an armistice. 72). Mao Zedong considered it advisable to 106). The Chinese approach to the war, When the UN group presented its proposal open negotiations with the UN command however, seems to have been contradictory. on 11 January 1951, Zhou again turned to because for the next two months the Chinese On the one hand, Mao Zedong was clearly Stalin for “advice and consultation” (docu- and North Koreans would have to occupy a anxious to avoid undermining the prestige of ment #52), and in accordance with Stalin’s defensive position (documents #73, 74, 76). the PRC by accepting unfavorable armistice recommendation the PRC rejected the UN If the Chinese and North Korean forces could terms (document #108). As Zhou Enlai proposal. avoid facing an enemy offensive during this explained to Stalin in a conversation in Stalin’s telegram to Mao Zedong on 5 period, by August they would be strong Moscow on 20 August 1952 (the transcript June 1951 (document #65) reveals the new enough to launch their own new offensive. of which is published elsewhere in this issue attitude toward the war that Stalin adopted Stalin agreed with Mao that armistice of the Bulletin), the Chinese leadership felt after Chinese successes on the battlefield negotiations were desirable at that time (see that as a matter of principle it could not yield removed the threat of an American advance document #69) and instructed Moscow’s to the Americans on the issue of repatriation toward Chinese and Soviet borders. He ambassador to the United Nations to take the of POWs. Zhou also reported to Stalin that informed Mao that he agreed that “the war appropriate initiative.14 This evidence sug- Mao believed that the war in Korea was in Korea should not be speeded up, since a gests that the “hawks” within the Truman advantageous to China because it kept the drawn out war, in the first place, gives the Administration who opposed opening nego- United States from preparing for a new world possibility to the Chinese troops to study tiations in Korea on the grounds that the war. Specifically, by fighting the Ameri- contemporary warfare on the field of battle enemy was only trying to buy time to build cans in Korea, China was helping to delay and in the second place shakes up the Truman up its forces were, in fact, correct. From the next world war by 15-20 years. On the regime in America and harms the military Mao’s assessment of the condition of the other hand, however, Zhou stated toward the prestige of Anglo-American troops.” We Chinese and North Korean troops in the end of this conversation that if America have no record of Mao’s reaction to Stalin’s summer of 1951, it appears that if the UN makes some sort of compromise on the POW enthusiasm for this costly “learning experi- forces had pushed their advantage in June issue, the communist side should accept it. ence” for China and one may imagine that and July 1951, before the Chinese had time to We need additional records from China the Chinese leadership may have been less dig fortifications, they may well have ad- in order to determine more clearly the Chi- enthusiastic about the massive casualties vanced of the front, and hence the nese leadership’s thinking regarding the war suffered in Korea, which ran to many hun- eventual border between the two Koreas. in Korea during the long months of armistice dreds of thousands by the end of the war. At After August 1951 the CPV and PLA were negotiations. However, from an internal the same time, however, Mao’s correspon- sufficiently well dug in that the war remained report on the Korean War written by the dence with Stalin indicates that the Chinese a stalemate. Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1966 (published leader was in fact willing to continue the An examination of Chinese and North in Issue 3 [Fall 1993] of the Bulletin), it war until he obtained from the United States Korean strategy during the armistice nego- appears that by the time of Stalin’s death in terms he considered acceptable. Russian tiations, which lasted from July 1951 to July March 1953, Beijing was eager to bring the records of Mao’s correspondence with Stalin 1953, is beyond the scope of this essay, war to an end. According to this report, thus lend support to Chen Jian’s argument though the Presidential Archive documents during conversations held while Zhou Enlai that Mao Zedong intervened in Korea pri- provide extensive evidence on this subject. I was in Moscow for Stalin’s funeral, the PRC marily in order to reassert China’s place in will note only that it appears that while Mao foreign minister “urgently proposed that the the international order and to revive revolu- Zedong opened negotiations in 1951 prima- Soviet side assist the speeding up of an tionary momentum within China.12 rily in order to buy time to reinforce his armistice.” As the tortuously worded USSR Despite Stalin’s interest in continuing position on the battlefield, his communica- Council of Ministers resolution of 19 March the war in Korea, the serious losses suffered tions with Stalin in July and August 1951 1953 (document #112) reveals, ending the by Chinese and North Korean troops in their (documents #84-88) suggest that if he had war in Korea was also a high priority for the failed offensives of April and May 1951 been able to secure satisfactory terms in the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow; in the forced the communist allies to consider open- negotiations, he may have been willing to midst of the great anxiety and confusion ing negotiations with the UN command. On conclude an armistice. However, the docu- following Stalin’s death, the new leadership June 5 Soviet Ambassador to the UN Jacob ments reveal that Stalin consistently took a drafted and approved this major foreign Malik informed the American diplomat “hard line” toward the negotiations, advising policy decision in only two weeks. The George F. Kennan that “the Soviet govern- Mao that since the Americans had an even evidence thus suggests that Stalin’s desire to COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 35 continue the war in Korea was a major factor sented below and the others from this collec- timing of the attack. The North Korean leadership in the prolongation of the war; immediately tion published in this issue, the documents informed Beijing about the military operation only on June 27, after the KPA had already occupied Seoul. See after his death the three communist allies declassified by the Presidential Archive Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The took decisive steps to reach an armistice greatly expand our knowledge of the Korean Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: agreement. War and of Soviet foreign policy in general Columbia University Press, 1994), 134. The timing of the Council of Ministers’ in the late Stalin years, particularly Soviet 5. Members of the Russian declassification committee for Korean War documents have reported that further resolution also suggests that it was Stalin’s relations with the new communist govern- records regarding the preparations for the military of- death rather than U.S. threats to use nuclear ment in China. It will be some time before fensive against South Korea in the spring of 1950 are weapons that finally brought a breakthrough these new sources can be adequately ana- not in the Presidential Archive and have not been in the armistice negotiations. The lyzed and integrated with documentary and located. 6. Khrushchev recorded that when he asked Stalin Eisenhower Administration later asserted memoir evidence from other countries. In about this “incomprehensible” order, the Soviet leader that it finally broke the stalemate at the meantime, readers may wish to consult replied sharply: “It’s too dangerous to keep our advisers Panmunjom by virtue of its “unmistakable the following recent publications using other there. They might be taken prisoner. We don’t want warning” to Beijing that it would use nuclear new sources from China and Russia in order there to be evidence for accusing us of taking part in this business. It’s Kim Il Sung’s affair.” See Nikita weapons against China if an armistice were to place this new evidence in a broader Khrushchev (Strobe Talbott, ed.), Khrushchev Remem- not reached—a claim that had great influ- context: Chen Jian, China’s Road to the bers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 370. ence on American strategic thinking after Korean War: The Making of the Sino-Ameri- 7. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, 135- 1953.15 However, Eisenhower’s threats to can Confrontation (New York: Columbia 141. 8. See Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: use nuclear weapons were made in May University Press, 1994); Thomas The Demilitarization of Japan (London: Hamish 1953, two months after the Soviet govern- Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Hamilton; Heinemann, 1989), 228-42. ment resolved to bring the war to an end. Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s 9. This contradicts the widespread conclusion that the The Russian documents thus provide impor- Korean War Telegrams,” International Se- DPRK air force had been eliminated in the first weeks of the war. DPRK air units ceased to operate over North tant new evidence for the debate over “nuclear curity 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-54; Sergei Korea after the first few weeks of the war, but it appears diplomacy.”16 N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue from this report that at least a portion of the air force was The final two documents presented be- Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and withdrawn to Manchuria. For a discussion of the role of low provide intriguing information about the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford Univer- the North Korean air force, see, e.g., Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), Mao Zedong’s attitude toward the Korean sity Press, 1993); Michael Hunt, “Beijing 255. War and the effect the war had on his rela- and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951,” 10. I am grateful to Mark O’Neill, who is writing a tions with Moscow. In a discussion with Political Science Quarterly 107: 3 (Fall dissertation on the Soviet air force in the Korean War Soviet officials in Beijing on 28 July 1953 1992), 453-78; William Stueck, The Korean based on records from the General Staff archive, for assistance in interpreting the documents on military (document #114), Mao was remarkably bel- War, An International History (Princeton: operations. licose, speaking of the war as though it had Princeton University Press, 1995); and Zhang 11. Gen. Georgii Lobov, who commanded the 64th been a great victory for China. He even Shu Guang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: Fighter Aviation Corps in Korea, stated in an interview commented that “from a purely military China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 in 1991 that approximately 70,000 Soviet pilots, tech- nicians and gunners served in the corps over the course point of view it would not be bad to continue (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, of the war. See “Blank Spots in History: In the Skies to strike the Americans for approximately 1995). Over North Korea,” JPRS Report, JPRS-UAC-91-004, another year.” Mao may have been mainly p. 3. 12. Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War , 211- posturing before the Russians, part of a larger 1. Photocopies of these documents have been deposited 223. at the National Security Archive in Washington DC, effort to redefine his relations with Moscow 13. Kennan to Matthews, 5 June 1951, in U.S. Depart- located in The Gelman Library (7th fl.), George Wash- following the death of Stalin; the Soviet ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States ington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC (FRUS), 1951, vol. 7 (pt.1), pp. 507-511. documents need to be combined with the 20037 (tel.: (202) 994-7000). The National Security 14. See Malik’s address over the UN radio network on new Chinese sources before one can draw Archive, a non-governmental organization devoted to 23 June 1951, ibid., 546-547. facilitating increased access to declassified records on firm conclusions about Mao’s thinking. It is 15. James Sheply, “How Dulles Averted War,” Life, 16 international relations, is open to all researchers. Cop- clear, however, as the excerpt from a conver- January 1956, 70-72; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, The ies of this collection will also be available at Columbia White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 sation with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing University. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 179- in April 1956 (document #115) suggests, 2. “New Findings on the Korean War,” CWIHP Bulle- 180. tin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18; and “To Attack or Not to that the Korean War profoundly affected 16. For discussion of the debate over the utility of Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War,” relations between the PRC and the USSR. nuclear threats in the Korean War see Roger Dingman, CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 1,2-9; and “The “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” Interna- Stalin desperately wanted Mao Zedong to Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New tional Security 13:3 (Winter 1988/89),50-91; and Rose- pull his chestnuts out of the fire in Korea, but Documentary Evidence,” The Journal of American- mary Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the East Asian Relations 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-458. the PRC’s stunning success against the for- ,” International Security 13:3 (Winter 3. See Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue midable American foe, combined with 1988/89), 92-112. Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean Moscow’s tightfistedness toward its ally, War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), made the communist government in Beijing 149. much less willing to tolerate subsequent 4. Although Kim Il Sung secured Mao’s approval Soviet demands. before launching the attack on South Korea, he did not inform Mao of the specific plan for the invasion or the As is apparent from the documents pre- 36 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

NOTE ON TRANSLATION: In translating himself for the meeting. to Comrade Stalin with a request to use in these documents I have retained the style of Regarding the question of delivering 1950 the credit the Soviet government had the Russian texts, which in most cases is the lead from Korea to the USSR, I read the allocated for 1951. With this credit they cumbersome, indirect, bureaucratic prose second point of your order. Kim answered would like to buy in the Soviet Union arms characteristic of official Soviet documents. that he will take all necessary measures to for the three infantry divisions they intend to The telegrams from Mao Zedong to Stalin in secure the delivery to the USSR from Korea form. I answered that I will report this 1951 and 1952 are written in particularly of the quantity of lead indicated by you. He question to my government. poor Russian; I have kept as much to the promised to work out all necessary measures 4. Kim Il Sung further communicated original text as possible while still rendering regarding this question in the course of 10-15 that they intend to call a session of the Su- the prose intelligible. The numbers of the days. preme People’s Assembly for February 25 ciphered telegrams are given when they are 31.I.50. [T.F.] SHTYKOV with the following agenda: legible, but in many cases the “DECLASSI- 1. Regarding the budget for 1950. 2. FIED” stamp obscured the number of the [Source: Archive of the President of the Regarding the criminal code. 3. Regarding telegram. Personal names and place names Russian Federation (hereafter APRF), Listy the results of the fulfillment of the national are given in English spelling 123-124, Fond and Opis not given; and economic plan in 1949. They still do not wherever possible; otherwise they are trans- Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian have a firm decision regarding whether to literated from the Russian. An index of Federation (hereafter AVPRF), Fond 059a, raise the three questions. abbreviations and identifications of the most Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 92-93] Kim Il Sung reported that he had com- important persons mentioned are provided missioned Pak Hon Yong to write a request after the documents. Dates are given in the 2. 7 February 1950, ciphered telegram, to the Soviet government about sending a Russian manner: day, month, year. Note on Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei group of textile workers to the Soviet Union archival citations: Those documents that were Vyshinsky re meeting with Kim Il Sung in order to prepare them to work on the provided by the Russian Government to Soviet equipment that is arriving. I answered South Korea have a citation to the Russian Ciphered telegram Strictly secret that as soon as I receive his letter I will report Foreign Ministry archives (AVPRF) as well Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, it to my government. as to the Russian Presidential Archive Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Vyshinsky, I ask your orders about what to answer (APRF); both archives are located in Mos- Copy. Kim Il Sung regarding the first three ques- cow.—K.W. From Pyongyang, No. 4040. 10 hours 10 tions raised by him [as reported] in this minutes. 8.II.1950 telegram. 1. 31 January 1950, ciphered telegram, Special File 7.II.50 SHTYKOV USSR Ambassador to the Democratic To Vyshinsky In the margins Stalin wrote “it is possible” People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) T.F. On 4 February I had a meeting with Kim beside points 1, 2 and 3, “we don’t object” Shtykov to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin re Il Sung at his request. During the meeting beside point 4 and “let him write it” beside meeting with North Korean leader Kim Il Kim Il Sung raised the following questions: the last paragraph. He wrote a note at the top Sung 1. Can they adopt a central committee to Malenkov to “give an answer today.” decision about issuing a loan, about which he Ciphered telegram Strictly secret earlier asked my advice[?] They have al- [Source: APRF, Listy 125-126, Fond and From Pyongyang ready calculated the loan at 2 billion won. Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, To Comrade Stalin, I.V. They have already prepared an example of a Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 145-146] On 30 January I had a meeting with bond. He asked agreement to send their Comrade Kim Il Sung, in accordance with representatives to Moscow with draft bonds 3. 10 February 1950, ciphered telegram, your order. After referring to the conversa- in order to formulate orders for these bonds. Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with tion that took place on January 17 during the I answered that I had communicated Kim Il Kim Il Sung lunch at [North Korean Foreign Minister] Sung’s request to Moscow, but had still not Pak Hon Yong’s, I relayed precisely the received an answer. Ciphered telegram Strictly secret contents of the first point of your orders. 2. Kim Il Sung asked my advice about Copying prohibited Kim Il Sung received my report with whether they can proceed toward forming From Pyongyang great satisfaction. Your agreement to re- three additional infantry divisions, so that To Vyshinsky ceive him and your readiness to assist him in the total number of the army will be brought Today, February 10, I visited Kim Il this matter made an especially strong im- to ten divisions. I answered that this question Sung and in accordance with your order pression. Kim Il Sung, apparently wishing is large and serious, that before adopting a verbally transmitted to him the answer to his once more to reassure himself, asked me if decision you must think through whether questions of February 4 of this year. Kim Il this means that it is possible to meet with you have the necessary material resources Sung received my communication enthusi- Comrade Stalin on this question. I answered for this. I also need time to think through this astically and several times asked me to com- that from this communication it follows that question before I give you advice on this municate to Comrade Stalin his gratitude for Comrade Stalin is ready to receive you. Kim measure. his assistance. Il Sung further stated that he will prepare 3. Kim Il Sung asked me if he can appeal I promised to present a letter to the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 37 government of the USSR within three days Soviet Union this year: following: concerning all the questions touched upon in 9 tons of gold — 53,662,900 rubles In connection with the agreement of the your telegram. 40 tons of silver — 1,887,600 rubles Government of the USSR to allocate to Ko- 10/II-50. SHTYKOV 15,000 tons of monazite concentrate — rea in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 in 79,500,000 rubles the amount of 70,700,000 rubles, the Gov- [Source: APRF, List 129, Fond and Opis not In all a sum of 133,050,500 rubles. ernment of the Korean People’s Democratic given] Korea is interested in the soonest pos- Republic would like to acquire with this sum sible receipt of the goods indicated in this arms, ammunition and military-technical 4. 23 February 1950, ciphered telegram, application. equipment for the Korean People’s Army in Shtykov to Maj. Gen. A.M. Vasilevsky, I ask you to inform the Soviet govern- the amounts indicated in the attached [list]. Head of Soviet Military Advisory Group ment of our request. The Government of the Korean People’s in DPRK Kim Il Sung Democratic Republic hopes that the Govern- Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of ment of the USSR, understanding well the Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.” needs of the young Korean Republic, will Copying prohibited 9.III.50 SHTYKOV complete the delivery of all the special goods From Pyongyang in the shortest period. To Vasilevsky, Copy to Vyshinsky. [Source: APRF, Listy 131-132, Fond and Kim Il Sung Lieutenant-General Vasiliev has arrived Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of and has taken over the responsibility of main Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 149-150] the Korean People’s Democratic Republic military adviser of the Korean People’s A copy of the note was transmitted by Army. He has familiarized himself with the 6. 12 March 1950, ciphered telegram, me to the trade representative of the USSR in position in the staff and units of the army. Vyshinsky to Soviet Ambassador in Korea. I will send the original note by In connection with this I understand Pyongyang (Shtykov) transmitting mes- diplomatic post. The arms and military equip- that the functions of main military adviser sage to Kim Il Sung ment indicated in the attached [list] will go to are removed from me. the formation of 3 divisions. I ask you to confirm. [handwritten] 16.III.50 SHTYKOV 23.II.50 SHTYKOV MID USSR Top Secret attached is a seven page list, divided into Copying is Prohibited sections for artillery armaments, ammuni- [Source: APRF, List 130, Fond and Opis not Ciphered telegram tion, [illegible], engineering equipment, mili- given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, To Pyongyang tary-medical equipment, and military avia- Delo 4, Papka 11, List 148] To Soviet Ambassador tion supplies. Communicate to Kim Il Sung, in answer 5. 9 March 1950, ciphered telegram, to his letter of 10 February, that the Soviet [Source: APRF, Listy 133-140, fond and Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting note Government will satisfy the request of the opis not given] from Kim Il Sung to Soviet Government government of the DPRK about using in 1950 a portion of the credit for 1951 that was 8. 18 March 1950, message, Stalin to Kim Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret allocated by the Soviet Union to Korea in Il Sung (via Shtykov) Copying is prohibited accordance with the Agreement of 17 March From Pyongyang. 1949. PYONGYANG To Vyshinsky. Telegraph the fulfillment. To SHTYKOV I transmit the text of a note received from the A. Vyshinsky Transmit to Kim Il Sung the following chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the answer from Comrade Stalin: DPRK: [Source: APRF, page 141, fond and opis not “First. I received your communication “The Cabinet of Ministers of the Ko- given] of March 4 about agreement to send the rean People’s Democratic Republic reports indicated amount of lead to the Soviet Union. to you about the following: 7. 16 March 1950, ciphered telegram, I thank you for the assistance. As concerns In 1950 the Korean People’s Demo- Shtykov to Vyshinsky transmitting 14 the equipment and materials you request, cratic Republic, in order to strengthen the March 1950 message from Kim Il Sung and also the specialists in lead industry, the people’s army and to fully equip it with Soviet Government has resolved to fully arms, ammunition and technical equipment, Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret satisfy your request. asked the Soviet government to send to Copying is Prohibited Second. I have also received your pro- Korea military-technical equipment in the From Pyongyang posal of 9 March about the delivery to you of amount of 120-150 million rubles, in accor- To Vyshinsky. arms, ammunition and technical equipment dance with an application made earlier to the I transmit the note we received on 14 for the people’s army of Korea. The Soviet Government of the USSR. March 1950 from the chairman of the Cabinet government has decided also to satisfy fully The Korean People’s Democratic Re- of Ministers of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung: this request of yours. public correspondingly will deliver to the “I have the honor to inform you of the With respect I. STALIN”. 38 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

transporting Kim and Pak to Moscow. For such a plan for unification of Korea, then the [Source: APRF, List 142, Fond and Opis not this purpose I request a corresponding order meeting with Kim Il Sung can be conducted given] to apportion a plane. The designated plane officially. should arrive in Pyongyang on March 29 of Li Zhou- has not given a concrete 9. 21 March 1950, ciphered telegram, this year. In case it is not possible to send a answer to the question of the time and form Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with plane, the departure from Korea can be orga- of the meeting, referring to the fact that Kim Kim Il Sung nized by naval transport from Seisin to Il Sung is presently undergoing medical treat- Vladivostok. From Vladivostok to Moscow ment. [Ed. note: Kim was making a secret Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret [Kim and Pak can travel] by train in a special visit to Moscow.] Further, Mao said in the Copying Prohibited car. conversation with Li Zhou-yuan that if a From Pyongyang Kim intends to take with him to Moscow third world war begins, Korea will not es- To Vyshinsky. as an interpreter Mun Il, who was interpreter cape participation in it, therefore the Korean In accordance with your order on March during the negotiations in Moscow, and the People’s Democratic Republic should pre- 20 I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung, at which personal adjutant of So Chen Diu, who was pare its armed forces. [DPRK Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong also with him in Moscow in 1949. In the conversation with Li Zhou-yuan, was present. During the meeting I transmit- I request an order regarding whether it is Mao Zedong expressed the wish to develop ted to Kim the text of the telegram of Com- necessary for someone from the embassy to wider trade between the Chinese People’s rade Stalin. accompany Kim to Moscow. Republic and the DPRK. During this meeting Kim asked me to I ask for corresponding orders. 2. Kim Ch’aek has reported that Kim transmit to Comrade Stalin his request that 24.III.50 Shtykov Dar Sen, the leader of the partisan detach- he, together with Pak Hon Yong, would like ments in the south of Korea whom the south- have a meeting with Comrade Stalin at the [Source: APRF, Listy 146-147, Fond and ern press and radio have repeatedly officially beginning of April. Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, reported as killed in battles with punitive They want to make the trip to Moscow Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 96-97] units of the South Korean army, arrived in and the meeting with Comrade Stalin unoffi- Pyongyang from South Korea on April 3. cially, in the manner as [it was done] in 1945. 11. 10 April 1950, ciphered telegram, So- Kim Dar Sen came to North Korea to report Kim Il Sung said further that they are viet representative Aleksei Ignatieff in about the position of the partisan movement completing the preparation of all materials Pyongyang Ignatiev to Vyshinsky in South Korea and to receive orders on this for the trip and intend to raise the following question. questions at the meeting with Comrade Stalin: Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret Kim Ch’aek asked me to transmit the 1. About the path and methods of unifi- Copying Prohibited above indicated questions to Kim Il Sung cation of the south and the north of the From Pyongyang through Comrade Shtykov. country. To Vyshinsky. 10.IV.50. [A.] IGNATIEV 2. About the prospects for the economic The deputy chairman of the Cabinet of development of the country. Ministers of the DPRK has reported to me [Source: APRF, Listy 148-149, Fond and 3. Also possibly several party questions. about the following: Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, I ask your order. 1. A report to Kim Il Sung was received Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 98-99] 21.III.50 SHTYKOV from the ambassador of the DPRK in the Chinese People’s Republic Li Zhou-yuan in 12. 25 April 1950, ciphered telegram, [Source: APRF, Listy 143-144, Fond and which he reports about a meeting between Ignatiev to Vyshinsky Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Mao Zedong and Li Zhou-yuan that took Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 94-95] place in Beijing at the end of March 1950. Ciphered telegram Strictly Secret In the conversation between Mao Zedong Copying Prohibited 10. 24 March 1950, ciphered telegram, and Li Zhou-yuan, at the initiative of the From Pyongyang Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with latter, the question of a meeting between To Vyshinsky. Kim Il Sung Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong was discussed. 25 April at 16:00 hours local time Kim Mao Zedong responded positively to Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong arrived in Seisin Ciphered telegram. Strictly secret. the question of a meeting with Kim Il Sung (North Korean) from Voroshilov by plane. From Pyongyang. and selected the end of April or the beginning Both feel well. To Vyshinsky. of May of this year as the approximate time 25.IV.50 IGNATIEV On March 24 I visited Kim Il Sung and for this meeting. communicated to him that Comrade Stalin Mao Zedong connected the proposed [Source: APRF, List 150, fond and opis not has agreed to receive him and [Foreign Min- meeting with the question of the unification given] ister] Pak Hon Yong. of Korea, indicating in this regard that if Kim Il Sung plans to leave Korea for there is a concrete plan for the unification of 13. 12 May 1950, ciphered telegram, Moscow on March 30 of this year. I consider Korea, then the meeting should be organized Shtykov to Vyshinsky re meeting with it advisable to arrange a special plane for secretly [not openly], but if there is not yet Kim Il Sung COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 39

the Politburo). Ciphered telegram Strictly secret Kim Il Sung reported to me that they [Source: APRF, Listy 151-154, Fond and Copying prohibited intend to discuss roughly the following ques- Opis not given; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, From Pyongyang tions with Mao Zedong: Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 100-103] To Vyshinsky 1. To inform about their intentions about At the request of Kim Il Sung, on May unifying the country by military means and to [Ed. note: For the texts of an exchange of 12 I had a meeting with him and [Foreign report about the results of the discussions on messages between the Chinese leadership Minister] Pak Hon Yong. During the con- this question in Moscow. and Stalin on 13-14 May 1950, during Kim Il versation Kim Il Sung reported to me that 2. To exchange opinions on the question Sung’s secret visit to Beijing and concerning upon his return from Moscow he received a of the conclusion of a trade agreement be- his plans to attack South Korea, see CWIHP letter from Li Zhou-yuan (ambassador to tween Korea and China. He intends to pro- Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 60-61.] China), in which he reported about a meet- pose that they sign a trade agreement in the ing that took place with Mao Zedong and nearest future, but that they sign an agree- 14. 26 June 1950, top secret report on [PRC Foreign Minister] Zhou Enlai. During ment about friendship after the unification of military situation by Shtykov to Comrade this meeting the question of the necessity of the country. Zakharov a meeting between Kim Il Sung and Mao 3. To inform Mao about several ques- Zedong was discussed. Zhou Enlai pro- tions which were placed under discussion Top Secret posed that the meeting have an official char- with Comrade Stalin in Moscow and about To Comrade Zakharov acter. Mao, turning toward Li as if asking the establishment of closer communications ([transmit] in person only) when you intend to begin the unification of between the Central Committee of the labor I report about the preparation and course the country, without waiting for an answer party of Korea and the communist party of of the military operations of the Korean stated that if you intend to begin military China. People’s Army. operations against the south in the near fu- 4. To exchange opinions on several ques- The concentration of the People’s Army ture, then they should not meet officially. In tions which interest both Korea and China, in the region near the 38th parallel began on such a case the trip should be unofficial. such as the electrical station at Suiho, Kore- June 12 and was concluded on June 23, as Mao Zedong added further that the uni- ans who live in China and so forth. was prescribed in the plan of the General fication of Korea by peaceful means is not Kim further asked my advice, about what Staff. The redeployment of troops took place possible, solely military means are required kind of questions he should raise before Mao in an orderly fashion, without incident. to unify Korea. As regards the Americans, Zedong from the point of view of assistance The intelligence service of the enemy there is no need to be afraid of them. The in the intended operation. I declined to an- probably detected the troop redeployment, Americans will not enter a third world war swer, stating that it is clearer to him, what he but we managed to keep the plan and the time for such a small territory. has insufficiencies in and what the Chinese of the beginning of troop operations secret. Kim Il Sung reported further that since can help him with. Then Kim Il Sung an- The planning of the operation at the Li Zhou-yuan did not have a commission swered that he intended to ask for ammuni- divisional level and the reconnaissance of from the Central Committee to meet with tion for the Japanese and American arms the area was carried out with the participa- Mao Zedong and to discuss questions about which the divisions that arrived from China tion of Soviet advisers. his meeting, i.e. Kim Il Sung’s, with Mao have and for some number of horses. How- All preparatory measures for the opera- Zedong, they decided to summon Li Zhou- ever, after a conversation with the chief of tion were completed by June 24th. On June yuan and give him corresponding rebukes staff of the army, who reported that they have 24th divisional commanders were given or- and instructions. more than 3 b.k. [boekomplekt, standard load ders about “D”[day] and “H”[hour]. Li Zhou-yuan came to Pyongyang and of ammunition] of ammunition, he decided The political order of the Minister of on May 10 left for Beijing with correspond- not to raise these questions. He stated that he Defense was read to the troops, which ex- ing commissions. doesn’t have more requests for Mao about plained that the South Korean army had Today, May 12, Li Zhou-yuan reported assistance, since all his requests were satis- provoked a military attack by violating the that he met with Mao Zedong, who agreed to fied in Moscow and the necessary and suffi- 38th parallel and that the government of the the arrival of Kim Il Sung at the time indi- cient assistance was given him there. DPRK had given an order to the Korean cated by him. Kim Il Sung reported that they Kim Il Sung reported to me that with People’s Army to go over to the counterat- intend to leave for Beijing in the morning of regard to the question of the preparation of tack. May 13 and asked me if the plane coming for the operation he had given all necessary or- The order to counter-attack was met him will be ready by this time. I answered ders to the chief of the general staff, who with great enthusiasm by the soldiers and that the plane is ready. already has begun to implement them, that officers of the Korean People’s Army. Kim Il Sung further reported that they his wish is to begin the operation in June, but The troops went to their starting posi- decided to go to China with Pak Hon Yong, he is still not convinced that they will manage tions by 24:00 hours on June 24th. Military that they have not discussed the question of it in this period. operations began at 4 hours 40 minutes local a meeting with Mao Zedong in the Central 13 May at 5:20 local time Kim Il Sung time. Artillery preparation was accompa- Committee, that he has only spoken about and Pak Hon Yong flew to Beijing. nied in the course of 20-40 minutes by direct this question with Kim Ch’aek (member of 12.V.50 SHTYKOV fire and a ten-minute artillery . The 40 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN infantry rose up and went on the attack in try Division, moving in the direction of Kosen, The first two days of military operations good spirits. In the first three hours indi- or with the 3rd Infantry Division and the have shown the following: vidual units and formations advanced from 3 mechanized attacking through 1. The enemy is putting up resistance to 5 kilometers. Sinyuri in the direction toward Geisif. and while fighting is retreating deep into the The attack of the troops of the People’s Conclusions regarding the North. territory of South Korea, mass taking of Army took the enemy completely by sur- It is necessary to note the following prisoners from the South Korean army has prise. substantial insufficiencies in the operations not been noted. The enemy put up strong resistance only of the People’s Army: 2. The South Korean puppet authorities in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. 1. With the beginning of military actions have begun to throw in troops from deep in The enemy began to put up a more organized and the forward advance of units and forma- the rear and are trying to halt the advance of resistance after 12:00 on the first day. tions, staff communication was lost from top the People’s Army. On the first day of battle the following to bottom. The general staff of the People’s 3. In the first day the attack of the People’s towns were taken: Osin (Ongjin direction), Army already on the first day did not direct Army caused confusion in the South. The Kaesong, Sinyuri—(map 1:1,000.000 pub- the battle, since it did not have firm commu- South Korean authorities and the ambassa- lished by the General Staff in 1943). nication with a single division. dor of the USA personally in their radio In the Sunsen direction units of the P.A. The commanders of units and forma- speeches called on the people of South Korea [People’s Army] advanced 12 kilometers. tions are not trying to establish communica- to stay calm. The staff of the South Korean On the eastern coast [they advanced] 8 tions with the senior staff, command posts army is broadcasting false reports about the kilometers. from combat level and higher change the successes of the South Korean army. On the very first day the DPRK navy senior staff without permission, the General SHTYKOV made two landings on the coast of the Sea of Staff still has not established communica- No. 358/sh Japan. The first landing party was in the tions with the brigade operating along the 26.6.50. Korio area and consisted of two of eastern coast or with the 12th Infantry Divi- naval infantry and around a thousand parti- sion. [Source: collection of Soviet military docu- sans. The second landing group was in the 2. The command staff of the KPA does ments obtained in 1994 by the British Broad- region of Urutsyn and consisted of 600 par- not have battle experience, after the with- casting Corporation for a BBC TimeWatch tisans. drawal of Soviet military advisers they orga- documentary titled “Korea, Russia’s Secret The landings took place at 5 hours 25 nized the battle command poorly, they use War,” to be broadcast in the UK and the USA minutes and were carried out successfully. artillery and tanks in battle badly and lose in 1996] The group of partisans took the city of communications. Urutsyn and a number of districts adjoining 3. However, our military advisers note 15. 1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si it. great enthusiasm in the units of the Korean (Stalin) to Soviet ambassador in The landings were carried out with a People’s army and a general aspiration to Pyongyang (Shtykov) battle between of the People’s Army fulfill their allotted tasks. and ships of the South Korean army. As a 4. The political mood among the people 8th Department of the General Staff of the result of the battle one Southern trawler was of North Korea in relation to the beginning of Armed Forces of the USSR sunk and one was damaged. The DPRK fleet military operations is characterized by a gen- Ciphered Telegram No. 34691/sh. had no losses. eral enthusiasm, by faith in the government Pyongyang. Soviet Ambassador. On June 26 troops of the People’s Army of the DPRK and belief in the victory of the 1. You do not report anything about continued the attack and, with fighting, ad- Korean People’s Army. what kind of plans the Korean command has. vanced deep into the territory of South Ko- On 26 June KIM IL SUNG made an Does it intend to push on? Or has it decided rea. appeal to the Korean people in the name of to stop the advance. In our opinion the attack During June 26 (left to right) the Ongjin the government of the DPRK, in which he absolutely must continue and the sooner South peninsula and Kaisin peninsula were com- described the situation that has been created Korea is liberated the less chance there is for pletely cleared and units of the 6th division in the country and laid out the tasks for the intervention. made a forced crossing of the bay and took defeat of the enemy and the unification of 2. Communicate also how the Korean the populated point in the direction of Kimpo Korea. leaders regard the attacks on North Korean airport. 5. The Command of the Korean People’s territory by American planes. Are they not In the Seoul direction, the 1st and 4th Army is taking measures to put right the frightened or do they continue to hold firm[?] divisions took the cities of Bunsan and troop communications and the organization Does the Korean government intend to Tongducheb and the took the of the battle command. To this end the Army make an open statement of protest against the provincial center Siunsen. Command Post has been moved to the attacks and the military intervention? In our On the coast of the Sea of Japan the Tepuges area. The War Minister, the chief of opinion, this should be done. advance has continued. The port of Tubuiri the General Staff and the main military ad- 4. [sic] We have decided to fulfill fully has been taken. viser, along with a group of officers, will go by July 10 the Koreans’ requests for delivery During the course of the day there has out to the Command Post. of ammunition and other military equip- been no communication with the 12th Infan- Conclusions regarding the South. ment. Report about this to KIM IL SUNG. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 41

CHINA’S ROAD TO conflict, therefore, was seen as an essential normalization of Sino-American relations, THE KOREAN WAR part of a life-and-death confrontation be- and the declassification of new archival docu- tween the Communists on the one hand and mentation. Building on Whiting’s thesis, by Chen Jian the “free world” on the other.1 scholars paid more attention to Chinese Com- The North Korean invasion of the South, munist Party (CCP) leaders’ concerns for In October 1950, one year after the as viewed by President Harry Truman—and China’s national security as the decisive establishment of the People’s Republic of many later students of the Korean War— factor underlying their decision to enter the China (PRC), Mao Zedong and the Beijing represented the first step in a general Com- Korean War. They generally argued that leadership sent “Chinese People’s Volun- munist plot to “pass from subversion” to Beijing did not welcome the Korean War teers” (CPV) to Korea to fight against United “armed invasion and war” in their scheme of because China faced difficult tasks of eco- Nations forces moving rapidly toward the world conquest.2 Correspondingly, Beijing’s nomic reconstruction and political consoli- Chinese-Korean border. Although China’s entrance into the Korean War was regarded dation at home and gave priority to liberat- intervention saved Kim Il Sung’s North as an action subordinate to Moscow’s overall ing Nationalist-controlled Taiwan. Many of Korean Communist regime from imminent Cold War strategy. Scholars in the West these scholars stressed that Beijing’s deci- collapse, it was unable to fulfill the Beijing widely believed that Beijing’s policy was sion to enter the Korean War was simply a leadership’s hopes of overwhelming the UN aggressive, violent, and irrational. reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to forces. Therefore, when the Korean War In 1960, Allen S. Whiting published his the physical security of Chinese territory. ended in July 1953, Korea’s political map landmark study, China Crosses the Yalu,3 And while most scholars believed that the remained virtually unchanged, while which has strongly influenced a whole gen- American decision to cross the 38th parallel America’s military intervention in Korea eration of scholars. Using Western intelli- triggered China’s intervention, some specu- and China’s rushing into a conflict with the gence sources and Chinese journal and news- lated that if UN forces had stopped at the United States finally buried any hope for a paper information, Whiting argued that un- parallel China would not have intervened.4 Sino-American accommodation, and the like the Soviet Union, Communist China had A large majority of Chinese scholars seem to Cold War in Asia entered a new stage char- not directly participated in the planning for share these assumptions, as can be seen in acterized by a total confrontation between the North Korean invasion of the South. Chinese publications on the “War to Resist the PRC and the United States that would After the outbreak of the Korean War, Whit- America and Assist Korea” that appeared in last nearly twenty years. ing believed, Beijing tried to terminate the the 1980s.5 The newly established Chinese Com- conflict through political settlement, and only As a lecturer at Shanghai’s munist regime faced enormous problems after the attempts for a political solution Normal University in the early 1980s and during its first year, including achieving failed in late August 1950 did Beijing begin then during my pursuit of doctoral studies in political consolidation, rebuilding a war- necessary military preparations in early Sep- the United States, I became increasingly shattered economy, and finishing reunifica- tember. Whiting emphasized that after the interested in the emergence of Sino-Ameri- tion of the country. Why then did Mao Inchon landing in mid-September, Beijing can confrontation in the late 1940s and early decide to assist North Korea in fighting a tried through both public and private chan- . In my study I too believed in the coalition composed of nearly all the West- nels to prevent UN forces from crossing the standard interpretation of China’s reasons ern industrial powers? How was the deci- 38th parallel. Beijing entered the war only for entering the Korean War. Not until sion made? What were the immediate and after all warnings had been ignored by Wash- 1988-1990, when the work on my disserta- long-range causes leading to Beijing’s deci- ington and General Douglas MacArthur and tion led me to fresh Chinese sources, did I sion to enter the Korean War? Finally, was therefore, in the Beijing leadership’s view, begin to feel doubts. For example, to my there any opportunity that might have pre- the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was surprise, I found that early in August 1950, vented the direct confrontation between the severely menaced. Whiting thus concluded more than one month before the Inchon PRC and the United States? More than forty that Beijing’s management of the Korean landing, Mao Zedong and the Beijing lead- years after the end of the Korean War, crisis was based primarily on the Chinese ership had been inclined to send troops to scholarly answers to these questions are still Communist perception of America’s threat Korea, and China’s military and political limited and remarkably inadequate. to China’s national security. Lacking access preparations had begun even a month ear- In the 1950s, Western scholars, strongly to Chinese archival materials, though, lier. I also found that the concerns behind influenced by the intensifying Cold War, Whiting’s study had to focus more on the the decision to enter the Korean War went generally viewed China’s entrance into the analysis of the environment in which the far beyond the defense of the safety of the Korean War as a reflection of a well-coordi- Beijing leadership made their decision to go Chinese-Korean border. Mao and his asso- nated Communist plot of worldwide expan- to war than on a close examination of the ciates aimed to win a glorious victory by sion, believing that the entire international decision-making process. driving the Americans off the Korean penin- Communist movement was under the con- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a more sula. It was no longer possible to accept the trol of Moscow, and that neither Beijing nor critical perspective on the Sino-American well-established view of Chinese and Ameri- Pyongyang had the freedom to make their confrontation in Korea emerged in the wake can historians. own foreign policy decisions. The Korean of the American debacle in Vietnam, the continued on page 85 42 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

FYN-SI [Stalin]. The leadership of the DPRK and the No. 362/sh People’s Army (Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-Yong, CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405840/sh. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov Pak Il U, Kim Bek, Tsoi En Gen, Kan Gen) From Pyongyang Sent 4.7.50 0:05 1.7.50 correctly evaluate the complicated military- Received 4.7.50 3:55 political situation in Korea, believe in full Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, victory and are directing all efforts toward a of the Armed Forces 4.7.50 4:10 List 104 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, subsequent broad attack on the south of Ko- To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin]. Delo 3, Papka 11, l. 107] rea. Today July 3 I met with KIM IL SUNG KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON-YONG and PAK HON-YONG. 16. 1 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov understand the difficulties for Korea elicited At the beginning of the conversation to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re political mood on by the entrance of the Americans into the war KIM IL SUNG described the situation at the North Korea against the DPRK and in connection with front. In his opinion the troops are moving this they are taking the necessary measures to very slowly, especially in the Central direc- Ciphered telegram No. 405809 stabilize human and material resources for tion. The troop crossing was disorganized, From Pyongyang.Sent 2.7.50 04.00. the war. although there was a minister in place there. Received 2.7.50 05.47. KIM IL SUNG asked my opinion about He expressed dissatisfaction with his [the Sent to the 8th Administration of the General forming additional infantry, tank, and naval minister’s] work. Staff of the Armed Forces. 2.7.50 05.55 units and formations. They intend to intro- Further, noting the seriousness of the By wire. duce universal military service in the DPRK. situation at the front and in the liberated Extremely Urgent. However, some portion of the leading territories and the danger of landings by To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin] figures, including KIM TU-BONG, KHON American troops in the rear or at North To No. 362. MEN KHI are speaking about the difficulties Korean ports or airborne landings of troops, I report about the political mood of the of conducting a war against the Americans he asked me to report to you his request for northerners in connection with the interven- with the forces of Korea and in a cautious quick delivery of arms in the following tion of the Americans. way have tried to ascertain from KIM IL amounts: 50,000 rifles; 5,000 PPSh sub- With the beginning of the successful SUNG the position of the Soviet Union on machine guns, 5,000 PPS [sub-machine military operations of the People’s Army, this question. (The secretary of KIM IL SUNG guns]; 1,500 light machine guns; 350 heavy and especially after the liberation of the city reported to me these facts, about a conversa- machine guns; 200 82mm mortars; 78 120mm of Seoul, the mood of the population was tion of KIM TU-BONG and KHON MEN mortars, 80 76mm ZIS-3 artillery pieces; 24 characterized by great general political en- KHI with KIM IL SUNG.) 122mm howitzers; 60 37mm anti- aircraft thusiasm. The rightist and centrist figures that are guns; 120 machine guns; 500 trucks. The population of the liberated regions entering the government of the DPRK are All these arms are needed for the forma- in the main greeted the People’s Army warmly supporting all measures of the government, tion of two divisions, 12 battalions of ma- and in every way cooperated with the mea- but so far are not displaying the necessary rines and for the formation of security de- sures it took. Organs of power are being direction of activity in the mobilization of tachments. created everywhere—people’s committees, their parties in the south of the country. Because of American air attacks on the social-political organizations, they have re- I communicated to KIM IL SUNG that railroad stations in the region of Kanko, stored production and trade. At this time the government of the USSR has satisfied his Seisin, he asked that the arms be sent on an even the reactionary elements did not take request for arms and ammunition. accelerated schedule through Manchuria action against the measures of the govern- The general situation in the KNP [Ko- [along the route of] Andong-Singisiu- ment of the DPRK and the People’s Army. rean People’s Republic, apparently a mis- Pyongyang. The successful attack of the People’s spelling of DPRK] continues to remain fa- He also communicated that they have Army activated the partisans, at present the vorable and makes it possible to continue the begun fitting out reserve regiments and 2 partisan movement is developing widely in active offensive of the People’s Army. tank and that these need arms and the rear of the South Korean army. No. 423/Sh. SHTYKOV. tanks. However, in connection with the wide- I.7.50. Further in the conversation he asked spread American propaganda over the radio, Copies to Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, advice about how better to organize troop which is directed against the DPRK, and the Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, command in the complicated situation. Since frequent attacks by American planes on popu- File of 8th Department. the People’s Army is fighting against Ameri- lation points, industrial and military sites in can troops, he considers it necessary to North and South Korea, the political mood of [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, strengthen the leadership of the army. the population is somewhat worsening. Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Further he asked advice about how bet- Individual attitudes of lack of belief in 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 107-110] ter to organize troop command and what kind the final victory have appeared, and in the of organizational command structure to liberated regions a certain (small) portion of 17. 4 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov choose so that the General Staff is brought the population is taking a wait and see posi- to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with Kim Il closer to the troops. tion. Sung and Pak Hon-Yong After consulting with General COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 43

VASILIEV we proposed the following struc- this measure will yield positive results. 19. 6 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn-Si ture: The staff of the front will move to Seoul (Stalin) to Shtykov 1. To create two army groups headed by in the near future. Military Councils composed of: a com- I ask your permission: 8th Department of the General Staff of the mander, a member of the Military Council 1. To have two advisers in every army Armed Forces of the USSR and a chief of staff. group (adviser for the group commander and CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 35678 To place 4-6 units under the command adviser for the artillery commander). Pyongyang. To Comrade Shtykov. of each army group. 2. I ask your permission for the main To No. 439/sh 2. To create a front headquarters headed military adviser Comrade VASILIEV to go 1. The arms will be sent through Man- by a commander of the front, a chief of staff to Seoul with a group of officers, together churia, Andong, Singisiu. and a member of the Military Council of the with the staff of the front, and to be perma- 2. Concerning the location of the chief front. nently located there with the staff. military adviser VASILIEV, we consider it The front headquarters should be cre- 3. I ask you to hasten the resolution of the more useful for him to be in Pyongyang. ated from [the facilities and personnel of] questions touched on. 3. We will give fully the arms, tanks and the General Staff. SHTYKOV other military equipment for 2 divisions, 2 3. To preserve the Ministry of National No. 439/sh. tank brigades and 12 battalions, but we con- Defense, since it already exists only in a 4.7.50. sider that the main thing is not this but to fill reduced form. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, out the existing divisions and to increase The Ministry’s task should be the sup- Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin. their strength approximately to 12,000. It is ply of combat troops with everything needed necessary to have attached to the divisions an (foodstuffs, fuel, transport, ammunition) as [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, apparatus for the formation of troops, which well as the training of reserves, new troop Listy 105-107 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis would receive the reinforcements, check and formation and the organization of anti-air- 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 111-114] train them and after this, transfer them to craft defense for the northern part of the reinforce the divisions. This is the main republic. 18. 5 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov thing. 4. To appoint Kim Il Sung as Supreme (Stalin) to Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou FYN-SI [Stalin] Commander of troops. He agreed with our Enlai (via Soviet ambassador to the No. 374/sh proposals. People’s Republic of China [PRC] N.V. 6.7.50 The restructuring will proceed without Roshchin) copies: Stalin (2), Bulganin harm to the military operations on the front. He then asked our opinion about how Ciphered telegram No. 3172 [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, best to arrange the disposition of command- Beijing. Soviet Ambassador. List 140 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, ing cadres. To your No. 1112-1126. Delo 3, Papka 11, List 116] From my part I proposed to appoint the Transmit to Zhou Enlai: following group commanders: Deputy Min- 1. We agree with the opinion of the 20. 8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Shtykov ister in charge of artillery Mu Den for the left Chinese comrades regarding the mediation to Fyn-Si (Stalin), transmitting letter from flank group, and for the commander of the of India on the question of the entry of people’s Kim Il Sung to Stalin right flank group Kim Koo, Deputy Chief of China into the membership of the UN. the General Staff (presently commanding an 2. We consider it correct to concentrate CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh operational group). To appoint as com- immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the Chi- From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26 mander of the front the Deputy Chairman of nese-Korean border for volunteer actions in Received 8.7.50 11:15 the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of North Korea in case the enemy crosses the Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff Industry, Kim Cha’ek (he knows military 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35. affairs, was a partisan and served in the for these units. By telegraph. Chinese brigade in Khabarovsk, is a very 3. Your report about flights of Soviet To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin]. strong-willed, thoughtful and brave man). planes over Manchurian territory is not con- I received the following letter from KIM To appoint as Chief of Staff of the front firmed. An order was given not to allow such IL SUNG addressed to us. Kan Gen, who is now Chief of the General flights. “To the Chairman of the Council of Staff. FILIPPOV [Stalin] Ministers of the USSR, Com- The Minister of National Defense will No. 373/sh rade Stalin, I.V. remain in his post. He will manage the 5.7.50 I ask that you accept the expression of formation of new units and the organization Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov deepest respect and gratitude for the invalu- of anti-landing defense, and also supplying able assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, troops with everything needed. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, continually render to our people in their They want this measure to be passed List 79 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, struggle for independence. through the military committee on July 4 or Delo 3, Papka 11, List 115] Being confident of your desire to help 5. I judge that in this complicated situation the Korean people rid themselves of the 44 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

American imperialists, I am obliged to ap- “1. The English have officially appealed Si (Stalin) to Shtykov peal to you with a request to allow the use of to us through their ambassador in Moscow 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of and declared that they, being bound by the 8th Department of the General Staff of the the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of decision of the Security Council, cannot now Armed Forces of the USSR the 2nd Army Group, since the national mili- make proposals regarding a peaceful settle- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 37219/sh tary cadres have not yet sufficiently mas- ment of the Korean question, but if the Ko- Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador. tered the art of commanding modern troops. rean People’s Democratic Republic with- Advise the Koreans immediately to re- Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chair- draws its troops to the 38th parallel, then this ply to [UN Secretary General] Trygve Lie man of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK. could hasten a peaceful resolution of the that the Korean army is strictly adhering to Pyongyang. 8 July 1950. Korean question. the Geneva convention with regard to pris- The English ask the Soviet government oners, and [that they should] let the Koreans SHTYKOV to express its opinion. make a statement in the press exposing the No. 481/sh We consider such a demand by the En- slander of the American press regarding poor 8.7.50 glish to be impertinent and unacceptable. treatment of prisoners by the Koreans. It Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, We intend to reply that the Korean ques- would be good for someone among the pris- Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin tion has become too complicated after the oners to make a statement on the radio that armed foreign intervention and that such a the treatment of prisoners by the Koreans is [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, complex question can be resolved only by very good. Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis the Security Council with the participation of FYN-SI [Stalin] 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151] the USSR and China and with the summon- No. 4.4781 ing of representatives of Korea in order to Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov. 21. 8 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Filippov hear their opinion. 13.7.50 (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin Communicate your views. in PRC transmitting message to Mao As regards the statement of the Indian [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Zedong ambassador, we have decided not to answer List 148] him, since they made it clear that his state- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3231 ment is his personal opinion, in which the 24. 14 July 1950, handwritten letter, Kim BEIJING. Soviet Ambassador. Indian government is not involved. Il Sung to Soviet Government (via Shtykov) Only by telegraph 2. It is not known to us whether you have Sent 18:40 8.7.50 decided to deploy nine Chinese divisions on To the Extraordinary and Plenipoten- Delivered 8.7.50 the border with Korea. If you have made tiary Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK, Communicate to MAO ZEDONG that such a decision, then we are ready to send Comrade Shtykov, T.F. the Koreans are complaining that there is no you a division of jet fighter planes—124 I ask you to transmit to the Government representative of CHINA in KOREA. A pieces for covering these troops. of the USSR the following: representative should be sent soon, so that it We intend to train Chinese pilots in two In connection with the appeal of the will be possible to have communications and to three months with the help of our pilots English to the Government of the USSR with resolve questions more quickly, if, of course, and then to transfer all equipment to your a demand about the withdrawal of troops of MAO ZEDONG considers it necessary to pilots. We intend to do the same thing with the Korean People’s Army to the 38th paral- have communications with KOREA. the aviation divisions in Shanghai. lel, the Government of the DPRK considers, FILIPPOV [Stalin]. Communicate your opinion.” as does the Soviet Government, that such a No. 379/sh. Telegraph fulfillment. demand of the English is impertinent and Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov FILIPPOV [Stalin] unacceptable. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov We are in full agreement with the opin- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, ion of the Soviet Government that the Ko- List 82 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 331, rean question [should be] discussed in the Delo 3, Papka 11, List 117] List 85 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Security Council with the participation of the Delo 3, Papka 11, List 118]. A copy of the USSR and China and with the summoning of 22. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, telegram was sent to Shtykov in Pyongyang representatives of Korea. Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao the same day (APRF, Fond 45, Delo 346, The Government of the DPRK [will Zedong (via Roshchin) Listy 149-150) The same note was sent to take measures] quickly to clear the entire Kim Il Sung on July 13, but without the territory of Korea of American intervention- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3305 section about the Indian ambassador. ists. BEIJING Only by ciphered telegraph [AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of SOVIET AMBASSADOR Sent 03:15 11, ll. 153-154] the DPRK 13.7.50 Kim Il Sung. Transmit to ZHOU ENLAI or MAO 14.7.50. ZEDONG the following: 23. 13 July 1950, ciphered telegram, Fyn- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 45

[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 826, tional and intelligence departments of the Korean comrades at the present time. Listy 108-109] PVO district; Adviser to the Chief of Staff of 3. Advise Comrade Kim Il Sung not to the VVS can advise the work also of the Chief scatter the air force, but to concentrate it on 25. 25 July 1950, ciphered telegram, of the Operational Department of the Staff of the front. It is necessary that each attack by Vyshinsky to Roshchin transmitting mes- the VVS district. the People’s Army on any portion of the front sage from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai The 38 advisers will leave for China begin with a number of decisive blows by soon. attack planes on the troops of the enemy, that MID USSR FILIPPOV [Stalin] the fighter planes defend the troops of the Tenth Department Received 4 hours 30 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov Peoples Army from the blows of the enemy minutes 25/VII.1950 planes as much as possible. If it is necessary, Dispatched 5 hours 55 minutes 25/ [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, we can throw in additional assault aircraft VII.1950 List 94] and for the Korean air force. CIPHERED TELEGRAM FYN-SI [Stalin] To Beijing To Soviet Ambassador 27. 28 August 1950, ciphered telegram, 28 August 1950 Roshchin Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov) No. 483/sh SPECIAL Copy No. 1 To Stalin TOP PRIORITY 8th Department of the General Staff of the To Your No. 1503. Armed Forces of the USSR [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, On the authorization of Filippov, trans- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75021 Listy 5-6, 10-11 (original copy); and AVPRF, mit to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that we Pyongyang Soviet Ambassador. Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy agree with the proposed procedure and time Verbally transmit the following to Kim Il 155-156] period for training Chinese pilots on jet Sung. If he demands it in written form—give planes. it to him in written form, but without my 28. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Telegraph the fulfillment. signature. Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) re meeting with VYSHINSKY 1. The CC VKP(b) [Central Committee, Kim Il Sung 25.VII.50 All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] sa- Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, lutes Comrade Kim Il Sung and his friends for CIPHERED TELEGRAM Vyshinsky, 10th Department, Copy. the great liberational struggle of the Korean From Pyongyang.Sent 31.8.50 11:32 people which comrade Kim Il Sung is leading Received 31.8 17:27 [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, with brilliant success. CC VKP(b) has no Sent to the 8th Department of the General List 90] doubt that in the soonest time the interven- Staff of the Armed Forces 31.8 17:35 tionists will be driven out of Korea with By telegraph 26. 27 August 1950, ciphered telegram, ignominy. FYN-SI [Stalin] Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai 2. Comrade Kim Il Sung should not be To No. 483/sh. embarrassed by the fact that he does not have In accordance with your order of 29.8.50 CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3962 solid successes in the war against the inter- I visited KIM IL SUNG and communicated Beijing ventionists, that the successes are sometimes to him the contents of the telegram. KIM IL To Comrade Kotov interrupted by delays in the advance or even SUNG listened to my communication and To No. 1726. by some local set-backs. In such a war asked permission to write down its contents, Visit Zhou Enlai and transmit to him the continuous successes do not occur. The Rus- which I dictated to him. reply to his telegram about military advisers. sians also did not have continuous successes KIM IL SUNG received your letter very “To Comrade Zhou Enlai. during the civil war and even more during the well, thanking you several times, underscor- The Soviet Government has satisfied war with Germany. The greatest success of ing that it is a very good letter. your request about sending Soviet military the Korean people is that Korea has now Afterwards he asked my agreement to advisers—specialists in PVO [Anti-Aircraft become the most popular country in the world summon [Foreign Minister] Pak Hon-Yong Defense] and VVS [Air Force] to the East- and has turned into the banner of the move- and read him your telegram. ern and Northeastern military districts. 38 ment in Asia for liberation from the imperial- After exchanging opinions with Pak advisers will be sent to China, of which 10 ist yoke. The armies of all enslaved peoples Hon-Yong he asked my opinion about will be specialists in PVO and 28 specialists will now learn from the Korean People’s whether he can bring it to the notice of the in VVS. Army the art of bringing decisive blows to the members of the PolitSoviet [Political Coun- As regards the remaining 26 advisers, Americans and to any imperialists. More- cil] of the CC, in connection with which he we consider that there is no special need to over, Comrade Kim Il Sung should not forget underscored that this is a very important send them, since the work of these advisers that Korea is not alone now, that it has allies, letter and he needs to communicate its con- can be fulfilled by the 38 advisers being sent who are rendering and will render it aid. The tents since some members of the PolitSoviet to China, specifically: Adviser to the Chief position of the Russians during the Anglo- are in a poor state of mind. It will be useful of Staff PVO, apart from his main work can French-American intervention in 1919 was to them to know the contents of this letter. advise the work of the Chiefs of the opera- several times worse than the position of the I replied that if he considers this neces- 46 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN sary then he can do it. KIM IL SUNG replied [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, that he would convene the PolitSoviet to- Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, File of 8th Depart- morrow and read them the contents of this 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162] ment. letter. SHTYKOV 30. 13 September 1950, ciphered telegram, [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, No. 1001 Shtykov to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Listy 18-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 30.8.50 Moscow 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 163-164] Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of 8th CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600155/III. [documents from 21 September 1950 through Department. From Pyongyang Sent 13.9.50 Received 14 October 1950 appear following the ar- 13.9. 13:15 ticle in this issue by Alexandre Mansourov] [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Sent to the 8th Department of the General Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Staff of the Armed Forces 13.9 13:22. 31. 25 October 1950, VKP(b) CC [All- 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 159-160] By telegraph. Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] Cen- Extremely urgent. tral Committee Politburo decision with 29. 31 August 1950, ciphered telegram, Moscow—Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved directives to Foreign Minister Shtykov to Fyn-Si (Stalin) transmitting of the USSR. Vyshinsky (at the United Nations in New letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin In connection with the forthcoming ses- York) and to Soviet Ambassador in Wash- sion of the [UN] General Assembly, we ington CIPHERED TELEGRAM consider it advisable to recommend to the FYN-SI [Stalin]. government of the Korean People’s Demo- All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik), I transmit the letter I received. cratic Republic to send a statement to the CENTRAL COMMITTEE According to the report of KIM IL General Assembly and the Security Council, No. P78/332 To Comrades Bulganin, SUNG’s secretary, MUN IL, this text of the in which, on the basis of documents found in Molotov, Gromyko. letter was confirmed by the PolitSoviet of the the archives of the Rhee Syngmann [South Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting CC of the Labor Party. Korean] government, to show how the clique of the Politburo CC VKPR(b). SHTYKOV of RHEE SYNGMANN prepared an attack Decision of 25 October 1950 No. 1011/sh on the north, to set forth once again the 332. - About the use by the United States of 31.8.1950 position of the government of the Korean Japanese in the war against Korea. Copies to Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, People’s Democratic Republic on the ques- To confirm the draft order of MID USSR Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of the tion of the illegality of the American inter- to Comrade Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to 8th Department. vention in Korea, to illuminate the barbaric the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern acts of the American armed forces in Korea Commission (attachment 2). “DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V. and to demand the adoption of measures for SECRETARY CC We are deeply touched by your atten- the immediate cessation of the American tion. intervention and the withdrawal from Korea To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78 We bring to you, our dear teacher, grati- of the troops of the foreign interventionists. Attachment 1 tude for the warm sympathy and advice. In In addition to this statement [we advise] NEW YORK the decisive period of the struggle of the to send to the General Assembly and the TO VYSHINSKY Korean people we have received great moral Security Council photocopies of the docu- 353. Your proposal about the inadvis- support from you.We have firmly resolved ments to which reference will be made in the ability of supporting in the General Assem- to win the final victory in the struggle against statement of the government of the Korean bly the accusation made by the government the American interventionists, who are try- People’s Democratic Republic. of the DPRK against the USA, which is using ing anew to enslave Korea. In such case as you agree to this pro- Japanese in the aggressive war against the In the noble struggle for independence posal, we ask you to communicate when it Korean people, we consider incorrect. A and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly would be convenient to send such a state- statement by the Soviet delegation in the care and assistance. ment. General Assembly with a declaration of sup- We wish you many years of life and We would consider it advisable also to port for the accusation made by the govern- health. inform the government of the Korean People’s ment of the DPRK against the USA, cannot Yours faithfully, Democratic Republic about the position weaken our position with regard to this ques- KIM IL SUNG which the Soviet delegation in the General tion in the Far Eastern Commission. There- (upon commission of the PolitSoviet of Assembly will take on the Korean question. fore it is necessary for you to support the the CC [Central Committee] of the Labor We ask your orders. protest of the government of the DPRK Party of Korea) SHTYKOV against the use by the Americans of Japanese city of PYONGYANG No. 1154/sh. servicemen in the war in Korea. Use the facts 31.8.1950.” 13 September of this year brought forth in the statement of Pak Hon- Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Yong, in one of your next speeches in the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 47

General Assembly at an appropriate mo- USA of Japanese servicemen in the war Note: ment, according to your discretion. against the Korean people. The Soviet del- Comrade Zakharov has familiarized We are simultaneously giving an order egation considers that the Far Eastern Com- himself with this telegram and considers that to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far mission must not disregard the aforemen- the trip of the naval commander with adviser Eastern Commission] to make a correspond- tioned facts, which testify to the direct viola- Kuz’min is necessary. ing statement on this question and to support tion of the agreed-upon decision on the de- ROSHCHIN the protest of the government of the DPRK militarization of Japan.” No. 2623 against the use by the United States of Japa- Give the statement to the press. 28.10 nese in military operations in Korea. A. GROMYKO By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin]. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, A. GROMYKO [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827, Listy 62-63] Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157] 33. 29 October 1950, ciphered telegram, TOP SECRET Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong Attachment 2 32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram, WASHINGTON Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via CIPHERED TELEGRAM SOVIET AMBASSADOR Roshchin BEIJING - to Comrade Zakharov It is necessary for you the make the For MAO ZEDONG following statement at the next meeting of SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF To Comrade MAO ZEDONG the Far Eastern Commission: THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET I received your telegram about naval “As is known, the Minister of Foreign ARMY matters. I agree to the trip to MOSCOW of Affairs of the Korean People’s Democratic CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239 , JINGUANG and the other comrades. Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, FILIPPOV [Stalin] chairman of the General Assembly and to Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin 29.10.50. the chairman of the Security Council a pro- From BeijingReceived 19 hours 50 minutes Copies: Stalin, Bulganin test against the use of Japanese servicemen 28.10.1950 in military actions in Korea. In this protest TOP PRIORITY T [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334, it is shown that in the fundamental facts TO FILIPPOV [Stalin] List 64] found in the decree of the government of the 27 October I received the following tele- Korean People’s Democratic Republic, it is gram from Mao Zedong addressed to you: 34. 1 November 1950, ciphered telegram, established that Japanese servicemen par- “Comrade Filippov! Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov ticipated in battles in the area of Seoul to- In connection with the military situation gether with American troops, that one Japa- that has developed in China at the present CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5222 nese company participated in battles in the time, we urgently need to acquire from the TO SHTYKOV area of Chkholvon and that a significant Soviet Union the following armaments for number of Japanese are found in the 7th and the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating You request that our officers and advi- 8th divisions of the Rhee Syngmann troops. mines, armored ships, small patrol boats, sers remain in the disposition of the [North] The use by the United States of Japa- minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress Koreans for the formation of Korean divi- nese servicemen in military operations in artillery and torpedo bomber planes. sions. Such a point of view of yours is well Korea is a gross violation of the Potsdam I therefore intend to send immediately to known to us. But we do not know the points declaration, and also of section III of the Moscow by plane the commander of the navy of view of the [North] Korean government, resolution of the Far Eastern Commission together with adviser Com- we do not know whether it wishes to have “Basic Policy in Relation to Japan after rade Kuz’min in order to conduct negotia- Soviet officers and advisers in the future or Capitulation” of June 19, 1947, and the tions with the responsible comrades of the prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not resolution adopted on the basis of this docu- Soviet Navy on the question of the request for communicated the point of view of the Ko- ment “Prohibition of Military Activity in the above mentioned arms and on the ques- rean government on this subject. We cannot Japan and Use of Japanese Military Equip- tion of the construction of the Chinese navy in impose our advisers and officers on the Ko- ment” of February 12, 1948. The Potsdam the future. rean government. Let KIM IL SUNG com- declaration and aforementioned resolution Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang, municate his point of view regarding this. of the Far Eastern Commission provide for two other comrades from the navy adminis- the full disarmament and demilitarization of tration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy FYN SI [STALIN] Japan, forbid the reestablishment or posses- chief of the rear administration of the navy sion of any kind of Japanese military forma- Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Mos- 1 November 1950 tions. cow]. Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the The Soviet delegation supports the pro- I ask you to review the aforementioned General Staff to Shtykov test of the government of the Korean People’s and give me a corresponding reply. Democratic Republic against the use by the MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950.” [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, 48 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

List 84, and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, a) 6 PO-2 planes, which are fully com- part in military operations in KOREA, have Delo 3, Papka 11, List 161] bat ready and are carrying out night mis- only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun sions. There are 14 pilots, and from the 15 cartridges. In the future, in connection with 35. 2 November 1950, ciphered telegram, PO-2 available, 5 planes crashed during land- the development of military operations, we S.E. Zakharov, Soviet military represen- ings and takeoffs at the airfield itself and 4 will have a very great need to supply the tative in Beijing, to Fyn Si (Stalin) planes were lost while on missions. army with ammunition. If there is no change b) 25 pilots for IL-10 planes, but up to in military production, then the rearmament Second Main Administration of the General now there are no planes for them can be begun in the second half of 1951. Staff of the Soviet Army 6. The command of the mixed air divi- For overcoming the difficulties of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26416 sion of Koreans in ANDONG has been present time I ask you to review the question Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, formed. It is headed by General LI FART. of the possibility of the delivery of small Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, 7. Comrade PETRACHEV asks about arms for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, Lomov the possibility of receiving 25 Il-10 planes of January and February 1951, according to From Beijing15 hours 30 minutes and 10 PO-2 planes. the following list (name, quantity in pieces): 2.11.1950 [S.E.] ZAKHAROV 1. Soviet rifles 140,000. TOP PRIORITY E No. 2702 2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000. FYN SI [Stalin] 2.11.50 3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000. To No. 5228 of 2.11.50 Report: No. 5228 of 2.11.50 asked Comrade 4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns I report: Through Colonel Petrachev, ad- Zakharov about the fact that there are dis- 80,000,000. viser to the Korean air force, I have obtained crepancies between his report and Belov’s 5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000. the following specific information: report about the air battle in the region of 6. Cartridges for light machine guns 1. By the first of November a regiment Andong. He was ordered to elucidate this 37,000,000. was formed using 26 Korean pilots that have discrepancy and report about the participa- 7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000. been trained and 24 Yak-9 planes that are tion of Korean planes in battles and about the 8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns located in An’dun. fact that two of them did not return. 20,000,000. 2. On November 1 of this year, 8 planes 9. Pilots’ handguns 1,000. of this regiment went into battle for the first [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, 10. Cartridges for pilots’ handguns time, in the region of ANSIU. As a result of Listy 71-72 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 100,000. this flight 2 B-29 planes and a Mustang were 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 187-188] 11. TNT 1,000 tons. downed. Two Yak-9’s did not return from I ask you to communicate to me the the battle. 36. 8 November 1950, ciphered telegram, results of your review of my request. The first report from comrade Belov to Mao Zedong to Filippov )Stalin) I wish you health. me about the loss of the two Yak-9 planes in MAO ZEDONG a battle in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF No. 2784 was thus imprecise. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET 7.11.50 The losses relate to a battle in the region ARMY of ANSIU. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26637 [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, 3. In a battle on November 1 of this year, Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Listy 80-81] in the region of ANDONG-SINGISIU, two Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, F-82 planes were downed by our pilots in Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko 37. 9 November 1950, VKB(b) CC Polit- MIG-15’s and two planes were downed by From Beijing Received 02 hours 00 min- buro decision with approved message from anti-aircraft artillery. In all 4 planes [were utes 8.11.1950 Gromyko to Roshchin with message for downed]. TOP PRIORITY T Zhou Enlai We had no losses in the air battle. To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] 4. MIG-15’s of Comrade Belov flew In view of the fact that the infantry arms ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY from airbases at MUKDEN and AN’SHAN’. of the People’s Liberation Army are mainly (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE In all, 8 sorties were made from each airport. trophies captured from the enemy, there is a No. P78/448 To Bulganin, 5. At present there are 16 battle [as great variety in the calibers of the rifles. Molotov, Gromyko. opposed to training] Yak-9’s at the airbase at Such a situation creates great difficulty 9 November 1950 ANDONG. In an attack on the Andong for the manufacture of ammunition, and in Excerpt from protocol No. 78 of the meeting airport on 1 November 1950 one Yak-9 was particular for the production of rifle and of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Com- burned and 3 were put out of action, but it is machine gun cartridges, especially as our mittee, All-Union Communist Party possible to restore them. In addition, 2 factories can produce only very small quan- (bolshevik)] planes were lost while patrolling. tities of these cartridges. Decision of 9 November 1950 In all 22 planes and 2 planes did not At present the troops of the volunteer 448.- Question of MID USSR. return from the region of ANSIU. army, in the amount of 36 (thirty-six) divi- To confirm the attached draft of a tele- In addition to the Yak-9’s there are: sions of the twelve armies, which are taking gram to Comrade Roshchin on the question COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 49 of the participation of China in the Security Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Council. 38. 15 November 1950, ciphered telegram, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, SECRETARY CC Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Khrushchev To p.448(op) pr.PB No.78 Zakharov From BeijingReceived 20 hours 15 minutes BEIJING 16.11.1950 SOVIET AMBASSADOR SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF EXTREMELY URGENT T For transmission to Zhou Enlai. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] I have received your telegram with the ARMY At present the number of our troops request for a consultation on the question of CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26901. operating in Korea has increased from 18 the participation of China in the [UN] Secu- Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, (eighteen) divisions of 6 (six) armies to 30 rity Council. Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, (thirty) divisions of 9 (nine) armies. More- In our opinion two variants are pos- Khrushchev. over we have another 9 divisions of 3 armies sible. From BeijingReceived 06 hours 10 minutes in reserve. In connection with this, transport The first variant [is] to refuse to accept 16.11.1950 is faced with very large tasks. With regard to the invitation in the manner in which it was TOP PRIORITY T automobiles, we have already received agree- formulated in the Security Council. Mo- To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] ment from the Government of the Soviet tives: the invitation deprives the Chinese Comrade FILIPPOV: Union about delivery of 3,000 automobiles people’s republic of the right to discuss in I fully agree with your proposal to rein- before December 15. the Security Council the most urgent ques- force Belov’s aviation force by an additional It is necessary that we urgently resolve tions of China, in particular the question of delivery of MIG-15 planes to China in two the question of gasoline and lubricant. I ask the military intervention in Korea and the lots, numbering 120 (one hundred twenty) you to confirm the delivery of gasoline and question of the seizure of Taiwan by the pieces and to create a command apparatus for lubricant in the quantity indicated below: United States of America, its right being the air corps. 1. New request: 10 thousand tons of limited only to the review of the report of As concerns questions regarding the air- gasoline, 2720 barrels (capacity of 53 gal- MacArthur. ports in MANCHURIA and the strengthen- lons, the same as below) of lubricating oil for The second variant [is] to accept the ing of all PVO [Anti-Aircraft Defense] mea- diesel engines, transmission oil 220 barrels, invitation and to commission the Chinese sures, we will resolve them together with brake oil 110 barrels, yellow oil (Grease) 144 delegation to make a statement in the Secu- comrade [S.E.] ZAKHAROV. barrels. rity Council on all the abovementioned ques- I express gratitude to the Soviet pilots for 2. I ask you to ship the following oils on tions, turning the discussion of the question the heroism and effort they have displayed in the oil quota agreed upon in the request made into an indictment of the USA. If they do not battle, and for the fact that over the last 12 by the Ministry of Trade of the Chinese allow the Chinese delegation fully to lay out days they downed 23 invading American People’s Republic to the Ministry of Foreign its position, the Chinese delegation will walk planes. I think that this is worth reporting to Trade of the USSR: gasoline 7000 tons, out of the meeting and refuse to discuss even you. diesel lubricant 2380 barrels, transmission one report of MacArthur. I congratulate you on the successes! oil 190 barrels, brake oil 95 barrels, yellow It seems to us that the first variant is MAO ZEDONG. oil (Grease) 126 barrels. more advisable. Nov 15, 1950. 3. The total quantity of various oils (1 You should not connect yourself to the NEW PARAGRAPH. and 2), which we must acquire from the conduct of the Soviet delegate in the Secu- To Comrade FILIPPOV. Soviet Union: gasoline 17,000 tons, diesel rity Council, where he voted for the resolu- I report. lubricant 5100 barrels, transmission oil 410 tion of the English delegate [Gladwyn] Jebb, Your telegram was communicated at 20 barrels, brake oil 205 barrels, yellow oil especially since, speaking between us, So- hours 30 minutes local time 15.11. (Grease) 270 barrels. viet delegate [Jacob] Malik did not have an ZAKHAROV I ask you to deliver the first half (50%) instruction to vote for the English resolu- No. 2910 of the aforementioned gasoline and oil by the tion, but had a direct directive to put in a veto 16.11 end of December, and the second half (50%) if the Soviet resolution was rejected. Malik by 20 January 1951. apparently was carried away by the fact that [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Will this be subject to regulations? he had nevertheless forced the Americans to Listy 116 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, We await your answer. vote in favor of inviting China, but he did not Delo 4, Papka 11, List 189] With bolshevik greetings. take into account that the form of the invita- ZHOU ENLAI tion adopted by the Security Council would 39. 16 November 1950, ciphered telegram, No. 2917 place China in a disadvantageous position. Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin) 14/16.11.50 Telegraph the fulfillment. A. GROMYKO SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Listy 117-118] [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 371, ARMY Listy 4-5] CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26935 40. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, 50 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Zhou Enlai to Filippov (Stalin) tion. 41. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, 2) The preparation of pilots for two SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via regiments of jet planes and one regiment of THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Zakharov bombers from among the 119 pilots of the ARMY Korean People’s Army who are being trained CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26998 CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5708 on the territory of the Soviet Union. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, BEIJING 3) The dispatch to the Soviet Union of Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, To Comrade Zakharov 120 men for the preparation of aviation tech- Khrushchev For Comrade Zhou Enlai nicians and 30 crew members for attack From BeijingReceived 20 hours 45 minutes I received the telegram with the request planes which we ourselves are not in a posi- 17.11.1950 for urgent delivery of 500 automobiles. Your tion to prepare. EXTREMELY URGENT T request will be satisfied by us. In order to 4) By January 1 to send an additional To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] speed up the transfer of the automobiles to 170 Korean pilots to the Soviet Union for According to a report from Peng Dehuai you, having in mind to give you new automo- flight training, who will have completed theo- and Gao Gang, we have an insufficient num- biles, orders have been given to our military retical preparation by that time. ber of automobiles engaged in transport to command not to give you old automobiles I hope that you, comrade STALIN, will the rear, enemy planes are inflicting losses from Port Arthur, but to send new automo- assist us in the resolution of these questions. on autotransport, and also it is not possible to biles to the Manchuria [railway] station and With respect KIM IL SUNG ensure the supply of local human and mate- to transfer 140 automobiles to Chinese repre- 16.11.50” rial resources, food supply and winter cloth- sentatives on 20 November and 355 automo- No. 15 T. SHTYKOV ing cannot be secured in time and the troops biles on 25-26 November. 17.11.50 are experiencing hunger and cold. We will speed up the shipment of the Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, A new operation will begin soon. Rail- remaining automobiles and another 1,000 Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, road bridges across the Yalu are subjected to automobiles will arrive at the Manchurian Khrushchev, Sokolovsky, Shtemenko, by enemy planes every day. station before 5 December. Gromyko, file of 8th Dept. of General Staff The river is beginning to freeze, and it is FILIPPOV [Stalin] of Armed Forces not possible to build submerged bridges and 17 November 1950 pontoons. Therefore until such time as the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, river is frozen, so that automobiles can cross [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, Listy 88-89 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis the ice, we must in the next 8-9 days transport List 124] 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 180-181] at an extraordinary speed food stuffs, winter gear and ammunition. If we do not, it will 42. 17 November 1950, ciphered telegram, 43. 20 November 1950, ciphered telegram, have an influence on the next stage of the Shtykov to Gromyko transmitting 16 No- Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov) fulfillment of the operation. vember 1950 message from Kim Il Sung to In view of this, besides the mobilization Stalin 8th Department of the General Staff of the of all automobiles in Manchuria that could Armed Forces USSR be mobilized on the front, we can mobilize a CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600742/III CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 75835 maximum of 200 automobiles from North- From CORRESPONDENT 13 Sent 17.11.50 To Comrade SHTYKOV ern China and immediately send them to the Received 18.11 4:03-19:35 for Comrade KIM IL SUNG front to relieve the difficult situation. Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff I have received your telegram about the I earnestly ask you to give a command to of the Armed Forces USSR 18.11 4:20-19:50 preparation of pilot cadres after a delay which the commander of the Soviet Army on the By telegraph was the fault of the Soviet apparatus. Liaodong peninsula about the transfer of 500 extremely urgent In the opinion of our military this ques- automobiles for our army. These 500 auto- To Comrade GROMYKO tion is more expediently resolved in the fol- mobiles will be reimbursed on the account of I transmit a note I received from the lowing manner: the portion which you promised to send from Korean government with the following con- 1. To organize the preparation of 200- 25.11 to 25.12, numbering 3,000 automo- tents: 300 pilots from Korean students, in the flight biles. “TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE school already existing in YANTSZY on the Can you satisfy my request? I await COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR territory of MANCHURIA. An additional your swift reply. Comrade STALIN I.V. contingent of Soviet instructors will be given With bolshevik greetings. For preparation of pilot cadres needed for this. ZHOU ENLAI for the forthcoming offensive operations 2. The preparation of pilots for two jet No. 2933 against the American troops I ask you, Com- fighter regiments can be organized at one of 17.11 10:00 rade STALIN, to allow: our jet divisions of MIG-15’s located in 1) The preparation of 200-300 pilots on MANCHURIA. After the preparation of the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335, the territory of the Soviet Union from among pilots, the appropriate number of MIG-15 Listy 122-123] Korean students sent to the USSR for educa- planes will be delivered. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 51

With regard to the preparation of pilots [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, 802. for one bomber regiment, it is more conve- List 94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, To confirm the draft orders to Comrade nient to prepare them in the Korean school Delo 3, Papka 11, List 182] Vyshinsky (attachment 1) and to Comrade we have in the Far East Maritime Region. Roshchin (attachment 2). The materiel, TU-2 planes for the bomber 45. 1 December 1950, ciphered telegram, TOP SECRET regiment, will also be given. Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong Attachment 1 3. We agree to accept an additional 120 to p.167(op) pr. PB No. 79 men in the Korean pilot school that we have CIPHERED TELEGRAM New York in the Far East Maritime Region, to train BEIJING - SOVIET AMBASSADOR To Vyshinsky them as technicians and crew for attack To transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG 802. We are answering point by point. planes. Comrade MAO ZEDONG! Regarding point one. We agree with 4. It is better that the Korean pilots I received your telegram No. 3153. your proposal. However, you should not receive flight training in the place where I thank you for the information about the make the stipulations you proposed, that the they will study, i.e. in MANCHURIA or in state of affairs in China, in connection with Assembly has the right to review a question our Maritime Region. the successful offensive of the Chinese of aggression if the Security Council turns If you agree with these proposals, cor- People’s Liberation Army in Korea. out not to be in a condition to fulfill its responding orders will be given to our mili- Your successes gladden not only me and obligation regarding supporting peace. Such tary command. my comrades in the leadership, but also all a stipulation would mean that we recognize FYN SI [Stalin]. Soviet people. Allow me to greet from the as having legal force the resolution of No- No. 4/7556 soul you and your friends in the leadership, vember 3, which the Soviet delegation de- 20 November 1950 the People’s Liberation Army of China and clared unlawful, as a contradiction of the UN Copies: Bulganin, Shtemenko, Stalin. the entire Chinese people in connection with Charter. these enormous successes in their struggle Regarding point two. We agree with [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, against the American troops. your proposal. As for the invitation to a Listy 90-91 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis I have no doubt that in the war against the representative of the Chinese People’s Re- 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 165-166] up-to-date and well-armed American army public to participate in the discussion of this the Chinese army will receive great experi- question in the General Assembly, do not 44. 22 November 1950, ciphered telegram, ence in contemporary warfare and will turn introduce a proposal about the invitation Kim Il Sung to Fyn Si (Stalin) via Shtykov itself into a fully up-to-date, well-armed, before you receive from us an additional formidable army, just as the Soviet Army in order, which we will give after the govern- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 600782/sh the struggle with the first-class-armed Ger- ment of the PRC makes it clear whether it From CORRESPONDENT No. 18 Sent man army received experience in contempo- considers it advisable for its representative to 22.11.50 6:30 Received 22.11 9:55 rary warfare and turned into an up-to-date participate in the discussion of this question Sent to 8th Department of General Staff of well-equipped army. in the General Assembly. Armed Forces 22.11 10:02 I wish you further successes. Regarding point three. We agree with By telegram FILIPPOV [Stalin] your proposal. Extremely urgent 1 December 1950 By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin]. To Comrade FYN SI [Stalin]. A. GROMYKO I transmit the letter I received from KIM [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, IL SUNG addressed to you with the follow- List 5] TOP SECRET ing contents: Attachment 2 “To Comrade FYN SI 46. 5 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Polit- to p.167(op) pr.PB No. 79 I received your telegram of 20.11.50 buro decision with approved orders to Peking about the preparation of pilot cadres. We Vyshinsky in New York and Roshchin in Soviet Ambassador fully agree with your opinions. Beijing (with message for Zhou Enlai) Urgently visit Zhou Enlai and commu- Accept, Comrade FYN SI, our deepest nicate to him the following. gratitude for your tireless assistance to the ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY According to the report of Comrade Korean people in its struggle for its indepen- (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE Vyshinsky, the Americans will introduce dence. No. P79/167 To Malenkov, into discussion at the [UN General] Assem- Yours truly - KIM IL SUNG 21.11.50" Molotov, Gromyko bly a question under the heading “The Inter- SHTYKOV December 1950 vention in Korea of the Central People’s No. 35 Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the Government of the Chinese People’s Repub- Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, meeting of Politburo CC lic.” Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, VKP(b) [Central Committee, All-Union Com- The Soviet delegation will express op- Khrushchev, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, File munist Party (bolshevik)] position to the inclusion of this question on of 8th Department Decision of 5 December 1950 the agenda. If it nonetheless is included, the 167.- Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. Soviet Government needs to know the opin- 52 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ion of the government of the Chinese People’s Lie: of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Com- Republic—whether it considers it advisable “Military operations in Korea will be mittee, All-Union Communist Party for its representative to participate in the ended under the following conditions: (bol’shevik)] discussion of the question raised by the 1. The withdrawal of all foreign troops Decision of 7 December 1950. Americans in the General Assembly. If from Korea. 189. Telegram of Comrade Vyshinsky No. Zhou Enlai asks what the point of view of the 2. The withdrawal of American troops 825. Soviet Government is on this question, you from the and from the territory To confirm the proposed draft order to should answer that in this case, as well as in of Taiwan. Comrade Vyshinsky. the case of the discussion of MacArthur’s 3. The Korean question must be re- SECRETARY CC report in the Security Council, the Soviet solved by the Korean people themselves. to p.189(op) pr.PB No. 79 Government considers it more advisable that 4. The participation of a representative New York the Chinese government not take part in the of the Chinese people’s republic in the UN To Vyshinsky discussion of this question in the General and the exclusion from the UN of a represen- No. 825. Your proposal about the cessa- Assembly. tative of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. tion of military activity in Korea we consider Telegraph the results. 5. Convening a conference of the minis- incorrect in the present situation, when Ameri- A. Gromyko ters of foreign affairs of the four great powers can troops are suffering defeat and when the for the preparation of a peace treaty with Americans more and more often are advanc- [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, Japan. ing a proposal about a cessation of military Listy 19-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 6. If the five aforementioned conditions operations in Korea, in order to win time and 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 4-6] for the cessation of military operations are prevent the complete defeat of the American accepted, the five great powers can send their troops. 47. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram representatives to convene a conference for The draft of the Soviet delegation should from Roshchin conveying message from signing the conditions of an armistice.” include the following: Zhou Enlai to Soviet Government Zhou Enlai transmitted the enumerated 1. The immediate withdrawal of all for- conditions in written form. eign troops from Korea. CIPHERED TELEGRAM Further, Zhou stated that before sending 2. The resolution of the Korean question Copying Prohibited the present conditions for cessation of mili- must be left to the Korean people them- Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, tary operations in Korea, the Chinese gov- selves. Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, ernment wishes that Wu Xiu-quan consult The text of your preamble does not elicit Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Gromyko, Copy. with the government of the USSR and asks objections. From BeijingNo. 35379 6 hours 55 minutes the Soviet government to express its opinion By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin]. 7/XII 1950 on this question. A. Gromyko Special Nos. 2522, 2523 Zhou Enlai earnestly asked [me] to trans- TOP PRIORITY mit to the Soviet government that the Chi- [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828, SPECIAL nese government wishes to receive an an- Listy 23-24 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis On December 7 at 3:00 Beijing time swer today. 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 7-8] Zhou Enlai invited me to his [office] and I stated to Zhou Enlai that what was transmitted the following in the name of the communicated by him: the report, the condi- 49. 7 December 1950, ciphered telegram, Chinese government: tions for ceasefire in Korea and the request Gromyko to Roshchin transmitting mes- At Lake Success representatives from for an answer will be immediately brought sage from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai India, England, and the general sec- before the government of the USSR. retary of the UN Trygve Lie have recently 7.XII.50 ROSHCHIN MID USSR No. 23343 appealed several times to the representative Tenth department Received 19 hours 10 min- of the Chinese people’s republic [General] [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, utes 7/XII.1950 Wu Xiu-quan asking under what conditions Listy 17-19 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Dispatched 20 hours 40 minutes it is possible to end the military operations in 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 193-195] 7/XII.1950 Korea. Special No. 1691,1692 Their aspirations are to hold the position 48. 7 December 1950, VKP(b) CC Polit- CIPHERED TELEGRAM in Korea at the 38th parallel. buro decision with approved message to To BEIJING To SOVIET AMBASSA- Not wishing to put ourselves in a disad- Vyshinsky in New York DOR vantageous position and having the goal of SPECIAL FILE holding the initiative in our hands and also ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY TOP PRIORITY showing assertiveness on this question, the (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE 2522. Immediately visit Zhou Enlai and government of the Chinese people’s republic No. P79/189 Copies to Malenkov, transmit to him the following: intends to give the following instruction to Molotov, Gromyko. “We completely agree with your condi- Wu Xiu-quan for answering the representa- 7 December 1950. tions for a ceasefire in Korea. We consider tives of India, England, Sweden and Trygve Excerpt from protocol No. 79 of the meeting that without the satisfaction of these condi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 53 tions military activity cannot be ceased. In SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF Kimpo airport and control the port of addition, we consider that you should not be THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Chemul’po, but this will create more advan- too open and show all your cards too early ARMY tageous conditions for the preparation of our before the representatives of the three states, CIPHERED TELEGRAM troops for a spring offensive. who, frankly speaking, are spies of the USA. Copies: Stalin (2) In order to achieve the aforementioned We think that the time has not arrived for From BEIJING Received 02 hours, 40 min- goals the following plan has been worked China to show all its cards, while Seoul is utes 8.1.1951 out: still not liberated. Moreover, the USA could EXTREMELY URGENT T. a) To leave 1 division of 1st corps of the use China’s five conditions to box us on the TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]. People’s Army for garrison duty in the city of ear by [making] a UN resolution. It is not I send you a copy of the telegram to Seoul. necessary to give this advantage to the USA. Comrade Kim Il Sung from Comrades Peng The main forces of the corps will be We therefore think that it is possible at Dehuai, Kim Son and Pak Il U, sent 24:00 4.1 deployed in the area of Toto, Tok-heiri, the present time to limit oneself to the fol- [January 4]. Dzinsori, Mokudo. lowing: I ask you to familiarize yourself with it: After rest and regrouping, in three days 1. The Chinese Central People’s Gov- “To Premier Comrade Kim Il Sung. We they must prepare to make a forced crossing ernment along with you, gentlemen del- are simultaneously sending a copy to the of the Kanko river and at the appropriate egates of England, Sweden, India would commanders of the corps and army Com- moment occupy the Kimpo airport, welcome the soonest possible conclusion of rades Hun Xianchu, Wu Ruilin, Chzhou Biao, Chemul’po port and consolidate themselves the military actions in Korea. China is Pan Khe-som and to the commander of the 1st there. applying all its strength in order to conclude Corps NRVS and to the staff of the Northeast. b) Troops of the left column as before quickly the military activity forced on Korea 1. Today (4 January) the 116th infantry are under the unified command of Khan’ and China. division and a unit of troops from the 117th Sian’-chu. 2. Therefore, we would like to know the infantry division occupied the city of Seoul. The 50th army will continue to advance opinion of the UN and the USA with regard Enemy troops defending Seoul withdrew to in the direction of Kosainairi, Kando, Kiriudo to conditions for an armistice. As far as we the south bank of the Kanko river. The city of and the area to the northwest of these points. know, you have not been commissioned by Siumsen was also taken on 3 January by units It will send out immediately a strong detach- the UN or the USA to discuss with anyone of our 66th army. ment to control the bridge across the Kanko the conditions for an armistice. Moreover, The enemy withdrew to the area of Kosen river (by a counterattack attempt to occupy the delegation from England together with and to areas further south. the fortification before the bridge on the the delegation from the USA, France, Nor- It is supposed that the next attempt by south bank of the Kanko river). This detach- way, Ecuador and Cuba already introduced enemy troops will be the defense of the river, ment will find out what the situation is, make into the First Committee [of the General which is beginning in the area of Chemul’po active preparations for a forced crossing of Assembly] of the UN a resolution condemn- [Inchon], Kimpo, Iokhei, and is going on the Kanko river, attack the enemy on the ing China, thereby hindering the matter of a along the south bank of the Kanko river, south bank and continue to carry out the settlement of the Korean question. through Gensiu, Seikheisio to Korio. battle in cooperation with the main forces. 3. In view of this we will eagerly await It is possible that the enemy, regrouping If the enemy continues to withdraw to the opinion of the UN and USA about the behind the natural barriers, like the Kanko the south, then it is necessary, while pursuing conditions for a cessation of military actions river and the mountainous areas, will gather him, to occupy Suigen and to wait for further in Korea. the remnants of its forces, gain time and make orders. FILIPPOV [Stalin].” preparations for new military operations. The line of delimitation between the Telegraph the fulfillment. Another possibility is that, in case of 50th army and the 1st corps of the People’s GROMYKO. further more powerful strikes by our troops, Army runs through Kokusekiri, Riuzan, 7/XII-50 the enemy will withdraw to the south. Kasaivairi. The line itself and the areas to the Copies: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, 2. If we give the enemy the possibility to west of it belong to the 50th army, the areas Bulganin, Vyshinsky, 10th Department, continue to occupy defensive positions along to the east of this line belong to the 1st corps. Copy the south bank of the river Kanko, to control The 38th, 39th and 40th armies will put the airport at Kimpo and to use the port at themselves in order, rest for three days (until [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Chemul’po for supply, then although Seoul 7.1 inclusive) and prepare for a forced cross- Listy 20-21 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis will be in our hands, it will be under constant ing of the Khokukan-ko river above and 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 196-197] threat from enemy air force and artillery, below Seisen. They will first strike the which will be extremely disadvantageous for enemy in the area of Iuokhei, after which 50. 8 January 1951, ciphered telegram, preparing our troops for a spring offensive. they will develop an offensive along a line Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) trans- If, in the presence of success, our troops from the southeast to the northwest on the mitting 4 January 1951 message from make one more effort and destroy another enemy positions in the area of Risen, Kosiu, Peng Dehuai, Kim Son, and Pak Il U to unit of enemy troops and force the enemy to Suien, Eitokho. Kim Il Sung retreat from the south bank of the Kanko A detailed plan is being worked out by river, then we not only will be able to take the Comrade Hun Xianchu. 54 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

c) The 42nd and 66th armies under the Zakharov to Filippov (Stalin) CIPHERED TELEGRAM unified command of Wu Ruilin and Chzhou Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Biao, and also the 2nd and 5th corps of the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, People’s Army under the unified command THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Copy. of Pan Kho-Son, in accordance with the joint ARMY From BEIJING No. 1309 20 hours 05 forces plan established earlier, must destroy CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15451 minutes, 13.1.1951 the enemy troops in the region of Kosen, Copies: Stalin (2) Special No. 62 Odzio, and afterwards await further orders. From BEIJING Received 00 hours 50 min- SPECIAL All the aforementioned troops must send utes 13.1.51 TOP PRIORITY spies and outposts toward the enemy troops EXTREMELY URGENT Your order No. 48 has been fulfilled. located in front of the frontline. To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] Zhou Enlai asked to give great thanks to When the troops of the right column I report - your ciphered telegram of 11.1 comrade Filippov for the advice and consul- begin a new offensive these units must be of this year to MAO ZEDONG was handed tation. Further he stated that the Korean ready to render assistance. Peng Dehuai, to ZHOU ENLAI at 23 hours local time 12.1. comrades will be informed. In addition, Mao Kim Son, Pak Il U. 24:00 4.1.” of this year. Zedong sent a telegram to Kim Il Sung and With bolshevik greetings. ZAKHAROV Peng Dehuai with a request to come to Beijing MAO ZEDONG. No. 207 for a short time to discuss a number of No. 103 questions. During their time in Beijing Mao 7.1.51. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, Zedong will also talk over with Kim Il Sung List 121] the questions touched on in the memoran- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, dum. Listy 88-90] 52. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram, 13.1.51 ROSHCHIN Roshchin to USSR Foreign Ministry Spravka: no. 48 (from no. 837) of Jan 51. 13 January 1951, ciphered telegram, 13, 1950. Vyshinsky proposed to visit Zhou

ASSESSING THE POLITICS OF growing number of violations of the 38th THE KOREAN WAR, 1949-51 parallel by South Korean police and armed 2. Kim insists on war, Stalin disagrees forces. On 3 February 1949 Soviet Ambas- by Evgueni Bajanov sador to North Korea Shtykov bitterly com- While Stalin tried to prevent a war in plained that the North Koreans did not have Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership This article is based on the recently enough trained personnel, adequate weap- increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, declassified Soviet archives and examines ons and sufficient numbers of bullets to demanding permission to liberate the South. the political line of Moscow as well as of its rebuff intensifying incursions from the South. On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in allies, Pyongyang and Beijing, on the Ko- Receiving Kim Il Sung in the Kremlin on 5 Moscow Kim Il Sung said: “We believe that rean Peninsula in 1949-1951, up to the armi- March 1949, Stalin showed an open concern the situation makes it necessary and possible stice negotiations, which began in the sum- about growing pressure from the opponent to liberate the whole country through mili- mer of 1951. in the vicinity of the 38th parallel and em- tary means.” The Soviet leader disagreed, The paper is divided into eleven sec- phatically told Kim: “The 38th parallel must citing the military weakness of the North, tions in order to show more clearly the be peaceful. It is very important.”2 the USSR-USA agreement on the 38th par- evolution of the policies of the three com- After Kim’s return to Korea, the situa- allel, and the possibility of American inter- munist governments in Korea. tion did not improve. On 17 April 1949, vention. Stalin warned his ambassador of an immi- Stalin added that only if the adversary 1. Stalin fears an attack from the South nent attack from the South. The Soviet attacked Pyongyang could they try military ambassador confirmed that a large-scale war reunification by launching a counterattack. Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan was begin prepared by Seoul with the help of “Then,” the Kremlin chief explained, “your any aggression against South Korea. In- Americans and raised alarm about the in- move will be understood and supported by stead he was worried about an attack from ability of North Korean troops to withstand everyone.”5 the South, and did everything to avoid pro- the aggression.3 In May-August 1949 the In August and again in September 1949, voking Washington and Seoul. In 1947- Kremlin and Pyongyang continued to ex- North Korean leaders resumed pressure on 1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the change data about a possible attack from the Moscow, hoping to convince it that: a) peace- possibility of a unification of Korea, and South. The USSR was clearly afraid of such ful reunification was totally impossible; b) refused to sign a separate friendship and an attack, and was nervous not knowing how the Korean people wanted liberation and cooperation treaty with North Korean leader to prevent the war. Stalin repeatedly casti- would not understand if the chance for reuni- Kim Il Sung.1 gated Ambassador Shtykov for failing to do fication was missed; c) Northern armed forces In the beginning of 1949 the Soviet everything in his power to maintain peace on were superior to the Southern army; d) after embassy began to alert the Kremlin to the the 38th parallel.4 continued on page 87 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 55

Enlai and transmit to him Filippov’s tele- goods ordered in the requests have been sent I send you a copy of my telegram of 14 gram regarding the memorandum of the only in part? Will this difference be covered January 1951 to Comrade Peng Dehuai for Chinese government. in 1951? I ask you to communicate about transmission to Comrade Kim Il Sung. this. I ask you to familiarize yourself with it: [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, 4. That you have established the amounts “To Comrade Peng Dehuai. I ask that the List 122 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, of military credit for 1951 is very good. As contents of this telegram be transmitted to Delo 5, Papka 11, List 13] soon as we sort out the first two requests we Comrade Kim Il Sung. will make an application for military goods The approximately 100,000 Korean re- 53. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, for 1951, with a careful calculation of the cost cruits being trained in Northeast China must Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) of this military hardware, so that the total sum be incorporated into various corps of the will not exceed the amount of 400,000,000 People’s Army in the next 2-3 months, in the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF rubles established by you, so that the Soviet period of rest and reformation, so that the THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET government will not be burdened by the ful- companies in all divisions of the People’s ARMY fillment of our military applications. Army will be fully manned. There must be CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15607 5. I thank you for your decision about the more than 100 men in each company and Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Vasilevsky, delivery of railway equipment as a part of the 10,000 - 15,000 men in each division. Men’shikov military credit in accordance with the agree- In the Korean army there are too many From BEIJING Received 14 hours 30 min- ment on military credit, with a reduction of units of the division and brigade type. It is utes 16.1.1951 25% of the cost of this equipment. necessary that all personnel be consolidated EXTREMELY URGENT T 6. We agree that 5,000 automobiles de- into fifteen divisions (approximately) and To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] livered to us in 1950 and 12,000 automobiles Soviet arms be apportioned to them so that 1. I received your telegram of 4.1.51. I which will be delivered in 1951 should be these Korean divisions, cooperating with the fully agree with all the arrangements con- paid through trade exchange. I hope that you Chinese volunteers, provide major support tained in your telegram. I thank you and the will review my request and communicate an to them during the spring offensive (April - Soviet Government for the assistance you answer about the delivery ahead of time of the May), with the goal of finally resolving the are rendering to us. remaining 12,000 automobiles for satisfying South Korean question. 2. We have studied the draft agreement the needs of the front. In the next two to three months the on military credit. 7. I ask you to communicate to us whether Chinese volunteers and the Korean troops We fully agree with the draft of this gasoline and aviation fuel, for military pur- must carry out serious and major work, in agreement, with the exception of the 1st and poses, included in the application for military particular to replenish the troops with newly 2nd points of the third article, to which were equipment sent after 19.10.1950, will be in- trained soldiers, to make sure that the newly introduced changes on the basis of your cluded in the military equipment stipulated trained soldiers imitate the experience of the telegram of 4.1 of this year, about which we by the agreement on military credit. Is the old soldiers, to strengthen the troop arma- requested Comrade Zakharov to inform you. agreement on military equipment applicable ments, to rebuild the railways, to lay in store With regard to the signing of this agree- to the aforementioned gasoline? food and ammunition, to improve the work ment, Comrade Zhou Enlai will resolve this With bolshevik greetings! of transport and the rear service. Carrying question together with Comrade Zakharov. MAO ZEDONG out this work can secure the final victory. 3. You communicated in your telegram No. 262 It is possible that the enemy command that in the first nine and a half months of 14.1.51 will have two variants for conducting subse- 1950 the USSR has agreed, in accordance quent military operations: with the agreement on credit of 14.2.1950, to [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, delo 337, 1. Under pressure from Chinese and deliver to China military goods in the amount Listy 4-5] North Korean troops the enemy will make of 140 million rubles. insignificant resistance and then withdraw Not long ago Comrade Wang Jia-xiang 54. 16 January 1951, ciphered telegram, from Korea. If this happens, it will be the brought the requests of February and May Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmit- result of our carrying out thorough prepara- for military goods that he received from the ting 14 January 1951 message from Mao to tions, because the enemy, having received military-engineering administration of MVT Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung information about the preparation work be- to the general sum of 237,548,103.64 rubles, ing carried out, will be convinced that our of which the request for February is SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF military forces have grown even greater, and 114,415,274.67 rubles and for May THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET therefore, fearing difficulty, he will with- 123,132,828.97 rubles. ARMY draw from Korea. Thus, the total value of the military CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 15603 2. The enemy will make stubborn resis- goods delivered, contained in our telegram, Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov tance in the area of Pusan-Taiko until he is 97,500,000 rubles less than the value of From BEIJING Received 14 hours 45 min- becomes convinced of the uselessness of the military goods in the February and May utes 16.1.1951 resistance, and then he will withdraw from requests. EXTREMELY URGENT T South Korea. Should it be considered that the military To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin]. If this happens, it is necessary for us to 56 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN carry out good preparation so that it will be comrades think that it is not possible to this). In the main I agreed with the aforemen- possible to continue to fight. In the opposite pursue the retreating American and puppet tioned plan for the defense of the sea coast. case, we can repeat the mistakes allowed by [South Korea] troops with the forces of the I ask you to review. the Korean troops in the period from June to Korean People’s Army alone. This would 3. The question of restaffing five corps. September 1950. also take on an adventuristic character. It was decided that each corps must be But it is also possible that objective They stated that the Politburo regards as composed of three divisions. At present, all causes will force us to make a single opera- correct the proposal made from my side five corps, with the exception of 1st corps, tion in February, after which again to con- about the necessity of conducting rest and have 4-5 divisions. However, these divi- tinue the respite and reformation for the reformation for two months in order to make sions are not fully manned, there are 3,000- purpose of completing the necessary prepa- a forward advance cautiously, without hur- 4,000-5,000 men. It is proposed that each ration for the next operation. This also must rying. Although Comrade PAK HON-YONG corps fill out three divisions using the fourth be taken into account. However, if this does had his own opinion, after the second eluci- division of the corps. In this way each not happen, then conducting the last decisive dation I made on 17 January, about the posi- division can be brought to an average of operation after finishing the necessary prepa- tive and negative sides of a risky forward 7,000 men. I introduced a proposal to appor- ration in two-three months, which was dis- advance without carrying out preparation tion 20,000 men per five armies from among cussed above, will be necessary and practi- and a cautious forward advance with ad- the South Korean prisoners, but they did not cable. vance preparation, he was satisfied. agree with me. Chinese and Korean comrades must be The Soviet adviser also agreed that the With regard to my proposal to fill out the patient and carry out the necessary prepara- next operation is decisive, therefore with the existing corps with the newly organized three tion. approval of the Politburo of the Korean Work- corps, they did not agree with this. Although I ask you to communicate your opinion. ers’ party, it will be conducted better. such a proposal was advanced by me, I con- MAO ZEDONG.” 2. The question of the defense of the sea sidered it awkward to defend it further. They With Bolshevik greetings. coast. are planning the participation in the next MAO ZEDONG Premier KIM IL SUNG and Comrade operations of three of their corps. No. 260 RAZUVAEV put forth the following opin- 4. A sufficient number of cadres were 15.1.51 ions: 26 brigade will be based in not prepared for carrying out work in the TSINNAMPO, 23 brigade in KAISIU, 24 newly liberated regions. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, brigade in GENZAN, 63 brigade in SEOUL earlier had a population of Listy 1-3] BUGTKHENG, 69 brigade in KORIO. These 1,500,000 persons, at the present time it brigades will occupy by , portions probably still has around 1,000,000 persons. 55. 27 January 1951, ciphered telegram, of the defense along the western and eastern There are great difficulties with food and Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey- sea coast, where they will serve as sentries. fuel. No assistance is being given to refugees ing 19 January 1951 telegram from Peng Each brigade to have an average of 3,000 and the unemployed. There is only just Dehuai to Mao re meetings with Kim Il men, and moreover their combat capability enough food for the Korean People’s Army Sung is not high. and the Chinese Volunteer troops. In the In addition to this, three newly orga- regions to the west of KAIDZIO and to the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF nized corps (6th, 7th and 8th) will control the south of SIARIN there are large gangs, which THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET following regions: 6th corps - ANSIU, 7th have even seized some locations. We agreed ARMY corps - KOKUZAN, 8th corps - KANKO. to send one regiment and four battalions CIPHERED TELEGRAM No decision was made about which units to from the People’s Army to destroy these Copies: Stalin (2) leave in SEOUL and CHEMUL’PO. They gangs. In addition it was decided to send one From BEIJING Received 19 hours 35 min- also ask to leave one army of Chinese Volun- division from the 39th corps to the region to utes 27.1.1951 teers, as a skeleton. We gave agreement to the west of the RINSINKO river to assist. EXTREMELY URGENT T leave one army, which will be located in Thus, with the destruction of these gangs we To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] TET-SUGEN. will be able to receive several dozen tons of I send you a copy of the telegram from 1000 sea mines and 200,000 anti-tank food. Comrade Peng Dehuai to me of 19 January and other mines have been received from the Agreement in principle was obtained 1951. USSR. So far a decision was made to use from our side in the discussion of such ques- I ask you to familiarize yourself with it. 100,000 mines for defense of the sea coast tions as: fortifying the areas under control; “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. and to place the sea mines in the most impor- demoralization of the enemy—for example Copy: To Comrade GAO GANG. tant ports. The task of defending the sea preparation for the spring planting in North- I arrived at Premier Comrade KIM IL coast to the south of the SUIGEN- ern KOREA; assistance to refugees; partial SUNG’s in the evening on 16 January 1951 SANSIOKU line was assigned to the for- restoration of production in several facto- and returned on the evening of 18 January ward units. Defense of the port RIUGANPO, ries; developing a political offensive in the 1951. which is located in the area of SINGISIU, areas temporarily occupied by the American I report about the results of our meeting: they asked to assign to troops VO of north- and puppet [South Korean] troops; creation 1. Comrade KIM IL SUNG and his east CHINA (one regiment is sufficient for of armed detachments which will include COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 57 party and administrative workers and leaders 2. Our troops must immediately conduct 7. After the Chinese and Korean troops of mass organizations which will penetrate preparations for the fourth operation, with occupy the region to the north of the Taiden- the enemy’s rear, where under the cover of the goal of the destruction of 20,000 to 30,000 Anto boundary, they must again make a two armed units of the detachment they will carry American and puppet [South Korean] troops to three months long preparation, after which out organizational work in the locality; the and the occupation of the area to the north of to accomplish the last, fifth, operation of combination of legal and illegal forms of the Taiden-Anto boundary. decisive significance. This is advantageous struggle; striking a blow at the most reaction- 3. In the course of the preparation for in all respects. ary elements; assistance to the progressive this operation it is necessary to hold 8. The ninth army group must in the near elements; attracting to their side the interme- Chemul’po, the fortification before the bridge future be redeployed to the region of diate elements; and also all methods of carry- on the south bank of the Kanko river and the Pyongyang, Seoul, Chemul’po, Suigen for ing out these measures. However, in the city of Seoul, and also to draw out the main rest and reformation. At the same time they future it will be clearer how to begin the enemy forces to the Suigen-Risen region. must fulfill the task of defending the given organization of the implementation of these After the beginning of the operation the main region so as not to give the possibility to measures resolutely and with the correct forces of the North Korean and Chinese enemy troops to land in Chemul’po an placement of cadres. troops must break through the enemy’s line Tsinnampo. At the time of the fifth operation PENG DEHUAI 12:00 19.1.51.” of defense in the region of Gensiu and make the given army group must participate in With bolshevik greetings! attacks in the direction toward Eisiu and military operations on the western portions MAO ZEDONG Anto. of the front. No. 449 4. The withdrawal of Chinese and North 9. At the time of implementing the fourth 26.1.51 Korean troops for 15-30 km to the north and operation I ask you to think over the question the publication of a communication about of whether it will be better for the main forces [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, support for the proposal about a temporary of the Chinese and North Korean troops to Listy 37-40] ceasefire is disadvantageous for us, since the divide into two echelons. Troops of each enemy precisely wishes to cease military echelon must have a five day dry ration. 56. 29 January 1951, ciphered telegram, operations only at the time when our troops Troops of the first echelon must make the Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey- withdraw some distance to the north and in breakthrough and carry out the pursuit of the ing 28 January 1951 telegram from Mao order that he (the enemy) can blockade the enemy to a determined border, and the troops Zedong to Peng Dehuai Kanko river. of the second echelon must continue the 5. After the conclusion of the fourth pursuit of the enemy, so that the operation SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF operation, it is possible that the enemy will will continue for 10-12 days and that in this THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET conduct peace negotiations with us regard- time it will be possible to destroy as many ARMY ing a resolution of the Korean question. Con- enemy troops as possible. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16052 ducting negotiations will then be advanta- I ask you to communicate your opinion. Copies: Stalin (2) geous for China and Korea. However, the MAO ZEDONG, 28.1.51 From BEIJING Received 18 hours 40 min- enemy at present is calculating to return the 19:00.” utes 29.1.1951 fortification before the bridge on the south No. 478. EXTREMELY URGENT T bank of the Kanko river, to the south of the 28.1.51. MAO ZEDONG To FILIPPOV [Stalin] line Seoul-Chemul’po and to blockade the At the present time the American troops Kanko river, so that Seoul would be under [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, are trying to attack the regions of the south- threat of shelling from enemy artillery, so as Listy 41-43] ern bank of the Kanko river adjacent to Seoul thereby to force us to cease military opera- and Chemul’po [Inchon]. Such a situation tions and begin peace negotiations. In this 57. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, has developed that our troops are deprived of way the enemy wants to place China and Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong the possibility of continuing rest and refor- Korea in a disadvantageous position, which mation and are forced immediately to begin we can in no case allow. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 633 preparation for the fourth operation. I send 6. Our troops have not been able to BEIJING TO ZAKHAROV you my telegram of 28.1.51, addressed to receive reinforcements. Transporting troops FOR COMRADE MAO ZEDONG Comrade PENG DEHUAI. is also inadequate. We have a very great Comrade MAO ZEDONG! I ask you to familiarize yourself with it difficulty in this regard. However, we are in I received your telegram to PENG and communicate your opinion about whether a position to concentrate the main forces and DEHUAI of 28 January. I agree with you. this is advisable from the point of view of the with a strike in the direction of Gensiu-Eisiu From the international point of view it is international situation: destroy a unit of American troops and four to undoubtedly advisable that CHEMUL’PO “Comrade PENG DEHUAI! five divisions of South Korean troops. and SEOUL not be seized by the enemy, so 1. I received your telegram of 27.1.51, I ask you explain this to a meeting of the that the Chinese-Korean troops can make a 24:00, and your order about preparation for high command. This meeting must be com- serious rebuff to attacking enemy troops. conducting military operations sent to all pletely directed to the preparation of the FILIPPOV [Stalin] armies. fourth operation. No. 60/sh 58 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

30 January 1951. leading the corps, but there are already army 60. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, apparatuses. It would be better to organize Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung via Razuvaev [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, the 5 army administrations with 4 divisions List 44] in each army, so that the army apparatus 8th Administration of the General Staff of itself directly commands its divisions. In this the Armed Forces of the USSR 58. 30 January 1951, ciphered telegram, case the Korean armed forces would have in CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100320 Fyn Si (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador to its composition 5 armies (in all 20 divisions), To RAZUVAEV for KIM IL SUNG the DPRK A.M. Razuvaev with message and 3 divisions could be in the reserve of the To Comrade KIM IL SUNG. for Kim Il Sung main command for assisting the most needy We have insufficient lead not only for armies according to the course of the opera- satisfying the needs of China and Korea, but 8th Administration of the General Staff of tion. With time, when the commanders ma- also for our own needs. In view of this we the Armed Forces of the USSR ture, when there will be enough of them and have decided to send to Korea a group of CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100269 when they learn to command joint divisions, Soviet specialists to assist the Korean orga- To Comrade RAZUVAEV. then it will be possible to transfer to a corps nizations in working out measures for the Discuss the following telegram with system. restoration of mines, concentrating mills and Comrade Kim Il Sung and his closest friends Of course, this reform should not be lead factories for the purpose of increasing and communicate their opinion. carried out now, but during a time of rest after the production of lead. We would like also to 1. It is possible to consider it incontest- conducting the operation. organize the export of lead ore to the USSR, able that the present [North] Korean divi- Discuss these proposals and communi- since it is not being processed now in Korea sions are less battle capable than the old cate your opinion. for [industrial] processing. divisions in the summer of last year. This is 30 Jan 1951 We hope that you will not be opposed to explained by the fact that the Koreans had 10 FYN SI [Stalin] this. divisions, well fitted out with officer corps No. 4/854 We await your answer. and more or less satisfactorily trained. And Copies: Stalin, Vasilevsky, Shtemenko FYN-SI [Stalin]. now the Koreans have 28 divisions, of which No. 83/sh. 19 divisions are at the front and 9 are in [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, 3 February 1951. Manchuria. It is clear that the Koreans are Listy 12-13 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis not in a position to supply such a large 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 15-16] [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, number of divisions with officer corps. Ac- List 20] cording to our norms, each division, having, 59. 3 February 1951, ciphered telegram, let’s say, 8,000 men must have at least 800 Fyn Si (Stalin) to Razuvaev 61. 4 February 1951, ciphered telegram, officers, not counting sergeants. I have in Razuvaev to Fyn-Si (Stalin) reporting mind the genuine officers, capable of ce- 8th Administration of the General Staff of message from Kim Il Sung menting a division, and not hastily commis- the Armed Forces of the USSR sioned officers. It is clear that the Koreans CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 100319 CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 500361/sh still don’t have such a number of officers. To Comrade RAZUVAEV. From Correspondent 20 Sent 4.2.51 14:35 Therefore the present Korean officers are You did not understand my telegram of Received 4.2. 15:10 understrength, unstable and little capable of January 30 about the Korean divisions. This Sent to the 8th Administration of the General battle. The Koreans increased the number of telegram is not a directive, but my proposal Staff of the Soviet Army 4.2 15:25 divisions and forgot about quality, but qual- for discussion together with Korean com- To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin]. ity plays the decisive role here. rades. I asked you to communicate to me the To No. 4/854 and No. 81/sh. 2. It would be advisable in the given opinion of the Korean comrades and your I report: situation to have not more than 23 divisions own opinion. You answer me that my order KIM IL SUNG and the Korean com- in the Korean army, so that the officer corps will be fulfilled by you. You did not under- rades discussed your telegram about the com- of the reduced 5 divisions can be used to fill stand my telegram. Once again I ask you to position of forces of the Korean People’s out the officer corps of the remaining weak familiarize KIM IL SUNG and his friends Army and arrived at the following conclu- divisions, and the rank and file to use as with my telegram and after my proposal is sion: reinforcement. This will strengthen the divi- discussed, communicate to me the opinion of 1. To raise the battle readiness of the sions, lessen the expenses and make for a the Koreans. troops and to improve their quality, it is gain in arms. The same needs to be said FYN SI [Stalin] necessary to lower the number of army ad- regarding the four Korean infantry brigades 3 February 1951. ministrations and the number of divisions. which are in poorly combat readiness and No. 81/sh 2. To produce the decrease in army which also can be used to fill out the divi- administrations and divisions by increasing sions with officers and rank and file. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, the three army administrations from Man- 3. At this stage the organization of corps List 20 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, churia. administration is inadvisable, since there are Delo 3, Papka 11, List 198] To reduce: two army administrations; no, or almost no, commanders capable of — four pd [infantry divisions]: 2nd army COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 59

- 27th and 31st pd, 5th army - 43rd pd, one BEIJING No. 4/2761 FILIPPOV [Stalin] pd by increasing To ZAKHAROV for MAO 29.V.51 3. To temporarily keep naval brigades ZEDONG Copies: Stalin (2) for the defense of bases and coastline. or ZHOU ENLAI To strengthen the naval brigades to sig- As is obvious, in the nearest future there [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, nificantly reduce VMU [“battle friction” will be major military operations in Korea by List 29 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, that results from being understrength]; the the Chinese and Korean liberation troops. It Delo 5, Papka 11, List 28] sailor school and apparatus of naval com- is apparent that you will need a large number mand. of aviation both at the front and in the rear. In 65. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, 4. To carry out further reductions after a previous telegram we accepted your pro- Filippov to Mao Zedong the next operation, which will begin Febru- posal about shifting the base of Belov’s air ary 7-13, 1951. force to Korea, in the rear of your troops, but CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3410 5. To have the total number of army with the condition that two Chinese fighter BEIJING units and divisions be within the numerical divisions be placed in the Andong region to TO KRASOVSKY limits that you recommended. cover this area. However, we see now that in FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG RAZUVAEV. view of the forthcoming major operations, I received your telegram of June 4, and No. 375/sh you will need the largest possible aviation also the two directives of Comrade Peng 4.2.51 force at the front. We have therefore decided Dehuai. Copies: Stalin (2), Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, to send to Andong from the USSR an addi- I also think, as do you, that the war in File of 8th Administration tional large fighter division so that the two Korea should not be speeded up, since a Chinese fighter divisions which were desig- drawn out war, in the first place, gives the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, nated for covering Andong would be sent to possibility to the Chinese troops to study Listy 25-26 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis the front for use in operations at the front. contemporary warfare on the field of battle 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 199-200] We hope that you will not object. and in the second place shakes up the Truman FILIPPOV [Stalin] regime in America and harms the military 62. 16 February 1951, ciphered telegram, No. 139/sh prestige of the Anglo-American troops. Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai via 15 March 1951 In my telegram I wrote mainly about the Zakharov fact that it is risky to conduct maneuvers if [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 337, there are no strong defensive fortifications in CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1078 List 118 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, the rear, to which the main forces could be Sent 22:03 16.2.51 Delo 3, Papka 11, List 202] quickly withdrawn. Comrade Peng Dehuai Transmitted 22:55 16.2.51 writes that he is creating three defensive lines BEIJING - To Comrade ZAKHAROV 64. 29 May 1951, ciphered telegram, in the rear. If this is done and the defensive for Comrade ZHOU ENLAI Filippov (Stalin) to Razuvaev with mes- lines are truly serious, then the affair will Your request about advisers for the Chi- sage for Kim Il Sung proceed in a better way and the troops will nese will be satisfied. I consider not fall into . it more advisable to give you advisers who 8th Administration of the General Staff of the You complain that you have little artil- know China and are familiar with the air war Armed Forces of the USSR lery, antitank guns and other arms. I commu- in Korea. As adviser to the command of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101255 nicated to you two months ago that the Poles Air Army we suggest Major General PYONGYANG have retracted their orders and we therefore GOLUNOV, who is attached to General of To Comrade RAZUVAEV. could make for you additional deliveries of the Army ZAKHAROV. The list of remain- Visit KIM IL SUNG and communicate arms in this year, thus increasing the volume ing advisers will be communicated sepa- to him that we have received their application of military credit for 1951. Comrade Zhou rately. for additional delivery of rifle-mortar arms Enlai welcomed this report of mine and told FILIPPOV [Stalin] that was sent through you. Communicate to us that you will soon send new applications. No. 635037 Comrade KIM IL SUNG that we unfortu- However, there are no new applications from 16 February 1951. nately cannot now fully satisfy this applica- you. Why is this? How is this explained? tion, since he sent it almost in the middle of Again I communicate to you that we could [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 336, 1951, while arms were already allocated for make new deliveries of artillery for you if List 60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, the Peoples Democracies in February. you want this. Delo 5, Papka 11, List 26] At this time we can send to KOREA Comrade Peng Dehuai is right that it is during the month of June: 25,000 carbines, necessary to strengthen the operations of 63. 15 March 1951, ciphered telegram, 5,000 sub-machine guns, 1,200 light ma- partisan detachments in the enemy’s rear. Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong or Zhou chine guns, 550 medium machine guns, 275 This is absolutely necessary. Enlai (via Zakharov) TShK machine guns, 500 antitank rifles, 700 Comrade Peng Dehaui writes about the 82 mm mortars, and 125 120 mm mortars. presence of a relatively high fighting spirit CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 1749 Telegraph the fulfillment. among the Anglo-American troops, and about 60 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the fact that “serious rightist moods” have matter of the resolution of these important to six months, then why is it impossible to appeared among the Chinese troops. In my questions. complete the training of Chinese pilots in opinion this is explained by the fact that your At the present time Comrade KIM IL seven to eight months? Isn’t it time to throw local maneuvers with some forward advance SUNG is in BEIJING. He wishes to go with away this harmful overcautiousness? The but then a falling back, repeated several Comrade GAO GANG for discussion of Chinese troops will not fight without air times, create among your troops the impres- these questions with you. cover. Therefore it is necessary to create sion of weakness of Chinese and Koreans, I ask you to communicate your opinion more quickly a group of eight Chinese air but create among the Anglo- American troops about the possibility of this trip. fighter divisions and send them to the front. the impression of their might. I fear that this MAO ZEDONG This is now your main task. situation can undermine the spirit of the No. 2787 Belov can send one division closer to the Chinese-Korean troops. I think that it will 5.6.51 Chinese border in Manchuria, and two divi- not be possible to crush these unhealthy sions can be held in the rear in North Korea, moods unless you prepare and carry out a [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, thus freeing up two airports for the Chinese serious blow to the enemy with the defeat of List 23] fighter divisions closer to the front. This is three to four enemy divisions. This would absolutely necessary. It is necessary to ar- lead to a serious turnaround in the moods of 67. 7 June 1951, ciphered telegram, range matters so that the Chinese rely only on the Chinese-Koreans as well as among the Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong their own aviation at the front. Anglo-American troops. This, of course, Report the fulfillment. will not be broad and far from being an CIPHERED TELEGRAM FILIPPOV [Stalin] offensive, will be only a serious short blow BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY No. 303/sh against the enemy, but this will be the kind of for Comrade MAO ZEDONG. blow that will sober up the enemy and raise To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, the fighting spirit of the Chinese-Korean We received your telegram about the List 47 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, troops. Moreover this would give you the trip to us of Comrades GAO GANG and Delo 5, Papka 11, List 33] possibility of undertaking then wider and KIM IL SUNG. We are ready to receive more successful local maneuvers needed to Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG 69. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, exhaust the enemy. and to discuss with them the questions indi- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong re meet- FILIPPOV [Stalin] cated in your telegram. ing in Moscow with Gao Gang and Kim Il No. 297/sh On 8 June in the morning we will send a Sung 5 June 1951 plane from Moscow to Peking to transport Comrades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3557 [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, to Moscow. The plane will arrive in Beijing BEIJING, TO ROSHCHIN Listy 17-18] on 9 June. Deliver immediately to the addressee. We ask you to give an order to your “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. 66. 5 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao authorities about the unimpeded flight of the Today there was a conversation with Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) plane and its reception at the airport in Beijing. your representatives from Manchuria and FILIPPOV [Stalin] Korea [Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung]. Three SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF questions were raised: THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, First—about an armistice. We recog- ARMY List 26 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, nized that an armistice is now advantageous. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20448 Delo 5, Papka 11, List 30] Second—about military advisers. If they Copies: Stalin (2) are very necessary to you, then we are ready From BeijingReceived 18:30 5 June 1951 68. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, to satisfy you. SERIES G T. Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advi- Third—about the delivery of arms for TO FILIPPOV [Stalin] sor in Beijing Krasovsky sixteen divisions. There will not be objec- Comrade FILIPPOV! tions from our side. In the course of conducting the war in CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3559 I won’t write about the details, since KOREA we have run into such serious ques- BEIJING your representatives will report to you about tions as the financial question, the question TO KRASOVSKY them. of the conduct of military operations directly According to our information, our pilots We consider it absolutely necessary now at the front, the question of the danger of a are training the Koreans very slowly and in a to start moving at least eight fighter aviation possible enemy landing on the sea coast in slipshod manner. You and General Belov divisions from the sixteen Chinese divisions. our rear. apparently intend to make professors rather We think that besides two or three aviation We intend to send Comrade GAO GANG than battle pilots out of the Chinese pilots. divisions of MIG-15s, you could take to the to MOSCOW by plane in a few days to We consider this to be overcautiousness on front from central and southern China five or inform you regarding the aforementioned the side of our aviation specialists. If Rus- six divisions of MIG-9’s, which operate very questions and to ask your directions in the sian pilots were trained during the war in five effectively against bombers. Eight fighter COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 61 divisions on your front could fully satisfy of an armistice to Comrade GAO GANG in the Korean army and Chinese volunteer troops the needs of the front. According to our order for him to relay it to you and receive must occupy a defensive position for the next information your pilots are already ready to instructions from you. I won’t write about it two months. fly. It is necessary to put them into battle in detail here. It is better to act in this way: more quickly, so that they will be not paper Comrade PENG DEHUAI very much 1. To wait for the enemy to make an pilots, but battle pilots. We trained our pilots needs Soviet advisers on strategy and tactics. appeal. for action at the front in five months. Seven It would be desirable if you could send them 2. It is hoped that, on the basis of the to eight months of training is fully sufficient as soon as possible. statement of [State Department official on- for the Chinese pilots. We consider this to be With regard to the participation of eight leave George F.] Kennan, the Soviet govern- the main question now for your front. fighter divisions in battles, in accordance ment would make an inquiry to the American After the end of the conversation we with your advice, I gave an order to the government about an armistice. received information that the Anglo-Ameri- General Staff to draw up a plan. In addition, It is possible to bring this about in two cans intend to appeal soon to you and to the I gave an order to Comrade PENG DEHUAI ways simultaneously, which are that from Koreans in the name of the sixteen nations that our troops firmly hold the line of defense one side the Soviet government makes an fighting against Korea with a proposal about at the second and third defensive lines and inquiry, and from the other—if the enemy an armistice. But before making this pro- create a new defensive line. puts forth the question of an armistice, then posal they want to strike a blow against our The position at the front in June will be Korea and China will express their agree- troops. It is possible that these are merely such that our forces will be comparatively ment to this. We ask you to share opinions rumors, but it is fully possible and probable weaker than those of the enemy. In July we about which is more advisable and decide that these are not merely rumors, but corre- will be stronger than in June and in August we with Comrade Filippov. sponds to reality. We therefore advise you to will be even stronger. We will be ready in 3. Conditions for the armistice: restora- hold tight the line of defense and not allow August to make a stronger blow to the enemy. tion of the border at the 38th parallel; to the enemy to advance. MAO ZEDONG apportion from both North Korea and South FILIPPOV [Stalin].” 13.6.51" Korea an insignificant strip [to serve] as a For Roshchin. ROSHCHIN neutral zone. A proposal that the neutral We ask you to familiarize Krasovsky No. 2974 zone come only from the territory of North with this telegram. We are sending him a 13.6.51 Korea will by no means be accepted. North special directive. and South Korea [should not] interfere with FILIPPOV [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, one another. No. 302/sh Listy 55-56; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis As concerns the question of the entrance 5a, Papka 11, List 34] of China into the UN, we consider that it is [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, possible not to raise this question as a condi- Listy 31-32 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 71. 14 June 1951, handwritten letter from tion, since China can refer to the fact that the 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 31-32] Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung to Stalin, with UN has in fact become an instrument of 13 June 1951 handwritten letter from Mao aggression, and therefore China does not at 70. 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung the present time attach a special significance Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Roshchin to the question of entrance into the UN. To Comrade Stalin, I.V. You must think about whether it is worth SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF We have received a reply telegram from raising the question of Taiwan as a condition. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Comrade Mao Zedong. We ask you to re- In order to bargain with them, we consider ARMY ceive it and if time allows also to receive us that this question should be raised. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 20772 today. We very much ask you to show us such If America firmly insists that the ques- Copies: Stalin (2) a high honor. Then we will have the possibil- tion of Taiwan be resolved separately, then From BEIJING Received 19:55 ity to depart tomorrow to resolve all the we will make a corresponding concession. 13.June.1951 questions in accordance with your instruc- In the interests of the cause of peace we Series “G” T tions. will resolve first of all the question of Korea. To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] With communist greetings! I ask you to appeal to Comrade Filippov and To my [telegram] No. 2967 (vkh. No. Gao Gang to receive orders from him. 20757). Kim Il Sung 4. We have ordered and the 13.6.51 at 22:00 Beijing time I received 14 June 1951 commander of the armies of the 13th army the following telegram addressed to you [attached handwritten letter]. group immediately to return to the front and from MAO ZEDONG. “To Comrades Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung: to hold firmly the present line of the front. In “To Comrade FILIPPOV. I received your telegram of 13 June. June and July preparations will be carried out I received your telegram of 13 June. Concerning how to raise the question of intensively. In August we will carry out a Today I received a telegram from Com- negotiations about an armistice, we consider larger operation. If the enemy does not make rades GAO GANG and KIM IL SUNG. I it inadvisable for Korea and China them- a large-scale amphibious landing in our rear, communicated our opinion on the question selves to advance this question today, since then our goal can be achieved. If the enemy 62 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN does not send new reinforcements to Korea negotiations fully in accordance with your Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and does not make an amphibious landing, opinion. then in August we will be significantly stron- 3. According a telegram received from CIPHERED TELEGRAM ger than now. Comrade Siu Sian-tsian after his preliminary BEIJING - Comrade KRASOVSKY 5. Right now we are planning the trans- negotiations with representatives of the So- For Comrade MAO ZEDONG fer of our aviation units to the front. viet General Staff, of the total quantity of We received your telegram of June 21. Mao Zedong arms for sixty divisions according to the 1. You must already know from [Soviet 13.6.51" calculation of the Soviet General Staff, arms ambassador to the UN Jacob] Malik’s speech for only sixteen divisions will be delivered that our promise about raising the question of [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, this year (including for three Korean [divi- an armistice has already been fulfilled by us. Listy 57-60 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis sions]), and arms for the remaining forty- It is possible that the matter of an armistice 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 35-37] four divisions will be delivered in 1952- will move forward. 1953. This is in contradiction to the needs 2. As concerns arms for 60 divisions 72. 21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao and time frame of the Korean theater of then I must say to you directly that to fulfill Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) military operations. this application in the course of a single year 4. For the goal of satisfying the urgent is physically impossible and altogether un- SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF needs of the Korean theater of military op- thinkable. Our production and military spe- THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET erations, I ask you to study the applications cialists consider it completely impossible to ARMY transmitted by Comrade Gao Gang to Com- give arms for more than 10 divisions in the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21039 rade Siu Sian-tsian, and explore the possibil- course of 1951. The fulfillment of the appli- Copies: Stalin (2) ity of fulfilling all deliveries of rifles, artil- cation for 60 divisions is possible, and at that From BEIJING Received 21:15 lery, tanks, airplanes, automobiles, spare parts with great difficulty, only in the course of 21.6.1951 for automobiles and GSM, medicines and 1951, ’52, ’53 and the first half of ’54, i.e. in SERIES “G” T other military equipment, at 1/6 [of the total] the course of three years. Such is the final To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] monthly, from July to the end of the year, so opinion of our production and military spe- Comrade FILIPPOV! that the various military units in the Korean cialists. I have tried in every way to shorten 1. Comrade Gao Gang has returned and theater of military operations receive replen- these periods even if by a half year, but transmitted your opinion on various ques- ishment according to the presently existing unfortunately upon examination it has turned tions. organizational structure, what is advanta- out that this is impossible. I consider that they are all correct and we geous for the conduct of military operations. I will communicate about all this in must do precisely thus. 5. With the availability this year of de- more detail in a separate telegram and also As regards the question of planting rub- liveries of arms according to our applica- about the staff-organizational structure of ber trees, we intend immediately to start the tions, the missing quantity of arms needed the present Chinese divisions. planning. for units in accordance with the new organi- FILIPPOV [Stalin] I hope that the Soviet government will zational structure proposed by the Soviet 24 June 1951 send its representatives to assist us in formu- General Staff can be delivered in the next No. 635177 lating plans. year. Simultaneously with this, in accor- 2. Our troops’ eight months of experi- dance with the delivery of arms, we will [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, ence in conducting war in Korea has clearly reorganize the selections for this division List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, shown the great difference in the equipment and in that way gradually convert the sixteen Delo 5, Papka 11, List 38] of our troops and the troops of the enemy and divisions to the new organization. the extreme necessity of improving the equip- 6. We have delayed our applications for 74. 26 June 1951, ciphered telegram, ment of our troops. This is why we commis- three months and have thus brought great Filippov (Stalin) to Krasovsky in Beijing sioned Comrade Gao Gang to appeal to you harm to ourselves. Today we suddenly have relaying telegram from Mao Zedong with a request about delivery to us of arms for appealed to you with such large numbers and sixteen divisions, to which you agreed. This want all this to be delivered in six months. CIPHERED TELEGRAM is the minimal requirement of our troops in This places before you great difficulties, BEIJING - TO KRASOVSKY Korea for the present year. especially in the area of transport. I do not We have received the following tele- Upon his return Gao Gang said that you know if this can be done. I ask you to do as gram from Mao Zedong: consider our requirements in arms for each much as is possible. “The government of the Chinese division insufficient and proposed to MAO ZEDONG People’s Republic intends to send fighter strengthen each division with tanks and artil- No. 3107 21.6.51 divisions armed with MIG-15s to Korea for lery. participation in the military actions, which I consider this completely correct. This [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, will be much better than sending divisions is necessary in war against imperialists. Listy 64-65] armed with MIG-9 planes. It is therefore I already sent a telegram to Comrade Siu necessary in the course of one and a half to Sian-tsian [with instructions] to conduct the 73. 24 June 1951, ciphered telegram, two months to retrain the 6th, 12th and 14th COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 63 fighter divisions, which are armed with MIG- Gromyko notes that the text of the letter was 28.6.51 9s, on MIG-15s, with a calculation of send- transmitted by Soviet ambassador Razuvaev ing them to the front in September 1951. by telegraph, using the telegraph line of the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, The government of the Chinese People’s Ministry of War USSR. Listy 85-86 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Republic asks you to give an order to the 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 40-41] Soviet comrades in China to retrain the 6th, [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, 12th and 14th fighter divisions on MIG-15s Listy 34-36] 77. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao in the indicated periods.” As is obvious, Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) transmitting Mao Zedong does not want to take MIG-9s 76. 28 June 1951, ciphered telegram, 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il Sung from the Chinese airports for transfer to the Krasovsky to Filippov (Stalin) transmit- to Mao front, but prefers to leave them in place, and ting 29 June 1951 telegram from Kim Il to use at the front only MIG-15 divisions. Sung to Mao SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF Speak with Mao Zedong, and if our suppo- THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET sition is confirmed, tell him that your people SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF ARMY will begin the retraining of Chinese pilots THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21336 now flying MIG-9s for flights on MIG-15s. ARMY Copies: Stalin (2) It seems to us that this does not require two CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21266 From BEIJING Received 11:30 30.6.1951 months, but if the Chinese insist, then train Copies: Stalin (2) SERIES “G” T them in the course of two months. Report From BEIJING Received 11:12 28.6.1951 To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] the fulfillment. SERIES “G” A telegram from Comrade Kim Il Sung. FILIPPOV [Stalin] To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] “Comrade Mao Zedong! 26 June 1951 I report: Malik’s speech on the radio on June 23 A meeting took place 27.6.51 at 19 hours of this year aroused interest among the Ameri- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, 30 minutes Beijing time. cans in the question of the cessation of mili- List 81 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, In the conversation Comrade Mao tary actions in Korea. In the United Press Delo 5, Papka 11, List 39] Zedong expressed the opinion that the 6th, report from Washington on June 28 it says: 12th and 14th fighter aviation divisions, which “Among American generals and senior of- 75. 26 June 1951, letter, Kim Il Sung to have been trained on MIG-9s, must retrain on ficers the hope for a cessation of military Stalin MIG-15s before being sent to the front. The actions in Korea grows with every day. [U.S. period of retraining was established as one Commander Matthew] Ridgway constantly Moscow, Kremlin and a half to two months, so that these divi- maintains contact with the chief of the Ameri- TO COMRADE STALIN, I.V. sions could take part in the forthcoming op- can General Staff on the question of the I am happy to inform you that despite erations in Korea. possibility of a cessation of military actions. the complicated military situation, our Ko- To the question I raised about the con- From the reports being circulated it is rean organizations were able to secure the struction of three additional airbases for the known that as soon as Ridgway receives an fulfillment of the plan for sending to the deployment of Chinese divisions, Comrade order from the Ministry of National Defense Soviet Union lead, lead ore and lead concen- Mao Zedong answered that in of the USA, he will enter negotiations with trate. the name of the Prime Minister sent a tele- the commander of the North Korean troops. As of 24 June of this year, in connection gram to Comrade Kim Il Sung with a request A report about this will be made by the staff with the plan for delivery of 7,000 tons, to select a place to the south of Pyongyang of UN troops. 8,379 tons were delivered, of which 7,239 and as soon as possible build three airbases How should we relate to this? How tons were transferred to Chinese territory. there for jet planes. should we answer, if Ridgway wants to con- By the same date we delivered 10,714 The commander of the VVS [Air Force] duct negotiations. tons of lead concentrate and 10,714 tons of of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] of I ask you urgently to communicate your enriched lead ore, of which 9,749 tons were China , who was present at the concrete opinion on this question. transferred to Chinese territory. conversation, stated that they have in mind Kim Il Sung 29.6.51” The government of the Korean People’s using the MIG-9s in the future in schools and Mao Zedong Democratic Republic will also in the future in the PVO [Anti- Aircraft Defense] system No. 3261 devote maximum attention to the matter of of the country. 30.6 securing and increasing the delivery to the An order was given by me to the com- Soviet Union of materials of lead content. mands of the 17th, 144th and 328th fighter [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, KIM IL SUNG aviation divisions immediately to begin re- List 92 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 26 June 1951. training the 6th, 12th and 14th Chinese fighter Delo 4, Papka 11, List 11] Pyongyang. aviation divisions on MIG-15 planes, accord- This copy was received July 30, 1951 by ing to the confirmed program. 78. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao diplomatic post from Pyongyang and sent to KRASOVSKY Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) A.N. Poskrebyshev by A. Gromyko. No. 3235 64 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF send corresponding representatives to con- 3. For the goal of securing for our repre- THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET duct negotiations. sentatives time for full preparation for the ARMY As regards how to answer Ridgway, meeting it seems to me advantageous to CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21334 after receiving a demand from Ridgway, the name July 15 as the opening day of the Copies: Stalin (2) contents should be discussed and an answer meeting. From BEIJING Received 11:20 formulated. What is your opinion on this 4. In light of the compressed period of 30.6.1951 question? time and the great importance of the given SERIES “G” T If negotiations begin, it is extremely meeting I ask you to immediately communi- To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] necessary that you personally lead them, so cate with comrade Kim Il Sung, personally to 1. I have received your two telegrams that we do not find ourselves in a disadvan- lead this meeting and simultaneously to in- (of 24.6.51 and 28.6.51). I fully agree with tageous position. form me. your opinion. I send you for familiarization the tele- Mao Zedong. a) As regards the time periods for the gram of Comrade Kim Il Sung. delivery of armaments for sixteen divisions, MAO ZEDONG [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, we should act only on the basis of the produc- No. 3260 Listy 93-94 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis tive and transport possibilities of the Soviet 30.6 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 12-13] Union, that is [we should] complete the de- liveries of arms for sixteen divisions in the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, 80. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, course of three years, and in 1951 complete Listy 90-91] Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong the deliveries for ten divisions. b) The staff-organizational structure you 79. 30 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3917 have proposed for the present Chinese infan- Zedong to Filippov (Stalin); note: no pho- BEIJING—TO KRASOVSKY try divisions is very good. We are imple- tocopy available—text copied by hand and for Comrade MAO ZEDONG menting it. With sixteen divisions armed in therefore exact heading not presented Your telegrams about an armistice have accordance with this staff-organizational been received. structure, the Chinese army will be far stron- The commander of the troops of the In our opinion it is necessary immedi- ger than at present. enemy, Ridgway, today made a statement ately to answer Ridgway over the radio with 2. Malik’s statement secured us the ini- with a proposal that representatives of both agreement to meet with his representatives tiative in the matter of conducting peace warring sides meet on a Danish ship in the for negotiations about an armistice. This negotiations. On 28.6.51 I received through port of Genzan for a meeting about the ces- communication must be signed by the Com- Comrade Roshchin the main positions of the sation of military activities. Simultaneously mand of the Korean People’s Army and the contents of the conversation of Comrade with this he stated that a corresponding guar- command of the Chinese volunteer units, Gromyko with the American ambassador to antee is required, and only in this case can consequently by Comrade KIM IL SUNG the Soviet Union, [Alan] Kirk. At the end of military actions be ceased. and Comrade PENG DEHUAI. If there is no the text is stated: “Only two representatives I report to you my opinion on the given signature of the commander of the Chinese must participate from each side. Moreover question. volunteer units, then the Americans will not these representatives must be from the com- I ask you to study [it] and give an an- attach any significance to only one Korean mand of the corresponding military units, swer, and I also ask you to communicate it signature. It is necessary decisively to refuse and not representatives of the governments. immediately to Comrade Kim Il Sung. the Danish hospital ship in the area of Genzan Thus, from the Chinese side a represen- 1. Comrade Kim Il Sung presumably as a place of meeting. It is necessary to tative of the volunteer troops must partici- must give an answer to Ridgway on the 2nd demand that the meeting take place at the pate and not a representative of China, as a or 3rd of July. In this answer he must express 38th parallel in the region of Kaesong. Keep warring state.” I consider this completely his agreement to representatives of both sides in mind that at the present time you are the correct. conducting negotiations about a cessation of bosses of the affair of an armistice and the I have received a telegram from Com- military operations, and to propose a time, Americans will be forced to make conces- rade Kim Il Sung in which he asks how he place and number of participants for the sions on the question of a place for the should answer if Ridgway calls for negotia- meeting. meeting. tions to begin. 2. As concerns the place for holding the Send to Ridgway today an answer I have already communicated to Com- negotiations, Ridgway suggests the port of roughly like this: rade Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai that on the Genzan. “To the commander of UN troops Gen- one hand we must carefully watch the mili- Considering that Genzan is a fortified eral RIDGWAY. Your statement of 28 June tary situation so as not to give the enemy the sea base of North Korea and the enemy regarding an armistice has been received. possibility of using this moment to his ad- intends to make a landing there, it seems to We are authorized to declare to you that we vantage, and on the other hand Comrade Kim me disadvantageous to agree to hold negotia- agree to a meeting with your representatives Il Sung and Peng Dehuai must discuss this tions in Genzan. Is it impossible to propose for negotiations about a cessation of military question and be prepared, in case of a de- for the conduct of negotiations the town of actions and the establishment of an armi- mand by the enemy to begin negotiations, to Kaidzio, a point on the 38th parallel? stice. We propose as a meeting place the 38th COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 65 parallel in the area of the city of Kaesong. If the following points: Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 30 you agree, our representatives will be pre- a) Time of ceasefire and cessation of June 1951 message from Kim Il Sung to pared to meet with your representatives July military operations; Mao 10-15. b) Withdrawal of troops from the 38th Commander in Chief of the Korean parallel to the north and south for 5-10 km; SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF People’s Army c) Crossing the 38th parallel by land or THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET KIM IL SUNG air is prohibited from the moment of the ARMY Commander in Chief of the Chinese ceasefire; CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21404 Volunteer Units d) Withdrawal of naval forces from the Copies: Stalin (2) PENG DEHUAI territorial waters of KOREA and removal of From BEIJING Received 12:10 3.7.1951 Date.” the blockade; SERIES “G” T In your telegram you propose that we e) Withdrawal of all foreign troops from To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] direct the negotiations about an armistice KOREA within a two month period; Telegram of Comrade KIM IL SUNG. from Moscow. This, of course, is inconceiv- f) Carrying out an exchange of prisoners “Comrade MAO ZEDONG! able and not necessary. It’s up to you to lead, of war and return of civilian population. I propose to create our delegation with a Comrade MAO ZEDONG. The most we Comrade KIM IL SUNG awaits corre- composition of three persons: chief of gen- can give is advice on various questions. We sponding advice of Comrade FILIPPOV eral staff of the People’s Army of Korea also cannot maintain direct communication [Stalin]. NAM IL (head of the delegation), deputy with KIM IL SUNG. You must maintain I ask your orders. minister of foreign affairs PAK DON CHO communication [with him]. RAZUVAEV and one representative from the volunteer FILIPPOV [Stalin] No. 1751 troops. 30 June 1951 1 July 1951 During the meeting of representatives No. 335/III Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, of both sides we propose to advance the Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, following points: [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky, 1. Beginning from a certain day and Listy 95-96 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Shtemenko, File of 8th Department hour (according to Pyongyang time) both 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 14-15] sides must cease fire and all other military [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, operations. 81. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Listy 3-4] 2. Beginning from a certain day the Razuvaev to S.M. Shtemenko reporting troops of both sides must within three days message from Kim Il Sung to Filippov 82. 1 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov withdraw from the 38th parallel for a dis- (Stalin) (Stalin) to Razuvaev with message for Kim tance of 10 km and create a buffer zone in that Il Sung region. CIPHERED TELEGRAM 3. Both sides must cease the transfer of From Correspondent 20 Sent 1.7.51 5:30 8TH ADMINISTRATION OF THE GEN- land, naval and air forces across the 38th Received 1.7.51 7:16 ERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES parallel. Dispatched to 8th Administration of the OF THE USSR 4. Withdraw all foreign ships from the General Staff of the Soviet Army 1.7.51 CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 101529 territorial waters of North Korea and liqui- 7:25 To Comrade RAZUVAEV. date the blockage of the sea coast north of the By telegram We received your telegram of July 1, No. 38th parallel. Extremely urgent 1751. 5. In the course of two months from the To Comrade SHTEMENKO S.M. Transmit to KIM IL SUNG that the Ko- day of the ceasefire all foreign land, naval I report: rean government must come to an agreement and air forces will withdraw from Korea. 1. The text of an answer of KIM IL on the questions raised in the telegram with 6. In the course of two months from the SUNG to a meeting on negotiations was the Chinese government and together work day of the ceasefire an exchange of prisoners given by me according to the line of MID. It out the proposals. will be conducted. is proposed to give an answer 2- 3.7.51. From the telegram received it is not 7. The civilian population forcefully Agreement of MOSCOW is urgently apparent that the proposals of KIM IL SUNG taken by the American and Rhee Syngmann needed. have been agreed to by MAO ZEDONG. troops from regions north of the 38th parallel 2. The composition of the delegation FILIPPOV [Stalin]. must be returned. from the Korean People’s Democratic Re- No. 4/3208 I ask you urgently to give an answer public is proposed to be three persons—the 2 July 1951 after familiarizing yourself with the tele- chief of staff of the Korean People’s Army gram. NAM IL, the deputy Minister of Foreign [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, KIM IL SUNG 30.6.1951.” Affairs PAK DENCHO and [one] from the List 5] MAO ZEDONG Chinese volunteers. No. 3304 3. It is proposed that NAM IL declare 83. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao 3.7.51 66 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

neutral states which would supervise the Comrade KIM IL SUNG insists on ad- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, fulfillment of points 1, 2 and 3. In this vancing this point. However, to bring this Listy 6-7] committee there must be an equal number of about is very difficult. It is apparent that with representatives of neutral states that have not regard to this question many differences of 84. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao taken part in the Korean war and that have opinion and many arguments will arise be- Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) been selected by both sides.” tween the representatives of North and South We think that the enemy also will ad- Korea, which can have an influence on the SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF vance an analogous proposal, therefore we resolution of other important questions. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET intend to show initiative in this. However, Or is it possible to advance this pro- ARMY there will be numerous difficulties in the posal? CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21405 fulfillment of this point. If it leads to arguments and is not re- Copies: Stalin (2) “Members” of the control committee solved, then transfer it for discussion at an From BEIJING Received 13:55 proposed by the enemy will monitor our international conference of a political char- 3.7.1951 military transport on the Chinese-Korean acter. SERIES “G” T border and at important communications I ask you to communicate your opinion To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] points in Korea. Or should we not take the on the points indicated above. Furthermore, Comrade FILIPPOV! initiative ourselves, but wait for the enemy to yesterday we sent Deputy Minister of For- During the meeting of military repre- advance his proposal, after which we will eign Affairs Comrade and his sentatives of both sides we intend to advance accept it? assistant to Korea. He will arrive approxi- the following 5 main points: I ask you to communicate your opinion mately on 5.7.1951 and will discuss with 1. “Both sides must simultaneously is- about how to proceed expediently. To com- Comrade KIM IL SUNG and other comrades sue an order for a ceasefire. Land, sea and air pletely refuse to create a control committee various questions concerning the peace ne- forces of both sides, after the issuing of the seems also inadvisable. gotiations. order on a ceasefire, must within all the 5. “Both sides must carry out repatria- After this he will go to the area of borders of Korea cease fire and halt all other tion of prisoners of war. In the course of four Kaesong, whence he will secretly lead the hostile actions.” months after the cessation of military opera- negotiations. This point will possibly be accepted by tions to conduct a full mutual exchange of I am also sending you the telegram which the enemy without qualifications. them, in separate batches.” lays out the opinion of Comrade KIM IL 2. “Land, sea and air forces of both sides The enemy will possibly propose to SUNG on this question. must withdraw from the 38th parallel for a conduct a one for one exchange. We must MAO ZEDONG distance of 10 English miles and create a demand repatriation of all prisoners of war. No. 3305 buffer zone in the region 10 English miles to However, the enemy has taken prisoner a 3.7.51 the south and to the north of the 38th parallel. relatively larger number of North Koreans, The civil administration of the buffer zone who have already been included in the ranks [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, must be as it was before 25.6.1950, in other of the South Korean troops, and therefore Listy 8-10] words to the north of the 38th parallel under this situation will possibly elicit an argu- the jurisdiction of the Korean People’s gov- ment. 85. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov ernment and to the south of the 38th parallel In our opinion the 5 basic points indi- (Stalin) to Mao Zedong under the jurisdiction of the South-Korean cated above must be accepted at the meeting government.” of military representatives of both sides. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 3950 It is possible that there will be some In addition there are some other points: BEIJING, TO KRASOVSKY. divergences [from this proposal] among the 1. “All foreign troops including Chinese For Comrade MAO ZEDONG. enemy but we consider that our proposal is volunteer troops must completely leave North “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG. extremely just and it will be difficult for the and South Korea within a specified period of We received your telegram of 3 July. enemy to refute it. time (for example within three-four months), With regard to the first two points of your 3. “Both sides must cease the transport in separate batches. proposal, we have no objections. It is pos- of arms, troops and reinforcements (includ- This is also a very important point. How- sible to delete the second part of the third ing land, sea and air transport) into Korea ever, the representatives of the enemy possi- point, but if the Americans advance such a from outside the country and also the afore- bly will think that this question belongs among proposal, it can be accepted. The fourth mentioned transports to the front line on the political questions and should not be re- point should not be advanced. But if the territory of Korea.” solved at this meeting. Americans advance a proposal about a con- We think that the enemy for his part will I ask you to study and communicate trol commission from the UN, then this pro- also advance a proposal on this question, and whether our side should advance this point. posal should be rejected, with reference to we therefore intend to take the initiative in 2. “Within a specified period of time the fact that the UN occupies the position of this. But perhaps it is better to leave off the (for example in several months) refugees of a warring side, but you should then advance last part of our proposal? North and South Korea must be returned to your proposal about a commission of repre- 4. “To create a control committee of the areas where they lived previously.” sentatives of neutral states named with the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 67 agreement of the sides. The fifth point either before or during the negotiations, which military situation. should be proposed and you should insist on the enemy may undertake in order to force us We consider that the goal of this is to it. to sign a disadvantageous agreement. avoid defeat in the area of propaganda but As concerns your remaining two points If the enemy begins a large-scale attack, also secretly to show that he can alter his (about the withdrawal of all foreign troops our troops must go over to the counterattack proposal. Taking this into account, in our and about refugees), both of these proposals and defeat the enemy. statement in today’s meeting we pursued the should be advanced and should be insisted 3. It is necessary to issue an order to goal of striking a blow against his unfounded on. second corps Yang Chengan and to the 50th theory of refusal to discuss the question of FILIPPOV [Stalin]. corps to depart quickly for the indicated re- the 38th parallel, and also tried to ascertain if No. 340/III gions so that the enemy cannot make use of he intended to abandon his unfounded pro- 3 July.” the opportunity to make a landing in Genzan. posal. Our 38th, 39th and 42nd corps must be At today’s meeting the enemy displayed [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, ready to repulse possible landings by the some interest in the portion of our statement List 11] enemy on the western coast. where we tried to ascertain his intention. 4. I ask you to think about what could However, in his statement in the second half 86. 3 July 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao occur after the signing of an agreement on of the day the representative of the enemy Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 2 cessation of military operations and be pre- expressed a strong [sense of] injustice and July 1951 telegram from Mao to Peng pared for everything that needs to be done. tried to lay on us the responsibility for the Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Kim Il Sung MAO ZEDONG 2.7.51.” impasse that has been created in the negotia- MAO ZEDONG tions. SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF No. 3308 Our statement for tomorrow will be con- THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET 3.7.51 structed on the basis of your instructions. ARMY The goal of the statement will be to smash CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21412 [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 339, this [claim of] injustice of the enemy, to Copies: Stalin (2) Listy 14-15] unmask his capacity for deception and si- From BEIJING Received 13:50 multaneously to advance such questions as 3.7.1951 87. 13 August 1951, ciphered telegram, to force the enemy more clearly to express SERIES “G” T Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey- his position. To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] ing 12 August 1951 telegram from Li The main goal of the statement is once Comrade Filippov! Kenong to Mao re armistice talks again to underscore that if the enemy does I send you the text of my telegram to not renounce his unfounded proposal, there Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO GANG SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF will be no progress in the work of the confer- and KIM IL SUNG. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ence. We consider that we can also express “Comrades PENG DEHUAI, GAO ARMY our wish to change the proposal about the GANG and KIM IL SUNG! CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 22834 buffer zone in the area of the 38th parallel as The period of preparations for and con- Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, the military only in such duct of negotiations with representatives of Bulganin case as the enemy clearly gives us to under- the enemy will occupy approximately 10-14 From BEIJING Received 17:20 stand that he abandons his earlier proposal. days. I ask you with all seriousness to fulfill 13.8.1951 3. After the resumption of the work of the following points: SERIES “G” T the conference, the mistaken views of the 1. In the course of the 10 days that we TO FILIPPOV [Stalin] enemy have become even more intensified have, to make every effort to increase the Comrade FILIPPOV! and the enemy has become even more con- personnel of the front line units and espe- I send you for familiarization the tele- vinced that we yearn for peace, and therefore cially to replenish them with arms and am- gram received from Comrade Li Kenong on it is possible to get concessions from us. All munition. 12 August 4:00. this was possible to foresee. I ask Comrade GAO GANG to transfer “To Comrade Mao Zedong. However, from the entire course of the from the rear to North Korea in no more than 1. I received your telegram of 11 August conference and the general situation outside 10 days the personnel, arms and ammunition 7:00. the conference it is apparent that it is not marked for transfer. It is necessary to be 2. At the evening meeting the mistaken possible to force the enemy to accept the prepared for the fact that after the signing of views of the enemy became even more inten- proposal about the 38th parallel. In the an agreement on cessation of military opera- sified. The enemy considers that it is possible course of several days the enemy on the one tions it will be impossible to transfer the through pressure to force us to abandon dis- hand will put pressure on us and try to force aforementioned personnel and armaments. cussion of the question of the 38th parallel. us to be the first to make a concession, and on 2. To heighten vigilance up to the limit. He has already four times expressed his wish the other hand will prepare for a possible Units of the first line must be prepared to to discuss a proposal about a military demar- breakdown in the conference. repulse a possible large scale attack by the cation line and a buffer zone on the basis of Therefore we consider it necessary to enemy and intensive bombing of our rear the present line of the front and the present work out a definite resolution with regard to 68 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the 38th parallel. 13.8.51 region of the building where the negotiations If our final goal consists of conducting a are being conducted on his own initiative, struggle for the principle of the determina- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, without agreement from the Americans. tion of the 38th parallel as the military de- Listy 56-58] Therefore, the provocational acts of the en- marcation line and if in this regard we can emy have caused us to make a decisive admit only certain alterations, then we should 88. 27 August 1951, ciphered telegram, counterstroke. have in mind a breakdown in the negotiations Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) We have declared a temporary cessation and we must prepare for this. of the negotiations until the enemy accepts In the opposite case we should have SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF responsibility for what has happened. The some kind of compromise position deter- THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET negotiations will not be resumed until we mined. Our past proposal, it is true, could not ARMY receive a satisfactory answer—we’ll let them foresee the possible development of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23256 cool their heels. However, we do not want to present situation, but it is also not possible to Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, take the initiative in declaring a breakdown win much time through action in accordance Bulganin in the negotiations. with your orders contained in the telegram of From BEIJING 01:3027.8.1951 We suppose that the enemy will not 17.7.51 about a concession to the enemy for SERIES “G” openly acknowledge his provocational acts. the purpose of gaining time, To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] The dragging out of the negotiations can 4. We (Li Kenong, Deng Hua, Xie Fang Comrade Filippov! end in two ways. and Qiao Guan-hua) suggest that the final In view of the fact that the enemy was First, the delay may bring the negotia- goal of the enemy is to cease military opera- not in a position to withdraw from the im- tions to a breakdown. tions at the present front line. In relation to passe created in the course of the negotia- We are forcefully preparing ourselves this the enemy may allow small alterations. tions on the question of a military demarca- to resist a possible attack by enemy troops It is thus necessary for us to decide: to tion line, he has undertaken a whole series of directly at the front. We are simultaneously struggle for the 38th parallel and prepare for provocational actions. strictly defending the ports on the western an end to the negotiations or, avoiding a On August 19 enemy troops, dressed in and eastern coast of North Korea from land- breakdown in the negotiations, to carry on civilian clothes, made a raid on our security ings by the enemy. For the last several days the struggle for the cessation of military forces in the neutral zone in Kaesong, as a enemy planes have passed through the area operations and to study the question of the result of which one man was killed and one of the following cities on the China coast: cessation of military operations at the present was wounded. After an investigation by Tsingtao, Shanghai, Hangchow. This was front line. representatives of both sides, the enemy in also done for provocational purposes. Having studied, on the basis of the lim- justifying himself stated that this was [com- Simultaneously with this, the enemy ited materials we have, the general world mitted by] partisans from the South Korean wanted to reconnoiter the air defense of our situation, the needs of our state and the fact partisan detachment active in our region, and coastal regions. With regard to this, we want that at present Korea cannot continue the therefore he does not take any responsibility to strengthen our command in Korea and the war, we think that it is better to think over the for this. air defense of the cities located in the coastal question of cessation of military operations After this, on the night of August 22, one region. In a subsequent telegram I will com- at the present front line than to carry on the enemy plane dropped nine bombs on the municate to you a draft [plan] for sending struggle for the 38th parallel and bring the territory of the neutral zone in Kaesong and Soviet military advisers to work with the conference to a breakdown. fired on the house where our delegation is Chinese volunteer troops in Korea. In connection with this it is necessary to quartered. Although American officers came Simultaneously with this I will ask you take into consideration that it is possible to to investigate that same night, the enemy about an additional delivery of artillery ar- gain some concessions from the enemy in the impudently refused to acknowledge their maments. discussion of the proposal about cessation of actions and contended that the fragments and Second, it is possible that as a result of military operations at the present front line. craters found there are not from air force the delay in the negotiations the enemy will Thus it will be possible to secure 3-5 bombs. After this, the enemy, contradicting find the means to extricate [himself] from the years time for preparation of forces. the former, said that the raid was made by an impasse and an agreement will be reached on Of course, if the enemy does not in any unidentified plane. the question of a military demarcation line. way abandon his unfounded proposal, which The enemy dared to make these impu- At the present time we want to use the he is at present insisting on, then we also dent provocations because he considered that period of the break in negotiations for con- intend to choose only the path of a schism. our side would not make a breakdown in the ducting a cold war in order to expose the Having limited materials at our disposal, negotiations over this. He therefore wanted impudent provocational acts of the enemy. the situation has been studied superficially. to use this measure to put pressure on us. However, we suppose that the enemy will We urgently ask your instructions for future Of course, it is possible [that it was] a not openly acknowledge his provocations. actions. South Korean secret service plan to break up If after some period of time the situation LI KENONG12.8.51 4:00.” the negotiations, but the possibility is ex- will develop so that the enemy wishes to MAO ZEDONG cluded that Syngmann Rhee could send a renew the negotiations, then we think that at No. 4061 plane to make an attack on Kaesong in the our own initiative we can propose a way COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 69 which would lead to a turn in the negotia- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong We agree with your evaluation of the tions and to force the enemy to agree with present condition of the negotiations in this. All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), Kaesong and with your line on the necessity Comrade Kim Il Sung suggests for the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of getting a satisfactory answer on the ques- purpose of securing the neutral zone at No. P83/280 tion of the incident provoked by the Ameri- Kaesong to ask representatives of neutral 28 August 1951 Copies: Malenkov, cans to pressure the Chinese-Korean side. states to participate at the conference as Molotov, Vyshinsky, Vasilevsky As before, with regard to this we will proceed monitors and witnesses for the period of Excerpt from protocol No. 83 of meeting of from the fact that the Americans have greater negotiations, as a necessary condition for the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Commit- need to continue the negotiations. the resumption of the negotiations. More- tee, All-Union Communist Party (bol’shevik)] We do not see the use in inviting, ac- over, these representatives can be used in the Decision of 28 August 1951 cording to your initiative, representatives of future as a control organ for the implemen- 280. Telegram of Comrade Mao Zedong neutral states to participate in the negotia- tation of the ceasefire. of 27 August (No. 4279) tions as monitors and witnesses during the How do you view this? Do you con- To adopt the attached draft answer of present period of negotiations. The negative sider this necessary or do you have a better Comrade Filippov to Comrade Mao Zedong. side of this proposal is that the Americans way? I ask your orders on the above. SECRETARY CC will view it as [an indication] that the Chi- With greetings. Mao Zedong. To p.280(op) pr.PB No. 83 nese-Korean side has more need quickly to TOP SECRET reach an agreement about an armistice than [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, BEIJING do the Americans. If you are of such an Listy 86-88 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis TO KRASOVSKY opinion on this question, then you must com- 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 51-53] For transmission to MAO ZEDONG municate this to Comrade Kim Il Sung. “Comrade Mao Zedong! FILIPPOV [Stalin].” 89. 28 August 1951, VKP(b) CC Politburo We received your telegram of August decision with approved message from 27. [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829,

THE SHTYKOV DIARIES: Soviet Union who participated in the found- full member of the Central Committee of the NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET ing of the North Korean regime have pub- CPSU (1956-61); and four times Represen- POLICY IN KOREA lished accounts, among them Gen. Kirill tative to the Supreme Soviet.4 He also Meretskov, the Commander of the Maritime received numerous decorations, including by Hyun-su Jeon Military District (1971); Gen. Ivan the Lenin medal (three times) and the first- with Gyoo Kahng Chistiakov, Commander of the Soviet 25th degree Kutuzov medal (three times).5 Army in North Korea until April 1947 (1975); Shtykov started writing his memoirs in From the time of his appointment as Lebedev (1976); I. Kravtsov, Special Aide to his last years but a fatal heart attack in 1964 Member of the Military Council of the Shtykov (1951); and V. Petukhov, a Soviet halted the writing.6 He was not only a USSR’s Maritime [Far Eastern] Military Foreign Ministry official (1987). Although vigorous political activist but an ardent re- District in the summer of 1945, until early these accounts are important sources for un- corder, almost an archivist. He kept numer- 1951, when he was summoned to Moscow, derstanding the period, they all try more or ous diaries from 1938, when he became the Gen. Terentii Fomich Shtykov played the less to reproduce the “myth” that the Soviet Second Secretary of the Leningrad party key role in planning and executing Soviet Army “liberated” North Korea. What makes committee, until his death; 60 volumes sur- foreign policy in Korea. According to Gen. Shtykov’s diaries so significant is that they, vive, each containing roughly 100-200 pages. Nikolai Georgievich Lebedev, the Director unlike the writings of the others who worked Such record keeping was quite unusual in of the Soviet Civil Administration in North with him, provide candid and vivid pictures the Soviet Union, as many people were re- Korea from the autumn of 1947, “there was of the Soviet occupation period. luctant to keep private records for fear of not an event in which Shtykov was not Shtykov started his political career in frequent political purges.7 Shtykov also involved.”1 Recently, it has emerged that 1938 as the Second Secretary of the Leningrad kept other official documents and pictures: Shtykov kept personal diaries and that these Communist party committee. He was as a photo collector, he kept thousands of were in the possession of his son, Viktor Zhdanov’s faithful protege.2 After 1938, he pictures; he also saved letters, reports, and Terentevich Shtykov, who lives in St. Pe- served as Member of the Military Council of telegrams which he wrote or were sent to tersburg. Although, unfortunately, the dia- the during the in him; he even kept some newspaper scraps. ries for some years are missing, they consti- (1939-40); Member of the Military Thus his diaries open for us a new horizon in tute an important new primary source for Council of the Maritime Military District studying Soviet policy in Korea after 1945. scholars of Soviet-Korean relations in the (1945-47); Deputy Commander of Political Unfortunately, however, only a portion period from the end of World War II to the Affairs of the Maritime Military District of his diaries covering the period when he onset of the Korean War, and of other issues (1947-48); the first Soviet Plenipotentiary was in charge of Korean affairs exists. For with which Shtykov was involved. Ambassador to North Korea (1948-51)3; the entire period 1945-1951 only four vol-

Since 1960, many individuals from the Soviet Ambassador to Hungary (1959-61); continued on page 92 70 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Listy 4-5 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 1. Advisers for the staff of the volunteer If you agree with this decision of ours, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 54-55] The telegram troops: in all nine persons, including: Main then General of the Army Zakharov can was sent to Beijing on August 29 [APRF, adviser - 1, adviser of the chief of staff - 1, depart soon for Beijing for further movement Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, List 89] adviser on operational questions - 1, adviser to the location of the staff of the Volunteer on intelligence - 1, adviser on communica- troops in Korea. 90. 30 August 1951, ciphered telegram, tions - 1, adviser on the rear - 1, adviser on FILIPPOV [Stalin].” Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) VOSO [voennye soobshcheniie, military 3-ae. communications] -1, adviser on artillery - 1, 10.IX.51 SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF adviser on tanks and self-propelled guns THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET [samokhodnym ustanovkam] -1, adviser on [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, ARMY engineering matters - 1. List 109] CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23397 2. Advisers for the five armies: in all 10 Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, persons. Two advisers to each army, specifi- 93. 14 November 1951, ciphered telegram, Bulganin cally: adviser of the command of the army Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) From BEIJING Received 19:00 30.8.1951 and jointly adviser of the chief of staff of the SERIES “G” T army -1, adviser on operational questions -1. SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] 3. Advisers for twenty one corps: in all THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET Comrade FILIPPOV. 83 persons. Three persons in each corps, ARMY I received your telegram of 29.8.1951. I specifically: adviser of the command of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25902 agree that it is not advisable to take the corps and jointly adviser of the chief of staff Copies: Stalin (2) initiative in inviting representatives of neu- - 1, adviser on artillery -1, adviser on tanks From BEIJING Received 13:40 tral states as monitors and witnesses at the and self-propelled guns -1. It is hoped that 14.11.1951 present stage of the negotiations. the aforementioned advisers be sent to Korea SERIES “G” T. I have already communicated about this through Beijing in September and October To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] to Comrade KIM IL SUNG. 1951. Comrade FILIPPOV! MAO ZEDONG I ask you to study this question and After the resumption of negotiations for No. 4358 communicate your decision. cessation of military operations in Korea, in 30.8.51 With greetings. view of the large losses at the front over the MAO ZEDONG last two months and the increase in demands [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 340, No. 4492 within America and outside its borders for List 97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, 8.9.51 cessation of military operations, the possibil- Delo 5, Papka 11, List 56] ity of the American side accepting the condi- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 341, tions for an armistice has increased. How- Listy 98-99] ever, at the same time, taking into account 91. 8 September 1951, ciphered telegram, internal and external politics, the American Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) 92. 10 September 1951, ciphered telegram, government is still trying to keep the interna- Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong tional situation tense, and therefore the Ameri- SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF cans, while actively engaged in spying and THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET BEIJING carrying out a policy of an advance in the ARMY To Comrade KRASOVSKY course of the negotiations, are trying to drag CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 23703 for Comrade Mao Zedong out the negotiations. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, “Comrade Mao Zedong! The main question in the negotiations is Bulganin We have received your telegram of 8 the determination of the demarcation line. In From BEIJING Received 16:20 September. place of the demand for designation of the 8.9.1951 We agree to send a main military adviser demarcation line deep in the rear of our SERIES “G” T and a group of military specialists as military troops, the enemy has proposed to designate To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] advisers attached to the staff of the Volunteer it on the basis of the present line of the front, Comrade FILIPPOV! troops in Korea. with some alterations and with the inclusion In my telegram to you of 27.8 of this We consider it advisable to resolve the of the region of Kaesong in the buffer zone. year I communicated to you that we intend to question of sending military advisers to the At present the enemy is already de- ask the Soviet Government to send its mili- armies and corps after the main military manding the designation of the line in fact tary advisers for work among the troops of adviser familiarizes himself with the situa- contiguous with the line of the troops at the the Chinese volunteers in Korea. tion on location and presents his consider- time of the signing of an agreement on cessa- After studying this question and con- ations on this question. tion of military operations as the demarca- sulting with the Main Military Adviser Com- As main military adviser for the staff of tion line without the inclusion of the region rade Krasovsky, we consider that it is neces- the Volunteer troops in Korea we could send of Kaesong in the buffer zone. We are sary to invite 83 advisers: General of the Army Zakharov. insisting on the cessation of military opera- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 71 tions at the present front line and the desig- tions to propose to transfer the monitoring ther strengthening of the campaign to aid nation of the present line contiguous to the functions to neutral states, in other words to Korea and struggle against American impe- troops of both sides as the demarcation line states that are not participating in the war. We rialism, for the purpose of ensuring the fur- with the introduction of alterations in the want to invite three states to fulfill these ther conduct of the war in Korea, securing line contiguous to troops of both sides in tasks: the Soviet Union, Poland and India. also by financial means the stabilization of case of alterations of it in the period of the It is possible that the Americans will the scene within the country, and also achievement of an agreement on all points of oppose this at the beginning. Then we will strengthening state construction and mainly the agenda. At the present time the enemy is propose to introduce [as monitors] represen- construction of defense. fighting with us precisely on this question, tatives from Sweden and one state of Latin In the present year, in light of rendering but we assume that this fight will not con- America. aid to Korea and the struggle against Ameri- tinue for long. As regards the exchange of prisoners of can , the budget of the Chinese Our proposal about cessation of mili- war, we will oppose exchange according to state in comparison with 1950 has increased tary operations at the present front line and the principle of 1 for 1 and will propose by 60%. 32% of the total budget is directly our agreement to set aside the question of the exchange according to the principle of return being used in the Korean theater of military 38th parallel as the demarcation line, and the of all prisoners of war by both sides. operations. (Military credit extended to us question of the withdrawal of all foreign I think it will not be difficult to reach by the Soviet Government is not included in troops from Korea before the convening of a agreement on this question. this calculation.) political conference, was made not only be- On the question of the governments of Thus, if a regime of economizing is not cause the present negotiations are negotia- the interested states convening a conference introduced now, in the next year the budget tions about cessation of military operations of high level officials, three variants are pos- will increase even more, which inevitably and [because] the enemy will not in any case sible: will have an influence on finances and lead to want to exchange eastern mountainous re- 1. Convening a conference of political a great rise in the prices of goods, which in gions to the north of the 38th parallel for representatives of both sides which are pres- turn will create difficulties at the front, and low-lying regions to the south of the 38th ently conducting negotiations. (It is possible also in the area of construction in the rear. It parallel, but also because in case the enemy that America will propose this variant.) is true that achieving peace as a result of the refuses to leave the eastern mountainous 2. Convening a conference with the par- negotiations is advantageous for us, but we regions we also have mountainous regions ticipation of four states: the Soviet Union, also are not afraid of dragging out the nego- there [that are] advantageous for defense; as China, America, England and representa- tiations. Acting thus, we will surely be able regards the western coastal plain to the south tives of North and South Korea. to achieve victory. At the same time we will of the 38th parallel, it is advantageous for us 3. Convening a conference with partici- be able successfully to carry out various because it has a much greater population pation of seven states: the Soviet Union, measures within the country and secure sta- than the eastern regions, and furthermore it China, America, England, France, India, bilization and further development in the is rich in agricultural products, plus the re- Egypt and representatives of North and South area of politics and the economy. gion of Kaesong is an advanced post for Korea. I ask your instructions on the above. taking Seoul. I ask you, proceeding from the interna- MAO ZEDONG Comrade Kim Il Sung during the dis- tional situation, to give instructions regard- No. 5631 cussion of armistice conditions in Beijing in ing which of the three variants is best or 14.11.51 June of this year had the same opinion on this propose a new variant. question. This time it also was done with his At the present time, on the basis of the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, agreement. aforementioned we will achieve cessation of Listy 16-19] As regards the discussion of the ques- military operations this year. At the same tion of monitoring at the negotiations, we time, we will carry out the necessary prepara- 94. 19 November 1951, ciphered telegram earlier suggested to propose to create an tion in case of a dragging out of the negotia- from Roshchin conveying message from organ for cessation of military operations, in tions by the enemy and their breakdown. Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) which would be included representatives of Expecting that the negotiations will be drawn both sides, and to assign to it the task of out for another half year or year, we have Ciphered Telegram monitoring the fulfillment of the conditions moved toward economizing on our human Copies: Stalin (2), Copy of the cessation of military operations and and material forces in the Korean theater of From BEIJING 17:1019/XI.1951 monitoring in the buffer zone. military operations and we are pursuing the Special No. 1821 However, the enemy is sure to demand tactics of a long, active defense, with the goal TOP PRIORITY the establishment of monitoring in the rear of holding the position we presently occupy SPECIAL of both sides, in order to limit the transport and inflicting great manpower losses on the 19 November at 18 hours Beijing time I by both sides of reinforcements and military enemy, in order to gain victory in the war. was invited to visit Zhou Enlai, who asked goods. Within the country we are preparing for me to transmit to Comrade Filippov the re- We intend to agree to the establishment the reorganization of the army, reduction of quest of Mao Zedong to give an answer to the of monitoring at 1 or 2 border points of both the bureaucracy, introduction of a regime of telegram of Mao Zedong to Comrade Filippov sides and in accordance with your instruc- economizing, increasing production and fur- [Stalin] on the question of negotiations in 72 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Korea, which was transmitted to the Center not showing haste and not displaying interest tive the question arose about an appeal by the on 14 November through Krasovsky. in a rapid end to the negotiations. government of the DPRK to the General Zhou Enlai acquainted me with the tele- We consider your position on the defini- Assembly and the Security Council with a gram and added that while awaiting the reply tion of the line of demarcation and the estab- demand concerning a speeding up of the of Comrade Filippov the Chinese side had lishment of monitoring in one or two border resolution of the Korean question. It is also already twice declined to meet with Ameri- points to be correct. We also agree with you not clear how the Chinese friends regard this, can representatives in Korea. about the composition of the commission for since you do not communicate anything about 19.XI.51ROSHCHIN the fulfillment of monitoring functions. this in your telegram. Your position on the question of an An appeal by the government of the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, exchange of prisoners of war is completely DPRK to the General Assembly and to the List 22 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, correct and it will be difficult for the oppo- Security Council as it is set forth in your Delo 5, Papka 11, List 62] nent to dispute it. telegram: about the immediate cessation of As regards the possible variants of con- military operations in Korea, about the with- 95. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Polit- vening a conference for the further resolu- drawal of troops along the front line and the buro decision with approved message tion of the Korean question after the conclu- creation of a two kilometer demilitarization Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong sion of an armistice, it seems to us that it zone and about making answerable those would be more expedient to convene a con- guilty of prolonging the war in Korea, could ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (Bol- ference of political representatives of both be evaluated in the present situation, in con- sheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE sides which are presently conducting the ditions of blackmail by the Americans, as a No. P84/421 negotiations, with the obligatory participa- sign of weakness on the Chinese-Korean 19 November 1951 Copies: Malenkov, tion of representatives of North and South side, which is politically disadvantageous. Molotov, Gromyko, Vasilevsky Korea. Therefore, not having the text of the Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting FILIPPOV [Stalin] appeal, not knowing the opinion of the Chi- of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Com- 19 November 1951 nese comrades and not knowing the motives mittee, All-Union Communist Party which are guiding the Korean friends, we (bol’shevik)] [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 828 consider it necessary that you advise the Decision of 19 November 1951 [9], Listy 42-43 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Korean friends to set aside resolution of the 421. Telegram of Mao Zedong on ques- Opis 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 64] A copy question of an appeal until the elucidation of tions of the negotiations about an armistice in of the telegram sent to Beijing in found in the aforementioned questions. Korea. [APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, List 23] We await a more detailed report from To adopt the attached draft answer of you. Comrade Filippov to the telegram of Com- 96. 19 November 1951, VKP(b) CC Polit- Confirm receipt. rade Mao Zedong on questions of the nego- buro decision with approved message from A. GROMYKO tiations about an armistice in Korea. Gromyko to Razuvaev 19/XI/51 SECRETARY CC ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, To p.421(op) pr.PB No.84 (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Top Secret No. P84/422 Copies: Comrades Malenkov, 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 65-66] BEIJING Molotov, Gromyko TO KRASOVSKY 19 November 1951 97. 20 November 1951, Gromyko to G.M. For transmission to Comrade MAO Excerpt from protocol No. 84 of the meeting Malenkov, attaching draft telegram to ZEDONG. of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Com- Razuvaev “Comrade Mao Zedong! mittee, All-Union Communist Party We received your telegram on the ques- (bol’shevik)] To Comrade MALENKOV G.M. tions of the negotiations about an armistice in Decision of 19 November 1951 I am sending a draft telegram to Com- Korea. 422. Telegram of Comrade Razuvaev rade Razuvaev. I ask you to review it. We agree with your evaluation of the No. 1352. A. Gromyko present condition of the negotiations. To adopt the attached draft instruction 20 November 1951 The entire course of the negotiations for to Comrade Razuvaev. No. 334/ag some time past shows that although the SECRETARY CC Copies: Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Khrushchev Americans are dragging out the negotiations, To p.422(op) pr.PB No. 84 TOP PRIORITY they nonetheless are more in need of rapidly Top Secret NORTH KOREA concluding them. This is based on the Top Priority SOVIET AMBASSADOR overall international situation. NORTH KOREA We draw your attention to the inadmis- We consider it correct that the Chinese/ To RAZUVAEV sibility of your actions in connection with the Korean side, using flexible tactics in the 1352. From your telegram it is not clear appeal of the Korean friends to the UN on the negotiations, continues to pursue a hard line, in connection with what and on whose initia- question of speeding up a peace settlement in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 73

Korea. ceived a direct order to do so and after the You communicated only on 18 Novem- Koreans had already made their statement. 99. 25 December 1951, memorandum, ber (your No. [number is illegible]) about Learn this in the future. Gromyko to Razuvaev the intention of the Korean friends to put forth an appeal to the General Assembly and [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, To Comrade STALIN I.V. the Security Council with demands: about Listy 46-48 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, According to the report of Comrade the immediate cessation of military opera- Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 27-29] Vyshinsky, reports have been published lately tions in Korea, about the withdrawal of troops in French and American newspapers in Paris from the front line and creation of a 2- 98. 21 November 1951, ciphered telegram, which underscore the inevitability of a break- kilometer demilitarization zone and about Gromyko to Razuvaev down in the peace negotiations in Korea and making answerable those guilty of prolong- the possibility of broadening the Korean ing the war in Korea—asking if such an MID USSR conflict and which lay the responsibility for appeal would contradict the statement of Tenth Department Received 18:35 this on the Korean-Chinese side (telegram Comrade Vyshinsky. 21.XI.1951 No. 812). Since we knew nothing about the pro- Sent 20:50 21.XI.1951 In connection with this, Comrade posed appeal of the Korean friends with a CIPHERED TELEGRAM Vyshinsky is introducing a proposal that by statement of the indicated demands, or at To NORTH KOREA the time the period for agreement about a whose initiative arose the question of put- To RAZUVAEV TOP PRIORITY demarcation line [expires], i.e. by 27 De- ting these demands before the UN, we asked SPECIAL cember, the Korean-Chinese command pub- you to elucidate (our No. 1059). On 20 November the following directive lish a communiqué about the course of the Without waiting for an answer to your from Comrade Filippov [Stalin] was sent to negotiations with an exposure of the position telegram, in which were laid out the de- Roshchin: of the Americans, which is aimed at drawing mands of the Korean friends mentioned “Explain to Mao Zedong and also to Kim out and breaking down the negotiations for above, you informed us (Your No. 1353 of Il Sung through Razuvaev, that there is in- an armistice in Korea. In the opinion of 19 November), that on that same day, i.e. 19 deed a difference between Vyshinsky’s de- Vyshinsky, MID [Ministry of Foreign Af- November, the text of the statement by Pak mand about the immediate withdrawal of fairs] DPRK should send such a communiqué Hon-Yong will be transmitted over the ra- USA troops across the 38th parallel and the to the chairman of the General Assembly of dio. Moreover, after receipt of our inquiry present position of the Chinese-Korean com- the UN with a request to publish it as a (our No. 1059), on the question of the indi- rades about the delineation of the demarca- document of the UN and to send it to all the cated demands of the Korean friends you tion line at the present front line. Vyshinsky delegations in the Assembly session. limited yourself only to a report that you had could not speak otherwise in order to demon- MID USSR considers the above indi- raised the question at your own initiative and strate the injustice of the USA position of cated reports of the French and American to a repetition of the question of whether refusing to withdraw their troops beyond the newspapers as blackmail, done for the pur- there is a discrepancy between the proposals 38th parallel. Vyshinsky’s position is advan- pose of putting pressure on the Korean-Chi- of Comrade Vyshinsky about withdrawal of tageous to the Chinese-Korean comrades, nese side. troops from the 38th parallel and agreement since it demonstrates from one side the greedi- As regards the communiqué proposed in Kaesong to the point of the agenda about ness of the Americans and from the other side by Vyshinsky, in the opinion of MID, it is the establishment of a demarcation line. Con- the tractability and peaceableness of the Chi- scarcely necessary to give advice to the Ko- cerning the appeal, you also only reported nese-Korean comrades, who are making seri- reans and Chinese on this account, since they that it would be announced 19 November. ous concessions for the sake of achieving systematically publish reports which dis- Thus, both in telegram No. 1353 of 19 peace.” close the line taken by the Americans in the November and in telegram No. 1355 of 19 In view of the fact that Comrade Roshchin negotiations about an armistice in Korea. November, you informed us that the Korean does not have communications with you and From the other side, the distribution of a friends will announce their appeal, even therefore cannot fulfill through you the order Korean-Chinese communiqué as a document though at that time you did not have instruc- about transmitting to Kim Il Sung the eluci- of the UN will not give any practical results, tions from us and could not yet have re- dation given in the directive of Comrade and a request from the Koreans and Chinese ceived an answer to your inquiry. As a result Filippov, MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] about this can be evaluated as a sign of their the Korean friends made the appeal without is sending the directive to you. weakness. agreement with us. Confirm receipt. In view of this, MID considers that to In that way you acted inadmissably Immediately telegraph the fulfillment. give any kind of advice to the Korean and thoughtlessly. Your guilt is aggravated also 21.XI.51 GROMYKO Chinese governments regarding the by the fact that you did not even take the 21.XI.51 communiqué is inadvisable. trouble to find out from the Korean friends Copies: Stalin, Copy A draft resolution is attached. whether they had reached agreement with I ask you to review. the Chinese friends about the appeal to the [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, A. Gromyko UN with the aforementioned demands, and Listy 44-45 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, opis 5a, 25 December 1951 you elucidated this only when you had re- Delo 5, papka 11, Listy 67-68] No. 396 74 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Copies: Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, trying to bring an end to the war in Korea, monitoring organ in the name of its represen- Kaganovich, Bulganin, Khrushchev. therefore in recent days the enemy was forced tative. All representatives can take with to set aside the discussion of the question of them assistants-advisers from among the citi- [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 829, limiting restoration and construction of air- zens of their country. All invited neutral Listy 94-97 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis ports in Korea and moved to discussion of states will provide the necessary number of 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 76-77] small questions concerning the agreement. administrative workers for the creation of a According to the concrete conditions of secretariat responsible for keeping proto- 100. 31 January 1952, ciphered telegram, the text of the agreement on an armistice cols, transmitting documents and transla- Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as tions. before, this text is not final, in other words 3. The functions of the monitoring organ SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF that, as before, the enemy has included con- of neutral states are: THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ditions about limiting the restoration and a) Practical control and monitoring of ARMY construction of airports and about liberation the observation of the agreement by both CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16008 of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after sides—not to transport to Korea from abroad, Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, having declared that these conditions can be through mutually agreed upon points, ship- Bulganin omitted and it is possible not to discuss them. ments to the rear as reinforcements, military From BEIJING Received 23:00 31.1.1951 From this it is obvious that the possibility of personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, Series “G” T reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of tanks, arms and ammunition after the armi- To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] course, we never have and are not now count- stice agreement is signed and goes into force, For the past period of time, in view of the ing only on these possibilities. and also to carry out an exchange of military deliberate prolongation of the negotiations We simultaneously will vigilantly fol- personnel of both sides on the scale stipu- by the enemy in the course of the negotia- low the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA lated by the agreement and in identical num- tions for an armistice in Korea, up to the who in view of the growth of internal and bers; present time a final agreement has not been external opposition will carry out as before a b) Report about places where an inci- achieved. policy of prolonging and even of breaking dent occurs, about the guilt of anyone from However, on the basic questions of the down the negotiations in order to strain the the [two] sides outside the demilitarization cessation of military operations, for example: international situation even more. However zone who violates the agreement on armi- on the question “Establishment of a military we are prepared in military and in political stice, and also the carrying out of practical demarcation line between the two sides for relations to inflict decisive blows on the observation. the purpose of establishment of a demilita- enemy in order to shatter its plans. At the At the request of both sides or one side rized zone” an agreement has already been present time both sides in the negotiations of the commission on military armistice, the reached on three points. have already moved over to detailed discus- monitoring organ must immediately send a On the question “working out practical sion of the questions. neutral group for inspection and observation measures for the implementation of a For the purposes of achieving a final and also for bringing the results of the inves- ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including agreement on an armistice it is necessary to tigation to the commission on military armi- the personnel, powers and functions of the receive your concrete instructions on the stice. apparatus for monitoring the implementa- following questions: 4. Simultaneously with the establish- tion of the conditions of the ceasefire and 1. About the monitoring organ com- ment of the functions indicated in column armistice” an agreement has already been posed of representatives of neutral states. “A” point 3, the American side also proposes reached on six points (the texts are attached). The American side proposes that both that both sides after cessation of military However, on the questions “Measures sides each invite three states whose armed operations must present information about about prisoners of war” the enemy in prin- forces are not participating in the military precise places of deployment of the land, sea ciple cannot oppose the liberation of all pris- operations in Korea, and also that each in- and air units which are participating in the oners of war. As a consequence of this, the vited state name one senior officer as a rep- military operations in Korea, and also must negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long resentative (in all 6 persons from the neutral not change the deployment or carry out a time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to states of both sides) for the creation of a concentration of their troops. We intend not drag out the negotiations under the pretext of monitoring organ of neutral states. to agree with this, since it was not stipulated a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding We intend to agree with this arrange- in the points on which agreement was reached. and construction of airports after the cessa- ment and ask the Soviet Union, Poland and 5. As concerns the points of disembar- tion of military operations and also a demand Czechoslovakia to send representatives so kation in the rear where observation must be about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary that they could discuss the matter on an equal established, the American side proposes to basis. However, in view of the fact that our basis with representatives of the three states establish in South Korea Seoul, Chemulpo side decisively opposes these proposals and invited by the USA and also have the right to [Inchon], Dzioio, Gensiu, Tsiusiu, Taiden, also in view of the fact that it is very difficult veto. Anto, Dzensiu, Gunzan, Taiko, Dzenten, for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for 2. Each of the abovementioned neutral Pusan—in all 12 points. In North Korea to continuation of the war in Korea, the satel- states must name one deputy representative establish Singisiu, Manpkhodin, Kangge, lites of the enemy and the USA itself are who could participate in the meetings of the Khesandun, Khekido, Sengdzii, Kaisiu—in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 75 all 15 points. dinate to it must be provided by both warring No. 72/III At each point a region of operation for sides. Both sides must provide the monitor- the neutral state must be established within ing organ with transport for trips of its mem- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, a radius of 30 miles from the center of the bers to points and to places where a violation List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, point. of the agreement on armistice occurs. Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80] We consider that the enemy has pro- All the 8 points set forth above concern posed too many points, the area of operation questions of monitoring by neutral states in 102. 8 February 1952, ciphered telegram, is too broad, and the number of open points the rear regions of both sides outside the Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey- is not equal. We intend to agree that both demilitarized zone. ing 22 January 1952 telegram from Peng sides open 3-5 points each in North Korea: I ask you to review whether our point of Dehuai to Mao and 4 February 1962 reply Singisiu, Seisin, Khanko, Manpkhodin and view is correct and whether anything needs to from Mao to Peng Dehuai one airport. In South Korea: Pusan, be added. Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We If you agree with our opinions, then do SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF also intend to propose that the radius of you consider it necessary to communicate THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET operations of the neutral group be estab- about this in advance to the comrade leaders ARMY lished as 5 kilometers from the center of the of the parties of Poland and Czechoslova- CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16293 point. kia[?] Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, 6. Neutral groups of observers will be I ask you to give your answer. Bulganin attached to the monitoring organ of neutral Note: The texts of the agreement reached From BEIJING Received 21:45 states. The group must be organized as a on two agendas was sent to you by separate 8.2.1952 minimum from four mid-level officers (lieu- telegram. SERIES “G” T tenant-major), two officers each from the With greetings. TO FILIPPOV [Stalin] representatives of neutral states invited by MAO ZEDONG I send you for familiarization the abbre- each side. In case of necessity subgroups No. 326 viated text of the telegram to me from Peng can be created attached to the monitor groups, 31.1.52 Dehuai of 22.1 of this year and my answer of composed of two representatives, one per- 4.2 of this year. son from each side. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, The telegram of Comrade Peng Dehuai The American side proposes to create Listy 73-77] of 22.1 of this year. 40 neutral groups of observers. We consider “1. 16.1 of this year the Minister of that this is too many. If an agreement is 101. 3 February 1952, ciphered telegram, Foreign Affairs of [North] Korea Pak Hon- reached that both sides will each open 5 of Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong Yong was at my place. In a conversation he their rear points, then it will be sufficient for said that the Korean people throughout the fulfilling the obligations of the monitoring CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 709 country demand peace and do not want to organ to have 16 neutral groups of observ- TOP PRIORITY continue the war. ers, of which 10 groups will be permanently SPECIAL If the Soviet Union and China consider located at mutually agreed upon points of BEIJING it advantageous to continue the war, then the disembarkation and 6 groups can be used as TO KRASOVSKY Central Committee of the Labor Party will be reserves to send to the site of incidents. Transmit the following answer to MAO able to overcome any difficulties and hold to 7. The monitoring organ of neutral ZEDONG. their position. groups and the commission on the military “Comrade MAO ZEDONG. I answered that a peaceful settlement on armistice must be located in one place. The We received your telegrams of January the basis of justice and rationality is advanta- neutral groups of observation during the 31 concerning the negotiations on questions geous for us. I also explained to him about fulfillment of the tasks of inspection and of an armistice. the favorable conditions of our side in the observation do not have the right to study the We agree with the plan outlined by you present military situation and about the in- “construction and characteristics” of all types and the evaluation of the course of the nego- crease in the difficulties of America. There- of arms and ammunition. tiations which you give. The firm position fore an agreement on an armistice can be As concerns the reports about results of taken by you has already given positive re- reached. However in military relations we the work of the neutral groups of observa- sults and must force the enemy to make will carry out active preparation of our forces tion, we consider that official reports must further concessions. for further conduct of military operations. be adopted by the majority of the members We consider that you must make an While departing, Minister Pak Hon Yong of the given group, but reports not adopted agreement with the leading comrades of Po- agreed with my point of view about the by the majority of members or reports from land and Czechoslovakia about including their general situation and said that his visit had individual persons cannot be official docu- representatives in the commission of observ- the goal of a simple meeting and his opinion ments. They can be used as reference mate- ers, and they, of course, will agree with this. is not the opinion of the Central Committee rials. With greetings. FILIPPOV [Stalin].” of the Labor party and the Korean govern- 8. Material supply of the monitoring Confirm receipt. ment, but purely his personal opinion. organ of neutral states and the groups subor- Telegraph the fulfillment. 2. In 1951 the Korean government col- 76 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN lected agricultural taxes in kind in grain in application will be carried out from Febru- 5 March 1952 the amount of 650,000 tons, which consti- ary to May. In each month 5,000 tons of rice [As indicated in the file in AVPRF, the tuted too large a percentage of the entire and 5,000 tons of chumiza [a cereal grain in Politburo decision was taken on March 7 to yield. At the present time 10 percent of the Northeast Asia] (in all 40,000 tons of rice and reject Razuvaev’s proposal, l. 82. Draft population is suffering from hunger. The chumiza will be delivered), in each month resolution to this effect is on l. 83] majority of the peasant population will be 200 tons of bean oil. able to subsist only until April-May. In addition, in February 3,300,000 meters [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, If there is no assistance soon, then this of cotton fabric will be delivered. List 3 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5, Delo will influence not only the carrying out of Negotiations will be concluded soon. 5, Papka 11, Listy 81-83] spring sowing but also the gathering of the According to your practical observation, if harvest. military operations in Korea cease, what is 104. 14 April 1952, VKP(b) CC Politburo They say that our government has al- necessary to restore in Korea as first priority? decision with approved message from ready resolved to deliver to the Korean gov- The army of the Chinese volunteers can Stalin to Kim Il Sung ernment 30,000 tons of grain. I do not know, render assistance as a work force to restore is this true? If it is not true, I consider that it the highways and agricultural economy. ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY is necessary to prepare for timely delivery of What other kind of aid is needed from us? (bolsheviks), CENTRAL COMMITTEE 30,000 tons of grain in March for the purpose I ask you to study these questions and No. P87/104 of providing assistance so that the communicate your opinion.” Copies: Malenkov, Mikoyan, can engage in spring planting. MAO ZEDONG Vyshinsky, Shtemenko 3. I consider that although our budget is No. 431 14 April 1952 also very strained, in 1952 we nevertheless 8.2.52 Excerpt from protocol No. 87 of the meeting need to plan to apportion 1,600,000 million of the Politburo CC VKP(b) [Central Com- yuan (which constitutes approximately 237 [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342, mittee, All-Union Communist Party million rubles) according to the plan of 1951 Listy 81-83] (bol’shevik)] budget year for rendering aid to Korea. This Decision of 14 April 1952 amount can hardly be reduced. I ask that all 103. 5 March 1952, memorandum, 104. Question of Korea. this possibly be planned earlier in the general Gromyko to Stalin To confirm the attached text of budget.” a telegram. My answer of 4.2 of this year. To Comrade STALIN I.V. SECRETARY CC “I received your telegram of 22.1 of this The Ambassador of the USSR in Korea To p.104(op) pr.PB No. 87 year. As concerns rendering aid to Korea, in Comrade Razuvaev proposes to advise Kim BY CIPHER our budget for 1952 we have already in- Il Sung to publish an interview with a TASS PYONGYANG cluded expenditures of 1,500,000 million correspondent concerning the negotiations To Soviet Ambassador RAZUVAEV yuan (approximately equal to 222 million for an armistice in Panmunjom. (telegram Hand Over Immediately rubles), which somewhat exceeds the sum of No. 188). For Comrade KIM IL SUNG the trade credit extended by China to Korea In the draft presented by Razuvaev the It has become known to me that the in 1951, the sum granted by China for urgent interview touches on three questions: the Korean people are in need of bread. We have restoration of Korean railroads and also the dragging out of the negotiations by the Ameri- in Siberia 50,000 tons of prepared wheat sum granted by China for maintenance of can side; inviting representatives of the So- flour. We can send this flour as a gift to the Korean citizens located in Manchuria. viet Union to a neutral organ for monitoring Korean people. Telegraph your agreement. If military operations in Korea are ended, the fulfillment of the conditions of the armi- We can send the flour immediately accord- then it is assumed that expenditures for aid stice; the position of the Korean side in case ing to your instruction. to Korea will be increased. of a breakdown in the negotiations by the With greetings. I. STALIN At the end of January of this year the American side. 14 April 1952 Minister of Trade of Korea Comrade Chan Si In the opinion of MID USSR, the pro- U came to Beijing for negotiations about posal of Comrade Razuvaev is unacceptable. [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 778, deliveries of goods in 1952. As a result of The publication of such an interview could Listy 22-23] these negotiations the total value we estab- be interpreted as a manifestation of haste and lished for goods delivered by us comes to nervousness on the Korean-Chinese side. 105. 16 April 1952, ciphered telegram, 700,000 million yuan (approximately 103 Moreover, the elements of threat, contained Babkin to Shtemenko conveying letter million rubles). in the answer to the third question, could be from Kim Il Sung to Stalin Korea will not deliver anything to us in used for accusing the Korean-Chinese side exchange, and therefore the aforementioned of trying to complicate the course of the CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 501587 amount was established as the sum of trade negotiations for an armistice. From CORRESPONDENT 20 Sent 16.4.52 credit. Draft resolution is attached. 13:00 Received 16.4. 14:44 As concerns foodstuffs stipulated in the I ask you to review. Dispatched to the 8th Administration of the application, the delivery according to this A. GROMYKO General Staff of the Soviet Army 16.4 14:50 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 77

Extremely urgent. cluded that the negotiations for an armistice part in active military operations and bring To Comrade SHTEMENKO can be drawn out for an indefinite period of influence to bear on important enemy sites. S.M. time. 3. To carry out a number of ground I transmit the reply letter of KIM IL Over the past year of negotiations we operations, appreciable to the enemy, so as to SUNG to Comrade I.V. STALIN. have virtually curtailed military operations divert the operations of the enemy VVS from No. 1448 BABKIN and moved to a passive defense. our rear and to influence the course of the 16.4.52 Such a position has led to the fact that the negotiations in Kaesong. Copies: Stalin (2), Malenkov, File of 8th enemy almost without suffering any kind of Aside from all of this, to raise the battle Administration (2) losses constantly inflicts on us huge losses in capability of the KPA it is extremely neces- Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! manpower and material values. sary for us to receive from you in the nearest The government of the DPRK is moved Thus, for example, just recently the en- future technical goods and materials accord- by your fatherly concern about the urgent emy put out of operation all the electrical ing to our note of January 10, 1952 and July needs of the Korean people. stations of Korea and because of the active 9, 1952 and application for 1952 in the note Your proposal to send us 50,000 tons of operations of VVS [air force] does not allow of October 6, 1951, within the limits of your bread, which we accept with endless grati- the possibility to restore them, which has possibilities. tude, is one more expression of the selfless caused and continues to cause huge losses to 4. In Kaesong we need simultaneously fraternal assistance of the great Soviet people the entire national economy of the DPRK. to move decisively toward the soonest con- to Korea, which has suffered from American In only one 24 hour period of barbaric clusion of an armistice, a ceasefire and trans- aggression but is prepared to defend to the bombing, of only one city of Pyongyang (on fer of all prisoners of war on the basis of the end its freedom and independence. July 11 and the night of July 12) more than Geneva convention. These demands are A grateful Korean people wishes you, 6,000 peaceful inhabitants were killed and supported by all peaceloving peoples and dear leader and teacher, many years of life wounded. will lead us out of a passive position in and health for the happiness of mankind. The enemy, making use of this situation, Kaesong. KIM IL SUNG makes demands in the negotiations that are The change in the character of military 16 April 1952 unacceptable to us. operations on the ground and in the air will Naturally, the Chinese friends refuse to have a corresponding, desirable influence on [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, accept these conditions. We share the opin- the enemy. Listy 60-61] ion of Comrade MAO ZEDONG on this A telegram of analogous content was question. sent to comrade MAO ZEDONG. 106. 16 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Kim However, in order to spare the DPRK The Korean people are boundlessly Il Sung to Stalin via Razuvaev and its people suffering and unjustified, need- grateful to you for the enormous selfless less losses, it is necessary for us hopefully to assistance being rendered to the Korean CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 502597/sh provide cover for the most important sites People’s Democratic Republic. From Correspondent 20 Sent 17.7.52 and to go over to active operations. We await your orders and advice on the 18:45 Received 17.7 20:50 For this it would be desirable: aforementioned questions. Sent to 8th Administration of the General 1. To strengthen antiaircraft defense. By We wish you good health and long years Staff of the Soviet Army 17.7 21:10 our accounting, for this it is necessary to of life for the well-being and happiness of Extremely Urgent receive additional arms for ten antiaircraft progressive humanity. To Comrade A. Vasilevsky regiments (including three middle caliber With deep respect and esteem To Comrade A.Ia. Vyshinsky regiments and seven small caliber regiments). Your Kim Il Sung I report the letter from KIM IL SUNG to It is desirable in connection with this that Pyongyang 16.7.52.” Comrade STALIN I.V. of 16.7.52. the Chinese comrades put out half and that the RAZUVAEV KPA receive arms for five antiartillery regi- [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, ments directly from you. Listy 65-68 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, 2. To activate the night operations of the 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 40-43] Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky. VVS [Air Force] of the KPA [Korean People’s No. 2250 Army] and CPV [Chinese People’s Volun- 107. 17 July 1952, ciphered telegram, 17.7.52 teers]. It is necessary to cover North Korea in Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong “Respected comrade ambassador, I ask the daytime with fighter aviation, if only up to you to bring to the attention of Comrade the line of Pyongyang. CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 4018 STALIN I.V. the contents of the following VVS of the KPA is prepared at any time BEIJING - telegram: to begin active military operations. Along TO KRASOVSKY “Dear Comrade STALIN I.V. with this, in the near future 40 crews of KPA Transmit to Comrade MAO ZEDONG I consider it necessary to report to you, TU-2 pilots will finish their training in the the following answer: Josef Visarrionovich, about the following: Soviet Union. We would like for these pilots “Comrade MAO ZEDONG. proceeding from a general analysis of the to come to the DPRK together with TU-2 We consider your position in the nego- situation in Korea the possibility is not ex- airplanes so that they could immediately take tiations on an armistice to be completely 78 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN correct. rean people a strengthening of the position at enemy in the present situation will inevitably Today we received a report from the 38th parallel has been won, North Korea make the enemy even more ambitious and Pyongyang that Comrade KIM IL SUNG and Northeast China have been defended. undermine our prestige. also agrees with your position. The people of Korea and China, espe- If we display resolution not to accept the FILIPPOV [Stalin] cially their armed forces, have received the enemy’s proposal and to prepare ourselves 16 July 1952” possibility of being tempered and acquiring for a breakdown in the negotiations from the Telegraph the fulfillment. experience in the struggle against American side of the enemy, the enemy surely will not imperialism. cause a breakdown in the negotiations. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 348, In addition, in the course of the struggle In the process of a further delay of the List 69 and AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, of the Korean and Chinese peoples, their negotiations, upon decisive insistence by our Delo 5, Papka 11, List 89] might has been strengthened, which is in- side on our point of view, it is possible that spiring the peaceloving peoples of the whole the enemy will make a new concession. 108. 18 July 1952, ciphered telegram, Mao world in the struggle against aggressive war If the enemy will not concede or breaks Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) conveying 15 and is facilitating the development of the off the negotiations, then we must continue July 1952 telegram from Mao to Kim Il movement for defense of peace throughout military operations so as to find in the course Sung and 16 July 1952 reply from Kim to the world. This also limits the mobility of the of the war, which the enemy cannot resolve, Mao main forces of American imperialism and a means for changing the present situation. makes it suffer constant losses in the east. As We will report to Comrade FILIPPOV SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF the stronghold of peace throughout the about this proposal and the course taken by THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET world—the Soviet Union can strengthen its us and we will ascertain his opinion. ARMY reconstruction and can exercise its influence We will report to you the results upon CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 21646 on the development of the revolutionary receiving an answer from him. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, movement of peoples of all countries. This With greetings! MAO ZEDONG, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, will mean the delay of a new world war. 3:00, 15.7.52” Khrushchev, Vyshinsky, Sokolovsky The presence of these great movements —————————————— From BEIJING Received 12:15 18.7.1952 testifies to the fact that the Korean people are “To Comrade MAO ZEDONG! Series “G” T no longer alone. Your telegram of 3:00 15 July of this To Comrade FILIPPOV [Stalin] In the first place, the Chinese people year was received. I send to you for familiarization the text want to apply all their strength to overcome As a result of careful study and discus- of my telegram of 3:00 15 July of this year to the difficulties of the Korean people. There- sion of it, we have arrived at a unanimous KIM IL SUNG and the text of the reply fore at the present time we ask you not to be conclusion. We consider that your analysis telegram to me from Comrade KIM IL SUNG ashamed to appeal to us with questions which concerning the present situation is correct. of 21:00 16 July of this year: demand an urgent resolution of the situation At the same time, considering our present “To Comrade KIM IL SUNG. in Korea. position, you have communicated to us to Copy to Comrade LI KENONG. If we are not able to resolve your ques- that we henceforth not be ashamed to raise After we wrote a telegram to comrade LI tions, then we will together with you appeal questions about the assistance we need, for KENONG we received your telegram of to FILIPPOV with a request to render assis- which we are sincerely grateful to you. 18:00 14 July of this year. tance for the resolution of these questions. We consider it necessary to activate After a two-day study by us of the given As concerns the acceptance of the pro- military operations in the long struggle against questions our comrades unanimously con- posal of the enemy, that will bring great the enemy. If we do not show aggressiveness sider that at present, when the enemy is harm. in military operations and continue a passive subjecting us to furious bombardment, ac- In the first place, accepting a provoca- defense, the enemy will not take into consid- cepting a provocative and fraudulent pro- tive and fraudulent proposal from the enemy eration our forces, and will continue furious posal from the enemy, which does not sig- under the influence of its bombardment will bombardment for the purpose of putting mili- nify in fact any kind of concession, is highly place us in a disadvantageous position in tary pressure on us. disadvantageous for us. political and military relations. We therefore propose to implement the We will look at the positive and negative The enemy will surely use this weak- following urgent measures: sides of this question: ness of ours for further pressure on us, which 1. It is necessary to strengthen anti- Rejecting the proposal of the enemy will will lead to new provocations from the side aircraft artillery, by at least 10 regiments. It bring only one harmful consequence—fur- of the enemy. Then, being in a disadvanta- is necessary to strengthen PVO [Anti-air- ther losses for the Korean people and Chi- geous position, upon putting pressure on the craft Defense] of the city of Pyongyang and nese people’s volunteers. However, once enemy we possibly will suffer even greater all important industrial sites, for example: the war began, China began to help Korea, failures and the aforementioned positive sides Shuifens-kaya, Chandzinganskaya, and the Korean people already honestly stood on will lose their significance. This will signify Puchenganskaya electrical stations. the front line of defense of the camp of peace an unsuccessful course, because of which the 2. It is necessary to make the air battles of the whole world. whole game will be lost. of our VVS [Air Force] more active: At the cost of the sacrifices of the Ko- Therefore to accept the proposals of the a) To improve the command of the VVS COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 79 so that it correctly directs the air battles on forthcoming session of the General Assem- 110. 17 September 1952, hand-delivered Korean territory. bly of the UN. Regarding the question of letter, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong b) The diameter of operations of avia- prisoners of war Mexico has advanced a tion units must not be limited only to the proposal consisting of 3 points, which are: FOR Comrade MAO ZEDONG present line along the Yalu river. At the first, both sides immediately conduct an ex- We agree with you that the proposal of least, it is necessary to extend it to the border change of prisoners who have expressed the the Mexicans is unacceptable, since it re- of Pyongyang and to strengthen by all mea- wish to return to their homeland; second, the flects the position of the USA in the negotia- sures the PVO of the capital and important remaining POWs will be transferred to the tions in Korea. As is obvious, the USA, not industrial sites. temporary protection of UN member states having achieved successes in negotiations in c) It is necessary to send already trained and be subject to repatriation according to an Korea, intends now to receive approval of air force bomber units on night actions deep agreement which will be concluded; third, their position in the UN and to make those in enemy [territory], to boldly carry out air after a normal situation is established in Ko- same demands in the name of the UN. The battles, subjecting to bombardment a num- rea, to guarantee that these POWs can return Mexicans are the agents of the USA. ber of airports, warehouses, barracks and to their homeland and to provide them with If the Mexicans advance their proposal other military installations of the enemy. the possibility for this. Until the restoration in the UN, the delegation of the USSR will 3. In infantry operations it is necessary of a normal situation in Korea, if the POWs reject this proposal as not corresponding to to make local attacks on several parts of the ask to return to their homeland, then the the interests of cessation of the war in Korea, front in order to put military pressure on the corresponding government also must take and will try to attain the following : enemy. measures and present to them all possibilities “1. Immediate cessation of military op- I ask you to review the opinions indi- for repatriation. erations of the [warring] sides on land, sea cated above and to make a decision about Apparently, the proposal to discuss the and air. rendering us assistance. Korean question in the General Assembly of 2. Return of all POWs to their homeland With highest respect toward you. KIM the UN was advanced at the initiative of according to international norms. IL SUNG. 21:00 16 July 1952.” England. The proposal of Mexico arose at the 3. Withdrawal from Korea of foreign MAO ZEDONG initiative of the USA. The latter have already troops, including also the Chinese volunteer No. 2084 expressed the wish to discuss this question in units, in the course of 2-3 months and a 18.7.52" the UN General Assembly. peaceful settlement of the Korean question We intend to express opposition to such in the spirit of the unification of Korea, [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, a variant. carried out by the Koreans themselves under Listy 72-75 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis I ask you to consult with comrade the observation of a commission with the 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 90-93] FILIPPOV about what our position should be participation of the sides directly interested on this question. as well as other states, including states which [Ed. note: The next two documents coincide 2. India and Burma have made indica- have not taken part in the war in Korea.” with a visit to Moscow by Chinese Foreign tions that they would like to sign a non- As concerns the proposal about tempo- Minister Zhou Enlai in August-September aggression pact with us, and also hope that rarily withholding 20% of POWs from both 1952; the transcripts of three of Zhou’s con- you will visit these countries. The essence is sides and returning all remaining POWs, the versations with Stalin during this visit are that [Indian leader Jawaharlal] Nehru would proposal of the Soviet delegation will not printed elsewhere in this issue of the Bulle- like to visit China, with a view, however, that touch on this and it will be left with you in tin.] you will go to India on a return visit. We reserve. received this information from our ambassa- On the question of the conclusion of a 109. 16 September 1952, hand-delivered dor in Burma Iao Chzhun-min. non-aggression pact with India and Burma note, Zhou Enlai to Stalin conveying tele- I suggest that it is highly possible that we completely share your point of view. gram from Mao to Zhou India and Burma will advance these ques- FILIPPOV [Stalin] tions for an exchange of opinion. If India and 17 September 1952 To Comrade STALIN, I.V. Burma make these proposals officially, then Stalin’s handwritten draft is attached. I send you a Russian translation of a it would be inconvenient for us to refuse. telegram I received from comrade Mao I ask also that you consult with Comrade [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, Zedong. FILIPPOV about whether it is advisable for Listy 97-103 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis I ask you to familiarize yourself with it China to conclude such pacts with India and 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, List 99] and indicate a time of meeting convenient Burma. for you for receipt of your personal orders. Mao Zedong. 111. 27 December 1952, Semenov (Stalin) With communist greetings. 15 September 1952 to Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai. 16 September 1952. [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, BEIJING Comrade ZHOU ENLAI. Listy 94-96 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, To the Main Military Adviser 1. According to our information, the Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 96-98] for Comrade MAO ZEDONG Korean question will be discussed at the Comrade Mao Zedong! 80 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

We have received your telegram of 17 Listy 115-116] of the war in Korea. In the eyes of honest December. people of the whole world, the actions of the Your observations regarding the prob- 112. 19 March 1953, resolution, USSR aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Korea ability of an attack by the Americans in the Council of Ministers with draft letters more and more expose that bloc, and espe- spring of 1953 reflect the plans of the present from Soviet Government to Mao Zedong cially the aggressive forces of the USA, as an American command in Korea, who are oper- and Kim Il Sung and directive to Soviet international factor that is pursuing a policy ating under the leadership of the Truman delegation at United Nations of preparing a new war and is ready to shift government. It is fully possible that these to a policy of broadening the war solely in plans will be changed by the Eisenhower COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR order to dictate to people their aggressive government in the direction of less tension RESOLUTION imperialistic will, which expresses an aspira- on the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are Of 19 March 1953 No. 858-372cc. tion for world domination, for the subjuga- acting correctly when you count on the worst Moscow, Kremlin tion of peoples to their imperialistic aims. and proceed from the probability of an attack The Soviet Government considers that by the Americans. Question of MID we should regard all these important circum- We have reviewed your application for stances of the international order in the same military goods for 1953 and the application The Council of Ministers of the USSR way that we have regarded them until now. for urgently needed military goods. RESOLVES: This does not mean, however, that in present The quantity of arms, ammunition and 1. To confirm the attached draft letters conditions we must simply mechanically con- other military goods which you requested of the Government of the USSR to Comrades tinue the line followed until now in the ques- oversteps the limits of our possibilities in Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung (Attachment tion of the war in Korea and not attempt to 1953. Our calculations are based on the fact No. 1). display initiative or to use an initiative of the that we must deliver to you in 1953 arms, To transmit the present letter to Com- opposing side and to secure the withdrawal ammunition and other goods for 20 infantry rade Mao Zedong through Comrade Zhou of Korea and China from the war in accor- divisions, this means that we must deliver for Enlai and Comrade Kuznetsov V.V., and dance with the fundamental interests of the each of 20 divisions around 800,000 [units [the letter] to Comrade Kim Il Sung through Chinese and Korean peoples and also in of] ammunition, 1320 artillery pieces of vari- Comrade Malik, who will immediately be accordance with the interests of all other ous types and other goods. sent to Pyongyang. peaceloving peoples. Taking into account the situation you 2. To confirm the directive to the Soviet In connection with all the abovestated speak of in your telegram, with great diffi- delegation in the General Assembly (Attach- and taking into account the concrete facts of culty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides ment No. 2). late regarding the war in Korea, we consider the arms and ammunition for 20 divisions Representative of the Council of Minis- it urgently necessary to carry out a number of [already] earmarked, with equal shipments ters of the USSR G. Malenkov measures, in particular: until the end of the year, approximately one- 1. It is necessary that Kim Il Sung and fourth of the quantity you stated in your Business Manager of the Council of Peng Dehuai give a positive answer to the telegram of 17 December, specifically: Ministers of the USSR M. Pomaznev appeal of General [Mark W.] Clark on Feb- 600,000 pieces of ammunition, 332 pieces of ruary 22 on the question of an exchange of artillery of various types, tractor artillery, Attachment No. 1 sick and wounded prisoners of war. detonating fuses and other goods; the amounts 2. Immediately after the publication of of the deliveries of each will be determined The Soviet Government has thoroughly the answer of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, by our War Ministry. reviewed the question of the war in Korea an authoritative representative of the gov- Thus, with a calculation of the arms and under present conditions and with regard to ernment of the PRC (best of all would be ammunition being delivered for 20 infantry the entire course of events of the preceding Zhou Enlai) should make a statement in divisions in 1953, there will be shipped to period. As a result of this, the Soviet Govern- Beijing in which is underscored a positive you: 1400 pieces of ammunition, as opposed ment has reached the conclusion that it would attitude toward the proposal on an exchange to the 1,125,000 delivered in 1952, 1652 be incorrect to continue the line on this of sick and wounded prisoners of war, and pieces of artillery of various types, as op- question which has been followed until now, also to indicate that the time has arrived to posed to 1056 guns delivered in 1952. without making those alterations in that line resolve the entire question of prisoners and, As regards the applications for materi- which correspond to the present political consequently, to secure the cessation of the als for military production mentioned in your situation and which ensue from the deepest war in Korea and the conclusion of an armi- telegram, transmitted to us by Minister of interests of our peoples, the peoples of the stice. Foreign Trade Comrade E Tszi USSR, China and Korea, who are interested 3. Simultaneously with the aforemen- Chzhuanom—this application is now being in a firm peace throughout the world and tioned statement in Beijing, the head of the studied by our Ministry of Foreign Trade. have always sought an acceptable path to- government of the DPRK, Kim Il Sung, SEMENOV [Stalin]. ward the soonest possible conclusion of the should make a statement in Pyongyang which 27 December 1952. war in Korea. declares full support for and the justice of the It is not necessary to dwell in detail on aforementioned statement of the government [Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 343, all that the aggressor has done in the course of the PRC. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 81

4. We consider it also advisable that of securing a positive resolution of the indi- effect twelve (12) hours after the agreement immediately after the aforementioned state- cated question, but also in securing a positive on armistice is signed, and guarantee the ments in Beijing and Pyongyang, the Minis- resolution of the entire question of prisoners fulfillment of this order.” ter of Foreign Affairs of the USSR make a of war, and consequently, to remove the There was also agreement on the fol- statement in Moscow with corresponding obstacles to the achievement of an agreement lowing important conditions for the armi- full support for the Beijing and Pyongyang on the cessation of military action and the stice: statements. conclusion of an armistice. Article 109 of the 1) About the determination of a military 5. In accordance with the four measures Geneva Convention should be used for this, demarcation line, which must run along the enumerated above, the Soviet delegation to especially the second paragraph of this ar- line contiguous to [the position of] the troops the General Assembly of the UN in New ticle, which stipulates the conclusion of “an of the warring sides on the day the armistice York should do everything possible to sup- agreement on repatriation or internment in a goes into effect, in other words along the line port and move forward the new political line neutral country of healthy prisoners of war of the front, from which “troops of both sides which is laid out above. who have spent a long time in captivity.” will withdraw for two kilometers in order to We consider it necessary to give the In the negotiations propose that all pris- form a demilitarized zone...” (point 1 of the following elucidation of the abovestated: oners of war who insist on repatriation be draft agreement on armistice). First. About the answer to General Clark. repatriated immediately, but the remaining 2) About the establishment of a Military We consider that the response letter of Kim prisoners be handed over to a neutral country Commission on the armistice composed of Il Sung and Peng Dehuai to General Clark in order to secure a fair resolution of the 10 senior officers, from whom five will be should express full agreement with Clark’s question of their repatriation. named by the Commander in Chief of the proposal to conduct an exchange of sick and With regard to these prisoners add that a armed forces of the UN and five by the wounded prisoners of war, with an indica- classification according to nationality and Command of the Korean People’s Army and tion that they have in mind a positive resolu- place of residence be made, as was proposed the Command of the Chinese volunteers tion of this question in accordance with in the letter from Kim Il Sung and Peng (point 19). The Commission must monitor article 109 of the Geneva Convention. Dehuai to General Clark on October 16, 1952 the observance of the armistice agreement, In the answer to Clark indicate that the (this is also in accordance with the Indian including monitoring the work of the Com- question of the exchange of sick and wounded draft on Korea). mittee on repatriation of prisoners of war and prisoners has the greatest significance for a After the classification, prisoners of war regulate through negotiations possible viola- successful resolution of the entire question immediately receive the right to return to tions of the armistice agreement (pp. 24 and of prisoners of war, and consequently, for a their homeland, which will be facilitated by 25). successful resolution of the question of the the assistance of all interested sides. 3) About the creation of a Commission cessation of the war and the conclusion of an Second. About the statement in Beijing. of neutral states to supervise the armistice, armistice. In view of this, propose to resume In this statement it would be advisable to say composed of representatives from Sweden the negotiations in Panmunjom between the that the government of the PRC has discussed and Switzerland named by the Commander main representatives of both sides to nego- the question raised by General Clark with the in Chief of the UN Military Forces and tiations for an armistice. government of the DPRK and both the gov- representatives of Poland and Czechoslova- Propose that the date of the negotiations ernment of the PRC and the government of kia named by the Supreme Commander of be established by the officers connected the DPRK have reached the same conclusion the Korean People’s Army and the Com- with both sides. about the necessity to give their representa- mander of the Chinese Volunteers. (pp. 36 In the course of the negotiations on the tives in Panmunjom an order to enter into and 37) exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, in negotiations with General Clark on the ques- The Commission may create inspection accordance with article 109 of the Geneva tion of the exchange of sick and wounded groups composed of representatives of those Convention, which stipulates that “not a prisoners of war, having in mind the achieve- states. (p. 40). single wounded and sick can ment of a positive resolution of this question The Commission of neutral states must be repatriated against his wishes during mili- in accordance with article 109 of the Geneva supervise the implementation of the agree- tary action,” add the receipt of a guarantee Convention of 1949, and also a positive reso- ment on the armistice and fulfill the func- from the American side that in relation to lution of the question of prisoners of war as a tions of control (p. 41). prisoners of war, under no circumstances whole. In the statement indicate that in the Inspection groups of neutral states will will forcible measures be applied to prevent course of the negotiations between both sides disembark at the ports of Synyidzhu, their return to their homeland. in Kaesong and Panmunjom, agreement was Chongchin, Khungnam, Manpo and Propose also to establish a commission reached on all questions except the question Sinandzhu (North Korea), Inchon, Taegu, of representatives of Poland, Czechoslova- of prisoners of war. Pusan, Kanchung and Kunsan (South Ko- kia, Sweden and Switzerland to render assis- Thus, agreement was reached that com- rea). tance in returning sick and wounded prison- manders of military forces of both sides “give Moreover, the sides reached agreement ers to their homeland. an order for the full cessation of any type of that the commanders of both sides must In the negotiations on the exchange of military action in Korea by all troops under “recommend to the governments of inter- sick and wounded prisoners of war, proceed their command, including all units and per- ested countries of both sides that a political from that fact that the task consists not only sonnel of land, sea and air forces, going into conference of all sides at the highest level be 82 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN convened within three months of the signing Pyongyang. We see the point of the Moscow negotiations between the warring sides were and implementation of the armistice...for the statement to be underscoring before the whole begun in Kaesong in June 1951 for a ceasefire resolution by means of negotiations of ques- world the full solidarity and concordance of and armistice in Korea. These negotiations tions regarding the withdrawal from Korea action between the USSR, PRC and DPRK led to agreement on all questions except the of all foreign troops, the peaceful resolution on the question of the war in Korea. question of repatriation of prisoners of war. of the Korean question etc.” (point 60). Fifth. On the Soviet delegation in the The Soviet Union continues to consider the A significant portion of the articles of General Assembly of the UN in New York. position taken in this question by the Chinese the draft agreement concerning prisoners of The Soviet delegation in the General Assem- People’s Republic and the Korean People’s war was also agreed to, with the exception of bly must act in accordance with the entire Democratic Republic to be just and fully in the question of repatriation of prisoners. The abovedescribed political plan with regard to accordance with the principles of interna- government of the PRC (Government of the the war in Korea. In this connection it is tional law and international practice, and DPRK), following its policy of preserving necessary that as soon as the Polish draft also the positions of the Geneva Convention and strengthening peace, striving for a peace- resolution “On Averting the Threat of a New of 1949. The Soviet Union fully supports ful resolution of the Korean question and World War” comes up for discussion, the this position. applying all its efforts to the immediate ces- Soviet delegation would secure the introduc- The question of the exchange of prison- sation of the war, proposes to resolve also the tion of the corresponding alterations to this ers of war is the single unresolved question in question of prisoners of war as a whole. The draft in the part concerning Korea and also the negotiations between the warring sides in government of the PRC (Government of the the necessary statements by the Soviet del- Korea. The governments of the PRC and DPRK) on its side is prepared to adopt mea- egation and the delegations of Poland and DPRK have declared their readiness to adopt sures to eliminate the disagreements on this Czechoslovakia. measures from their sides toward the settle- question, which is at present the only ob- Sixth. Additional notes. It goes without ment of this question, in order to remove the stacle to the conclusion of an agreement on saying that at the present time we cannot last obstacle to a ceasefire in Korea and the ceasefire and armistice. Toward this goal, foresee all steps and measures which the conclusion of an armistice. the Government of the PRC (DPRK) pro- governments of the USSR, PRC and DPRK The Soviet Union welcomes the noble poses that all prisoners of war who insist on will need to make. However, if there is full initiative of the Chinese People’s Republic repatriation be immediately repatriated and agreement between our governments in the and the Korean People’s Democratic Repub- the remaining prisoners be handed over to a conduct of a general line on this question, for lic on this question. The Soviet Union fer- neutral country to secure a just resolution of which we fully hope, then the remaining vently supports the proposal on resumption the question of their repatriation. points can be agreed upon in the course of the of negotiations in Korea with the goal of The Beijing statement must also say the affair. achieving an agreement on exchange of sick following: and wounded prisoners of war, and also on Our new step, which is directed at the DIRECTIVES FOR THE settlement of the entire question of prisoners conclusion of the war in Korea, should also SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE of war, and consequently, also the question serve as an example for a positive resolution GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN. of cessation of the war in Korea and conclu- of a number of other important and urgent sion of an armistice. international questions, first of all the resto- 1. To commission the delegation of the Commission the Soviet delegation in ration of the rights of China and Korea in the USSR in the General Assembly (Comrade the General Assembly to reach an agreement UN. Vyshinsky), upon the presentation for dis- with the Polish delegation about introducing Third. On the statement in Pyongyang. cussion of the resolution of the Polish del- into the draft Polish resolution on the ques- We suggest that in this statement Comrade egation, the part concerning Korea, to make tion of averting the threat of a new world war Kim Il Sung should indicate that the afore- a statement with firm support for the last the following alterations in the part concern- mentioned statement of the representative of proposals and statements of the PRC and ing the Korean question: in place of the old the PRC was worked out jointly by the gov- DPRK. text of p. “b)” (about returning all prisoners ernments of the PRC and DPRK and that the Having set forth the position of the So- of war to their homeland) to include the Government of the DPRK fully shares both viet Union in the question of exchange of following text: “b) immediate resumption of the evaluation of the political situation con- prisoners of war as a position which fully negotiations on an armistice between the tained in the Beijing statement and the con- corresponds to generally acknowledged prin- sides, having in mind that at the same time crete conclusions and proposals contained in ciples of international law and the positions the sides will apply all efforts to achieve an it. In connection with this, underscore not of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which agreement on the question of exchange of only the full support for, but also the justice demands repatriation of all prisoners of war, sick and wounded prisoners of war as well as of, the statement of the representative of the the representative of the USSR must point on the entire question of prisoners of war and PRC. out the following. The Soviet Union has will thus apply all efforts to remove the Fourth. About the statement in Mos- repeatedly proposed and is proposing to rec- obstacles that are hindering the conclusion of cow. We consider expedient a statement by ommend to the warring sides in Korea that the war in Korea.” the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, they immediately and fully cease military which should be made immediately after the operations on land, sea and in the air. [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, aforementioned statements in Beijing and At the initiative of the Soviet Union, Listy 60-71 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 83

5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, Listy 54-65] 29.III.53 Kuznetsov, Fedorenko American monopolists amassed colossal SPRAVKA [Report]: No. 359 (bkh. #8265) profits in military orders and deliveries, but 113. 29 March 1953, ciphered telegram 29.III.53 with the end of the negotiations for an armi- from Kuznetsov and Fedorenko in Comrades Kuznetsov, Razuvaev and stice, and also as a result of the strengthening Pyongyang [from notes taken at AVPRF; Fedorenko have reported that on March 29 of the movement to end the war in Korea, photocopy not available] they were received by Kim Il Sung in the their profits began to fall sharply. presence of General Nam Il, that Kim Il Sung Having returned to the military side of CIPHERED TELEGRAM was given the document which arrived from the matter, Mao noted that from a purely From PYONGYANG Moscow and that they agreed to meet again military point of view it would not be bad to Top Priority after Kim Il Sung has familiarized himself in continue to strike the Americans for approxi- Special File detail with the document. mately another year in order to occupy more In response to your communication No. No. 242 (iskh. No. 6277) 24.III.53 favorable borders along the Changan river. 359. Molotov gave an order to transmit to Kim Il Further movement to the south would risk During the second meeting on March Sung that Moscow advises that the decision stretching out the flanks in the west and east 29, Kim Il Sung again declared that he fully of the question of naming Nam Il as Minister shore of Korea. In this case the danger of agrees with the proposal of the Soviet gov- of Foreign Affairs be postponed until Malik’s landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean ernment on the Korean question and consid- arrival and that it would be good at the present troops would grow significantly. ers that this proposal must be implemented moment to be limited to the naming of a Touching on further steps after the sign- as soon as possible. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who ing of an armistice, Mao Zedong said that the Kim Il Sung further underscored that would meanwhile serve as minister.” government of the PRC has a number of the time has come to show initiative from questions about which it would like to con- our side on the question of the conclusion of [Source: AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo sult with the government of the USSR. By the war in Korea and achievement of peace. 5, Papka 11, Listy 120-122] approximately 10 August, we will prepare a It is necessary, Kim said, either actively to proposed plan of measures about which it is carry out military operations or to end the 114. 29 July 1953, ciphered telegram, necessary to consult with the Soviet govern- war; a further dragging out of the existing Kuznetsov to Soviet Foreign Ministry re ment. situation is not in the interests of the DPRK meeting with Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai was present at the meeting. and PRC, or of the entire democratic camp. KUZNETSOV In connection with this, Kim pointed out that CIPHERED TELEGRAM the losses on the Korean side at the front and From BEIJING From Kuznetsov [Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 830, in the rear (daily nearly 300-400 persons) To MID USSR URGENT Listy 187-189; and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis are very significant and it is hardly advisable Copies: Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, 5a, Delo 5, Papka 11, Listy 156-158] to conduct further discussion with the Ameri- Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, cans regarding repatriation of a disputed Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, Vyshinsky, 115. 20 April 1956, ciphered telegram, number of prisoners of war. In the present Gromyko, Zorin, Podtserob excerpt from cable from Soviet Ambassa- conditions, Kim said, the proposal of the [reporting a meeting of July 28] dor to the PRC P. Yudin re meeting with Soviet government is the most advisable and After listening to the greetings of the CC Mao Zedong correct. CPSU, Mao asked me extend deep gratitude Kim Il Sung is taking measures to pre- to the CC CPSU in the name of the CC CCP. CIPHERED TELEGRAM pare for the anticipated negotiations: the Mao noted that the enemy was forced to reach Strictly Secret number of sick and wounded prisoners in the an armistice not only by force of military From BEIJING DPRK is being determined, materials for the reasons but also by force of political and 31 March I visited Comrade Mao negotiations in Panmunjom are being pre- economic reasons. In military matters the Zedong. pared, a statement from Pyongyang is being last year has shown that the enemy is not only ...The important moments that apparently prepared, etc. not in a condition to advance on land but is somewhat strengthened Stalin’s trust in the Following your instructions (Your Com- also not able firmly to hold and defend the CCP were your (my) information about the munication #242) we agreed with Kim Il line of the front. The Chinese troops had trip to China and the Korean war—the per- Sung that the representative at the negotia- begun not only to conduct a positional war formance of the Chinese People’s Volun- tions (if they resume) will be Nam Il, as but also to break through the front. teers, although in this question, said Mao before. In connection with this, the publica- Among the political causes that forced Zedong, we were not sufficiently consulted. tion of a decree of the Presidium of the the enemy to conclude an armistice, Mao On the Korean question, when I (Mao Supreme People’s Assembly about naming noted the military contradictions in the camp Zedong) was in Moscow [in December 1949- Nam Il Minister of Foreign Affairs will be of the imperialists and the significant activa- January 1950] we came to an understanding delayed. The post of Minister of Foreign tion of world social opinion, which is speak- about everything, the issue was not about the Affairs of the DPRK is temporarily being ing out against the war in Korea. seizure of South Korea, but about the signifi- held by Li Don Gen. Kim Il Sung will Concerning economic causes, Mao stated cant strengthening of North Korea. But inform the Chinese friends about this. that in the first two years of the war the subsequently Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, 84 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN where some kind of agreement was reached, Gao Gang, Head of the Northeast Bureau of in Seoul, 1940-46, became deputy to Politi- about which no one considered it necessary the Chinese Communist Party cal Adviser in North Korea to consult with us beforehand. It should be Gromyko, A.A., First Deputy Minister of Shtemenko, S.M., Chief of the General Staff noted, said Mao Zedong, that there was a Foreign Affairs, USSR of the Soviet Armed Forces serious miscalculation in the Korean war Jiang Jieshi, (Chiang Kai-shek in Wade- Shtykov, T.F., Soviet Ambassador to the about the supposed impossibility of inter- Giles spelling) leader of Chinese Nationalist DPRK until December 1950 vention of international forces on the side of Party who established a rival government in Tsarapkin, S.K., Member of Soviet delega- South Korea... Taiwan in after being driven out of mainland tion to United Nations, had served as Minis- P. YUDIN China by the PLA in 1949 ter Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ko- Kaganovich, L.M., Deputy Premier of USSR rea 1946-48 [Source: APRF, List 157, Fond, Opis and Kim Ch’aek, Deputy Commander of Korean Vasiliev, Major General, Head of Soviet Delo not given] People’s Army Military Advisory Group in DPRK Kim Tu-bong, Chairman of the Central Com- Vasilevsky, A.M., Minister of War, USSR INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS mittee of the Korean Workers’ Party Vyshinsky, A.Ia., Minister of Foreign Af- Li Kenong, Director of Military Intelligence fairs, USSR APRF Archive of the President, Russian and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Af- Wu, General Xiu-quan, Head of special del- Federation fairs, PRC, head of Chinese delegation at egation to the United Nations from the AVPRF Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian armistice negotiations People’s Republic of China in December Federation Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force, 1950 CC Central Committee (of a communist PRC Xiao, Jinguang, Commander of the Navy of party) Malenkov, G.M., Deputy Chairman of the the People’s Republic of China CCP Chinese Communist Party Council of Ministers, USSR Xie, Fang, Chief of Staff, Chinese People’s CPV Chinese People’s Volunteers (the Malik, Ia., Soviet Ambassador to the United Volunteers designation given PLA units sent to fight in Nations Zakharov, General Matvei Vasilievich, Korea) Mao Zedong, (Mao Tse-tung in Wade-Giles Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of spelling), supreme leader of Chinese Com- Soviet Armed Forces, Head of Special Mili- Korea (North Korea) munist Party tary Mission to North Korea (pseud. Matveev) KPA Korean People’s Army (the army Matveev, pseudonym used by M.V. Zakharov Zakharov, Semen Egorovich, Corps Com- of North Korea) Mikoyan, A.I., Minister of Foreign Trade, missar sent to Beijing during Korean War as MID Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del USSR Stalin’s personal military envoy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Molotov, V.M., replaced as Minister of For- Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister of People’s PLA People’s Liberation Army (Army eign Affairs 1949, remained deputy chair- Republic of China of the PRC) man of Council of Ministers, USSR, until PRC People’s Republic of China restored to Foreign Minister’s post follow- VKP(b) All-Union Communist Party ing Stalin’s death in March 1953 (bolshevik) Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of General Staff VVS Voennye Vozdushnye Sily Air of People’s Liberation Army Kathryn Weathersby, Assistant Profes- Force Pak Hon-Yong, Foreign Minister of Korean sor of History, Florida State University People’s Democratic Republic (Tallahassee), is working on a book on INDEX OF NAMES Pak Il U, Minister of Internal Affairs, DPRK, the Soviet Union and the Korean War. named by Mao Zedong as deputy com- She contributed articles on new Russian mander and deputy of Beria, L.A., Minister of State Security, USSR archival evidence on the Korean War to Belov, General M. Chief of Staff for Soviet Chinese People’s Volunteers Peng Dehuai, Commander of Chinese CWIHP Bulletins 3 (Fall 1993) and 5 First Air Army, Commander of 64th Fighter (Spring 1995) and authored CWIHP Air Corps People’s Volunteers in Korea Bulganin, N.A., Deputy Chairman of Coun- Qiao Guanhua, Director of the Press Bureau, Working Paper No. 8 on “Soviet Aims in cil of Ministers, USSR PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of Korea and the Origins of the Korean Deng Hua, Commander of the 13th Army Chinese delegation at armistice negotiations War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Corps of the People’s Liberation Army, in Razuvaev, V.N., USSR Ambassador to Russian Archives.” June 1951 became Acting CPV Commander DPRK following Shtykov’s dismissal in De- and Political Commissar cember 1950 Fedorenko, N.T., diplomat and interpreter at Ridgway, Gen. Matthew, April 1951 ap- the Soviet embassy in Beijing pointed Commander of U.S. Eighth Army in Filippov, pseudonym used by Stalin for ci- Korea phered telegrams Roshchin, N.V., Soviet Ambassador to the Fyn Si, pseudonym used by Stalin for ci- People’s Republic of China phered telegrams Shabshin, A.I., former Soviet Vice-Consul COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 85

CHINA’S ROAD the party’s foreign behavior, and the lever- While it is apparent that these sources have continued from page 41 age of historical-cultural factors (such as the created new opportunities for fresh studies, Chinese emphasis of the moral aspect of it is also clear that they were released on a The reexamination of the Korean case China’s external relations, Chinese ethno- selective basis and, sometimes, for purposes led me into a broader question concerning centrism, and Chinese universalism) upon other than a desire to have the truth known. the proper understanding not only of Com- Mao and the CCP leadership. Only with a Indeed, unless scholars, both Chinese and munist China’s foreign policy but also, prob- better understanding of the logic and dy- non-Chinese, are offered free and equal ac- ably, that of any sovereign country: is it namics of the CCP’s outlook is it possible to cess to the original historical documenta- appropriate to comprehend the foreign policy reconstruct the interactions that led China tion, there is always the possibility that a behavior of a country, especially one that and the United States into a major confron- study might be misled by its incomplete had historically viewed itself as the “Middle tation in Korea.6 databases. Fully aware of this danger, I have Kingdom,” as totally reactive and without My three-part study begins with an made every effort to doublecheck my cita- its own consistent inner logic? The assump- analysis of Communist China as an emerg- tions as much as possible (such as checking tions underlying most of the existing schol- ing revolutionary power. Focusing on the documents with information from interviews, arship on China’s entrance into the Korean pre-1949 period, I first discuss the domestic and vice versa, and comparing Chinese ma- War, though seemingly critical of sources of the CCP’s foreign policy, the terials with non-Chinese ones). Wherever Washington’s management of the Korean party leadership’s perception of the outside necessary, I pointed out what I consider to be crisis, emerge ironically as American-cen- world and China’s position in it, and Mao’s dubious sources in the notes. tered in a methodological sense. Lacking a central role in the CCP’s policy-making My study was also based on my four real understanding of the logic, dynamics, structure. The second part explains how the research trips to China respectively in 1987, goals, and means of Communist China’s conflict between the CCP and the United 1991, 1992, and 1993. During these trips I foreign policy, they treat Beijing’s manage- States escalated and the strategic coopera- established and updated my research data- ment of the Korean crisis simply as a passive tion between Beijing and Moscow devel- bases, and interviewed those who were in- reaction to the policy of the United States. oped in 1949 and the first half of 1950: On volved in Beijing’s policy-making during They thus imply that American policy is the the eve of the Korean War, Beijing and the late 1940s and early 1950s, and those source of all virtues as well as evils in the Washington had perceived each other as a who have access to classified CCP docu- world—if something went wrong some- dangerous enemy, and the stage for Sino- ments (because of the political sensitivity where, it must have been the result of a American confrontation had been set. The involved in the issues under discussion, un- mistake committed by the United States. It third part examines Beijing’s management less authorized by the interviewees, I do not was time to rethink Beijing’s entrance into of the Korean crisis from late June to mid- identify their names, but I restrict myself to the Korean War. October 1950, focusing on how the decision using unidentified interviews only when My study, China’s Road to the Korean to enter the war was made and how it with- absolutely necessary). I have not been able War: The Making of the Sino-American Con- stood both internal and external tests. Em- to get close to Beijing’s CCP Central Ar- frontation (New York: Columbia Univer- phasizing that Beijing’s decision to enter the chives (which, by the way, is located in the sity Press, 1994), retraces China’s path to war was based on the belief that the outcome city’s remote western suburb). But by a involvement in the Korean War with insight of the Korean crisis was closely related to combination of effort and good luck, I gained gained from recently released Chinese ma- the new China’s vital domestic and interna- access to some important classified docu- terials. It argues that China’s entry into the tional interests, I argue that there was little ments (including correspondences and tele- Korean War was determined by concerns possibility that China’s entrance into the grams of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and much more complicated than safeguarding Korean War could have been averted. other CCP leaders, and a few minutes of the Chinese-Korean border. To compre- A note on the Chinese sources used in CCP leaders’ decision-making conferences) hend China’s decision to enter the war, one this study is appropriate here. Since the mid- for the 1948-1950 period. To balance the must first examine the CCP leaders’ percep- 1980s, thanks to China’s reform and open- need to protect my sources with the general tion of China’s security interests and their ing policies, many fresh and meaningful practice of Western scholarship, I cite them judgment of to what extent and in which materials concerning China’s entry into the in my book by pointing out their forms ways such interests had been challenged Korean War have been released, which offer (telegram, correspondence, or minute), dates, during the Korean crisis. This examination the basis for this study. These new sources and where their originals are maintained (the requires an extended analysis of a variety of include personal memoirs by those who were Chinese Central Archives or Chinese Mili- basic factors shaping the CCP leadership’s involved in Beijing’s intervention in Ko- tary Archives). I believe that this is the best understanding of China’s external relations. rea,7 scholarly articles and monographs by one can do in the current circumstances. It is Among these factors, the most important Chinese researchers with archival accesses,8 my hope that China, my motherland, will ones include CCP leaders’ perception of the official academic publications using classi- follow the internationally accepted practice outside world and China’s position in it, the fied documents,9 openly or internally pub- of declassifying historical documents on a nature and goals of the Chinese Communist lished collections of CCP Central legal basis, so that all researchers, including revolution and their impact on the CCP’s Committee’s and regional bureaus’ docu- myself, will soon be able to get free access to security strategy and foreign policy, the in- ments,10 and the internally and openly pub- them. fluence of the CCP’s domestic policies on lished collections of Mao Zedong’s papers.11 86 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

1. Except for a few books written by journalists, such 6. In a series of recent studies, scholars in the U.S. have series. as Isidor F. Stone’s The Hidden History of the Korean begun to use the new Chinese sources. Russell Spurr’s 10. The most useful ones include Zhonggong dangshi War (New York: Press, 1952), this Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War against the jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Reference Materials for Teach- approach dominated the study of the origins of the U.S. in Korea (New York: Newmarket, 1988) was the ing CCP History, Beijing: National Defense University Korean War in the 1950s and part of the 1960s. See, first one in this regard. Allegedly supported by “infor- Press, 1986), vols. 18-19 (1945-1953); Zhonggong e.g., Robert T. Oliver, Why War Came in Korea (New mation from extensive interviews,” this book appears zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the York: Fordham University Press, 1950); Philip E. largely based on hearsay and fiction-style imagination. CCP Central Committee, first edition, Beijing: CCP Mosley, “Soviet Policy and the War,” Journal of Inter- Harrison Salisbury devotes a whole chapter to China’s Central Academy Press, 1983-1987), 14 vols. Both national Affairs 6 (Spring 1952), 107-114; Alexander decision to enter the Korean War in his new book, The collections were published for “internal circulation” L. George, “American Policy Making and the North New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng only. An open and generally enlarged version of the Korean Aggression,” World Politics 7:2 (), (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), which is based on a few second collection has been published in 1989-1992, but 209-232; and Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, interviews and a haphazard reading of secondary Chi- a few important documents are not included. 1941-1950 (Chicago: Press, nese sources. Lacking corroborating documentary 11. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Military 1963), 555-556. In his classic study of the Korean War, sources, this book contains many errors. The studies by Works of Mao Zedong, Beijing: Soldiers’ Press, 1981); Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin’s Michael Hunt and Thomas Christensen represent the and Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Press, 1964), 18-20, David Rees continued to draw a best efforts to reinterpret China’s entrance into the Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People’s Re- picture reflecting a well-coordinated Communist plot Korean War with the support of new Chinese sources. public, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Docu- to start the war. For summaries of various scholarly Hunt, in “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June ments, 1987, 1989), vol. 1, September 1949-December interpretations of the origins of the Korean War based 1951,” Political Science Quarterly 107:3 (Fall 1992), 1950, and vol. 2, January 1951-December 1951. Both on the assumption that the North Korean invasion 453-478, offers enlightening analyses of Beijing’s man- collections are “for internal circulation” only. Also obeyed Moscow’s grand strategic design, see Denna F. agement of the Korean Crisis and Mao’s direction of the useful are the openly published Mao Zedong junshi Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, 2 CPV’s first-year operations in Korea. Christensen, in wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers, vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), 2:605; and “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: 6 vols., Beijing: Military Science Press and the Central Kim Hak-joon, “Approaches and Perspectives to the The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” Inter- Press of Historical Documents, 1993), and Pang Xianzhi Origins of War,” in War Memorial Service-Korea, national Security 17:1 (Summer 1992), 122-154, uses et al., Mao Zedong nianpu, 1893-1949 (A Chronology comp., The Historical Reillumination of the Korean Beijing’s response to the Korean crisis to challenge the of Mao Zedong, 1893-1949, 3 vols., Beijing: People’s War (Seoul: Korean War Research Conference Com- traditional view based on . Also of Press and the Central Press of Historical Documents, mittee, 1990), 1-9. For general historiographical dis- note is Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue 1993). cussions of the origins of the Korean War, see John Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean Merrill, Korea: The Peninsula Origins of the War War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), which (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989), chap. offers interesting, though sometimes highly specula- Chen Jian is Associate Professor of History at tive, interpretations of the Sino-Soviet alliance and its 1; Philip West, “Interpreting the Korean War,” Ameri- Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. This can Historical Review 94:1 (February 1989), 80-96; relation to the origins of the Korean War. Rosemary Foot, “Make the Unknown War Known: 7. The most important ones include Chai Chengwen and article is adapted from the introduction to his Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Zhao Yongjun, Banmendian tanpan (The Panmunjom China’s Road to the Korean War; The Making of Decade,” Diplomatic History 15:3 (Summer 1991), Negotiations, Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: 411-431. 1989; second edition, 1992); Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun Columbia University Press, 1994). 2. Truman’s statement, 27 June 1950, Foreign Rela- zongbu: Du Ping huiyilu (My Days at the Headquarters tions of the United States 1950, vol. 7 (Washington, of the Chinese People’s Volunteers: Du Ping’s Mem- DC: Government Printing Office), pp. 202-203. oirs, Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 1988); WILSON CENTER ASIA PROGRAM 3. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The , Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi (Rec- BOOK ON CCP FOREIGN RELATIONS Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: ollections of the War to Resist America and Assist The Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson Macmillan, 1960). Korea, Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature 4. These interpretations are evident in Robert R. Press, 1990); Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu (Nie International Center for Scholars has published a Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Rongzhen’s Memoirs, Beijing: People’s Liberation compilation of articles on CCP foreign relations, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War ( Press, 1986); and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian: revised versions of papers originally prepared for York: The Free Press, 1975); Melvin Gurtov and Shi Zhe huiyilu (Together with Historical Giants: Shi a 7-9 July 1992 international academic confer- Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Poli- Zhe’s Memoirs, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical ence at the Wilson Center. Toward a History of tics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Documents, 1991). Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, - Hopkins University Press, 1980), 25-62; Peter Lowe, 8. For example, Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece 1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches, The Origins of the Korean War (London and New neimu (The Inside Story of the Decision-making during edited by Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, contains: York: Longman, 1986), ix, 189-201; Ronald Keith, the Korean War, : Liaoning University Press, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991); Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang: kangmei yuanchao Niu Jun, “The Origins of Mao Zedong’s Think- 1989), 45-47; Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The zhanzheng de lishi huigu yu fansi (The First Test of ing on International Affairs (1916-1949); He Di, Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), Strength: A Historical Review and Evaluation of the “The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedon’g Per- 236-238. War to Resist America and Assist Korea, Beijing: Chi- ception of the United States”; Zhang Baija, “Zhou 5. This approach can be found in a wide range of nese Broadcasting and Television Press, 1990); Yao Xu, Enlai—The Shaper and Founder of China’s Di- Chinese publications, such as Shen Zonghong and Cong yalujiang dao banmendian (From the Yalu River plomacy”; , “ and China’s Meng Zhaohui et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun to Panmunjom, Beijing: People’s Press, 1985); and Diplomacy”; Odd Arne Westad, “The Foreign kangmei yuanchao zhanshi (History of the War to Zhang Xi, “Before and After Peng Dehuai’s Appoint- Policies of Revolutionary Parties: The CCP in a Resist America and Assist Korea by the Chinese ment to Command Troops in Korea,” Zhonggong dangshi People’s Volunteers, Beijing: Military Science Press, ziliao (Materials of the CCP History) 31 (1989), 111- Comparative Perspective”; Jurgen Osterhammel, 1988), chap. 1; Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo 159. “CCP Foreign Policy as International History: waijiao (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, Chinese 9. Good examples in this category include Tan Jingqiao Mapping the Field”; Michael H. Hunt, “CCP Social Sciences Press, 1987), 37-38; Hao Yufan and et al., Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng (The War to Resist Foreign Policy: ‘Normalizing’ the Field” . Zhai Zhihai, in “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean America and Assist Korea, Beijing: Chinese Social For information on obtaining copies, contact War: History Revisited,” The China Quarterly 121 Sciences Press, 1990); and Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingqiao the Asia Program, Wilson Center, 1000 Jefferson (March 1990) 94-115, attempt to offer an alternative to et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo (The Dr. SW, Washgton, DC 20560 USA; tel.: (202) Whiting’s thesis but generally follow Whiting’s stress Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army, 357-1937; fax: (202) 357-4439; e-mail: on Beijing’s concerns for the safety of the Chinese- Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 2 vols. Korean Border. Both volumes are part of the “Contemporary China” [email protected] COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 87

BAJANOV So, Stalin finally took the decision to South continued from page 54 initiate preparations for the war. At exactly the withdrawal of American troops from the same time that the above mentioned China was involved in the process of Korea, the 38th parallel lost its meaning; e) exchange of cables between Moscow and working out communist strategy in Korea in a counterattack was no longer possible since Pyongyang took place, Mao Zedong was the late 1940s. Basically Mao supported Seoul postponed its plans for an overall present in the Soviet capital. Stalin dis- Kim’s desire “to liberate” the South and offensive against the North.6 cussed with Mao the Korean situation, but even promised to help with troops if neces- Finally Stalin ordered a new appraisal according to all available data the Soviet sary. Mao, however, recommended not to of the situation in Korea, sending, on 11 dictator never mentioned to the Chinese hurry things up, to wait until the Chinese September 1949, instructions to the Soviet guest his decision to launch an attack on the completed their revolutionary war. embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, South as well as his invitation to Kim Il Sung In the beginning of May 1949, North political, and international aspects of a pos- to come to Moscow. Korean Politburo member Kim Il had meet- sible attack on the South. The embassy gave Kim Il Sung and his delegation spent ings with Chinese leaders. Mao Zedong a negative view on the matter (14 September almost the whole of April 1950 in the Soviet expressed the opinion that a war in Korea 1949), and on 24 September 1949, the CPSU Union. The first issue on the agenda was: could start at any moment. If the war dragged CC Politburo rejected the appeal of the North ways and methods of unification of Korea on, the Japanese could interfere, but this was Koreans to start the war, concluding that the through military means.10 Stalin gave his not a reason for worry. Mao pointed out: “If North Korean army was not prepared for approval to an invasion of the South and necessary, we can throw in for you Chinese such an attack militarily, that “little has been outlined his view on how the war had to be soldiers, all of us are black, Americans will done to raise the South Korean masses to an prepared. Unfortunately, memorandums of not see the difference.” Mao at the same active struggle,” and that an unprovoked conversations between Stalin and Kim in time warned Kim not to advance to the South attack by the North “would give the Ameri- April 1950 have not been found as yet in the in the near future. He cited the unfavorable cans a pretext for all kinds of interference Russian archives. However, from some situation in the world and the preoccupation into Korean affairs.”7 secondary sources (testimonies of people of Chinese communists with the civil war. As can be seen from this Politburo docu- involved in the negotiations, reports of the Mao Zedong recommended to postpone the ment, Moscow no longer flatly rejected the Foreign Ministry of the USSR) and from war until China was united under the leader- idea of military reunification of Korea. In- earlier and later statements and positions of ship of the Communist party.11 stead it called upon Pyongyang to get better Moscow and Pyongyang, the following con- In the end of March 1950, Mao Zedong, prepared for the operation. Evidently clusions can be drawn: talking to the North Korean ambassador, couraged by this shift in the Kremlin’s mood, 1. Stalin changed his mind on the Ko- stressed that peaceful unification in Korea the North Korean leadership increased pres- rean war because of: a) the victory of the was impossible, it was necessary to employ sure to win Soviet support for the war. On 17 communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisi- military means. Mao said one should not be January 1950, Kim Il Sung complained to tion of the atom bomb (first tested by Mos- afraid of Americans because “they would Soviet ambassador Shtykov: “I can’t sleep cow in August 1949); c) the establishment of not start a third world war over such a small at night because I am thinking of the unifica- NATO and general aggravation of Soviet territory.”12 tion of the whole country. If the cause... is relations with the West; and d) a perceived After completion of Kim Il Sung’s April postponed, then I may lose the confidence of weakening of Washington’s positions and 1950 visit to the USSR, of which Mao seemed the Korean people.” Kim Il Sung requested of its will to get involved militarily in Asia. to know nothing, Stalin authorized the So- permission to make a new visit to the USSR Stalin was now more confident of the viet ambassador in China to tell the Chinese to receive “orders and permission” from Communist bloc’s strength, less respectful leadership the following: “Korean com- Stalin for the offensive.8 of American capabilities and less interested rades visited us recently. I’ll inform you in the reaction of Western public opinion to shortly about the results of our conversa- 3. Stalin blesses the invasion communist moves. tions.”13 Simultaneously Kim Il Sung re- 2. Stalin did not consult Mao in advance quested a visit to Beijing to execute Stalin’s After ambassador Shtykov informed because he wanted to work out the plans for instructions: to continue with the war plans Moscow of this wave of demands by the Korean war himself without Chinese only if Chinese supported the idea. On the Pyongyang, Stalin (on 30 January 1950) interference and objections and then present eve of the visit Kim II Sung said to the Soviet replied (through diplomatic channels): “I Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would ambassador that he did not intend to ask understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim have no choice but to agree with the invasion anything from the Chinese since “all his Il Sung, but he must understand that such a and assist it. While in Moscow Mao insisted requests had been met in Moscow.”14 large matter regarding South Korea... re- on the liberation of Taiwan. Stalin was nega- Upon hearing from Kim Il Sung about quires thorough preparation. It has to be tive to the idea. It would be hard for Stalin the decision to attack South Korea, Mao organized in such a way that there will not be to convince Mao in Moscow to help the requested additional information from Stalin. a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this Koreans before the Chinese had completed On 14 May 1950 Stalin sent the following issue, then I’ll always be ready to receive the reunification of their own country. cable to Mao Zedong: “In the conversations him and talk to him.... I am prepared to help with Korean comrades Filippov [Stalin’s him in this matter.”9 4. China’s position on “liberating” the alias] and his friends expressed the opinion 88 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN that due to the changed international situa- mation about the imminent attack could leak liant success,” that Kim Il Sung “should not tion they agreed with the proposals by the to the South; and that in July rain would slow feel embarrassed ... because of delays in Koreans to set upon unification. The final the advancement of troops. advancement and because of some local decision of the issue must be made jointly by While making final preparations for the defeats... The biggest success of Korea is Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chi- war, the North continued a propaganda cam- that it has become the most popular country nese comrades disagree, the decision must paign, proposing initiatives on the peaceful in the world and has turned into the banner of be postponed till a new discussion.”15 unification of Korea. Initially the commu- the liberation movement in Asia against the In talks with North Korean leaders Mao nists wanted to strike at the Ongjin penin- imperialist yoke.”22 Kim Il Sung expressed approved their analysis of the situation and sula, but at the last moment the strategy was deep gratitude to Stalin for this letter, and for stressed that he supported a speedy military changed. It was believed that Seoul had “fatherly care and assistance.”23 solution of the Korean problem. He was sure learned about the attack and beefed up its But the outlook for the North Koreans of its success. Mao did not exclude the defenses in the Ongjin direction. The North soured following the successful U.S./UN possibility of American interference. In Koreans now asked Moscow for permission landing at Inchon in mid-September. On such an event, China would help.16 to attack along the whole front. September 27, the Soviet Politburo, frus- Unfortunately the final period (May- trated by problems at the front, approved a 5. Preparations for the war June 1950) before the attack is not well letter to Ambassador Shtykov which con- documented, and additional research in the tained devastating criticism of the North Even before Kim Il Sung received, in archives is required to get a clearer and more Korean military leadership and Soviet mili- January 1950, the first hints from the Krem- detailed picture of the final preparations by tary advisers. The letter explained in detail lin that Stalin had become more favorably the communist side for the war. what to do and how to do it in the course of disposed to a war in Korea, Pyongyang had the fighting. With the situation getting more embarked upon a concerted effort to up- 6. The initial stage of the war and more complicated for the North Kore- grade its military potential. Stalin responded ans, Stalin, after persistent requests from positively. After Kim’s talks in Moscow in Throughout the initial stage of the Ko- both Kim Il Sung and Moscow’s representa- April 1950 the war was energetically pre- rean War Stalin was clearly in charge: his tives in Korea, consented to station air force pared by the two sides jointly. word was final on the date of the invasion, he units in the North. Meanwhile, the situation On June 1949 a special protocol was told the Koreans how to fight and he kept for the communists was becoming desper- signed between the USSR and the People’s instructing the Sino-Korean command on its ate.24 Democratic Republic of Korea (North Ko- every move. As for the mood of both Stalin The North Korean leadership forwarded rea) on military-technical assistance. Mos- and Kim Il Sung, it was quickly changing for on September 30 a letter to Stalin literally cow agreed to supply its ally with large the worse as the adversary hit back harder begging for direct military assistance by the numbers of air force planes, tanks, cannons, and harder. Soviet Union or “volunteer units of China landing ships, machine-guns, engineering Already on 1 July 1950, Stalin seemed and other countries of people’s democ- equipment, etc.17 to be worried about a halt in the advance- racy.”25 Realizing that the situation was At the end of 1949 Kim ll Sung again ment of North Korean troops and the impact desperate, Moscow responded in the follow- addressed himself to Moscow a reguest for of American air raids on North Korean terri- ing ways: 1 ) giving constant advice to North large quantities of armaments and ammuni- tory.20 Soviet Ambassador Shtykov admit- Koreans on tactical matters; 2) withdrawing tions necessary for the creation of new 5 ted that American air raids had worsened the Soviet representatives from Korea; 3) pre- round units and enlargement of the fleet.18 political mood in the North. Doubts regard- paring plans for the evacuation of the In March 1950, Kim Il Sung asked to use the ing final victory surfaced and some officials Pyongyang regime and its troops out of the Soviet credit allocated for 1951 in 1950 and began to hint that it was difficult for country; 4) training troops for a comeback to to acquire additional quantities of military Pyongyang to rely purely on its own forces Korea in the future; 5) pressuring the Chi- hardware; these requests were met. in the war with America.21 Meeting with the nese to enter the conflict. In April 1950, leaders of the guerilla Soviet ambassador on July 3, Kim Il Sung movement in the South arrived in Pyongyang confirmed the seriousness of the situation on 7. China’s role in the war’s initial stage to work out a program of action for before the front due to American bombing. He and after the invasion. On 12 May 1950, wanted Soviet advice on how to reorganize As was mentioned earlier in this paper, Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassa- the command of the military actions, and China supported an attack on the South. dor that his General Staff had already started also hoped for new supplies of weapons. However, quite soon Beijing became dis- to plan the operation. Pyongyang wanted to On July 8, Kim Il Sung requested Soviet tressed and offended by the fact that the attack in June but was not sure that prepara- military advisers in order to strengthen his North Koreans did not consult with them tions could be completed by that time.19 By army. Stalin agreed to provide some of these and did not pay heed to their advice. Mos- the end of May, the armaments which had advisers, but his main preoccupation was to cow attempted to calm the emotions of the been promised by Stalin arrived and the plan give moral support to Pyongyang. In an Chinese. of the invasion was ready. Kim Il Sung August 28 cable to Kim, he emphasized the On 2 July 1950, Zhou Enlai in a conver- insisted on an attack in June, not in July as fact that “the great liberation struggle of the sation with Soviet Ambassador Roshchin Soviet advisers preferred, arguing that infor- Korean people ... was conducted with bril- complained that the North Koreans had un- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 89 derestimated the probability of American against perfectly equipped foreign troops, it take place now rather than a few years military intervention, ignoring Mao not simply South Koreans. later, when Japanese militarism will be re- Zedong’s warnings back in May 1949 and In general, Moscow and Beijing held stored as an American ally, and when the 1950. Zhou passed on Mao’s advice to the similar views at that time on the strategy and United States and Japan will possess a mili- North Koreans to create a strong defense tactics of the war, though with the landing of tary spring-board on the continent in the line in the area of Inchon, because American Americans at Inchon, the mood in China form of Rhee’s Korea.”32 Stalin informed troops could land there. The Chinese lead- started to change. In a conversation with Kim Il Sung about his attempts to persuade ership feared landing operations by Ameri- Roshchin on September 21, Zhou Enlai ad- the Chinese and called upon the North Kore- cans in other parts of the Korean peninsula mitted that there were persons in China who ans “to hold firm to every piece of their as well. In this conversation Zhou Enlai complained that the Korean war would drag land.” However, on 12 October 1950, the confirmed that if the Americans crossed the on and would require sacrifices on the part of Soviet leader told Kim that the Chinese had 38th parallel, Chinese troops, disguised as Chinese. It is also significant that China’s refused again and that Korea had to be evacu- Korean, would engage the opponent. Three authorities leaked to the Soviets intelligence ated. On the next day, however, Stalin had Chinese armies, 120,000 men in total, had information, showing the Kremlin’s policy better news: the Chinese, after long delib- already been concentrated in the area of in Korea in a bad light. Thus, at one point erations and discussions, had agreed to ex- Mukden. Zhou inquired if it would be Moscow was informed by Beijing that the tend military aid to North Korea. Moscow in possible to cover these troops with the So- British consul in the Chinese capital had exchange agreed to arm the Chinese troops viet air force.26 reached the conclusion that the USSR and and to provide them with air cover.33 By July 8, Stalin was already showing the USA had colluded in Korea, trying, with According to available sources, it was a certain irritation with China. In a cable to the help of the war there, to prevent China not easy for Beijing to adopt that military Ambassador Roshchin he ordered: “Tell from capturing Taiwan, completing the civil decision. Two members of the Chinese Mao Zedong that Koreans complain that war and becoming a strong power.29 leadership considered sympathetic to Mos- there is no representative of China in Korea. cow, Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, finally They should quickly send a representative... 8. Stalin pressures a reluctant China to managed to convince Mao to take their side. if, of course, Mao Zedong feels it is neces- enter the Korean war Their main argument was: if all of Korea sary to have a communication link with was occupied by the Americans, it would Korea.”27 On 1 October 1950, Stalin came to the create a mortal danger to the Chinese revo- On July 13, Stalin approved the Chi- conclusion that China had to come to the lution. Those who opposed participation, on nese decision to deploy troops in the vicin- rescue of the collapsing Kim regime. On that the other hand, complained about Soviet ity of the Korean border and promised to day he sent an urgent message to Mao and refusal to participate in the conflict. Some train Chinese pilots and to provide China Zhou asking them “to move to the 38th even suggested that China should accept the with military planes. In August-September parallel at least 5-6 divisions in order to give American advance, even occupation by the 1950, on a number of occasions, Mao per- our Korean comrades a chance to organize USA of Manchuria—because in this case a sonally expressed concern over the escala- under the protection of your troops’ military war between Moscow and Washington would tion of American military intervention in reserves to the North of the 38th parallel.” break out and China could stay away from Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing Stalin added that Pyongyang was not in- trouble. to send troops to the Korean Peninsula “to formed of this request.30 It did not take Mao mince” American divisions. Simultaneously long to respond to Stalin’s cable. Mao de- 9. Chinese “volunteers” enter the Korean the Chinese leaders complained that the clined to fulfill his own promise under the War, the communist camp is euphoric North Korean military command had com- pretext that Chinese troops were not strong mitted many mistakes and ignored Beijing’s enough and a clash between China and the After the entrance of Chinese “volun- recommendations. Moreover, Pyongyang USA would ruin Beijing’s plans for peaceful teers” into the Korean war in late November did not even inform China of developments reconstruction and could drag the USSR into 1950, the mood of Stalin and Kim Il Sung (as on the front.28 a war with Washington. Instead, he sug- well as that of Mao Zedong, of course) On September 20, Stalin in a cable to gested that the North Koreans accept defeat dramatically changed for the better. With Mao agreed that it was not normal and and resort to guerrilla tactics.31 every new success of the Chinese on the correct that the North Korean leadership did The Soviets were stunned with this un- battlefield the desires and arrogance of Stalin not properly inform their Chinese comrades expected change in China’s position. Stalin and his allies grew (though they did feel their about the development of combat activities reminded the Chinese of their previous prom- weak points and exchanged occasional com- in Korea. Stalin, however, defended the ises and urged them again to move into the plaints). Koreans, explaining the aforementioned fact conflict. The Soviet dictator tried to con- On December 1, Stalin cabled Mao: by the lack of proper communications and vince Beijing that the Americans would not “Your successes make happy not only my- noting that Moscow too had only received dare to start a big war and would agree on a self and my comrades in the leadership, but “sporadic and outdated” information from settlement on Korea favorable to the com- the entire Soviet people. Let me welcome the front. Stalin reminded Mao that the munist camp. Under such a scenario China from all my heart you and your friends in the (North) Korean People’s Army was very would also solve the Taiwan issue. He added leadership, your army and the entire Chinese young and inexperienced and it had to fight that even if the USA provoked a big war, “let people in connection with tremendous suc- 90 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN cesses in the struggle against American noticeable that Stalin tried to keep the USSR tween the USSR and the PRC reveals that troops.”34 On December 4, Soviet deputy as much as possible out of direct participa- the fighting spirit of the communist side Foreign Minister , talking tion in the war—if he agreed to send Soviet continued to deteriorate as that of the Ameri- to the Chinese Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, advisers, pilots and other military personnel cans improved.44 The situation got so bad advised Beijing to continue its successful to Korea once in a while, every time he did that Stalin felt it necessary to criticize Mao offensive by crossing the 38th parallel. He so only after repeated pleas by Mao and for wrong tactics employed in the war.45 stressed that the Chinese had to exploit the Kim. Stalin did not always satisfy the re- emerging opportunities to the full extent. quests of his allies about supplies of arma- 11. Communists seek an armistice Both sides agreed that Americans were con- ments, but for objective reasons: they wanted fused and had fallen into a very unfavorable more than the USSR, still weak after WWII By June 1951 the situation at the front situation, that disagreements had developed and engaged in a global Cold War, could became so hopeless for the communists that between Washington and London. The Chi- provide. they started to seek a way out. The question nese ambassador quoted reports from the On January 28, Mao informed Stalin of an armistice was raised by the North front that Americans were poor fighters, that the adversary had begun an unexpected Koreans and Chinese. Stalin had no choice much worse than the Japanese.”35 offensive and due to this the communist but to agree. Maneuvers around the armi- On December 7, Stalin and Mao agreed troops lost the opportunity to rest and to stice talks did not, however, prevent the to go on with the fighting and present at the undergo a restructuring. Instead they had to communists from looking for every oppor- United Nations tough conditions for a cease- launch a counterattack. After achieving an tunity to reinforce the army, to gain territory fire. On 8 January 1951, in a cable announc- operational success the Chinese side hoped and to strike at the opposite side. At the same ing the further advance of Chinese troops, to resume preparation for the final assault on time the communists constantly worried Stalin wrote: “From all my heart I congratu- the South.39 Stalin promptly agreed with the about attacks by the opposite side. The late Chinese comrades on the capture of strategy, stressing that “from the interna- conditions presented by the communists for Seoul. This is a great victory of popular tional point of view it is undoubtedly advis- an armistice were inflexible. It is also worth patriotic forces over forces of reaction.”36 able that Inchon and Seoul are not captured noting that Stalin flatly refused to direct the On January 16, Mao suggested to Kim Il by the adversary, that Chinese-Korean troops armistice negotiations and quite rudely told Sung to reinforce and to restructure joint give a serious rebuff to the advancing troops Mao to do the job. Another prominent forces in Korea (in order “not to repeat of the adversary.”40 feature of this period was constant bargain- mistakes committed by the Korean troops In late January/early February 1951, ing between Stalin and Mao about Soviet from June to September 1950”). After a Stalin criticized the structure, organization, military supplies and military advisers. Mao certain rest, Mao proposed that a spring and quality of the Korean armed forces, kept bombarding Stalin with new requests, (April/May) offensive could start “with the suggesting substantial changes. His propos- and the Kremlin chief continued to rebuff purpose of achieving the final solution of the als were immediately accepted by the Kore- Mao, sometimes with visible irritation. South Korean issue.” Mao did not exclude ans and supported by Beijing. By that time In June 1951, Kim Il Sung and Gao that the Americans, having learned about the first reports of the falling spirit of the Gang went to Moscow, where they con- serious preparations on the Chinese-North Korean troops reached Beijing and Mos- vinced Stalin to agree to the necessity of an Korean side, would cease resisting and leave cow.41 That the situation for the communist armistice-seeking policy. However, at the the Korean peninsula. But even if Washing- side continued to deteriorate is quite clear same time the communists discussed mea- ton continued to resist, it would soon realize from a cable sent by Mao to Stalin on 1 sures to beef up their military capabilities that resistance was futile and evacuate its March 1951, in which the Chinese leader and to prepare for an offensive in August.46 troops from Korea.37 admitted that a general offensive was no In ensuing communications, tactics were On January 19, Peng Dehuai reported to longer possible, that the adversary had supe- worked out on who would raise the issue of Mao that Pyongyang accepted Mao’s plan of riority in weapons and dominated the air, the armistice first and how it would be done. a rest and thorough preparation for the final and that Sino-Korean troops were sustaining It was also decided to insist on restoration of assault (though Pak Hon-Yong tried to hurry heavy losses and urgently needed air cover the border line along the 38th parallel and on things up). It was also agreed that the North by Soviet air force units. Mao stressed that a small neutral zone on both sides. Mao Koreans could not advance alone; Chinese the communist side must prepare for a long suggested to raise, for the sake of bargain- participation was needed.38 war and admitted that American troops will ing, the issue of Taiwan and then to drop it. not be driven out of Korea for at least a Simultaneously China requested from the 10. Euphoria disappears number of years.42 USSR armaments for 60 divisions. Stalin Stalin satisfied Mao’s requests, imme- gave the OK, though he rebuked the Chinese By the end of January 1951, as docu- diately noting that large-scale military op- for trying to get all the weapons during one ments testify, the communists’ euphoria erations were in the offing for Sino-Korean year, explaining that it was “physically im- started to decline; soon it disappeared, re- troops.43 In the following months Moscow possible and totally unthinkable.”47 placed by worries, fear, confusion, and at promptly and favorably responded to all Preparing for the negotiations, Mao times panic. Reading the documents, one other requests of the Chinese, concerning cabled Stalin: “It is extremely important also senses growing irritation among the first of all airplanes and air defense. that you personally take charge of the nego- ranks of the communist allies. It is also Meanwhile, further correspondence be- tiations in order to prevent us from getting COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 91 into an awkward position.”48 Stalin re- 2. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46. 43. Ibid., p. 118. jected the idea, saying: “In your cable you 3. Shtykov report to Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives of 44. See, e.g., the coded message N 20412, June 1951, Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF). See ibid., file 339, pp. 4-6. proposed that we, from Moscow, should also Marshal Vasilevsky and Ambassador Shtykov’s 45. Ibid., file 338, pp. 98-99. direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, APRF. 46. Coded message N 3557, 13 June 1951, APRF, Fond unthinkable and not necessary. It’s you, 4. See, e.g., Stalin cable to Shtykov, 30 October 1949, 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 31-32; see also file 339, pp. 61- comrade Mao Zedong, who’ll have to direct APRF. 63. 5. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46. 47. Coded message N 635177, 24 June 1951, ibid., file negotiations. We can at best give advice on 6. See, e.g., memorandums of conversations of ambas- 339, p. 78. some questions. We are not able to be in sador Shtykov with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong, 12 48. Coded message N 21334, 30 June 1951, APRF, direct communication with Kim Il Sung. and 14 August 1949, and Charge’d’Affaires Tunkin’s Fond 45, list 1, file 339, p. 92. You must have direct communication with cable to Moscow on 3 September 1949, AVP RF. 49. Coded message N 3917, 30 June 1951, ibid., pp. 95- 7. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 776, pp. 30-32. 96. 49 him.” 8. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 19 January 1950, AVP To raise the stakes at the forthcoming RF. 9. Stalin’s cable to Shtykov, 30 January 1950, AVP RF. negotiations the communists decided to be Dr. Evgueni Bajanov is Director of the Insti- more active on the front, to put additional 10. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 23 March 1950, AVP RF. tute for Contemporary International Prob- pressure on the adversary as well as to 11. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 15 May 1949, AVP RF; lems, Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, improve their own defenses in case the other cable to Stalin by General Kovalev about a conversa- Russia. This article was originally pre- tion with Mao Zedong, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, side would try to gain a military advantage. sented to the conference on “The Korean Measures were also taken to upgrade pp. 59-61. 12. Shtykov cable to Moscow, 12 May 1950, AVP RF. War: An Assessment of the Historical the overall military potential of North Ko- 13. Coded message N 2220, 3 May 1950, APRF, Fond Record,” held on 24-25 July 1995 at rea, making it ready for a prolonged war. 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61. Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 14. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950. Stalin satisfied the requests of his allies as and sponsored by the Korea Society, the much as he was able, except for the advisers. 15. Coded message N 5500, 14 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55. Korea-America Society and Georgetown Periodically Stalin lashed at the Chinese for 16. See Ambassador Roshchin’s cable to Moscow, 14 University. extravagant requests for weapons and un- May 1950, AVP RF. willingness to share them with the North 17. APRF, Fund 6, list 9, file 14, p 57. CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS Koreans. 18. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 1 January 1950, AVP RF. 19. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950, AVP RF. My analysis concludes here, leaving 20. Coded message N 34691 /sh, 1 July 1950, APRF, The Cold War International History Project for other contributions a reexamination of Fond 45, list 1, file 346, p. 104. awards a limited number of fellowship for schol- the strategy and tactics of the communist 21. Coded message N 405809, 2 July 1950, APRF, ars from countries on “the other side” of the Cold side at the armistice talks and in the final Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 105-107. War to conduct up to one year of archival re- 22. Coded message N 75021, 28 August 1950, ibid., pp. stage of the war. In conclusion, I would search in the United States. Recipients are based 5-6, 10-11. at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eur- stress that further archival research is needed 23. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 12-15. asian Studies, George Washington University, 24. Coded message N 600262/sh, 27 September 1950, to get definite answers to the following Washington, D.C. Applications should include: aspects of communist politics in the Korean APRF, Fund 3, list 65, file 827, pp. 94-96. 25. Coded message N 600508/sh, 30 September 1950, CV; letter of nomination and three letters of war: APRF, Fond 45, list l, file 347, pp.41-45. recommendation; research proposal, indicating 1. The exact reasons for the reversal of 26. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 2 July 1950. topic to be investigated and sources to be utilized; Stalin’s position on “the liberation” of 27. Stalin cable to Roshchin, 8 July 1950. writing samples in English welcomed, though not South Korea. 28. See, e.g., Mao’s conversations with Soviet acade- required. Applicans should have a working abil- mician on 19 and 28 August 1950, and Zhou’s com- 2. The real motives behind China’s ini- ity in English. Preference will be given to schol- ments on 14 September 1950 to Roshchin. ars who have not previously had an opportunity to tial refusal to enter the Korea War, and 29. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 13 July 1950, AVP RF. do research in the United States. Applications the total picture of Soviet-Chinese in- 30. Coded message N 4581, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file may be sent or faxed to: teractions on Korea in 1949-1950. 334, pp. 97-98. 31. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 3 October 1950, coded Jim Hershberg 3. The detailed process of communist message N 25199, ibid., pp. 105-106. Cold War International History Project preparations for the war. 32. See Stalin’s cable to Kim Il Sung (quoting Stalin’s Woodrow Wilson Center 4. The events of the first days of the war earlier message to Mao), 8 October 1950, APRF, Fond 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW and reaction to these events in Moscow, 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 65-67. Washington, D.C. 20560 USA 33. Coded message N 4829, 14 October 1950, APRF, Fax: (202) 357-4439 Beijing, and Pyongyang. Fond 45, list 1, file 343, p.77. 5. What further strategy Stalin had in 34. Coded message N 9768. APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file E-mail: [email protected] mind when he ordered North Korean 336, p. 5. Recent recipients of CWIHP fellowships include: communists to evacuate the country in 35. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 371, pp. 35-37. 36. Ibid., list 1, file 336, pp. 88-90. Vytas Berenis (Insitute of Culture and Arts, the autumn of 1950. 37. See coded message N 15603, 16 January 1951, Vilnius); Wanda Jazarbek (Insitute of Political APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, pp. 81-82. Studies, Warsaw); Michael Latysh (Institute of 1. See, e.g., coded message N 121973, 2 May 1947, The 38. Coded message 15994, 21 January 1951, APRF, Slavonic & Balkan Studies, Moscow); Michael 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Fond 45, list 1, file 335, pp. 37-40. Lesniewski (Warsaw University); Bartek Pawlak Forces, pp. 4-6, Archives of the President of the Rus- 39. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, p. 44. (Warsaw University); Michael Skapa (Charles sian Federation (hereafter APRF); cable from Ambas- 40. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 47-48. sador Shtykov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19 41. Ibid., Fond 3, list 65, file 828, p. 123. University, Prague); and Wenqian Gao (Re- January 1949, APRF. 42. See APRF, Fond 45, list l, file 337, pp. 78-82. search Center on Party Literature, Beijing). 92 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

SHTYKOV the Soviet Army in the north. The Soviet As regard to the strike, I in- continued from page 69 leaders in the north, through Kim Il Sung, structed as follows: umes remain: Vol. 1, 149 pages (from Sept. tried to persuade or even threaten leftist Continue the struggle until the 5-Nov. 16, 1946); Vol. 2, 141 pages (from leaders in the south, who were against the demands of various economic Dec. 1, 1946-Feb. 5, 1947); Vol. 3, 193 merger, into accepting Pak Hon-yong’s line claims, wage increase for workers, pages (from July 7-Aug. 29, 1947); Vol. 4, and the merger. For instance, when Kang the release of the leftist leaders 72 pages (from July 26-Sept. 6, 1948). The Jin, a leftist leader in the south who was from prison, the cancellation of the periods of Aug. 1945-Sept. 1946, Feb.-July against the merger, visited North Korea, Kim warrant of arrests of Communist 1947, Sept. 1947-July 1948, and Sept. 1948 Il Sung, apparently under the direction of leaders, and revived publication of to 1951 have been lost. Shtykov, met with Kang and reported the banned leftist newspapers are met. In the diaries, of course, Shtykov wrote details of the meeting to Shtykov on 22 Stop the strike when the de- much about strictly military affairs. How- October 1946.10 mands are met. ever, the majority of the diaries were de- Declare that [the strikers] will voted to the political and economic situation I met with Kang Jin. I told him continue to talk with the American in Korea after the liberation from Japanese that he had to take full responsibility Occupation Government on the is- occupation in . The first vol- for the failure of the merger. I also sue of transition of power to ume deals with the September 1946 General told him, “Although I don’t know People’s Committee [in the south]. Strike, the October 1946 Uprising, and the whether you are a running-dog of Demand that the American Oc- merger of the three leftist parties in the American Imperialism, you are help- cupation Government not oppress south; volume two covers the election for ing Americans enormously. ... Com- the organizers and supporters of the People’s committees of provinces, cit- rade Pak Hon-yong’s decision is not the strike. ies, and counties, and the Assemblies of the only his but also 400,000 North Ko- Committees in North Korea; the third vol- rean Party members’. ... You have to Probably the most striking evidence of ume includes the Second Soviet-American admit that you made a mistake if you intervention was that Shtykov funneled 2 Joint Commission, when Shtykov himself truly want to be a real revolutionary million yen to support the General Strike was the head of the Soviet Delegation; and which you have not been.” and later 3 million yen for the October Riot.14 finally volume four covers the cabinet for- There are some problems in analyzing After the success of the merger, Shtykov mation of the Democratic People’s Repub- the diaries. First, the information in the ordered General Romanenko, the Director of lic of Korea (North Korea). diaries is so fragmentary that it is nearly the Soviet Military Administration in the Most important, the diaries vividly show impossible for us to understand completely north, to telegraph Pak Hon-yong as follows: that the Soviet Stationary/Occupation Army how certain situations evolved. They also “Congratulations on the hard-earned but suc- intervened deeply in and exerted an enor- contain many abbreviations which can be cessful merger.”11 Even after the merger, mous influence on not only North Korean understood only by the author himself and Shtykov and the Soviet leaders closely but also South Korean politics.8 grammatical errors which are open to a vari- The merger of the three leftist parties worked with Pak and even supported him ety of interpretations. Above all, Shtykov 12 and the September General Strike/October financially from time to time. wrote as if he were giving orders to Korean It has been a widely accepted view that Uprising in the south are the two most leftist leaders: according to the diaries, the the September General Strike and the Octo- conspicuous examples of the Soviet inter- Korean leaders were simply automatons. ber Taegu Riot (or Uprising) in the south had vention.9 In the case of the merger of the Therefore we must interpret historical events parties, the Soviet Army played the role of nothing to do with the Soviets. However, the very carefully, comparing information from moderator and leader in the process. Inter- Shtykov Diaries shed new light on this issue. the diaries and that from other sources. estingly, despite the efforts by Shtykov and The strike and the riot broke out to a certain Still, the Shtykov diaries are undoubt- the Soviet Army to make Kim Il Sung the extent spontaneously under KCP leadership. edly among the most important documents representative of the will of the Soviets, the But the incidents themselves provoked the to emerge on Soviet policy toward Korea South Korean leftist leaders preferred to intervention of Soviet leaders in the north. from 1945 to 1951 and the emergence of the deal with the Soviets directly rather than On the other hand, Communist leaders in the Cold War in . From the diaries, it with Kim Il Sung. This demonstrates that south had to consult with the Soviets when is evident that Shtykov and the Soviet Army the leftist leaders in the south did not yet the General Strike transformed into an armed in North Korea played a major role in the approve Kim’s leadership. In the process of riot. In their wholehearted support for the decision-making: Soviet policies in Korea the merger, the Soviet Army consistently strike and riot, Shtykov and the Soviet lead- were planned at Shtykov’s desk and ap- supported Pak Hon-yong, head of the Ko- ers did not refrain from giving advice: proved by the higher ranking Soviet army rean Communist Party (KCP). The reasons Shtykov gave specific instructions to Com- leaders and later by Moscow. After he were, first of all, that Pak controlled the munist leaders in the south, and these leaders received approval from Moscow, the diaries biggest leftist party in the south; and second, often asked for the instructions of the Soviet suggest, Shtykov and his lieutenants care- 13 For example, Shtykov that Pak’s transition of policy from coopera- leaders in the north. fully choreographed and directed the politi- wrote in his diary on 28 September 1946: tion to confrontation with the U.S. Occupa- cal drama of North Korean (and sometimes tion Government was consistent with that of South Korean) politics. Although not all of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 93 them were puppets of the Soviet Army, it is evident that North Korean Communist lead- ers like Kim Il Sung were under the tutelage of the Soviet Army. Even though the Soviet DMITRII VOLKOGNOV Army leaders tried to make their rule look (1928-1995) like an indirect one, their intervention was always direct and full-scale. In other words, General Dmitrii Volkogonov, a promi- In late 1991, Volkogonov was appointed the Shtykov diaries show that the Soviet nent Russian military historian, died of head of a special parliamentary commission Army in North Korea was a de facto Occu- cancer on 6 December 1995 at age 67. to oversee the handling of archives from the pation Army, not merely a “Stationary Volkogonov spent much of his career as a Soviet period. In that capacity, he helped Army.” In addition, we now know from the high-ranking political officer in the Soviet secure the release of many valuable docu- diaries that the Soviets were more deeply Army, and for several years was director of ments, including items from the Presidential involved in politics and social unrest in the the prestigious Institute of Military His- Archive, the collection of highly-sensitive south than we had known previously; leftist tory. More recently, he served as a military materials kept under the personal control of parties in the north and south were strongly adviser to Russian President , Soviet and then Russian leaders. Even so, dependent upon the Soviets in the north and, and as co-chair of the joint U.S.-Russian critics of Volkogonov frequently charged ultimately, Moscow. commission on prisoners of war. Even that he exploited his privileged access to the while he performed these functions, he archives and held back from circulation the 1. Lebedev, “S soznaniem ispolnennogo dolga,” in Osvobodzhdenie KOREI (Moscow, 1976), 79. continued to work on lengthy books about most significant or sensational documents 2. Zhdanov was the First Secretary of the party commit- Soviet history. Beginning in 1989, for his own use. After a lengthy article along tee of Leningrad. Shtykov had absolute loyalty to Volkogonov published richly documented these lines appeared in the newspaper Zhdanov. When Zhdanov died on 31 , biographical studies of Josif Stalin (Triumf Izvestiya in July 1994, Volkogonov sent a Shtykov expressed his deep grief over his death in his diary. Diaries, 31 August, 1, 3 . i tragediya: Politicheskii portret I.V. letter to the editor asserting that he had 3. When the Communist regime was established in Stalina, 4 vols. [Moscow: Novosti, 1989], enjoyed no special access for his Stalin and North Korea, Stalin immediately appointed Shtykov to English ed., Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, Trotsky biographies, and that virtually all this important post. Interestingly enough, Shtykov re- trans. and ed. Harold Shukman [New York: the documents he used for his Lenin book fused the offer at first because of his heart problem. However, he could not refuse Molotov’s urgent request Free Press, 1991]); Leon Trotsky (Trotskii: were “accessible to everyone.” Partly as a along with promise to send Shtykov to a center for Politicheskii portret, 2 vols. [Moscow: result of this controversy, the translator’s medical treatment and provide him with competent Novosti,1992]); and preface to the English edition of the Lenin aides. See Diaries, 2 . (Lenin: Politicheskii portret, 2 vols. [Mos- biography was modified to include a pledge 4. Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsiklopediia (Moscow, 1980), 544 cow: Novosti, 1994], English ed., Lenin: A that all documents cited in the book, includ- 5. Ibid. New Biography, trans. and ed. Harold ing those from the Presidential Archive, 6. His memoirs stopped at the years of his childhood. Shukman [New York: Free Press, 1994). would be made available to all researchers. Interview in 1995 with Viktor Terentevich Shtykov, Shortly before his death, he completed a Unfortunately, the access envisaged in General Shtykov’s son, in St.Petersburg. 7. For example, Kravtsov, a special aide to Shtykov, survey of the whole Soviet period (Sem’ that pledge has not yet materialized. Rus- recollected that he had burned in the 1950s all of his Portretov (Seven Portraits)[Moscow: sian and foreign scholars who worked in the documents, including reports he had written. Novosti, 1995]), which only recently ap- Russian archives in 1995 (including myself) 8. For convenience’s sake, I use North Korea and South peared in Russia. were summarily turned down when they Korea although there were only the de jure U.S. Occu- pation Government in the south and de facto Soviet Having been an orthodox Communist requested access to documents adduced in Occupation Government in the north from 1945- 1948. for most of his life, Volkogonov in the the Lenin book. Whether because of bureau- 9. The 3 November 1946 election in North Korea was 1990s shifted toward a strongly anti-Com- cratic inertia or some other motive, most of another example. munist position. As recently as when he the senior archival officials in Moscow dis- 10. Kim Il Sung’s Report to Shtykov on Kim’s meeting with Kang Jin. Diaries, 22 October 1946. wrote his books on Stalin and Trotsky, he played no interest in gathering and making 11. Diaries, 2 December 1946. had glorified Lenin. But by the time he available the items that Volkogonov cited. 12. Diaries, 6, 7, 11, 12, 25, 27 December 1946 completed his study of Lenin in 1994, One hopes that with Volkogonov’s death, a 13. Diaries, 28 September, 7, 8, 22 December 1946. Volkogonov had concluded that the founder renewed effort will be made to release for 14. At that time one seom of rice (a big sack of rice) cost 15 yen in the north and 150 yen in the south). of Bolshevism was in fact a “savage, cruel, open research the many documents he em- uncompromising, remorseless, and venge- ployed to such good effect. That would be a Hyun-su Jeon is a doctoral candidate at the ful” figure. Volkogonov said he had found fitting tribute to a courageous historian. Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Acad- it “painful” to “shed [his] illusions” about emy of Sciences; this article was edited and the Soviet regime, but shed them he did. —Mark Kramer translated by Gyoo-hyoung Kahng, a fellow His final books provide overwhelming sup- Russian Research Center of the Contemporary History Institute, Ohio port for his ideological change of heart. Harvard University University. A longer version of this article appeared in the Fall 1995 issue of the Ko- rean-langauge publication Yoksa biyong [Critique of History]. 94 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

STALIN, MAO, KIM, AND CHINA’S DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN WAR, SEPTEMBER 16-OCTOBER 15, 1950: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

article and translations by Alexandre Y. Mansourov1 At 5:45 a.m. on 15 September 1950, the scholarly and eyewitness accounts of the negotiations between Stalin and Zhou Enlai 5th Marine Brigade of the X Corps com- preparation, implementation, and strategic on 10-11 October 1950, as well as the still- manded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond and military significance of Operation enigmatic October 1950 correspondence began its unprecedented amphibious land- Chromite, as well as the subsequent pros- between Beijing and Moscow.9 ing onto the beaches of Inch’on. There were ecution of the war by the UN forces, includ- But due to the unavoidable lack of hard about 500 North Korean soldiers on Wolmi- ing the origins and aftermath of the reversal top-level archival evidence, these accounts do, a tiny island protecting the entry into the of fortunes for the UN troops in November fell far short of being able to reconstruct in Inch’on harbor, another 500 at Kimpo, and 1950.4 In addition, in his 1960 study China detail the attitudes and policy orientations of about 1,500 within Inch’on.2 They were Crosses the Yalu, Allen S. Whiting persua- Stalin or other key Soviet leaders in Moscow confronted with more than 70,000 troops sively showed how national security con- and their representatives on the ground in from the United States, Australia, Canada, cerns, as well as domestic political and eco- Korea, nor the decision-making processes New Zealand, France, Holland, and the UK nomic considerations, may have led the taking place inside the Kremlin immediately disembarking from more than 260 ships. People’s Republic of China (PRC) govern- after the U.S. landing at Inch’on and leading The surprise of the UN attack, and the pre- ment to decide to enter the Korean War. His up to the final Chinese decision a month later ponderant firepower and manpower of the preliminary conclusions were supported al- to intervene militarily in Korea. Moreover, U.S.-led forces, destroyed pockets of the most three decades later by Russell Spurr,5 this literature suffered from the lack of pre- dazed North Korean resistance within hours. who focused his research on the psychologi- viously classified Moscow-Pyongyang top- By the next morning the 1st Marines had cal background of the Chinese leaders’ deci- level correspondence, and to rely primarily been able to squeeze the remnants of the sion to provide military assistance to a on the officially authorized, at times propa- Korean People’s Army (KPA) out of Inch’on friendly communist regime in Pyongyang. gandistic Chinese sources of the exchanges and had started their rapid advance towards Then, a wave of memoirs6 published in between the PRC and USSR leaders. Kimp’o and Seoul. Operation Chromite was the PRC by former high-ranking Chinese This absence of critical Soviet source a complete success and later labelled as “a officials, military leaders, and other insiders materials, consequently, gave birth to a num- masterpiece of amphibious ingenuity.”3 In allowed scholars to reconstruct in great de- ber of academic debates. First, many schol- a little more than a week Seoul was recap- tail the relevant decision-making processes ars disagree in their assessments of Soviet tured by the UN forces. On 1 October 1950, in Beijing and Northeast China regarding and Chinese intentions and motivations in they crossed the 38th parallel, and began the merits of Chinese military intervention Northeast Asia and the nature and param- their rapid, sweeping advance northward. in Korea, including debates within the Polit- eters of their respective perceived national The KPA surrendered Pyongyang on Octo- buro of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests on the Korean peninsula at this ber 19, and soon the first Republic of Korea and among PLA senior commanders. These stage of the war. Second, an overarching (ROK) and U.S. battalions approached the works also brought to light some differences debate among historians involves a series of Yalu River on the Chinese-North Korean in the individual positions of Chinese lead- interrelated questions about alliance com- border. ers, including last-minute doubts, reversals, mitments between Moscow and Beijing— However, U.S./UN Commander Dou- disagreements, and vacillations on the part what commitments were made, why and glas MacArthur’s promise to “Bring the of those involved, and analyzed the corre- how they were reached, whether they were Boys Home by Christmas” never came true. spondence between Mao Zedong and Zhou broken or honored, and how they affected The Thanksgiving offensive proved still- Enlai and their military officials, as well as the subsequent course of Sino-Soviet rela- born, for it was a new enemy that the UN other political, economic, military, and ad- tions (a good example of this is the claim troops confronted in Korea from then on: 36 ministrative events related to the war which advanced in some Chinese accounts that divisions of the Chinese People’s Volun- occurred in China in August-October 1950.7 Stalin, in his 10-11 October 1950 meeting teers (CPV) who entered North Korea in late However, what this literature still left to with Zhou, reneged on a prior commitment October-early November, supported by al- speculation was the Soviet side of the story. for the USSR to provide air support for the most twelve wings and air defense divisions Some of the books, especially Uncertain CPVs). This debate includes controversies of the Soviet Air Force operating from nearby Partners (1993), by Sergei N. Goncharov, related to the personal roles of Stalin, Mao, airfields in Northeast China. Recognizing John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, and William and Kim Il Sung in manipulating one new patterns in the enemy’s behavior, in his W. Stueck’s recently-published The Korean another’s decisions regarding the war, espe- special communiqué to the UN dated 28 War: An International History,8 discuss stra- cially the initial decision to initiate a large- November 1950, MacArthur called it “an tegic calculations which Stalin might have scale attack against the south in June 1950 entirely new war.” Indeed, it was. made at this crucial juncture of the Korean and later over China’s intervention. There is In the Western literature there are many War, the course and outcome of crucial also a cloud of uncertainty over the role of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 95

Zhou Enlai as an intermediary between Stalin new evidence on the commonalities and dif- his exchange with Mao Zedong, Stalin held and Mao in managing (mismanaging?) the ferences in the Soviet and Chinese world Kim Il Sung and his Korean generals re- Sino-Soviet alliance, and the role of the views, and their respective views on the sponsible for failures at the battleground. In Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang in the limits of the U.S. global power and likeli- turn, Zhou Enlai blamed Kim Il Sung for initial stages of the war, T.F. Shtykov, as an hood of a U.S.-led escalation of the Korean withholding military intelligence from the intermediary between Stalin and Kim Il conflict, as well as on the varied significances Chinese and for ignoring Mao’s warnings, Sung in the ill-fated handling of the USSR- of Korea, divided or unified, for the Soviet issued as early as mid-August, about the DPRK alliance. versus Chinese national interests. Also, the danger of a U.S. landing at Inch’on. Kim Il Shortly before the 40th anniversary of newly declassified early October 1950 cor- Sung, in turn, blamed his commanders for the end of the Korean War, the Russian respondence between Moscow and Beijing insubordination, Stalin for lack of commit- government released a new batch of previ- sheds dramatic new light on intra-alliance ment, and his Soviet advisers for profes- ously classified documents related to the bargaining between Stalin and Mao Zedong sional ineptitude. Reading the newly de- events on the Korean peninsula from 1949 regarding the terms of China’s entry into the classified Russian telegrams, it is hard not to to 1953, including some correspondence Korean War, which is at variance with the conclude that these mutual recriminations between Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Stalin and traditional Chinese and Western interpreta- undermined palpably the mutual trust among Mao Zedong, internal correspondence be- tions thereof. In particular, these Russian the leaders of these communist allies. tween the Kremlin and various Soviet gov- documents raise questions about the reliabil- The ciphered telegrams also reveal the ernment ministries involved in the prosecu- ity and even authenticity of Mao’s telegrams atmosphere of confusion and discord that tion of the war in Korea, and ciphered tele- of 2 and 14 October 1950 as they appear in permeated relations between the Soviet and grams between Soviet representatives in officially authorized Chinese sources, and Chinese leaders and their respective repre- North Korea (known officially as the Demo- subsequently in scholarly literature. They sentatives and associates in Korea regarding cratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) also reveal the depth of Stalin’s and Mao’s the military-strategic significance of the and their respective superiors in Moscow. personal involvement and the complexity of Inch’on landing. Stalin considered the In total, these new primary source materials policymaking processes in Moscow and Inch’on landing a development of vital stra- amount to well over a thousand pages and Beijing regarding the prosecution of the tegic significance, fraught with grave impli- come from the Archive of the President of Korean War, as well as how domestic politi- cations for the KPA [Document #3]. There- the Russian Federation (APRF), the Archive cal considerations and bureaucratic politics fore, in his ciphered telegram dated 18 Sep- of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in the USSR and PRC affected their respec- tember 1950, he directed that Gen. Vasiliev, (AVPRF) at the Ministry of Foreign Af- tive policy outcomes concerning military the Chief Soviet Military Adviser to the fairs, and from the Military Archive at the strategy and tactics. Finally, they reveal for KPA, and Ambassador T.F. Shtykov, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federa- the first time a series of decisions by the Soviet envoy to the DPRK, tell Kim Il Sung tion. Soviet leadership to reduce the Soviet pres- to redeploy four KPA divisions from the This article introduces and analyzes a ence in Korea at that time, including three Naktong River front to the vicinity of selection of these newly declassified docu- CPSU Politburo conferences (on 27 and 30 Seoul.10 Also on September 18, he ordered ments from the Russian Archives related to September 1950 and 5 October 1950) which Soviet Defense Minister Marshal A.M. the period after the U.S.-UN troops’ landing considered the Chinese leadership’s pro- Vasilevsky urgently to develop a plan for the at Inch’on on 16 September 1950, until mid- nounced reluctance to accommodate Stalin’s Soviet Air Force to provide air cover to October 1950, when the PRC decided to prodding of Mao to send troops to rescue the Pyongyang, including the transfer of several send its troops to Korea to save Kim Il DPRK, leading to Stalin’s 13 October 1950 Soviet Air Force fighter squadrons with Sung’s collapsing regime. The newly re- decision to abandon North Korea and evacu- maintenance crews, radar posts, and air de- leased documents primarily from the APRF, ate Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the KPA fense battalions from their bases in the Mari- offer new information and insights into how to Northeast China and the Soviet Far East, time Province of the Soviet Far East (includ- Stalin and his political representatives and as well as his dramatic reversal less than ing the strategic port city of Vladivostok) to military advisers in Korea; Kim Il Sung and twenty-four hours later upon learning of the the airfields around Pyongyang [Document his close associates; and Mao Zedong, Zhou Chinese final decision to fight. #1]. Enlai and their personal representatives in The value of the ciphered telegrams lies In contrast with Stalin’s judgment, nei- Korea, viewed and assessed the strategic in the fact that they reveal the atmosphere of ther Shtykov nor Vasiliev seemed to grasp, and military significance of the UN forces’ mutual finger-pointing which reigned in the let alone forecast, the strategic importance landing at Inch’on, recapture of Seoul, cross- offices of the Soviet, North Korean, and of the U.S. troops’s amphibious landing at ing of the 38th parallel, and drive to the Chinese decision-makers after the Inch’on Inch’on—as Stalin harshly admonished them Yalu. These new archival materials provide landing. In the internal correspondence be- in a withering message on September 27 researchers with a fascinating window into tween Stalin and the Soviet political and [Document #3]. They believed it was a bluff the internal dynamics and politics of alli- military advisers in Korea, Stalin blamed aimed at distracting the attention of the KPA ance relationships among the Soviet Union, them for all the KPA failures in the Korean Command from the main southeastern front. PRC, and the DPRK from the aftermath of campaign, whereas in his correspondence Shtykov even suggested that an author of an the Inch’on landing until the Chinese cross- with Kim Il Sung Stalin blamed the KPA article in the Soviet newspaper about ing of the Yalu River. They present startling commanders for military defeats, while in the Inch’on landing should be brought to 96 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN trial for disinformation and panicking. In had not heard anything from them.13 Zhou talions and regiments to the vicinity of their correspondence with Stalin, they complained that the DPRK leaders had per- Inch’on and Seoul—were flawed and fraught doubted the need to redeploy KPA troops sistently ignored Mao Zedong’s advice and with the possible annihilation of these units from the Naktong River front to the defense predictions and, moreover, deprived the without providing any solution to the prob- of Seoul, instead favoring a strategy of ex- Chinese Ambassador in Pyongyang, Ni lem as a whole. He stressed that only a erting additional pressure on the southeast- Zhiliang, of operational information about pullout of main forces from the southeastern ern front in order to throw the U.S. and ROK the military situation, thereby preventing front and creation of formidable lines of troops defending the Pusan perimeter off the him from informing his government prop- defense east and north of Seoul could halt cliffs into the Sea of Japan in a final great erly in a timely fashion. As a result, Mao had the unfolding UN offensive around Seoul. offensive. Consequently, they dragged their only sketchy reports about the execution and Upon receiving Stalin’s message from feet in executing Stalin’s order to withdraw consequences of the Inch’on landing. Roshchin on September 21, Zhou expressed four KPA divisions from the Southeast to In response to Roshchin’s question about satisfaction that the Soviet assessment of the the vicinity of Seoul. the appropriate course of action for the KPA military situation in Korea after Inch’on As the military situation around Seoul at this juncture, Zhou recommended with matched the Chinese one. He mentioned to deteriorated due to the rapid advance of the some reservations Zhou recommended that, Roshchin that two days earlier, he had sent a U.S. X Corps toward the ROK capital from if the KPA had 100,000-men reserves in the cable to Chinese Ambassador Ni Zhiliang in the west, and their recapture of Kimp’o on vicinity of Seoul and Pyongyang, they could Pyongyang with recommendations similar September 18, Stalin urgently dispatched to and must eliminate the enemy’s landing to those which he had given Roshchin and Korea a special mission headed by Army force at Inch’on. If, however, the KPA Soviet military advisers earlier that day. General Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov,11 lacked such reserves, then they had to with- According to Zhou, the same day, Ni had a (known by the pseudonym Matveyev), the draw their main forces from the Naktong long talk with Kim Il Sung, with Pak Il’u and Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet River front northward, leaving rear-guards Pak Hon-Yong present, and, afterwards, Army, carried Stalin’s order that Shtykov behind to defend the frontline. On behalf of cabled to Beijing Kim’s words that “the and Vasiliev tell Kim Il Sung to halt the the PRC government, Zhou requested that Korean people were ready to fight a pro- offensive along the Pusan perimeter, to as- the Soviet government pass to the Chinese tracted war.”15 sume the defensive and pull out all his divi- leadership more accurate and up-to-date in- In the meantime, on September 22, the sions from the Naktong River front and formation on the military situation in Korea, 5th and 7th regiments of the 1st U.S. Ma- redeploy them to defend Seoul in the north- if it possessed it itself. rines Division approached Seoul from the east and east. Also, he pressed Vasilevsky to On September 20, Stalin sent a ciphered northwest and northeast, while the 32nd and step up his efforts to provide the KPA with telegram to Roshchin in Beijing for delivery 17th regiments of the ROK 7th Division air cover and set up an air defense system to Zhou Enlai, responding to the latter’s advanced to Seoul from southeast, preparing around Pyongyang (see Document #2). Fi- request for more information on the Korean for the final stage of Operation Chromite: nally, Stalin directed his representative in situation.14 First of all, he stressed that poor the recapture of the capital. There was a Beijing to solicit the Chinese leadership’s communications between the DPRK and general feeling that Seoul was about to fall. opinion on the Korean situation and what to PRC and lack of information in Beijing on On September 23, the U.S.-UN-ROK forces do about it. the military situation in Korea was “abnor- launched a frontal assault on Seoul; at the On the night of September 18, Stalin mal.” In Stalin’s opinion, Kim Il Sung failed same time the Eighth Army’s general offen- received a ciphered telegram from his Am- to provide Mao Zedong with military intel- sive in the South, unleashed on September bassador to the PRC, N.V. Roshchin.12 ligence because of difficulties in his own 16, began to bear fruit, and the KPA fell Roshchin informed Stalin of his meeting the communications with his Frontline Com- apart at the Naktong River front. same day with Zhou Enlai, with the Soviet mand rather than his reluctance to share this Upon arrival in Korea, General Military Advisers Gen. Kotov and Konnov kind of information. Stalin complained that Zakharov (Matveyev) sent his first ciphered present. Zhou said that the Chinese leader- he himself received odd and belated reports telegram to Stalin on September 26 [Docu- ship had no other information about the U.S. about the frontline situation from his Am- ment #4]. He reported that the situation of amphibious landing at Inch’on besides that bassador in Pyongyang (Shtykov). He asked the People’s Army troops on the western reported in the Western newspapers and by Zhou to bear in mind that the KPA was a very (Seoul) and southeastern (Pusan) fronts was the Pyongyang Radio. Zhou noted that, in young and ill-experienced army with an grave; that the KPA’s First and Second general, the Chinese had very poor contacts underdeveloped command and control sys- Armies faced the certain prospect of being with the North Korean government regard- tem and weak cadres unable to analyze the encircled and completely destroyed by the ing military matters. The Chinese were frontline situation quickly and efficiently. enemy troops; and that the U.S. Air Force aware of the North Korean demand for cad- He blamed the U.S. intervention for the dominated the air space without hinderance, res but were absolutely in the dark about the KPA’s debacle at Inch’on, emphasizing that wreaking havoc both within the KPA and in KPA’s operational plans. They had at- had the KPA fought only against Syngman the rear areas. He noted that the KPA troops tempted to dispatch a team of senior Chinese Rhee’s troops, “it would have cleaned up had suffered heavy losses, mainly from the military officers from the Northeast Frontier Korea from the reactionary forces long time enemy’s air force, having lost almost all its Forces Command to Korea to observe the ago.” Stalin argued that the tactics used by tanks and much of its artillery; and that they military situation on the battleground, but the KPA at that time—dispatching odd bat- lacked munitions and fuel, the delivery of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 97 which was virtually halted. He stressed that reported that the North Koreans had only just charges, however, no personnel changes the KPA’s top-down command and control started to form six infantry divisions in the among the Soviet political and military ad- system was set up poorly, that wire and northern part of Korea, and that Kim Il Sung visers were made in Korea at that time. radio communications worked only inter- had issued a directive to take immediate Meanwhile, in Korea, on September 28 mittently because of the breakdowns in- steps to withdraw manpower from South Kim Il Sung convened an emergency meet- flicted by the enemy’s air raids and due to Korea in order to use it in the formation of ing of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central the lack of qualified radio operators and new divisions in North Korea and deny this Committee Political Council (WPK CC radio station fuel, and that courier mail was opportunity to the South. PC).18 Everyone present agreed that the almost nonexistent. Stalin was furious. On September 27, he military situation was critical and warranted On September 25-26, Seoul became convened an emergency session of the Polit- extreme measures. First, in order to restore “an inferno,”16 with the U.S. Marines ad- buro of the Central Committee of the All- the KPA Command Structure and improve vancing into Seoul from the South, North, Union Communist Party (bolshevik) [Docu- its efficiency and reliability, the Political and West, and methodically destroying over ment #3]. This was the first in a series of CC Council approved Kim’s proposal to com- 20,000 North Korean troops making a last- VKR(b) Politburo meetings which consid- bine the positions of the Supreme Com- ditch stand. According to Zakharov’s ci- ered Soviet national interests in Korea and mander-in-Chief (SCINC) and Minister of phered telegram [Document #4], on Sep- eventually decided to minimize Soviet expo- National Defense in his hands and to set up tember 25, at 19:00 hours, local time, Kim Il sure on the peninsula. In its decision P#78/ a General Staff for the SCINC, i.e., the Sung was finally persuaded to abandon his 73, the Politburo blamed the KPA’s predica- measures recommended to Kim by Zakharov dream of pushing the UN troops into the sea ment in the Seoul area and in the southeast on and Shtykov at their meeting on September in the south. He succumbed to his Soviet a series of grave mistakes made by the KPA 26. This was tantamount to establishing an advisers’ urging and ordered that the Seoul Frontline Command, the Commands of the entirely new command and control system Group and the Group operat- Army Groups and army groupings in the over the KPA centered on Kim Il Sung. This ing in the northern part of the southeastern questions related to command and control decision was an obvious reflection of the front assume the defensive and hold up the over troops, and combat tactics. In particu- fact that by September 28, Kim had already enemy by any means. The troops of the lar, Stalin and his associates in Moscow held lost contact with his Defense Minister, Ch’oe Second Army Group operating in the cen- responsible the Soviet military advisers for Yong-gon, who was in charge of the defense tral and southern parts of the southeastern these blunders. In their judgment, the Soviet of Seoul.19 Moreover, Kim and other top front were ordered to begin a general retreat military advisers had failed to implement political leaders in Pyongyang had lost all northwestward. But the North Korean troops scrupulously and in a timely fashion Stalin’s communication with their Front Line Com- in the South no longer obeyed their com- order to withdraw four divisions from the mand and the Auxiliary Command Posts, manders; the KPA was rapidly disintegrat- central front to the Seoul area, and had dis- which had been cut off from each other by ing. In Zakharov’s judgment, at that time played, moreover, strategic illiteracy and Walker’s rapidly advancing Eighth Army.20 the North’s top political and military leaders incompetence in intelligence matters. “They That day, the U.S.-led UN forces enveloped already had no idea about the predicament failed to grasp the strategic importance of the both the First and Second Army Groups of of the KPA troops, in particular on the enemy’s assault landing in Inch’on, denied the KPA, broke up the KPA’s command southeastern front. the gravity of its implications... This blind- structure, and completely destroyed its com- On September 26, the ROK 7th Divi- ness and lack of strategic experience led to munications system. The KPA units at- sion moving westward from Namsan dis- the fact that they doubted the necessity of tempting to retreat to the north from the trict, after having crossed the Han River, redeploying troops from the South toward Naktong River were pursued and destroyed. joined hands with the U.S. 5th and 7th Seoul. At the same time, they procrastinated In Kim Il Sung’s own words, “because of Marines. Although some North Korean over the redeployment and slowed it down poor discipline and failure to fulfill orders,” resistance, including suicide squads attack- considerably, thereby losing a week to the the KPA failed to pull out most of their ing American tanks, continued fiercely un- enemy’s enjoyment.” The Politburo stated troops stuck in the south.21 til the afternoon of September 27, by and that “the assistance provided by our military The WPK CC PC’s second decision large the battle for Seoul was over as the advisers to the Korean Command in such was to take urgent measures aimed to orga- night fell. According to Zakharov’s ci- paramount questions as communications, nize defenses along the 38th parallel, ap- phered telegram [Document #4], later that command and control over troops, organiza- proving Kim’s plan to form immediately night, Kim Il Sung received him; DPRK tion of intelligence and combat is exception- fifteen new divisions. At that time, six new Foreign Minister Pak Hon-Yong and ally weak.”17 In conclusion, the Politburo infantry divisions were already being cre- Shtykov also attended. As a result of the decided that after the fall of Seoul the KPA’s ated in South Pyongan and South Hwanghae, conversation, Kim Il Sung decided to com- main goal should be to withdraw all its troops and South and North Hamgyong Provinces. bine the duties of the Supreme Commander- to North Korea and defend its own homeland At the same time, Kim hoped to reconstitute in-Chief and Defense Minister in his own by all means. It attached a list of military nine more infantry divisions from the rem- hands, to set up a Staff Office for the Su- measures which Chief Soviet Military Ad- nants of the KPA returning from the south- preme Commander-in-Chief for command viser Vasiliev was ordered to implement in eastern front.22 and control over troops, and to pay serious order to prevent the enemy from crossing the Finally, in the course of a fierce debate, attention to the work of the rear. Zakharov 38th parallel. Despite the gravity of the the Political Council concurred that after the 98 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN fall of Seoul nothing would stop the UN pleading for help [Document #6]. Actually, could not be more explicit than that. Recog- forces from crossing the 38th parallel; that if the letter was dated September 29. The next nizing that they could not survive on their they did cross the parallel, the remaining day, Pak Hon-Yong personally delivered it own, they were crying out for help to Stalin, KPA units would not be able to render any to Shtykov with an emotional plea that “at their “fatherly leader,” for, preferably, the serious resistance, and, consequently, the the moment of the enemy’s troops crossing Soviet cavalry to rescue the day, or, if not, to war would be over in a very short period of of the 38th parallel, we will desperately need broker Mao’s consent to enter the war. time, with the North Korean state being ground troops from the Soviet Union.” The In the meantime, on September 29, eliminated by the aggressive American im- letter arrived at the Eighth Department of the General MacArthur restored the Govern- perialists. Unanimously, the North Korean General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces on ment of the Republic of Korea headed by leadership agreed to ask both allies, the September 30, at 23:30 p.m., by wire as in an emotional ceremony in Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of “very urgent,” was deciphered on October 1, the capital in Seoul. The last hope that the China, for direct military assistance. The at 0:35 a.m., typed up at 1:45 a.m., and war could be contained at the status quo ante Political Council thus discussed and ap- forwarded to Stalin to his dacha in the South belli was dashed when later that day the U.S. proved two official letters [Document #6] at 2:50 a.m. The timing is important in this Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved addressed to Stalin and Mao Zedong, beg- case because only after having received Kim MacArthur’s plan for the conquest of North ging them to intervene directly and without Il Sung’s plea for help did Stalin dispatch a Korea, envisioning the Eighth Army ad- delay to save the North Korean regime. cable to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on vancing to Pyongyang and the Tenth Corps It is noteworthy that the next day, before October 1, at 3:00 a.m., requesting China’s being withdrawn from the Inch’on-Seoul dispatching the letter to Stalin, Kim solicited direct intervention in the Korean conflict. area for another amphibious landing at Shtykov’s advice regarding its content and In their letter, Kim and Pak informed Wonsan. The same day, U.S. Secretary of advisability. On the evening of September Stalin about the severe consequences for the Defense Gen. George C. Marshall sent an 29, following the mandate of the WPK CC KPA of the Inch’on landing. Although still encouraging message to MacArthur: “We Politburo, Kim for the first time officially loathe to admit that Seoul had fallen, they want you to feel unhampered strategically raised to his Soviet military advisers the indicated that the enemy “had the real possi- and tactically to proceed north of the 38th question of the UN forces’ crossing the 38th bility of taking over Seoul.” They were Parallel.”25 parallel. At his meeting with Shtykov and certain that “with the complete occupation On September 30, the Soviet Politburo Zakharov [Document #5], with Pak Hon- of Seoul, the enemy would launch a further conferred again on the Korean situation, in Yong present, he asked Shtykov whether the offensive into North Korea.” Kim and Pak particular Zakharov’s latest report on the latter thought the enemy would dare to cross admitted that “if the enemy were to take dire military situation [Document #4]. The the 38th parallel. Once Shtykov replied that advantage of the situation and step up its discussion focused on the need to avoid a he was not sure, Kim concurred by saying offensive in North Korea, then we would be direct military confrontation between the that “it was not clear to me either.” Kim unable to stop the enemy by our own forces... USSR and the United States and the options added, however, that “if the enemy did cross and the U.S. aggression would succeed in still available to salvage the situation in the parallel, the People’s Army would not be the end.” Nonetheless, they emphasized that Korea, including soliciting Chinese help and able to form new troops and, therefore, would they were still determined to fight on, to opening a last-ditch diplomatic maneuver- not be able to render any serious resistance mobilize new troops and to prepare “for a ing at the United Nations. The Politburo to the enemy forces.” Kim told Shtykov he protracted war.” They argued that it was “in directed that the Foreign Ministry draft a wanted his advice as to how they should the USSR’s national interest to prevent the new ceasefire resolution to be submitted to approach Stalin concerning their letter re- U.S. advance into North Korea and the latter’s the UN. Also, they decided to approve Kim questing direct Soviet military assistance. transformation into a and military Il Sung’s proposals to reorganize the KPA But Shtykov dodged the question, obviously springboard of U.S. imperialism.” high military command, form six new divi- to ensure that the final decision to invite Finally, they begged Stalin for a “spe- sions, and withdraw remaining North Ko- Soviet troops to the defense of North Ko- cial kind of assistance,” admitting that “at rean troops from the South [Document #8]. rea—and subsequent responsibility, should the moment when the enemy troops begin to At the same time, the Politburo decided that things go wrong—would rest with Kim Il cross the 38th parallel, we would desper- armaments, munition, and other materials Sung and Pak Hon-Yong themselves.23 Kim ately need direct military assistance from the for the new divisions would be supplied to and Pak were visibly dissatisfied and upset Soviet Union.” Afraid of their plea being the KPA between October 5 and 20.26 Fi- but at the same time so “confused, lost, rejected outright and fearful that Stalin held nally, the Politburo recommended that Kim hopeless, and desperate,” and had so much at them personally responsible for the war’s ask the Chinese to dispatch truck drivers to stake at the moment, that they went ahead disastrous turn, Kim and Pak inserted a face- North Korea. and asked Stalin for a total commitment, saving proposition for Stalin, i.e., “if for any It is worth noting that Stalin specifically including Soviet ground troops, even with- reason, this [direct military assistance - AM] mentioned in his instructions to Shtykov that out Shtykov’s blessing.24 proves to be impossible, please, assist us in their last recommendation should be passed It was on October 1, at 2:50 a.m., that lining up international volunteers’ units in to Kim Il Sung without any reference to Stalin received ciphered telegram #1351 from China and other countries of people’s de- Moscow, as if it were coming from the Shtykov, containing an official text of the mocracies to be used in providing military Soviet military advisers in the field. The letter of Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong assistance to our struggle.” Kim and Pak probable cause for such reticence may have COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 99 been Stalin’s belief that the entire question ernment. Otherwise, all had to stay at their generals, implying that the role of the Soviet of the Chinese entry into the war was so post, whatever it was. At the same time, the military advisers to Kim Il Sung and the profound that: 1) he had to discuss it with Foreign Ministry in Moscow insisted that it, KPA would be drastically curtailed, if not Mao directly; and 2) he should not even not Shtykov, should have the final say in abolished altogether. raise it until it was clear that without Chi- each case of anticipatory repatriation. Sur- It is noteworthy that this is one of the nese help the North Koreans would not prisingly, Stalin opted to defer both Shtykov’s first instances in the Stalin-Mao correspon- survive, and until the latter asked for it request and Gromyko’s recommendation for dence where Stalin indicated to Mao his explicitly. Also, Stalin may have wanted to the time being. willingness to share control over events in probe Mao’s intentions and promises and Later that same night, on September 30, Korea. In exchange for shouldering so much put them to a real test, albeit on the minor Stalin, who was vacationing at one of his of the burden of defending of North Korea, issue of truck drivers. Perhaps Stalin even dachas on the Black Sea, was informed about Stalin offered Mao a power-sharing arrange- hoped to drag Mao into the war incremen- the content of Zhou Enlai’s official speech in ment. Thus, this telegram was a harbinger of tally: according to this scenario, the drivers Beijing earlier that day, in which Zhou stated the looming end of the unilateral Soviet would be the first commitment of man- that “the Chinese people will not tolerate control over North Korea which had lasted power by Mao to Korea, which would later foreign aggression, nor will they supinely since 1945. It also meant that from then on lead to a chain of escalating commitments. tolerate seeing their neighbors being sav- Kim Il Sung would have two masters to The Politburo made these decisions and agely invaded by the imperialists.” Stalin serve, as well as to play off against each wired some of them to Pyongyang close to may well have sensed that the Chinese might other—one in Moscow and one in Beijing. noon on September 30, i.e., before Stalin be ready for action. At the same time, Stalin felt compelled to received another ciphered telegram #1340 On October 1, at 3:00 a.m., upon the show some respect for Chinese sensitivities, from Shtykov [Document #5], later that the receipt of Kim Il Sung’s desperate plea for in particular, their yearning for national in- same day (after 4:55 p.m.). Only then was help, Stalin immediately dictated a telegram dependence and independent decision-mak- Stalin officially informed by him that Seoul to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and had it ing; moreover, he was intent to avoid the had fallen and Syngman Rhee was back in wired to Beijing [Document #10]. In his possibly very awkward position of being the the capital, promising to complete his drive telegram, first of all he placed all the blame messenger of bad news, in case Mao turned to the North and vanquish Stalin’s North for the KPA’s collapse and disintegration on down his request. Therefore, Stalin “mag- Korean comrades; that Kim Il Sung was North Korean military commanders who, in nanimously” designated Mao to deliver his afraid that the UN forces would not halt his opinion, had failed to carry out Kim Il own response directly to Kim Il Sung, stress- their advance northward at the 38th parallel; Sung’s orders for a strategic retreat of the ing that he did not intend to pre-judge the and that the North Koreans would not be main forces from the South. He specifically Chinese comrades and tell Kim Il Sung able to resist the enemy’s offensive on their mentioned to Mao that Moscow had fore- about their likely decision, nor would he own. warned the North Korean political leader- desire to do so in the future, because all the Later in the evening of September 30, ship about possibly devastating consequences honors and gratitude should belong to Mao, in line with the general disposition in Mos- of the U.S. landing at Inch’on as early as not Stalin. cow toward limiting the Soviet presence September 16, but that the warning was dis- On the evening of October 1, Stalin and risks in Korea, Shtykov requested evacu- regarded. However, he was careful to avoid approved the text of a Soviet draft resolution ation powers from Moscow [Stalin was in- blaming Kim Il Sung personally, thereby regarding the Korean Question that had been formed of this in a note from Deputy For- indicating to Mao that Kim was still the man drafted at the Foreign Ministry’s first Far eign Minister A. A. Gromyko dated Sep- to deal with in Pyongyang. Second, Stalin Eastern Department, approved by Gromyko, tember 30—Document #9]. Shtykov asked informed Mao and Zhou that after their ruin- and submitted for Stalin’s consideration. for the right to send back to the USSR all ous defeat in Seoul, the North Koreans no For Stalin, it was a last pitch to the West to Soviet specialists working at the North Ko- longer had any troops capable of resistance, resolve the Korean crisis without major es- rean enterprises,27 as well as some redun- and that the road toward the 38th parallel calation.28 At 9:15 p.m. (Moscow time), in dant personnel of the Soviet organizations from the south was wide open. Finally, Beijing Soviet Ambassador Roshchin deliv- in the DPRK. As the Soviet Ambassador to Stalin requested that Mao, if possible, “im- ered the content of the draft resolution to the DPRK responsible for the lives of his mediately dispatch at least five to six divi- Zhou Enlai. At 10:45 p.m. (Moscow time), people and anticipating the inevitability of sions toward the 38th parallel so that the Zhou Enlai met Roshchin again and in- the U.S. occupation of North Korea, Shtykov Korean comrades would have an opportu- formed him that Mao agreed with its provi- not unnaturally sought emergence authority nity to regroup and form combat reserves sions. An hour later, after learning Mao’s to order their evacuation. But Gromyko north of the 38th parallel under the protection view, Stalin immediately ordered it wired to disagreed and advised a different proce- of the Chinese troops.” Stalin suggested, the Soviet Representative to the United Na- dure: In order to show the Soviets’ continu- apparently for the first time, that the Chinese tions at Lake Success.29 ous faith and backing for Kim Il Sung’s troops should be designated as “volunteer” It is well known that on October 2, government, he recommended to Stalin that forces. In order to entice Mao further, he Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky presented Shtykov be allowed to repatriate the Soviet indicated that he was ready to share overall the Soviet draft resolution to the Political specialists only after a specific request of command and control over the KPA and the Committee of the General Assembly, which such a nature was made by the DPRK gov- Chinese volunteer forces with the Chinese stipulated an immediate ceasefire, with COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 100 drawal of all foreign troops, and general plained, after “thoroughly” considering the October 2 which was published in 1987 in an elections in all Korea to be held under inter- matter, many of his comrades now advo- official Chinese document compilation and national supervision. However, at this stage cated a more cautious course of action. has since been relied upon for numerous of the war, after a miraculous landing at Consequently, the PRC would refrain from scholarly accounts; see the attached foot- Inch’on and the recapture of Seoul when the sending troops to Korea, at least for the time note for further information.)30 KPA was in ruins, a ceasefire was out of being. Mao attributed this reversal to three Stalin, while undoubtedly sorely disap- question and totally unacceptable to the West. principal considerations. First, the Chinese pointed, did not know whether Mao had By now, the decision made in Washington, army was poorly armed, ill-prepared, and given his final word or was simply for bar- on mostly tactical grounds, to cross the 38th had “no confidence” it could defeat the mod- gaining for better terms for China’s partici- parallel, after Inch’on had become an offi- ern American military, which could “force pation in the war. During the day of October cial United Nations operation. us into retreat.” Second, Chinese interven- 5, Stalin conferred with the members of the While waiting for Mao’s reply, on Oc- tion in the conflict would “most likely” lead (VKP(b) CC) Politburo. Although the offi- tober 2, Stalin received information that the to an open Sino-American war, which in cial agenda was designated as “the Question North Korean frontier defenses had begun to turn could drag the USSR into the war due to of Comrade Shtykov,” the real issue under crumble under incessant attacks from Rhee’s its commitments under the Sino-Soviet Alli- consideration was the nature of the Soviet revenge-hungry troops, and the ROK forces ance Treaty, “and the question would thus national security interest in Korea and how had pushed north beyond the parallel on the become extremely large.” Finally, after to protect it on the ground. All Politburo east coast road heading towards Kosong. He decades of civil war, Chinese entry into the members agreed that a direct Soviet-U.S. sent an angry ciphered telegram to Matveev Korean conflict to confront a powerful confrontation in Korea should be avoided at in Pyongyang [Document #11], reiterating American adversary would provoke wide- all costs, even if the USSR had to abandon his earlier directive to his chief military spread domestic resentment within the PRC North Korea. In his memoirs, Khrushchev representative in Korea to do his utmost to toward the newly-established People’s Gov- recalls that “When the threat [after Inch’on] bring the remnants of the KPA mired in the ernment, and wreck the leadership’s plan for emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea south back into the north, and to hold the peaceful reconstruction. that North Korea would be annihilated, and frontline along the 38th parallel. Therefore, Mao reluctantly concluded, that the Americans would reach our border. In the meantime, in Beijing, the crisis it was necessary to “show patience now,” I remember quite well that in connection was building on October 2: ignoring Zhou’s focus on building military strength for a with the exchange of opinions on the Korean warnings, ROK troops with U.S. backing possible later conflict, and in the meantime question, Stalin said: ‘So what? Let the had crossed the 38th parallel a day earlier; accept a temporary defeat in Korea while the United States of America be our neighbors Kim Il Sung was begging for direct military North Koreans “change the form of the in the Far East. They will come there, but we assistance; and, finally, Stalin was person- struggle to partisan war.” Mao concluded shall not fight them now. We are not ready ally urging Mao to intervene in Korea. Con- his message by noting that this decision was to fight.’”31 The upshot of the Politburo sequently, that day Mao convened the first provisional and awaited a final determina- discussion was a decision to increase pres- of a series of enlarged meetings of the Chi- tion by the Central Committee of the Chi- sure on Mao to extract an unequivocal com- nese Communist Party Central Committee nese Communist Party; in the meantime, he mitment from China to enter the war. (CCP CC) Politburo in Beijing to formulate was ready to send Zhou Enlai and Thus, it appears that as a result of cumu- the Chinese response. New documents from to Stalin’s vacation home for direct consul- lative discussions and a series of incremen- the Russian Presidential Archive suggest tations. In conveying Mao’s telegram, which tal decisions dated September 27, Septem- that at their first meeting the CCP CC Polit- was dated October 2, an obviously shocked ber 30, and October 5, the Soviet Politburo buro members discussed general reasons Roshchin noted that this new position flatly adopted a major policy shift in the Soviet why the PRC should or should not enter the contradicted repeated assurances from Chi- policy toward Korea. The Soviet leadership war in Korea and decided that the risks nese leaders that the People’s Liberation appears to have decided to begin to limit outweighed the benefits of China’s direct Army was ready, indeed, in high “fighting Soviet military and political exposure in military intervention at that time. Zhou spirit,” to aid the Koreans and to defeat the Korea, and at the same time permit a greater Enlai and Lin Biao’s negative position pre- Americans. The Soviet envoy could only Chinese role in the alliance decision-making vailed, and Mao felt obliged to inform Stalin speculate on the reasons for the turnabout in on Korea. of the Chinese hesitations and lack of deci- the Beijing leadership’s stand: the interna- In this light, given the continuous dete- sion. tional situation, the “worsening” predica- rioration of the military situation in Korea, On October 3, the Soviet ambassador in ment in Korea, and/or Anglo-American “in- as well as the Soviet leaders’ determination Beijing, Roshchin, relayed Mao Zedong’s trigues” through the intercession of Indian to see Chinese, not Soviet, troops fighting negative response. [See Document #12.] Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. (It is there, the Politburo overruled the Foreign Replying to Stalin’s October 1 entreaty to important to note that this account of Mao’s Ministry’s objections and decided, as one of enter the war, Mao acknowledged that the October 2 communication to Stalin, inform- the first steps aimed at curtailing the Soviet Chinese leadership had “originally planned” ing him of Chinese refusal to enter the war, presence in Korea, to grant Ambassador to send “several volunteer divisions” to as- based on newly-declassified documents int Shtykov the evacuation powers that he re- sist the “Korean comrades” once the enemy he Russian archives, fundamentally contra- quested with respect to some Soviet special- crossed the 38th parallel. However, he ex- dicts the purported Mao to Stalin message of ists employed by the DPRK government and 101 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN by Soviet organizations in Korea [Politburo but it would not be able to get back even 5] letter and stated that he would send nine, Decision No. P78/168, Document #14]. He Taiwan, which at that time the United States not six, divisions to Korea, but that he would was notified of this policy change by wire was clinging to; not for the benefit of Nation- not do it right away; instead, he intended to the same day. Ironically, the permission alist Chinese leader Jiang Jieshi (Chiang do it some time soon. In the meantime, he arrived just as Shtykov, sensing a policy Kai-shek), in Stalin’s view, but to use the asked me to receive his representatives and shift in Moscow, losing all his faith in Kim island as its own strategic base or for a discuss with them a plan of military assis- Il Sung’s ability to defend his regime on his militaristic Japan of tomorrow. tance to Korea in detail” [see Document own, and unsure if any help was coming In conclusion, Stalin displayed a singu- #13]. Evidently, Mao’s October 7 telegram from Moscow or Beijing, requested even larly unusual propensity for high-stakes gam- contained only his conditional consent to more extended evacuation powers, now in- bling which was fraught with the potential send troops to Korea. He had taken a step cluding the families of the Soviet citizens of for global disaster. He reassured Mao that he toward Stalin’s position but hinted that, once Korean nationality,32 the personnel of the had taken into account the possibility that the again, the decision was not yet final, and Soviet Air Force units stationed in Korea,33 United States, albeit unready to fight a major could be rendered final only after Stalin and all other Soviet citizens in Korea [Docu- war then, could still be drawn into a big war received in person and succeeded in per- ment #16]. It took less than a day for (i.e., with China) on a question of prestige, suading the chief CCP CC Politburo oppo- Vasilevsky and Gromyko to get Stalin’s which, in turn, would drag the USSR, which nents of China’s entry into the Korean War: approval and immediately wire the affirma- was bound with China by a Mutual Assis- Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Stalin accepted tive response. tance Pact, into the war. Stalin asked Mao: Mao’s request with understanding, realizing After the conference with his Politburo “Should we be afraid of this possibility? In that he had to bolster Mao if he wanted the associates sometime during the day of Octo- my opinion, we should not, because, to- latter to deliver. ber 5, Stalin sent a ciphered telegram to Mao gether, we will be stronger than the United While Moscow and Beijing bickered and Zhou [Document #13]. Without men- States and Great Britain, whereas none of the about why, when, on what terms, and whether tioning the latest policy shift in Moscow, he other European capitalist states (with the troops should be sent to defend Kim Il Sung’s outlined his reasoning why it was in China’s exception of Germany, which is unable to crumbling regime—and whose troops they national interest to dispatch the Chinese provide any assistance to the United States should be—the Western allies intensified “Volunteers” to save the collapsing North now) possess any military power at all. If their diplomatic offensive at the United Na- Korean regime and why this had to be done war is inevitable, let it be waged now, and not tions and stepped up their military offensive immediately. First, he reiterated his convic- in a few years when Japanese imperialism on the battleground, anticipating a quick tion that the United States was not ready to will be restored as a U.S. ally and when the mop-up of the entire Korean campaign. On fight a major war at present, while Japan, U.S. and Japan will have a ready-made bridge- October 4, the Political Committee of the whose militaristic potential had not yet been head on the continent in the form of all Korea UN General Assembly rejected the Soviet restored, was not currently capable of mili- run by Syngman Rhee.” This telegram was draft resolution of October 2, and, on Octo- tarily assisting the Americans. Therefore, a call for action. Stalin forcefully indicated ber 7, the UN General Assembly passed by he argued, the U.S. would be compelled to to Mao that all the chips were down, and Mao a 47-5-7 vote a “Go after the DPRK” resolu- concede in the Korean question to China, had to show what hand he was playing after tion, proposed by the United Kingdom, which which was backed by its ally, the USSR, and all. recommended that: “1. a) All appropriate to agree to terms of settlement favorable to The embattled Mao must have received steps be taken to ensure conditions of stabil- (North) Korea thus preventing the Ameri- this telegram amidst a series of tense emer- ity throughout Korea; b) all constituent acts cans from transforming the peninsula into gency sessions of the CCP CC Politburo in be taken, including the holding of elections, their springboard. Following the same hard- Beijing sometime on October 6. It was at one under the auspices of the U.N., for the estab- nosed reasoning, Stalin stated of these meetings that Mao reportedly an- lishing of a united, independent and demo- that, consequently, not only would Wash- nounced his decision to appoint Peng Dehuai cratic government in the sovereign state of ington have to abandon Taiwan, but also as the commander of the Chinese People’s Korea.” In a nutshell, this resolution gave they would have to reject the idea of sepa- Volunteers (CPV). Later that evening, Mao Gen. MacArthur and the Western powers rate peace with the Japanese “revanchists,” dined together with Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai, carte blanche to occupy all of North Korea and to jettison their plans of revitalizing and Gao Gang. Reportedly, they agreed that and rearrange its political and economic Japanese imperialism and of converting Ja- “now it seems that we have to fight a war,” systems to their liking. On the day this pan into their bridgehead in the Far East. and that Zhou Enlai would fly to Moscow to crucial vote was taken, in Korea the ad- Having depicted his vision of an emerg- solicit Soviet military aid. The next morn- vanced units of the 1st Cavalry of Gen. ing new geopolitical order in the Far East, ing, a supreme military conference presided Walton Walker’s Army crossed the 38th Stalin blandly told Mao that he proceeded over by Zhou is said formally to have ap- Parallel in the Kaesong area. from the assumption that China could not proved of Mao’s decision to send Zhou and At 10:15 p.m. on the night of October 7 extract these concessions if she were to Lin Biao to the USSR to discuss the details of Stalin asked Bulganin to forward to Kim Il adopt a passive wait-and-see policy. With- military cooperation.34 Sung via Shtykov his long-delayed response out some serious struggle and an imposing On October 7, Stalin received Mao’s to Kim’s October 1 plea for help. It had display of force, he argued, not only would reply; in Stalin’s own words, “Mao expressed taken almost a week for Stalin to respond, China fail to obtain all these concessions, solidarity with the main ideas of my [October although he was well aware that Kim was COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 102 desperate and hanging over a precipice. Stalin military advice and arms supplies from the forces could use this opportunity to raise had tarried simply because he did not yet USSR. Nonetheless, once informed of Mao’s their heads again; and, finally, 3) the U.S. have any good news to deliver. Only after commitment to send ground troops to fight could declare war on China, should the latter receiving Mao’s conditional commitment in Korea, he apparently began to distance intervene in Korea. did he decide to write to Kim. In his tele- himself from Stalin. No longer did he re- Aware of these arguments from his pre- gram, which Shtykov gave Kim on the after- quest Soviet ground troops or even air cover, vious correspondence with Mao and bearing noon of October 8, Stalin for the first time because he knew Mao would probably take in mind that Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao were told Kim Il Sung about his ongoing negotia- care of it by himself.36 the chief opponents within the CCP CC tions with Mao, noting that the Chinese In the meantime, the Western allies Politburo of China’s entry into the war, comrades still had doubts and hesitated to continued to advance. On October 9 in Stalin went on the offensive. First, he noted make a final commitment to fight, but, at the Washington, President Truman and the JCS that the Great Patriotic War (World War II) same time, emphasizing that negotiations directed MacArthur to cross the 38th paral- had just ended, and therefore it would be continued, and therefore Kim Il Sung had to lel, even if Chinese intervention occurred, so very difficult for the USSR to fight another battle tenaciously for each inch of his land long as “in your judgment, action by forces large-scale war right away. Besides, the because help was on its way [Document now under your control offers a reasonable Soviet-North Korean border was too narrow #13]. chance of success.” At once, MacArthur to allow massive troop transfers. Notwith- Reportedly, Mao also sent a telegram to issued his final de- standing this, if U.S. actions were to jeopar- Kim Il Sung via his Ambassador in mand, stating that unless North Korea ca- dize the fate of world socialism on a global Pyongyang, who went to Kim’s underground pitulated, he would proceed to “take such scale, the Soviet Union would be ready to headquarters and handed it to him on the military action as may be necessary to en- take up the American challenge. However, night of October 8. It said: “In view of the force the decrees of the United Nations.” he stressed that, at that time, U.S. imperial- current situation, we have decided to send The same day, advanced ROK I Corps units ism was in a weak strategic position because volunteers to Korea to help you fight against moving up the east coast from the perimeter it could not rely for assistance on traditional the aggressor.” Chinese sources report Kim reached Wonsan, over 110 miles north of the military powers such as Germany and Japan, Il Sung to have reacted gleefully.35 parallel. The 1st Cavalry and the 27th Com- as well as Britain, all of which were pro- The next morning, on October 9, at 7:05 monwealth Brigade pushed north towards foundly weakened by the Second World a.m., Shtykov wired Kim’s reply to Stalin Kumchon, Sariwon, and Pyongyang itself.37 War. Hence, Washington would not dare to [Document #16], adding that he concurred On October 9, two F-80 jets raided “by launch a world war. Since any kind of U.S. with its content. Clearly, this letter reflected mistake” a Soviet airfield sixty miles inside attack against China would trigger the mu- Kim’s new, more positive mood and his the USSR border near Vladivostok. The tual military assistance provision of the So- newly found self-confidence. Although days of Kim Il Sung’s state appeared to be viet-Chinese Alliance Treaty and draw the Shtykov did not mention any contacts be- numbered. It is plausible to assume that U.S. into a global conflict with the USSR, tween Kim and the Chinese representatives Stalin was aware of these developments in for which it was not ready, America was the night before, surely Mao’s cable had Korea when he first received Zhou Enlai and unlikely to risk a war with China on the lifted Kim’s spirit. In his letter, Kim ex- Lin Biao at a dacha near the Black Sea late latter’s own territory. Hence, in Stalin’s pressed his belief that the U.S. aggressor that night. opinion, at that moment, Beijing could help would not stop until it had occupied Korea The Stalin-Zhou talks of 9-10 October the North Koreans without fear of U.S. re- entirely and converted it into its military- 1950 are crucial in understanding the evolu- taliation against . More- strategic springboard for further aggression tion of the Soviet-Chinese alliance and the over, Stalin emphasized that it was in China’s in the Far East; therefore, the struggle of the terms of the Chinese entry into the Korean national interest to ensure the survival of a Korean people for their independence, free- War. They reveal how domestic political friendly government in North Korea. For, if dom, and state sovereignty would be pro- considerations influenced the foreign policy the U.S. occupied the North and deployed its tracted and very hard. priorities of these two communist giants, as forces along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, this In contrast to his previous letter of Sep- well as the pivotal role of misperceptions would pose an enormous threat to Chinese tember 29, in which he had requested “direct and miscommunications in the mismanage- security, because the Americans could ha- military assistance” from the Soviet Union, ment of the alliance relationship. rass China from the air, land, and sea at their Kim now asked Stalin only to aid the KPA The newly declassified Russian docu- discretion and could also endanger the eco- by training 2,000 pilots, 1,000 tank drivers, ments from the APRF by and large confirm nomic development of northeast China. 500 radio operators, and 500 engineering the account of Mao’s interpreter, Shi Zhe,38 But, despite these arguments, Zhou did officers in the territory of the USSR. Of (except dates) of what transpired between not yield to Stalin’s pressure. Stalin appears course, if one looks at the numbers, the Stalin and Zhou at the former’s dacha during to have almost yelled in exasperation, “That inescapable impression is that Kim basically these two days. In brief, Zhou told Stalin you do not want to send troops to Korea is asked Stalin to help train an entirely new that the CCP CC Politburo had decided not your decision, but socialism in Korea would professional officers corps for the KPA, to send troops to Korea because: 1) China collapse within a very short period of time.” with the exception of the infantry officers. lacked adequate money, arms, or transport; After regaining his composure, Stalin In other words, Kim Il Sung’s fortunes were 2) the CCP’s domestic political opposition changed his tactics and laid out a stark alter- still very much dependent on professional had not been pacified yet, and reactionary native for Zhou. He suggested that both the 103 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Soviet Union and PRC provide sanctuary very beginning.41 Not only did these fic- other’s throat because they both disagreed for Kim Il Sung and the remnants of the tional events never occur, they could not with his own beliefs. Zhou seems to have KPA if they could no longer fight on their even have happened the way they were de- viewed his visit to Stalin as a last opportu- own; the main forces, arms, equipment, and scribed. Stalin never co-signed his tele- nity to prevent China from entering the Ko- some cadres of the KPA would be rede- grams with anybody, regardless of the status rean war and to shift the entire burden of ployed to northeast China, while the dis- of the other party or the addressee, including saving Kim’s regime onto Stalin’s broad abled and wounded men, as well as Koreans Mao and Zhou. In the Stalinist era, Soviet shoulders. Once he realized that Stalin did of Soviet origin, could be moved to the Politburo members never used the telephone not want to accept this responsibility and Maritime Province of the Soviet Far East. In to communicate important decisions, no preferred to see the Chinese fighting, Zhou their new bases in northeast China they matter how urgent those might be, let alone opted to bluff and may even have misrepre- would train new troops, master new weap- to talk to foreign leaders. These fictional sented the Soviet position in his correspon- onry, and prepare themselves for the day of events contradict the then-prevailing Soviet dence with Mao. But, to his regret, he their reentry into Korea. Stalin reiterated party bureaucratic practices.42 The present miscalculated Stalin’s high risk-taking pro- that since the Chinese did not intend to send author has never encountered evidence of pensity in his gambling on the future of troops, the Soviet Union and China should such unorthodox procedures anywhere in the North Korea altogether, as well as Mao’s work out concrete plans to provide shelter Russian Archives. own determination to fight in Korea, and for their Korean comrades and their forces, In reality, all along Stalin reiterated his failed to foresee that Mao would decide to and make sure that one day they would be willingness to provide the CPV with air fight even when his back was pushed against able to return to Korea. cover if Mao sent his troops to Korea.43 and he was left ostensibly alone, Reportedly, Zhou was stunned at what Nonetheless, on October 11, Zhou report- allegedly without Soviet air support. he heard. He backed away from his initial edly sent a telegram to Mao in Beijing, stat- In the meantime, in Korea, on October tough stance, and asked Stalin whether China ing that “Comrade Filippov [a pseudonym 12, the Interim Committee of the UN Com- could count on Soviet air cover should it for Stalin-AM] did not express his objections mission for the Unification and Rehabilita- decide to fight in Korea. Without a pause, to the CCP CC Politburo’s decision not to tion of Korea, created by the UN General Stalin responded positively: “We can send a send troops to Korea.” It was Gao Gang who Assembly resolution of October 7, advised certain number of aircraft to offer cover [for told the Soviet Consul-General in , the to take over the CPV in Korea-AM].” Stalin also reas- A.M. Ledovsky, and General Vazhnov about the civil government of North Korea, which sured Zhou that the Soviet Union would Zhou’s cable from Moscow during a conver- meant in practice that the U.S. military was take care of weapons and equipment sup- sation on October 25 in Shenyang. He added authorized to rule the “liberated” provinces plies for the CPV, including their replace- that it was this telegram from Zhou that of North Korea. Kim Il Sung moved his ments, immediately after the Chinese side reignited a fierce debate in the CCP CC headquarters to Kosangjin, near Kanggye, ascertained its needs in actual combat. Politburo regarding the merits of China’s not far from the Chinese border. The newly- The Stalin-Zhou talks lasted for two intervention in Korea.44 The result was that rebuilt KPA Front Line Command was days, and yet no mutually agreed upon deci- Mao put on hold all Chinese preparations in moved to Tokch’on in South P’yongan Prov- sions were reached at the end. Zhou simply the northeast for the dispatch of troops to ince. The KPA forces desperately tried to said that he needed to communicate with Korea.45 halt the advancing ROK and U.S. troops that Beijing in order to ask for new instructions. I would interpret what happened during had broken through the 38th parallel and Stalin replied that he could wait but that the Stalin-Zhou talks on October 9-10 as reached as far as Chunghwa, a few miles time was fast running out. They parted, follows. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao went to see from Pyongyang. reportedly, both confused about each other’s Stalin with a strong belief that China could On the morning of October 13, Stalin true intentions.39 not and should not intervene in Korea. Dur- received a report from Admirals Golovko Contrary to Goncharov, Xue, and ing the talks, Stalin failed to convince them and Fokin informing him of a large concen- Lewis’ account in Uncertain Partners40— of the potentially dire consequences of the tration of U.S. heavy and am- citing the recollections of Zhou aide Kang North’s collapse for Chinese security and its phibious assault vessels, manned with troops, Yimin—Stalin and Zhou Enlai did not agree international standing. Therefore, Zhou and apparently ready for an amphibious landing to send a joint telegram to Mao Zedong the Lin decided to stick to their original anti- in the harbor of Wonsan [Document #17]. next day. Nor did Molotov call Zhou after intervention stand in their debate with Mao, That day, Wonsan was the target of fero- the latter’s arrival in Moscow with “star- Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang. At the same cious U.S. air raids and Navy fire. Stalin tling news that the Soviet Union would not time, they invented a “respectable” excuse could easily foresee the strategic implica- offer any military equipment to China.” for their obduracy, i.e., an alleged refusal by tions of the forthcoming U.S. landing in These are stories, perhaps elaborated by Stalin to provide the CPV with air cover. At Wonsan: the KPA would be again split in Zhou’s entourage in order to persuade Mao that moment, there was a brief rupture in half, this time along the Pyongyang-Wonsan that Stalin, not Zhou’s obduracy, was to bilateral communications, and both sides were line, and, with its rear absolutely unpro- blame for the “breakdown of talks;” that left to make decisions for themselves. tected, the ROK I Corps and U.S. X Corps Stalin was an unreliable ally; and that, after As far as Zhou Enlai’s role is concerned, could march unimpeded toward the Yalu- all, China should not fight a war in Korea if this scenario is correct, he rose up between Tumen rivers on the North Korean-Chinese alone, which was Zhou’s belief from the Stalin and Mao, and almost had them at each and North Korean-Soviet borders, while Gen. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 104

Walker’s Eighth Army mopped up KPA After receiving Stalin’s evacuation or- asked Zhou Enlai to discuss the matter of remnants in the Pyongyang area and then der on the night of October 13, Kim Il Sung China’s entry into the Korean War with advanced toward the northwest. called Major-General Ch’oe Kyong-dok47 Comrade Filippov again. He stressed that This was a decisive moment for Stalin. to his headquarters in Kosangjin and ordered “Zhou Enlai was being sent new instruc- A week earlier, the Soviet Politburo had that Ch’oe leave immediately for the north- tions.” decided that the USSR would rather aban- eastern provinces of China in order to set up What is important about this telegram is don North Korea than risk a direct military guerrilla bases for Kim and the KPA rem- that it contains Mao’s admission that, in confrontation with the U.S., unless the latter nants there. Ch’oe is said to have departed essence, Zhou’s position was to stonewall deliberately attacked Soviet territory. There- with two adjutants the same night. In the because of the hesitations and reservations fore, Stalin did not intend to send Soviet next several hours, Kim is said to have displayed by some prominent CCP CC lead- ground troops to save Kim Il Sung. As Zhou repeatedly told his close associates that they ers in Beijing. However, once these domes- had told Stalin a couple of days earlier, the would have to wage a guerrilla war from tic political disputes were resolved, Mao Chinese also decided to refrain from sending China again. Within a day Ch’oe and his two wanted Stalin back in the game. the CPV to Korea for the time being. Real- aides had mysteriously disappeared. Kim Il Indeed, Stalin rejoiced at Mao’s new izing that neither he nor Mao was willing to Sung dispatched a small team of scouts to decision because he had been so reluctant to save Kim Il Sung from total defeat, Stalin find them, but in vain.48 abandon North Korea to begin with. At evidently resigned himself to viewing the Meanwhile, however, even before see- once, he hand-wrote a note to Shtykov for entire Korean situation as a matter of cutting ing Kim’s response, Stalin had changed his immediate delivery to Kim Il Sung [Docu- his losses and saving face. mind and dramatically reversed himself, ment #20], the second telegram within hours, Such a conclusion is supported by the thanks to some welcome news from Beijing. temporarily halting the implementation of dramatic order Stalin appears to have sent a Early in the morning of October 14, at 3:20 his order of October 13.49 It said: “I have Kim Il Sung via Ambassador Shtykov on the a.m., he received two extremely urgent tele- just received a telegram from Mao Zedong afternoon of October 13.46 Informing Kim grams (#2406 and #2408) from the Soviet in which he reports that the CCP Central of his talks with Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, envoy to the PRC described a late-night Committee discussed the situation again and Stalin reported with regret that Zhou had meeting with Mao which took place imme- decided after all to render military assistance stated that the Chinese were not yet ready to diately after the CCP CC Politburo finally to the Korean comrades, regardless of the enter the war. Consequently, they con- decided, at a emergency session, to inter- insufficient armament of the Chinese troops. cluded that it would be better for Kim to vene in Korea before the war ended in a U.S. I am awaiting detailed reports about this withdraw the remnants of his forces from victory. Roshchin cited Mao as saying: matter from Mao Zedong. In connection Korea to China and the USSR. Therefore, “Our leading comrades believe that if the with this new decision of the Chinese com- Stalin ordered that Kim Il Sung “evacuate U.S. troops advance up to the border of rades, I ask you to postpone temporarily the North Korea and pull out his Korean troops China, then Korea will become a dark spot implementation of the telegram sent to you to the north.” He also directed that Shtykov for us and the Northeast [China] will be yesterday about the evacuation of North assist Kim in drawing up a plan of measures faced with constant danger.” Mao con- Korea and withdrawal of the Korean troops to implement this evacuation order. In ef- firmed that “past hesitations by our com- to the north.” This telegram makes perfectly fect, Stalin was fed up with Kim Il Sung and rades occurred because the questions of the clear that the crucial consideration in Stalin’s had thrown in the towel. international situation, the questions of the position on intervention in Korea was the Late on the night of October 13, Shtykov, Soviet assistance to us, the question of air role of China. When Mao balked, so did following Stalin’s instructions, met with Kim cover were not clear to them,” and stressed Stalin. When Mao decided to make a com- Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong and read the text that “at present, all these questions have mitment to Kim Il Sung, Stalin again fol- of Stalin’s telegram to them. In Shtykov’s been clarified.” Furthermore, Mao pointed lowed suit. Still unsure whether Mao’s telegram addressed to Fyn Si (another Stalin out, “now it is advantageous for us to dis- decision was irrevocable, Stalin displayed pseudonym), which he wired from patch Chinese troops into Korea. China has some caution and ordered that Kim Il Sung Pyongyang at 3:15 a.m. on October 14 [Docu- the absolute obligation to send troops to “temporarily” postpone, not cancel, the ment #18], he described the North Koreans’ Korea” [Document #19]. He mentioned that implementation of measures advised to him reaction as follows: “Kim Il Sung and Pak at this point they were sending a first contin- a day earlier. Hon-Yong were very much surprised by the gent of nine divisions. Although poorly Only after Stalin received further clari- content of the telegram. Kim Il Sung stated armed, it would be able to fight the troops of fications and proof from Beijing that this that it was extremely hard for them to imple- Syngman Rhee. In the meantime, the Chi- time Mao meant it, did he order that his ment such advice; however, since there was nese comrades would prepare a second ech- previous recommendations to Kim be an- such advice, they would implement it.” Then, elon. As for air cover, Mao expressed hope nulled. He reiterated his commitment to Kim asked Shtykov to give him his practical that the Soviet air force would arrive in supply the CPV with weapons and equip- recommendations and directed that Pak Hon- northeast China as soon as possible, but not ment. Most importantly, he felt compelled Yong write them down. Also, he asked later than in two months. Mao concluded by to indicate to Kim that he was relinquishing Shtykov and Matveyev to assist him in draft- saying that the CCP CC believed that the some of his authority on the Korean matter ing a plan of measures to be taken regarding Chinese must assist Korean comrades in to Mao and his CPV commanders. A few the KPA evacuation plan. their difficult struggle; therefore, he had hours later on October 14, he dispatched a 105 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN third ciphered telegram to Shtykov for Kim at the critical juncture of the war after the UN Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Document #21] which said: “After hesita- troops had crossed the 38th parallel: he or- of the Russian Federation, Moscow. In order to make these materials readily available to researchers in the tions and a series of temporary decisions, dered Kim to abandon the defense of North United States, the Center for Korean Research has the Chinese comrades at last made a final Korea and pull out the remnants of the KPA agreed to cooperate with the Cold War International decision to render assistance to Korea with into guerrilla camps in northeast China and History Project (CWIHP) of the Woodrow Wilson troops. I am glad that the final and favorable the Soviet Far East. Although within several International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. in the procurement, translation, custody, and dissemi- decision for Korea has been made at last. In hours Stalin reversed himself, after learning nation of these documents. (CWIHP has provided a this connection, you should consider the of Mao’s renewed commitment to fight in copy of the documents to the National Security Archive, recommendations of the meeting of the Korea, this original decision dramatically located on the seventh floor of the Gelman Library at Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which revealed the limits of the Soviet national George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where they are available for researchers.) The Center you were told about earlier, annulled. You security interest on the Korean peninsula. In for Korean Research acknowledges with gratitude a will have to resolve concrete questions re- Stalin’s own words (as recalled by generous facilitating grant from the Luce Foundation in garding the entry of the Chinese troops Khrushchev), he was willing to abandon support of this project. jointly with the Chinese comrades. The North Korea and allow the United States to 2. This is according to the field reports filed by several dozen agents sent to the area by the Joint Special armaments required for the Chinese troops become the USSR’s neighbor, with its troops Operations Group from the Far East Command’s G-2 will be delivered from the USSR. I wish you deployed in Korea, if this was the price to pay on the eve of operation Chromite. success.” for avoiding direct military confrontation 3. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (Baltimore, with the U.S. at that time. Moreover, I MD: Penguin Books, Inc., 1964), 84. 4. See, e.g., David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, CONCLUSIONS believe that it was as a result of this incident, op.cit.; Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schelesinger, not Khrushchev’s destalinization campaign, Jr., The General and the President, and the Future of The new documentary evidence from that Kim Il Sung realized the limits of the American Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, the Russian archives led me to the following Soviet support as well as the extent of his and Young, 1951); I. F. Stone, The Hidden Story of the Korean War (New York and London: Monthly Review conclusions. First, all three supreme leaders personal dependency on Moscow, and made Press, 1951); Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the of the USSR, PRC, and the DPRK—Stalin, up his mind to begin distancing himself from Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il Sung—were per- his Soviet handlers. CA: Stanford University Press, 1960); Dean Acheson, sonally and intimately involved in the pros- Fourth, obviously, there was little politi- The Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1967); Kim Chullbaum, ed., The Truth About the Ko- ecution of the Korean War. Notwithstand- cal will and much less hope in Moscow, rean War (Seoul, Korea: Eulyoo Publishing Co., Ltd. ing this, their will often failed to prevail, for Beijing, and even Pyongyang to defend North 1991). the war policies of these states were also Korea to the last man when the military 5. Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Unde- shaped by the pressures of intra-alliance situation collapsed in mid-October 1950. clared War against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951 (New York: New Market, 1988). bargaining, domestic politics, bureaucratic Therefore, had the United States been less 6. See, e.g., Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star: The outputs, and personal preferences of people ambivalent, more consistent, and more per- Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing, 1988); in charge of the implementation of leaders’ suasive on the diplomatic front in stating to Peng Dehuai, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The decisions, not to mention circumstances cre- Moscow and Beijing the goals of its Korean Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984); Shi Zhe, Zai ated by enemy and external forces. campaign—e.g., that it had no desire to at- Lishi Juren Shenbian Shi Zhe Huiyilu [Beside Great Second, contrary to the traditional Chi- tack Mainland China or threaten the territory Historical Figures: The Memoirs of Shi Zhe] (Beijing: nese interpretation, Stalin never reneged on of the Soviet Far East—the Soviet and Chi- Central Archives and Manuscripts Press, 1991); and his promise to Mao to provide the CPV with nese governments could well have decided Yao Xu, Yalujiang dao Banmendian [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom] (Beijing: People’s Press, 1985). Soviet air cover. From early July until late to let Kim Il Sung’s regime go under and 7. Important scholarly contributions in this respect October 1950 he unwaveringly maintained acquiesced to a UN-proposed Korean settle- include Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision that if the Chinese comrades decided to ment. However, Gen. MacArthur’s repeated to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” China intervene in Korea he would send the Soviet unconditional surrender demands, coupled Quarterly 121 (March 1990), 94-115; Michael Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951,” Air Force and Air Defense units to protect with barely veiled direct threats against the Political Science Quarterly 107 (Fall 1992), 453-478; the Chinese ground troops from the air. He PRC and the USSR, coming out of Tokyo Thomas Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the even considered dispatching them directly headquarters, literally pushed the insecure Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean to Pyongyang. An “account of Stalin’s Chinese to the brink, compelling them al- War Telegrams,” International Security 17 (Summer 1992), 122-154; Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, betrayal of Mao” is fictional and should be most against their will to intervene in Korea, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and attributed to Zhou Enlai’s entourage, who thereby providing Stalin a legitimate reason the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University wanted to have their boss look good after the to reconsider his own decision to evacuate Press, 1993); Kim Chull Baum and James Matray, latter probably purposefully failed his mis- North Korea. Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament (1993); Chen Jian, China’s Road to the sion at his talks with Stalin in mid-October, Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Con- 1950 and perhaps even misled Mao about 1. This article is based on the newly-declassified Rus- frontation (New York: Columbia University Press, Stalin’s true intentions. sian archival materials related to the Korean War. Re- 1994), and Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Roman- Third, the only person who had a legiti- searchers were allowed access to these primary sources ticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 from Russia as a result of a series of agreements on (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995). mate reason to feel that Stalin had betrayed academic cooperation and joint research on the history 8. William W. Stueck, The Korean War: An Interna- him at that time was Kim Il Sung. Stalin of the Korean War, signed by the Center for Korean tional History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University reneged on his commitment to back up Kim Research of Columbia University, New York, and the Press, 1995). COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 106

9. [Ed. note: In addition, some high-level declassified mobility by Stalin’s early order that under no circum- records indicating whether Stalin knew of U.S. delegate Russian documents bearing on the period examined by stances they cross the 38th parallel, even when the KPA to the UN Warren Austin’s famous statement to the UN this article were published in English translation in was on the offensive at the Naktong River front. Hence, Political Committee made the day before: “Today the Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role in the Early their own knowledge of the military situation and forces of the United Nations stand on the threshold of Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evi- ability to influence it were very much limited. military victory... The aggressor’s forces should not be dence,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 18. See Shabshin’s conversation with Pak Hon-Yong, permitted to have refuge behind an imaginary line 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-458; see also Col. Gen. D.A. recorded in Document #5. A.I. Shabshin had been the because that would recreate the threat to the peace of Volkogonov, “Should We Be Frightened by This?— Soviet Deputy Consul in Seoul before the end of the Korea and of the world.” Behind the Scenes of the Korean War,” Ogonok (Mos- Second World War; as Adviser on Political Affairs; in 29. See Chronology, list 61. cow) 25-26 (June 1993), English translation in Vladimir 1946, he was appointed as a Political Adviser to the 30. The purported Mao to Stalin cable of 2 October Petrov, “Soviet Role in the Korean War Confirmed: Soviet 25th Army responsible for the occupation of 1950 appeared in an official Chinese compilation of Secret Documents Declassified,” Journal of Northeast North Korea; when the Korean War started, he was Mao’s writings published by the Central Committee of Asian Studies 13:3 (Fall 1994), 42-67, esp. 48-57.] assigned to Gen. Matveyev’s team. the Chinese Communist Party: Jianguo Yilai Mao 10. Although this document has still not been declassi- 19. Kim was reported to be very upset that Ch’oe failed Zedong Wengao Diyi Ce (1949.9-1950.12) [The Manu- fied, it is alluded to in a detailed chronology of events to report to him regularly about the development of the scripts of Mao Zedong Since the Founding of the prepared by officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry military situation in Seoul, despite his access to radio. Nation, vol. 1 (Sept. 1949-Dec. 1952)] (Beijing: Cen- who had access to still-classified materials. In particu- 20. Kim Il Sung commanded his troops from inside an tral Documents Publishing House, 1987), pp. 539-541; lar, the chronology entry dated 20 September 1950, underground located in the vicinity of an English translation appears in Goncharov, Lewis, describing the content of Stalin’s reply to Zhou Enlai’s Pyongyang. According to Yu Song-ch’ol’s memoirs, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 275-76, reading as fol- inquiry about the military situation in Korea after the during the entire war Kim Il Sung made only one visit lows: Inch’on landing (an inquiry which Zhou had conveyed to the Front Line Command. That was when it was to Amb. Roshchin and Soviet military advisers Kotov located at the Seoul Capitol Building. Others disagree 1. We have decided to send some of our and Konnov on September 18), states: “These Soviet and insist that he came down as far as Suanbo to inspect troops to Korea under the name of [Chinese recommendations [regarding what the KPA should do the front lines and allegedly even bathed in hot springs People’s] Volunteers to fight the United States following the Inch’on landing] were transmitted to Kim there. [See Yu Song-ch’ol, “Recollections,” Choong- and its lackey Syngman Rhee and to aid our Il Sung on 18 September 1950.” See Chronology of ang Ilbo (Seoul), 14 November 1990.] Consequently, Korean Comrades. From the following consid- Major Developments on the Eve of and During the the only more or less reliable source of updates on the erations, we think it necessary to do so: the Korean War (January 1949-October 1950) [hereafter military situation for Kim Il Sung at that time was his Korean revolutionary force will meet with a Chronology]. Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Fed- Soviet advisers. But as the predicament of the KPA fundamental defeat, and the American aggres- eration (AVPRF), Moscow, Fond 5, opis 58, delo 266, deepened, they seemed to begin to dodge his inquiries, sors will rampage unchecked once they occupy list 55. citing insufficient knowledge, and to avoid giving rec- the whole of Korea. This will be unfavorable to It appears that this is the same telegram which ommendations on strategy and tactics. the entire East. Stalin referred to in his message to Mao Zedong and 21. See Document #5. 2. Since we have decided to send Chinese Zhou Enlai on 1 October 1950 [Document 10], in which 22. One should note that two days earlier Zakharov had troops to fight the Americans in Korea, we hold he stated that on September 16 “Moscow warned our told Kim that it was wishful thinking on his part to count that, first, we should be able to solve the prob- Korean friends that the landing of the USA troops at on manning those nine divisions from among “the lem; that is, [we are] ready to annihilate and Chemulp’o [Inch’on] had great significance....” Per- southerners” because the UN offensive would most drive out the invading armies of the United haps the discrepancy can be explained by the fact that likely cut off and rout them. See Document #4. States and other countries. Second, since Chi- although the telegram may have been drafted in or sent 23. Such “shyness” was quite unusual for Shtykov, who nese troops are to fight American troops in from Moscow on September 16, given the time differ- in the past had pushed Kim Il Sung around as he pleased Korea (although we will use the name Volun- ence and the chaos of the military situation it might have and often used Kim’s name to promote his own ideas in teers), we must be prepared for a declaration of been handed to Kim only on September 18. Further Moscow. war by the United States and for the subsequent declassification is required to resolve the question con- 24. The origins of this request were not without contro- use of the U.S. air force to bomb many of clusively, however. versy even within the DPRK government. In his con- China’s cities and industrial bases, as well as an 11. At this point, it is worth clarifying a bit of confusion versation with A.I. Shabshin on September 28 [Docu- attack by the U.S. navy on [our] coastal areas. that has emerged over the fact that there were two senior ment #5], Pak Honyong mentioned that originally the 3. Of these two problems, the primary prob- Soviet military officials with the surname Zakharov at WPK CC PC intended to ask only for Soviet air support lem is whether or not the Chinese troops can this juncture of the Korean War. Army Gen. Matvey because some nationalistic North Korean leaders advo- annihilate the American troops in Korea and Vasilievich Zakharov (1898-1972), the Deputy Chief of cated only limited direct Soviet participation in the war. effectively resolve the Korean issue. Only the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, was As of September 29, Kim Il Sung still insisted, perhaps when it is possible for our troops to annihilate dispatched to Pyongyang in late September 1950 to pro forma, that “we should continue to fight on and the American troops in Korea, principally the inspect and report back to Stalin on the military situa- eventually unite Korea by our own forces.” However, Eighth Army (an old army with combat effec- tion. He signed and received messages using the as the military situation continued to deteriorate, in- tiveness), can the situation become favorable to pseudonym, “Matveyev.” In October 1950, shortly creasing the perception in Pyongyang that only an all- the revolutionary camp and to China, although after M.V. Zakharov was sent to Korea, Corps Commisar out intervention by the USSR could bail out the North the second problem (a by the Semyon Egorovich Zakharov (1906-1969) was sent to Korean regime, which was on the brink of complete United States) is still a serious one. This means Beijing as Stalin’s personal military envoy to Mao disaster, Kim felt compelled to seek full Soviet military that the Korean issue will be solved in reality Zedong and Zhou Enlai and remained in the Chinese intervention. along with the defeat of the American troops (in capital until the end of the war in July 1953, and 25. Quoted in Rees, Korea, 103. name it will probably remain unsolved because documents involving him bear his actual name. 26. This timetable may have reflected Stalin’s hope that the United States will most likely not admit 12. See Chronology, AVPRF, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo the remnants of Kim’s troops would be able to resist the Korea’s victory for a considerable period of 266, listy 52-53. UN troops on their own at least for the next few days time). Consequently, even if the United States 13. In Uncertain Partners (p. 174), Goncharov, Lewis, while he would be busy seeking Chinese support. declares war on China, the war will probably not and Xue refer to a five-man team which was dispatched 27. His justification for this measure was that most of be of great scope or last long. The most unfavor- from China to Korea on September 17 “to survey local these enterprises were destroyed by American air raids able situation, we hold, would result from the topography.” This must be the same team of senior and out of operation anyhow. inability of the Chinese troops to annihilate military officers to which Zhou referred. 28. I have not located any evidence in the Russian American troops in Korea and the involvement 14. Chronology, listy 54-55. archives as to whether Stalin was informed on October of the two countries’ troops in a stalemate while 15. See Chronology, listy 55-56. 1 that MacArthur had just made an unconditional sur- the United States publicly declares war on China, 16. Rees, Korea, 91. render demand to the North Koreans to “forthwith lay undermines the plans for China’s economic 17. These charges are not completely fair because the down your arms and cease hostilities under such mili- reconstruction, which has already begun, and Soviet military advisers were severely restricted in their tary supervision as I may direct.” Nor could I find any sparks the dissatisfaction of [China’s] national 107 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

bourgeoisie and other segments of the people appears to leave two principal alternatives: 1) that both 35. See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 185, 279. (they are very afraid of war). Russian documents, and others in the Presidential Ar- 36. One can notice also that from then on, Kim Il Sung 4. Under the current situation, we have chives collection that are logically and chronologically started to conclude his personal letters to Stalin with the reached a decision to order the 12 divisions consistent with the events they describe, are elaborate words “respectfully yours,” instead of “faithfully yours.” stationed in advance in South Manchuria to set fakes (which I find highly unlikely, especially as the 37. See Rees, Korea, 108-109. off on October 15. They will be deployed in collection includes plenty of documents that are highly 38. See Shi Zhe, op. cit. appropriate areas in North Korea (not necessar- incriminating regarding the Soviet role in the war); or 2) 39. The above account of Stalin-Zhou talks in October ily reaching to the 38th parallel). On the one (what I find more likely) that the published Chinese 1950 is based on the author’s June 1995 interview with hand, they will fight the enemies who dare to version of the October 2 telegram is unreliable: inaccu- Dr. Nikolai T. Fedorenko, one of the Soviet participants cross the 38th parallel. At the initial stage, they rate, unsent, or perhaps misdated; nor can one exclude at these talks who interpreted them and later composed will merely engage in defensive warfare to the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by minutes thereof. In the near future, the Center for wipe out small detachments of enemy troops Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be Korean Research expects to receive copies of the min- and ascertain the enemy’s situation; on the a more ideologically or politically correct version of utes of the Stalin-Zhou talks as part of its project on other hand, they will wait for the delivery of history. (In contrast to the case with Russian docu- academic cooperation with the Diplomatic Academy of Soviet weapons. Once they are [well] equipped, ments, scholars have not been permitted access to the the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow. they will cooperate with the Korean comrades relevant Chinese archives to examine original docu- 40. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 190. in counterattacks to annihilate American ag- ments or facsimiles, and have been forced to rely on 41. It is noteworthy, however, that Goncharov, Xue, gressor troops. published versions.) In any case, numerous important and Lewis’s account is based on the personal recollec- 5. According to our intelligence to date, an accounts of the events leading to the PRC’s entry into tions of Kang Yimin, a confidential secretary of Zhou American corps (composed of two infantry the Korean War relying on the Chinese version of the 2 Enlai from the CCP Central Committee who accompa- divisions and a mechanized division) has 1,500 October 1950 Mao to Stalin cable must now be called nied the latter to Moscow. One may speculate that Zhou guns of 70 mm to 240 mm caliber, including into question. [Ed. note: Some of the more important of might have attempted to distort the record of talks in tank cannons and anti-aircraft guns. In com- the many examples of recent works using the Chinese order to manipulate Mao’s opinion, and later used his parison, each of our corps (composed of three version of the cable—an English translation of which confidential secretary to leak his preferred version of divisions) has only 36 such guns. The enemy was reprinted under the headline, “Mao’s Cable Ex- what allegedly happened in Moscow. dominates the air. By comparison, we have plains Drive Into Korea,” in on 26 42. This conclusion is based on the author’s June 1995 only just started training pilots. We shall not be February 1992—include Christensen, “Threats, Assur- interview with a former high-ranking official at the able to employ more than 300 aircraft in combat ances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” esp. 135-142; International Department of the CPSU CC who asked until February 1951. Accordingly, we do not Hunt, “Beijing and the Korean Crisis,” esp. 460-463; not to be identified. now have any certainty of success in annihilat- Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: 43. Intriguingly, the first time Stalin mentioned his ing a single American corps in one blow. Since Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: willingness to provide Chinese troops with air cover if we have made a decision to fight the Ameri- Cornell University Press, 1992), 97; Goncharov, Lewis, they engaged in Korea was in his letter to Zhou Enlai cans, we certainly must be prepared to deal with and Xue, Uncertain Partners, esp. 176-183; Chen Jian, dated 5 July 1950(!). In his ciphered telegram #3172 a situation in which the U.S. headquarters will China’s Road to the Korean War, esp. 175-180; Stueck, wired to Beijing at 23:45 p.m., he stated that “we employ one American corps against our troops The Korean War, esp. 99-100; and Shu Guang Zhang, consider it correct to concentrate immediately nine in one [of the Korean] theaters. For the purpose Mao’s Military Romanticism, esp. 78-80.] Chinese divisions on the Chinese - North Korean border of eliminating completely one enemy corps Clearly, further research is necessary, in both the for volunteers’ actions in North Korea in the event of with a certainty of success, we should in such a Moscow and Beijing archives, to establish the precise the enemy’s crossing the 38th parallel. We will do our situation assemble four times as many troops as contents and chronology of the communications be- best to provide the air cover for these units.” For the full the enemy (employing four corps to deal with tween Stalin and Mao during the first two weeks of text, see Document #7. one enemy corps) and firepower from one-and- October 1950. In the meantime, the evidence cited here 44. See Chronology, list 61. a-half times to twice as heavy as the enemy’s should induce additional caution in treating the Chinese 45. See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 192-195. (using 2,200 to 3,000 guns of more than 70mm version of Mao’s decision to enter the Korean War. 46. Although we do not have this ciphered telegram in caliber to deal with 1,500 enemy guns of the 31. N. S. Khrushchev, The Korean War (Moscow: our physical possession, there is plenty of circumstan- same caliber). Progress Publishing House), 28, in Russian; for a slightly tial evidence to believe that this document actually 6. In addition to the above-mentioned 12 different English translation, see Khrushchev Remem- existed: Stalin cited and referred to this ciphered tele- divisions, we are moving 24 divisions from bers: The Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. gram several times in Documents #20 and #21; also, a south of the River and from Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, reference to it appears in Shtykov’s telegram to Stalin and provinces to areas along the - Brown, and Co., 1990), 147. in Document #18. Lanzhou, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Shenyang 32. I believe that Shtykov referred to the members of the 47. Major-General Ch’oe Kyong-dok was a member of railroad lines. We plan to employ these divi- DPRK government and various administrative agen- the Front Military Council. Before the war he was the sions as the second and third groups of troops cies and organizations who originally came from the Chairman of the DPRK Federation of Trade Unions. sent to aid Korea in the spring and summer of USSR as Soviet citizens of Korean nationality. This 48. This account is based on the author’s interview with next year as the future situation requires. was an “escape clause” for all the so-called Soviet Dr. V. K. Pak (Pak Gil-yon), former Deputy Foreign Korean leaders, including Kim Il Sung himself and his Minister of the DPRK (1954-1960) in charge of the Is the above text—indicating a firm Chinese guerrilla comrades. DPRK’s relations with socialist countries, who has decision to intervene militarily against the Americans 33. I believe that herein Shtykov referred to the Soviet been in exile in the USSR since his purge in 1960. in Korea (albeit with some trepidation and an explicit aircraft maintenance and support teams which were During the Korean War, Mr. Pak served at Kim Il statement that the “Volunteer” forces would require transferred from the Maritime Province to the vicinity Sung’s headquarters as his second personal interpreter. adequate Soviet weaponry before they could take the of Pyongyang in the last week of September. At that The interview took place in Moscow on 10 July 1995. offensive)—compatible with the message from Mao to time, the Soviet General Staff had still been considering 49. Although this note was written and wired out in the Stalin dated 2 October 1950 which Roshchin cabled to Stalin’s order to dispatch a Soviet fighter aviation early morning hours of October 14, Stalin seems to have Moscow on 3 October 1950 [Document #12], accord- to provide air cover for the North Korean pre-dated it as of October 13. Perhaps he wanted to ing to the document recently declassified in the Rus- capital. However, once the UN forces moved over the make everybody in the loop, as well as posterity, forget sian archives? Clearly not. Nor is it compatible with 38th parallel on October 1 and were rapidly and suc- about his original evacuation order sent to Kim only a Stalin’s statement to Kim Il Sung on October 8, stating cessfully advancing toward Pyongyang, apparently few hours earlier. that, in response to his own letter of October 1 seeking Stalin made a decision not to deploy the Soviet Air Chinese entry into the war, “Mao Zedong replied with Force directly in North Korea, but to redeploy it in Alexandre Y. Mansourov is a doctoral can- a refusal, saying that he did not want to draw the USSR northeast China. Therefore, Shtykov requested author- into the war, that the Chinese army was weak in ity to send home the remaining aircraft maintenance didate at the Center for Korean Research, technical terms, and that the war could cause great and support teams. Columbia University. dissatisfaction in China.” [Document #13.] That 34. See Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 183. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 108

Document 1: Soviet Defense Minister several radar units designed to locate the operation. A.M. Vasilevsky to Stalin, 21 September enemy’s aircraft, as well as a team of radio At present, there are no maintenance 1950 operators who can set up communications personnel at these airdromes because they between the airbase and these radar posts. had all been redeployed to airfields south of To Comrade STALIN Otherwise, our airplanes on the ground will Seoul. Neither are there fuel and munitions be subject to sudden raids by the enemy’s for combat aircraft in the vicinity of Regarding the question of the transfer aviation. Pyongyang. of fighter aviation regiment of “YAK-9s” to 5. We ask You to give us permission to Therefore, first, from September 25 to provide air cover to Pyongyang, I herewith report all our final calculations regarding the September 30, we will transport the follow- report: regiment’s transfer to Pyongyang as soon as ing by railroad from the Maritime Region 1. In order to speed up the regiment we find out in Pyongyang the details related via Andong to their destinations: transfer, we consider it the most expedient to to the questions of the regiment’s redeploy- - a team for the technical maintenance use the 84th fighter regiment of the 147th ment. At the same time, we will report to of the regiment with the minimum required based on 40 metal-made You our considerations concerning the or- airbase equipment; “YAK-9s”, deployed in the Maritime Re- ganization of the air defense system of the - a team of radio technicians with four gion in the vicinity of Voroshilov. The airbase from which the regiment will oper- radar units for locating the enemy’s planes regiment shall be dispatched by air via Chi- ate. and guiding our planes thereto; nese territory by the route Yanji-Andong- [signature] - an air defense artillery battalion con- Pyongyang. The regiment’s overflight V A S I L E V S K Y sisting of three 85-mm gun batteries and one should take two days. During the prepara- “21” September 1950 37-mm gun battery, in total 16 artillery guns, tion for the overflight one has to take into No. 1172cc for providing air cover to the airdrome; account the inevitability of air combat in the Copies: Stalin, Malenkov, Beriya, - fuel for 15 refueling cycles and 15 sets area of Andong-Pyongyang. Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, of munitions. 2. In a very cautious manner, we made Khrushchev. 3. On September 24, in order to orga- a number of inquires to Comrade Shtykov nize the reception of the regiment and its concerning the following questions: [Source: Archive of the President, Russian combat operation, we are sending by car - the suitability for the landing of our Federation (APRF), fond 3, opis 65, delo from the Maritime Region to Pyongyang the aircraft of airbases in the vicinity of 827, listy 79-80] commander of the aviation corps Colonel Pyongyang which have been badly damaged Noga who is supposed to meet the regiment by the enemy’s air raids, especially lately; in Andong, assign combat tasks thereto, and - the availability of aircraft maintenance Document 2: Vasilevsky to Stalin, 23 be in charge of its flight over to Pyongyang. personnel, fuel, and munitions thereat. September 1950 4. The regiment is expected to com- 3. If the Koreans do not have aircraft mence fulfilling its combat mission aimed at maintenance crews, before the regiment’s To Comrade STALIN covering Pyongyang from the air on October transfer we will have to dispatch an aviation 3. maintenance battalion for this regiment, com- I herewith report concerning the under- 5. At the same time, we consider it posed of 223 men with air-base equipment, taken measures relating to the redeployment necessary to report that our pilots’ work in to Pyongyang by the railroad via Andong. It of the fighter aviation regiment based on the the skies over Pyongyang will inevitably be is likely to take us five-six days to transfer “LA-9” type of aircraft from the Maritime discovered by the U.S. troops right after the this battalion, given the transport overload Region to provide air cover for the city of first air combat, because all the control and across the Yalu River in the vicinity of Pyongyang. command over the combat in the air will be Andong. 1. For the redeployment we assigned conducted by our pilots in the Russian lan- If the Koreans do not have fuel and the 304th fighter aviation regiment of the guage. munitions, we will have to ship them to 32nd fighter aviation division numbering 40 [signature] Pyongyang simultaneously with the battal- airplanes “LA-9” currently deployed at the V A S I L E V S K Y ion transport. air base Spassk in the Maritime Region. “23” September 1950 In this case, accounting for the transfer On October 1-2, the regiment will be of the personnel, it is likely to take up to redeployed by air via Chinese territory by [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, eight-ten days for the final readiness of the the route Spassk-Dongning-Yanji-Tonghua- listy 81-82] regiment for combat in the vicinity of Andong-Pyongyang. Pyongyang. We will carefully elaborate the flight 4. Bearing in mind the lack of Korean plan, especially regarding its segment from Document 3: Telegram from Fyn Si aerial surveillance and alert system in the Andong to Pyongyang, and the regiment’s (Stalin) to Matveyev (Army Gen. M.V. vicinity of Pyongyang, in order to create pilot crews will study it thoroughly. Zakharov) and Soviet Ambassador to normal conditions in combat for our regi- 2. The information which we received the DPRK T.F. Shtykov, approved 27 ment, we would consider it necessary to from Korea indicates that airdromes in the September 1950 Soviet Communist dispatch along with the regiment at least vicinity of Pyongyang are still suitable for Party Central Committee Politburo 109 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

unprepared for combat, could not produce mand, especially in the questions of an orga- VKP(b) CC any effect because of lack of coordination nized pullout of the KPA troops from the # P78/73 and communications with the staff. The southeast and the prompt organization of a 27 September 1950 division which arrived from the southeast new defense front to the east, south, and [To:] Cmrds Malenkov, Bulganin, was thrown into combat in a disorganized north of Seoul, our military advisers must Vasilevsky manner and in odd units, which made it arrange the following: easier for the enemy to decimate and annihi- 1. The pullout of the main forces must late it. As we directed earlier, you should be conducted under the protection of strong Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of the have deployed this division for combat at the rear guards dispatched from the divisions Meeting of the Politburo of the CC line northeast and east of Seoul, reorganize it and capable of rendering serious resistance VKP(b) Decision dated September 27, there, give its soldiers at least one day of to the enemy. This can be achieved if the 1950 respite, prepare it for battle and only after- command over the rear guards is assigned to wards introduce these troops into combat. commanders with considerable military ex- #73. - Questions of Korea. One cannot help taking serious note of perience, if the rear guards are strengthened erroneous and absolutely inadmissible tac- with standing and antitank artillery, field Approve of the attached directive tics for tank use in combat. Lately you have engineering units, and, if possible, with tanks. to Comrades Matveyev and Shtykov. used tanks in combat without preliminary 2. The rear guards must engage in com- artillery strikes aimed at clearing the field for bat from defensive line to defensive line, Secretary of the C[entral] C[ommittee] tank maneuvers. As a consequence, the making broad use of engineering fortifica- enemy easily destroys your tanks. Our mili- tions, including mines and materials at hand. * * * * * tary advisers who have personal experience The rear guards must act decisively and from the Great Patriotic War must be aware actively in order to gain the time required for Attachment to that such ignorant use of tanks leads to their the pullout of the main forces. #73 (op) of the Politburo Protocol #78 loss. 3. The bulk of the troops of the divi- One cannot help noticing the strategic sions, to the extent possible, must be with- Top Secret illiteracy of our advisers and their incompe- drawn in a compact manner, ready to force Pyongyang tence in intelligence matters. They failed to their way forward, but not in separate and grasp the strategic importance of the enemy’s odd units. The major force must dispatch TO MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV] assault landing in Inch’on, denied the gravity strong forward guards armed with artillery TO SHTYKOV of its implications, while Shtykov even sug- and, if possible, with tanks. gested that we should bring to trial the author 4. Tanks must be used only in joint The serious predicament in the area of of an article in the “Pravda” about the U.S. action with infantry and only after prelimi- Seoul and in the South-East in which the assault landing. This blindness and lack of nary artillery fire. Korean People’s Army has found itself lately strategic experience led to the fact that they 5. One must dispatch forward detach- has to a great extent been caused by a series doubted the necessity of redeploying troops ments to occupy and hold ravines, bridges, of grave mistakes made by the Frontline from the South toward Seoul, as well as ferries, passes and important road junctions Command, the Commands of the Army procrastinated over their redeployment and located along the way of the movement of Groups and army groupings in matters re- slowed it down considerably, thereby losing the major forces until the latter pass through lated to command and control over troops, a week to the enemy’s enjoyment. them. as well as to the tactics of their combat use The assistance provided by our military 6. Special attention must be paid to the in particular. advisers to the Korean Command in such questions of the organization of field intelli- It is our military advisers who are even paramount matters as communications, com- gence, as well as flank protection and main- more to blame for these mistakes. Our mand and control over troops, organization tenance of communications between march- military advisers failed to implement scru- of intelligence and combat is exceptionally ing troops’ columns. pulously and in a timely fashion the order of weak. As a result of this, the KPA troops, in 7. When preparing for defense, one the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the essence, are beyond control: they are en- should avoid stretching out the troops along withdrawal of four divisions from the cen- gaged in combat blindly and cannot arrange the entire front line but tightly cover the tral front to the area of Seoul despite the fact the coordination between the various armed main directions and set up strong reserve that at the moment of adopting this decision services in battle. One can tolerate such a units for active actions. such a possibility existed. Consequently, situation during a successful offensive, but 8. When setting up communications they lost seven days which brought about an one cannot allow this to happen when the with troops via the line of the Korean Com- enormous tactical advantage in the vicinity frontline situation is worsening. mand, one must utilize radio with the use of of Seoul to the U.S. troops. Had they pulled You must elucidate all these points to codes. out these divisions on time, this could have our military advisers, and first of all to In the future, while organizing the work changed the military situation around Seoul Vasilyev. of our military advisers in accordance with considerably. Odd battalions and separate In the present military situation, in order this directive, you must undertake all neces- detachments arriving in the vicinity of Seoul, to provide assistance to the Korean Com- sary measures so that none of our military COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 110 advisers will be captured by the enemy, as over Sangju and Antó to the north and north- Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense was directed earlier. west of Taegu. Minister in his hands, to set up a Staff Office Report on the implementation of this According to the information which still for the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for directive. needs to be verified, some tank units of the the command and control over troops, and to enemy’s Seoul group continue to advance pay serious attention to the work of the rear. F Y N SI. [STALIN] toward Ch’ungju, which creates the danger At present, they have begun to form of encirclement of the Group of only six infantry divisions in the northern [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, the KPA. part of Korea, whereas the current military listy 90-93] The People’s Army troops, suffering situation has made impossible the formation heavy losses, mainly from the enemy’s of nine infantry divisions manned with the airforce, having lost almost all their tanks Southerners. Document 4: Ciphered telegram from and much artillery, are engaged in difficult KIM IL SUNG issued a directive to take Matveyev (Zakharov) to Fyn Si (Stalin), battles to hold their positions. The troops immediate steps aimed at withdrawing the 26 [27] September 1950 lack ammunition and fuel the delivery of remaining KPA troops from South Korea so which has been virtually halted. The ac- that to use it to form new divisions in North CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600262/sh counting for the available weapons and am- Korea and deny this opportunity to the South. munition is organized unsatisfactorily. The In connection with the fact that the From Pyongyang Sent on top-down command and control system is Chinese railroads are overloaded transport- 26.9.50 at 8:101 a.m., by wire set up poorly. The wire and radio communi- ing supplies to Korea, it is desirable that the Received in Moscow on 27.9.50 at 20:55 cations work intermittently because of the armaments designated for use by the six p.m. interruptions inflicted by the enemy’s air divisions which are being newly formed be Arrived in the 8th MDGS2 on 27.9.50 at raids and due to the lack of qualified radio shipped first, and only then should the am- 21:10 p.m. operators and the lack of fuel for radio sta- munition be delivered. Deciphered by Morozov on 27.9.50 at tion generators correspondingly. Courier After our conversation with KIM IL 23:50 p.m. mail is almost nonexistent. SUNG we got down to work in order to assist The predicament of the KPA troops, in in: Number of copies made - 10 particular on the Southeastern front, remains - organizing good command and con- Distribution List: unclear. trol over troops; Stalin - 2,Molotov - 1, Malenkov -1, Upon our recommendation, on the night - rearranging the system of troop sup- Beria -1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, of 26.9.50 [26 September 1950], some Ko- plies, shipments, and transport services; Bulganin - 1, Vasilevsky - 1, 8th MDGS rean communications officers were dis- - preparing defensive fortifications. file - 1. patched to the Front Command and the Seoul The People’s Army is experiencing a group in order to collect information on the dire shortage of drivers. The 3,400 trucks troops’ situation. which are to arrive soon have no drivers at TO COMRADE FYN SI [STALIN] On 25.9.50, at 19:00 pm, local time, all. It may be expedient to propose to Kim Il Kim Il Sung’s order was forwarded to the Sung that he ask the Chinese friends to Having familiarized myself with the troops, according to which the Seoul group- dispatch not less than 1,500 drivers to Ko- predicament of the KPA, I report: ing and the Second Army Group operating rea, may it not? The situation of the People’s Army in the northern part of the southeastern front troops on the Western (Seoul) and South- were told to go on the defensive and hold up MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV] eastern (Pusan) fronts is severe. the enemy by any means. # 1298/sh Seeking to encircle and destroy the main The troops of the Second Army Group 09/27/50 forces of the People’s Army, it is in the operating in the central and southern parts of 12:35pm, Pyongyang time general direction of Ch’ungju that the U.S. the southeastern front were ordered to begin Typed by Budanova on 28.9.50 at 0:15 troops have concentrated the major efforts general retreat northwestward with the aim a.m. of the assault group which had landed in the of getting to the area of Chénchang, Taejon, area of Chemulp’o, as well as of the troops Poún for further levelling off the front line [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, that had launched an offensive from the area approximately following the line Seoul, listy 103-106] to the North and Northwest of Taegu. Yóju, Ch’ungju [in Russian translation: Using the support of the air force which Seoul, Reisiu, Tsiusiu, Naidzio, Urutsin]. has dominated the air space without hin- On 26.9.50, KIM IL SUNG received Document 5: Ciphered Telegram, drance and caused aircraft-fright our group. Shtykov to Deputy Foreign Minister [aviaboiazn’] both among the ranks within The meeting was also attended by For- Andrei Gromyko and Instantsia the People’s Army and in the rear areas, the eign Minister PAK HÓN-YÓNG and Com- (Stalin), 29 September 1950 U.S. troops have managed to move from rade SHTYKOV. Suwon eastward and southeastward for 25 to As a result of our conversation, KIM IL CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600301/sh 30 kilometers and some of their troops took SUNG decided to combine the duties of the 111 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

From: PYONGYANG mediate deployment of troops at the already CH’ÓNGJU, to cut off the Second Army Sent on 09/29/50 at 20:23 p.m. prepared fortifications there. Group composed of 7 divisions. Seoul fell. Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 14:45 KIM IL SUNG asked me, how do you There are no standby troops ready to render p.m. consider [the situation], will the adversary any serious resistance to the enemy advanc- Received at the 8D/GS on 09/30/50 at cross the 38th parallel northward? ing to the 38th parallel. 14:50 p.m. I replied that it was not clear yet, but that New military units being formed in the Deciphered by Vakushin on 09/30/50 at they had to undertake urgent measures to set North advance to the frontline very slowly 15:50 p.m up defenses along the 38th parallel. because the railroads in fact do not function Distribution list - 12 copies: KIM IL SUNG reiterated his earlier due to the demolished bridges and ruined Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, stated desire to unify the country by his own railway stations, while automobile transport Beria - 1, Mikoyan -1, Kaganovich - 1, means, he stated that he wanted to form 15 is scarce. Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1, 8 MDGS - 1, divisions and to continue the struggle, but it These new units lack armaments. The MFA - 1, on file - 1. was not clear for him whether the adversary newly formed units and groupings desig- would cross the 38th parallel or not. Should nated to defend CHEMULP’O, HAEJU, To: MOSCOW the enemy cross the 38th parallel, they [the WÓNSAN, and CH’ÓNGJIN have weap- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR North Korean leadership - AM] would be ons designed for training purposes only. To Comrade GROMYKO unable to form new troops and they would The political situation is also getting Instantsia [Highest Authority] have no means to render any serious resis- more and more complicated. tance to the enemy. The enemy stepped up its activity of On 29 September 29 I met KIM IL In this connection, he would like to ask dropping paratroopers into the territory of SUNG upon his request. my advice regarding his letter to Comrade North Korea with the task of gathering intel- PAK HÓN-YÓNG was present at the STALIN. They discussed this idea and want ligence on what deliveries are being shipped meeting. In the beginning of the conversa- to send the letter. from the Soviet Union and to conduct sub- tion KIM IL SUNG asked me whether I was I responded that I could give no advice versive activities. Reactionary forces are aware of the military situation at the front. on this matter. At that moment, PAK HÓN- raising their heads in North Korea. I replied that I did not know the latest YÓNG joined the conversation and said that one. they had already drafted a letter, that the S H T Y K O V Then KIM IL SUNG briefly ex- WPKs Political Council had discussed it, 30.IX.50 plained to me the predicament of his troops and they wanted to familiarize me with its No. 1340 on the basis of the report of the Front Com- content. Typed by Lobyseva on 09/30/50 at 16:55 mander and asked my advice as to what one I dodged the reading by saying that it p.m. could do in order to improve the situation at was up to the Political Council what its the front. KIM IL SUNG believes that in the members were going to write in their letter. [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, wake of the enemy’s having occupied the On 28.9.50, [A.I.] SHABSHIN, a mem- listy 46-49] Syarye mountain range and moving into the ber of MATVEYEV’S group, told rear of the Second Army Group the front MATVEYEV and myself that at a chance situation is becoming particularly trouble- meeting with PAK HÓN-YÓNG the latter Document 6: Ciphered Telegram, some. Earlier they hoped that they would be told him that the Political Council had dis- DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and South able to withdraw troops in an organized cussed and adopted a text of the letter ad- Korean Communist leader Pak Hon- manner. But because of their poor disci- dressed to comrade Stalin, containing a re- Yong to Stalin (via Shtykov), 29 Sep- pline and failure to fulfill orders, the enemy quest to aid Korea with air support. tember 1950 managed to cut off the First Army Group PAK informed SHABSHIN that they and is moving to cut off the Second Army had dispatched a letter in reply to MAO CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 600308/sh Group by its breakthrough toward P’UNGGI ZEDONG which contained a hint about aid. [BUNKEI] and JIJYON [TISEN]. It was obvious that they [Kim and Pak - Sent from Pyongyang by wire on 09/30/50 The situation in Seoul is also murky. AM] were not satisfied with my earlier reply at 20:35 p.m. His orders notwithstanding, CH’OE and they did not know what to do with their Received in Moscow on 09/30/50 at 23:32 YONGGÓN does not report anything, de- letter to Comrade STALIN. p.m. spite the fact that a line of communications KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG Arrived in the 8 MDGS on 09/30/50 at with him is available. are nervous. In the present difficult situation 23:30 p.m. I replied that it was hard for me to one can feel some confusion and hopeless- Deciphered by Mikhaylenko on 10/01/50 advise anything regarding this matter be- ness. at 0:35 a.m. cause I did not know the predicament of the The military situation has worsened dra- Distribution list - 12 copies: KPA troops and their location, however, I matically lately. The adversary managed to Stalin - 2, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, would consider it expedient for KIM IL cut off the entire First Army Group com- Beria -1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, SUNG to take urgent steps to organize de- posed of six divisions and two brigades, as Bulganin - 1, Gromyko - 1. fense along the 38th parallel, including im- well as, by advancing to the vicinity of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 112

Extremely Urgent restore its prestige and to implement by any can aggression ultimately will be success- means its long-held plans of conquering ful. MOSCOW Korea and transforming it into its military- In order to provide troops with all the To Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the strategic bridgehead, on 16.9.50, the U.S. necessary supplies and to feed the frontline USSR performed an assault landing operation and without any interruption, first of all, we need Comrade GROMYKO landed a considerable number of troops and to have an appropriate air force. But we do armaments in the vicinity of Inch’ón after not possess well-trained pilots. I herewith relay the text of a letter ad- having mobilized almost all its land, naval, Dear Comrade STALIN, we are deter- dressed to Comrade STALIN which I re- and air troops deployed in the Pacific ocean. mined to overcome all the difficulties facing ceived from KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN- The enemy took over Inch’ón and is engaged us so that Korea will not be a colony and a YÓNG (translation from the Korean). in street combats in the city of Seoul itself. military springboard of the U.S. imperial- This letter was handed over to me by The military situation became perilous. ists. We will fight for the independence, PAK HÓN-YÓNG in person. The units of our People’s Army hero- democracy and happiness of our people to ically fight against advancing assault land- the last drop of blood. Therefore, with all ing units of the enemy. However, we con- our energy we are taking decisive measures S H T Y K O V sider it necessary to report to You about the for the formation and training of many new emergence of very unfavorable conditions divisions with the aim of using more than No. 1351 for us. 100,000 troops mobilized in South Korea The enemy’s air force numbering about [captured in South Korea - AM] in the most Enclosure: 4-page letter. a thousand airplanes of various types, facing advantageous operational areas, as well as no rebuff from our side, totally dominate the arming the entire people so as to be prepared This letter was cabled to Comrade Stalin air space and perform air raids at the fronts to fight a protracted war. on 10.01.50 at 12:50 p.m. and in the rear day and night. At the fronts, This notwithstanding, if the enemy does under the air cover of hundreds of airplanes not give us time to implement the measures Typed by Shcherbakova on 10/01/50 at the motorized units of the enemy engage us which we plan, and, making use of our 1:45 a.m. in combat at their free will and inflict great extremely grave situation, steps up its offen- losses to our manpower and destroy our sive operations into North Korea, then we * * * * * armaments. Moreover, by freely destroying will not be able to stop the enemy troops railroads and highways, telegraph and tele- solely with our own forces. Moscow, Kremlin. phone communications lines, means of trans- Therefore, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, portation and other facilities, the enemy’s we cannot help asking You to provide us DEEPLY RESPECTED Iosif air force impedes the provision of supplies with special assistance. In other words, at Vissarionovich STALIN. to our combat units and bars maneuvers by the moment when the enemy troops cross our troops, thereby making their timely re- over the 38th parallel we will badly need On behalf of the Workers’ Party of deployments impossible. We experience direct military assistance from the Soviet Korea, we express to You, the liberator of this difficulty on all fronts. Union. the Korean people and the leader of the Having cut off all the communications If for any reason this is impossible, working peoples of the entire world, our lines of our troops and joined the assault please assist us by forming international profound gratitude for compassion and as- force that landed in Inch’ón with the units of volunteer units in China and other countries sistance which You constantly provide to their southern front that broke through our of people’s democracy for rendering mili- our people struggling for the freedom and frontline, the adversary has a real opportu- tary assistance to our struggle. independence of its Motherland. nity to take over the city of Seoul com- We request Your directive regarding In this letter, we would like to brief You pletely. the aforementioned proposal. on the current situation at the fronts of the As a result, the units of the People’s liberation war of our people against the Army that are still fighting in the southern Respectfully, The CC of the Workers’ Party American aggressors. part of Korea have been cut off from the of Korea Prior to the assault landing at Inch’ón northern part of Korea, they are torn into (Chemulp’o) one could not judge the situa- pieces and cannot receive munitions, arma- KIM IL SUNG, PAK HÓN-YÓNG tion at the fronts as unfavorable to us. The ments, and food rations. Moreover, some adversary, suffering one defeat after an- units do not have any communication with 29 September 1950 other, was cornered into a tiny piece of land each other, while some of them are sur- at the southern-most tip of South Korea and rounded by enemy troops. [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, we had a great chance of winning a victory After taking over Seoul completely, the listy 41-45] in the last decisive battles. enemy is likely to launch a further offensive Such a situation considerably damaged into North Korea. Therefore, we believe that Document 7: Ciphered Telegram, the military authority of the United States. if in future the above-mentioned conditions Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador Therefore, in those conditions, in order to unfavorable to us continue, then the Ameri- in Beijing (N.V. Roshchin) with message 113 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN for Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950 the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC VKP(b) Comrade STALIN I.V.

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 3172 Decision dated 30 September 1950 The Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK Comrade Shtykov has reported that Coded, only by wire as a result of air by the U.S. Submitted at 23:45 p.m. on 07/05/50 118. Telegram from Comrade Matveyev # Air Force many enterprises of the DPRK Distribution List - 3 copies: Stalin - 2, 1298. have been ruined and are not in operation. At Molotov -1 the present time, Koreans do not intend to To BEIJING, [SOVIET] AMBASSA- The attached draft of the reply to Com- rebuild these factories and plants. DOR rade Matveyev regarding his telegram # 1298 In this situation Comrade Shtykov con- has been approved. siders it expedient to send some of the Soviet specialists back to the Soviet Union and asks Re Your ciphered telegrams ## 1112- to be given the right to dispatch the Soviet 1126 SECRETARY OF THE CC experts back to the USSR regardless of the length of their stay in Korea upon consulta- Tell Zhou Enlai the following: * * * * * tions with the government of the DPRK. 1. We agree with the opinion of Chi- Comr. Shtykov also requests that he be nese comrades regarding the Indian inter- Attachment to the Decision of the Polit- permitted, at his judgement and upon con- mediation in the matter of admitting the buro #78 on #118 sultations with heads of the Soviet organiza- People’s [Republic of] China into the UN PYONGYANG tions in Korea, to evacuate some of their membership. To MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV] personnel working in Korea without whom 2. We consider it correct to concentrate RE: # 1298 they can still continue to do their work. immediately 9 Chinese divisions on the The M[inistry of] F[oreign] A[ffairs of Chinese-Korean border for volunteers’ ac- We consider correct the decisions the] USSR considers it possible to recall tions in North Korea in the event of the adopted by Kim Il Sung at his meeting with some of the Soviet specialists from the DPRK enemy’s crossing the 38th parallel. We will You, in particular, regarding the combining only if the initiative for their return to the do our best to provide the air cover for these of the duties of the Supreme Commander-in- Soviet Union were to come from the govern- units. Chief and Defense Minister in the hands of ment of the DPRK. 3. Your report about the flights of the Kim Il Sung, the establishment of the Staff at As far as Comr. Shtykov’s suggestion Soviet aircraft over the Manchurian terri- the office of the Supreme Commander-in- about the evacuation of the personnel of the tory has not been confirmed. But we have Chief, the formation of six divisions and Soviet organizations from the DPRK, the issued an order not to permit such over- withdrawal of manpower reserves from South MFA [of the] USSR proposes that we main- flights. Korea. tain the existing procedures according to The formation of six divisions must be which the recall of personnel is to be done F I L I P P O V [STALIN] accelerated. Necessary armaments, ammu- via the MFA of the USSR upon consulta- nition, and other materials will be supplied tions with appropriate ministries and organi- _ 373/sh from October 5 to October 20. zations of the USSR. 5.7.50 [5 July 1950] As far as the question about the expedi- A draft [cable to Shtykov - AM] is Typed by Stepanova at 0:55 a.m. on 07/ ency of recommending that Kim Il Sung ask attached. 06/50 the Chinese friends to dispatch drivers to I request Your consideration. Korea, You may give such advice but with- [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 331, out citing Moscow. A. G R O M Y K O list 79] Upon the directive of Instantsia 30 September 1950 # 182-sh Document 8: Draft Telegram, Chan Fu C H A N F U [STALIN] 1 copy (Stalin) to Matveyev (Zakharov), 30 September 1950 [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 100-101] Attachment VKP(b) CC TOP PRIORITY # P78/118 09/30/50 Document 9: Memorandum Gromyko To PYONGYANG, To: Cmrds. Malenkov, Bulganin, to Stalin, 30 September 1950, with draft To SOVIET AMBASSADOR Vasilevsky cable from Gromyko to Shtykov In connection with the present situation Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR the evacuation of the Soviet specialists from COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 114

Korea may take place only when the initia- lel. However, the 1 [First] and 2 [Second] feels compassion toward them and will help tive for the return of any such specialists Army Groups’ Commands failed to imple- them out. They must leave heavy weapons comes from the government of the DPRK. ment Kim Il Sung’s order for the withdrawal behind and try to get to the north by all You should not display any initiative of your of troops northward, which allowed the U.S. means, by using the cover of night and the own in raising the issue of the evacuation of troops to cut them off and surround them. areas unoccupied by the enemy yet. You Soviet specialist before the Koreans do. Our Korean friends have no troops capable have the possibility of rescuing thereby the The return of the personnel of the Soviet of resistance in the vicinity of Seoul. Hence, most valuable asset, that is, the cadres. organizations working in the DPRK to the one needs to consider the way toward the Take all the necessary measures to Soviet Union should be done in the previ- 38th parallel wide open. implement this directive. ously-established order, that is, via the MFA I think that if in the current situation you Telegraph the fulfillment. of the USSR upon consultations with appro- consider it possible to send troops to assist priate ministries and organizations of the the Koreans, then you should move at least C H A N F U [STALIN] USSR. five-six divisions toward the 38th parallel at 2 October 1950 You should inform the MFA of the once so as to give our Korean comrades an USSR about each case of pending return of opportunity to organize combat reserves [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, the Soviet specialists from Korea well in north of the 38th parallel under the cover of list 64] advance. your troops. The Chinese divisions could be considered as volunteers, with Chinese in A. G r o m y k o command at the head, of course. Document 12: Ciphered telegram from I have not informed and am not going to Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin], [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, inform our Korean friends about this idea, 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October listy 123, 125] but I have no doubt in my mind that they will 1950 message from Mao to Stalin be glad when they learn about it. I await your reply. SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION Document 10: Ciphered Telegram, OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Greetings, SOVIET SOVIET ARMY Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950 F I L I P P O V [STALIN] CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 25199 Transmitted to Bulganin 1 October 1950 On 1.X.50 [1 October 1950] at 3:00 a.m. Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin Ciphered Telegram listy 97-98] From BEIJING Received 12:15 To BEIJING, SOVIET AMBASSA- 3.10.1950 DOR Document 11: Ciphered Telegram, (For immediate transmission to MAO Chan Fu (Stalin) to Matveyev TOP PRIORITY T ZEDONG and ZHOU ENLAI.) (Zakharov), 2 October 1950 TO FILIPPOV [STALIN] I am far away from Moscow on vaca- Ciphered Note (by wire) tion and somewhat detached from events in I report the answer of MAO ZEDONG Korea. However, judging by the informa- To PYONGYANG to your [telegram] No. 4581: tion that I have received from Moscow to- MATVEYEV [ZAKHAROV] (transmit- “I received your telegram of 1.10.50 [1 day, I see that the situation of our Korean ted by ciphered telegram) October 1950]. We originally planned to friends is getting desperate. move several volunteer divisions to North It was on 16 September already that We constantly point out to You the Korea to render assistance to the Korean Moscow warned our Korean friends that the exceptional importance of the withdrawal of comrades when the enemy advanced north landing of the U.S. troops at Chemulp’o troops out of the encirclement. In this mat- of the 38th parallel. [Inchon] had great significance and was ter, the crucial point is to bring the man- However, having thought this over thor- aimed at cutting off the First and Second power and commanding officers back to the oughly, we now consider that such actions Army Groups of the North Koreans from north. may entail extremely serious consequences. their rear in the North. Moscow admonished In the current situation, without delay In the first place, it is very difficult to them to withdraw at least four divisions you must give instructions to the soldiers resolve the Korean question with a few divi- from the South immediately, to set up a and officers who are still fighting in the sions (our troops are extremely poorly frontline to the north and east of Seoul, and south to retreat by any means, in groups or equipped, there is no confidence in the suc- later to gradually pull out most of the troops person by person, to the north. There is no cess of military operations against Ameri- fighting in the South northward, thereby continuous frontline. These troops are fight- can troops), the enemy can force us to re- providing for the defense of the 38th paral- ing on their own territory, so the population treat. 115 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

In the second place, it is most likely that USA and China, then our entire plan for has not been taken on this question. This is this will provoke an open conflict between peaceful construction will be completely ru- our preliminary telegram, we wish to con- the USA and China, as a consequence of ined, and many people in the country will be sult with you. If you agree, then we are ready which the Soviet Union can also be dragged dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the immediately to send by plane Comrades into war, and the question would thus be- people by the war have not yet healed, we ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vaca- come extremely large [kraine bol’shim]. need peace). tion place, to talk over this matter with you Many comrades in the CC CPC [Cen- Therefore it is better to show patience and to report the situation in China and tral Committee of the Communist Party of now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] Korea. China] judge that it is necessary to show actively prepare our forces, which will be We await your reply. caution here. more advantageous at the time of war with Of course, not to send out troops to the enemy. MAO ZEDONG 2.10.50” render assistance is very bad for the Korean Korea, while temporarily suffering de- comrades, who are presently in such diffi- feat, will change the form of the struggle to 1. In our view MAO ZEDONG’s an- culty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but partisan war. swer is indicative of a change in the original if we advance several divisions and the We will convene a meeting of the CC, at position of the Chinese leadership on the enemy forces us to retreat; and this more- which will be present the main comrades of Korean question. It contradicts the earlier over provokes an open conflict between the various bureaus of the CC. A final decision appraisal, which was repeatedly expressed

MAO TO STALIN, 2 OCTOBER 1950: THE RUSSIAN VERSION COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 116 in conversations of MAO ZEDONG with rades, which took several days. On 1 Octo- wait-and-see policy, and that without seri- YUDIN, KOTOV and KONNOV; [and] LIU ber, I sent a letter to Mao Zedong, inquiring ous struggle and an imposing display of SHAOQI with me, which were reported at whether he could dispatch to Korea immedi- force not only would China fail to obtain all the time. In these conversations, it was ately at least five or six divisions under the these concessions but it would not be able to noted by them that the people and the PLA cover of which our Korean comrades could get back even Taiwan which at present the [People’s Liberation Army] are ready to form reserve troops. Mao Zedong replied United States clings to as its springboard not help the Korean people, the fighting spirit of with a refusal, saying that he did not want to for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who has the PLA is high and it is able, if necessary, to draw the USSR into the war, that the Chinese no chance to succeed, but for themselves or defeat the American troops, regarding them army was weak in technical terms, and that for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow. as weaker than the Japanese. the war could cause great dissatisfaction Of course, I took into account also [the 2. The Chinese government undoubt- [nedovol’stvo] in China. I replied to him by possibility] that the USA, despite its edly could send to Korea not only five-six the following letter: unreadiness for a big war, could still be battle ready divisions, but even more. It drawn into a big war out of [considerations goes without saying that these Chinese troops “I considered it possible to turn to You of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China are in need of some technical equipping in with the question of five-six Chinese volun- into the war, and along with this draw into antitank weapons and to some extent in teer divisions because I was well aware of a the war the USSR, which is bound with artillery. number of statements made by the leading China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should The reasons for the changes in the posi- Chinese comrades regarding their readiness we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, tion of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It to move several armies in support of the because together we will be stronger than the is possible to suppose that it has been influ- Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross USA and England, while the other European enced by the international situation, the wors- the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness capitalist states (with the exception of Ger- ening of the position in Korea, [and] the of the Chinese comrades to send troops to many which is unable to provide any assis- intrigues of the Anglo-American bloc Korea by the fact that China was interested tance to the United States now) do not present through [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] in preventing the danger of the transforma- serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, NEHRU, who has urged the Chinese toward tion of Korea into a USA springboard or a then let it be waged now, and not in a few patience and abstention [from intervention] bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan years when Japanese militarism will be re- in order to avoid catastrophe. against China. stored as an ally of the USA and when the ROSHCHIN While raising before You the question USA and Japan will have a ready-made of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered bridgehead on the continent in a form of the No. 2270 3.10 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee. ______and I was proceeding from the following Such were the considerations and pros- considerations of an international character: pects of an international nature that I pro- Dec[iphered by] Araushkin 12.50 3.10 1) the USA, as the Korean events ceeded from when I was requesting a mini- [12.50 p.m. 3 October] showed, is not ready at present for a big war mum of five-six divisions from You.” Typ[ed by] Doronchenkova 13.20 3.10 [k bol’shoi voine]; In response to this [letter], on October 7, [1.20 p.m. 3 October] 2) Japan, whose militaristic potential I received letter from Mao on 7 September Typ[ed in] 10 copies [copies no.] 9-10 -(to has not yet been restored, is not capable of [sic-October], in which he expresses soli- file) rendering military assistance to the Ameri- darity with the fundamental positions dis- cans; cussed in my letter and declares that he will [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 334, 3) the USA will be compelled to yield in dispatch to Korea nine, not six, divisions. listy 105-106; translation by Kathryn the Korean question to China behind which But [he said] that he will send them not now, Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov.] stands its ally, the USSR, and will have to but after some time. He also requested that agree to such terms of the settlement of the I receive his representatives and discuss Korean question that would be favorable to some details of the mission with them. Of Document 13: Letter, Fyn Si [Stalin] to Korea and that would not give the enemies a course, I agreed to receive his representa- Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8 [7] Octo- possibility to transform Korea into their tives and to discuss with them a detailed plan ber 1950 springboard; of military assistance to Korea. 4) for the same reasons, the USA will It is obvious from the above mentioned not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to that You must stand firm and fight for every PYONGYANG, To SHTYKOV reject the idea of a separate peace with the tiny piece of your land, that You have to for KIM IL SUNG Japanese reactionaries, as well as to aban- strengthen resistance to the American occu- don their plans of revitalizing Japanese im- piers of Korea and prepare reserves, using perialism and of converting Japan into their for this purpose the military cadres of the Comrade Kim Il Sung! springboard in the Far East. Korean People’s Army coming out from the In this regard, I proceeded from the encirclement. Also, this shows that You are My reply has been delayed because of assumption that China could not extract these absolutely right in your proposal that we my consultations with the Chinese com- concessions if it were to adopt a passive transfer all Korean comrades studying in the 117 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

USSR into the pilot training program. concerning the temporary evacuation of some nizations and their families, follow the in- I will keep you informed about further Soviet specialists upon consultations with structions laid out in our telegram # 18909. talks with the Chinese comrades. 8 October the Korean government, as well as of the Second. You must decide the question 1950. personnel of Soviet organizations in Korea. of the evacuation of families of Soviet citi- zens of Korean nationality from the territory F Y N S I [STALIN] G R O M Y K O of Korea on the spot, bearing in mind changes in the situation on the ground. Comrade Shtykov, I ask You to read 5-nb Third. All the Soviet personnel of the this letter to Kim Il Sung. He may copy it by air commandants’ offices and families of hand in your presence, but You may not [APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy Soviet military advisers must be evacuated hand over this letter to Kim Il Sung because 121-122] from the territory of Korea. of its extreme confidentiality. Fourth. We agree with your proposal F Y N S I [STALIN] that, in case of emergency, all the Soviet Document 15: Gromyko and citizens, including Soviet citizens of Korean [Handwritten: This letter was delivered to Vasilevsky to Stalin, 6 October 1950, nationality, be evacuated to the territory of Comrade Bulganin on October 7, 1950 at attaching draft cable to Shtykov the USSR and China. 22:15 pm.] [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, Ministry of Defense of the USSR (A. Vasilevsky) (A. Gromyko) listy 65-67] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, listy 126-127] Document 14: Telegram from Distribution list: Gromyko to Shtykov Approved by Stalin - 1, Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Soviet Communist Party Central Beria - 1, Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Document 16: Ciphered Telegram, Committee Politburo, 5 October 1950 Bulganin - 1, Khrushchev - 1. Kim Il Sung to Stalin (via Shtykov), 9 October 1950 VKP(b) CC Comrade STALIN I.V.: # P78/168 Ciphered Telegram # 600382/sh 05/10/50 In connection with Comrade Shtykov’s To: Cmrds Bulganin, Gromyko telegram #1405/sh dated 5 October in which To Comrade STALIN I.V. he pressed the question of the evacuation FROM: PYONGYANG Extract Minutes from Protocol #78 of from Korea of Soviet specialists working in the Meeting of the Politburo of the CC Korea, personnel of Soviet organizations in Sent by wire on 10/09/50 at 7:05 a.m. VKP(b) Korea, families of Soviet citizens of Korean Received in Moscow on 10/09/50 at 9:38 nationality, staff of the Soviet air comman- a.m. Decision dated October 5, 1950 dants’ offices, and, in case of emergency, all Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/09/50 at 9:45 Soviet citizens, we consider it necessary to a.m. 168. The Question of Shtykov. reply in accordance with the attached draft. Deciphered by Morozov on 10/09/50 at 10:45 a.m. The attached draft of a telegram ad- We request your consideration thereof. Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2, dressed to the Ambassador of the USSR to Molotov - 1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, the DPRK Com. Shtykov, regarding the A. VASILEVSKY A. GROMYKO Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - question of the evacuation of Soviet special- [signature] 1. ists and personnel of Soviet organizations 6 October 1950 from Korea to the USSR, has been ap- No. 201-gi I herewith transmit a letter of the fol- proved. lowing content addressed to Your name from [Attachment] comrade KIM IL SUNG: SECRETARY OF THE CC PRIORITY CABLE 4ak “Comrade STALIN Iosif To PYONGYANG Vissarionovich, [Attachment to the Decision of the SOVIET AMBASSADOR. Politburo #78 regarding #168] Let me ask You, dear Iosif RE: 1405/sh Vissarionovich, for assistance and advice. PYONGYANG Now it is evident to everybody that SOVIET AMBASSADOR First. Regarding the question of the having made significant achievements in evacuation of Soviet specialists and their recent military operations, the American 1304/sh. We agree with your proposals families, as well as personnel of Soviet orga- aggressor will not stop at anything short of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 118 the complete takeover of all of Korea, and its squadron of mine-sweepers, the first and the p.m. conversion into its military-strategic spring- third assault landing groups. board for further aggression in the Far East. Ch’óngjin was heavily bombarded from [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, In my opinion, the struggle of our people the air and the sea. list 3] for its independence, freedom and state sov- ereignty will be protracted and very hard. [signature] G O L O V K O For a successful struggle against a strong [signature] F O K I N Document 19: Ciphered Telegram, enemy armed with the latest achievements No. 244cc Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14 of military science and technology we will 13 October 1950 October 1950, re Meeting with Mao have to train pilots, tankists, radio operators, Zedong and engineering officers urgently. [Source: APRF, fond 3, opis 65, delo 827, It is very difficult to train them inside list 139] Ciphered Telegram # 25629 our country. Therefore, we turn to You, comrade STALIN, with the following re- FROM: BEIJING quest: Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 01:38 1. To permit the training of 200-300 Document 18: Ciphered Telegram, a.m. pilots from among Korean students studying Shtykov to Fyn Si (Stalin), 14 October Deciphered by Yelezov on 10/14/50 at in the Soviet Union. 1950 02:00 a.m. 2. To permit the training of 1,000 Typed by Rubleva on 10/14/50 at 03:20 tankists, 2,000 pilots, 500 radio operators, Ciphered Telegram # 600428/sh a.m. and 500 engineering officers from among FROM: PYONGYANG Cabled by VTCH to the South for Stalin Soviet Koreans residing in the Soviet Union. Distribution list - 9 copies: Stalin - 2, I ask You, comrade STALIN, to render Sent by wire on 10/14/50 at 03:15 a.m. Molotov -1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, us assistance in this regard. Received in Moscow on 10/14/50 at 6:36 Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - a.m. 1, 8MDGS - 1. Respectfully, KIM IL SUNG” Arrived at the 8D/GS on 10/14/50 at 7:10 PRIORITY T a.m. I support KIM IL SUNG’S request. Deciphered by Morozov on 10/14/50 at To FILIPPOV [STALIN] 7:45 a.m. S H T Y K O V Distribution list - 11 copies: Stalin - 2, In addition to my No. 2406 (incoming Molotov-1, Malenkov - 1, Beria - 1, No. 25612), Mao Zedong went on to say: No. 1447/sh Mikoyan - 1, Kaganovich - 1, Bulganin - Our leading comrades believe that if the 1. U.S. troops advance up to the border of 9 October 1950 China, then Korea will become a dark spot FYN SI [STALIN] for us [the Chinese - AM] and the Northeast Typed by Kravchuk on 10/09/50 at 11:20 will be faced with constant menace. a.m. In accordance with your directive dated Past hesitations by our comrades oc- 13.10.50 I had a meeting with KIM IL SUNG. curred because questions about the interna- [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, PAK HÓN-YÓNG was present at the tional situation, questions about the Soviet listy 72-73] meeting. I read the text of your telegram to assistance to us, and questions about air them. The content of the telegram caught cover were not clear to them. At present, all Document 17: Memorandum, Golovko KIM IL SUNG and PAK HÓN-YÓNG by these questions have been clarified. and Fokin to Stalin, 13 October 1950 surprise. Mao Zedong pointed out that now it is KIM IL SUNG stated that it was very advantageous for them to dispatch the Chi- Comrade STALIN hard for them [to accept Stalin’s recommen- nese troops into Korea. The Chinese have dation - AM], but since there is such advice the absolute obligation to send troops to According to electronic intelligence data they will fulfill it. Korea. gathered by the Seventh Fleet, as of 8:00 KIM IL SUNG asked me to read prac- At this point, they are sending the first a.m., 13 October, the following U.S. battle- tical recommendations and ordered PAK echelon composed of nine divisions. Al- ships were noticed in the vicinity of HÓN-YÓNG to write them down. He also though it is poorly armed, it will be able to Ch’óngjin: USS “Missouri,” three heavy asked us to help him develop a plan for fight against the troops of Syngman Rhee. In aircraft carriers (“Valley Forge,” “Leyte,” measures related to this question. the meantime, the Chinese comrades will “The Philippine Sea”), two escort aircraft have to prepare the second echelon. carriers (“Sicily,” “Beduin Strait”), three S H T Y K O V The main thing that we need, says Mao heavy (“Rochester,” “Toledo,” “Hel- No. 1476/sh Zedong, is air power which shall provide us ena”), three cruisers (“Wooster,” “Juno,” 14 October 1950 with air cover. We hope to see its arrival as “Ceylon”), twelve , the third Typed by Bantsekina on 10/14/50 at 13:30 soon as possible, but not later than in two 119 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN months. 13 Oct 1950 Furthermore, Comrade Mao Zedong [typed:] Sent on 13.X.50 CWIHP ACTIVITIES noted that at present the government of the AT V WORLD CONGRESS People’s Republic of China cannot pay in [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, OF CENTRAL AND cash for the armaments delivered. They listy 74-75] EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, hope to receive arms on credit. POLAND, AUGUST 1995 Thus, the 1951 budget will not be af- The Cold War International History Project fected, and it will be easier for them to Document 21: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn (CWIHP) organized several activities in con- explain it to the democrats. Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung, 14 October nection with the V World Congress of Central In conclusion, Mao Zedong stated that 1950 and East European Studies, held at Warsaw the leading comrades in the Central Com- University on 6-11 August 1995. mittee of the Chinese Communist Party be- CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 4829 CWIHP, in cooperation with the National lieve that the Chinese must come to the Security Archive (a non-governmental reposi- assistance of the Korean comrades in their To PYONGYANG—SOVIET AMBAS- tory for declassified documents and research institute located at George Washington Univer- difficult struggle. To discuss this matter, SADOR sity), co-organized three panels at the Warsaw Zhou Enlai will have to meet comrade meeting. Two were chaired by CWIHP Director Filippov again. Transmit to KIM IL SUNG the follow- Jim Hershberg: “New Evidence on the Polish Zhou Enlai is being sent new instruc- ing message: Crisis, 1980-1981,” with presentations by Mark tions. Kramer (Russian Research Center, Harvard Uni- “After vacillations [kolebaniy] and a versity), Michael Kubina (Free University, Ber- R O S H C H I N series of temporary [provisional] decisions lin), and Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive); and “Cold War Flashpoints,” with No. 2408 the Chinese comrades at last made a final Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive), 13.10 [13 October] decision to render assistance to Korea with Johanna Granville (Carnegie-Mellon Univer- troops. sity), Byrne, and Kramer. Malcolm Byrne [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, I am glad [rad] that the final and favor- chaired a session on “New Opportunities for listy 1-2] able decision for Korea has been made at Research and the Issue of Openness in Cold War last. Studies,” with presentations by Hope Harrison In this connection, you should consider (Lafayette College), Sven Holtsmark (Norwe- Document 20: Ciphered Telegram, Fyn the recommendations of the meeting of the gian Institute for Defense Studies), Hershberg, and Zubok. Si (Stalin) to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), Chinese-Soviet leading comrades, which During the conference, CWIHP, the Na- 13 October 1950 You were told of earlier, annulled. You will tional Security Archive, and the Institute of have to resolve concrete questions regarding Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ciphered Telegram # 75525/4/6759 the entry of the Chinese troops jointly with conducted a day-long workshop on current schol- (incoming #3735/shs) the Chinese comrades. arship and research on the 1980-81 Polish Cri- (Stalin’s hand-written note) The armaments required for the Chi- sis. CWIHP presented a collection of newly- nese troops will be delivered from the USSR. released Soviet documents on the crisis, in- PYONGYANG I wish You success.” cluded Politburo minutes, selected, translated, annotated, and introduced by Mark Kramer, To SHTYKOV for Comrade Kim Il while the Archive assembled declassified U.S. Sung F Y N S I [STALIN] documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Plans were discussed to hold I have just received a telegram from 14.10.50 an oral history conference on the 1980-81 Polish Mao Zedong in which he reports that the CC Typed by Doronchenkova #8865 Crisis, gathering key Polish, Russian, and Ameri- CPC [Central Committee of the Communist Made 2 copies: Stalin - 1, 8MDGS - 1. cans involved in the events, in the spring of 1997 Party of China] discussed the situation [in in Poland. Meetings were also held with Ger- man and Hungarian colleagues regarding, re- Korea - AM] again and decided after all to [Source: APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, spectively, meetings for scholars to present new render military assistance to the Korean com- list 77] East-bloc evidence on the 1953 East German rades, regardless of the insufficient arma- uprising and the 1956 Hungarian crisis which ment of the Chinese troops. I am awaiting are planned in connection with the National detailed reports about this matter from Mao 1. Although on the front page of the telegram it says that Security Archive’s “Cold War Flashpoints” Zedong. In connection with this new deci- it was sent from Pyongyang at 8:10 a.m. on September project and will be co-sponsored by CWIHP. sion of the Chinese comrades, I ask You to 26, I believe that the date was indicated incorrectly In conjunction with the Warsaw gathering, because of a typo. It should be dated as of September 27 postpone temporarily the implementation of Hershberg and Byrne gave presentations re- because at the end of the telegram it says that it was garding CWIHP’s and the Archive’s activities the telegram sent to You yesterday about the dispatched from Pyongyang at 12:35 p.m. on 27 Sep- at the International Librarians’ Conference on evacuation of North Korea and the retreat of tember 1950 (local time) which is 6:35 a.m. of the same Libraries in Europe’s Post-Communist Coun- the Korean troops to the north. date Moscow time. 2. 8th MDGS stands for the Eighth Main Department of tries, held near Krakow, Poland, at Jagellonian the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. University’s Polonia Institute (Przegorzaly) on F Y N S I [STALIN] 3-5 August 1995. Cumings and WCeathersby—AnOLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 120

11 July 1995 trary, charged Kim two percent—about what mander of the Korean Military Advisory mortgages cost in the U.S. then.) Group (KMAG) “to recover high ground in To the Editor: Document #7, Stalin’s telegram to Rus- North Korea occupied by [the] South Ko- sian ambassador to P’yôngyang Shtykov on rean Army.” Before dawn it launched strong Since Kathryn Weathersby chose once 30 January 1950, does not say what artillery barrages and then at 5:30 a.m., 4000 again to stigmatize my work (as “revision- Weathersby says it does, namely, it does not to 6000 North Korean border guards at- ist”) in the spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP “reveal so bluntly” Stalin’s strategic think- tacked the salient. They routed the South Bulletin, perhaps I might be permitted a ing or his “perfect mafioso style.” Instead it Korean defenders, destroying two compa- comment. The documents that she repro- shows Stalin appearing to be more interested nies of ROK soldiers and leaving hundreds duced, selectively culled from a vastly larger than at any previous point in Kim Il Sung’s dead. archive and handcarried to Seoul by a Boris plans for South Korea, without a hint of what Virtual panic ensued at high levels of Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the Stalin’s own strategic thinking might be. Dr. the South Korean government, leading faltering Russian economy, are quite inter- Weathersby thinks the timing of this change Syngman Rhee and his favored high officers esting but in ways that she does not seem to is to be explained by Dean Acheson’s famed in the army to argue that the only way to understand. press club speech on January 12, which is to relieve pressure on Ongjin was to drive Document #1, a standard transcript of assume a Stalin so inexperienced as to take north to Ch’orwon—which happened to be Kim Il Sung’s meeting with Stalin on 5 Acheson’s public statement of a private policy about 20 miles into North Korean territory. March 1949 widely circulated for use inside at face value (and even the public statement Rhee, who was meeting with Chiang Kai- the Soviet government, is impressive pri- is always misread by scholars). Finally, shek [Jiang Jieshi] in a southern Korean marily for how bland it is, adding very little Stalin’s request that Kim send 25,000 tons of port, returned to Seoul and dressed down his to the existing record. If anything it illus- lead (whether gratis or for a price is not defense minister for not having “attacked trates how distant Stalin was from the Ko- mentioned) is no more “mafioso” than the the North” after the Ongjin debacle. The rean situation, probing Kim on what kind of U.S. more or less telling South Korea that it American ambassador and the KMAG com- an army he had, what kind South Korea had, would require Korea’s entire annual output mander both intervened, since an attack on and whether he had utilized the “national of tungsten in the early 1950s, to make up for Ch’orwon would, in the words of the latter, bourgeoisie” to organize trade (which Kim the lost tungsten supplies of southern China. “cause heavy civil war and might spread.” indeed had done). This transcript adds Documents number two through six are The South did not move against Ch’orwon, virtually nothing to what has been known of considerably more interesting, but remain but attacks from both sides across the paral- this meeting, a relatively full record of which inexplicable unless placed against the back- lel on the Ongjin peninsula continued through can be found in an archive of captured North and-forth logic of the developing civil con- the end of 1949. Korean materials in Washington. But it flict on the peninsula, with full knowledge of All this is based on unimpeachable does appear to show that no secret military what the South and the U.S. were doing. The American archival documentation, some of alliance or agreement issued forth from this critical issue in these documents is not a which was reproduced in the 1949 Korea meeting, as the South long claimed. wholesale invasion of the South, but a mili- papers of the Foreign Relations of the U.S. This document certainly does not pro- tary operation to seize the Ongjin Peninsula, and which I treated at length in my 1990 vide evidence for Dr. Weathersby’s asser- which juts southward from the 38th parallel book. When we now look at both sides of the tion that the meeting was “revealing in a on Korea’s west coast, reachable from the parallel with the help of Soviet materials, we most intimate way [of] the nature of the South only by sea or by an overland route see how similar the Russians were in seek- relationship” between the USSR and the through North Korean territory. This is where ing to restrain hotheaded Korean leaders, DPRK or that North Korea was “utterly the Korean War conventionally dated from including the two chiefs of state. Indeed, dependent” on the USSR. The captured 25 June 1950 began, and where fighting two key Russian Embassy officials seeking archive has large numbers of documents on between the South and North began on 4 to restrain Kim used language almost iden- Korean-Soviet trade, negotiations over vari- May 1949—in a battle probably started by tical to that which used ous exchanges, and proof that some pre- the South, according to the most reliable with Rhee in his June 1950 discussions in cious Korean minerals, like gold and mona- accounts. Seoul (both, upon hearing Kim or Rhee zite (when refined, useful for a thorium According to these Soviet documents, declaim their desire to attack the other side, atomic bomb) were indeed transferred in Kim Il Sung first broached the idea of an “tried to switch the discussion to a general large quantities to Russia. (I covered this operation against Ongjin to Shtykov on 12 theme,” to quote from document #6). We briefly in my Origins of the Korean War, August 1949. This came on the heels of the see that Kim Il Sung, like southern leaders, volume 2 [Princeton University Press, 1990], biggest Ongjin battle of 1949, initiated on wanted to bite off a chunk of exposed terri- pp. 151-2, 340-45.) These voluminous ma- August 4 by the North to dislodge South tory or grab a small city—all of Kaesong for terials still do not prove North Korea’s utter Korean army units holding Unp’a Mountain, example, which is bisected by the 38th par- dependency on the USSR, especially when a salient above the 38th parallel which the allel, or Haeju city just above the parallel on contrasted to South Korea, which had half South had aggressed against in a previous Ongjin, which southern commanders wanted its annual budget and five-sixths of its im- battle and the summit of which commanded to occupy in 1949-50. ports in the 1950s provided virtually gratis much of the terrain to the north. The North The Soviet documents also demonstrate by the United States. (Stalin, to the con- sought, in the words of the American com- the hardwon, learned logic of this civil war 121 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN by late 1949, namely, that both sides under- “rise up” to greet northern troops (Origins, of half-century-old documents?) And even stood that their big power guarantors would 1990, pp. 456-57). Kim Il Sung trumped up when we have every document the Soviets not help them if they launched an unpro- these charges in show trials in 1953, and then ever produced, we will still need the South voked general attack—or even an assault on had Pak and his close allies executed. Mean- Korean archives, the North Korean archives, Ongjin or Ch’orwon. Document #6, a tele- while Kim told Shtykov in January 1950 that the Chinese archives on both sides of the gram from the Russian ambassador to Mos- “partisans will not decide the question. The Taiwan straits, and the American intelli- cow in January 1950, shows Kim Il Sung people of the south know that we have a gence, signals and cryptography archives, impatient that the South “is still not instigat- good army.” South Korean “liberation” was before we will be able to argue on truly solid ing an attack,” thus to justify his own, and to come courtesy of, and only of, the Korean ground the question we ought all try to the Russians in P’yôngyang tell him once Peoples Army. forget, namely, “who started the Korean again that he cannot attack Ongjin without Finally, what is absolutely fascinating civil war?” risking general civil war. Meanwhile Rhee about documents two through six is Kim Il and his advisors (some of whom were Ameri- Sung’s basic conception of a Korean War, Sincerely yours, cans with cabinet-level portfolios in the ROK originated at least by August 1949: namely, government) had gotten the message (espe- attack the cul de sac of Ongjin (which no Bruce Cumings cially through OSS and CIA operative sane blitzkreig commander would do pre- Preston Goodfellow) that the US would only cisely because it is a cul de sac), move 1. The armistice did not end discussions of seizing back Seoul in the case of an unprovoked and eastward and grab Kaesong, and then see Ongjin and Kaesông, however. According to American unequivocal attack from the North. Thus the what happens. At a minimum this would intelligence reports in February 1955, Syngman Rhee had held “meetings in which Rhee told Korean military 1950 logic for both sides was to see who establish a much more secure defense of and civilian leaders to prepare for military actions would be stupid enough to move first, with P’yôngyang, which was quite vulnerable against north Korea,” and in October came reports Kim itching to invade and hoping for a clear from Ongjin and Kaesong. At maximum, it saying that he had ordered plans for the retaking of southern provocation, and hotheads in the might open Seoul to his forces. That is, if the Kaesông and the Ongjin Peninsula. This never hap- pened, probably because the U.S. once again prevented South hoping to provoke an “unprovoked” southern army collapses, move on to Seoul Rhee from doing it. See declassified information cited assault, thus to get American help—for that and occupy it in a few days. And here we see in Donald S. MacDonald, U.S.-Korean Relations from was the only way the South could hope to the significance of the collapse of the ROK Liberation to Self-Reliance (Boulder, Colorado: win. What better way for both sides to begin 2nd and 7th divisions, 25-27 June 1950, Westview Press, 1992), 23-24, 80. than to do it in isolated, remote Ongjin, with which opened the historic invasion corrider * * * * * * no foreign observers present along the paral- and placed the Korean People’s Army in lel? Seoul on the 27th, and why some people K. Weathersby responds: Other items in these documents also with intimate knowledge of the Korean civil bear comment. They make clear that well conflict have speculated that these divisions Professor Cumings attempts to before the war Kim already had begun play- may have harbored a fifth column (Origins, downplay the significance of the Russian ing Moscow off against Beijing, for ex- 1990, pp. 572-73, 582-85). Kim did not by documents by asserting, first of all, that the ample letting Shtykov overhear him say, at any means get what he wanted out of the documents on the decision-making behind an apparently drunken luncheon on 19 Janu- Korean War, but, rest his soul, he got his the North Korean attack on South Korea in ary 1950, that if the Russians wouldn’t help minimum demand: Kaesong and Ongjin re- June 1950 published in the previous issue of him unify the country, “Mao Zedong is his main firmly on the other side of the 1953 the Bulletin were “selectively culled from a friend and will always help Korea.” In demilitarized zone....1 vastly larger archive.” In fact, the collection general this document underscores my point Readers of this Bulletin may not be as from the Presidential Archive declassified that the victory of the Chinese revolution interested in the details of Korean history as in preparation for Yeltsin’s presentation of a had an enormous refractory effect on North I am. But they make the point that Korean portion of them to South Korea includes the Korea (Origins, 1990, pp. 369-71), and that history is made first and foremost by Kore- great majority of what that archive contains, North Korea’s China connection was a trump ans, which is something that much of the as can be ascertained from looking at the card Kim could play to create some breath- Korean War literature (from all sides) still “Delo” and page numbers. The important ing room for his regime between the two fails to grasp. The Soviet documents also gaps in that collection are from April-June communist giants. The documents also show show that they are merely documents, that 1950 and October 1950, not from the earlier that Kim’s timing for an invasion was deeply is, evidence that remains to be interpreted period. influenced by his desire to get large numbers with all the intelligence, hindsight, imagina- Cumings also writes that these docu- of Korean soldiers back from China, where tion and care that the historian can muster. ments were “handcarried to Seoul by a Boris they had been fighting for years with Mao’s Furthermore these documents are highly se- Yeltsin beseeching South Korea to aid the forces (Origins, 1990, pp. 451-53). lective, drawn from one portion of one sec- faltering Russian economy.” Actually, These documents put to rest forever, in tion of one archive, and proferred to a Seoul Yeltsin presented them to President Kim my view, P’yôngyang’s canard that it was still socked into the Korean civil struggle by Young Sam while the latter was in Moscow. Pak Hon-yong, the southern communist a mendicant from Moscow. (Can we imag- Furthermore, Yeltsin’s government’s eco- leader, who argued for war in 1950 and ine the reverse? An American president nomic reasons for wishing to improve rela- foolishly thought the southern people would currying favor in P’yôngyang with a handful tions with South Korea are only relevant to COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 122 our discussion if this motivation led the testing him and reinforcing his vulnerability limited military operation on the Ongjin Russian declassification commission to ex- by making him expose himself through his peninsula. As the Soviet documents show, clude certain documents, presumably ones replies to such questions. he was correct to conclude that something that would present the Soviet role in the Cumings also argues that this transcript was up on Ongjin. However, he stops his Korean War in an unfavorable light. As is does not provide evidence for my assertion account before the punch line. In 1949 Kim apparent from the documents published in that North Korea was utterly dependent on did raise the possibility of a limited opera- this issue as well as the previous issue of the the Soviet Union. Of course it doesn’t—it tion to seize Ongjin, but the Soviet leader- Bulletin, unflattering documents have not would have been ridiculous to claim that it ship rejected the plan. In early 1950 Stalin been excluded; these records are, in fact, did. What I wrote was that “the thousands of changed his mind, and, as the article in this remarkably frank. pages of documents on post-war Korea in the issue details, in April and May Soviet and Cumings disparages the usefulness of Russian Foreign Ministry archive” show “in North Korean military leaders together the transcript of the first meeting between exhaustive detail” that “in the years prior to worked out a plan for a full-scale offensive Kim Il Sung and Stalin by describing it as a and during the Korean War, North Korea against South Korea. Cumings is right that “standard transcript...widely circulated for was utterly dependent economically on the leaders of both sides hoped to gain their use inside the Soviet government” which Soviet Union,” a subject I address further in patron’s support for a war by provoking an “adds virtually nothing to what has been my essay in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. assault by the other side and that “the 1950 known of this meeting.” With regard to this Cumings adds that the collection of docu- logic for both sides was to see who would be assertion, it must be pointed out that Cumings ments captured by UN forces in Pyongyang stupid enough to move first.” But the end of has no knowledge of the circulation of this in the fall of 1950, which is housed in the the story is that the Soviet Union eventually transcript within the Soviet government, National Archives in Washington, reveal decided to support its client’s plan for mili- and neither does any other scholar. Further- considerable trade between the DPRK and tary reunification while the United States more, nothing was “widely circulated” the USSR, but “still do not prove North did not. Thus, though Cumings is right that within the Soviet government; in the Soviet Korea’s utter dependency on the USSR.” Korean history is made first and foremost by context this claim simply makes no sense. With regard to this argument, it must be Koreans, the war of 1950-53 was not a In addition, the account of Kim’s meeting pointed out that the collection of captured purely Korean product. with Stalin provided in the captured docu- documents consists of documents that the Of course it’s true, as Cumings notes, ments is limited to a report of the trip Kim Il North Koreans left behind when they with- that we must examine the archives from all Sung presented to a party assembly, in which drew from Pyongyang in the face of the U.S./ the major actors in the war before we can he described the agreements reached, the UN advance into North Korea. They thus fully understand this unusually complex “friendly atmosphere” of the talks, the sites include only those documents that were not conflict. The Cold War International His- the delegation visited, etc. Obviously, an considered important enough either to evacu- tory Project is facilitating just such a actual transcript of the meeting with Stalin ate or destroy. This is why there is nothing in multiarchival investigation, beginning with provides a much more substantial piece of that collection about the planning of the June a close comparison of the Chinese and Rus- historical evidence. 1950 attack and no records of high-level sian sources. Nonetheless, certain impor- As for Cumings’ conclusion that the correspondence between Pyongyang and tant questions about the war have been re- transcript reveals “how distant Stalin was Moscow. It is not sound reasoning to argue solved by the Russian archival sources; to from the Korean situation,” it would be that something was not the case if it is not pretend otherwise is simply dishonest. possible to interpret Stalin’s remarks in this documented in this collection. way if one had no knowledge of Soviet/ The captured documents are a very rich North Korean relations and no knowledge source of information on many aspects of the of Stalin’s style with subordinates. Perhaps history of North Korea that are little illumi- I should have been more explicit. Stalin was nated in the Soviet documents, such as poli- very well informed about events in North tics at the village level, economic records of Korea. The ranking Soviet official in North individual factories, and party personnel ros- Korea was General T.F. Shtykov, one of ters. But to get the big picture we must turn Stalin’s “own men,” who had direct access to the Russian documents. And to get a to Stalin, reporting to him outside the nor- complete picture, we must examine both sets mal channels of the Foreign Ministry and of records, a laborious undertaking which a General Staff. Throughout 1949 and 1950 handful of scholars from South Korea has Shtykov regularly communicated with Stalin begun. about the situation in Korea, particularly With regard to Cumings’ disagreement about the U.S. military presence in the South, of my reading of Stalin’s telegram of 30 the opposition movement in the South, and January 1950, I refer readers to my article in the actions of the U.S.-backed government the present issue of the Bulletin. Cumings in Seoul. Stalin’s request to Kim to provide goes on to discuss documents #2-6, recount- him with information on such topics was a ing the reasons why he concluded in his 1990 familiar style of dealing with subordinates, volume that the war of June 1950 began as a 123 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

SOVIET INTERROGATION OF ministers, stated: such activities secret—as “weather” or “train- U.S. POWs IN THE KOREAN WAR Representatives of the MGB of ing” missions. the USSR and China came from These flights, which actually began be- by Laurence Jolidon Peking to conduct further prisoner fore the outbreak of the Korean War and interrogations, in order to gain more continued for years afterward, were them- The extensive, covert involvement of precise information on spy centers, selves responsible for the loss of approxi- Soviet intelligence in the interrogation of landing strips and flights over the mately 140 U.S. pilots and crewmen shot American prisoners throughout the Korean territory of the Soviet Union. down over or near Soviet territory. Except in War has been laid bare thanks to a trove of The interrogations will continue rare cases these men were never publicly long-secret military documents unearthed in Pekton [Pyoktong]. acknowledged by the U.S. government and by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on While seemingly cursory and matter- the very existence of their missions was missing Americans in the former Soviet of-fact, this document had several important routinely disavowed. Union. implications. Just as routinely, the Soviets denied Despite accounts in the debriefings of First, it contradicted previous Russian finding or capturing any survivors of these repatriated U.S. POWs—and even brief assurances that Soviet officials had not been shootdowns. They were secret casualties in mentions in the Western press during and involved in the interrogation of American a secret war. So long as the U.S. and the immediately following the war—that Rus- POWs. USSR remained superpower enemies, to sians had questioned U.S. POWs, Soviet Even after of the Soviet mili- publicly seek their whereabouts would vio- officials steadfastly maintained for decades tary intelligence service had told the Joint late their secret status. that it never happened. Commission of their personal involvement But the interrogations referred to in the The Kremlin’s obvious interest in the in numerous interrogations, the Russian side 26 November 1952 message were primarily details of American weapons, strategy and had insisted that the rules under which So- those conducted on Americans taken pris- morale in the Far East—as early-Cold War viet forces operated in the Korean War the- oner in hostile action in the Korean War. In indicators of what to expect once the battle ater forbade such acts. the case of U.S. aviators, they included men for world supremacy that most assumed As proof, they cited message traffic to shot down over or otherwise forced to ditch would eventually occur in Europe was Soviet posts in the war theater dating from or parachute in Manchuria. joined—had never gone that far, Stalin and January 1951, and repeated as a standing By UN Command edict, U.S. planes his successors argued. order throughout the war, that “our transla- were forbidden to enter Chinese air space. Moscow’s leaders hid behind the fic- tors are categorically forbidden to interro- This stipulation was frequently breached by tion that the Soviet Union, while lending gate American and British POWs, or prison- U.S. pilots, although it was customary for moral and logistical support to the troops of ers of any other nationality.” official military records to mask this fact in North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and air The Ignatyev-Malenkov message, on after-action reports. protection along the Manchurian border for its face, was either a reversal of that policy Secondly, the 26 November 1952 mes- the sanctuary it had recently ceded to the or—as some American analysts believed— sage to the Soviet advisor in North Korea is new Chinese ruler, Mao Zedong, had prima- a clue that the “categorically forbidden” an important clue to the dynamics of the rily been a neutral, disinterested party in order was only for public consumption. covert war the Soviets were then conducting Korea. (In the course of the Russian-American behind the lines in Korea. But just as Soviet Communist Party dialog on this subject through the meetings Rather than simply sitting back and archival documents made public in the past of the Joint Commission, the Russian posi- waiting for the reports of POW interroga- few years have drawn a clear, intentional tion shifted several times. Some Russian tions to be sent through channels, from the and decision-making connection between members of the commission admitted reluc- prison camps that were ostensibly under the Stalin’s hand and the North Korean inva- tantly that one favored method of interrogat- control of the Chinese army, the Soviets sion, documents from Soviet military files ing American POWs was to have the Rus- were taking the initiative to monitor and have deepened our knowledge of what be- sians’ questions put to the prisoners by Chi- direct the process more directly. came in effect an extensive, bold, yet largely nese interrogators while the Soviets sat, un- This speaks to the apparent competition covert intelligence war conducted by the seen, in an adjacent room. Testimony taken for access to the most valuable POWs— Soviets north of the 38th parallel. by the commission also made clear that in documented in wartime accounts of UN One key document, obtained in April some cases the Soviets carefully chose Rus- prisoners—among the three Communist al- 1994 by investigators from the Pentagon’s sian officers of Asiatic cast to do the interro- lies in the war. POW/MIA Affairs Office working under gating.) By the fall and winter of 1952, for the aegis of the Joint Commission, came While Americans are not specifically instance, the Chinese had capitalized on the from files at the Soviet military archives in mentioned in the Ignatyev-Malenkov mes- capture on Manchurian territory of a number Podolsk. sage, the reference to “flights over the terri- of U.S. aviators by charging them with “war The two-paragraph message, dated 26 tory of the Soviet Union” could pertain only crimes,” including the much-disputed alle- November 1952, from S. Ignatyev, the chief to American reconnaissance flights, dis- gation of waging “germ warfare” by drop- Soviet military advisor in North Korea, to guised in public statements by U.S. authori- ping infected plants and insects while over- G.M. Malenkov, one of Stalin’s principal ties—who had their own reasons for keeping flying Chinese territory. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 124

The statement that “interrogations will Captain Charles McDonough was the incident—has been resolved through the continue in Pekton (Pyoktong),” a city on taken prisoner. Joint Commission’s efforts. the North Korean side of the Yalu near the Under interrogation he said: But investigations into other cases, par- border with China, could be read as a sign The aircraft was shot down at ticularly those related to the testimony of that the Soviets wished to make it clear that an altitude of 30,000 feet. live Russian witnesses, are continuing; and the prisoners—and the intelligence gained The crew numbering 3 persons together, the Senate committee and the Joint from their interrogations—should be shared. bailed out on parachutes. The navi- Commission did become a catalyst for bring- A later Soviet document, acquired by gator having landed ran off, where ing to light some of the Soviet Union’s most the American side of the commission in the radio operator disappeared to he closely-held secrets regarding the treatment early 1995, also appears to lift any previous did not see. The captive himself of Americans in Russian hands. prohibition against Soviet involvement with was burned and is in a critical con- One clear lesson was that the main tar- American POWs—if the prohibition ever dition. gets of the Soviet’s intelligence war during existed. Sent on 29 January 1953, and A second cable, dated the following Korea were American POWs—and that the addressed to three top Soviet leaders includ- day, added this: most prized among them were the pilots and ing Lavrenti Beria, then head of the MGB, I am informing you that the pi- crews of the innovative units of the U.S. Far the message read: lot from the shot down B-45 aircraft East Air Force. Of men flying the F-86, the “The minister of public security of died en route and the interrogation most advanced U.S. fighter of the Korean China, having reported on 27 January 1953 was not finished. War era, a disproportionate several dozen to our advisor on this decision of the TSK These two cables—both sent to Marshal failed to appear among the ranks of the KPK [the Central Committee of the Chinese Stepan Krasovskiy, chief of the Soviet gen- repatriated U.S. POWs when prisoners were Communist Party], requested that our advi- eral staff in Moscow—were found in the exchanged in 1953. sor help the Chinese investigators organize Soviet military archives in Podolsk by civil- The documents on American POWs the interrogation of the prisoners of war and ian Russian researchers working under the from Soviet military archives, taken together oversee their work. The MGB advisor was direction of Dr. Cole, then with the with the testimony of Soviet veterans of ordered by us to render such help.” Rand Corp. Cole’s project was authorized Korea and now-declassified papers from A second document that illustrates the under a Pentagon contract with Rand to search U.S. archives, clearly point to Soviet com- involvement of Soviet military intelligence for information in Soviet archives dealing plicity in the disappearance and probable in the interrogation of American POWs in with Americans missing after World War II, death of dozens, if not hundreds, of those Korea deals with the 4 December 1950 the Korean War and Cold War. POWs who were not repatriated. shootdown of a USAF RB-45 reconnais- The cables in the McDonough-Lovell Soviet military data dealing with Ameri- sance plane. RB-45 case were made available to the Ameri- can prisoners in Korea began making its way None of the four men aboard the plane— can side of the Joint Commission within a to U.S. authorities and private researchers in the pilot, Capt. Charles McDonough, two short time after Cole learned of them in the the winter of 1991-92, as the administration other crewmen, and Col. John R. Lovell, a fall of 1992 and ultimately became a part of of was giving way to his top-ranking Air Force intelligence officer the large repository of Joint Commission rival, Boris Yeltsin. believed to be on a mission from the Penta- documents that comprises the results of the During what many would later charac- gon—made it back to the U.S. commission’s efforts. terize as a brief “window of opportunity,” Thus, like the Cold War spy flights, the After being translated, documents re- when a mood of genuine reform and open- RB-45 case was wrapped not only in the ceived from the Russian side of the commis- ness about past misdeeds seemed to emanate difficulties of unraveling any MIA case sion, along with transcribed minutes of the from Moscow, government and private re- from the tangles of the Korean War but also Joint Commission’s regular meetings (usu- searchers seeking answers about U.S. POWs in the sensitivity that attaches to intelligence ally three times a year), are placed on file at and MIAs attempted to turn the moment to missions and personnel. the Library of Congress. their advantage. The key document discovered so far in Besides filling gaps in the world’s ex- A number of interested parties in the the RB-45 case revealed not only that at panding knowledge of Soviet behavior and U.S. government—the State Department, least one of those aboard was captured alive, policies, the still-growing collection of docu- Pentagon, National Archives, Library of but also that Soviet interest and involve- ments, summaries of papers, lists and trans- Congress—decided on a unified approach to ment in the case was high. lations now available to scholars and the gaining access to files related to missing A cable dated 17 December 1950, stated general public may ultimately help resolve a Americans, and supported the creation of in part: significant number of American MIA cases. the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission. Each An aircraft shot down on 12-4- To date, the Joint Commission’s record agency or department appointed a represen- 50 of the B-45 type fell in a region on that score has been modest. Only one tative to the commission, whose co-chair- 70 km to the east of Andun (Man- actual Cold War MIA case—a U.S. fighter men were former U.S. ambassador to Mos- churia). The aircraft caught fire in pilot whose remains were retrieved from an cow Malcolm Toon for the U.S. and the late the air and upon falling to the earth uninhabited coastal island in the Russian Far Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, a historian and burned up completely. The crew East after a Russian man who took part in the military adviser to Yeltsin, for the Russians. bailed out on parachutes. The pilot original burial came forward with details of The commission began its work in rela- 125 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tive obscurity. But in a move whose motiva- number of Russian citizens who have come tion and meaning to this day remains some- forward as a result of printed and broadcast what of a mystery, Yeltsin in June 1992 appeals for information. (Joint Commission suddenly announced that a number of Ameri- staffers operate on the understanding that CWIHP On-Line can military prisoners had indeed been held Russian officials will be notified of and on Soviet territory. And he vowed an inves- invited to sit in on all interviews of Russians ...is coming! tigation that would determine whether any volunteering information to the American The Cold War International History remained alive. side.) Project (CWIHP) is developing an internet- His statement revived the hopes not Now in its fifth year, the Joint Commis- accessible system to make publications (in- only of thousands of families seeking infor- sion remains in operation, although the flow cluding the Bulletin and Working Papers), mation about MIAs in Indochina—the most of tips and leads has slowed drastically and translated documents, and other features vocal and media-noticed segment of the the frequently stated promise of access to available via computer. The service is being POW/MIA community—but also of a qui- KGB files on foreign POWs remains unful- developed in cooperation with the National eter and more patient community represent- filled. Security Archive, a non-governmental, non- profit research institute and declassified ing the families and friends of nearly 8,200 While conducting ground-breaking documents repository located at George unaccounted-for men from the Korean War work that frequently kept the POW/MIA Washington University. and dozens more from the shootdowns of community’s hopes on razor’s edge, the Plans call for the system to go on-line U.S. spy planes during the 1950s and 1960s. Joint Commission also became caught in early in 1996, with CWIHP to be part of the This community—unaligned with and post-Cold War gridlock, as the archival “win- Archive’s home-page on the World Wide largely separate from the academic commu- dow of opportunity” closed and the Russian Web. Once in service, users will be able to nity that had begun to forage in Soviet ar- side’s hardliners parried with a dwindling gain access to past, present, and in-progress chives for its own purposes—had two pow- and sometimes fractious team of Americans CWIHP publications, to learn other infor- erful allies in its search for information about on the other side. mation on CWIHP and related research ac- tivities. American MIAs assumed to be in Russian A report released in the summer of 1993 One planned feature of the on-line ser- hands. by the Task Force Russia—a team of U.S. vice of special interest to many users will be Each of these allies—the Senate Select experts on Soviet affairs and military intel- the Russian Archives Documents Database Committee on POWs and MIAs and the ligence put together by the U.S. Army— (RADD). RADD, a collaborative effort of U.S.-Russia Joint Commission—would end concluded that up to 1,000 or more Ameri- CWIHP and the National Security Archive, up disappointing the Korean War and Cold can POWs from the Korean War had been is intended to help inform researchers of War MIA community in its own way. shipped to the former Soviet Union for inter- documents relevant to Cold War history that The Senate committee, whose co-chairs rogation. various scholars and scholarly projects have were Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts and But the report’s findings were mini- obtained from Russian archives, and to share expenses for translations so that they can be Sen. Robert Smith of New Hampshire, lasted mized by Pentagon officials who charged used as widely as possible. An English- for one year and drew significant media they were more supposition than fact. The language inventory of documents which attention. But, predictably, it spent the vast team of experts who had constructed the scholars have already provided is being pre- majority of staff time and investigative ef- case made by the report—Task Force Rus- pared, and the aim is to put translations on fort on Indochina. The life of the committee sia—was effectively disbanded after one line as soon as feasible. Those scholars who was marked by private and public quarrels year, and its duties subsumed under the can read Russian may then read the docu- over the value of certain evidence and the Pentagon’s Office of POW/MIA Affairs. ments in the Archive reading room, while integrity of some of the witnesses. The current U.S. position on this issue is those who cannot can commission transla- But in every case, the context of the that the strongest available evidence points tions, which will then be made freely avail- able. RADD is presently being managed at news and controversy was the Vietnam War. to the transfer to Soviet territory of a rela- the Archive by Mark H. Doctoroff, who can In the public hearings phase, only one day tively small number of Korean War Ameri- be reached at (202) 994-7239 (telephone) or was devoted to Korean War and Cold War can POWs—perhaps corresponding to the (202) 994-7005 (fax). issues and cases. roughly 25-30 fighter pilot MIAs who are As the project moves forward, we are The Joint Commission, meanwhile, had believed to have been among the most prized open to expanding RADD into READD— begun what can now be seen as an extremely captives for intelligence purposes. Russian and East-bloc Documents Data- ambitious attempt to investigate the thou- base—if resources permit and source mate- sands of intelligence tips and live-sightings rials justify this expansion. of Americans held in the former Soviet Union Laurence Jolidon is an investigative reporter, Further information on CWIHP’s on- from the end of World War II to the present war correspondent, and the author of Last line service will appear in the next issue of the day. Seen Alive—The Search for Missing POWs Bulletin. In the meantime, we welcome sug- Thanks to some Russian cooperation— from the Korean War, from which this ar- gestions and (as always) donations of docu- or, to put it another way, despite frequent ticle was excerpted. ments and translations for RADD (and Russian non-cooperation—the American READD). side of the commission has been able to visit some archives and museums and interview a NewCOLD WAR INTERNATIONALChinese HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 126

CONSTRUCTING A HISTORY side of China (largely but by no means exclu- younger, adventuresome generation have OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY sively in the United States), scholarship bears begun to exploit their inherent advantages in FOREIGN RELATIONS the imprint of the political science discipline studying China’s complex behavior in an and the closely related international relations often threatening and generally intrusive by Michael H. Hunt field, which has long dominated CCP for- world. They have had immediate access to eign-policy studies. Historical questions and publications (some of limited circulation), The study of the foreign relations of the historical methods are thus, at least outside and enjoyed the first glimpses into the ar- Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is under- of China, only beginning to move from the chives. They have profited from their per- going dramatic changes that are taking it in margins to a more central position. sonal contacts with former policymakers, a distinctly more historical direction. This The purpose of this article is to offer a and brought to new sources an unmatched development has essentially been driven by guide to this emergent historical approach. It sensitivity to the political culture in which the appearance of an abundance of new begins with an extended look at the field’s China’s policy was made. They have en- material (for details see the accompanying two chief geographic divisions, China and joyed the stimulus of a large and interested essay on sources). This material is largely the United States. It closes with some thoughts audience for their writing and easy opportu- the product of the party’s own history estab- on ways to encourage the already promising nity to discuss with colleagues work in lishment and its mandate to transcend a prospects for a solidly grounded and concep- progress and news of the field. As a result of simple and largely discredited party my- tually sophisticated history of party foreign these developments, the center for the study thology in favor of a better documented and relations. of foreign relations and the CCP has shifted hence more credible past. The publication back to China. A glance at the number of of documents, memoirs, chronologies, and Scholarship in China specialists and special research offices, the standard historical accounts has at last made frequency of conferences, and the long list it possible for specialists outside of China to Scholars in the People’s Republic of of publications would all confirm this im- move beyond broad, heavily speculative China, now in many ways at the leading edge pression. treatments based on fragmentary evidence of CCP foreign-policy history, have only But Chinese specialists still face some and to construct a party foreign-policy his- recently come into their own.1 They long notable difficulties. One of these is a patrio- tory marked by engaging human detail and labored under the gaze of party representa- tism that the CCP did not create but did structural complexity. tives whose main task was to ensure that powerfully reinforce in scholarship as in My book, The of Chinese Com- history served the party’s political agenda other realms of Chinese life. The mantra is munist Foreign Policy (New York: Colum- and contributed to nationalist myths and popu- familiar: China was divided and oppressed; bia University Press, 1996), is itself a good lar morale during the international crises that China pulled itself together under CCP lead- gauge of that already well advanced if un- marked Mao Zedong’s years of power. Un- ership; China stood up. This satisfying if even reorientation. As is evident in the der these difficult conditions specialists on somewhat simple story to which specialists volume, the historical ground becomes more Chinese foreign relations did their best work on party history and foreign relations still treacherous to traverse the closer we get to by putting together politically inoffensive give at least lip service constrains their ex- the present. The prehistory of the CCP collections of historical materials, many of amination of foreign relations, not least with (located in the opening chapters of my study notable quality and lasting value. But in their the capitalist powers and inner-Asian in the late Qing and the early Republic) is own writing they had to serve up a thin peoples. These sensitive topics must be firmly in place. From the point of the CCP’s historical gruel heavily spiced but hardly addressed correctly and carefully or not at formal founding in 1921 down to its con- made more palatable by quotes from Chair- all. solidation of state power in 1949-1950 (the man Mao and other sources of the official While the fate of non-Han people under subject of the middle chapters), the evi- orthodoxy. This revolutionary historiogra- China’s imperial ambitions are simply writ- dence constitutes uneven footing that re- phy, following tenets laid down by Mao, ten out of the category of foreign relations quires some caution. The most recent stressed the wave of imperialism that had (to be treated instead as an “internal” mat- phase—the foreign relations of the party- overpowered China. Commercial and later ter), dealings with foreign powers are fea- state—is just beginning to pass into the industrial , its diplomatic agents, tured in terms of the comfortable and safe historical realm (as the tentativeness of the and those Chinese drawn into the unsavory tale of struggle and triumph. For example, relevant chapter suggests). It will prove the role of collaborator, had left the Chinese PRC scholars enjoying unparalleled access most interpretively volatile as historical people impoverished, economically subor- to source materials on the Korean conflict patterns begin to emerge for the first time dinate, and politically in thrall. The preda- waged against a U.S.-led coalition have been from the accumulation of reliable evidence. tory character of imperialism locked China in a position to offer the fullest account of its This trend toward a more historical in fundamental conflict with the powers until conduct, warts and all. Their accounts are treatment of the CCP’s external relations a popular revolution transformed China and indeed fuller but the warts are hard to spot, has occurred at an uneven pace and taken altered China’s relationship to the capitalist thus keeping alive the old heroic narrative. different forms in a field effectively frag- world. Patriotism, reinforced by party orthodoxy, mented into two distinct parts. The work Since the late 1970s established schol- has inspired repeated claims that the Korean done in China is already decidedly histori- ars have worked free of many of the old intervention was a “brilliant decision” cal though still politically constrained. Out- interpretive constraints, and joined by a (yingming juece) unblemished by confu- 127 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN sion, division, or opportunism. That very ence. others.4 phrase appears in the title of one of the How the CCP privately assessed the But Mao’s account also arose from the earliest of the documented accounts to ap- USSR as a supporter and model—surely the more practical political concern with launch- pear in the PRC, and the theme persists in single most important issue for understand- ing a publicity campaign that would win virtually all of the secondary studies of the ing the CCP’s position within the socialist support for the party among Chinese and Korean War published in the last decade.2 camp—will remain a matter of speculation foreigners and bring in much needed contri- A second impulse, as constraining as if not controversy so long as the historical butions from the outside. Inviting , a patriotism and no less intrusive, has been the sources needed to arbitrate it are kept locked reliably progressive American, to Bao’an pressure to fit research findings within a in Chinese archives and excluded even from was part of that strategy. Mao set aside linear, progressive conception of the CCP’s restricted-circulation materials. The open- roughly two hours a night over ten evenings development. Highly selfconscious of the ing of Soviet archives may provide the first to tell his story. While Wu Liping translated, importance of its own past to legitimizing revealing, detailed picture of broad aspects Snow took notes. then trans- the current leadership and maintaining party of the relationship, and may perhaps even lated those notes back into Chinese for Mao prestige, the CCP has consistently sought to help overcome some of the squeamishness to review. Snow then returned to Beijing to explain its evolution in terms of the forces of party leaders apparently feel about a candid prepare the final account, to appear in 1938 history and the wisdom of its leaders. The look at this important part of their own past. in Red Star Over China. The first Chinese result is a picture of a party that adjusted to Or it may take the passing of the last of party version of Mao’s story appeared the year changing social and international conditions elders whose memories of dealing with the before. That Chinese edition and others and that consistently and correctly reassessed Soviets go back to the 1920s. However they would circulate within Nationalist as well as its own performance, distinguishing correct get there, scholars badly need freer rein to CCP controlled areas.5 from mistaken policy lines. The party, thus research and publish on this long sensitive The second layer is associated with the at least in theory, developed according to a topic vital to understanding the CCP after “new democracy” Mao began to form in the logic which left scant room for recurrent 1949 no less than before that date. [Ed. note: wake of Wang Ming’s defeat and in the miscalculation or fundamental misdirection. A sampling of recently released Chinese context of the rectification movement of This notion of history in which all events materials on Sino-Soviet relations, 1956-58, 1942-1943.6 Party theoreticians had in 1941 are mere tributaries feeding the main stream appears on pages 148-163 of this issue of the begun to promote the importance of “Mao itself flowing toward some predestined point CWIHP Bulletin.] thought” to party orthodoxy, and a Political is extraordinarily constraining, as a look at The last and easily the most practical Bureau meeting in September and October PRC writings relating the 1919 May Fourth problem handed down from earlier CCP of that year produced statements of support movement to the CCP reveals. Chinese historical work is the matter of the layers of from Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Chen leaders interested in the origins of the party tendentious documentation and personal Yun, and . (Neither Zhou Enlai have tried to force a rich set of contemporary reminiscences that have come to surround nor Lin Biao was present.) For the next two views into an orthodox framework wherein Mao Zedong. Those layers have unfortu- years the visibility of “Mao thought” contin- the raison d’être of May Fourth is to serve as nately not only served to obscure him as a ued to rise. Zhang Ruxin, , Chen intellectual midwife to the CCP’s birth. Their personality and policymaker but also cov- Yun, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai offered studies make the Bolshevik revolution the ered over the contributions of his colleagues. praise, and Mao’s writings figured promi- central and transformative event in the intel- Repeatedly over the last half century party nently in the study material used in the lectual life of future party leaders; they un- officials have remade Mao, re-creating his rectification campaign. The Seventh Party derestimate that era’s ideological explora- persona to suit the politics of the times. Congress brought the apotheosis. A Liu tion and fluidity; they minimize attachment These multiple layers baffle and distract Shaoqi report and a resolution passed at the to such heterodox beliefs as anarchism; and foreign scholars no less than Chinese. congress established a Maoist historiogra- they downplay the influence of earlier per- The process began in the late phy and proclaimed the guiding role of “Mao sonal concerns and indigenous political when the task was to reinforce Mao’s claims thought.” ideas.3 to leadership of the party. Mao himself made As early as mid-1944 the first genuine The third obstacle standing in the way a signal contribution by relating his autobi- collection of Mao’s writings had appeared to of party historians is the sensitivity with ography to Edgar Snow in mid-1936. Put- help consolidate his claim to ideological which the party center continues to regard ting aside the reticence usually so marked a dominance within the CCP. This early five- past relations with “fraternal” parties. This feature of Chinese autobiography, Mao of- volume Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works reticence is perhaps understandable in the fered a self-portrait that highlighted his own of Mao Zedong] was edited under Wang case of North Korea and Vietnam. A candid moment of Marxist illumination and his Jiaxiang’s supervision and published in the look at the past can complicate dealings with strong revolutionary commitment. The re- Jin-Cha-Ji base area by the New China News parties still in power. But the reticence sulting account bears an uncanny resem- Agency. New editions of his selected works applies even to the now defunct Soviet party. blance to the genre of spiritual autobiogra- (perhaps as many as eight, some with re- By thus consigning interparty relations to phy penned by Buddhist and Confucian writ- stricted circulation) continued to appear in historical limbo, the CCP has effectively set ers intent on making their own journeys of the base areas down to 1948. That same year out of bounds large and important slices of spiritual self-transformation and spiritual Xiao San published his account of the young its own foreign-relations record and experi- discovery available for the edification of Mao; he had conceived the project nearly a COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 128 decade earlier and proceeded with Mao’s and considerable Political Bureau discus- factual questions as the date of a particular approval and the party leadership’s sup- sion. The resulting 1981 resolution, pre- document or the contents of a particular port.7 pared by a small drafting group headed by conversation. Engrossed in a clearly de- The third layer of Mao publications and supervised by Deng himself fined body of party history materials, re- began to appear soon after the conquest of along with , made Mao bear the searchers pay scant attention to either Chi- power in 1949. Stalin is supposed to have burden of mistakes committed in his last nese society or the international environ- suggested to Mao during their Moscow sum- years, forced him to share credit for the ment in which the CCP operated. The failure mit the formal designation of an official successes with his colleagues, but let him to read, not to mention engage, foreign schol- body of Mao’s writings. [Ed. note: The retain full credit for his earlier revolutionary arship has helped preserve the narrowness, Soviet transcript of the first Stalin-Mao leadership. Finally, in 1986 a two-volume discourage international dialogue, and close meeting, on 16 December 1949, published reader appeared defining the essence of this off CCP history from comparative insights. on pages 5-7 of this issue of the Bulletin, latest, emphatically scientific version of “Mao Behind at least some of these difficul- indicates that Mao, not Stalin, made this thought.”10 ties is something that is likely to be in short suggestion.] The Political Bureau gave its In the new atmosphere of greater open- supply for the foreseeable future—material approval in spring 1950, and a compilation ness the party history establishment has made resources for research and the assurance that committee was formed at once. The result- available a wide range of works that consti- researchers have political support or at least ing four volumes of this new xuanji, pub- tute the point of departure for anyone inter- tolerance from a ruling party concerned to lished between 1952 and 1960, burnished ested in Mao’s outlook and political role. keep its historical reputation free of blemish. the image of the statesman traveling the But cutting through the successive layers of An attempt to circumvent these two prob- Chinese road to socialism. This new collec- Mao documentation and sorting through the lems by sending Chinese abroad for gradu- tion, carefully revised by Mao with the help mountain of writing that he left behind is a ate study in history and international rela- of his staff, was flanked by yet another task that Chinese scholars have sidestepped. tions has proven somewhat disappointing. It treatment of the young revolutionary, this Without comment, they have let new schol- is my impression that those studying over- one by .8 arly collections pile up on top of the older seas in one or another of the broad foreign- The next layer in the official Mao was ones compiled with a marked political agenda, relations fields have not found training and laid down during the . leaving specialists outside China such as research on China-related topics notably at- Alarmed by what he saw as ideological Takeuchi Minoru, Stuart R. Schram, Michael tractive, and dismayingly few of those who backsliding in the USSR and the persistent Y. M. Kau, and John K. Leung struggling to have completed their studies abroad have bourgeois grip on China’s intellectual and produce a full and accurate collection essen- gone home to share their skills, knowledge, cultural life, Mao put forward his own ideas tial to recovering the historical figure be- and contacts. Long-time expatriates are as the antidote. His acolytes took up the neath all the political mythmaking. likely to find settling into home institutions struggle, beginning with compilation of the A variety of other difficulties stand in trying and particularly frustrating after hav- “Little Red Book” on the eve of the Cultural the way of the development of party history ing paid a substantial personal price in mak- Revolution. That slim but ever-present vol- in its homeland. The publications process ing the earlier adjustment to foreign aca- ume was but the herald to twenty-plus col- lacks quality controls, in part because there demic life. lections intended to define the most impos- are so many party history journals with pages Despite all these problems, good work ing Mao ever—“the greatest genius in the to fill and so many party elders with reputa- on CCP foreign relations is being done in world,” unsurpassed “in several hundred tions to burnish, causes to advance, and scores China that bears considerable relevance to years in the world and in several thousand to even. Access to archives for the entire historical scholarship in the United States years in China.” One enthusiast declared, history of the Communist Party and for the and elsewhere abroad. Indeed, it has already “Chairman Mao stands much higher than era of the PRC is tightly restricted. Some had an impact here, thanks above all to the Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin.” His thought favored Chinese specialists get in; foreigners PRC scholars who have helped foreigners “serves as the lighthouse for mankind,” its are uniformly excluded. Even the best librar- researching in China, who have published in “universal truth applicable everywhere.”9 ies are weak on international studies gener- English, or who have begun careers in the The latest layer took form soon after ally and on the foreign relations of particular American university system. It seems cer- Mao’s death and was shaped by the political countries whose histories impinged on that tain that foreign historians bent on studying struggle to claim his legacy and appraise his of China. Opportunities are limited for re- the CCP will ride on the coat-tails and in achievements. sought to search in libraries and archives outside China many cases work in close cooperation with strengthen his claim to leadership through and for exposure to conceptual approaches the larger and more active group of Chinese the editing of volume five of the official prevailing abroad. scholars. xuanji, published in 1977. The other, ulti- As a result, party historians in China mately victorious side in the succession operate in an atmosphere of caution and Scholarship in the United States struggle dismissed the tendentious quality insularity. There is little if any interest in of that volume and went off in search of its methodological or theoretical issues so promi- On this side of the Pacific, historical own Mao. The new image, intended to nent outside of China. Scholarly debates do work on CCP foreign relations has suffered serve the political program of not publicly at least go beyond brief ex- from neglect. In the most direct sense this and his allies, was defined after two years changes in party history journals over such state of affairs is the result of indifference to 129 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the subject by historians of modern China. today’s governing historical concerns. Why importance in filling out such diverse topics The paucity at least until recently of ad- should specialists in early twentieth-century as the role of ideas, life in the city, or changes equate sources provides the most obvious anarchism, urban women, or rural society in the countryside. Party historians in par- explanation for this indifference. But per- care about the party’s dealings with the ticular run the risk of losing track of the haps even more important is the fall of outside world? Even specialists in party global dimensions of the revolutionary and foreign relations from historical grace—from history drawn from a new generation of state-building enterprise and thereby for- the position of prominence and respect it American historians are inclined to set for- feiting a chance to move toward a fully once enjoyed. As historians embraced a eign relations beyond their purview or ban- rounded understanding of the CCP. At the “China-centered” approach, they became ish it at best to the margins of their concerns. same time, CCP foreign relations needs the increasingly absorbed in intellectual, social, But arguably to set foreign relations methodological leavening and interpretive economic, and local history. They looked somewhere on edge of Chinese history is to breadth afforded by the as it back with a critical eye on the earlier histori- impoverish both. Politics and the state do is now practiced. Foreign relations also cal literature with its strong emphasis on matter, a point that social and cultural histo- needs the well honed language tools that China’s external relations, and they saw rians in a variety of fields have come to historians of China could bring to mining the scant reason for interest in more recent treat- accept.12 And foreign policy, the regulation documentary ore now so abundantly in view. ments of CCP foreign policy produced in the of relations with the outside world, may be While there is no reason to mourn the main by political scientists.11 one of the most powerful and consequential passing of the age of foreign-relations hege- As a result, an emergent CCP foreign- aspects of the state’s activity. Understand- mony in the study of the Chinese past, the policy history, like other aspects of China’s ing the decisions, institutions, and culture effect has been to leave the stewardship of foreign relations, stands somewhat apart from associated with that activity can be of signal China’s foreign relations to political scien-

CCP FOREIGN RELATIONS: tion. Gittings first broached the major themes edition (14 vols.; Beijing: Zhonggong A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE later developed in the book in “The Origins zhongyang dangxiao, 1982-87). It has re- of China’s Foreign Policy,” in portedly been supplemented by a two-vol- by Michael H. Hunt and Revolution, ed. David Horowitz (Bos- ume addition. An open edition is now avail- ton: Beacon Press, 1967), 182-217. Hélène able (18 vols.; Beijing: Zhonggong This article offers a general overview of Carrère d’Encausse and Stuart Schram, zhongyang dangxiao, 1989-92). A transla- the literature on the origins and evolution of and Asia: An Introduction with tion of key items from this collection will the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)’s Readings (London: Penguin Press, 1969), appear in The Rise to Power of the Chinese external relations. This opportunity to share also offers a long-term view of the CCP Communist Party: Documents and Analy- with interested readers my understanding of within the context of the international com- sis, ed. Tony Saich with Benjamin Yang that literature also permits me to acknowl- munist movement. A sampling of the new (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, forthcom- edge the scholarly contributions of others work and a discussion of its interpretive ing). who made my synthesis in The Genesis of implications and field repercussions can be There are several other general collec- Chinese Communist Foreign Policy pos- found in Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds., tions containing materials helpful to explor- sible. Toward a History of Chinese Communist ing the party’s approach to international Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Person- issues and its closely related domestic con- Background and General Treatments alities and Interpretive Approaches (Wash- cerns: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi ington: Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson xueyuan dangshi jiaoyanshi, comp., Anyone in search of major themes in International Center for Scholars, 1995). Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao [Refer- Chinese foreign relations or a ready over- Historical materials appearing in China ence materials on CCP history] (11 vols.; view should start with Jonathan Spence’s over the last decade have dramatically broad- n.p. [Beijing?], n.d. [preface in vol. 1 dated elegant The Search for Modern China (New ened our window on CCP foreign relations 1979]; continued for the post-1949 period as York: Norton, 1990), and The Cambridge and left somewhat dated most of the earlier Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao); History of China, general editors Denis Western-language literature. The most im- Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan xinwen Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge portant of those materials for the period yanjiusuo, comp., Zhongguo gongchandang University Press, 1978- ). The Cambridge treated here is Zhongyang dang’anguan, xinwen gongzuo wenjian huibian [A collec- History provides good coverage not only of comp., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian tion of documents on CCP journalism] (3 the period treated in this study—the nine- xuanji [A selection of CCP Central Commit- vols.; Beijing: Xinhua, 1980; “internal cir- teenth and twentieth centuries—but also tee documents] covering 1921-1949. This culation” [neibu]), which covers 1921-1956; earlier times. Both Spence and The Cam- collection is supposedly drawn from an even and Fudan daxue lishixi Zhongguo jindaishi bridge History volumes offer help on the fuller body of materials extending beyond jiaoyanzu, comp., Zhongguo jindai duiwai relevant literature. 1949, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian guanxi shiliao xuanji (1840-1949) [A selec- Of all the broad-gauge surveys of CCP huibian [A compilation of CCP Central tion of historical materials on modern China’s external relations, John Gittings’s The World Committee documents], compiled by foreign relations (1840-1949)] (4 vols.; and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper Zhongyang dang’anguan and available on a Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1977). and Row, 1974) stands out for the vigor of its very limited basis only in China. The xuanji Most of the major figures in the CCP argument and for the breadth of its concep- first appeared in an “inner-party” (dangnei) continued on page 136 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 130 tists with their own understandably distinct those pronouncements can deceive. Usually documentation might impose. At first based agenda and style. The consequence of their couched in explicit and correct ideological largely on circumstantial evidence, the fac- dominance is a literature tending in two terms, they may not reflect the more direct, tional interpretation enjoyed a major boost directions, each bearing features that are less jargon-ridden inner-party discussions during the Cultural Revolution when mate- worrisome because of the effect they may and directives. They are, moreover, some- rial on elite conflict became public. As a have in slowing and skewing the use of new times intended to manipulate foreigners, and result, a variety of factional cleavages have materials on the CCP.13 thus are couched in terms that the party gained prominence in the writing of China- One tendency, marked but by no means thinks will be effective on its target audience, watchers, and soon found their way back dominant, is a preoccupation with theoreti- not in terms that are revealing of inner-party into the work on party history produced by cal abstractions. What may most strike calculations. Finally, they may be directed at political scientists. Perhaps the best known historians is how this theory-building enter- an audience altogether different from the one of the factional interpretations has arrayed prise tends to thrive under conditions that the contemporary foreign reader may have “Maoists” against Moscow-oriented “inter- are euphemistically described by those who assumed was the target.16 nationalists.”20 attempt it as “data poor” (if imagination American observers’ misreading of the The new materials have raised two sets rich). We can all call to mind efforts to CCP’s propaganda line from mid-1945 to of doubts about the factional model. On the construct and test high-flying theoretical mid-1946 offers a good example of these one hand, they offer little to support even a formulations that get off the ground only interpretive difficulties. Inner-party docu- circumstantial argument for the existence of after the perilous potholes along the eviden- ments now capture Mao Zedong as a back- factions, and on the other they have set in tiary runway are carefully smoothed over. stage operator, carefully orchestrating an at- question the Cultural Revolution evidence Once airborne, those formulations stay aloft tempt to manipulate Washington into an en- used to beat down former party leaders. only so long as no dangerous mountains of gagement in Chinese politics beneficial to Some of this evidence is of doubtful authen- data intrude in the flight path. The virtuosity the CCP. He was not intent, as most students ticity, and much seems torn from context to of the performance can be impressive, but it of the period have naturally concluded on the score political points. usually comes at the price of obscuring the basis of the public record, on dismissing It would prove ironic indeed if the fac- fascinating complexity of political life with American contacts or rejecting American tional model turns out to offer a no more sometimes mind-numbing abstractions.14 involvement.17 subtle treatment of Chinese politics than The second, perhaps more pronounced An even more complicated example of does the former dependence of the CCP’s tendency among political scientists is to the perils of reading public signals is Zhou own analysts on struggles within monopoly approach Chinese policy with a stronger Enlai’s interview on 3 October 1950 with the capitalism to explain U.S. politics. Undeni- commitment to description and a more de- Indian ambassador. Often cited retrospec- ably, informal networks and shifting coali- veloped historical sensibility. Political sci- tively as one of a string of crystal-clear tions have played a part in PRC politics, but entists working along these lines bring to warnings issued by Beijing following the a compelling, carefully documented case their work an awareness of the way that outbreak of the Korean War, Zhou’s own has not yet been made that those networks skimpy documentation hobbles their inter- language in the formal Chinese record is in have supported stable and identifiable as pretive effort. This group also follows an fact strikingly muffled and vague and does opposed to complex and cross-cutting po- old-fashioned faith in the importance of not accurately convey the depth of Mao’s litical attachments. Scholars pressing fac- individual leaders’ values, style, and per- commitment to intervention at that moment. tional claims bear the responsibility for be- sonality—especially Mao’s.15 But the pau- Zhou was apparently aware that he might be ing explicit about their definition of the city of good documentation long locked misconstrued and worked with his translator term, marshalling reliable evidence, and set- CCP decisionmaking in a black box and to get his point across. But U.S. China- ting whatever factional activity may exist forced these China-watchers to find modes watchers in Hong Kong had difficulty ex- within the broad political context so as to of analysis that would help them make sense tracting a clear message from that October clarify the relative importance of such activ- of limited evidence and communicate their interview, and the puzzle still remains for ity. findings promptly and clearly to the broad historians today looking back. While we A final shortcut rendered doubtful by policy community. Determined to make may puzzle over whether Zhou’s lack of the new CCP history is the China-watchers’ some sense of what was going on inside the clarity was inadvertent or by design, the reliance on China’s own international af- black box, these analysts developed a vari- point remains that this critical public pro- fairs “experts” as a prime source of informa- ety of tools to penetrate its mysteries. How- nouncement is still hard to interpret.18 tion.21 These experts, often accessible and ever, the problematic nature of some of An emphasis on factions, the relatively able to speak the language (both literally and those tools is becoming apparent as the new stable groups united by some sort of figuratively) of Western analysts, have be- CCP sources open up that box for the first overarching interest or ideology,19 is an- come over the past decade understandably time and permit comparison of past inter- other of the questionable short-cuts employed attractive contacts, constituting along with pretations with the newer, more richly docu- by China-watchers struggling to make sense their foreign counterparts a transnational mented understanding. of Beijing politics. The reduction of compli- community of policy specialists and com- The reading of public pronouncements, cated political choices to stark factional al- mentators on current international affairs. long a mainstay of China-watchers, is ren- ternatives reflected the analysts’ need for But the new history underlines the lim- dered particularly tricky by all the ways clarity and the absence of restraints that rich ited insights of these experts by revealing 131 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the degree to which decisionmaking on criti- commonsensical “theory” and perhaps even of how the present may subtly influence the cal issues has been closely held, the mo- to enter the fray over what the evidence agenda for historical research and how his- nopoly of a handful of leaders. Moreover, actually means. The theoretically enthralled torical findings may illuminate current prob- the new history reveals that major decisions may thereby rediscover in Chinese policy lems. have often been tightly guarded, not some- some of the classic and “soft” issues of thing to share with a foreigner—except where international politics—the importance of Defining a Historical Agenda it suits the purposes of the party center to personality, the contingent nature of poli- make available partial and sometimes ten- tics, the complexity of thought behind ac- CCP foreign policy is, as the above dentious information. tion, and the persistence and power of politi- discussion suggests, a field distinctly in flux. The shift toward a more historical ren- cal culture. Specialists have put a good deal of time and dering of the CCP past should have a notable While this new CCP history should give energy into coping with the recent flood of impact on political science research. Those political scientists pause, they also have im- valuable documentary and other materials. of a more descriptive bent should welcome portant contributions to make to a more The flood may be cresting, and those who and benefit from the accumulation of fresh historically oriented field. Their concern have escaped drowning and reached the evidence that makes possible greater ana- with understanding the state and explaining safety of high ground are now in a position lytic rigor and sharper interpretive insight. its exercise of power has generated a reper- to reflect on their future tasks. The more theoretically inclined may be the toire of theories that may prove helpful to The most obvious is to link a better more threatened, but some will accommo- anyone trying to make sense of considerable documented version of CCP external rela- date to the new data, using it as ballast that new data and still uncertain of the most tions chronologically and thematically to will keep them closer to the safety of the fruitful way to frame the issues. Moreover, Chinese foreign relations in general. Qing ground. Indeed, it is possible that taking a the political scientists’ preoccupation with sources, printed and archival, have long been longer view and looking at the implications contemporary questions stands as a salutary available, and have been recently reinforced of better documented cases may induce them reminder to the more historically oriented of by the opening of collections located in the to dispense with all but the most modest, the complex relationship of past to present— PRC. Materials from the Republican era get

CCP LEADERS’ SELECTED WORKS I Consequently, the selection process often AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY For the purpose of mobilizing the party’s resulted in a substantive revision of the texts OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST rank and file as well as the masses, the CCP of historical documents. For example, it is REVOLUTION1 has long carried out a practice of compiling well known among China scholars that the and publishing the works of Party leaders. texts of many pieces in Mao Zedong xuanji By Chen Jian The most important example in this regard is were substantially altered from the original the publication of the four-volume Mao versions. The study of 20th-century Chinese his- Zedong xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Yet scholars of the Chinese revolution, tory, especially the history of the Chinese Zedong) in the 1950s and 1960s. Alto- including historians, have widely used such , has experienced a gether, over 100,000,000 sets of xuanji had publications as Mao Zedong xuanji as their boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s been printed and sold by 1966-1967, making primary sources. Indeed, at a time that largely for two reasons. First, the introduc- them, together with the famous “little red Western scholars had to travel to Hong Kong, tion of the “reform and opening to the out- book” (Quotations of Chairman Mao), the , and Tokyo to collect materials on the side world” policy in the People’s Republic “Red Bible” during the years of the “Great Chinese Communist revolution, how could of China in the late 1970s and early 1980s Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” (As a by- they exclude Mao Zedong xuanji from their resulted in a more flexible political and product, Chairman Mao became the richest data base? The openly published selected academic environment, which enabled Chi- person in China from royalty income, al- works by CCP leaders, together with official nese scholars, historians in particular, to though, according to the memoirs of his CCP statements, contemporaneous newspa- conduct their studies in more creative and nurses and bodyguards, he disliked money per and journal literature, and, in some cases, critical ways. Second, the release of many and was unwilling to touch it himself.) The Guomindang (Nationalist Party) and West- previous unavailable documentary sources publication of works of the CCP leaders was ern intelligence reports, formed the docu- about the activities of the Chinese Commu- not designed to provide scholars with reli- mentary basis of Western studies on the nist Party (CCP) makes it possible for schol- able source materials to study the party’s Chinese Communist revolution before the ars, both in China and in the West, to base past; rather, it was aimed to guide the revo- early 1980s. Sometimes China scholars had their studies on a more comprehensive docu- lutionary mass movement into the orbit set no choice but to rely on obviously flawed mentary foundation. This paper reviews the up by the party. documentary sources. As a result, in those works of CCP leaders that have been com- Thus, the criteria for selecting the works years, the ability to make good “educated piled and published (both internally and of Party leaders followed the Party’s needs. guesses” was a necessary quality for every openly) since the early 1980s, examining Indeed, only those documents which served Western scholar writing about China. their influence on the historical writing of to promote the Party’s current policy, or to II the Chinese Communist revolution. enhance the Party’s and its leaders’ image of In a brief sketch, it is hard to describe being “eternally correct,” were made public. continued on page 144 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 132 steadily better as fresh publications appear on one or the other of its horns. interests,” “geostrategic imperatives,” and and archives open on Taiwan and within the Of all the dualisms, none is more perva- “geopolitical realities.” Thus we get ac- PRC. The new CCP material helps round sive and troubling than the idea of the “inter- counts that confidently proclaim China’s out an already rich documentary base and national system” and its conceptual twin, foreign relations is “propelled by national makes all the more urgent an integrated “domestic determinants.” A moment of criti- interests” (not its evil twin, “ideology”). treatment of China’s external relations. cal reflection reminds us that the make-up of Other accounts seek to differentiate “prag- Drawing on this range of sources, historians the international system is not self-evident, matic” policies (usually linked with Zhou can begin to offer in-depth treatment of all and those who champion its power to shape Enlai’s or Deng Xiaoping’s name) from the kinds of topics associated with a well national policy differ widely on what the “radical” or “provocative” policies (here developed foreign-relations literature— system is and how it works. Claims for the Mao or the “” is likely to from important personalities to the relation primacy of “domestic determinants” suffer appear), and hold up as an ideal a “balance- of policy to the “public.” It should also from an equally serious problem: “domes- of-power” approach that secures “strategic convey a more complex sense of policy with tic” is understood so narrowly and “determi- interests,” “national security,” and “foreign- features—economic opportunism, political nants” is taken so literally that the phrase is policy interests” in a changing “interna- flexibility, cultural ambivalence, strategic almost drained of its significance. tional system.” opportunism, and policy confusion—long The impulse to distinguish domestic and While this language most commonly associated with the better studied policies of international influences may not be particu- appears in American writing on contempo- other countries. To bring these themes into larly useful in understanding the foreign rary China, Chinese scholars writing about better focus specialists will want to place policy of any country, and in the case of their country’s foreign policy have been the CCP’s historical experience in a com- China draws a distinction that party leaders showing signs of appropriating this vocabu- parative framework and look for insight on from to Deng Xiaoping would lary. Influenced by American international the CCP that might emerge from juxtaposi- have found baffling, even wrong-headed. relations literature as well by their own search tion with other foreign-relations histories.22 The growing availability of documentation for a usable foreign-policy past, they have This broad agenda, good as far as it makes it possible to argue what common emphasized the neatly formulated and goes, neglects a fundamental and necessar- sense already suggests—that discussions of smoothly executed nature of Chinese policy ily unsettling interpretive about to Chinese policy need to transcend this and the and held up Zhou Enlai as a model of “real- play out within the CCP foreign-relations other stark categories that narrow and im- ism” and “expertise,” while wrestling over field. Its resolution bears directly on the poverish our discourse. whether to make Mao’s contributions to kind of agenda the field will follow. As Some scholars (including political sci- foreign-policy “realistic” or “ideological.”25 historians turn to CCP foreign relations, entists) have already begun to escape these Behind this vocabulary lurks a strongly they will bring with them an anthropologi- stark alternatives.24 They have shown not judgmental impulse antipathetic to less uni- cal concern with culture and a post-modern just that Mao and his colleagues operated versal, more culture-specific insights. Un- sensitivity to language, both currently strong within an international arena of Cold War derstanding policy, whatever its complexi- preoccupations within their discipline.23 rivalry and in a China of revolutionary aspi- ties, takes a back seat to handing down a Those interpretive proclivities are distinctly rations and conflict but also that those worlds clear-cut verdict based on what a “rational” at odds with at least three fundamental fea- overlapped and interacted. Conclusions or “realistic” actor would have done in a tures of the established literature and dis- drawn from the behavior of the American particular set of circumstances. course defined by political science. Finding imperialists, upheavals observed in Eastern The Korean War literature starkly illus- ways to make fresh, thoughtful use of the Europe, and ’s theses on trates this point about the powerful impulse new historical evidence is here as perhaps in played off against in- to evaluate the rationality or realism of policy. general inextricably tied to a critical exami- ternal discussions and debates about the best Chinese scholars have joined Americans in nation of older, well worn, and often narrow road for China’s socialist development, treat- reporting approvingly on Beijing’s reassur- channels of interpretation. ment of peasants and intellectuals, the nature ingly clear, unitary, and above all carefully One point of conflict arises from the of party leadership, and China’s appropriate calculated response to U.S. intervention on long-established tendency to cast policy in place in a world revolutionary movement. the peninsula. In the American literature on terms of antinomies that in effect impose an Together the foreign and the domestic strands deterrence China’s handling of the Korean interpretive strait-jacket. The literature is were interwoven into a single web, and nei- War has even been enshrined as a positive peppered with reference to policies that are ther strand can be removed without doing model in striking contrast to the bumblings supposed to fit in one of several either/or fundamental harm to our understanding of of U.S. policymakers at the time.26 Sub- categories. Policies were either “idealistic” the whole. jected now to a closer look thanks to the new or “realistic.” They were either “ideologi- A second point of likely conflict is an evidence, this positive characterization seems cally driven” or responsive to “situational interpretive vocabulary whose unexamined wide of the mark. Mao and his associates, it factors.” They were shaped either by the assumptions exercise a quiet but nonetheless now turns out, were themselves engulfed in “international system” or by “domestic de- dangerous linguistic tyranny. Any reader of the kind of messy and confused terminants.” These alternatives confront international relations would recognize the decisionmaking that also afflicted Ameri- scholars with an interpretive dilemma that widely used lexicon, including prominently can leaders. Viewed in this new light, they often resolve by impaling themselves such terms as “national interest,” “strategic Beijing’s reaction to the Korean crisis be- 133 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN comes interesting not so much for the evalu- ploy a definition of culture so narrow as to surroundings. ative question of who did the better job but close off potentially interesting lines of in- Analysts using imposed, culture-bound rather for the interpretive question of how do vestigation. Historians more interested in categories find themselves in much the same we understand the limits of cultural under- understanding the past than judging it will impossible situation an outsider would face standing and human control in a story strongly find limited appeal in hauling CCP leaders in trying to understand the Australian ab- marked by chaos and contingency. These into court and formulating a verdict on the origines who spoke Dyirbal. To ignore their observations are not meant to deny rational- basis of their realism. language is to close the door to understand- ity on the part of Chinese policymakers or The third interpretive impulse likely to ing their world with its unfamiliar classifica- for that matter on the part of Americans but create conflict is a notion of ideology that is tion: bayi (human males, animals); balan to highlight the difficulty of evaluating policy ahistorical and anemic. This unfortunate (human females, water, fire, fighting); balam rationality, especially with the help of simple, approach to the role of ideas in policymaking (nonflesh food); and bala (a residual cat- dichotomous notions of policy as either real- is in part a reflection of the rigid dualisms egory).32 This breakdown may not make istic or idealistic, driven by either careful and fixation with rationality discussed above. much sense to an outsider, but if getting into calculations of national interest or by ungov- It is also a reflection of a broader tendency the head of the “other” is important, then ernable ideological impulses.27 during the Cold War to denigrate ideology uncovering the particular categories used to Though the critique of the rational actor as a peculiar deformation of the socialist constitute their world is essential. By con- model is widely made and apparently widely bloc, a tendency that carried over into the trast, the conceptual baggage the observer accepted,28 much of the CCP literature still China field as international relations spe- brings from home must be counted a serious seems unusually preoccupied with distin- cialists, schooled in comparative commu- impediment. Employing outside frames of guishing sound from misguided policy. This nism, applied a Soviet model to Chinese reference may obscure more China-centered siren call to make judgments about interna- politics. In their accounts a pervasive, pow- and China-sensitive perspectives and thereby tional behavior finds a response in all of us, erful Marxist-Leninist ideology came to of- divert us from our ultimate destination—the but answering the call carries dangers. The fer an important key to understanding Chi- understanding of China’s beliefs and behav- most apparent is the tendency for simple nese policy. ior in international affairs.33 judgments and a polemical style to appeal The resulting notions of CCP ideology One promising way to get beyond simple most strongly when limited evidence af- are, it would now appear, ahistorical. The and mutually exclusive notions of CCP ide- fords the weakest supporting grounds for use of the Soviet Union as a starting point for ology—for example, either making it “Marx- them. For example, it was easy to offer up an understanding Chinese thinking may be un- ism-Leninism” or “”—is to think idealized Mao when his own party decided wise and is certainly premature because the of it as a fabric that we can better understand what we should know, and it was natural to Soviet model is itself drawn in narrow politi- by following the strand of keywords. A move toward a negative appraisal when new cal terms and lacks firm historical ground- close look at those keywords and the rela- revelations thrust at us serious, previously ing.29 Moreover, the Chinese party, which tionship among them might prove helpful in unsuspected personal flaws. As the evi- itself only recently began to come into sharper defining policy discourse over time and un- dence becomes fuller and more reliable for historical focus, is unlikely to offer an easy locking contending visions of China’s place Mao as for the CCP in general, older judg- fit with any Soviet template.30 Indeed, we in the world.34 ments must confront previously unimagined may look back on this Sino-Soviet ideologi- “Patriotism” (aiguo zhuyi) is one of moral and political dimensions, and what cal model and realize that the conclusions those neglected keywords examined earlier previously seemed self-evident evaluations drawn from one set of highly circumstantial in these pages. Another is “small and weak dissolve into complexity. studies became the foundation for another nationalities” (ruoxiao minzu). It too would But beyond the simple problem of judg- set of equally circumstantial studies. repay close examination, revealing com- ments handed down on scant or skewed The prevalent thin, abstract conception plexities not easily spotted in a straightfor- evidence there is a broader and more com- of ideology should not divert our attention ward reading of formal party statements. plex problem. The claim to understand and from more subtle and perhaps powerful in- Like patriotism, this term had its roots in the judge “national interest,” “national secu- formal ideologies that may be of consider- late Qing, and persisted in CCP discourse rity,” and so forth rests on a fundamentally ably greater analytic value.31 Examining from the party founding through the Maoist metaphysical faith that value preferences the intellectual predispositions and funda- era and even beyond, injecting into it ten- serve to settle otherwise eminently debat- mental assumptions that constitute informal sions as well as unintended ironies. China at able issues. That claim becomes often un- ideology may render us more sensitive to the times offered flamboyant rhetorical support thinkingly universalistic when scholars dis- cultural and social influences over policy. for its revolutionary neighbors, but it has cover in countries and cultures other than Such an approach may thus help us better also collided with India and Vietnam, both their own roughly comparable notions of understand how calculations of “interest” important members of that community to national interest and national security—at are rooted in social structure and filtered which China claimed to belong. How has least among policymakers deemed suffi- through a screen of culturally conditioned the concept of “small and weak nationali- ciently skilled in the realist calculus of power. assumptions and how individual responses ties” evolved, and what has China’s regional The inadvertent results of this rational actor to “objective” circumstances in the interna- ambitions and limited resources done to framework are judgments that are funda- tional environment are profoundly condi- reconstitute the meaning of that term? mentally culture-bound or at least that em- tioned by personal background, beliefs, and This discussion of keywords suggests COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 134 that we need a more subtle and expansive was the first, perhaps rudimentary collection of Mao’s essays. For evidence on the existence of such a collec- notion of ideology—one that includes more 1. The observations that follow draw in part on Jin tion, see Mao Zedong ji [Collected writings of Mao Liangyong, “Jianguo yilai jindai Zhongwai guanxishi than the formal ideology that the party uti- Zedong], ed. Takeuchi Minoru (10 vols.; Tokyo: yanjiu shuping” [A review of post-1949 research on the lized as an organizational glue and mobili- Hokubosha, 1971-72; Hong Kong reprint, 1975), 5: history of modern Sino-foreign relations], Jindaishi 232. zation guide—if we are to move toward a yanjiu, 3 (1985), 193-214; Wang Xi and Wang Bangxian, 6. This and the paragraph that follows draw on Xu richer understanding of CCP external rela- “Woguo sanshiwu nianlai de ZhongMei guanxishi Quanxing and Wei Shifeng, chief authors, Yanan shiqi yanjiu” [Research on the history of Sino-American tions. The network of ideas that make up an de Mao Zedong zhexue sixiang yanjiu [Studies on Mao relations in our country over the last thirty-five years], informal ideology is a complex, unstable Zedong’s philosophical thought during the Yanan pe- Fudan xuebao 5 (1984), 73-76; Tao Wenzhao, riod] (Xian: Shaanxi renmin jiaoyu, 1988), chap. 11 amalgam drawn from a wide variety of “ZhongMei guanxishi yanjiu shinian huigu” [Looking (written by Xu); and Thomas Kampen, “Wang Jiaxiang, sources and varying significantly from indi- back on a decade of research on the history of Sino- Mao Zedong and the ‘Triumph of Mao Zedong-Thought’ American relations], in Xin de shiye: ZhongMei guanxishi vidual to individual. Some party leaders (1935-1945),” Modern Asian Studies 23 (October 1989), lunwenji [New fields of vision: a collection of articles on had experienced formative brushes with an- 716-22. the history of Sino-American relations] (Nanjing: 7. Xiao San’s Mao Zedong tongzhi de qingshaonian archism. Others had reacted strongly against Nanjing daxue, 1991), 282-307; a fairly extensive read- shidai [Comrade Mao Zedong’s boyhood and youth] disturbing urban conditions that made capi- ing in party history periodicals; and conversations with (originally published 1948; rev. and exp. ed., Chinese colleagues working on the CCP’s foreign rela- talism the main foe. Yet others constructed : Xinhua, 1950). tions. from their rural roots a populist outlook. 8. Zhang Min et al., “‘Sannian zhunbei’ de diernian” 2. Yao Xu, “KangMei yuanChao de yingming juece” [The second year of the “three years of preparation”], Each borrowed from a rich, complex intel- [The brilliant decision to resist America and aid Korea], Dangde wenxian 2 (1989), 79; Mao Zedong xuanji lectual tradition, drew from distinct regional Danghshi yanjiu 5 (1980), 5-14. A new generation of [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (4 vols.; Beijing: scholarship heralded by Yao’s work did greatly improve roots, and learned from diverse political Renmin, 1952-60); Li Rui, Mao Zedong tongzhi de on earlier thin and domestically oriented accounts such experience as youths. A more penetrating chuqi geming huodong [Comrade Mao Zedong’s initial as Hu Zhongchi, KangMei yuanChao yundong shihua revolutionary activities] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian, grasp of Chinese policy depends ultimately [An informal history of the resist-America aid-Korea 1957). on exploring the enormous diversity of think- campaign] (Beijing: Zhonghua qingnian, 1956), which 9. Quotes from Joint Publications Research Service, had its own, even more pronounced patriotic premises. ing that shaped its course. Selections from Chairman Mao, no. 90 (JPRS no. 3. These tendencies are evident in Ding Shouhe and Yin The negotiation of these and other points 49826; 12 February 1970), 66, 80. For guidance through Shuyi, Cong wusi qimeng yundong dao makesi zhuyi de the thicket of this Cultural Revolution material, see of difference between historians and politi- chuanbo [From May Fourth enlightenment to the propa- Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment cal scientists will redefine the agenda for gation of Marxism] (rev. ed.; Beijing: Sanlian, 1979), of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in The Secret Speeches esp. 88-108; Lu Mingzhuo, “ zai wusi yundong CCP foreign-policy studies and in the pro- of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the shiqi de fandi sixiang” [Li Dazhao’s anti-imperialist cess help recast a field already in the midst , ed. Roderick MacFarquhar et al. thought during the period of the May Fourth move- (Cambridge: Harvard University Council on East Asian of important change as a result of the revival ment], in Jinian wusi yundong liushi zhounian xueshu Studies, 1989), 78-81; and Cheek, “The ‘Genius’ Mao: of CCP studies in China. Historians taking taolunhui lunwenxuan [A selection of articles from a A Treasure Trove of 23 Newly Available Volumes of scholarly conference in commemoration of the sixtieth a more prominent place in the field will be Post-1949 Mao Zedong Texts,” Australian Journal of anniversary of the ], ed. Zhongguo advancing a new constellation of questions Chinese Affairs, 19-20 (January-July 1988), 337-44. shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo (Beijing: 10. Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], and methods. The response by political Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1980), 2: 151-63; and Zhu vol. 5 (Beijing: Renmin, 1977); Mao Zedong zhuzuo scientists will doubtless vary with those of a Jianhua and He Rongdi, “Shilun Li Dazhao de fandi xuandu [A reader of works by Mao Zedong], comp. sixiang” [An exploration of Li Dazhao’s anti-imperial- descriptive bent finding it easy, while those Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianji weiyuanhui (2 ist thought], in Li Dazhao yanjiu lunwenji [A collection devoted to theory may well find the transi- vols.; Beijing: Renmin, 1986). More revealing than the of research papers on Li Dazhao], ed. Han Yide and public “resolution on certain historical issues concern- tion awkward. How much this interaction Wang Shudi (2 vols.; : renmin, ing the party since the founding of the PRC” [“Guanyu across disciplinary lines will lead to a new 1984), 2: 515-29. jianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi”] is the 4. Pei-yi Wu, The Confucian’s Progress: Autobiographi- mix of concerns and approaches and how limited circulation treatment of sensitive issues raised cal Writings in Traditional China (Princeton: Princeton much historians and political scientists will by this reappraisal, in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi University Press, 1990), offers a suggestive introduc- yanjiushi “Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao” turn their back on each other, effectively tion to this genre. bianxiezu, Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao shuoming creating a schism in the field, remains to be 5. The earliest Chinese version appears to be Waiguo [Elucidation of “A chronology of major events in CCP jizhe xibei yinxiangji [A foreign reporter’s impressions seen. Whatever the outcome outside of history”] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, of the northwest] (Shanghai: Dingchou bianyishe, 1937). China, party historians within China are for 1983; “internal circulation”). A partial copy is in the Wang Fu Shih collection, 11. The comments that follow draw on Paul A. Cohen, their part likely to maintain a largely au- University Archives, University of Missouri, Kansas Discovering History in China: American Historical tonomous community interacting selectively City. translated one of the early versions, Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Co- perhaps this one. Snow’s account was also published with foreigner counterparts. Thus this trend lumbia University Press, 1984); William T. Rowe, under the title Xixing manji [Notes on a journey to the toward a more historical picture of CCP “Approaches to Modern Chinese Social History,” in west] and Mao Zedong zizhuan [Mao Zedong’s autobi- Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History, ed. external relations , at work in both the United ography]). For details on the production of the autobiog- Olivier Zunz (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro- States and China, is not likely to lead to a raphy, see Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi lina Press, 1985), 236-96; my own “Meiguo guanyu and Xinhua tongxunshe, comps., Mao Zedong xinwen new monolithic field. And perhaps this Zhongguo duiwai guanxishi yanjiu wenti yu qianjing” gongzuo wenxuan [A selection of Mao Zedong works on outcome, marked by national and disciplin- [The study of the history of Chinese foreign relations in journalism] (Beijing: Xinhua, 1983), 37-38; Wu Liping, the United States: problems and prospects], trans. Yuan ary diversity, is to be welcomed if it proves comp., Mao Zedong yijiusanliunian tong Sinuo de tanhua Ming, Lishi yanjiu [Historical studies] 3 (1988), 150-56 conducive to the wide-ranging inquiry and [Mao Zedong’s 1936 talk with Snow] (Beijing: Renmin, Philip C. C. Huang, “The Paradigmatic Crisis in Chi- 1979), 1, 6-9; and Qiu Ke’an, Sinuo zai Zhongguo lively discussions associated with a field in nese Studies: Paradoxes in Social and Economic His- [Snow in China] (Beijing: Sanlian, 1982). renaissance. tory,” Modern China 17 (July 1991), 299-341; and Appearing in 1937 along with the Snow account Judith B. Farquhar and James L. Hevia, “Culture and 135 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Postwar American Historiography of China,” positions well-documented picture of those events it is hard to to the lure of the experts with “inside” information. 1 (Fall 1993), 486-525. For a helpful evaluation of the imagine measuring with any confidence the accuracy of 22. These points are treated more fully by Jürgen literature on imperialism accompanied by suggestions contemporary readings. Osterhammel, “CCP Foreign Policy as International on fruitful modes of inquiry, see Jürgen Osterhammel, 17. This point is developed in chapters 5 and 6 of Hunt, History: Mapping the Field,” and by Odd Arne Westad, “Semi- and Informal Empire in Twentieth- The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. “The Foreign Policies of Revolutionary Parties: The Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis,” in 18. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and CCP in Comparative Perspective,” both in Toward a Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Zhou History of the Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Osterhammel (London: Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Ap- Allen and Unwin, 1986), 290-314. of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), proaches, ed. Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun (Washing- 12. See e.g., Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, 25-27; comments by Chai Chengwen on Pu Shouchang’s ton: Asia Program, Woodrow Wilson International Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (New Ha- role as Zhou’s translator on this occasion, in Renwu 5 Center for Scholars, n.d.). ven: Yale University Press, 1987), which begins by (1992), 18. [Ed. note: For an English translation, see 23. See on some of the recent trends, Lynn Hunt, ed., stressing the importance of relating the actions of the Sergei N. Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, The New Cultural History (Berkeley: University of state to “the lives of even ordinary citizens” (xi). Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War California Press, 1989); John E. Toews, “Intellectual 13. Bin Yu, “The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: (Stanford, CA: University Press, 1993), 276-278.] For History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Problems and Prospect,” World Politics 46 (January the understandably perplexed reaction of China-watch- Meaning and Irreducibility of Experience,” American 1994), 235-61, offers a detailed, critical appraisal of ers, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of Historical Review 92 (October 1987), 879-907; and this large body of writing. See also Friedrich W. Wu, the United States, vol. 7 (Washington: U.S. Govern- Bryan D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The “Explanatory Approaches to Chinese Foreign Policy: ment Printing Office, 1976), 906, 912-13. Reification of Language and the Writing of Social A Critique of the Western Literature,” Studies in Com- 19. The oft-cited authority is Andrew Nathan, “A Fac- History (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). parative Communism 13 (Spring 1980), 41-62; and tionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly 53 24. Levine, Anvil of Victory; John W. Garver’s Chi- Samuel S. Kim, “China and the World in Theory and (January-March 1973), 34-66. nese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Practice,” in China and the World: Chinese Foreign 20. A glance at the literature on the CCP will reveal (New York: Oxford University Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Kim (3rd rev. numerous instances of works stressing factional struggle Press, 1988); Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolu- ed.; Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), 3-41. Both Kim, on the basis of highly circumstantial evidence. Derek J. tion: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the China and the World; and Thomas W. Robinson and Waller, The Kiangsi Soviet: Mao and the National Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory Congresses of 1931 and 1934 (Berkeley: University of University Press, 1993). and Practice (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, California Center for Chinese Studies, 1973), sees a 25. For good examples of this notable interpretive 1994), offer a sampling of the kinds of work now being clear split between Maoists and Russian Returned Stu- proclivity among Chinese scholars, see Hao Yufan and done by political scientists. Harry Harding, “The Evo- dents in the early 1930s, with the latter increasingly Guocang Huan, eds., The Chinese View of the World lution of American Scholarship on Contemporary dominant over the former in the factional struggles. (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Hao Yufan and Zhai China,” in American Studies of Contemporary China, Richard C. Thornton, The Comintern and the Chinese Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: ed. David Shambaugh (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Communists, 1928-1931 (Seattle: University of Wash- History Revisited,” China Quarterly 121 (March 1990), 1993), 14-40, helps put this particular body of political ington Press, 1969), interprets the Li Lisan period in 94-115; He Di, “The Evolution of the People’s Repub- science work in the broader context of the general social strong factional terms with leaders of each faction lic of China’s Policy toward the Offshore Islands,” in science literature on China. driven by a quest for personal power. James Reardon- The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, ed. Warren 14. Wu’s 1980 survey, “Explanatory Approaches,” tied Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia Univer- progress in the field to better theory and methodology, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (New sity Press, 1990), 222-45; and Chen Xiaolu’s, “China’s as did Michael Ng-Quinn’s “The Analytical Study of York: Columbia University Press, 1980), and Steven I. Policy Toward the United States, 1949-1955,” Jia Chinese Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quar- Levine, Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Qingguo, “Searching for Peaceful Coexistence and terly 27 (June 1983), 203-24. More recently James N. Manchuria, 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia Univer- Territorial Integrity,” and Wang Jisi, “An Appraisal of Rosenau, “China in a Bifurcated World: Competing sity Press, 1987), see factions defining the policy alter- U.S. Policy toward China, 1945-1955, and Its After- Theoretical Perspectives,” in Chinese Foreign Policy, natives for the CCP in 1945-1946. Reardon-Anderson math,” all in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: A eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 524-51, has offered a argues for a Mao-Zhou bloc favoring negotiations with Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade, ed. Harry somewhat defensive presentation along the same lines. the Nationalists, while the ultimately victorious mili- Harding and Yuan Ming (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Bin Yu, “The Study of Chinese Foreign Policy,” 256- tary leaders wanted a resort to force. For his part, Resources, 1989), 184-97, 267-86, 289-310. For a 59, is considerably more reserved about the prospects Levine sees differences in strategy in the northeast base discussion of the impact of U.S. international-relations for the theoretical enterprise. area in factional terms. Donald S. Zagoria, “Choices in approaches on Chinese scholars, marked by this single, 15. For an early, vigorous argument for putting Mao at the Postwar World (2): Containment and China,” in signal success, see Wang Jisi, “International Relations the center of the policy process, see Michel Oksenberg, Caging the Bear: Containment and the Cold War, ed. Theory and the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy: A “Policy Making under Mao, 1948-68: An Overview,” Charles Gati (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), 109- Chinese Perspective,” in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. in China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, ed. 27, puts Mao and Zhou at the head of a nationalist Robinson and Shambaugh, 481-505. John M. H. Lindbeck (Seattle: University of Washing- group, while Liu emerges as the leader of the interna- 26. For perhaps the best known example, see Alexander ton Press, 1971), 79-115. Frederick C. Teiwes, “Mao tionalists. The tendency to find factions persists in the L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American and His Lieutenants,” Australian Journal of Chinese studies of the post-1949 period. See for example Uri Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Co- Affairs 19-20 (January-July 1988), 1-80, and Roderick Ra’anan’s and Donald Zagoria’s treatments of Beijing’s lumbia University Press, 1974), chap. 7. MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution response to the Vietnam War in 1965-1966 in China in 27. I have developed this point in more detail in “Beijing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), with Crisis, vol. 2, ed. Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951,” Political their stress on personality and sensitivity to sources, are Chicago Press, 1968), 23-71 and 237-68, as well as Science Quarterly 107 (Fall 1992), 475-78. good examples of the application of this approach. Both Michael Yahuda’s response, “ and the 28. For a helpful discussion of “the rationality model,” are concerned mainly with domestic politics, but their Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66,” China Quarterly see Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy findings have considerable import for foreign policy. 149 (January—March 1972), especially 74-75. Yahuda Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes 16. One distinguished China-watcher has proposed rejects easy factional explanations, while stressing the (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 11-14. careful examination of past forecasting as a way of interaction between “foreign and domestic politics.” 29. W. R. Connor, “Why Were We Surprised?” Ameri- highlighting possible future interpretive problems as 21. For a thoughtful critique of this approach, now can Scholar 60 (Spring 1991), 175-84. Moshe Lewin, well as identifying past successes. Allen S. Whiting, much in vogue, see Bin Yu, “The Study of Chinese The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpreta- “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Foreign Policy,” 244-56. Warren I. Cohen, “Conversa- tion (rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press, Fortune Cookie,” in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. tions with Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai’s Associates 1991); Lewin, “Russia/USSR in Historical Motion: An Robinson and Shambaugh, 506-23. This proposal Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940s Essay in Interpretation,” Russian Review 50 (July 1991), tellingly omits historical reconstruction of the very and the Korean War,” Diplomatic History 11 (Summer 249-66; and Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet events analysts were trying to read. Without a fresh, 1987), 283-89, suggests that historians are not immune Experience: Politics and History since 1917 (New COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 136

York: Oxford University Press, 1985), are notable CCP FOREIGN RELATIONS temporary revolutionary history] (Beijing: efforts at moving Soviet history beyond a thin, simple, continued from page 129 Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1987), is broadly and strongly judgmental “totalitarian” model associ- ated with the Cold War. An elaborated, well-grounded have had their major writings published. The cast but omits limited circulation source alternative appears to await the completion of a new Mao collection (discussed below) is the best materials and journals. A draft version of the generation of historical research. known, but the list extends to those who Zhang volume containing more citations to 30. Paul A. Cohen, “The Post-Mao Reforms in Histori- restricted (“internal circulation”) materials cal Perspective,” Journal of Asian Studies 47 (August played a prominent role briefly in the mid- 1988), 518-40, highlights the dangers of a heavy reli- and late 1920s (such as Qu Qiubai and Peng appeared in Dangshi ziliao zhengji tongxun ance on an abstract Leninist party model to the neglect Shuzhi), the group that accompanied Mao to 7-12 (1985). A partial English translation, of long-term historical patterns. the top (such as Liu Shaoqi, Wang Jiaxiang, prepared by Timothy Cheek and Tony Saich, 31. For an effort at teasing out an informal foreign- has appeared in Chinese Studies in History policy ideology that might be applicable to China, see Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and Chen Yun), my own Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Ha- party intellectuals (such as Chen Hansheng 23 (Summer 1990), 3-94, and Chinese Stud- ven: Yale University Press, 1987) and my follow-up and Ai Siqi), notable public supporters (such ies in Sociology and Anthropology 22 essay, “Ideology,” in “A Roundtable: Explaining the as Song Qingling), and even that party black (Spring-Summer 1990), 3-158. Zhang Jingru History of American Foreign Relations,” Journal of and Tang Manzhen, eds., Zhonggong American History 77 (June 1990), 108-115. Clifford sheep, Wang Ming. These volumes appear Geertz’s “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in Ideology variously as wenji (collected works), wenxuan dangshixue shi [A history of CCP historical and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (London: Free (selected works), xuanji (selections), and in studies] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, Press, 1964), 47-76, is a classic still worth reading. several cases junshi wenxuan (selected works 1990), traces the field’s development, in- 32. George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous cluding notably its opening up in the 1980s. Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chi- on military affairs). Generally these collec- cago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 92-93. tions, especially the ones published in the Party history journals are a treasure 33. For an extended argument for the importance of early decades of the PRC, are less revealing trove, offering fresh documentation, reveal- internal categories and outlooks to the understanding on foreign affairs than the more recent mate- ing articles, and news of conferences and of Chinese values, see Thomas A. Metzger, Escape pending publications. A number of the chief from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s rials. The collected works for a few of the Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia Uni- best known party figures can be found in journals underwent a confusing set of title versity Press, 1977). Andrew J. Nathan makes a translation. changes in the late 1980s, and most are contrary case in favor of what he calls “evaluative For an early introduction to these vari- restricted in their circulation. They are as a universalism,” those externally based judgments that result difficult for researchers outside of not only are legitimate but also can stimulate better ous materials, see Michael H. Hunt and Odd understanding. Nathan, “The Place of Values in Cross- Arne Westad, “The Chinese Communist Party China to keep straight and use systemati- Cultural Studies: The Example of Democracy and and International Affairs: A Field Report on cally. Of these journals Dangde wenxian China,” in Ideas Across Cultures: Essays on Chinese New Historical Sources and Old Research [Literature on the party] (published by Thought in Honor of Benjamin Schwartz, ed. Paul A. Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Cohen and Merle Goldman (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- Problems,” China Quarterly 122 (Summer versity Council on East Asian Studies, 1990), 293-314. 1990), 258-72. Steven M. Goldstein and He Zhongyang dang’anguan, 1988- ; “internal For instructive exercises in paying serious attention to Di offer an update in “New Chinese Sources circulation”) and its earlier incarnation, language in the Chinese context, see Michael on the History of the Cold War,” Cold War Wenxian he yanjiu [Documents and research] Schoenhals, Doing Things with Words in Chinese (published by Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Politics (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International History Project Bulletin 1 East Asian Studies, 1992), and Frank Dikötter, The (Spring 1992), 4-6. Fernando Orlandi, 1982-87; “internal circulation”), deserve sin- Discourse of Race in Modern China (London: Hurst, “Nuove fonti e opportunità di ricerca sulla gling out for their fresh documentation as 1992). storia della Cina contemporanea, del well as helpful articles. 34. The approach is thoughtfully discussed in James Farr, “Understanding Conceptual Change Politically,” movimento comunista internazionale e della in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed. guerra fredda” (Rome: working paper, Centro Rise of an International Affairs Terrence Ball et al. (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Gino Germani di Studi Comparati sulla Orthodoxy (1921-1934) University Press, 1989), 24-49, and is applied in Daniel Modernizzazione e lo Sviluppo, 1994), of- T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American CCP views on foreign affairs emerged Politics Since Independence (New York: Basic Books, fers the most recent, wide ranging survey of 1987); and in , Keywords: A Vo- the new literature. Susanne Weigelin- during the late Qing and early Republic out cabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford Schwiedrzik, “Party Historiography in the of a complex intellectual setting. This back- University Press, 1976). People’s Republic of China,” Australian ground is nicely suggested by a large body of Journal of Chinese Affairs 17 (January 1987), literature: Charlotte Furth, ed., The Limits of Michael H. Hunt is Everett H. Emerson Profes- Change: Essays on Conservatives Alterna- sor of History at the University of North Caro- 78-113, stresses the highly political nature of tives in Republican China (Cambridge: lina at Chapel Hill. This essay was adapted from the party history establishment. CCP Re- a chapter of his forthcoming book, The Genesis search Newsletter, edited by Timothy Cheek, Harvard University Press, 1976); Hao Chang, of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New and the twice-monthly Zhonggong dangshi Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for York: Columbia University Press, 1996), and tongxun [CCP history newsletter] are both Order and Meaning (1890-1911) (Berke- also appeared, in slightly different form, in essential for keeping current with new pub- ley: University of California Press, 1987); Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds., Toward a lications and research projects. Don C. Price, Russia and the Roots of the History of Chinese Communist Foreign Rela- There are in Chinese several major guides Chinese Revolution, 1896-191l (Cambridge: tions, 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpre- to party history literature. Zhang Zhuhong, Harvard University Press, 1974); James tive Approaches (Washington, DC: Asia Pro- Pusey, China and Charles Darwin (Cam- gram, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Zhongguo xiandai gemingshi shiliaoxue [A bridge: Harvard University Council on East Scholars, [1993]). study of historical materials on China’s con- 137 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Asian Studies, 1983); Mary B. Rankin, Early Origins of Chinese Communism (New York: perialism and the Left Guomindang,” Mod- Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellec- Oxford University Press, 1989); Lawrence ern China 11 (January 1985), 39-76; and P. tuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902-1911 Sullivan and Richard H. Solomon, “The Cavendish, “Anti-imperialism in the (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Formation of Chinese Communist Ideology Kuomintang 1923-8,” in Studies in the So- 1971); Benjamin I. Schwartz, In Search of in the May Fourth Era: A Content Analysis cial History of China and South-east Asia, Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West of Hsin ch’ing nien,” in Ideology and Poli- ed. Jerome Ch’en and Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, tics in Contemporary China, ed. Chalmers (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University 1964); Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen and Johnson (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), 23-56. the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Ber- Press, 1973); Hans J. van de Ven, From To form a more precise impression of keley: University of California Press, 1970); Friends to Comrades: The Founding of the CCP views on imperialism, turn to contem- Li Yu-ning, The Introduction of Socialism Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (Ber- porary materials, notably prominent party into China (New York: Columbia Univer- keley: University of California Press, 1991); journals such as Xiangdao zhoubao [The sity East Asian Institute, 1971); Martin Michael Y. L. Luk, The Origins of Chinese guide weekly] (1922-27) and the collections Bernal, Chinese Socialism to 1907 (Ithaca: Bolshevism: An Ideology in the Making, of Central Committee documents (noted Cornell University Press, 1976); Arif Dirlik, 1921-1928 (Hong Kong: Oxford University above). Evidence on the general attractive- Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution (Ber- Press, 1989); Marilyn A. Levine, The Found ness of anti-imperialism as a tool of political keley: University of California Press, 1991); Generation: Chinese Communists in Eu- mobilization can be found in Wusa yundong Peter Zarrow, Anarchism and Chinese Po- rope during the Twenties (Seattle: Univer- shiliao [Historical materials on the May 30 litical Culture (New York: Columbia Uni- sity of Washington Press, 1993); and Ben- (1925) movement], comp. Shanghai shehui versity Press, 1990); Chow Tse-tsung, The jamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, vol. 1 (Shanghai: May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revo- Chinese Communists on the Shanghai renmin, 1981); Sanyiba yundong lution in Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990). Benjamin ziliao [Materials on the March 18 (1926) University Press, 1964); Lin Yü-sheng, The I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the movement], comp. Sun Dunheng and Wen Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Rise of Mao (originally published 1951; Hai (Beijing: Renmin, 1984); and Sanyiba Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), can’an ziliao huibian [Materials on the March (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, is a classic that still commands attention. 18 (1926) massacre], comp. Jiang Changren 1979); Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese En- There is good material on early party (Beijing: Beijing, 1985). lightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of leaders. See in particular Maurice Meisner, The CCP’s relationship to the Commu- the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berke- Li Dazhao and the Origins of Chinese Marx- nist International (Comintern) in the 1920s ley: University of California Press, 1986); ism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, and early 1930s is, despite limited, fragmen- and Benjamin I. Schwartz, ed., Reflections 1967); Huang Sung-k’ang, Li Ta-chao and tary evidence, the subject of a good range of on the May Fourth Movement: A Symposium the Impact of Marxism on Modern Chinese studies. The central work is C. Martin Wilbur (Cambridge: Harvard University East Asian Thinking (The Hague: Mouton, 1965); Li and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries of Research Center, 1972). Dazhao wenji [Collected works of Li Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist Writings from the People’s Republic of Dazhao], comp. Yuan Qian et al. (2 vols.; China, 1920-1927 (Cambridge: Harvard China offer such a constricted treatment of Beijing: Renmin, 1984); Lee Feigon, Chen University Press, 1989), a much expanded the CCP’s May Fourth background that they Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist version of C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien- are of only limited use. Broader perspec- Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ying How, eds., Documents on Communism, tives are available in documentary collec- 1983); Duxiu wencun [A collection of writ- Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, tions such as Wusi aiguo yundong [the May ings by (Chen) Duxiu] (originally published 1918-1927: Papers Seized in the 1927 Pe- fourth patriotic movement], comp. Zhongguo 1922; 2 vols.; Jiulong: Yuandong, 1965); king Raid (New York: Columbia University shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jindai and Zhang Guotao, The Rise of the Chinese Press, 1956). The following are more spe- ziliao bianjizu (2 vols.; Beijing: Zhongguo Communist Party: The Autobiography of cialized but no less important: Tony Saich, shehui kexue, 1979); and Shehui zhuyi Chang Kuo-t’ao (2 vols.; Lawrence: Uni- The Origins of the First in sixiang zai Zhongguo de chuanbo [The versity of Kansas Press, 1971-72). China: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring) propagation of socialist thought in China] (3 The variant views on imperialism in the (2 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991); Jane L. vols.; Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang 1920s emerge from A. James Gregor and Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commis- dangxiao keyan bangongshi, 1985). The Maria Hsia Chang, “Marxism, Sun Yat-sen, sars: The Training of the Chinese Commu- latter is but one of a number of documentary and the Concept of ‘Imperialism’,” Pacific nist Leadership, 1920-1945 (Boulder, Colo.: collections that have been compiled in China Affairs 55 (Spring 1982), 54-79; Herman Westview Press, 1976); M. F. Yuriev and A. over the last decade on ideological transmis- Mast III, “-t’ao, Sunism and Marx- V. Pantsov, “Comintern, CPSU (B) and Ideo- sion and formation around the time of May ism During the May Fourth Movement in logical and Organizational Evolution of the Fourth. Shanghai,” Modern Asian Studies 5 (July Communist Party of China,” in Revolution- An accumulation of research spanning 1971), 227-49; Edmund S. K. Fung, “The ary Democracy and Communists in the East, several decades offers good insight on the Chinese Nationalists and the Unequal Trea- ed. R. Ulyanovsky (Moscow: Progress Pub- founding of the CCP and subsequent party- ties 1924-1931,” Modern Asian Studies 21 lishers, 1984); and Alexander Pantsov, “From building. See in particular Arif Dirlik, The (October 1987), 793-819; Fung, “Anti-Im- Students to Dissidents: The Chinese COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 138

Trotskyists in Soviet Russia,” trans. John Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: the Myth of the ‘Lost Chance’, 1948-1950,” Sexton, Issues and Studies (Taibei), vol. 30, Princeton University Press, 1984), chaps. 4, Modern Asian Studies 28 (1994), 475-502; pt. 1 (March 1994), 97-126, pt. 2 (April 8-10; Frank S.T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. and Chen Jian, “The Ward Case and the 1994), 56-73, and pt. 3 (May 1994), 77-109. Sullivan, “A Political History of the Taiwan- Emergence of Sino-American Confronta- Once standard accounts still deserving at- ese Communist Party, 1928-1931,” Journal tion, 1948-1950,” Australian Journal of tention include Allen Whiting, Soviet Poli- of Asian Studies 42 (February 1983), 269-89; Chinese Affairs 30 (July 1993), 149-70. cies in China, 1917-1924 (New York: Co- and Hsiao and Sullivan, “The Chinese Com- A number of studies prepared without lumbia University Press, 1954); and Dan N. munist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928- benefit of the recently released documenta- Jacobs, Borodin: Stalin’s Man in China 1943,” Pacific Affairs 52 (Fall 1979), 446- tion are still worth attention. James Reardon- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 67. Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers: 1981). The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign There are some revealing memoirs on The Emergence of a Foreign Policy Policy, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia the early CCP-Soviet relationship. Yueh (1935-1949) University Press, 1980), stirred up debate by Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow minimizing ideological constraints on CCP and the Chinese Revolution: A Personal The CCP’s handling of the United States policy and by arguing for a “lost chance” at Account ([Lawrence]: University of Kansas and the Soviet Union during the the end of the Pacific War when the CCP was Center for East Asian Studies, 1971); and and into the early Cold War period has been frustrated in its attempt to avert Sino-Ameri- Wang Fan-hsi, Chinese Revolutionary: the subject of roughly three decades of seri- can hostility and to minimize dependence on Memoirs, 1919-1949, trans. Gregor Benton ous scholarship. The appearance of new docu- the Soviet Union. (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, mentation has rendered much of that litera- This interpretative challenge was 1980), are notable for their treatment of ture obsolete and compromised interpreta- quickly taken up by several contributors to study in Moscow and its personal impact. tions advanced as recently as the late 1980s. Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Rela- Otto Braun, A Comintern Agent in China, Several major works drawing on the fresh tions, 1947-1950, ed. Dorothy Borg and 1932-1939, trans. Jeanne Moore (Stanford: source materials have already appeared. John Waldo Heinrichs (New York: Columbia Stanford University Press, 1982), is colored W. Garver’s Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937- University Press, 1980), 181-278, 293-303. by a strong anti-Mao animus. 1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese National- See in particular my own “Mao Tse-tung Among a substantial collection of gen- ism (New York: Oxford University Press, and the Issue of Accommodation with the eral surveys in Chinese on the CCP and the 1988) stresses the CCP’s policy of maneuver United States, 1948-1950,” Steven M. Comintern, the standouts are Xiang Qing, and places Mao alongside Jiang Jieshi Goldstein’s response, “Chinese Communist Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi [Chiang Kai-shek] as a nationalist whose Policy Toward the United States: Opportu- shigao [Draft history of the relations be- outlook drove him into “rebellion” (274) nities and Constraints, 1944-1950,” and tween the Comintern and the Chinese revo- against Moscow. Odd Arne Westad’s Cold Steven I. Levine’s two commentaries. lution] (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1988); Yang War and Revolution: Soviet-American Ri- Goldstein revisited the debate in “Sino- Yunruo and Yang Kuisong, Gongchan guoji valry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil American Relations, 1948-1950: Lost he Zhongguo geming [The Comintern and War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia Uni- Chance or No Chance?” in Sino-American the Chinese revolution] (Shanghai: Shang- versity Press, 1993), sets Mao’s policy in an Relations, 1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment hai renmin, 1988); and Yang Kuisong, impressively international context and pic- of a Critical Decade, ed. Harry Harding and Zhongjian didai de geming: Zhongguo tures as largely abortive his efforts to make Yuan Ming (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly geming de celüe zai guoji beijing de the great powers serve his party’s cause in Resources, 1989), 119-42. yanbian [Revolution in the intermediate the immediate aftermath of World War II. These Goldstein accounts emphasize zone: The development of China’s revolu- Also drawing on new material are shorter policy constraints imposed by formal party tionary strategy against an international studies: John W. Garver, “The Origins of the ideology. They as well as his “The Chinese background] (Beijing: Zhonggong : The Comintern and the Revolution and the Colonial Areas: The zhongyang dangxiao, 1992), the freshest Chinese Communist Party,” China Quar- View from Yenan, 1937-41,” China Quar- and most detailed treatment. All three ac- terly 113 (March 1988), 29-59; Garver, “The terly 75 (September 1978), 594-622, and his counts carry the story into the 1940s—down Soviet Union and the Xi’an Incident,” Aus- “The CCP’s Foreign Policy of Opposition, to the dissolution of the Comintern and tralian Journal of Chinese Affairs 26 (July 1937-1945,” in China’s Bitter Victory: The beyond. 1991), 147-75; Michael M. Sheng, “Mao, War with Japan, 1937-1945, ed. James C. Treatment of the CCP approach to na- Stalin, and the Formation of the Anti-Japa- Hsiung and Steven I. Levine (Armonk, N.Y.: tional minorities and its support for foreign nese United Front, 1935-37,” China Quar- M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 107-134, draw from his liberation movements, an important issue as terly 129 (March 1992), 149-70; Sheng, “Chinese Communist Perspectives on Inter- early as the 1920s, can be found in June T. “America’s Lost Chance in China? A Reap- national Affairs, 1937-1941” (Ph.D. thesis, Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions: Minority praisal of Chinese Communist Policy To- Columbia University, 1972), a pioneering Nationalities and National Integration in ward the United States Before 1945,” Aus- effort at systematic treatment based largely the People’s Republic of China (Cambridge: tralian Journal of Chinese Affairs 29 (Janu- on party press and other public pronounce- Harvard University Press, 1976); Walker ary 1993), 135-57; Sheng, “Chinese Com- ments available to researchers at the time. Connor, The National Question in Marxist- munist Policy Toward the United States and Levine’s own major statement, Anvil of 139 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Victory: The Communist Revolution in Man- tious account to date is Niu Jun’s Cong and Jiefangjun, 1984): Wu Xiuquan, Wode churia, 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia Yanan zouxiang shijie: Zhongguo licheng [My course] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, University Press, 1987), also joined the is- gongchandang duiwai guanxi de qiyuan 1984); Peter Vladimirov, The Vladimirov sue by looking at revolutionary mobilization [Moving from Yanan toward the world: the Diary, Yenan, China: 1942-1945 (Garden in a strategically pivotal and internationally origins of Chinese Communist foreign rela- City, N.Y., 1975), a translation that is not as sensitive region. It elaborates themes antici- tions] (Fuzhou: renmin, 1992). Niu complete as the Russian original, and in any pated in his “A New Look at American locates the origins of the CCP’s independent case betrays a tendentious quality that in- Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The foreign policy in the Yanan years, and per- vites some suspicion; and Ivan V. Kovalev and Manchuria,” Diplo- haps better than any other account—in En- and Sergei N. Goncharov, “Stalin’s Dia- matic History 3 (Fall 1979), 349-75, and his glish or Chinese—provides the supporting logue with Mao Zedong,” trans. Craig essay, “Soviet-American Rivalry in Man- evidence. He builds here on his earlier work Seibert, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies churia and the Cold War,” in Dimensions of on the CCP’s handling of the Hurley and 10 (Winter 1991-92), 45-76. Chen Jian has Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Chün-tu Hsüeh Marshall missions, Cong He’erli dao translated the portions of the Shi Zhe mem- (New York: Praeger, 1977), 10-43. Maxie’er: Meiguo tiaochu guogong maodun oir dealing with the 1949 missions by Other early accounts grappling with shimo [From Hurley to Marshall: a full ac- Mikoyan and Liu Shaoqi in Chinese Histo- CCP foreign policy ideology include Okabe count of the U.S. mediation of the contradic- rians 5 (Spring 1992), 35-46; and 6 (Spring Tatsumi, “The Cold War and China,” in The tions between the Nationalists and the Com- 1993), 67-90. in Asia, ed. munists] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin, 1988). Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York: Chinese specialists have published ex- Mao Zedong Columbia University Press, 1977), 224-51; tensively in Chinese journals on various key and Warren I. Cohen, “The Development of aspects of CCP policy in this period. A Anyone interested in tracing Mao’s Chinese Communist Policy toward the portion of that work has appeared in transla- evolving outlook on international affairs and United States,” Orbis 11 (Spring and Sum- tion. See especially Zhang Baijia, “Chinese his central policy role from the mid-1930s mer 1967), 219-37 and 551-69. Policies toward the United States, 1937- has an embarrassment of documentary riches A growing body of scholarship helps 1945,” and He Di, “The Evolution of the to contend with. Indeed, a wide variety of situate CCP external relations in the broader Chinese Communist Party’s Policy toward materials have accumulated layer upon layer context of base building, revolutionary war- the United States, 1944-1949,” in Sino- so that systematic research requires consid- fare, peasant mobilization, and united front American Relations, 1945-1955, 14-28 and erable patience. Those who press on will policy in the 1930s and 1940s. Key items 31-50 respectively; and Yang Kuisong, “The find as their reward Mao emerging from include Odoric Y. K. Wou, Mobilizing the Soviet Factor and the CCP’s Policy Toward these materials a more complex and more Masses: Building Revolution in Henan the United States in the 1940s,” Chinese interesting figure than previously guessed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Historians 5 (Spring 1992), 17-34. Most notable among the English-lan- Gregor Benton, Mountain Fires: The Red Key sources for this period, aside from guage treatments of Mao’s career is the body Army’s Three-Year War in , the central party documents mentioned of writing by Stuart R. Schram. See in par- 1934-1938 (Berkeley: University of Cali- above, are Zhongyang tongzhanbu and ticular Schram’s classic life-and-times bi- fornia Press, 1992); Kui-Kwong Shum, The Zhongyang dang’anguan, comps., ography, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth, Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Zhonggong zhongyang kangRi minzu tongyi Eng.: Penguin, 1966); the update to it in Mao Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935- zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [A selection of Zedong: A Preliminary Reassessment (New 1945 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, documents on the CCP Central Committee’s York and Hong Kong: St. Martin’s Press and 1988); Levine, Anvil of Victory (cited above); national anti-Japanese united front] (3 vols.; Chinese University Press, 1983); and finally Chen Yung-fa, Making Revolution: The Beijing: Dang’an, 1984-86; “internal circu- his The Thought of Mao Tse-tung (Cam- Communist Movement in Eastern and Cen- lation”); and Zhongyang tongzhanbu and bridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, tral China, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: Univer- Zhongyang dang’anguan, comps., 1989), consisting of two essays that first sity of California Press, 1986); and Suzanne Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng appeared in The Cambridge History of China, Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [A vols. 13 and 15. See also Frederick C. Struggle, 1945-1949 (Berkeley: University selection of documents on the CCP Central Teiwes, “Mao and His Lieutenants,” Aus- of California Press, 1978). Some of the Committee’s united front during the period tralian Journal of Chinese Affairs 19-20 issues raised by this literature are discussed of liberation struggle] (Beijing: Dang’an, (January-July 1988), 1-80; Jerome Ch’en, in Kathleen J. Hartford and Steven M. 1988; “internal circulation”). Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Goldstein, “Perspectives on the Chinese Personal accounts are useful in supple- Oxford University Press, 1965); Frederic Communist Revolution,” in Single Sparks: menting the primary collections. See Shi Wakeman, Jr., History and Will: Philosophi- China’s Rural , ed. Goldstein Zhe with Li Haiwen, Zai lishi juren shenbian: cal Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung’s Thought and Hartford (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Shi Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 3-33. history: Shi Zhe’s memoir] (Beijing: 1973); Dick Wilson, ed., Mao Tse-tung in PRC historians have led the way in Zhongyang wenxian, 1991); Nie Rongzhen, the Scales of History (Cambridge, Eng.: filling out the picture of CCP policy from the Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Cambridge University Press, 1977); Robert late 1930s down to 1949. The most ambi- Rongzhen] (3 vols.; Beijing: Janshi, 1983, A. Scalapino, “The Evolution of a Young COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 140

Revolutionary—Mao Zedong in 1919- indicated, 1975). a new series on Mao the military strategist: 1921,” Journal of Asian Studies 42 (No- The officially sanctioned and most fre- Junshi kexue chubanshe and Zhongyang vember 1982), 29-61; He Di, “The Most quently cited collection of Mao’s writings, wenxian chubanshe, comps., Mao Zedong Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong’s Percep- post- as well as pre-1949, is Mao Zedong junshi wenji [A collection of Mao Zedong tion of the United States,” China Quarterly xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong] (5 works on military affairs] (6 vols.; Beijing: 137 (March 1994), 144-58; and Benjamin I. vols.; Beijing: Renmin, 1952-77). It has long publisher same as compiler, 1993), which Schwartz, “The Maoist Image of the World been available in translation: Selected Works expands on Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun Order,” Journal of International Affairs 21 of Mao Tse-tung (5 vols.; Beijing: Foreign junshi kexueyuan, comp., Mao Zedong junshi (1967), 92-102. The Schwartz article is Languages Press, 1961-77). wenxuan [A selection of Mao Zedong works notable as a pioneering effort to inject more Aware that Selected Works is highly on military affairs] (Beijing: Zhongguo sophistication and subtlety into the study of selective and politically edited, scholars out- renmin jiefangjun zhanshi, 1981; “internal Mao’s guiding ideas by placing earlier for- side China have subjected the Mao corpus to circulation”; Tokyo reprint: Sososha, 1985). eign relations practices and experience as critical analysis, sought to supplement it with A second is the detailed and authoritative well as twentieth-century nationalism along- fresh materials, and prepared translations account of Mao’s emergence and triumph as side Marxist-Leninist sources. based on the most authentic originals avail- a revolutionary leader in Zhonggong There is a good body of writings on able. The effort began in earnest with Stuart zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (under the Mao’s early years. The starting point has Schram’s 1963 compilation and translation direction of Pang Xianzhi), Mao Zedong long been Mao’s own recital in Edgar Snow’s of key documents, The Political Thought of nianpu, 1893-1949 [A chronological biog- Red Star Over China (originally published Mao Tse-tung (rev. ed.; Harmondsworth, raphy of Mao Zedong, 1893-1949] (3 vols.; 1938; New York: Grove Press, 1961). The Eng.: Penguin, 1969). The major nonofficial Beijing: Renmin and Zhongyang wenxian, first to add to the picture was Xiao San (Emi collection, launched in Japan under the su- 1993). A third is Zhonggong zhongyang Hsiao), Mao Zedong tongzhi de pervision of Takeuchi Minoru, provided a wenxian yanjiushi, comp., Mao Zedong wenji qingshaonian shidai [Comrade Mao reliable and considerably fuller body of Mao [Collected works of Mao Zedong] (2 vols. to Zedong’s boyhood and youth] (originally materials at least down to 1949. The first date; Beijing: Renmin, 1983- ), which stands published 1948; rev. and exp. ed., series appeared as Mao Zedong ji [Collected as a supplement to the well known xuanji Guangzhou: Xinhua, 1950). A translation is writings of Mao Zedong] (10 vols.; Tokyo: (selected works) but which is largely silent available as Mao Tse-tung: His Childhood Hokubosha, 1971-72); it was followed by a on international issues. A fourth anniver- and Youth (Bombay: People’s Publishing second, supplementary series, Mao Zedong sary collection on Mao’s diplomacy has also House, 1953). Li Rui followed with Mao ji bujuan [Supplements to the collected writ- appeared: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan Zedong tongzhi de chuqi geming huodong ings of Mao Zedong] (9 vols.; Tokyo: [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] [Comrade Mao Zedong’s initial revolution- Sososha, 1983-85). A parallel project to (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical ary activities] (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian, provide a full English-language collection, Documents, 1994). Helpful in putting Mao’s 1957). The translation prepared by An- Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writ- role in the revolution in context are collec- thony W. Sariti and James C. Hsiung ap- ings, 1912-1949, is now underway. The tions of central party documents and the pears as The Early Revolutionary Activities PreMarxist Period, 1912-1920, ed. Stuart R. documents on overall united front policy of Mao Tse-tung (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Schram (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), from 1935-1948 (both cited above). Sharpe, 1977). Li Rui has since offered a is the first volume to appear. For the post-1949 Mao turn to the clas- revised and expanded version of the biogra- Collections compiled by the party his- sified series compiled by Zhonggong phy: Mao Zedong de zaoqi geming huodong tory establishment in China over the last zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Jianguo yilai [Mao Zedong’s early revolutionary activ- decade have added significant, fresh light on Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong manu- ity] (: renmin, 1980). The Mao’s general outlook and his emergence as scripts for the period following the estab- recollections by Siao Yu (Xiao Yü; Xiao a maker of foreign policy. These collections lishment of the country] (8 vols. to date; Zisheng), Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beg- include Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987- ; “in- gars (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University yanjiushi, comp., Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji ternal circulation”). This series sheds new Press, 1959), sound a somewhat sour tone. [A selection of Mao Zedong correspondence] light on Mao and world affairs down to the Recently a full collection of early writings (Beijing: Renmin, 1983); Zhonggong late 1950s, and taken together with the out- has been published in China: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Xinhua pouring of Mao material during the Cultural zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and tongxunshe, comps., Mao Zedong xinwen Revolution, gives us the basis for beginning Zhonggong Hunan shengwei “Mao Zedong gongzuo wenxuan [A selection of Mao to understand Mao’s PRC years. The formi- zaoqi wengao” bianjizu, comps., Mao Zedong works on journalism] (Beijing: dable task of collecting, collating, and veri- Zedong zaoqi wengao, 1912.6-1920.11 Xinhua, 1983); and Zhonggong zhongyang fying these materials has only begun. For a [Mao Zedong manuscripts from the early tongyi zhanxian gongzuobu yanjiushi et al., good recent guide, see Timothy Cheek, “Tex- period, June 1912-November 1920] comps., Mao Zedong lun tongyi zhanxian tually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly (Changsha: Hunan, 1990; “internal circula- [Mao Zedong on the united front] (Beijing: Available Mao Texts,” in The Secret tion”). M. Henri Day offers translations of Zhongguo wenshi, 1988). Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hun- some early writings in Mao Zedong, 1917- The hundredth anniversary of Mao’s dred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward, 1927: Documents (: publisher not birth gave rise to new compilations. One was ed. Roderick MacFarquhar et al. (Cambridge: 141 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, wenxian yanjiushi, comp., Zhou Enlai shuxin There are several good overviews that 1989), 78-81; and Cheek, “The ‘Genius’ xuanji [A selection of Zhou Enlai letters] must serve for the moment. The Cambridge Mao: A Treasure Trove of 23 Newly Avail- (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1988); History of China, vols. 14 and 15, covers able Volumes of Post-1949 Mao Zedong Zhonggong zhongyang tongyi zhanxian PRC foreign policy in chapters by Nakajima Texts,” Australian Journal of Chinese Af- gongzuobu and Zhonggong zhongyang Mineo, Allen S. Whiting, Thomas Robinson, fairs 19-20 (January-July 1988), 337-44. wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Zhou Enlai and Jonathan D. Pollack, while also offering To make the post-1949 Mao materials tongyi zhanxian wenxuan [A selection of helpful source essays. Samuel S. Kim, ed., available in English, Michael Y. M. Kau and Zhou Enlai writings on the united front] China and the World: Chinese Foreign Re- John K. Leung launched a translation series (Beijing: Renmin, 1984); and Zhonghua lations in the Post-Cold War Era (3rd rev. in 1986. Two volumes of their The Writings renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and ed.; Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), pulls of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976 (Armonk, N.Y.: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, together a good range of up-to-date accounts. M. E. Sharpe, 1986- ) have appeared to date comps., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Se- John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the covering the period down to December 1957. lected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] People’s Republic of China (Englewood Their formidable task has been complicated (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990). These Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1993), provides a by the continuing flow of new materials out materials go well beyond the limited docu- thematic treatment with some attention to of China. Translated fragments are avail- mentation in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian the pre-1949 background. Among older able elsewhere—in a variety of publications bianji weiyuanhui, comp., Zhou Enlai xuanji surveys Wang Gungwu’s terse China and by U.S. Joint Publications Research Service [Selected works of Zhou Enlai] (2 vols.; the World Since 1949: The Impact of Inde- (better known as JPRS); in Stuart Schram, Beijing: Renmin, 1980, 1984), which is avail- pendence, Modernity, and Revolution (New Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks able in translation as Selected Works of Zhou York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), still de- and Letters, 1956-1971 (New York: Pan- Enlai (2 vols.; Beijing: Foreign Languages serves attention for its commendable stress theon, 1975); and in MacFarquhar et al., The Press, 1981-89). on setting CCP foreign relations in a broad Secret Speeches (cited above). For an introduction to recent work in domestic context. China on Zhou’s diplomatic career and think- The PRC’s exercise of control over bor- Zhou Enlai ing, see Zhou Enlai yanjiu xueshu taolunhui der regions is still only poorly understood. lunwenji [Collected academic conference For the moment the best places to start are Zhou deserves special attention as Mao’s research papers on Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions (cited above); chief lieutenant in foreign affairs. For the Zhongyang wenxian, 1988); Zhonghua A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern moment the place to start is the archivally renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiaoshi Tibet (London: Zed, and Armonk, N.Y.: M. based biography, Zhonggong zhongyang bianjishi (under the direction of Pei E. Sharpe, 1987), chaps. 5-11; and Donald wenxian yanjiushi (under the direction of Jin Jianzhang), ed., Yanjiu Zhou Enlai—waijiao H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power Chongji), Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1898-1949 sixiang yu shiyan [Studying Zhou Enlai— and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977 (Boul- [Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949] diplomatic thought and practice] (Beijing: der, Colo.: Westview, 1979). (Beijing: Renmin and Zhongyang wenxian, Shijie zhishi, 1989); Zhongguo geming The general secondary accounts in Chi- 1989). This biography should be used in bowuguan et al., comps., Zhou Enlai he tade nese on post-1949 policy increasingly re- conjunction with Zhonggong zhongyang shiye: yanjiu xuancui [Zhou Enlai and his flect the new openness in the PRC but still wenxian yanjiushi, comp., Zhou Enlai enterprises: a sampling of studies] (Beijing: stick close to the official line. Han Nianlong, nianpu, 1898-1949 [A chronicle of Zhou Zhonggong dangshi, 1991); and Zhonghua chief comp., Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao Enlai’s life, 1898-1949] (Beijing: Zhongyang renmin gongheguo waijiaobu waijiaoshi [Chinese foreign affairs in recent times] wenxian and Renmin, 1989). Zhou’s early yanjiushi, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1987) years abroad are richly documented in Huai huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [A record of is the best known of these. That volume has En, comp., Zhou zongli qingshaonian shidai Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic activities, 1949- been translated as Diplomacy of Contempo- shiwenshuxinji [A collection of writings from 1975] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1993). rary China (Hong Kong: New Horizon, Premier Zhou’s youth] (2 vols., Chengdu: 1990) by Qiu Ke’an. It appears as a part of renmin, 1979-80); and Zhongguo The Foreign Policy of the PRC the series “Dangdai Zhongguo” (Contem- geming bowuguan, comp. Zhou Enlai porary China), which includes studies on the tongzhi lüOu wenji xubian [A supplement to The new sources and studies that have armed forces also germane to foreign policy. the collected works from the time of com- refashioned our understanding of early CCP Zhongguo waijiaoshi: Zhonghua renmin rade Zhou Enlai’s residence in Europe] attitudes and policies are just beginning to gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 [A diplomatic (Beijing: Wenwu, 1982). These materials have an impact on the post-1949 period. history of China: The PRC period, 1949- largely supercede the treatment in Kai-yu Until more documentary publications ap- 1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1988) is Hsu, Chou En-: China’s Grey Eminence pear and are digested, it is likely that our a major survey produced by Xie Yixian, who (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), and understanding of PRC foreign policy will served in the foreign service before taking Dick Wilson, Zhou Enlai: A Biography (New remain thin and fragmentary, and the writ- up teaching duties in the Foreign Ministry’s York: Viking, 1984). ings in English on the topic will for the most Foreign Affairs College. Helpful documentation on Zhou’s policy part hold to the well-established political These accounts should be supplemented role can be found in Zhonggong zhongyang science approaches. by such memoirs as Bo Yibo, Ruogan COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 142 zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflec- framework: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes Toward tions on some major decisions and inci- yanjiushi, comp., Jianguo yilai zhongyao Nuclear Weapons: China and the United dents] (2 vols.; Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian xuanbian (Beijing: Zhongyang States During the Korean War (Armonk, zhongyang dangxiao, 1991-93); Li wenxian, 1992- ); and Zhonggong zhongyang N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989); Hao Yufan and Shengzhi, YaFei huiyi riji [A diary of the wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongyang Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Asian-African conference] (Beijing: pub- dang’anguan “Dangde wenxian” bianjibu, Korean War: History Revisited,” China lisher not indicated, 1986); Liu Xiao, Chushi comps., Gongheguo zouguodelu: jianguo Quarterly 121 (March 1990), 94-115, which Sulian banian [Eight years as ambassador to yilai zhongyao wenxian zhuanti xuanji (1949- were in turn overtaken by Chen Jian, “The the Soviet Union] (Beijing: Zhonggong 1952) [The path travelled by the republic: a Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into dangshi ziliao, 1986); , selection of important documents on special the Korean War” (Washington, D.C.: ZhongMei huitan jiunian huigu [Looking topics since the founding of the country Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War Interna- back on nine years of Sino-American talks] (1949-1952)] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, tional History Project, 1992); Chen Jian, (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1985); and Wu 1991). “China’s Changing Aims during the Korean Xiuquan, Zai waijiaobu banian de jingli, For the Korean War, Allen S. Whiting’s War, 1950-1951,” The Journal of Ameri- 1950.1-1958.10 [Eight years’ experience in China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to can-East Asian Relations 1 (Spring 1992), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January Enter the Korean War (originally published 8-41; Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, As- 1950-October 1958] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1960; Stanford: Stanford University Press, surances, and the Last Chance for Peace: 1983). This last item, the second volume of 1968) was a path-breaking work that long The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Tele- the Wu memoirs, is translated as Eight Years stood as the single, indispensable work. His grams,” International Security 17 (Summer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January account of Chinese signalling from June to 1992), 122-54; and Michael H. Hunt, 1950-October 1958: Memoirs of a Diplo- November 1950 depicted Beijing as neither “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950- mat (Beijing: New World Press, 1985). Moscow-dominated nor irrational but acting June 1951,” Political Science Quarterly 107 Documentary collections are beginning essentially out of fear of “a determined, pow- (Fall 1992), 453-78. to open the window on PRC foreign rela- erful enemy on China’s doorstep” (159). A Treatment of Sino-Soviet relations dur- tions. See in particular Jianguo yilai Mao decade later Edward Friedman, “Problems in ing the initial phase of the Korean War was Zedong wengao (cited above); the tightly Dealing with an Irrational Power,” in for a time sharply limited by the lack of held collection compiled by Zhongguo America’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian- documentation. Robert R. Simmons, The renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi xueyuan dangshi American Relations, ed. Friedman and Mark Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Mos- jiaoyanshi (renamed Zhongguo jiefangjun Selden (New York: Pantheon, 1971), fol- cow and the Politics of the Korean War guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong lowed Whiting in stressing the defensive, (New York: Free Press, 1975); Wilbur A. jiaoyanshi), Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue calculated, and rational nature of Chinese Chaffee, “Two Hypotheses of Sino-Soviet cankao ziliao [Reference materials for the policy and Beijing’s “complex and differen- Relations as Concerns the Instigation of the teaching of CCP history] (vols. to date num- tiated view of American foreign policy” (212). Korean War,” Journal of Korean Affairs bered 12-27 with 25-27 withdrawn; n.p. The theme that China was essentially re- 6:3-4 (1976-77), 1-13; and Nakajima Mineo, [Beijing?], n.d. [preface in vol. 12 dated sponding in Korea to a danger to its security “The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots 1985]); Xinhuashe xinwen yanjiubu, comp., again enjoyed prominence in Melvin Gurtov in the International Background of the Ko- Xinhuashe wenjian ziliao xuanbian [A se- and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: rean War,” Australian Journal of Chinese lection of documentary materials on the The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Bal- Affairs 1 (January 1979), 19-47, were early New China News Agency] (4 vols.; no place timore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1980), chap. efforts to explore that topic and especially and no publisher, [1981-87?]); and 2., although by this point other competing the ways the war may have intensified strains Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun dangshi concerns—domestic issues, divisions within that would eventually bring about the Sino- dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi and Guofang the leadership, and strong internationalist Soviet split. Drawing on new materials, daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong elements in Beijing’s justification for inter- Kathryn Weathersby treats “The Soviet Role jiaoyanshi, comps., “Wenhua dageming” vention—were beginning to creep into the in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New yanjiu ziliao [Research materials on “the picture and blur the interpretation. Documentary Evidence,” Journal of Ameri- Cultural Revolution”] (3 vols.; Beijing: pub- The last few years have witnessed a can-East Asian Relations 2 (Winter 1993), lisher same as compiler, 1988; withdrawn flurry of publications, one after another broad- 425-58, and also presents Soviet archival from circulation). The second series of ening and enriching our understanding of materials on the war in issues 3, 5, and 6 of ZhongMei guanxi ziliao huibian [A collec- Chinese policy and China’s place in an inter- the Cold War International History Project tion of materials on Sino-American rela- national history of the early Cold War (while Bulletin. tions], comp. Shijie zhishi (2 vols.; Beijing: unfortunately neglecting the domestic di- The most detailed and up-to-date ac- Shijie zhishi, 1960; “internal circulation”), mensions of that conflict). Chen Xiaolu, counts of the war’s origins are to be found in reads like a “white paper” with a strong “China’s Policy Toward the United States, Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: emphasis on materials between 1949 and 1949-1955,” and Jonathan D. Pollack, “The The Making of the Sino-American Confron- 1958, virtually all from the public domain. Korean War and Sino-American Relations,” tation (New York: Columbia University Two new collections are helpful in putting both in Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955, Press, 1994), notable for its stress on the early PRC foreign relations in a broad policy 184-97 and 213-37, were soon followed by strong revolutionary streak in Mao’s foreign 143 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN policy, and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Jian, “Peng Dehuai and China’s Entry into over the Taiwan Strait and Vietnam is get- Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: the Korean War,” Chinese Historians 6 ting increasing scrutiny by scholars exploit- Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: (Spring 1993), 1-29. ing fragmentary PRC revelations and docu- Stanford University Press, 1993), which The Chinese military has made a major mentation. Guang, Deterrence depicts the two leaders as shrewd national- effort to tell its Korean War story not only in and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American ists and resolute realpolitikers engaged in an some of the general accounts noted above Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell intricate game of international chess with but also in a long string of memoirs. They University Press, 1992), relates new infor- ideology counting for little. include Peng Dehuai zishu bianjizu, ed., mation from Chinese sources to theoretical Within the Chinese historical establish- Peng Dehuai zishu [Peng Dehuai’s own concerns with deterrence, calculated deci- ment, Yao Xu, Cong Yalujiang dao account] (Beijing: Renmin, 1981), which sion-making, and “learning” by Banmendian: Weida de kangMei yuanChao contains treatment of Korea prepared before policymakers. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, zhanzheng [From the Yalu River to the Cultural Revolution and apparently with- China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford Panmunjom: the great war to resist America out access to personal files; Du Ping, Zai University Press, 1988), reveals how Mao’s and aid Korea] (Beijing: Renmin, 1985; “in- zhiyuanjun zongbu [With the headquarters public dismissal of the American nuclear ternal circulation”); and Chai Chengwen of the volunteer army] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, threat was belied by a high-priority program and Zhao Yongtian, KangMei yuanChao 1989); , Yang Chengwu to create a Chinese bomb. jishi [A record of resisting America and huiyilu [Memoirs of Yang Chengwu] (2 A long list of special studies helps fur- aiding Korea] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi vols.; Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1987 and 1990); ther fill out our picture of PRC policy: Chen ziliao, 1987; “internal circulation”), were Yang Dezhi, Weile heping [For the sake of Jian, “China and the , the first to deal in detail with the war. Their peace] (Beijing: Changzheng, 1987); and 1950-54,” China Quarterly 133 (March work was in turn improved on by Junshi Hong Xuezhi, KangMei yuanChao 1993), 85-110; Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting jiaoxueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, comp., zhanzheng huiyi [“Recollections of the war the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advis- Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangMei to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea”] ers and the First Vietnam War, 1950-1954,” yuanChao zhanshi [A battle history of resis- (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi, 1990). Peng’s Journal of Military History 57 (October tance to America and aid to Korea by the memoir is translated as Memoirs of a Chi- 1993), 689-715; Qiang Zhai, “China and the Chinese people’s volunteer army] (Beijing: nese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes Geneva Conference of 1954,” China Quar- Junshi jiaoxue, 1988; “internal circulation”); of Peng Dehuai (1898-1924), trans. Zheng terly 129 (March 1992), 103-22; Gordon H. Chai Chengwen and Zhao Yongtian, Longpu and ed. Sara Grimes (Beijing: For- Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War in Banmendian tanpan: Chaoxian zhanzheng eign Languages Press, 1984). the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy juan [The Panmunjom talks: a volume on There are abundant published source and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, the Korean War] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1989); materials on the Korean conflict. Aside Deterrence?” American Historical Review Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian: kangMei from Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao and 98 (December 1993), 1500-24; Xiaobing Li, yuanChao lishi jishi [Sending troops to Ko- Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (both noted “Chinese Intentions and 1954-55 Offshore rea: a historical record of the resistance to above), see Peng Dehuai zhuanji bianxiezu, Islands Crisis,” Chinese Historians 3 (Janu- American and assistance to Korea] (Beijing: comp., Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan [A ary 1990), 45-59; He Di, “The Evolution of Beijing shiyue wenyi, 1990); Qi Dexue, selection of Peng Dehuai writings on mili- the People’s Republic of China’s Policy Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu [The in- tary affairs] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, toward the Offshore Islands,” in The Great side story of the Korean War decisions] 1988); and Zhongguo renmin kangMei Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (cited (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue, 1991); yuanChao zonghui xuanchuanbu, comp., above), 222-45; and Chen Jian, “China’s “Dangdai Zhongguo” congshu bianji Weida de kangMei yuanChao yundong [The Involvement with the Vietnam War, 1964- weiyuanhui, KangMei yuanChao zhanzheng great resist-America, aid-Korea campaign] 69,” China Quarterly 142 (June 1995), 357- [The war to resist America and aid Korea] (Beijing: Renmin, 1954), a collection of 387. (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1990); documents on domestic mobilization. For a Our understanding of the PRC’s Tai- and Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang: kangMei selection of Korean War materials trans- wan and Vietnam policies is, much like yuanChao zhanzheng de lishi huigu yu fansi lated from Jianguo yilai, volume 1, see Li insights on Korea, in debt to the Chinese [The first test of strength: a historical review Xiaobing et al., “Mao’s Despatch of Chinese military. Xu Yan, Jinmen zhi zhan (1949- and evaluation of the war to resist America Troops into Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams, 1959 nian) [The battle for Jinmen (1949- and aid Korea] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo July-October 1950,” Chinese Historians 5 1959)] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi, dianshi, 1990), the most complete and fully (Spring 1992), 63-86; Li Xiaobing and Glenn 1992), and Zhongguo junshi guwentuan lishi researched of the Chinese studies. Zhang Tracy, “Mao’s Telegrams During the Ko- bianxiezu, Zhongguo junshi guwentuan Xi’s unusually revealing “Peng Dehuai rean War, October-December 1950,” Chi- yuanYue kangFa douzheng shishi [Histori- shouming shuaishi kangMei yuanChao de nese Historians 5 (Fall 1992), 65-85. cal facts about the struggle by the Chinese qianqian houhou” [The full story of Peng Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, 229- military advisory team to assist Vietnam and Dehuai’s appointment to head the resistance 91, serves up a generous sampling of Chi- resist France] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1990; to the United States and the assistance to nese as well as Soviet documents on the “internal circulation”), are but examples from Korea], Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 31 (1989), origins of the war. what is likely to become an imposing body 111-59, is available in a translation by Chen The subsequent Sino-American crisis of work. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 144

CCP LEADERS culation only,” it is not difficult for scholars the early 1980s, contains many previously continued from page 131 outside of China to gain access to them. For unknown inner-Party instructions and tele- how the situation has changed in the age of example, the Yenching Library and the li- grams by Mao, especially the telegraphic “reform and opening to the outside world.” brary of John K. Fairbank Center at Harvard communications between Mao and Chinese Insofar as the original works of CCP leaders University, the East Asian Library at Colum- field commanders during the early stage of are concerned, the archives storing them, bia University, the East Asian Library at China’s military intervention in Korea (Oc- especially Beijing’s Central Archives, re- Stanford University, the East Asian Library tober-December 1950). Its circulation was main inaccessible to most scholars (both at Toronto University, the Asian Section of highly restricted at first; after the mid-1980s, Chinese and Western). If one carefully Library of Congress, and many other East however, it became available to scholars examines the contents of the selected works Asian libraries in North America have col- outside of China through several channels, of CCP leaders that have been compiled and lected various volumes of this set. especially after it had been reprinted by a published since the early 1980s (especially The documents published in this collec- publisher in Hong Kong. The six-volume the editions “for internal circulation only”), tion are of high historical value. They cover, Mao Zedong junshi wenji was published in however, it is easy to find that the policy of among other things, such important events as December 1993, on the 100th anniversary of “reform and opening to the outside world” Mao Zedong’s visit to the Soviet Union in Mao’s birthday. Its coverage is extraordi- has made its stamp on them. Put simply, the 1949-1950; China’s participation in the Ko- narily uneven. The first five volumes, which “selected works” compiled and published in rean War in 1950-1953; Mao Zedong’s di- cover the period from the late 1920s to 1949, the 1980s and 1990s are more substantial, rection of the “Three-Antis” and “Five-Antis” include many documents released only for and, so far as their texts are concerned, more Movements in 1951-1952; Mao’s and the the first time. The sixth volume, which reliable than previous collections. To make CCP leadership’s management of relations covers the period from 1949 to 1976, con- this point clear, I will introduce and exam- with the Soviet Union in the mid- and late tains almost nothing new compared with the ine several major “selected works” com- 1950s; Mao’s management of the Taiwan previously published Mao Zedong junshi piled and published during this period. Crisis and the potential confrontation with wenji and Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. 1. Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian the United States in 1958; Mao’s handling of In actuality, many documents concerning xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP the “Anti-Rightist Movement” and the “Great Mao’s military activities during this post- Central Committee). This documentary col- Leap Forward” in 1957-1958; and Mao’s revolution period published in the other two lection covers the period from 1921 to 1949 presentations at the Lushan Conference in collections are deleted from this volume. in two different editions: A fourteen vol- 1959. In many places, the documents pub- This is a great disappointment for scholars lished in this collection confirm the inner- who are interested in Mao’s activities during ume internal edition published in the mid- Party statements and instructions by Mao the PRC period. 1980s, and an eighteen volume open edition divulged during the “Cultural Revolution” 4. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Se- published in the early 1990s.2 Both editions years.4 But the majority of the documents lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong).8 contain many previously unpublished ma- contained in this collection have never been This collection focuses on Mao’s diplomatic terials. The open edition contains almost released in the past. Most of the documents and strategic activities, emphasizing the post- fifteen percent more documents than the are published in their entirety; some, how- 1949 period. Some of the documents pub- earlier internal one (however, a few “sensi- ever, are published only in part. The quality lished in this volume are of high historical tive documents” that were included in the of the eight published volumes is uneven. value. For example, it has long been known internal edition disappeared from the open The first volume, which covers the period to scholars that in the summer of 1958, a edition). The “quality” of some of the from October 1949 to December 1950, is one major dispute emerged between Beijing and documents is impressive. For example, the of the best. It offers, among other things, a Moscow in the wake of Moscow’s proposal Central Committee’s “Instructions on Dip- quite detailed coverage of Mao’s visit to the to establish a joint Chinese-Soviet subma- lomatic Affairs,” dated 18 August 1944, Soviet Union, as well as how the CCP lead- rine flotilla. However, it has been unclear to clearly reveals the CCP leadership’s per- ership made the decision to enter the Korean scholars how this dispute developed. The ception of international affairs as well as its War.5 Volume Four, covering the 1953- minutes of a talk between Mao Zedong and calculation on how the Party should best 1954 period, is, compared with other vol- P. F. Yudin, the Soviet ambassador to China, deal with the perceived situation. These umes, extremely thin. As a whole, this col- on July 22, 1958, published in this issue of documents provide scholars with valuable lection provides scholars with much fresh the CWIHP Bulletin, reveal the Chinese information for understanding important de- information (compared with what we knew attitude, including Mao’s reasoning under- cisions by the CCP leadership. in the past) and, therefore, must be regarded lying it, toward this question.9 2. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao as a basic reference for the study of Mao 5. Mao Zedong wenji (A Collection of (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Zedong, the Chinese revolution, and the his- Mao Zedong’s Papers).10 This collection Founding of the People’s Republic of tory of the People’s Republic of China. publishes Mao’s speeches, instructions, and China).3 The publication of this series be- 3. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Se- telegrams not included in Mao Zedong xuanji. gan in late 1987, with eight volumes pub- lected Military Papers of Mao Zedong)6 and Among the quite impressive documents re- lished by 1995, covering the period from Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of leased are those about the CCP leadership’s October 1949 to December 1959. Although Mao Zedong’s Military Papers, 6 volumes).7 handling of the Xian Incident of 1936. these volumes are marked “for internal cir- Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan, published in 6. Mao Zedong nianpu (A Chronicle of 145 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Mao Zedong, 3 volumes).11 Published in 10. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Se- tions are more useful to researchers. Indeed, December 1993, the 100th anniversary of lected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai).17 the footnotes of several important collec- Mao’s birth, it offers a quite detailed day-to- As the PRC’s defense minister in the 1950s tions, such as Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong day account of Mao’s activities up to 1949. and the commander of the Chinese Volun- wengao, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, and It releases many previously unknown im- teers in Korea, Peng Dehuai played an im- Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, contain much portant documents, going beyond the cover- portant role in developing China’s military important documentary information. age of other Mao collections. For example, and security strategies. This volume pub- Third, some of the collections, espe- it publishes for the first time Mao Zedong’s lishes some of Peng’s most important mili- cially those for “internal circulation only,” telegram to the CCP’s Nanjing Municipal tary papers, including his correspondences have broken many “forbidden zones” in the Committee dated 10 May 1949, in which with Mao during the early stages of the writing of the CCP history. For example, Mao established the principles for Huang Korean War. scholars who are interested in the CCP’s Hua to meet with , the In addition to the above listed collec- management of the Xian Incident will find American ambassador to China who re- tions, other “selected works” that have been that the information offered by the docu- mained after the Communist takeover of published since the 1980s include ones by ments in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian Nanjing.12 Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Shaoqi, Nie xuanji, Mao Zedong nianpu, Zhou Enlai 7. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Se- Rongzhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, nianpu, and Mao Zedong wenji differ from lected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai).13 and Zhu De.18 the Party’s propaganda in the past, indicat- This is a collection of minutes of internal III ing that the CCP leadership’s attitude to- talks, instructions, statements, and speeches Compared with the “selected works” ward Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) had related to Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic activi- published earlier, the above list of “selected been strongly influenced, or even defined, ties. This collection includes some interest- works” published in the 1980s and 1990s by the Comintern. Also, the documents ing documents, such as the Chinese minutes have several distinctive features. First, con- offered by Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao of Zhou Enlai’s talk with K.M. Pannikar, trary to the earlier practice of making exten- reveal that, different from the description of Indian Ambassador to China, early in the sive excisions from, or even revisions in, the the official Party history, one of the consid- morning of 3 October 1950. During this original documents for the sake of publica- erations behind Mao Zedong’s decision to meeting Zhou Enlai issued the warning that tion, the compilation and editing of most of shell the Nationalist-controlled Jinmen Is- if the American forces crossed the 38th the volumes published in the past decade are lands in August 1958 was to assist the people parallel in Korea, China would “intervene” more faithful to the original text of the docu- in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, in in the conflict.14 ments. For example, Zhonggong zhongyang their struggles against the U.S. imperial- 8. Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A wenjian xuanji and Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong ists.19 Chronicle of Zhou Enlai).15 This chronicle, wengao clearly indicate at the end of most However, one should not exaggerate like Mao Zedong nianpu, covers the period documents that they are printed according to the utility and significance of the historical up to 1949. It offers a day-to-day account of the original texts of the documents. In some documents released in “selected works.” The Zhou Enlai’s activities, from his early years cases, photocopies of original documents documents that have been included in the to the time of the nationwide victory of the are provided. This practice significantly “selected works” of the 1980s and 1990s are Chinese revolution. The Collection includes increases the reliability and historical value only a small portion of the entire body of complete texts of several important docu- of these publications. original documents, and the criteria used in ments relating to Zhou Enlai. Second, in the pre-1980 period, the ed- their selection remain highly dubious. In 9. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected iting and publication of “selected works” reality, through other sources, we know for Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3 volumes).16 As were generally controlled and conducted by certain that many documents, which in the China’s most important leader after Mao’s party cadres who always put the party’s eyes of the editors have the potential of death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping played a cen- interests over everything else and who had harming the image of the CCP and its leaders tral role in China’s “reform and opening to had, at best, only inadequate knowledge of being “generally correct,” have been inten- the outside world” period. This collection China’s modern history. In the past decade, tionally excluded from the selections. offers researchers, as well as the general increasing numbers of professional histori- An example of this practice is a tele- public, a window through which to study ans, many of whom have B.A., M.A., or gram Mao Zedong sent to Peng Dehuai on Deng Xiaoping’s thoughts. The most im- even Ph.D. degrees in modern history, the 28 January 1951. Let me first give some portant volume of this collection is the third history of the Chinese revolution, and mod- background introduction. After Chinese volume, which covers the period from 1982 ern Chinese politics, have joined the edito- troops entered the Korean War in October to 1992, when Deng was indisputably China’s rial teams responsible for compiling and 1950, they waged three offensive campaigns (although he never as- editing the “selected works.” Although these from late October 1950 to early January sumed that title). Among the documents scholars still must follow the general direc- 1951, driving the American/UN troops from published in the volume is the talk Deng tions of the Party in conducting their work, areas close to the Chinese-Korean border to gave after the 1989 Tiananmen Square trag- their professional training makes them less areas south of the 38th parallel. However, edy, in which Deng explained his reasoning willing than their predecessors to alter the the Chinese forces exhausted their offensive for opening fire on the demonstrators on documents. As a result, the documents se- potential because of heavy casualties, lack Beijing’s streets. lected are of better “quality” and the annota- of air support, and the overextension of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 146 supply lines. Therefore, when the Ameri- send troops to Korea, and it would take great 7. Mao Zedong junshi wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers, Beijing: Military Science can troops started a counteroffensive on 25 efforts from Stalin to persuade the Chinese Press, 1993, 6 vols.) January 1951, Peng Dehuai, the Chinese that it was in China’s basic interest to prevent 8. Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic commander, proposed a temporary retreat the war from reaching China’s northeast Papers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: World Knowledge in a telegram to Mao on January 27. Mao, border. (See the article by Alexandre Press, 1994). 9. Ibid., 322-333. however, overestimated China’s strength. Mansourov in this issue of the Bulletin.) 10. Mao Zedong wenji (A Collection of Mao Zedong’s In a telegram to Peng the next day, he Why does this discrepancy exist? What Papers, Beijing: People’s Press, 1993, 2 vols.). ordered Peng to use a Chinese/North Ko- really happened between Beijing and Mos- 11. Mao Zedong nianpu (A Chronicle of Mao Zedong, rean offensive to counter the American of- cow in October 1950? Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents and People’s Press, 1993, 3 vols.). fensive. He even argued that the Chinese To answer these questions (and many 12. Ibid., 3:499-500. troops possessed the capacity to advance to other similar questions) scholars need full 13. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic the 36th parallel.20 Mao’s instructions con- access to Beijing’s archives. “Selected Papers of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of tributed to the military defeat of the Chinese works” are useful, but only in a highly lim- Historical Documents, 1990). 14. See ibid., 25-27. troops on the Korean battlefield in spring ited sense. This is particularly true because 15. Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A 1951. This telegram is certainly important even in the age of “reform and opening to the Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of because it revealed Mao’s strategic thinking outside world,” the writing of Party history Historical Documents, 1989). at a crucial point of the Korean War, and in China remains a business primarily de- 16. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing: People’s Press, 1993, 3 vols). reflected the goals he hoped to achieve in signed to enhance the legitimacy of the Party’s 17. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Korea—driving the Americans out of the reign in China. This means that materials Papers of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: The Central Press of Korean peninsula, thus promoting China’s released through “selected works” are often Historical Documents, 1989). reputation and influence in East Asia while driven by intentions other than having the 18. Chen Yun wenxuan (Selected Works of Chen Yun, Beijing: People’s Press, 1984, 2 vols.); Hu Qiaomu at the same time enhancing the Chinese truth known, and, as a result, can be mislead- wenji (A Collection of Hu Qiaomu’s Works, Beijing: revolution at home. However, this telegram ing. People’s Press, 1993-94, 3 vols.); Liu Shaoqi xuanji also makes it clear that sometimes Mao’s Therefore, while it is wrong for China (Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Beijing: People’s Press, judgment of the situation could be very scholars to refuse to recognize the historical 1982, 2 vols.); Nie Rongzhen junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Nie Rongzhen, Beijing: People’s poor. Although a few Chinese authors with value of materials contained in “selected Liberation Army Press, 1992); Wang Jiaxiang xuanji access to classified documents have cited works,” it is dangerous and unwise for them (Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang, Beijing: People’s the telegram in its entirety, this important to rely completely or uncritically on “se- Press, 1984); Zhang Wentian xuanji (A Collection of telegram is excluded from Jianguo yilai lected work” sources. While using them, Zhang Wentian, Beijing: People’s Press, 1993-94, 3 vols); Zhu De xuanji (Selected Works of Zhu De, Mao Zedong wengao and Mao Zedong junshi scholars must double check “selected works” Beijing: People’s Press, 1984). wenji.21 This, of course, is only one of materials against other sources, including 19. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7: 391-392. many, many such cases. information obtained from interviews. In the 20. For a more detailed description of the contents of The end of the Cold War makes it long run, scholars must be given full and Mao’s telegram, see Chen Jian, “China’s Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-1951,” The Journal possible for scholars to gain access to docu- equal access to Chinese archives to tell the of American-East Asian Relations 1:1 (Spring 1992), ments from the former Soviet Union. Many story of the Chinese Communist revolution 31-33. of the Russian documents that have recently and China’s relationship with the outside 21. My interviews with researchers at Beijing’s Acad- become available display discrepancies com- world. emy of Military Science, who were responsible for editing Mao Zedong junshi wenji, in summer 1991 pared to what has been revealed by Chinese confirmed that this telegram would not be included 1. An earlier draft of this article was presented to an documents. In some cases these discrepan- because of its “improper” content. international symposium on “Local Chinese Archives 22. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Stalin, 2 October 1950, cies expose the limit to which truth is re- and the Historiography of Modern China” at the Univer- Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 1:549-552. vealed in the documents published in “se- sity of Maryland, College Park, 5-7 October 1995. 2. Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected lected works” in China. Here is another Chen Jian is associate professor of history at Southern Documents of the CCP Central Committee, internal example. All the Chinese documents about Illinois University (Carbondale) and is the author of edition, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1983- China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the the Korean War published in the first vol- 1987, 14 vols.; open edition, Beijing: CCP Central Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia ume of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao Academy Press, 1989-1993, 18 vols.). University Press, 1994). indicate that the Beijing leadership made 3. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s the decision to enter Korean War in early Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Repub- lic of China, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical October 1950. In a telegram dated October Documents, 1987-1994, 8 vols.). CORRECTION 2, Mao formally informed Stalin that the 4. For English translations of these previously released CCP leadership had made the decision to documents, see Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao send troops to Korea.22 However, Russian Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971 (New The Bulletin regrets that, due to production York: Pantheon Books, 1974). documents on the Korean War (which Rus- errors, a number of errors were introduced 5. For English translations of these documents, see into the footnoting of Mark Kramer’s ar- sian President Yeltsin gave to South Korean Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Commu- President Kim Young-sam in June 1994) nist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: Docu- ticle in the Spring 1995 issue on “The tell a different story. According to these mentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publi- ‘Lessons’ of the for cations, 1995), Part II. documents, Mao Zedong informed Stalin Nuclear Operations.” A cor- 6. Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Pa- rected version will appear in the next issue. on 3 October 1950 that China would not pers of Mao Zedong, Beijing: Soldier’s Press, 1981). 147 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

THE SECOND HISTORICAL the compiling of a collection of archival cial archives, and those which “involve na- ARCHIVES OF CHINA: documents, Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi tional interest,” scholars are free to utilize all A Treasure House for Republican ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Materials of SHAC’s files. Procedures for foreign China Research on Chinese Modern Political History]. The scholars have also been dramatically simpli- project, launched in 1956 with a directive fied. However, due to the effects of eco- by Gao Hua from the CCP Central Committee Political nomic reform, SHAC has also increased its translated by Scott Kennedy Research Office, consumed SHAC’s entire fees for those scholars who have yet to use its energies for three years. Only 100 sets of the services. SHAC is also planning to install an After arriving at Nanjing’s 309 244 volume, 21 million character collection air-conditioned reading room as another ser- East Road, passing the police were printed. They were then distributed to vice to foreigners, but, of course, you’ll have stationed at their post and going through a central party and political organs as well as to pay. routine check-in, researchers face a classical some universities to be used as a research A Chinese-language reference book Chinese edifice—the famous Second His- reference. At present, this important collec- which is helpful to users of the Second torical Archives of China (SHAC).1 tion is the largest and richest set of materials Archives is Zhongguo dier lishi dang’anguan Established in February 1951, SHAC concerning China’s domestic situation dur- jianming zhinan [A Brief Guide to the Sec- has one of the largest historical collections ing the Republican era. ond Historical Archives of China], (. The former tenant at the archive’s Since 1979, SHAC has made public a Publishing House, 1987), a well-organized address was the “Committee for Compiling large number of documents one after an- introduction to each of the categories under GMT [Guomindang] Party Historical other and published three major archival which all of SHAC’s documents are stored. Records.” After the People’s Republic of document sets: Zhonghua minguoshi Also useful are Dangdai zhongguode China (PRC) was established in 1949, the dang’an ziliao huibian [A Compilation of dang’an shiye [China Today: Archival Un- Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over Republican China History Archival dertakings] (Chinese Academy of Social management of the Committee as well as the Records], Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an Sciences Publishing House, 1988); and archives from the original “National History ziliao conkan [A Series of Republican China Minguoshi yu minguo dang’an lunwenji House.” Soon after, large quantities of docu- History Archives], and Zhonghua minguoshi [Republican History and Collected Essays ments concerning the GMT regime housed dang’an ziliao congshu [A Collection of on Republican Archives] (Archives Pub- in Guangzhou (Canton), (Chung- Republican China History Archives]. Fi- lishing House, 1991). king), Chengdu, , Shanghai and nally, in 1985, SHAC launched the quar- Beijing, as well as the archival records stored terly, Minguo dang’an [Republican Ar- 1. Zhongguo dier lishi dang’anguan. in Beijing on the Northern Warlords Gov- chives]. ernment, were all moved to Nanjing, and SHAC has been a resource on issues Gao Hua, a specialist on Republican era together make up the foundation of SHAC’s where historical questions influence current history and modern intellectual history, collection. policy questions. Since 1986, Minguo teaches in the history department at Nanjing At the heart of SHAC’s collection are dang’an has published a large number of University and the Johns Hopkins Univer- the original records of the central organs of documents concerning relations between sity- Center for Ameri- the various regimes in existence during the Tibet and central government authorities. can and Chinese Studies. He is currently a Republican era (1912-1949), namely: 1) the SHAC has also cooperated with Beijing’s visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and Nanjing Provisional Government (January- “China Tibetan Studies Research Center” to is working on a study of the origins of the April 1912); 2) the Northern Warlords Gov- publish three volumes of historical materials Yanan Rectification Campaign and its influ- ernment (April 1912 - June 1928); 3) the on Tibet. The journal has also published ence on the development of . Scott various GMT regimes, first centered in materials concerning China’s claim to the Kennedy is a research assistant in the For- Guangzhou and , and then as a na- in the . eign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings tional government in Nanjing (1927-1949); SHAC provided the Ministry of Foreign Institution and a doctoral candidate in the and 4) the various puppet regimes of the Affairs with materials concerning China’s political science department of George Japanese (e.g., ’s Nanjing re- Republican-era relationship with , Washington University. gime). The archives provide a detailed ac- and . They recently al- count of policy and actual conditions—at lowed Taiwanese scholars to view docu- the central and local levels—on foreign ments concerning the 2-28 Incident (a mas- RUSSIAN HISTORIANS policy, military matters, commerce and fi- sacre of Taiwanese by the GMT on 28 Feb- TO PUBLISH STUDY nance, culture and education, and even so- ruary 1947). Finally, geologists and policy- Two Russian historians who have conducted cial customs. However, the materials of makers involved in the planning of the con- extensive research in Russian and U.S. sources greatest number and value collected at SHAC troversial proposed dam have have completed a study of Soviet leaders and the early Cold War: Vladislav M. Zubok and are those archives concerning the GMT rule relied on SHAC for materials on relevant Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s in Nanjing from 1927-1949. Republican-era research. Cold War: Soviet Leaders From Stalin to From 1951 to 1979, SHAC’s doors re- SHAC has formally been open to schol- Khrushchev, is scheduled for publication by mained closed to the public. During those ars for the past 14 years. Apart from the Harvard University Press in March 1996. years, the only significant work done was dossiers of various individuals, some judi- NEWCOL D WEAR INTERNATIONALVIDENCE HISTORY PROJECT ONBULLETIN 148 THE EMERGING DISPUTES BETWEEN BEIJING AND MOSCOW: TEN NEWLY AVAILABLE CHINESE DOCUMENTS, 1956-1958

Translated and Annotated by Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian

Translators’ Notes: In February 1950, conversation with the Soviet Ambassador as butchers and Hitler-style fascists, and we the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and P.F. Yudin on 22 July 1958, Mao Zedong kept silent on the resolution [condemning the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friend- related the joint Sino-Soviet flotilla issue to you], although we published articles to criti- ship and alliance. Through the mid-1950s, a series of more general questions concern- cize you in 1948. In retrospect, we should both Beijing and Moscow claimed that the ing the overall relationship between the two not have done that; we should have dis- Sino-Soviet alliance, made between two countries, revealing comprehensively (often cussed [this issue] with you: if some of your “brotherly” Communist countries, would in cynical tones) his understanding of the viewpoints were incorrect, [we should have last forever. However, serious problems historical, philosophical, and political ori- let] you conduct self-criticism, and there soon emerged between the Chinese and gins of the problems existing between Beijing was no need to hurry [into the controversy] Soviet parties and governments. Starting in and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again as [we] did. The same thing is true to us: 1960, the two parties became engaged in an emphasized the issue of “equality,” empha- should you disagree with us, you should do increasingly heated polemical debate over sizing that Beijing could not accept Moscow’s the same thing, that is, the adoption of a the nature of true communism and which treatment of the CCP as a junior partner. method of persuasion and consultation. party represented it. By the late 1960s, the The third group includes four Chinese docu- There have not been that many successful relationship between the two countries had ments from Russian Foreign Ministry ar- cases in which one criticizes foreign parties deteriorated to such an extent that a major chives, which demonstrate the extent to which in newspapers. [Your] case offers a pro- border war erupted between them in March China had been dependent upon the military found historical lesson for the international 1969. Why did China and the Soviet Union and other material support of the Soviet communist movement. Although you have change from allies to enemies? What prob- Union in the 1950s. These documents make suffered from it, the international commu- lems caused the decline and final collapse it possible to observe the Sino-Soviet rela- nist movement has learned a lesson from this of the Sino-Soviet alliance? In order to tions from another perspective. mistake. [The international communist answer these questions, scholars need ac- movement] must fully understand [the seri- cess to contemporary documentary sources, Part I. Criticism of Stalin and the ousness of ] this mistake. and these translations of the newly avail- Emergence of Sino-Soviet Differences When you offered to recognize new able Chinese documents provide a basis for China, we did not respond, nor did we de- beginning to answer these questions. 1. Minutes, Mao’s Conversation with a cline it. Undoubtedly, we should not have The documents are divided into three Yugoslavian Communist Union Delega- rejected it, because there was no reason for groups. The first group includes two tion, Beijing, [undated] September 19561 us to do so. When Britain recognized us, we speeches by Mao Zedong and one report by Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Se- did not say no to it. How could we find any Zhou Enlai in 1956-1957. They reflect the lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] excuse to reject the recognition of a socialist Chinese Communist view on such important (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical country? questions as Khrushchev’s criticism of Documents, 1993), 251-262 There was, however, another factor Stalin, the general principles underlying which prevented us from responding to you: the relations among “brotherly parties and We welcome you to China. We are very the Soviet friends did not want us to form states,” and their perception of the Soviet pleased at your visit. We have been sup- diplomatic relations with you. If so, was Union’s attitude toward the Chinese revo- ported by you, as well as by other brotherly China an independent state? Of course, yes. lution. Particularly interesting is Mao [Communist] parties. We are invariably If an independent state, why, then, did we Zedong’s repeated reference to the “un- supporting you as much as all the other follow their instructions? [My] comrades, equal” relationship between the Chinese brotherly parties. In today’s world, the Marx- when the Soviet Union requested us to fol- Communist Party (CCP) and the Soviet ist and Communist front remains united, low their suit at that time, it was difficult for Union during Stalin’s era. Through these whether in places where success [of Com- us to oppose it. It was because at that time documents one is able to sense some of the munist revolution] is achieved or not yet some people claimed that there were two deep-rooted causes leading to the decline of achieved. However, there were times when Titos in the world: one in Yugoslavia, the the Sino-Soviet alliance. The second group we were not so united; there were times when other in China, even if no one passed a includes three documents reflecting the CCP we let you down. We listened to the opinions resolution that Mao Zedong was Tito. I have leadership’s response to the Soviet propos- of the Information Bureau2 in the past. Al- once pointed out to the Soviet comrades that als in 1958 to establish a long-wave radio though we did not take part in the Bureau’s [they] suspected that I was a half-hearted station in China and a joint Sino-Soviet [business], we found it difficult not to sup- Tito, but they refuse to recognize it. When flotilla in 1958. In his long port it. In 1949 the Bureau condemned you did they remove the tag of half-hearted Tito 149S COLDIN WARO INTERNATIONAL-SOVIET HISTORY PROJEC T BULLETINRELATIONS from my head? The tag was removed after tion. [Ironically,] Jiang Jieshi helped us people who had suspected whether China’s [China] decided to resist America [in Korea] correct this mistake: while Wang Ming was a real revolution. and came to [North] Korea’s aid and when “decked himself out and fawned on [Jiang],” You might wonder why [we] still pay a [we] dealt the US imperialists a blow. Jiang Jieshi “slapped his face and kicked tribute to Stalin in China by hanging his The Wang Ming line3 was in fact Stalin’s him out.” Hence, Jiang Jieshi was China’s portrait on the wall. Comrades from Mos- line. It ended up destroying ninety percent best instructor: he had educated the people cow have informed us that they no longer of our strength in our bases, and one hundred of the whole nation as well as all of our Party hang Stalin’s portraits and only display percent of [our strength] in the white areas.4 members. Jiang lectured with his machine Lenin’s and current leaders’ portraits in pub- Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi5 pointed this out in guns whereas Wang Ming educated us with lic parade. They, however, did not ask us to his report to the Eighth [Party] Congress.6 his own words. follow their suit. We find it very difficult to Why, then, did he not openly attribute [the The third time was after Japan’s surren- cope. The four mistakes committed by Stalin losses] to the [impact of] Stalin’s line? There der and the end of the Second World War. are yet to be made known to the Chinese is an explanation. The Soviet Party itself Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and people as well as to our whole party. Our could criticize Stalin; but it would be inap- [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give situation is quite different from yours: your propriate for us to criticize him. We should the whole of China to America and Jiang [suffering inflicted by Stalin] is known to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Jieshi. In terms of material and moral sup- the people and to the whole world. Within Union. Maybe [we] could make our criti- port, especially moral support, Stalin hardly our party, the mistakes of the two Wang cism public sometime in the future. It has to gave any to us, the Communist Party, but Ming lines are well known; but our people be that way in today’s world, because facts supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was do not know that these mistakes originated are facts. The Comintern made numerous made at the Yalta conference. Stalin later in Stalin. Only our Central Committee was mistakes in the past. Its early and late stages told Tito [this decision] who mentioned his aware that Stalin blocked our revolution and were not so bad, but its middle stage was not conversation [with Stalin on this decision] in regarded me as a half-hearted Tito. so good: it was all right when Lenin was his autobiography. We had no objection that the Soviet alive and when [Georgii] Dimitrov was in Only after the dissolution of the Union functions as a center [of the world charge.7 The first Wang Ming line domi- Comintern did we start to enjoy more free- revolution] because it benefits the socialist nated [our party] for four years, and the dom. We had already begun to criticize movement. You may disagree [with us] on Chinese revolution suffered the biggest opportunism and the Wang Ming line, and this point. You wholeheartedly support losses.8 Wang Ming is now in Moscow tak- unfolded the rectification movement. The Khrushchev’s campaign to criticize Stalin, ing a sick leave, but still we are going to elect rectification, in fact, was aimed at denounc- but we cannot do the same because our him to be a member of the party’s Central ing the mistakes that Stalin and the Comintern people would dislike it. In the previous Committee. He indeed is an instructor for had committed in directing the Chinese revo- parades [in China], we held up portraits of our party; he is a professor, an invaluable lution; however, we did not openly mention Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as one who could not be purchased by money. a word about Stalin and the Comintern. those of a few Chinese [leaders]—Mao, has taught the whole party, so that it Sometime in the near future, [we] may openly [Shaoqi], Zhou [Enlai], and Zhu [De]9 — would not follow his line. do so. There are two explanations of why we and other brotherly parties’ leaders. Now That was the first time when we got the did not openly criticize [Stalin and the we adopt a measure of “overthrowing all”: worst of Stalin. Comintern]: first, as we followed their in- no one’s portrait is handed out. For this The second time was during the anti- structions, we have to take some responsi- year’s “First of May” celebration, Ambassa- Japanese war. Speaking Russian and good bility ourselves. Nobody compelled us to dor Bobkoveshi10 already saw in Beijing at flattering Stalin, Wang Ming could di- follow their instructions! Nobody forced us that no one’s portrait was held in parade. rectly communicate with Stalin. Sent back to be wrongfully deviated to right and left However, the portraits of five dead per- to China by Stalin, he tried to set [us] toward directions! There are two kinds of Chinese: sons—Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin and right deviation this time, instead of follow- one kind is a dogmatist who completely Sun [Yat-sen]—and a not yet dead person— ing the leftist line he had previously advo- accepts Stalin’s line; the other opposes dog- Mao Zedong—are still hanging [on the wall]. cated. Advocating [CCP] collaboration with matism, thus refusing to obey [Stalin’s] in- Let them hang on the wall! You Yugoslavi- the Guomindang [the Nationalist Party or structions. Second, we do not want to dis- ans may comment that the Soviet Union no GMD], he can be described as “decking please [the Soviets], to disrupt our relations longer hangs Stalin’s portrait, but the Chi- himself out and self-inviting [to the GMD];” with the Soviet Union. The Comintern has nese still do. he wanted [us] to obey the GMD whole- never made self-criticism on these mistakes; As of this date some people remain heartedly. The Six-Principle Program he nor has the Soviet Union ever mentioned suspicious of whether our socialism can be put forward was to overturn our Party’s Ten- these mistakes. We would have fallen out successfully constructed and stick to the Principle Policy. [His program] opposed with them had we raised our criticism. assertion that our Communist Party is a establishing anti-Japanese bases, advocated The fourth time was when [Moscow] phony one. What can we do? These people giving up our Party’s own armed force, and regarded me as a half-hearted Tito or semi- eat and sleep every day and then propagate preached that as long as Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Titoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but that the Chinese Communist Party is not Kai-shek] was in power, there would be also in other socialist countries and some really a communist party, and that China’s peace [in China]. We redressed this devia- non-socialist countries were there some socialist construction is bound to fail. To COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 150 them, it would be a bewildering thing if remains the most fearsome [for the imperial- ten to twenty years and even more dangerous socialism could be built in China! Look out, ists] whereas China is merely the second. in forty to fifty years. [they warn]. China might become an impe- What they are afraid of is our politics and that My comrades, let me advise you that rialist country—to follow America, Britain, we may have an enormous impact in Asia. you should also watch out for this potential. and France to become the fourth imperialist That is why they keep spreading the words Your industry is much modernized and has country! At present China has little indus- that China will be out of control and will experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin try, thus is in no position [to be an imperial- invade others, so on and so forth. made you suffer and hence, justice is on your ist country]; but [China] will become formi- We have been very cautious and mod- side. All of this, though, may become your dable in one hundred years! Chinggis Khan11 est, trying to overcome arrogance but adher- [mental] burden. might be brought to life; consequently Eu- ing to the “Five Principles.”14 We know we The above-mentioned four mistakes rope would suffer again, and Yugoslavia have been bullied in the past; we understand Stalin committed [concerning China] may might be conquered! The “” how it feels to be bullied. You would have also become our burden. When China be- must be prevented! had the same feeling, wouldn’t you? comes industrialized in later years, it will be There is absolutely no ground for this to China’s future hinges upon socialism. It more likely that we get cocky. Upon your happen! The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist will take fifty or even one hundred years to return to your country, please tell your young- Party. The Chinese people are peace-loving turn China into a wealthy and powerful coun- sters that, should China stick her tail up in people. We believe that aggression is a try. Now no [formidable] blocking force the future, even if the tail becomes ten thou- crime, therefore, we will never seize an inch stands in China’s way. China is a huge sand meters high, still they must criticize of territory or a piece of grass from others. country with a population of one fourth of China. [You] must keep an eye on China, We love peace and we are Marxists. that of the world. Nevertheless, her contribu- and the entire world must keep an eye on We oppose great power politics in in- tion to the world is yet to be compatible with China. At that time, I definitely will not be ternational relations. Although our industry her population size, and this situation will here: I will already be attending a conference is small, all things considered, we can be have to change, although my generation and together with Marx. regarded as a big power. Hence some people even my son’s generation may not see the We are sorry that we hurt you before, [in China] begin to be cocky. We then warn change taking place. How it will change in thus owing you a good deal. Killing must be them: “Lower your heads and act with your the future depends on how [China] develops. compensated by life and debts must be paid tails tucked between your legs.” When I China may make mistakes or become cor- in cash. We have criticized you before, but was little, my mother often taught me to rupt; the current good situation may take a why do we still keep quiet? Before behave “with tails tucked between legs.” bad turn and, then, the bad situation may take [Khrushchev’s] criticism of Stalin, we were This is a correct teaching and now I often a good turn. There can be little doubt, though, not in a position to be as explicit about some mention it to my comrades. that even if [China’s] situation takes a bad issues as we are now. In my previous con- Domestically, we oppose Pan- turn, it may not become as decadent a society versations with [Ambassador] Bobkoveshi, Hanism,12 because this tendency is harmful as that of Jiang Jieshi’s. This anticipation is I could only say that as long as the Soviet to the unity of all ethnic groups. based on dialectics. Affirmation, negation, Union did not criticize Stalin, we would be Hegemonism and Pan-Hanism both are sec- and, then, negation of negation. The path in in no position to do so; as long as the Soviet tarianism. Those who have hegemonious the future is bound to be tortuous. Union did not restore [diplomatic] relations tendencies only care about their own inter- Corruption, bureaucracy, hegemonism, with Yugoslavia, we could not establish ests but ignore others’, whereas those Pan- and arrogance all may take effect in China. relations with you.15 Now these issues can Hanists only care about the Han people and However, the Chinese people are inclined to be openly discussed. I have already talked to regard the Han people as superior to others, be modest and willing to learn from others. the Soviet comrades about the four mistakes thus damaging [the interests of] all the mi- One explanation is that we have little “capi- that Stalin had committed [to China]; I talked norities. tal” at our disposal: first, we did not invent to [Soviet Ambassador Pavel] Yudin16 about Some people have asserted in the past Marxism which we learned from others; sec- it, and I shall talk to Khrushchev about it that China has no intention to be friends ond, we did not experience the October Revo- next time when we meet. I talk to you about with other countries, but wants to split with lution and our revolution did not achieve it because you are our comrades. However, the Soviet Union, thus becoming a trouble- victory until 1949, some thirty-two years we still cannot publish this in the newspa- maker. Now, however, this kind of people after the ; third, we were pers, because the imperialists should not be shrinks to only a handful in the socialist only a branch army, not a main force, during allowed to know about it. We may openly countries; their number has been reduced the Second World War; fourth, with little talk about one or two mistakes of Stalin’s in since the War to Resist America and Assist modern industry, we merely have agriculture the future. Our situation is quite different Korea.13 It is, however, a totally different and some shabby, tattered handicrafts. Al- from yours: Tito’s autobiography mentions thing for the imperialists: the stronger China though there are some people among us who Stalin because you have already broken up becomes, the more scared they will be. appear to be cocky, they are in no position to with the Soviet Union. They also understand that China is not that be cocky; at most, [they can merely show] Stalin advocated dialectical material- terrifying as long as China has no advanced their tails one or two meters high. But we ism, but sometimes he lacked materialism industry, and as long as China continues to must prevent this from happening in the and, instead, practiced metaphysics; he wrote rely on human power. The Soviet Union future: it may become dangerous [for us] in about historical materialism, but very often 151 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN suffered from historical idealism. Some of sugar plant while discussing Stalin’s mis- have such a ruler [in your history] who might his behavior, such as going to extremes, takes concerning us, we feel it inappropriate take it well even when people cursed him fostering personal myth, and embarrassing to make them public. There are other issues right in his face. The capitalist society has others, are by no means [forms] of material- involving conflicts and controversies. taken a step ahead of the feudalist society. ism. Generally speaking, the Soviet Union is The Republican and Democratic Parties in Before I met with Stalin, I did not have good. It is good because of four factors: the United States are allowed to quarrel with much good feeling about him. I disliked Marxism-Leninism, the October Revolution, each other. reading his works, and I have read only “On the main force [of the socialist camp], and We socialist countries must find [bet- the Basis of Leninism,” a long article criti- industrialization. They have their negative ter] solutions. Certainly, we need concen- cizing Trotsky, and “Be Carried Away by side, and have made some mistakes. How- tration and unification; otherwise, unifor- Success,” etc. I disliked even more his ever, their achievements constitute the ma- mity cannot be maintained. The uniformity articles on the Chinese revolution. He was jor part [of their past] while their shortcom- of people’s minds is in our favor, enabling us very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his ings are of secondary significance. Now that to achieve industrialization in a short period heart with others and treated others as equals the enemy is taking advantage of the criti- and to deal with the imperialists. It, how- whereas Stalin liked to stand above every cism of Stalin to take the offensive on a ever, embodies some shortcomings, that is, one else and order others around. This style world-wide scale, we ought to support the people are made afraid of speaking out. can be detected from his works. After I met Soviet Union. They will certainly correct Therefore, we must find some ways to en- with him, I became even more disgusted: I their mistakes. Khrushchev already cor- courage people to speak out. Our Politburo’s quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin rected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. comrades have recently been considering was excitable by temperament. When he They are already aware of Wang Ming’s these issues. became agitated, he would spell out nasty mistakes, although in the past they were Few people in China have ever openly things. unhappy with our criticism of Wang Ming. criticized me. The [Chinese] people are I have written altogether three pieces They have also removed the “half-hearted tolerant of my shortcomings and mistakes. praising Stalin. The first was written in Tito” [label from me], thus, eliminating alto- It is because we always want to serve the Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday [21 gether [the labels on] one and a half Titos. people and do good things for the people. December 1939—ed.], the second was the We are pleased to see that Tito’s tag was Although we sometimes also suffer from congratulatory speech [I delivered] in Mos- removed. bossism and bureaucracy, the people believe cow [in December 1949—ed.], and the third Some of our people are still unhappy that we have done more good things than bad was an article requested by Pravda after his with the criticism of Stalin. However, such ones and, as a result, they praise us more than death [March 1953—ed.]. I always dislike criticism has positive effects because it de- criticize us. Consequently, an idol is cre- congratulating others as well as being con- stroys mythologies, and opens [black] boxes. ated: when some people criticize me, others gratulated by others. When I was in Moscow This entails liberation, indeed, a “war of would oppose them and accuse them of to celebrate his birthday, what else could I liberation.” With it, people are becoming so disrespecting the leader. Everyday I and have done if I had chosen not to congratulate courageous that they will speak their minds, other comrades of the central leadership him? Could I have cursed him instead? as well as be able to think about issues. receive some three hundred letters, some of After his death the Soviet Union needed our Liberty, equality, and fraternity are slo- which are critical of us. These letters, how- support and we also wanted to support the gans of the bourgeoisie, but now we have to ever, are either not signed or signed with a Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that fight for them. Is [our relationship with false name. The authors are not afraid that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. Moscow] a father-and-son relationship or we would suppress them, but they are afraid That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the one between brothers? It was between father that others around them would make them Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I and son in the past; now it more or less suffer. did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal resembles a brotherly relationship, but the You mentioned “On Ten Relation- feelings and treat him as the leader of a shadow of the father-and-son relationship is ships.”17 This resulted from one-and-a-half- socialist country. Therefore, that piece was not completely removed. This is under- months of discussions between me and thirty- rather vigorous whereas the other two came standable, because changes can never be four ministers [of the government]. What out of [political] need, not my heart, nor at completed in one day. With certain open- opinions could I myself have put forward my will. Human life is just as contradictory ness, people are now able to think freely and without them? All I did was to put together as this: your emotion tells you not to write independently. Now there is, in a sense, the their suggestions, and I did not create any- these pieces, but your rationality compels atmosphere of anti-: a father-and- thing. Any creation requires materials and you to do so. son relationship is giving way to a brotherly factories. However, I am no longer a good Now that Moscow has criticized Stalin, relationship, and a patriarchal system is be- factory. All my equipment is out-of-date, I we are free to talk about these issues. Today ing toppled. During [Stalin’s] time people’s need to be improved and re-equipped as I tell you about the four mistakes committed minds were so tightly controlled that even much as do the factories in Britain. I am by Stalin, but, in order to maintain relations the feudalist control had been surpassed. getting old and can no longer play the major with the Soviet Union, [we] cannot publish While some enlightened feudal lords or role but had to assume a minor part. As you them in our newspapers. Since Khrushchev’s emperors would accept criticism, [Stalin] can see, I merely played a minor role during report only mentioned the conflict over the would tolerate none. Yugoslavia might also this Party’s National Congress whereas Liu COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 152

Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping18 and fuses to establish diplomatic relation with us. At present there exist some controversies others assumed the primary functions. The longer you drag on [these issues], the between China and the Soviet Union. Their more debts you will owe us. The longer the ways of thinking, behavior, and historical 2. Speech, Mao Zedong, “On Sino-Ameri- issues linger there, the more unreasonable traditions differ from ours. Therefore, we can and Sino-Soviet Relations,” 27 Janu- you will appear, and the more isolated you must try to persuade them. Persuasion is ary 195719 will become both domestically and in face of what I have always advocated as a way to Source: Mao Zedong Waijaio Wenxuan, international public opinion. I once told an deal with our own comrades. Some may 280-283 American in Yanan that even if you United argue that since we are comrades, we must States refused to recognize us for one hun- be of the same good quality, and why in the [Let me] talk about U.S.-China rela- dred years, I simply did not believe that you world is persuasion needed among com- tions. At this conference we have circulated United States could refuse to recognize us in rades? Moreover, persuasion is often em- a copy of the letter from [Dwight D.] the one hundred and first year. Sooner or ployed for building a common front and Eisenhower to Jiang Jieshi. This letter, in later the U.S. will establish diplomatic rela- always targeted at the democratic figures22 my view, aims largely at dampening the tions with us. When the United States does and, why is it employed toward communist enthusiasm of Jiang Jieshi and, then, cheer- so and when Americans finally come to visit party members? This reasoning is wrong. ing him up a bit. The letter urges [Jiang] to China, they will feel deep regret. It is be- Different opinions and views do exist even keep calm, not to be impetuous, that is, to cause by then, China will become completely within a communist party. Some have joined resolve the problems through the United different [from what it is now]: the house has the party, but have not changed their mindset. Nations, but not through a war. This is to been thoroughly swept and cleaned, “the Some old cadres do not share the same pour cold water [on Jiang]. It is easy for four pests”21 have altogether been elimi- language with us. Therefore, [we] have to Jiang Jieshi to get excited. To cheer [Jiang] nated; and they can hardly find any of their engage in heart-to-heart talks with them: up is to continue the hard, uncompromising “friends.” Even if they spread some germs sometimes individually, sometimes in policy toward the [Chinese] Communist [in China], it will have no use at all. groups. In one meeting after another we will Party, and to hope that internal unrest would Since the end of the Second World War, be able to persuade them. disable us. In his [Eisenhower’s] calcula- every capitalist country has suffered from As far as I can see, circumstances are tion, internal unrest has already occurred instability which has led to disturbance and beyond what persons, even those occupying and it is hard for the Communist Party to disorder. Every country in the world is high positions, can control. Under the pres- suppress it. Well, different people observe disturbed, and China is no exception. How- sure of circumstance, those in the Soviet things differently! ever, we are much less disturbed than they Union who still want to practice big-power I still believe that it is much better to are. I want you to think about this issue: will invariably encounter diffi- establish diplomatic relations with the United between the socialist countries and the impe- culties. To persuade them remains our cur- States several years later than sooner. This rialist countries, especially the United States, rent policy and requires us to engage in is in our favor. The Soviet Union did not which side is more afraid of the other after direct dialogue with them. The last time our form diplomatic relations with the United all? In my opinion, both are afraid [of the delegation visited the Soviet Union, [we] States until seventeen years after the Octo- other], but the issue is who is afraid more. I openly talked about some [controversial] ber Revolution. The global economic crisis am inclined to accept such an assessment: the issues.23 I told Comrade Zhou Enlai over the erupted in 1929 and lasted until 1933. In imperialists are more afraid of us. However, phone that, as those people are blinded by that year Hitler came to power in Germany such an assessment entails a danger, that is, lust for gain, the best way to deal with them whereas Roosevelt took office in the United it could put us into a three-day-long sleep. is to give them a tongue-lashing. What is States. Only then was the Soviet-American Therefore, [we] always have to stress two [their] asset? It involves nothing more than diplomatic relationship established. [As far possibilities. Putting the positive possibility 50 million tons of steel, 400 million tons of as I can anticipate], it will probably wait aside, the negative potential is that the impe- coal, and 80 million tons of oil. How much until when we have completed the Third rialists may become crazy. Imperialists al- does this count? It does not count for a thing. Five-Year Plan20 that we should consider ways harbor malicious intentions and con- With this asset, however, their heads have forming diplomatic relations with the United stantly want to make trouble. Nevertheless, gotten really big. How can they be commu- States. In other words, it will take eighteen it will not be that easy for the imperialists to nists [by being so cocky]? How can they be or even more years [before we do so]. We start a world war; they have to consider the Marxists? Let me stress, even ten times or a are not anxious to enter the United Nations consequences once war starts. hundred times bigger, these things do not either. This is based on exactly the same [Let me] also talk about Sino-Soviet count for a thing. They have achieved noth- reasoning as why we are not anxious to relations. In my view, wrangling [between ing but digging a few things out of the earth, establish diplomatic relations with the United us] will continue. [We shall] never pretend turning them into steel, thereby manufactur- States. The objective of this policy is to that the Communist parties will not wrangle. ing some airplanes and automobiles. This is deprive the U.S. of its political assets as Is there a place in the world where wrangling nothing to be proud of! They, however, turn much as possible, so that the U.S. will be does not exist? Marxism itself is a wran- these [achievements] into huge burdens on placed in an unreasonable and isolated posi- gling-ism, and is about contradiction and their back and hardly care about revolution- tion. It is therefore all right if [the U.S.] struggle. Contradictions are everywhere, ary principles. If this cannot be described as blocks us from the United Nations and re- and contradictions invariably lead to struggle. being blinded by lust for gain, what else 153 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN could this be? Taking the office of the first (1) In my view, the mistakes of the to encourage him. However, in open talks, secretary can also become a source for being Soviet Communist leadership arise from er- they refused to admit this. blinded by lust for gain, making it easy for roneous thinking. They often set the inter- Khrushchev and Bulganin claimed that one to be out of one’s mind. Whenever one ests of the Soviet Communist Party ahead of as members of the third generation [of So- is out of his mind, there must be a way to their brotherly parties; they often set their viet] leadership, they could not do anything bring him back to his senses. This time own interests as the leaders ahead of those of to persuade Stalin or prevent his mistakes. Comrade [Zhou] Enlai no longer maintained the party. As a result, they often fail to During [my visit] this time, however, I a modest attitude but quarreled with them overcome subjectivity, narrow-mindedness, stressed the ideological and social roots of and, of course, they argued back. This is a and emotion when they think about and Stalin’s mistakes, pointing out that the other correct attitude, because it is always better to resolve problems; they often fail to link leaders had to assume some responsibility make every [controversial] issue clear face together the interests of the above-stated for the gradual development of Stalin’s mis- to face. As much as they intend to influence sides in an objective, far-sighted, and calm takes. I also expressed our Chinese Party’s us, we want to influence them too. However, fashion. Although they may correct one conviction that open self-criticism will do we did not unveil everything this time, be- mistake, they are not free of making others. no harm to, but will enhance, the Party’s cause we must save some magic weapons [in Sometimes they admit that they made mis- credibility and prestige. Before getting out reserve]. Conflict will always exist. All we takes; but it does not mean that they fully of the car at the [Moscow] airport, hope for at present is to avoid major clashes come to grips with their mistakes for they Khrushchev explained to me that they could so as to seek common ground while reserv- merely take a perfunctory attitude toward not conduct the same kind of self-criticism ing differences. Let these differences be these mistakes. as we do; should they do so, their current dealt with in the future. Should they stick to For instance, the dispatch of their troops leadership would be in trouble. the current path, one day, we will have to to Warsaw was clearly interference with the About the Poland question.26 It is crys- expose everything. internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed tal-clear that the Poland incident was a result As for us, our external propaganda must forces, but not an action to suppress counter- of the historical antagonism between the not contain any exaggeration. In the future, revolutionaries. They admitted that they Russian and Polish nations. Since the end of we shall always remain cautious and mod- had committed a serious mistake, and they [the Second World] War, many [outstand- est, and shall tightly tuck our tails between even stated in our meetings this time that no ing and potential] conflicts have yet to be our legs. We still need to learn from the one should be allowed to interfere with other appropriately resolved. The recent [Soviet] Soviet Union. However, we shall learn from brotherly parties’ internal affairs; but in the dispatch of troops to Warsaw caused an even them rather selectively: only accept the good meantime, they denied that [their interven- worse impact [in Poland]. Under these cir- stuff, while at the same avoiding picking up tion in Poland] was a mistake. cumstances the Polish comrades have good the bad stuff. There is a way to deal with the When we had a general assessment of reason not to accept the policy of “following bad stuff, that is, we shall not learn from it. Stalin, analyzing the ideological and social the Soviet leadership.” The Polish com- As long as we are aware of their mistakes, roots of his [mistakes], they kept avoiding rades, however, admitted that they had yet to [we] can avoid committing the same mis- any real discussion. Although they seem- build a whole-hearted trusting relationship take. We, however, must learn from any- ingly have changed [their view] in measur- with the Soviet Comrades. For that purpose, thing that is useful to us and, at the same ing Stalin’s achievements and mistakes, to [Wladyslaw] Gomulka27 is trying his best to time, we must grasp useful things all over the me, such an alteration was to meet their retrieve the losses and reorient the Polish- world. One ought to seek knowledge in all temporary needs, not the result of profound Soviet relations by resolutely suppressing parts of the world. It would be monotonous contemplation. any anti-Soviet acts [in Poland]. Regard- if one only sticks to one place to receive We immediately sensed this shortly af- less, however, the Soviet comrades remain education. ter our arrival in Moscow. At the dinner unwilling to accept the criticism that [they] party hosted by Liu Xiao25 on the 17th [of practiced big-power politics [in resolving 3. Report, “My Observations on the So- January], Khrushchev again raised the Stalin the Polish crisis]. This kind of attitude does viet Union,” Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong issue. Spelling out a good deal of inappro- not help at all to convince the Polish com- and the Central Leadership, 24 January priate words, however, he made no self- rades. 1957 (Excerpt)24 criticism. We then pushed him by pointing It is safe to say that although every Source: Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de out that, given the development of Stalin’s public communiqué [between the Soviet zhuoyue fengxian [Remarkable Achieve- , ossified way of thinking, Union and] other brotherly states has repeat- ments and Contributions of Zhou Enlai] and arrogant and conceited attitude over edly mentioned what the 30 October [1956] (Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, twenty years, how can those comrades, es- declaration28 has announced as the prin- 1993), 302-305 pecially those [Soviet] Politburo members, ciples to guide the relationship among broth- who had worked with Stalin, decline to as- erly parties and governments, [the Soviets] Having already spoken considerably sume any responsibility? They then admit- seem to recoil in fear when dealing with about the achievements of the Soviet Com- ted that Stalin’s errors came about gradu- specific issues and tend to be inured to munist leadership in public, now let [me] ally; had they not been afraid of getting patronizing others and interfering with other illustrate again the major mistakes it has killed, they could have at least done more to brotherly parties’ and governments’ internal made: restrict the growth of Stalin’s mistakes than affairs. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 154

(2) About Sino-Soviet relations. Fac- the union among the Soviet Union, China for us not to persuade them [to make changes]; ing a [common] grave enemy, the Soviet and India, as well as [about] possible Sino- it is, however, equally inadvisable for us to comrades have ardent expectations about Soviet collaboration on the production of be impatient in changing them. Therefore, Sino-Soviet unity. However, in my opin- atomic and hydrogen bombs. We regarded changes on their part can only be achieved ion, the Soviet leaders have not been truly these statements as swashbuckling, which is through a well-planned, step-by-step, per- convinced by our argument; nor have the not good, and they were finally deleted from sistent, patient, long-term persuasion. differences between us disappeared com- the communiqué. As a result, we did not use pletely. For instance, many leaders of the the Soviet draft. The published communiqué Part II. Disputes over Long-wave Radio Soviet Communist Party toasted and praised was largely based on our draft. Stations and the Joint Submarine our article “Another Comment on the His- (4) In spite of all of the above, however, Flotilla torical Lessons of the Proletarian Dictator- Sino-Soviet relations are far better now than ship.”29 Their three top leaders (Khrushchev, during Stalin’s era. First of all, facing the 4. Report, Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong Bulganin, and Mikoyan), however, have [common] grave enemy, both sides have and the CCP Central Committee, 5 June never mentioned a word of it. Moreover, realized and accepted the necessity of pro- 1958 (Excerpt)30 when we discussed with them the part of the moting Sino-Soviet unity and mutual sup- Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 634 article concerning criticism of Stalin, they port, which had been taken as the most im- said that this was what made them dis- portant principle. Second, now the Soviet With regard to Soviet Union’s request for pleased (or put them in a difficult position, Union and China can sit down to discuss establishing long-wave radio stations in our I can’t remember the exact words). . . . issues equally. Even if they have different country, the Soviet side insists on the origi- Therefore, I believe that some of the Soviet ideas on certain issues, they must consult nal idea that the construction should be jointly leaders have revealed a utilitarian attitude with us. The articles by the Chinese Party are invested by the two sides. They also propose toward Sino-Soviet relations. Consequently, having some impact on the cadres and people to dispatch experts to China in early June to at the last day’s meeting, I decided not to in the Soviet Union, and even on some [So- conduct such activities as selecting the proper raise our requests concerning the abolition viet] leaders. Third, the previous dull situa- location, making investigations and prepar- of the long-term supply and purchase con- tion in which the brotherly parties and states ing for the design work, and drafting an tracts for the Five-Year Plan, the [Soviet] could hardly discuss or argue with one an- agreement. It seems that the Soviet side will experts, and [Soviet] aid and [Sino-Soviet] other no longer exists. Now, different opin- not quickly accept the opinion of our side. In collaboration on nuclear energy and missile ions can be freely exchanged so that unity order not to hinder the investigation and development. About these issues I didn’t and progress are thereby promoted. Fourth, design work, [we] may permit the Soviet say a word. It was not because there wasn’t the majority of the Soviet people love China experts to come to China to conduct some enough time to do so, but because [I wanted and feel happy for the Chinese people’s technical work, leaving the question con- to] avoid impressing upon them that we achievements and growth in strength. Their cerning investment and operation to be solved were taking advantage of their precarious admiration and friendship with the Chinese as the next step. position by raising these issues. These people are being enhanced on a daily basis. issues can be raised later or simply dropped. However, while [Russian] arrogance and self- 5. Remarks, Mao Zedong, concerning the (3) In assessing the international situa- importance have not been completely elimi- Soviet Request on Establishing a Special tion, I am convinced that they spend more nated, an atmosphere lacking discipline and Long-wave Radio Station in China, 7 June time and effort on coping with specific and order is spreading. This time the [Soviet 195831 isolated events than on evaluating and an- leadership] gave us a splendid and grand Source, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 316- ticipating the situations thoroughly from reception which indicated its intention to 317 different angles. They explicitly demon- build a good image in front of its own people strate weakness in considering and discuss- and the peoples all over the world. Fifth, on For the eyes of Liu [Shaoqi], Lin Biao, ing strategic and long-term issues. As far as the one hand, extremely conceited, blinded [Deng] Xiaoping, Zhou [Enlai], Zhu [De], tactics are concerned, on the other hand, by lust for gain, lacking far-sightedness, and Chen [Yun], , and Chen Yi only;32 lacking clearly defined principles, they tend knowing little the ways of the world, some of return to Comrade Peng Dehuai for file: to be on such a loose ground in handling their leaders have hardly improved them- I specific affairs that they will fail to reach selves even with the several rebuffs they This can be implemented as [you have] satisfactorily the strategic goals through re- have met in the past year. On the other hand, planned. China must come up with the solving each specific conflict. As a result, it however, they appear to lack confidence and money to pay for [the financial cost] which is very likely that some worrisome events suffer from inner fears and thus tend to cannot be covered by the Soviet side. may occur in international affairs. For in- employ the tactics of bluffing or threats in stance, this time they conceded to our con- handling foreign affairs or relations with Mao Zedong viction that in today’s world there existed other brotherly parties. Although they did two camps and three forces (socialist, impe- sometimes speak from the bottom of their 7 June rialist, and nationalist) and agreed to our hearts while talking with us, they neverthe- If they try to put heavy pressure on us, analysis. But the communiqué drafted by less could not get down from their high [we] shall not respond and shall let it drag on them included only vague statements about horse. In short, it is absolutely inadvisable for a while, or [we] may respond after the 155 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN central leadership discusses it. This issue obtain [them] simply by sending a cable [to tion. You [Russians] have often stated that must be settled through an agreement be- Moscow]. the Europeans looked down upon the Rus- tween the two governments. Well, your navy’s nuclear sians. I believe that some Russians look Peng [Dehuai] ought to pay attention to are of a [top] secret advanced technology. down upon the Chinese people. the section about the conversation where The Chinese people are careless in handling At the most critical juncture [of the Mao has added some comments. things. If we are provided with them, we Chinese revolution], Stalin did not allow us II might put you to trouble. to carry out our revolution and opposed our China must shoulder the responsibility The Soviet comrades have won victory carrying out the revolution. He made a huge of capital investment for this radio station; for forty years, and are thus rich in experi- mistake on this issue. So did [Grigory Y.] China is duty-bound in this case. [We] may ence. It has only been eight years since our Zinoviev. have to ask for Soviet comrades’ help with victory and we have little experience. You Neither were we pleased with [Anastas] regard to construction and equipment, but therefore raised the question of joint owner- Mikoyan. He flaunted his seniority and all the costs must be priced and paid in cash ship and operation. The issue of ownership treated us as if [we were] his sons. He put on by us. [We] may share its use after it is has long before been dealt with: Lenin pro- airs and looked very arrogant. He assumed constructed, which ought to be determined posed the system of rent and lease which, the greatest airs when he first visited Xibaipo by an agreement between the two govern- however, was targeted at the capitalists. in 194938 and has been like that every time ments. 33 This is China’s position, not purely China has some remnant capitalists, but he came to China. Every time he came, he the position of mine.34 the state is under the leadership of the Com- would urge me to visit Moscow. I asked him munist Party. You never trust the Chinese! what for. He would then say that there was 6. Minutes, Conversation between Mao You only trust the Russians! [To you] the always something for you to do there. Nev- Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 22 July Russians are the first-class [people] whereas ertheless, only until later when Comrade 195835 the Chinese are among the inferior who are Khrushchev proposed to hold a conference Source: Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, 322- dumb and careless. Therefore [you] came to work out a resolution [concerning the 333 up with the joint ownership and operation relationship among all the communist par- proposition. Well, if [you] want joint own- ties and socialist states] did [I go to Mos- After you left yesterday I could not fall ership and operation, how about have them cow].39 asleep, nor did I have dinner. Today I invite all—let us turn into joint ownership and It was our common duty to commemo- you over to talk a bit more so that you can be operation our army, navy, air force, indus- rate the fortieth anniversary of the October [my] doctor: [after talking with you], I might try, agriculture, culture, education. Can we Revolution. Up to that time, as I often be able to eat and sleep this afternoon. You do this? Or, [you] may have all of China’s pointed out, there had existed no such thing are fortunate to have little difficulty in eating more than ten thousand kilometers of coast- as brotherly relations among all the parties and sleeping. line and let us only maintain a guerrilla because, [your leaders] merely paid lip ser- Let us return to the main subject and force. With a few atomic bombs, you think vice and never meant it; as a result, the chat about the issues we discussed yester- you are in a position to control us through relations between [the brotherly] parties can day. We will only talk about these issues asking for the right of rent and lease. Other be described as between father and son or here in this room! There exists no crisis than this, what else [do you have] to justify between cats and mice. I have raised this situation between you and me. Our relation- [your request]? issue in my private meetings with ship can be described as: nine out of ten Lüshun [Port Arthur] and Dalian Khrushchev and other [Soviet] comrades. fingers of yours and ours are quite the same [Darinse] were under your control before. They all admitted that such a father-son with only one finger differing. I have re- You departed from these places later. Why relationship was not of European but Asian peated this point two or three times. You [were these places] under your control? It is style. Present were Bulganin, Mikoyan, and haven’t forgotten, have you? because then China was under the [M. A.] Suslov. Were you also at the meet- I’ve thought over and again of the issues Guomindang’s rule. Why did you volunteer ing? From the Chinese side, I and Deng that were discussed yesterday. It is likely to leave? It is because the Communist Party Xiaoping were present. that I might have misunderstood you, but it had taken control of China. I was unhappy with Mikoyan’s con- is also possible that I was right. We may Because of Stalin’s pressure, the North- gratulation speech which he delivered at our work out a solution after discussion or de- east and Xinjiang became [a Soviet] sphere Eighth National Congress and I deliberately bate. It appears that [we] will have to with- of influence, and four jointly owned and refused to attend that day’s meeting as a draw [our] navy’s request for [obtaining] operated enterprises were established.37 protest. You did not know that many of our nuclear-powered submarines [from the So- Comrade Khrushchev later proposed to have deputies were not happy with [Mikoyan’s viet Union]. Barely remembering this mat- these [settlements] eliminated, and we were speech]. Acting as if he was the father, he ter, I have acquired some information about grateful for that. regarded China as Russia’s son. it only after asking others.36 There are some You [Russians] have never had faith in China has her own revolutionary tradi- warmhearted people at our navy’s head- the Chinese people, and Stalin was among tions, although China’s revolution could not quarters, namely, the Soviet advisers. They the worst. The Chinese [Communists] were have succeeded without the October Revo- asserted that, now that the Soviet nuclear regarded as Tito the Second; [the Chinese lution, nor without Marxism-Leninism. submarines have been developed, we can people] were considered as a backward na- We must learn from the Soviet experi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 156 ences. We will comply with the commonly but it was mainly Stalin’s responsibility. For God’s sake, we fought wars for twenty- accepted principles, especially the nine prin- [We] have had three grievances [against two years; we fought in Korea for three ciples stated in the “Moscow Manifesto.”40 Stalin]. The first concerns the two Wang years! Let [me ask] the Central Military We ought to learn from all the experiences Ming lines. Wang Ming was Stalin’s fol- Commission to prepare some materials con- whether they are correct or erroneous. The lower. The second was [Stalin’s] discour- cerning [our war experiences] and give them erroneous lessons included Stalin’s meta- agement of and opposition to our revolution. to Comrade Yudin, of course, if he is inter- physics and dogmatism. He was not totally Even after the dissolution of the Third Inter- ested. metaphysical because he had acquired some national, he still issued orders claiming that, We did not speak out on some [contro- dialectics in thinking; but a large part of his if we did not strike a peace deal with Jiang versial] issues because we did not want to [thoughts] focused on metaphysics. What Jieshi, China would risk a grave danger of cause problems in the Sino-Soviet relations. you termed as the cult of personality was national elimination.42 Well, for whatever This was particularly true when the Polish one [example of his metaphysics]. Stalin reason, we are not eliminated. The third was Incident broke out. When Poland demanded loved to assume the greatest airs. during my first visit to Moscow during which that all of your specialists go home, Com- Although we support the Soviet Union, Stalin, [V.M.] Molotov, and [Lavrenti] Beria rade Liu Shaoqi suggested in Moscow that we won’t endorse its mistakes. As for [the personally attacked me. you withdraw some. You accepted [Liu’s] differences over] the issue of peaceful evo- Why did I ask Stalin to send a scholar [to suggestion which made the Polish people lution, we have never openly discussed [these China] to read my works?43 Was it because happy because they then tasted some free- differences], nor have we published [them] I so lacked confidence that I would even have dom. At that time we did not raise our in the newspapers. Cautious as we have to have you read my works? Or was it problems with your specialists [in China] been, we choose to exchange different opin- because I had nothing to do myself? Not a because, we believe, it would have caused ions internally. I had discussed them with chance! [My real intention] was to get you you to be suspicious that we took the advan- you before I went to Moscow. While in over to China to see with your own eyes tage [of your crisis situation] to send all the Moscow, [we assigned] Deng Xiaoping to whether China was truly practicing Marxism specialists home. We will not send your raise five [controversial] issues. We won’t or only half-hearted toward Marxism. specialists home; we will not do so even if openly talk about them even in the future, Upon your return [to Moscow] you spoke Poland does so ten more times. We need because our doing so would hurt Comrade highly of us. Your first comment to Stalin Soviet aid. Khrushchev’s [political position]. In order was “the Chinese [comrades] are truly Marx- Once I have persuaded the Polish people to help consolidate his [Khrushchev’s] lead- ists.” Nevertheless Stalin remained doubt- that [we all] should learn from the Soviet ership, we decided not to talk about these ful. Only when [we entered] the Korean War Union, and that after putting the anti-dog- [controversies], although it does not mean did he change his view [about us], and so did matism campaign at rest, [they] ought to that the justice is not on our side. East European and other brotherly parties advocate a “learn from the Soviet Union” With regard to inter-governmental re- drop their doubts [about us]. slogan. Who will benefit in learning from lations, we remain united and unified up to It appears that there are reasons for us to the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union or this date which even our adversaries have be suspect: “First, you opposed Wang Ming; Poland? Of course, it will benefit Poland conceded. We are opposed to any [act] that second, you simply insisted on carrying out more. is harmful to the Soviet Union. We have your revolution regardless of [our] opposi- Although we shall learn from the Soviet objected to all the major criticism that the tion; third, you looked so smart when you Union, we must first of all take into account revisionists and imperialists have massed went all the way to Moscow desiring Stalin our own experiences and mainly rely on our against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union to sign an agreement so that [China] would own experiences. has so far done the same thing [for us]. regain authority over the [Manchurian] rail- There should be some agreed limits on When did the Soviets begin to trust us road.” In Moscow it was [I. V.] Kovalev who the terms of [Soviet] specialists. For in- Chinese? At the time when [we] entered the took care of me with [N. T.] Fedorenko as my stance, there have never been restrictions on Korean War. From then on, the two coun- interpreter. 44 I got so angry that I once your chief advisers in [our] military and tries got closer to one another [than before] pounded on the table. I only had three tasks public security branches, who can come and and as a result, the 156 aid projects came here [in Moscow], I said to them, the first was go without even notifying or consulting with about. When Stalin was alive, the [Soviet] to eat, the second was to sleep, and the third us in advance. Presumably, if you leave aid consisted of 141 projects. Comrade was to shit. your post, is it all right that another ambas- Khrushchev later added a few more.41 There was a [Soviet] adviser in [our] sador be sent [to China] without discussing We have held no secrets from you. who, in discussing war it with us? No, absolutely not! How much Because more than one thousand of your cases, would only allow [the Chinese train- information could your advisers to our min- experts are working in our country, you are ees] to talk about those of the Soviet Union, istry of public security obtain if they merely fully aware of the state of our military, not China’s, would only allow them to talk sit there totally uninformed by their Chinese political, economic, and cultural affairs. We about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army, colleagues? trust your people, because you are from a not [ours] in the Korean War. Let me advise you [and your special- socialist country, and you are sons and Please allow us to talk about these cases! ists] to pay more visits to each of our prov- daughters of Lenin. [Can you imagine] he wouldn’t even allow inces so as to get in touch with the people and Problems have existed in our relations, us to talk about [our own war experiences]! obtain first-hand information. This have I 157 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mentioned to Comrade Yudin many times: Indeed, it was [your] proposition for this regard. if not ten thousand times, at least one thou- establishing a “cooperative” on nuclear sub- Certainly [the arrangements] will be sand times! marines which led to these remarks. Now totally different in war time. Your army can With some exceptions, though, most of that we’ve decided not to build our nuclear operate in our [land], and our army can move the [Soviet] specialists are of a good quality. submarines, we are withdrawing our request to your places to fight. If your army operates We have also made mistakes before: we did [for obtaining submarines from the Soviet on our territory, however, it must be com- not take the initiative to pass on information Union]. Otherwise, we would have to let manded by us. When our army fights in your to the Soviet comrades. Now we must cor- you have the entire coast, much larger areas land, as long as it does not outnumber your rect these mistakes by adopting a more ac- than [what you used to control in] Lüshun army, it has to be directed by you. tive attitude [toward the Soviet comrades]. and Dalian. Either way, however, we will These remarks of mine may not sound Next time [we] ought to introduce to them not get mixed up with you: we must be so pleasing to your ear. You may accuse me China’s general line. If the first time [we] independent from one another. Since we of being an nationalist or another Tito. My fail to get the information through, [we] will will in the end build our own flotilla, it is not counter argument is that you have extended try a second time, third time, and so forth. in our interest that [we] play a minor role in Russian nationalism to China’s coast.

MAO ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: viet treaty of 1950—the very text on which printed below) is as difficult to interpret for Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador the relationship between the two Commu- historians today as it must have been for nist states was built. Moscow Center 35 years ago. 1960 was the Introduction by Odd Arne Westad To Mao, more than to most CCP lead- year when the Sino-Soviet split broke into ers, Khrushchev’s speech was a golden op- the open, first with newspaper polemics in Soviet Ambassador to the People’s Re- portunity not only to restate China’s past and the spring, and then the recall of all Soviet public of China Pavel Yudin’s two conver- present relationship with the Soviet Union, advisory personnel from China in July. sations with Mao on 31 March (printed be- but also to sanction his and the party’s turn Meetings between the two sides had been low) and 2 May 19561, form some of the best to more radical policies since the start of increasingly frosty, even if the compromises evidence we have on the Chairman’s reac- 1955. These policies, including the sweep- reached on some issues during the meeting tion to Khrushchev’s secret speech at the ing collectivization of agriculture which had of Communist parties in Moscow in the fall February 1956 CPSU 20th Congress. The just been completed (of which the Soviets momentarily reduced the intensity of the conversations provide a fascinating insight had been rather critical) and the further steps confrontation. into how Mao Zedong manipulated history in speeding up the revolutionary process Mao had not met Chervonenko earlier and the myth of his own role in the Chinese which Mao contemplated (fueled in part by in the year, but in this meeting he seemed to Communist Party (CCP). They also show a nascent concern about the lack of revolu- be eager to depreciate his own role in Chi- that Mao’s concrete views on the “Stalin tionary fervor within the CCP), could now nese policymaking, and thereby in the re- issue” in the spring of 1956 were much be advanced without too much interference sponsibility for the split. Granted, Mao’s different from those to which the Chinese from Moscow. Since the CPSU had, in description of his political status is not to- party later subscribed. effect, repudiated much of its own past, it tally inaccurate; in the wake of his disastrous In his long monologues to Yudin—with could no longer insist on having a monopoly economic experiments in the late 1950s, he whom he was on personally friendly terms— on theoretical guidance. Mao could—in a had—not of his own free will—taken less Mao gave vent to three decades of frustra- dual sense—liberate himself from Stalin’s part in day-to-day governance than before. tions with Stalin’s China policy—frustra- ghost. But here he overstated his case and he did so tions which up to 1956 he could neither It was not until, first, half a year later, to the Soviet ambassador. In addition, when present fully to the Soviets nor share openly after the Polish and Hungarian events in it came to the Sino-Soviet conflict, we know with his Chinese colleagues. In terms of October-November 1956, that Mao’s con- that Mao had been fully in charge, even CCP history, Mao’s spring 1956 version cern with the political effects of de- during this period. was not radically different from what had Stalinization came to the fore. The disinte- So what was Mao’s purpose? To be- been dogmatically accepted in the party since gration of Communist authority in Eastern have civilly to a well-wisher bringing birth- 1945, with the major exception that Stalin’s Europe frightened the Chinese leaders and day greetings? To give away as little as role had been filled in. In this version, the compelled them to adopt a much more cau- possible about how he really felt about Sino- major “mistakes” which almost destroyed tious attitude to the “Stalin issue,” including Soviet relations? Or to position himself so the party before Mao took the helm were an indirect criticism of the Soviets for hav- that in case his game with real or perceived ascribed not only to the CCP leaders who ing gone too far in their revision of the enemies within his own party went against implemented the policies (Li Lisan, Wang Communist past. (For revealing insights him, he could still play the “Soviet card” to Ming and others), but to Stalin, who had into the causes of Mao’s change of heart, see strengthen his hand? As of yet, we still do inspired and abetted “the mistakes.” Like- Bo Yibo’s and Wu Lengxi’s recent mem- not know. wise, the resistance to Mao’s “correct” lead- oirs.) Translations of the two documents fol- ership since the late 1930s could again be Mao’s conversation with the somewhat low below: traced back to Stalin’s errors, which even startled Soviet ambassador S.V. continued on page 164 influenced the negotiating of the Sino-So- Chervonenko on 26 December 1960 (also COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 158

It was Comrade Khrushchev who had military codes were basically to guide opera- encounter considerable problems; the same eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before tions on flatlands, and as Fujian [province] is true with us: if you undermine our [politi- his death, Stalin demanded the right to build had nothing but mountains, the Soviet codes cal] positions, we will be in trouble. a plant to manufacture canned food in our were not entirely applicable [to Fujian’s re- In wartime, you can utilize all our naval country. My response was that [we] would ality]. Very upset at hearing this, ports, military bases, and other [facilities]. accept [the demand] as long as you provide Petroshevskii immediately responded: “You [In return] our [military] can operate in your us equipment, help us build it, and import all have insulted the great military science in- places including your port or bases at the products [from us]. Comrade vented by the great Stalin!” His remarks Vladivostok and shall return home when Khrushchev praised me for giving [Stalin] a made everyone at the meeting very nervous.) war is over. We may sign an agreement on good answer. But why in the world do [you Some of the above-mentioned [contro- wartime cooperation in advance which does Russians] want to build a naval “coopera- versial] issues have been raised [by us] be- not have to wait until war breaks out. Such tive” now? How would you explain to the fore, some have not. You have greatly aided an agreement must contain a stipulation that rest of the world that you propose to build a us but now we are downplaying your [role]; our [forces] can operate on your territory; naval “cooperative”? How would you ex- you may feel very bad about it. Our relation- even if we might not do so, such a stipulation plain to the Chinese people? For the sake of ship, however, resembles that between pro- is required, because it involves the issue of struggling against the imperialists, you may, fessor and student: the professor may make equality. In peacetime, however, such an as advisers, train the Chinese people. Oth- mistakes, do not you agree that the student arrangement cannot be accepted. In peace- erwise, you would have to lease Lüshun and has to point them out? Pointing out mistakes time, you are only to help us construct [mili- other [ports] for ninety-nine years; but your does not mean that the [student] will drive tary] bases and build armed forces. “cooperative” proposal involves the ques- the professor out. After all the professor is a We would not have accepted [your] tion of ownership, as you propose that each good one. proposition for building a naval “coopera- side will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday You are assisting us to build a navy! tive” even it had been during Stalin’s time. I you made me so enraged that I could not Your [people] can serve as advisers. Why quarreled with him in Moscow! sleep at all last night. They (pointing at would you have to have fifty percent of the Comrade Khrushchev has established other CCP leaders present) are not angry. ownership? This is a political issue. We plan his credibility by having the [previous] “co- Only me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my to build two or three hundred submarines of operative” projects eliminated. Now that sole responsibility. this kind. such an issue involving ownership is raised (Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unani- If you insist on attaching political condi- again, we are reminded of Stalin’s positions. mously agreed upon these points.) tions [to our submarine request], we will not I might be mistaken, but I must express my If we fail to get our messages through satisfy you at all, not even give you a tiny opinion. this time, we may have to arrange another [piece of our] finger. You may inform Com- You explained [to me] yesterday that meeting; if not, we may have to meet every rade Khrushchev that, if [he] still [insists on] [your proposition] was based on the consid- day. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to these conditions, there is no point for us to eration that [Russia’s coastal] conditions Comrade Khrushchev; or we can invite Com- talk about this issue. If he accepts our re- were not as good for nuclear submarines to rade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to quirement, he may come [to Beijing]; if not, function fully as China’s, thus hamstringing clarify every issue. he does not have to come, because there is future development of nuclear submarines. (Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet De- nothing for us to talk about. Even one tiny You can reach [the Pacific] Ocean from fense Minister Malinovsky cabled me re- condition is unacceptable [for us]! Vladivostok through the Kurile Islands. The questing to build a long-wave radio station When this issue is involved, we will condition is very good! along China’s coast to direct the [Soviet] refuse to accept your aid for ten thousand What you said [yesterday] made me submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As years. However, it is still possible for us to very uneasy and displeased. Please report the project will cost a total of 110 million cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 mil- that we would break up. We will, from you must tell him exactly what I have said lion and China will pay 40 million.)45 beginning to the end, support the Soviet without any polishing so as to make him This request is of the same nature as the Union, although we may quarrel with each uneasy. He has criticized Stalin’s [policy] naval “cooperative” proposal which [we] other inside the house. lines but now adopts the same policies as cannot explain to the people. [We] will be While I was in Moscow, I once made it Stalin did. put in a politically disadvantageous position clear to Comrade Khrushchev that you did We will still have controversies. You if [we] reveal these requests to the world. not have to satisfy every one of our requests. do not endorse some of our positions; we (Peng Dehuai: Petroshevskii [a Soviet Because if you hold back your aid from us, cannot accept some of your policies. For military adviser] also has a rude attitude and [you] in effect would compel us to work instance, your [leadership] is not pleased at rough style. He is not very pleased because harder [to be self-reliant]; should we get our policy regarding “internal contradic- some of our principles for army building do everything from you, we will end up in an tions among the people,” and the policy of not completely follow the Soviet military disadvantageous position. “letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hun- codes. Once at an enlarged CMC meeting, It is, however, extremely important for dred schools of thought contend.” when Comrade from the Fujian Mili- us to cooperate politically. Because, if we Stalin endorsed the Wang Ming line, tary District46 pointed out that, as the Soviet undermine your political positions, you will causing the losses of our revolutionary 159 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN strength up to more than ninety percent. At him try his method! As a result, his trial fered severe flood this year thus encounter- the critical junctures [of our revolution], he achieved a remarkable success which has ing a shortage of material supplies, however, wanted to hold us back and opposed our become a first-rate, world-class scientific [we] have to reallocate materials that have revolution. Even after [we] achieved vic- invention. originally been designated for export so as to tory, he remained doubtful about us. At the I have never met with Comrade Xining, meet the needs of our domestic supply and, same time, he boasted that it was because of but I have talked to many cadres who partici- therefore, to reduce our export for next year. the direction of his theories that China’s pated in the construction of the Yangtze In order to maintain the balance between our [revolution] succeeded. [We] must do away Bridge. They all told me that Comrade import and export for the year of 1957, we with any superstition about him. Before I Xining was a very good comrade because he have no other alternatives but to reduce die, I am prepared to write an article on what took part in every part of the work, adopted purchases of foreign goods. As we have Stalin had done to China, which is to be a very pleasant working style, and worked calculated, however, we cannot afford to cut published in one thousand years. very closely with the Chinese comrades. down such items as complete sets of equip- (Yudin: The Soviet central leadership’s When the bridge was built, the Chinese ment and general trade items so as to avoid attitude toward the policies of the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from casting an adverse effect on the ongoing central leadership is: it is completely up to him]. Any of you who knows him person- capital construction. Therefore, we have the Chinese comrades how to resolve the ally please convey my regards to him. decided that our original order worth 890 Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese Please do not create any tensions among million rubles of materials from the USSR comrades who understand the situation best. the specialists regarding the relations be- for 1957 be reduced to that of 426 million Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and tween our two parties and two countries. I rubles. arrogant to judge and assess whether or not never advocate that. Our cooperation has We understand that our reduction of the CCP’s policies are correct, for the CCP covered a large ground and is by far very purchase orders of Soviet military materials is a great party.) satisfactory. You ought to make this point will cause the Soviet Government some prob- Well, [we] can only say that we have clear to your embassy staff members and lems. But [our request for the change] is an been basically correct. I myself have com- your experts so that they will not panic when act against our will. [We] wish that the mitted errors before. Because of my mis- they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criti- Soviet Government will accept our request. takes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which cized [Soviet leaders]. Provided that you accept our request, we examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and I have long before wanted to talk about will dispatch Tang Tianji,49 our representa- two other campaigns.47 I will be very con- some of these issues. However, it has not tive with full authority in military material tent if I am refuted as being basically correct, been appropriate to talk about them because orders, to Moscow for the purpose of con- because such an assessment is close to real- the incidents in Poland and Hungary put ducting negotiations with the Soviet Minis- ity. your [leadership] in political trouble. For try of Foreign Trade. We will also submit a Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will instance, we then did not feel it right to talk detailed list of orders which are reduced and be built is a policy issue: only China is in a about the problem concerning the experts [in verified to the Soviet Economic Office to position to decide whether we should build China]. China soon. We look forward to hearing it with your assistance or it should be “jointly Even Stalin did improve himself: he let from you. owned.” Comrade Khrushchev ought to China and the Soviet Union sign the [alli- come to China [to discuss this issue] because ance] treaty, supported [us] during the Ko- 8. Memo, PRC Foreign Ministry to the I have already visited him [in Moscow]. rean War, and provided [us] with a total of USSR Embassy to Beijing, 13 March 1957 [We] should by no means have blind 141 aid projects. Certainly these achieve- Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, faith in [authorities]. For instance, one of ments did not belong to him but to the entire delo 4, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, your specialists asserted on the basis of a Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we Moscow book written by one [of your] academy schol- do not want to exaggerate Stalin’s mistakes. ars that our coal from [province] The Chinese Government asserts that, cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an Part III. China’s Request for Soviet although generally acceptable, the draft pa- assertion has despaired us: we therefore Military and Material Support48 per on a review of Far Eastern economic would have no coal which can be turned into development, compiled by the [Soviet] Far coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit! 7. Memorandum, Chen Yun to N. A. East Economic Committee has made sev- Comrade Xining [transliteration], a So- Bulganin, 12 December 1956 eral errors on China’s economic develop- viet specialist who helped us build the Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, ment. Yangtze River Bridge [in Wuhan], is a very delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, (1) The sentence that “[China’s] agrar- good comrade. His bridge-building method Moscow ian collectivization has encountered peas- has never been utilized in your country: ants’ opposition,” under the section of [you] never allowed him to try his method, On 30 April 1956, our government pro- “Speedy Advance toward Socialism” (page either to build a big or medium or even small posed to the USSR that [China] would order 1), does not correspond with reality. The sized bridge. When he came here, however, a total of 890 million rubles worth of mili- speed of our country’s agricultural collec- his explanation of his method sounded all tary supplies [from the USSR] for the year of tivization, which has been fully explained right. Since we knew little about it, [we] let 1957. As large areas [of China] have suf- by Liu Shaoqi in his report to the [National] COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 160

People’s Congress, completely refutes such year plan only includes the main part of amount—of technical experts and aides; an assertion. In discussing [China’s] price economic and cultural [entertaining and edu- (5) invite and dispatch on a reciprocal problem, the draft paper deliberately dis- cational] construction, whereas the total of basis experts and delegations for the purpose torts and obliterates our basic achievements [China’s] capital construction during 1953- of on-site inspection, participation in con- which are clearly presented in Li 1956 covers much wider grounds. ferences, delivery of research reports, and Xiannian’s50 report [to the People’s Con- 4. The session on “Development Plans” short-term internships; gress], and instead, exaggerates our isolated notes that the Second Five-Year Plan origi- (6) establish frequent contacts on scien- weakness and mistakes. Given this fact, nally set 98.3% as the [overall] increase tific research and production conditions in therefore, the paper could not help but draw objective, but Premier Zhou [Enlai] in his [each side’s] national defense industry; erroneous conclusions (page 20). report on the Second Five-Year Plan reduces (7) discuss the exchange and provision (2) The draft paper has also made errors this objective to 90.3% (page 23). There is of teaching guides, textbooks, or other mate- merely by comparing our published statis- indeed no reduction of the original increase rials on national defense industry training, tics which are, indeed, to serve different objective. Because the former [figure] ex- or materials necessary to enhance national purposes. There are several such errors: cludes the outputs of individual production defense industry personnel’s techniques and 1. The section titled “Speedy Advance whereas the latter includes the outputs of skills; toward Socialism” mentions that “[China] individual production, thus becoming 90.3%. (8) exchange lessons and experiences plans to raise the percentage of handicrafts Since there are detailed explanations and of employing new machinery, new facili- [as an industry] in the nation’s GNP up to illustrations as to exactly what the above ties, and new technology as well as new 15.3 % in 1956, whereas the First Five-Year mentioned figures cover when these reports applications of research results to weaponry Plan has originally planned to have [the are publicized, there exists no excuse why production; handicrafts] reach 9.4% in 1957” (page 4). such errors have been committed. Other than (9) study the issue of warranties for In actuality, the former [figure] refers to a the above listed mistakes, [the draft paper] technical materiel [one side] provides [the combined output of “handicrafts factories” still contains minor errors which are of no other side] for production; and “handicrafts individuals” while the later significant concern [of ours]. (10) discuss other issues concerning [figure] only reflects the percentage of national defense industry that both sides “handicrafts individuals’ outputs” in GNP. 9. Memo, Embassy of the PRC in Moscow deem necessary. 2. The section on “National Income and to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 14 Decem- During the period when the joint com- Capital Accumulation” asserts that “[China] ber 1957 mission adjourns, the Chinese Government in one way or another exaggerates its [per Source: fond 100 (1957), op. 50, papka 423, will authorize the Second Machinery Minis- capita] increase, given the [Chinese] statis- delo 3, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, try and the Commercial Office of the PRC tics on the nation’s per capita increase from Moscow embassy [in Moscow] to take charge of 1953 to 1956, that is, 1953, 127 yuan, 1954, communications and contacts regarding rou- 137 yuan, 1955, 141 yuan, 1956, 154 yuan. In order to strengthen Sino-Soviet coop- tine affairs and issues of national defense This is because, according to Liu Shaoqi’s eration and close links regarding national industry. Whichever agency [of the Soviet report, the increase of industrial production defense industry, the Chinese Government side] will be in charge [during this period] is during 1953-1956 is no higher than 90.3%, proposes that a joint Sino-Soviet commis- left to the Soviet Government to decide. whereas the above listed figures seem to sion in charge of national defense industry be Before every meeting of the joint com- assume that the increase would be 104%” established which, consisting of several del- mission, each side is to provide the other side (page 5). The 90.3% increase mentioned in egates from each side, is to meet once or with a memorandum containing the agenda Liu Shaoqi’s report covers all industrial twice annually. [and] schedule as well as supplementary increase including modern [heavy] and fac- The joint commission’s major responsi- materials. tory industries, and individual production, bilities include: All minutes and records of the joint while Bo Yibo’s51 reported 104% increase (1) exchange published and unpublished commission’s meetings are to be prepared only refers to the increase of production by books, journals, handbooks, directories, tech- respectively in Chinese and Russian lan- modern [heavy] and factory [machinery] nical criteria, or other materials both sides guages and co-signed by the representatives industries. deem appropriate; of each side’s delegation to the joint com- 3. The section on “National Income and (2) discuss such issues as standardiza- mission. Capital Accumulation” also points out that tion of weaponry, technical conditions, speci- All results of the joint commission’s the total of [China’s] capital construction fications, and national criteria, and com- discussions are to be references for each during 1953-1956 exceeds the five-year monly acceptable differences of weaponry Government which, if deemed necessary, budget’s 42.74 billion yuan by 1%, but State production; will authorize certain agencies for their imple- Planning Commission Chairman Li (3) discuss standardization of [techni- mentation. Fuchun’s52 report [to the People’s Con- cal] specifications, and provide [each other] All costs of organizing the joint gress] only states that [China] will by 1956 with standard products and measuring appa- commission’s meetings will be charged to complete up to 87.6% of the planned capital ratus; the Government where the meeting is held, construction (page 7). In fact, the amount of (4) discuss invitation and engagement— whereas each Government will be respon- capital construction as designed by the five- including procedures, terms limits, and sible for expenditures of its own delegation 161 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN during the meeting. to their advantage. Therefore, China will nals of the United Nations and its special Please consider our above-stated propo- from now on refuse to participate in any organizations. sitions. The Chinese side wishes to know the international organizations or conferences 3. With regard to those international Soviet Government’s response. involving such a situation. China will also conferences already having certain relations consider withdrawing from those interna- with the United Nations or its special orga- 10. Memo, [PRC] Ministry of Foreign tional organizations, such as the Interna- nizations which China considers participat- Affairs to the Soviet Embassy in China, 4 tional Law Association, at an appropriate ing, our policy is as follows: September 1958 moment. a. China will support any resolutions of Source: fond 100 (1958), op. 51, papka 531, For those individuals the conferences which only generally men- delo 5, Russian Foreign Ministry archives, who participate in the international organi- tion the United Nations Charter. China will Moscow zations or conferences which have already not comply with any resolutions of the con- invited Chinese delegates, [we] will decide ferences which have a good deal to do with (1) As China’s influence in the interna- by looking at these [overseas Chinese indi- the United Nations or its special organiza- tional community rises day by day, the US viduals’] attitude toward politics. If they do tions. However, if these resolutions are imperialists’ policy of disregarding the Chi- not act in the name of the Jiang Clique but favorable to world peace and friendly coop- nese people and not recognizing but shutting represent their [residential] countries, [we] eration [among all the nations], China will out the Chinese [Government] from interna- will not treat them as complicating the “two- not oppose. tional life is getting increasingly difficult China” issue. However, [we] must not relax b. China will not attend any sessions [of and losing support of the peoples [all over our vigilance because they might disguise the conferences] which are designated to the world]. In order to extricate itself from their appearance but in effect carry out con- discuss the United Nations or its special such a difficult position as well as to assure spiratorial activities [related to the creation organizations. continuous control of Taiwan, [the US Gov- of “”]. c. China will refuse to attend any ses- ernment] has stepped up the realization of its 3. With regard to the situation in which sions where United Nations representatives “two-China” conspiracy. an international organization which has al- speak in the name of conference advisers or (2) The following is the Chinese ready had the Jiang representatives, or its as key-note speakers; neither will Chinese Government’s counter-measure against the branch organization, invites us to attend [delegates] listen to United Nations repre- [US] “two-China” plot: conferences even if Jiang Clique’s delegates sentatives’ report or presentation. However, 1. With regard to the situation in which are not invited. Such a situation definitely Chinese delegates will be allowed to partici- China’s delegation and Jiang [Jieshi] constitutes a “two-China” reality. More- pate in sessions where United Nations repre- Clique’s “delegation” join the same interna- over, it will leave others with a wrong im- sentatives participate in or give speeches as tional organization or attend the same inter- pression that China is anxious to participate ordinary participants. If UN representatives national conference. Facing this situation, in the activities of those international orga- deliver speeches or remarks to insult or the Chinese side will resolutely demand to nizations. Therefore, China will not be part slander China, Chinese delegates will have have the Jiang Clique elements driven out. If of these organizations or conferences. to refute them right on the spot and then [our request is] rejected, China will not co- (3) Controlled by the United States, the leave. If some Jiang Clique elements are operate with such an organization or confer- United Nations and its Special Organiza- included in the UN delegation, Chinese del- ence and, thus, will have to withdraw with tions have generally retained Jiang’s repre- egates must point out that this ignored China’s no hesitation. In the past year China has sentatives and kept rejecting the restoration interests and then, protest and refuse to par- already done this many times, including of China’s legitimate positions [in these ticipate. withdrawing from the Nineteenth World international organizations]. The following d. No Chinese delegate is authorized to Convention of the Red Cross. [China] has are our counter-measures. express any opinion on whether China will recently decided not to recognize the Inter- 1. China will not dispatch any represen- establish, in some fashion, a consultative national Olympic Committee. From now tatives (either of the Chinese Government or relationship with the United Nations or its on, China will resolutely refuse to partici- of other organizations) to participate in any special organizations. If any international pate in any international organizations or conferences organized by the United Na- conference is to vote on this issue, Chinese conferences which invite or tolerate the par- tions and its Special Organizations. No delegates cannot but abstain from the vot- ticipation of the Jiang Clique’s representa- individual of Chinese citizenship, either as a ing. tives. representative or a staff member of other (4) China asserts that [its] participation 2. With regard to the situation in which international organizations, is permitted to in international conferences and organiza- China’s delegation or individual and Jiang contact or conduct negotiations with the tions is only one way to establish contacts Clique’s individuals participate in the same United Nations and its special organiza- and relations in the international commu- international organization or international tions. nity, which may bring about some results in conference. Such a situation, although in 2. China will not provide the United terms of enhancing China’s visibility and formality constituting no “two-China,” will Nations or its special organizations with any obtaining some information on how certain in effect impress upon the [international] materials or statistics, nor will China en- specific [international] projects progress. community that “two Chinas” co-exist, and dorse that [our] brother countries publish However, no or minimum participation in is very likely to be used by [our] adversaries any materials concerning China in the jour- the international conferences or organiza- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 162 tions will not keep China from developing 10. Bobkoveshi was Yugoslavia’s first ambassador to to visit the Soviet Union from 7 to 11 and 17-19 January vigorously, nor will it prevent the Chinese the PRC, with whom Mao Zedong met for the first time 1957 (the delegation visited Poland and Hungary from on 30 June 1955. January 11 to 17). During the visit, Zhou had five people from getting acquainted or making 11. Chinggis Khan, also spelled Genghis Jenghiz, was formal meetings with Soviet leaders, including Nikolai friends with other nations; no or minimum born about 1167, when the Mongolian-speaking tribes Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Anastas Mikoyan. participation in some international confer- still lacked a common name. He became their great After returning to Beijing, Zhou Enlai prepared this ences or organizations does not mean that organizer and unifier. Before his death in 1227, Chinggis report for Mao Zedong and CCP central leadership, established the basis for a far-flung Eurasian empire by summarizing the discrepancies between the Chinese China adopts a negative or protective atti- conquering its inner zone across . The and Soviet parties. tude toward [international] cultural exchange are remembered for their wanton aggressive- 25. Liu Xiao was Chinese ambassador to the Soviet activities. [In regard to these activities], ness both in Europe and in Asia, and this trait was Union from February 1955 to October 1962. China may take part in other fashions. On certainly present in Chinggis. 26. On 11-16 January 1957, Zhou Enlai visited Poland. 12. The Han nationality is the majority nationality in This trip was arranged after Zhou had decided to visit the other hand, China’s non-participation China, which counts for over 95 percent of the Chinese the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong personally approved may put so much pressure on these confer- population. Zhou’s Poland trip. Mao Zedong sent a telegram to ences or organizations that they will have 13. The “War to Resist America and Assist Korea” Zhou on 4 December 1956 (Zhou was then making a difficulties in organizing activities thus mak- describes China’s participation in the Korean War from formal state visit in India): “The Polish ambassador October 1950 to July 1953. visited us, mentioning that their congress election is ing them discontented with the United States. 14. The five principles were first introduced by Zhou scheduled for 20 January, which will come very soon. As a result, more and more criticism and Enlai while meeting a delegation from India on 31 There exists the danger that the United Workers’ Party condemnation of the “two-China” policy December 1953. These principles—(1) mutual respect might lose the majority support. He hoped that China may be aroused. In short, China remains for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non- would offer help by inviting a Chinese leader to visit aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in international Poland before the election. They hoped to invite Com- willing to cooperate with those international affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful rade Mao Zedong. When we told the ambassador why conferences and organizations which are in coexistence—were later repeatedly claimed by the Chi- it is impossible for Comrade Mao Zedong to make the China’s interests [and] have no intention to nese government as the foundation of the PRC’s foreign trip at this time, and that the Soviet Union had already impair China’s sovereignty. policy. invited you to Moscow, we mentioned that if time 15. China did not establish diplomatic relations with allows and if you agree, perhaps you can make the trip. [We are certain] that, as long as we Yugoslavia until January 1955, although the Yugosla- Now the struggle in Poland has changed into one have the Soviet-led socialist countries’ sup- vian government recognized the PRC as early as 5 between the United Workers’ Party and other parties port, our just cause of smashing America’s October 1949, four days after the PRC’s establishment. (with bourgeoisie character) over attracting votes from “two-China” conspiracy will achieve a com- 16. P. F. Yudin (1899-1968), a prominent philosopher the workers and peasants. This is a good phenomenon. and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet But if the United Workers’ Party loses control, it would plete success. Communist Party from 1952 to 1961, was Soviet am- be disadvantageous [to the socialist camp]. Therefore, bassador to China from 1953 to 1959. we believe that it is necessary for you to make a trip to 17. “On Ten Relationships” was one of Mao’s major Poland (the Polish ambassador also believes that this is works in the 1950s. He discussed the relationship be- a good idea). What is your opinion? If you are going, the 1. The content of this conversation suggests that it tween industry and agriculture and heavy industry and trip should be made between 15 and 20 January, and it occurred between 15 and 28 September 1956, when the light industry, between coastal industry and industry in is better to make it before 15 January. If so, you should CCP’s Eighth National Congress was in session. the interior, between economic construction and na- visit Moscow between 5 and 10 January, which will 2. This refers to the Information Bureau of Communist tional defense, between the state, the unit of production, allow you to have four to five days to have the Sino- and Workers’ Parties (), which was estab- and individual producers, between the center and the Soviet meetings, issuing a communiqué. Then you can lished in September 1947 by the parties of the Soviet regions, between the Han nationality and the minority travel to Poland to hold Sino-Polish meeting and also Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, France, nationalities, between party and non-party, between issue a communiqué, thus offering them some help.” Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The Bureau revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, between right (Shi Zhongquan, Zhou Enlai de zhuoyeu fengxian, 299- announced that it was ending its activities in April and wrong, and between China and other countries. For 300). 1956. an English translation of one version of the article, see 27. Wladyslaw Gomulka was the leader of the Polish 3. Wang Ming (1904-1974), also known as Chen Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People Communist regime. Shaoyu, was a returnee from the Soviet Union and a (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 61-83. 28. This refers to the “Declaration on Developing and leading member of the Chinese Communist Party in the 18. Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were all Further Strengthening the Friendship and Cooperation 1930s. Official Chinese Communist view claims that leading members of the Chinese Communist Party. At between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Coun- Wang Ming committed “ultra-leftist” mistakes in the the Party’s Eighth Congress in September 1956, Liu and tries” issued by the Soviet government on the evening early 1930s and “ultra-rightist” mistakes in the late Zhou were elected the Party’s vice chairmen, and Deng of 30 October 1956. As a response to the Hungarian 1930s. the Party’s general secretary. crisis, the Soviet Union reviewed in the declaration its 4. The white areas were Guomindang-controlled areas. 19. This was part of Mao Zedong’s speech to a confer- relations with other communist countries and promised 5. Liu Shaoqi was vice chairman of the CCP Central ence attended by CC provincial, regional, and municipal that it would adopt a pattern of more equal exchanges Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee secretaries. with them in the future. of the People’s National Congress. He was China’s 20. China adopted the first five-year plan in 1953. So, 29. This article was based on the discussions of the CCP second most important leader. the year of completing the third five-year plan would be Politburo and published in the name of the editorial 6. The Chinese Communist party’s eighth national 1968. board of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) on 29 Decem- congress was held in Beijing on 15-27 September 21. The elimination of the “four pests” (rats, bedbugs, ber 1956. 1956. flies, and mosquitoes) became the main goal of a na- 30. Peng Dehuai, China’s minister of defense, submit- 7. Georgii Dimitrov (1882-1949), a Bulgarian commu- tional hygiene campaign in China during the mid- and ted this report in the context of the emerging dispute nist, was the Comintern’s secretary general from 1935 late 1950s. between Beijing and Moscow over the issue of estab- to 1943. 22. “Democratic figures” is a term used by Mao and the lishing a special long-wave radio station in China. On 8. Mao here pointed to the period from 1931 to 1935, Chinese Communists to point to non-communists or 18 April 1958, Radion Malinovsky, the Soviet Union’s during which the “international section,” of which communist sympathizers in China. defense minister, wrote a letter to Peng Dehuai: Wang Ming was a leading member, controlled the 23. This refers to Zhou Enlai’s visit to the Soviet Union, In order to command the Soviet Union’s sub- central leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Poland, and Hungary on 7-19 January 1957. For Zhou marines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high 9. Zhu De was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Enlai’s report on the visit, see the next document. command urgently hopes that between 1958 Committee and vice chairman of the PRC. 24. Zhou Enlai led a Chinese governmental delegation and 1962 China and the Soviet Union will 163 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

jointly construct a high-power long-wave ra- assistance? Or [do you mean] that we should jointly 52. Li Fuchun was then a member of CCP Politburo and dio transmission center and a long-wave radio create [the flotilla], otherwise you will not offer any China’s vice premier, chairman of State Planning Com- receiving station specially designed for long assistance?” Mao emphasized that he was not interested mission. distance communication. In terms of the fund in creating a Sino-Soviet “military cooperative.” that is needed for the construction of the two (Source: Han Nianlong et al. Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, stations, the Soviet Union will cover the larger 113-114.) The next day, Mao discussed the proposal portion (70%), and China will cover the smaller with Yudin at length. Zhang Shu Guang is associate professor at portion (30%). 36. Mao referred to Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai who the University of Maryland at College Park The leaders in Beijing immediately considered this a were present during this discussion. and author, most recently, of Mao’s Military matter related to China’s sovereignty and integrity. 37. In March 1950 and July 1951, the Chinese and Romanticism: China and the Korean War, Therefore, they wanted to pay all the expenses and to Soviet government signed four agreements, establish- have exclusive ownership over the stations. (Source: ing a civil aviation company, an oil company, a non- 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao [Con- ferrous and rare metal company, and a shipbuilding of Kansas, 1995); Chen Jian is associate temporary Chinese Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese So- company jointly owned by the two countries. professor of history at Southern Illinois cial Science Press, 1989), 112-113.) 38. Xibaipo was tiny village in Hebei Province where University at Carbondale and author of 31. Mao Zedong made these remarks on Peng Dehuai’s the Chinese Communist Party maintained headquarters report of 5 June 1958. See the previous document. from mid 1948 to early 1949. Dispatched by Stalin, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Mak- 32. Lin Biao was then a newly elected vice chairman of Mikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo from 31 January to 7 ing of the Sino-American Confrontation the CCP Central Committee and China’s vice premier; February 1949 and held extensive meetings with Mao (New York: Columbia University Press, Chen Yun was then vice chairman of the CCP Central Zedong and other CCP leaders. For a Chinese account 1994). Committee, and China’s vice premier in charge of of Mikoyan’s visit, see Shi Zhe (trans. Chen Jian), financial and economic affairs; Peng Zhen was a mem- “With Mao and Stalin: The Reminiscences of a Chinese ber of the CCP Politburo and mayor of Beijing; Chen Yi Interpreter,” Chinese Historians 5:1 (Spring 1992), 45- was a member of the CCP Politburo, China’s vice 56. For a Russian account of the visit, see Andrei premier, and newly appointed foreign minister (starting Ledovsky, “Mikoyan’s Secret Mission to China in in February 1958). January and February 1949,” Far Eastern Affairs (Mos- 33. Words in italics were added by Mao. cow) 2 (1995) 72-94. It is interesting and important to 34. Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, Peng Dehuai note that the Chinese and Russian accounts of this visit sent to Malinovsky the following response on 12 June are in accord. 1958: “The Chinese government agrees to the construc- 39. Mao Zedong attended the of tion of high-power long-wave radio stations, and wel- leaders of communist and workers’ parties from social- comes the technological assistance from the Soviet ist countries in November 1957, on the occasion of the Union. However, China will cover all expenses, and the 40th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet 40. The “Moscow Manifesto” was adopted by the Union after the completion of their construction. There- Moscow conference of leaders of communist and work- fore, it is necessary for the governments of the two ers’ parties from socialist countries in November 1957. countries to sign an agreement on the project.” On 11 41. The 156 aid projects were mainly designed for July 1958, the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement China’s first five-year plan, focusing on energy devel- to construct long-wave radio stations. The Soviets did opment, heavy industry and defense industry. not understand the nature of Beijing’s concern over 42. Here Mao referred to two of Stalin’s telegrams to the having exclusive ownership of the station, and the draft CCP leadership around 20-22 August 1945, in which insisted that the stations should be constructed and Stalin urged the CCP to negotiate a peace with the jointly managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Guomindang, warning that failing to do so could cause Chinese responded with several suggestions for revi- “the danger of national elimination.” sion: China would take the responsibility for construct- 43. Mao referred to his request to Stalin in 1950 to ing the station and its ownership belongs to China; dispatch a philosopher to China to help edit Mao’s China will purchase the equipment it cannot produce works. Stalin then sent Yudin to China, who, before from the Soviet Union, and will invite Soviet experts to becoming Soviet ambassador to China, was in China help construct the station; after the station’s comple- from July 1950 to January 1951 and July to October tion, it will be jointly used by China and the Soviet 1951, participating in the editing and translation of Mao Union. Zedong’s works. 35. Mao Zedong held this conversation with Yudin in 44. I. V. Kovalev, Stalin’s representative to China from the context of the emerging dispute between Beijing 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the and Moscow on establishing a Chinese-Soviet joint Soviet Union in December 1949-February 1950; N. T. submarine flotilla. Allegedly, in 1957-1958, Soviet Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s military and naval advisors in China repeatedly made served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy suggestions to the Chinese that they should purchase in Beijing. new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On 28 45. See note 30. June 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting 46. Ye Fei commanded the Fujian Military District. that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance 47. Mao commanded these military operations during for China’s naval buildup, especially the designs for the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934. new-type submarines. On 21 July 1958, Yudin called 48. Documents in this group are found in Russian on Mao Zedong. Invoking Khrushchev’s name, Yudin Foreign Ministry archives. The originals are in Chi- told Mao that the geography of the Soviet Union made nese. it difficult for it to take full advantage of the new-type 49. Tang Tianji was deputy director of the People’s submarines. Because China had a long coastline and Liberation Army’s General Logistics Department. good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China 50. was a member of CCP Politburo and and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flo- China’s vice premier and finance minister. tilla. Mao Zedong made the following response: “First, 51. Bo Yibo was then alternate member of CCP Polit- we should make clear the guiding principle.[Do you buro and China’s vice premier, chairman of National mean that] we should create [the flotilla] with your Economic Commission. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 164

MAO’S CONVERSATIONS the to the Guomintang, having ample, a deviation, that in the Soviet regions continued from page 157 viewed it as a united front of the revolution- of China which were blockaded by the ary forces of China. Stalin said that it is Guomintang even the petty trading bour- Document I: necessary to depend on the Guomintang, to geoisie was liquidated and all kinds of inter- Mao’s Conversation with Yudin, follow after that party, i.e. he spoke directly nal trade was stopped. As a result of this 31 March 1956 about the subordination of the Communist policy the Chinese Red Army, which in Party of China to the Guomintang. This was 1929 was comprised of 300,000 fighters, From the Journal of Top Secret a great mistake which had held back the was reduced by 1934-35 to 25,000, and the P.F. Yudin Copy No. 1 independent work of the Communist Party of territory which made up the Soviet regions “5” April 1956 China on the mobilization of the masses and of China was reduced by 99%. CPC organi- No. 289 on attracting them to the side of the Commu- zations in the cities were routed by the nist Party. Guomintang and the number of Commu- Through the Comintern, Mao Zedong nists was reduced from 300,000 to 26,000 RECORD OF CONVERSATION continued, Stalin, having become after the people. The Soviet regions were totally with Comrade Mao Zedong death of V.I. Lenin the de facto leader of the isolated from the remaining part of the coun- Comintern, gave to the CC CPC a great try and remained without any products, even 31 March 1956 number of incorrect directives. These mis- without salt. All this caused serious discon- taken and incorrect directives resulted from tent among the population of the Soviet Today I visited Mao Zedong and gave the fact that Stalin did not take into account regions. him Comrade Khrushchev’s letter about the the opinion of the CPC. At that time Van As a result of the ultra-leftist policy of assistance which the Soviet Union will pro- Minh, being a Comintern worker, met fre- Van Minh, the more or less large regions vide: 1) in the construction of 51 enterprises quently with Stalin and tendentiously had which remained under CPC leadership were and 3 scientific research institutes for mili- informed him about the situation in the CPC. mostly in (the provinces of tary industry, 2) in the construction of a Stalin, evidently, considered Van Minh the Shaanxi, Gansu, ), to which Van railroad line from Urumqi to the Soviet- single exponent of the opinion of the CC Minh’s power did not extend. Van Minh, Chinese border. Mao Zedong asked me to CPC. backed by the Comintern, essentially man- send his deep gratitude to the CC CPSU and Van Minh and Li Lisan, who repre- aged it so that the 8th and 4th armies re- the Soviet government. sented the CPC in the Comintern, tried to moved themselves from subordination to Further I said that I had wanted to visit concentrate the whole leadership of the CPC the CC CPC. him (Mao Zedong) in the very first days in their own hands. They tried to present all Van Minh and his successors saw the following my return to Beijing and to tell the Communists who criticized the mistakes Guomintang as the “young power,” which about the work of the 20th Congress of the of Van Minh and Li Lisan as opportunists. absorbs all the best and will be able to gain CPSU and, in particular, about Comrade Mao Zedong said, they called me a right a victory over Japan. They spoke against the Khrushchev’s speech at the closed session opportunist and a narrow empiricist. As an independent and autonomous policy of the regarding the cult of personality. Mao example of how the Comintern acted incor- Communist Party in the united front, and Zedong responded that because of his ill- rectly in relation to the Communist Party of against the strengthening of the armed forces ness he had found it necessary to put off the China, Mao Zedong introduced the follow- of the CPC and revolutionary bases, against meeting with me. Mao Zedong said that the ing. the unification of all strata of the population members of the CPC delegation who had Under the pretext that the Third Plenum around the policy of the CPC. Van Minh’s attended the 20th Congress had told him of the CC CPC, while considering the coup- supporters tried to replace the genuinely something about the work of the Congress plotting errors of Li Lisan, had not carried the revolutionary program of the CPC, which and had brought one copy of Comrade successive criticism of these mistakes to its consisted of 10 points, with their own six- Khrushchev’s speech regarding the cult of conclusion and allegedly so as to correct the point program, the author of which was Van personality. That speech has already been mistakes of the Third Plenum of the CC CPC, Minh, although this was, in the essence of translated into Chinese and he had managed the Comintern after 3-4 months had sent to the matter, a capitulationist program. In to become acquainted with it. China two of its own workers - [Pavel] Mif conducting this whole program Van Minh, During a conversation about I.V. and Van Minh - charged with the task of backed by the Comintern and in Stalin’s Stalin’s mistakes Mao Zedong noted that conducting the Fouth Plenum of the CPC. name, spoke as the main authority. Stalin’s line on the China question, though Nonetheless the decisions of the Fourth Ple- Van Minh’s supporters, taking advan- it had basically been correct, in certain peri- num of the CC CPC made under the pressure tage of the fact that they had captured a ods he, Stalin, had made serious mistakes. of Mif and Van Minh, were in fact more majority in the Southern bureau of the CC In his speeches in 1926 Stalin had exagger- ultra-leftist that Li Lisan’s line. In them it CPC in Wuhan, gave incorrect directives to ated the revolutionary capabilities of the was stated that it is necessary to move into the army and to the local authorities. So, for Guomintang, had spoken about the the large cities, to take control of them, and example, once, to our surprise, said Mao Guomintang as the main revolutionary force not to conduct the struggle in rural regions. Zedong, even in Yanan the slogans of the in China. In 1926 Stalin had given the In the decisions of the Fourth Plenum of the CPC which were posted on the walls of the Chinese Communists an instruction about CC CPC there was permitted such, for ex- houses were replaced, on Van Minh’s order, 165 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN with slogans “about a stable union with the continued to believe more in the power of people asked us whether a treaty of the Guomintang,” etc. the Guomintang than of the Communist USSR with the new China will be signed, As a result of the serious ideological Party. In 1945 he insisted on peace with why until now legally there continues to struggle and the great explanatory work fol- Jiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] support- exist a treaty with the supporters of the lowing the 7th Congress of the Communist ers, on a united front with the Guomintang Guomintang, etc. The issue of the treaty was Party, especially in the last four years, the and the creation in China of a “democratic an extremely important matter for us, which majority of Communists who made left or republic.” In particular, in 1945 the CC CPC determined the possibilities for the further right errors acknowledged their guilt. Van received a secret telegram, for some reason development of the PRC. At the first con- Minh at the 7th Congress also wrote a letter in the name of the “RCP(b)” (in fact from versation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I with acknowledgement of his mistakes, how- Stalin), in which it was insisted that Mao brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along ever he then once again returned to his old Zedong travel to Chuntsin for negotiations government lines, but Stalin declined to an- positions. All of the former activity of Van with Jiang Jieshi. The CC CPC was against swer. During the second conversation I Minh, Mao Zedong said, which was carried this journey, since a provocation from Jiang returned once again to that issue, showing out under the direct leadership of the Jieshi’s side was expected. However, said Stalin a telegram from the CC CPC with the Comintern and Stalin, inflicted a serious Mao Zedong, I was required to go since same type of proposal about a treaty. I loss to the Chinese revolution. Stalin had insisted on this. In 1947, when the proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow Characterizing the Comintern’s activ- armed struggle against the forces of Jiang to sign the treaty, since he is the Minister of ity overall, Mao Zedong noted that while Jieshi was at its height, when our forces were Foreign Affairs. Stalin used this suggestion Lenin was alive he had played the most on the brink of victory, Stalin insisted that as a pretext for refusal and said that “it is prominent role in bringing together the forces peace be made with Jiang Jieshi, since he inconvenient to act in this way, since the of the Communist movement, in the creation doubted the forces of the Chinese revolu- bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chi- and consolidation of the Communist parties tion. This lack of belief remained in Stalin nese government is located in Moscow.” in various countries, in the fight with the even during the first stages of the formation Subsequently, Stalin refrained from any opportunists from the Second International. of the PRC, i.e. already after the victory of meetings with me. From my side there was But that had been a short period in the the revolution. It is possible that Stalin’s an attempt to phone him in his apartment, but activity of the Comintern. Consequently, to lack of trust and suspiciousness were caused they responded to me that Stalin is not home, the Comintern came “officials” like Zinoviev, by the Yugoslavian events, particularly since and recommended that I meet with [A.I.] Bukharin, Piatnitskii and others, who as far at that time, said Mao Zedong with a certain Mikoyan. All this offended me, Mao Zedong as China was concerned, trusted Van Minh disappointment, many conversations took said, and I decided to undertake nothing more than the CC CPC. In the last period of place to the effect that the Chinese Commu- further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then the Comintern’s work, especially when nist Party was going along the Yugoslav an unpleasant conversation took place with Dimitrov worked there, certain movements path, that Mao Zedong is a “Chinese Tito.” [I.V.] Kovalev and [N.T.] Fedorenko, who were noticed, since Dimitrov depended on I told Mao Zedong that there were no such proposed that I go on an excursion around us and trusted the CC CPC, rather than Van moods and conversations in our Party. the country. I sharply rejected this proposal Minh. However, in this period as well, not The bourgeois press around the world, and responded that I prefer “to sleep through just a few mistakes were made by the continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right it at the dacha.” Comintern, for example, the dissolution of socialists, had taken up the version of Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, the Polish Communist Party and others. In “China’s third way,” and extolled it. At that they handed me a draft of my interview for this way, said Mao Zedong, it is possible to time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, publication which had been signed by Stalin. discern three periods in the activity of the did not believe us, while the bourgoisie and In this document it was reported that nego- Comintern, of which the second, longest laborites sustained the illusion of the tiations are being held in Moscow on con- period, brought the biggest loss to the Chi- “Yugoslav path of China,” and only Jiang cluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This al- nese revolution. Moreover, unfortunately, Jieshi alone “defended” Mao Zedong, shriek- ready was a significant step forward. It is precisely in this period the Comintern dealt ing that the capitalist powers should not in possible that in Stalin’s change of position, most of all with the East. We can say any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the directly, commented Mao Zedong, that the “he will not turn from his path,” etc. This Indians and the English, who had recog- defeat of the Chinese revolution at that time behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, nized the PRC in January 1950. Negotia- was, right along with other reasons, also the since he knows us too well, he more than tions began right after this, in which result of the incorrect, mistaken actions of once had to stand in confrontation to us and Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, the Comintern. Therefore, speaking openly, to fight with us. Kaganovich and Beria took part. During the noted Mao Zedong, we were satisfied when The distrust of Stalin to the CPC, Mao negotiations, at Stalin’s initiative there was we found out about the dissolution of the Zedong continued further, was apparent also undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union Comintern. during the time of Mao Zedong’s visit to the to assume sole ownership of the Chinese In the last period, continued Mao Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway. Subse- Zedong, Stalin also incorrectly evaluated trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a quently, however, a decision was made about the situation in China and the possibilities Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, coop- the joint exploitation of the Chinese for the development of the revolution. He eration and mutual assistance. The Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) Railway, besides COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 166 which the PRC gave the USSR the naval complete a trip around the whole country. In to the union of the working class and the base in Port Arthur, and four joint stock relation to this I told Mao Zedong about a peasantry. Mao Zedong observed that this companies were opened in China. At Stalin’s conversation which I had with Stalin, in the group of mistakes, in particular, the incor- initiative, said Mao Zedong, Manchuria and presence of several members of the Polit- rect policy in relation to the peasantry, was Xinjiang were practically turned into spheres buro, upon my return from the trip to China. discussed during Comrade Khrushchev’s of influence of the USSR. Stalin insisted on Stalin at that time asked me whether the conversation with [PRC military leader] Zhu the fact that in these regions only Chinese ruling Chinese comrades are Marxists. Hav- De in Moscow; people and Soviet citizens be permitted to ing heard my affirming response, Stalin said, 4. Mistakes in the nationality question live. Representatives of other foreign states, “That’s good! We can be calm. They’ve connected to the unlawful resettlement of including Czechs, Polish people, and En- grown up themselves, without our help.” certain nationalities and others. However, glishmen who were living permanently in Mao Zedong noted that in the very pos- overall, said Mao Zedong, nationality policy those regions should be evicted from there. ing of this question Stalin’s distrust of the was implemented correctly; The only ones whom Stalin skipped over Chinese Communists was also made appar- 5. Rejection of the principle of collec- through his silence were Koreans, of whom ent. tive leadership, conceit and surrounding him- there are counted one and a half million in Important things which, evidently, to self with toadies; Manchuria. These types of pretensions from some extent strengthened Stalin’s belief in 6. Dictatorial methods and leadership Stalin’s side, said Mao Zedong, were in- the CPC, were your (Yudin’s) report about style; comprehensible to us. All this also was the journey to China and the Korean War- 7. Serious mistakes in foreign policy fodder for the bourgeois press and represen- performance of the Chinese people’s volun- (Yugoslavia, etc.). tatives of capitalist states. In fact, continued teers. Mao Zedong further stressed a thought Mao Zedong, in the course of the negotia- In such a way, said Mao Zedong, if we to the effect that overall in the Communist tions around this treaty, there was the most look historically at the development of the movement great victories were won. The genuine trading going on. It was an unat- Chinese revolution and at Stalin’s attitude to single fact of the growth of the Socialist tractive way to pose the issue, in which it, then it is is possible to see that serious camp from 200 million people to 900 mil- Stalin’s distrust and suspicion of the CPC mistakes were made, which were especially lion people speaks for itself. However, in was brightly expressed. widespread during the time of the the course of successful forward advance in We are glad to note, said Mao Zedong, Comintern’s work. After 1945, during the some certain countries, in some certain par- that the Chinese Changchun (i.e. Harbin) period of the struggle with Jiang Jieshi, be- ties these or other mistakes arose. Mistakes Railway and Port Arthur have been returned cause of the overestimation of the forces of similar to these and others, he said, can arise to China, and the joint stock companies the Guomintang and the underestimation of in the future too. I observed that it would be have ceased to exist. In this part of the the forces of the Chinese revolution, Stalin better not to repeat mistakes like Stalin’s. To conversation Mao Zedong stressed that undertook attempts at pacification, at re- this, Mao Zedong answered that, evidently, Khrushchev did not attend these negotia- straining the development of the revolution- there will be these types of mistakes again. tions, and that Bulganin’s participation in ary events. And even after the victory of the The appearance of these mistakes are en- them was minimal. Stalin’s distrust of the revolution Stalin continued to express mis- tirely explicable from the point of view of CPC was apparent in a number of other trust of the Chinese Communists. Despite all dialectical materialism, since it is well known issues, including Kovalev’s notorious docu- that, said Mao Zedong, we have stood firmly that society develops through a struggle of ment about anti-Soviet moods in the leader- behind the revolutionary positions, for if we contradictions, the fight of the old with the ship of the CPC. Stalin, in passing this had permitted vascillations and indecisive- new, the new-born with the obsolete. In our document to the CC CPC, wanted, evi- ness, then, no doubt, long ago we would not consciousness, said Mao Zedong, there are dently, to stress his mistrust and suspicions. have been among the living. still too many vestiges of the past. It lags Over the course of the time I spent in Then Mao Zedong moved on to a gen- behind the constantly developing material Moscow, said Mao Zedong, I felt that dis- eral evaluation of Stalin’s role. He noted that world, behind everyday life. trust of us even more strongly and there I Stalin, without a doubt, is a great Marxist, a In our countries, continued Mao Zedong, asked that a Marxist-representative of the good and honest revolutionary. However, in much has come from the former, capitalist CC CPSU be sent to China in order to his great work in the course of a long period society. Take, for example, the issue of the become acquainted with the true situation in of time he made a number of great and application of corporal punishments to the China and to get to know the works of the serious mistakes, the primary ones of which accused. For China too, this is not a new Chinese theoreticians, and simultaneously were listed in Khrushchev’s speech. These issue. Even in 1930 in the Red Army during to examine the works of Mao Zedong, since fundamental mistakes, said Mao Zedong, interrogations beatings were broadly applied. these works in the Chinese edition were not could be summed up in seven points: I, said Mao Zedong, at that time personally reviewed by the author in advance, while 1. Unlawful repressions; was a witness to how they beat up the ac- the Soviet comrades, counter to the wish of 2. Mistakes made in the course of the cused. Already at that time a corresponding the author, insisted on their publication. war, moreover, in particular in the begin- decision was made regarding a ban on cor- Mao Zedong reminded me that upon ning, rather than in the concluding period of poral punishment. However, this decision my (Yudin’s) arrival in China he had persis- the war; was violated, and in Yanan, it is true, we tently and specially recommended to me to 3. Mistakes which dealt a serious blow tried not to allow unlawful executions. With 167 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the creation of the PRC we undertook a this topic and getting greatly carried away further struggle with this ugly manifesta- briefly touched on a few philosophical ques- AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO THE tion. It is entirely evident, continued Mao tions (about the struggle of materialism with PRC P. YUDIN Zedong, that according to the logic of things idealism, etc.). In particular he stressed that during a beating the one who is being beaten it is incorrect to imagine to oneself Commu- [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian begins to give false testimony, while the one nist society as a society which is free from Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, who is conducting the interrogation accepts any sort of contradictions, from ideological papka 410, delo 9, listy 87-98; also Center that testimony as truth. This and other ves- struggle, from any sort of vestiges of the for Storage of Contemporary Documenta- tiges which have come to us from the bour- past. In a Communist society too, said Mao tion (TsKhSD), fond 5, opis 30, delo 163, geois past, will still for a long time be pre- Zedong, there will be good and bad people. listy 88-99; see also Problemi Dalnego served in the consciousness of people. A Further he said that the ideological work of Vostok 5 (1994), 101-110. Translation for striving for pomposity, for ostentatiousness, China still to a significant extent suffers CWIHP by Mark Doctoroff, National Secu- for broad anniversary celebrations, this is from a spirit of puffery [nachetnichestva] rity Archive] also a vestige of the psychology of bour- and cliches. The Chinese press, in particu- geois man, since such customs and such lar, still cannot answer to the demands which * * * * * psychology objectively could not arise are presented to it. On the pages of the among the poorest peasantry and the work- newspapers the struggle of opinions is lack- Document II: ing class. The presence of these and other ing, there are no serious theoretical discus- Mao’s Conversation with Chervonenko, circumstances, said Mao Zedong, creates sions. Because of insufficient time Mao 26 December 1960 the conditions for the arising of those or Zedong expressed a wish to meet with me other mistakes with which the Communist again to talk a little specifically about issues From the diary of TOP SECRET parties will have to deal. of philosophy. S. V. CHERVONENKO Copy No.3 I observed that the main reason for At the end of the discussion I inquired of Stalin’s mistakes was the cult of personality, Mao Zedong whether he had become ac- bordering on deification. quainted with the Pravda editorial about the “6” January 1961 Mao Zedong, having agreed with me, harm of the cult of personality, a translation Outgoing No. 9 noted that Stalin’s mistakes accumulated of which was placed in [Renmin Ribao] on gradually, from small ones growing to huge 30 March. He responded that he still had not RECORD OF CONVERSATION ones. To crown all this, he did not acknowl- managed to read through that article, but with comrade Mao Zedong edge his own mistakes, although it is well they had told him that it is a very good known that it is characteristic of a person to article. Now, said Mao Zedong, we are 26 December 1960 make mistakes. Mao Zedong told how, preparing for publication in Renmin Ribao a reviewing Lenin’s manuscripts, he had be- lead article which is dedicated to this issue, According to the instructions of the come convinced of the fact that even Lenin which should appear in the newspapers in Center I visited Mao Zedong today. crossed out and re-wrote some phrases or the coming week. Beginning on 16 March, In the name of the CPSU CC and com- other in his own works. In conclusion to his he noted jokingly, all the newspapers in the rade N.S. Khrushchev personally, I con- characterization of Stalin, Mao Zedong once world raised a ruckus about this issue— gratulated Mao Zedong with his 67th birth- again stressed that Stalin had made mistakes China alone for the time being is silent. day and wished him good health, long life not in everything, but on some certain is- Then I briefly told Mao Zedong about and fruitful work. sues. the arrival in the PRC of 16 prominent So- Mao Zedong was very impressed by this Overall, he stressed that the materials viet scholars and about the beginning of the warm attention from the CPSU CC and from the Congress made a strong impression work of a theoretical conference dedicated comrade N.S. Khrushchev. He was deeply on him. The spirit of criticism and self- to the 20th Congress, which is opening today moved, and, without concealing his emo- criticism and the atmosphere which was in the Club of Soviet specialists. Soviet and tions, he most warmly expressed his thanks created after the Congress will help us, he Chinese scholars will deliver speeches at the for the friendly congratulations and wishes. said, to express our thoughts more freely on conference. Mao Zedong stated that it is a great honor for a range of issues. It is good that the CPSU Mao Zedong listened to these thoughts him to receive these high congratulations on has posed all these issues. For us, said Mao with great interest. his birthday. He asked to give his warmest Zedong, it would be difficult to take the The conversation continued for three thanks to comrade N.S. Khrushchev and initiative on this matter. hours. Mao Zedong was in a good mood, wished him, personally, as well as all the Mao Zedong declared that he proposes and joked often. members of the CPSU CC Presidium, good to continue in the future the exchange of The Deputy Head of the Adminstration health and big fruitful successes in their opinions on these issues during Comrade of Affairs of the CPC Yang Shankun, the work. Mikoyan’s visit, and also at a convenient Chief of the CC CPC Translation Bureau Shi Then, on Mao Zedong’s initiative, we time with Comrades Khrushchev and Zhe and Counselor of the USSR Embassy in had a conversation. He told me that the Bulganin. the PRC Skvortsov, T.F. attended the con- Chinese leaders have to work a lot now. “As Then Mao Zedong got distracted from versation. for myself - he mentioned - I am now work- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 168 ing much less than before. Though - Mao (before they are adopted) of the most impor- instructions on this question to the prov- Zedong went on - I mostly work 8 hours a tant party and state conferences and meet- inces. day (sometimes more), the productivity is ings. Then he told me that the CPC CC Ple- not the same as it used to be. His compre- Mao Zedong agreed with my statement, num will take place in January 1961 (the last hension of the material studied is less effec- that in spite of a certain redistribution of Plenum was in April 1960), where the CPC tive, and the necessity arose [for him] to authority between the CPC CC leaders he CC delegation at the Moscow Conference read documents printed in large charac- (Mao Zedong) still has great responsibilities will present its report. It is planned to adopt ters.” He mentioned in this connection that in the leadership of the party and the country. a short Plenum resolution on this question, “this must be a general rule that people of He said that he still often has to work at night. expressing support of the Moscow advanced age are in an unequal position to “The principal workload is connected with Conference’s decisions. Apart from the the young as regards the efficiency of their the reading of numerous documents and ma- results of the Conference the January Ple- work.” terials.” Twice a day, for instance, he said, num of the CPC CC will also discuss the Mao Zedong then emphasized that his “they bring me two big volumes of routine economic plan of the PRC for 1961. resignation from the post of the Chairman of information on international affairs, which After that Mao Zedong told me that the PRC had lessened the load of state of course it is necessary to look through to there are certain difficulties in the PRC which activities on him. Speaking about this he keep updated, not to lose contact with life.” make it impossible to elaborate a perspec- mentioned that at the time when he had In the course of the conversation I men- tive plan, “and we also lack the experience submitted this proposal he had been sup- tioned that the rapidly developing interna- for this.” At first, he went on, the CPC CC ported only by the Politburo members, while tional affairs demand constant attention and wanted to work out a plan for the three many members of the CPC CC had ob- timely analysis. I stressed the outstanding remaining years of the second five year plan. jected. “There was even more disagreement significance of the Moscow Conference However, 1960 is already over. So it was among the rank and file communists.” By where the recent international developments decided to make separate plans for the two now, he said, everybody was supporting this were submitted to deep Marxist-Leninist remaining years of the five year plan. He decision. analysis. said that the current plan of economic devel- As he continued talking about his work Mao Zedong agreed with this statement opment for the first quarter of 1961 exists and the activities of the leadership of the and quickly responded to the topic, saying: and is practically put into implementation. CPC CC, Mao Zedong said that for several “The Moscow Conference was a success, it For my part I told him about the favor- years, practically from 1953-54 he was not was thoroughly prepared, and the editing able conditions for planning achieved in the chairing the Politbureau meetings any more. commission, which included the representa- Soviet Union, of the adoption of the eco- He said that from 1956 Liu Shaoqi is in tives of 26 parties, worked fruitfully.” For- nomic plan and budget for 1961 by the charge of all the routine activities of the eign representatives, he went on, are often Supreme Council of the USSR. Politbureau, while he is taking part in some puzzled and ask why was the conference so Expressing a critical opinion of the lag of the meetings from time to time. Mao long. Mao Zedong said that they apparently with the adoption of economic plans in the Zedong mentioned that he personally is do not have a full understanding of the real PRC, Mao Zedong said that the plan for usually working and consulting mostly with situation when it took more than 10 days for 1960, for instance, was adopted only in the members of the Permanent Committee each of the representatives of 81 parties to April 1960, and on some occasions plans of the CPC CC Politbureau. Sometimes deliver his speech. Then there were repeated were adopted by the sessions of CAPR [Chi- specially invited persons also take part in speeches, not to mention the work on the nese Assembly of People’s Representatives] the meetings of the Permanent Committee. documents themselves. He stated: “It is very only in June-July. He explained it by the Then Mao Zedong told that on some good that there were arguments and discus- lack of sufficient experience in the PRC. occasions he takes part in the enlargened sions at the conference. This is not bad.” I told Mao Zedong of the forthcoming Politbureau meetings. Leading party ex- Then, agreeing with my statement on Plenum of the CPSU CC, of the serious ecutives from the periphery are usually in- the deep theoretical character of the docu- attention paid by the party and government vited to these meetings, for instance the ments of the Moscow Conference, Mao to the problems of agricultural development secretaries and deputy secretaries of the Zedong added that these documents caused a in the Soviet Union, including some special CPC CC bureaus from certain regions, the great confusion in the Western imperialist features of the forthcoming Plenum, where secretaries of the CPC Provincial Commit- circles, among our common enemies. the most important questions of further in- tees. Mao Zedong said that now he practi- During the conversation I gave a brief crease of agricultural production will be cally never speaks at the CPC CC Plenums, review of the work to popularize the results discussed and resolved. and even at the CPC Congress he just deliv- of the Moscow Conference in the Soviet Mao Zedong said that the CPC CC is ers a short introductory speech. His resigna- Union, to study the Conference’s documents now also “specializing” on agriculture. In- tion from the post of the Chairman of the within the political education network. creasing the attention to this question, he Republic gave him also an opportunity to In his turn Mao Zedong told me that the continued, “we are even thinking about nar- refrain from participating in the work of the study of the Moscow Conference documents rowing the industrial front to some extent.” Supreme State Conference. However, he is also being organized by the CPC. As for Explaining this idea he said that it is about a mentioned in this connection, I systemati- the summarizing of the Conference’s results, certain lowering of the scale of capital in- cally study the documents and materials the CPC CC has not yet sent any precise vestments into the industrial production, in- 169 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN cluding some branches of heavy industry; were however “displeased” that the Chinese came to see us to our car. Bidding us a warm capital investments into the construction of delegation was not able to visit them. He farewell, he once again asked to give his public buildings will also be cut. said, laughing, that this protest should be warm greetings to comrade N.S. Khrushchev In the course of the conversation he addressed to the members of the delegation, and the members of the CPSU CC Presidium briefly mentioned the bottlenecks of the for instance to Yang Shankun, who is present and most sincere thanks for their congratula- PRC’s industry, pointing, for instance, at the here at the conversation, as the Politburo had tions and warm wishes. mining and coal industry, and the transport no objections against prolonging the visit. I Candidate member of the CPC CC Sec- as well, talked about the interconnection of noted in the same tone that the Chinese retariat Yang Shankun, the functionaries of these industries, their influence on the de- friends had disarmed the “displeased” So- the CPC CC apparatus Yan Min Fu and Zhu velopment of many other branches (steel viet comrades, saying that it was not their Jueren, Counsellor Minister of the USSR production etc.). last visit to the Soviet Union. So, Mao Embassy in the PRC Sudarikov N.G. and the Returning to the problem of agriculture, Zedong said, one can maintain that they owe counsellor of the embassy Rakhmanin O.B. he emphasized that the lack of appropriate you. were present at the conversation. attention to this most important field of the When he broadened the topic of the PRC’s economy, as well as to the develop- usefulness of these meetings and visits I told The Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC ment of the light industry, would make it him that during the trip of the Chinese del- impossible to satisfy the requirements of the egation Soviet citizens had repeatedly asked [signature] population for foodstuffs, clothing and con- to give him (Mao Zedong) their best wishes S. CHERVONENKO sumer goods. Our own experience, Mao and expressed their hope that he will also Zedong went on, persuaded us that “orga- come to the Soviet Union when he finds it [Source: AVPRF, fond 0100, opis 55, papka nizing the production of living plants and convenient, visit different cities, enterprises, 454, delo 9, listy 98-105; translation for animals is much more difficult than the collective farms, especially that he had had CWIHP by Maxim Korobochkin.] production of lifeless items - metals, ore, no chance to get better acquainted with the coal etc.” He stated jokingly that “the dead country during his previous visits. He re- will not run away from us and can wait.” acted warmly and stated that he “must cer- 1. Memorandum of conversation, Yudin-Mao Zedong, 2 May 1956, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian In the course of the conversation Mao tainly find the time for such a visit.” Federation (AVPRF), fond 0100, opis 49, papka 410, Zedong repeatedly stressed that after the Then Mao Zedong told that in China he delo 9, listy 124-130. revolution in the PRC the material require- is criticized by the functionaries from the ments of the Chinese population have been periphery, who are displeased that he has not steadily growing. So the CPC must seri- been able yet to visit a number of cities and ously contemplate these problems, and the regions - Xinjiang, Yanan, , Tibet, way to overcome the arising difficulties. Of , Baotou, Xian, Lanzhou etc. These course, it is not the difficulties only that workers, he said, used to call me “the Chair- matter. Even when we have successes, new man for half of the Republic,” and when I problems and tasks are appearing all the resigned from this post in favor of Liu Shaoqi, same. He stated in this connection, that even they started to call me “the Chairman of the in 300-400 years new problems will be still CPC for half of the country.” arising, demanding to be solved, “no devel- In the final part of the conversation Mao opment will be possible without them.” Zedong returned to the notion of his alleged I shared with Mao Zedong some of the retirement from active state and party work, impressions from my trip around the Soviet saying half jokingly that now “he will wait Union together with the Chinese delegation for the moment when he will become an headed by Liu Shaoqi, stressing the signifi- ordinary member of the Politburo.” I have cance of the trip for the strengthening of not consulted anybody in the party on this friendship and solidarity between the USSR matter, he mentioned, even him, Mao Zedong and the PRC. said, pointing at Yang Shankun, you are the Mao Zedong actively supported this first whom I am telling about my “con- part of the conversation. He said that in spiracy.” China they are very happy with this visit, “it I expressed assurance that the members is very good that it took place.” Both our of the CPC will apparently not agree to such peoples, he said with emphasis, demanded a proposal from Mao Zedong. Then, he said such an action to be taken. “By making this jokingly, I will have to wait until everybody decision, the Central Committees of both realizes its necessity; “in several years they parties satisfied the demands of both will have mercy for me.” peoples.” The conversation lasted more than an I told him as if jokingly, that many hour in an exceptionally cordial, friendly republics of the USSR, for instance, atmosphere. When it was over Mao Zedong COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 170

THE USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY’S parts. The first part will discuss the content Moscow’s part between 1950 and 1953 that APPRAISAL OF SINO-SOVIET of the Foreign Ministry’s report, highlight- had “impeded the successful development RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ing items of particular interest as well as of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of SPLIT, SEPTEMBER 1959 several important lacunae. The second part full equality, mutuality, and trust.”6 will consider how Zimyanin’s assessment His views on this matter, interestingly by Mark Kramer contributed to, and was affected by, changes enough, were very similar to conclusions under way in Soviet policy-making toward reached by U.S. intelligence sources in the In early September 1959, Soviet For- China. Those changes, as explained below, early 1950s. Despite efforts by Moscow and eign Minister Andrei Gromyko instructed temporarily enhanced the role of the Foreign Beijing to project an image of monolithic the head of the Foreign Ministry’s Far East- Ministry and therefore gave increased promi- unity (an image, incidentally, that was not ern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to pre- nence to Zimyanin’s report. far from the reality), U.S. officials at the time pare a detailed background report on China could sense that negotiations leading to the for Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had Tensions in Sino-Soviet Relations Sino-Soviet alliance treaty of 14 February recently agreed to visit Beijing at the end of 1950 had generated a modicum of ill will September and early October to take part in In both substance and tone, Zimyanin’s between the two countries. According to a ceremonies marking the tenth anniversary analysis of Soviet relations with China re- secret background report, Mao was “highly of the Communist victory in China. The flected the burgeoning unease among Soviet dissatisfied with [Moscow’s] attempted ex- Soviet leader’s trip, as Gromyko was well officials. Although his view of the relation- actions on China,” and Zhou Enlai said he aware, was also intended to alleviate a grow- ship was still distinctly favorable overall, he “would rather resign than accede to [Soviet] ing rift between Moscow and Beijing—a was quick to point out many areas of incipi- demands as presented.”7 Although Soviet rift that had not yet flared up in public. ent conflict between the two countries. His and Chinese officials did their best to con- Initially, Khrushchev had been reluctant to report suggested that a full-fledged rift could ceal any further hints of bilateral discord travel to China because he had numerous be avoided, but he also implied that recurrent over the next few years, word continued to other commitments at around the same time; differences were bound to cause growing filter into Washington about “strain and dif- but after discussing the matter with his col- acrimony and recriminations unless appro- ficulties between Communist China and Rus- leagues on the CPSU Presidium, he decided priate steps were taken. In citing a litany of sia”—the same strain and difficulties that that face-to-face negotiations with Mao disagreements about key ideological and Zimyanin noted.8 Zedong and other top Chinese officials practical questions, the report drew a causal By tracing the origins of the Sino-So- would be the only way to “clear the atmo- link between internal political conditions in viet conflict back to the Stalin period, sphere” and restore a “sense of friendship China and the tenor of Chinese foreign policy, Zimyanin’s report was quite different from between our peoples.”1 a theme emphasized by many Western ana- the public statements made later on by offi- Zimyanin completed a top-secret, 30- lysts as well.4 Although Zimyanin con- cials in both Moscow and Beijing, who page survey of “The Political, Economic, cluded the document on an upbeat note— averred that the split had begun when the and International Standing of the PRC” (Re- claiming that “relations of fraternal amity two sides disagreed about Khrushchev’s se- port No. 860-dv) on 15 September 1959, the and fruitful cooperation have been estab- cret speech at the 20th Soviet Party Congress same day that Khrushchev began a highly lished on a lasting basis and are growing in February 1956.9 Until recently, the large publicized visit to the United States. The wider and stronger with every passing year”— majority of Western (and Russian) scholars Soviet leader returned to Moscow on 28 his analysis left little doubt that existing had accepted 1956 or 1958 as the best year in September, just a day before he was due to tensions between Moscow and Beijing could which to pinpoint the origins of the dis- leave for China. On his way back from the eventually take a sharp turn for the worse. pute.10 It is now clear, both from Zimyanin’s United States, he was given a copy of Four specific points about the document report and from other new evidence (see Zimyanin’s report. That copy is now housed are worth highlighting. below), that tensions actually had begun in the former CPSU Central Committee First, the report acknowledged that fric- emerging much earlier. archive in Moscow (known since 1992 as tion between the two Communist states had This is not to say that the whole Sino- the Center for Storage of Contemporary been present, to some degree, since the very Soviet rift, especially the bitter confronta- Documentation, or TsKhSD).2 The final start of the relationship. Although Zimyanin tion of the mid- to late 1960s, was inevitable. section of Zimyanin’s report, which focuses did not imply that China had been merely a Most events seem inevitable in retrospect, on Sino-Soviet relations and is by far the “reluctant and suspicious ally” of Moscow in but the reality is usually more complex. Far most interesting portion of the document, is the early 1950s, he emphasized that the So- from being a “reluctant and suspicious ally” translated here in full except for a few extra- viet Union under Stalin had “violated the of the Soviet Union during the first half of neous passages at the beginning and end.3 sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese the 1950s, Mao was eager to copy Soviet Zimyanin’s appraisal of Sino-Soviet People’s Republic” and had “kept the PRC in experience and to forge close, comprehen- relations is intriguing not only because of its a subordinate position vis-a-vis the USSR.”5 sive ties with Moscow in the name of social- substance, but also because of the light it No doubt, these criticisms were motivated in ist internationalism. Even so, the latest sheds on Soviet policy-making at the time. part by the then-prevailing line of de- memoirs and archival revelations, including Both points will be briefly taken up in this Stalinization, but Zimyanin provided con- Zimyanin’s report, leave little doubt that the introduction, which is divided into two main crete examples of “negative” actions on seeds of a conflict between Moscow and 171 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Beijing were present, at least in some fash- omissions in Zimyanin’s assessment, which during all the high-level Sino-Soviet meet- ion, as early as 1950-53. are worth briefly explicating here because ings in 1949-1950.14 Although Fedorenko Second, while giving due emphasis to they provide a better context for understand- and Shi acknowledged that several points of problems that arose during the Stalin era, ing the document: contention had surfaced between Stalin and Zimyanin also underscored the detrimental • Stalin’s relationship with Mao. Al- Mao, they both emphasized that the relation- impact of criticism unleashed by the 20th though Zimyanin discussed problems in ship overall was amicable. Fedorenko spe- Soviet Party Congress and by the “Hundred Sino-Soviet relations that arose during the cifically took issue with Khrushchev’s ac- Flowers” campaign in China. Zimyanin Stalin era, he did not explicitly refer to the count: claimed that the Chinese leadership had “fully way Stalin behaved when Mao visited the supported the CPSU’s measures to elimi- Soviet Union for nearly two-and-a-half Later on it was claimed that Stalin nate the cult of personality and its conse- months beginning in December 1949. This had not received Mao Zedong for quences” after the 20th Party Congress, but omission is unfortunate because even a few nearly a month, and in general had he conceded that Beijing’s assessment of brief comments might have helped clarify not displayed appropriate courtesy Stalin was considerably “different from our what has been a matter of great confusion. toward the Chinese leader. These own” and that the Congress had prompted First-hand accounts of the Stalin-Mao rela- reports created a false impression of “the Chinese friends . . . to express critical tionship by former Soviet and Chinese offi- the host and his guest. In actual fact, comments about Soviet organizations, the cials offer sharply conflicting interpreta- everything happened quite differ- work of Soviet specialists, and other issues tions. One of the most jaundiced descrip- ently. Judging from what I saw in Soviet-Chinese relations.” Even more tions of the way Stalin treated Mao can be first-hand, the behavior of the two damaging, according to Zimyanin, was the found in Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs: leaders and the overall atmosphere effect of the Hundred Flowers campaign. were totally different from subse- He cited a wide range of “hostile statements” Stalin would sometimes not lay eyes quent depictions. . . . From the very and “denunciations of the Soviet Union and on [the Chinese leader] for days at a first meeting, Stalin invariably dis- Soviet-Chinese friendship” that had surfaced time—and since Stalin neither saw played the utmost courtesy toward in China. “The airing of these types of Mao nor ordered anyone else to his Chinese counterpart. . . . statements,” he wrote, “can in no way be entertain him, no one dared to go Throughout the talks with Mao justified.” The report expressed particular see him. We began hearing rumors Zedong, Stalin was equable, re- concern about a number of territorial de- that Mao was very unhappy be- strained, and attentive to his guest. mands that had been raised against the So- cause he was being kept under lock His thoughts never wandered and viet Union.11 and key and everyone was ignoring were always completely focused on Third, as one might expect, Zimyanin him. Mao let it be known that if the the conversation. devoted considerable attention to the Sino- situation continued, he would leave. Soviet ideological quarrels that began to . . . In this way, Stalin sowed the Likewise, Shi Zhe noted that “Stalin was surface during the Great Leap Forward. In seeds of hostility and anti-Soviet, visibly moved [when he met the Chinese 1958 and 1959 the emerging rift between anti-Russian sentiment in China.12 leader] and continuously dispensed compli- Moscow and Beijing had primarily taken the ments to Chairman Mao.” Shi dismissed form of disagreements about the establish- A similar appraisal of Stalin’s demeanor rumors in the West that “Stalin had put ment of “people’s communes,” the role of was offered by Andrei Gromyko, who Chairman Mao under house arrest” during a material versus ideological incentives, the claimed in his memoirs that when Stalin particularly tense stage in the negotiations nature of the transition to socialism and hosted a special dinner for Mao in February leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of alli- Communism, and other aspects of Marx- 1950, the atmosphere was “oppressive” and ance. ism-Leninism. In subsequent years, bitter the two leaders “seemed personally to have Even with the benefit of new evidence, disputes erupted over territorial demands nothing in common that would enable them it is difficult to sort out the discrepancies and questions of global strategy (not to men- to establish the necessary rapport.”13 Be- between these accounts. So far, transcripts tion a clash of personalities between cause Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s obser- of only the first two private meetings be- Khrushchev and Mao), but those issues had vations fit so well with everything that is tween Mao and Stalin—on 16 December not yet come to dominate the relationship in known about Stalin’s general behavior, their 1949 and 22 January 1950—are available.15 September 1959. Hence, it is not surprising accounts have been widely accepted in the Both transcripts shed a good deal of light on that Zimyanin would concentrate on ideo- West. the Stalin-Mao relationship (not least by logical differences that were particularly More recently, though, a very different confirming how long the interval was be- salient at the time. His report provides picture of the Stalin-Mao relationship has tween meetings), but they do not, and indeed further evidence that ideological aspects of emerged from testimony by Nikolai cannot, convey a full sense of Stalin’s be- the conflict must be taken seriously on their Fedorenko, a former diplomat at the Soviet havior toward Mao. Gestures, facial expres- own merits, rather than being seen as a mere embassy in China who served as an inter- sions, and even some unflattering comments smokescreen for geopolitical or other con- preter for Stalin, and by Shi Zhe, a former are apt to be omitted from these stenographic cerns. official in the Chinese foreign ministry who reports either deliberately or inadvertently, Finally, there are a few conspicuous interpreted for Mao. Both men were present just as there are crucial gaps in numerous COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 172 other East-bloc documents.16 The two tran- Kovalev, a distinguished Soviet military of- nary discussions with Stalin: scripts also do not reveal anything about ficer who served as Stalin’s personal envoy unpleasant incidents that may have occurred to China from 1948 until the early 1950s. In From then on, Stalin sought to avoid outside the formal talks. Although retro- a lengthy interview in 1992, Kovalev re- me. I tried, for my part, to phone spective accounts by aides to Stalin and counted the tribulations and rudeness that Stalin’s apartment, but was told that Mao who took part in the meetings can be Mao had experienced during his visit: he was not home and that I should helpful in filling in gaps, these memoirs meet with Mikoyan instead. I was must be used with extreme caution, espe- Mao was met [on 16 December] by offended by all this, and so I de- cially when they are published long after the Bulganin and Molotov, who cided that I would not do anything events they describe. Khrushchev’s recol- brusquely turned down his invita- more and would simply spend my lections were compiled more than 15 years tion to join him for a meal, saying time resting at the dacha. Then I after the Stalin-Mao talks; and Gromyko’s, that it would be contrary to proto- had an unpleasant conversation with Fedorenko’s, and Shi’s accounts were writ- col. For the same reason, they de- Kovalev and Fedorenko, who sug- ten nearly 40 years after the talks. Even if clined Mao’s invitation to ride with gested that I go for a trip around the one assumes (perhaps tenuously) that all the him to his assigned dacha. . . . Mao country. I flatly rejected this pro- memoir-writers relied on notes and docu- was clearly upset by the cool recep- posal and said that I might as well ments from the period they were discussing tion. That same day, Stalin received just “go on sleeping at my dacha.”22 and depicted events as faithfully as they Mao Zedong, but they held no con- could, the passage of so many years is bound fidential talks of the sort that Mao Mao revealed these “problems and difficul- to cause certain failings of memory.17 had wanted. After that, Mao spent ties” to his Chinese colleagues as well, albeit Two important factors might lead one numerous boring days at the dacha. somewhat more discreetly. In a secret speech to ascribe greater credibility to Fedorenko’s Molotov, Bulganin, and Mikoyan at the CCP’s Chengdu conference in March version of the Stalin-Mao relationship than stopped by to see him, but had only 1958, Mao averred that he had been forced to Khrushchev’s. First, Fedorenko and Shi very brief official conversations. I into humiliating concessions by Stalin eight participated in all the private talks between was in touch with Mao and saw him years earlier: Stalin and Mao, whereas Khrushchev and every day, and I was aware that he Gromyko were present at only the public was upset and apprehensive.20 In 1950, Stalin and I argued with meetings.18 Second, it is conceivable that each other in Moscow for two Khrushchev was inclined to depict Stalin’s Kovalev also noted that in late December, months about our mutual defense behavior in an unduly negative light. Mao asked him to convey a formal request to treaty, about the Chungchang rail- (Khrushchev may have done this sub-con- Stalin for another private meeting, indicating road, about joint economic ventures, sciously, or he may have been seeking to lay that “the resolution of all matters, including and about our boundary lines. Our the “blame” on Stalin for the subsequent the question of [Mao’s] spare time and medi- attitudes were such that when he rupture with China.) By contrast, Fedorenko cal treatment, [would] be left entirely to your offered a proposal which was unac- had no obvious reason by 1989 (the height [i.e., Stalin’s] discretion.”21 According to ceptable to me, I would resist it; but of the Gorbachev era) to want to defend Kovalev, this appeal went unheeded, and “as when he insisted on it, I would give Stalin. One could therefore make a prima before, Mao remained practically in isola- in. I did so for the sake of social- facie case on behalf of Fedorenko’s ac- tion.” Even when Mao “retaliated by refus- ism.23 count. ing to meet with Roshchin, our ambassador On the other hand, most of the latest to China,” it had no effect on Stalin. Kovalev Mao noted with particular distaste that he evidence tends to support Khrushchev’s and emphasized that it was “not until Zhou Enlai had allowed Stalin to get away with treating Gromyko’s versions, rather than arrived in Moscow at the end of January Manchuria and Xinjiang as mere “” Fedorenko’s. One of the most trusted aides 1950 that the talks finally proceeded more of the Soviet Union—a point mentioned by to Stalin, , who re- successfully.” All this amply corroborates Zimyanin as well.24 At Chengdu and in mained a staunch defender of the Soviet what Khrushchev wrote. numerous other speeches before closed CCP dictator even after being ousted by Khrushchev’s depiction of the Stalin- gatherings, Mao repeatedly condemned Khrushchev in June 1957, later recalled that Mao relationship is also borne out by newly Stalin’s “serious mistakes” and “shortcom- when the Chinese delegation came to Mos- declassified testimony from another key ings,” a practice that suggests long pent-up cow in December 1949, Mao had to wait source, namely Mao himself. In a private feelings of animosity toward the late Soviet many days or even weeks after his initial meeting with the Soviet ambassador to China dictator.25 perfunctory meeting with Stalin until the in late March 1956, Mao spoke bitterly about Furthermore, even some of the com- Soviet leader finally agreed to receive him the “ugly atmosphere” he had confronted in ments in Fedorenko’s and Shi’s own articles again.19 This corresponds precisely to what Moscow in 1950 and about the “profound imply—if only inadvertently—that the rela- Khrushchev said, and it is confirmed by the distrust and suspicion” that Stalin had shown tionship between Stalin and Mao was not sequence of the transcripts, as noted above. toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) really so cordial after all. Both Fedorenko Khrushchev’s account is further strength- leadership. Mao also recalled the “insulting” and Shi acknowledged that a residue of ened by the recollections of General Ivan treatment he had suffered after his prelimi- tension still plagued Sino-Soviet relations in 173 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the early 1950s because of Stalin’s refusal Wladyslaw Gomulka, and urged the Soviet cally warned that local Third World con- during the Chinese civil war to provide Union to forgo military intervention in Po- flicts could escalate to a highly destructive greater support for the Communist rebels.26 land. Ultimately, Khrushchev did accept a global war if the superpowers directly inter- This tension inevitably caused personal peaceful settlement with Gomulka. Senior vened on opposing sides. strains between the two leaders, as Mao Chinese officials also initially counseled In terms of actual policy, however, the himself observed during his March 1956 against an invasion of Hungary when they difference between Soviet and Chinese ap- meeting with the Soviet ambassador and in traveled to Moscow on October 30 for emer- proaches was relatively small.31 If only for one of his secret speeches two years later at gency consultations. By that point, logistical reasons, it was the Soviet Union, the Chengdu conference: Khrushchev and his colleagues were no not China, that had been the primary arms longer confident that “the Hungarian work- supplier to Communist insurgents in numer- The victory of the Chinese revolu- ing class” could “regain control of the situ- ous Third World countries (e.g., Indonesia, tion was against Stalin’s wishes.... ation and suppress the uprising on its own,” Malaya, South Vietnam, Guatemala, the Phil- When our revolution succeeded, but they agreed for the time being to desist ippines, and Cuba).32 Moreover, Chinese Stalin said it was a fake. We made from further intervention in Hungary.28 Less leaders, for all their seeming belligerence, no protest.27 than 24 hours later, however, the Soviet were often hesitant about translating rheto- authorities reversed their decision and voted ric into concrete policy. In private discus- Shi also recalled how Stalin would lapse into in favor of a large-scale invasion.29 When sions with Soviet officials, senior Chinese a “sullen” mood during the 1949-50 meet- Mao Zedong was informed of this last-minute representatives argued that “reasonable cau- ings whenever Mao was being deliberately change, he immediately and strongly en- tion” was needed even when “conditions “evasive.” This was particularly evident, dorsed the Soviet decision, not least because were ripe for the spread of progressive ideas according to Shi, when negotiations on the had announced on November 1 in certain [Third World] countries.”33 treaty of alliance bogged down and Stalin (the day after the Soviet Presidium decided Despite the underlying similarities be- repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to “gauge to invade) that Hungary was pulling out of tween Chinese and Soviet policies, the two Chairman Mao’s intentions.” Shi added that the Warsaw Pact and establishing itself as a Communist states were bound to disagree at the testy exchanges between the two leaders neutral state. times. This was evident in July 1958 when prompted Mao at one point to remark sarcas- China subsequently became the most a leftist coup against Iraq’s pro-Western tically that Stalin was wont to “blame the vocal supporter of the invasion and even government sparked a brief but intense crisis Chinese for all the mistakes” in bilateral publicly welcomed the execution of Imre in the Middle East, leading to U.S. and relations. Similarly, Fedorenko alluded to Nagy in June 1958, but the whole episode, as British troop landings in Lebanon and Jor- Stalin’s extreme suspiciousness during the Chinese officials later confirmed, had a jar- dan. Both publicly and privately, Chinese talks, as reflected in the Soviet dictator’s ring effect in Beijing. Zimyanin promi- officials urged the Soviet Union to take a incessant complaints about “conspiracies,” nently cited the Soviet declaration of 30 firm stand against “American imperialist “plots,” and “illegal murmurs.” This behav- October 1956 in his report, but he made no aggression” in the Middle East, a task that ior, too, suggests that Stalin may not have mention of the turmoil that had given rise to China itself could not perform because of its been quite as hospitable as Fedorenko ini- the declaration or of the actions that fol- lack of power-projection capabilities. Con- tially implied. lowed. trary to Beijing’s wishes, however, Soviet Despite the wealth of new evidence, • Sino-Soviet policies in the Third World. leaders quickly decided there was little to be there are still many unresolved questions In the late 1950s, Chinese leaders began gained by risking a direct East-West con- about the nature of Stalin’s relationship with vigorously championing—and, where pos- frontation.34 Rather than sending “volun- Mao. Further scrutiny of the emerging docu- sible, actively promoting—“wars of national teers” to the Middle East or extending an mentation and first-hand accounts will be liberation” and “anti-imperialist struggles” overt military guarantee to the new Iraqi essential to set the record straight. in the developing world.30 This strategy regime (as urged by Beijing), the Soviet Khrushchev’s and Gromyko’s recollections mirrored the growing radicalization of Union relied mainly on diplomacy and called seem to be corroborated by the latest disclo- China’s domestic politics at the time. It also for a special UN-sponsored meeting to re- sures, but Fedorenko’s and Shi’s accounts flowed naturally from Mao’s view, first enun- solve the situation. Although the peak of the must be taken seriously, at least for now. ciated in November 1957, that “the East crisis had subsided (and Sino-Soviet differ- Zimyanin’s analysis, with its strong criti- Wind is now stronger than the West Wind.” ences on this score had seemingly waned) by cism of Soviet policy during the early 1950s, Recent Soviet breakthroughs with long-range the time Khrushchev arrived in China at the is more compatible with Khrushchev’s ver- nuclear missiles, according to Mao, would end of July 1958, the ongoing tensions in the sion than with Fedorenko’s, but the report deter Western countries from responding to Middle East were a prominent topic of dis- provides no conclusive evidence one way or Communist-backed guerrilla movements. cussion during his visit.35 The resulting the other. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautious— exchanges may have been partly responsible • The crises in Poland and Hungary in at least rhetorically—than their Chinese for the bolder stance that the Soviet Union October-November 1956. During the stand- counterparts, not least because they were took during the Quemoy Islands crisis a few off between the Soviet Union and Poland in aware that the East-West military balance weeks later (see below). October 1956, Chinese officials generally had not improved as much as most Chinese Judging from numerous documents pre- supported the defiant Polish leader, officials assumed. Soviet leaders periodi- pared by the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 174

Eastern department in 1958 and early 1959, the United States responded by deploying a buke the “many people both inside and out- there is no doubt Zimyanin was aware that huge naval contingent to the Taiwan Straits. side the Party who do not understand the Chinese leaders had been disappointed by Simultaneously, top U.S. officials, including paper tiger problem.”46 Soviet policy during the first ten days of the President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Soviet leaders, for their part, were con- 1958 Middle Eastern crisis, when it still John Foster Dulles, publicly reaffirmed their vinced until late September that the PRC’s appeared that U.S. and British forces might commitment to protect Taiwan against Chi- effort to get rid of Jiang Jieshi was still on try to restore a pro-Western government in nese incursions and to counter any naval track. When Soviet Foreign Minister Iraq. The initial phase of the crisis marked threats in the Taiwan Straits.40 The strongest Gromyko flew secretly to Beijing shortly one of the first times that Soviet and Chinese warning to this effect came on September 4, after the crisis began, he found that Mao was policies in the Third World had diverged, three days before heavily armed U.S. ships still expressing hope of “responding with albeit only temporarily.36 It is odd, there- began escorting Taiwanese vessels on resup- force against force.”47 After hearing back fore, that Zimyanin’s briefing report for ply missions to Quemoy. U.S. naval aircraft from Gromyko, Khrushchev followed up on Khrushchev barely mentioned the crisis and also were called into action to support the his earlier pledge to support the Chinese gave no intimation that Beijing and Mos- Taiwanese air force as it established control operation. On September 7, while U.S. cow had been at odds about the best way to of the region’s airspace. In a rapid series of ships were embarking on their first escort handle it. air battles, Taiwanese pilots flying U.S.- missions, the Soviet leader issued a public • Lessons derived from the 1958 Tai- made fighters routed their Chinese oppo- warning that any attack against mainland wan Straits crisis. Shortly before nents, casting serious doubt on the quality of China would be deemed an attack against the Khrushchev’s trip to Beijing in July-August China’s air crews and Soviet-made MiGs.41 Soviet Union as well.48 This warning was 1958, the Chinese Communist Party’s Mili- These humiliating defeats forced Mao and followed two weeks later by a declaration tary Affairs Committee (which had been several of his top military commanders onto that any use of nuclear weapons against meeting in an extraordinary two-month ses- the defensive during subsequent intra-party China would be grounds for a Soviet nuclear sion since 27 May 1958) approved Mao’s debates.42 attack against the United States. Many plans for a major operation in late August to The unexpectedly forceful U.S. response Western analysts have claimed that these recapture China’s small offshore islands. posed a dilemma for Chinese and Soviet two Soviet statements were largely cosmetic, The aim of the operation was to weaken or leaders.43 On September 5, Mao privately and that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric even undermine the Guomintang (Chinese acknowledged to the PRC’s Supreme State only when he believed there was no longer Nationalist) government in Taiwan by ex- Conference that he “simply had not antici- any danger of war. New evidence does not posing its inability to defend against an pated how roiled and turbulent the world bear out this long-standing view. A week attack from the mainland.37 Khrushchev would become” if China “fired a few rounds after Khrushchev issued his initial warning, was not explicitly informed of the proposed of artillery at Quemoy and Matsu.”44 Con- he met secretly with the Chinese ambassa- undertaking during his visit to Beijing, but fronted by the threat of U.S. military retalia- dor, Liu Xiao, and gave every indication that he was told in general terms that a military tion, Mao abandoned any hopes he may have he still expected and hoped that China would operation was being planned to “bring Tai- had at the time of seizing the offshore islands proceed with its “decisive” military action wan back under China’s jurisdiction.”38 The or, perhaps, attacking Taiwan.45 Although against Taiwan.49 Although Khrushchev Soviet leader welcomed the news and of- Chinese artillery units continued in Septem- clearly wanted to avoid a war with the United fered both political and military backing for ber and early October to shell U.S.-escorted States, the failure of U.S. aircraft carriers to China’s efforts. In the first few weeks of convoys as they landed with resupplies in attack mainland China after Chinese artil- August the Soviet Union transferred long- Quemoy, these actions were coupled with lery units resumed their bombardment of range artillery, amphibious equipment, air- efforts to defuse the crisis by diplomatic Quemoy gave the Soviet leader reason to to-air missiles, and combat aircraft to China means. Most notably, on September 6, Zhou believe (or at least hope) that U.S. forces in the expectation that those weapons would Enlai proposed a resumption of Sino-Ameri- would not follow through on their commit- facilitate a “decisive move against the Jiang can ambassadorial talks, and on October 6 ment to defend Taiwan. Later on, Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] regime.”39 Soviet the Chinese government announced a provi- Khrushchev acknowledged that he had felt military advisers also were sent to China to sional cease-fire, effectively bringing the betrayed when he finally realized in late help supervise—and, if necessary, take part crisis to an end. The continued bombard- September/early October that Mao had de- in—the upcoming operation. ment of Quemoy had posed some risk that cided to bail out of the operation.50 Although Chinese and Soviet leaders wider hostilities would break out, but Chi- To that extent, the Quemoy crisis ended assumed (or at least hoped) that the action nese leaders were careful throughout the up sparking discord between Soviet and would not provoke a direct military re- crisis to avoid a direct confrontation with Chinese officials, but for a much different sponse from the United States, this assump- U.S. forces. Mao’s retreat came as a disap- reason from what has usually been sug- tion proved erroneous from the very start. pointment to some of his colleagues because gested. Most Western analysts have argued After the Chinese army launched a heavy of his earlier claims that the United States that Chinese leaders were dismayed when artillery bombardment of the Quemoy Is- was merely a “paper tiger.” At a meeting of the Soviet Union allegedly provided only lands on and Chinese patrol boats senior Chinese officials in late November lukewarm military backing for the probe were sent to blockade Quemoy and Matsu (several weeks after the crisis had been de- against Taiwan.51 New evidence suggests against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts, fused), Mao even found it necessary to re- that, on the contrary, the Soviet Union did 175 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN everything it had promised to do in support submarine-launched ballistic missiles • Differences about Soviet efforts to of the Chinese operation, and that it was (SLBMs), the naval version of the SS-1B.56 seek improved ties with the United States. China, not the USSR, that was unwilling to Although the R-11FM had a maximum range Starting in the mid-1950s the Soviet Union follow through.52 This outcome explains of just 162 kilometers and could be fired pursued a line of “peaceful coexistence” why Khrushchev, feeling he had been burned only from the surface, it was the most ad- with the United States. Chinese leaders, by once, was determined not to let it happen vanced Soviet SLBM at the time. contrast, wanted to step up the confrontation again. From then on he emphasized the need Despite the initial success of these ef- between the Communist world and the capi- for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan prob- forts, Soviet leaders decided by early 1958 talist world and to avoid any hint of compro- lem, a lesson that Mao was unwilling to that it would be inadvisable, in light of mise. Chinese leaders even claimed that draw, for fear it would expose the magnitude Beijing’s territorial claims against the So- they were willing, in extremis, to risk a of his failure in the Quemoy crisis. These viet Union, to fulfill the pledge undertaken global nuclear war in the “struggle against different views became a sore point in Sino- in the NDTA to supply a prototype nuclear imperialism.” To be sure, the connection Soviet relations, as was evident during bomb to the PRC.57 Chinese officials were between rhetoric and concrete policy was Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing in the autumn not informed of this decision until nearly a often tenuous; in 1958, China quickly backed of 1959.53 Zimyanin’s brief discussion of year and a half later, and in the meantime down when confronted by a massive U.S. Soviet policy during the Quemoy crisis does mutual recriminations occurred behind the naval force in the Taiwan Straits. Neverthe- not mention the frustration that Soviet lead- scenes when the promised shipment repeat- less, even after that humiliating retreat, offi- ers felt and the lasting impact this had on edly failed to materialize. Khrushchev tried cials in Beijing continued to insist that “if the Khrushchev’s approach to the Taiwan issue. to alleviate the burgeoning tension when he imperialists launch an all-out war,” it inevi- • Soviet assistance to China’s nuclear traveled to Beijing at the end of July 1958, tably would result in “victory” for the Com- weapons program. When Chinese leaders but his trip proved of little avail in this munist states and “inspire hundreds of mil- formally decided in January 1955 to pursue respect and tensions continued to increase. lions of people to turn to socialism.” Mao’s an independent nuclear weapons program, Finally, in a secret letter dated 20 June 1959, seeming indifference to the potential conse- they did so in the expectation that they Soviet leaders formally notified their Chi- quences of nuclear war chastened Soviet would receive elaborate advice and backing nese counterparts that no prototype bombs leaders, who were concerned that the Soviet from Moscow. Between January 1955 and or detailed technical blueprints would be Union might be drawn into a large-scale December 1956 the Soviet Union and China provided. The letter infuriated the Chinese, conflict against its will.60 Soviet officials concluded four preliminary agreements on but Khrushchev and his colleagues were like Zimyanin were fully cognizant of these bilateral cooperation in uranium mining, willing to pay that price at a time when, in divergent outlooks (and the high-level con- nuclear research, and uranium enrichment, their view, Sino-Soviet “relations were cern they had provoked in Moscow), so it is and these were followed in October 1957 by steadily deteriorating” and the NDTA was odd that he made no more than an oblique the signing of a New Defense Technology “already coming unraveled.”58 Curiously, reference to the matter. Agreement (NDTA), which provided for the letter did not yet cause officials in Beijing Nor did Zimyanin mention the disagree- broad Soviet assistance to China in the de- to give up all hope of obtaining further ments between Moscow and Beijing about velopment of nuclear warheads and delivery assistance from Moscow on nuclear arms. the value of East-West arms control. Chi- vehicles.54 Soon thereafter, Soviet nuclear At the summit in October 1959, Chinese nese officials were deeply suspicious of the weapons scientists and engineers were dis- prime minister Zhou Enlai formally requested U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the late 1950s patched to China, sensitive information was Soviet aid in the development and produc- aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear transferred, equipment was sold for uranium tion of nuclear-powered strategic subma- test ban. Chinese leaders feared that their processing and enrichment, and prepara- rines and longer-range, solid-fueled SLBMs. country, too, would come under pressure to tions were made to ship a prototype nuclear Khrushchev immediately turned down both sign a test ban treaty (even though they had bomb to the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Re- proposals, thus dashing any lingering ex- taken no part in the negotiations), and that search Institute for training and instruction pectations that Mao and Zhou still had of this would effectively end China’s hopes of purposes. In addition, a group of high- pursuing new forms of nuclear-weapons co- becoming a nuclear power.61 The inception ranking Soviet military specialists were sent operation or of at least reviving the NDTA.59 of a U.S.-Soviet test moratorium in the spring to help the Chinese establish new regiments The Soviet Foreign Ministry had not of 1958, coupled with the Soviet letter of 20 for nuclear-capable SS-1 (8A11) and SS-2 been involved in the implementation of the June 1959 (which explicitly cited the test (8Zh38) tactical missiles.55 The Soviet of- NDTA, but senior ministry officials most ban negotiations as a reason not to supply a ficers not only gave detailed advice on the likely were aware that nuclear assistance prototype nuclear bomb to China), intensi- technology and operational uses of the mis- was being provided to China. (After all, the fied Beijing’s concerns that arms control siles, but also helped find suitable locations Foreign Ministry had been the initial contact talks were antithetical to China’s nuclear for SS-1/SS-2 test ranges and deployment point for Chinese leaders in mid-1957 when ambitions.62 Zimyanin was well aware of fields. Similar cooperative arrangements they sought to open negotiations for the these differences, but chose not to bring were established for naval delivery vehicles. agreement.) Hence, it is surprising that them up. The Soviet Union provided China with tech- Zimyanin did not bring up this matter at all, • China’s deepening confrontation with nical data, designs, components, and pro- apart from two oblique references to “ques- India. Sino-Indian relations had been har- duction equipment for liquid-fueled R-11FM tions of defense cooperation.” monious for several years after the Commu- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 176 nists took power in Beijing, but the relation- provided for subsidized credits to India of to China was quite different. The MFA ship deteriorated sharply in the late 1950s as some $385 million over five years. ended up with a dominant role in the prepa- a result of differences over Tibet and the These events were still under way—and rations for the trip, thanks in part to a delib- disputed Chinese-Indian boundary in the tensions along the Sino-Indian border were erate effort by Gromyko to obtain a greater Himalayas.63 In the spring of 1959 China still acute—when Zimyanin was drafting his say for the Foreign Ministry in policy to- crushed a popular revolt in Tibet and de- report, so it was probably too early for him to ward China.72 When Gromyko first asked ployed many thousands of extra troops on gauge the significance of Moscow’s deci- Zimyanin to prepare a briefing report on Tibetan soil—actions that were viewed with sion to remain neutral.68 Even so, it is odd China, the foreign minister knew that he great apprehension in neighboring India. that he did not allude at all to the Sino-Indian would soon be accompanying Khrushchev Over the next few months, the Sino-Indian conflict, particularly because it ended up on a two-week visit to the United States, a border dispute heated up, leading to a seri- having such a deleterious effect on task that would enable him to bolster the ous incident in late August 1959, when Khrushchev’s visit.69 Foreign Ministry’s standing (as well as his Chinese troops attacked and reoccupied a own influence) on other issues, especially contested border post at Longju. Although Zimyanin’s Report and Sino-Soviet relations. Because the time in each side blamed the other for the incident, Soviet Policy-Making between Khrushchev’s two visits in late the clash apparently was motivated in part September was so limited, briefings for the by the Chinese authorities’ desire to take a The submission of Zimyanin’s report to China trip had to occur almost entirely on the firm stand against India before Khrushchev Khrushchev was one of several indicators of plane. Gromyko was aware that the other arrived in Beijing. a small but intriguing change in Soviet policy- senior members of the Soviet “party-gov- As recriminations between India and making vis-a-vis China. Throughout the ernment delegation,” led by Mikhail Suslov, China escalated, Chinese officials secretly 1950s the Soviet Union’s dealings with the were scheduled to depart for China on Sep- urged “the Soviet Union and other fraternal PRC, as with other Communist states, had tember 26-27, while Khrushchev and socialist countries to exploit all possible been handled mainly along party-to-party Gromyko were still in the United States. opportunities” to “conduct propaganda mea- lines. A special CPSU Central Committee Hence, the foreign minister knew he would sures against India” and “expose the subver- department, known after February 1957 as be the only top official accompanying sive role of imperialist and reactionary Ti- the Department for Ties with Communist Khrushchev on the flight to Beijing on the betan forces” armed and supported by In- and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries, 29th and 30th.73 (Gromyko, of course, also dia.64 These pleas were of no avail. Instead was responsible for keeping track of devel- intended to make good use of his privileged of rallying to China’s defense, the Soviet opments in East-bloc countries and for man- access to Khrushchev during the visit to, and Union scrupulously avoided taking sides aging relations with those countries on a day- flight back from, the United States.74) during the skirmishes, and released a state- to-day basis.70 (Matters requiring high-level Under those circumstances, the Foreign ment on 9 September 1959 expressing hope decisions were sent to the CPSU Presidium Ministry’s report on China, prepared by that China and India would soon resolve the or Secretariat.) To be sure, the Ministry of Zimyanin, became the main briefing mate- matter “in the spirit of their traditional friend- Foreign Affairs (MFA) was not excluded rial for Khrushchev, along with a short up- ship.”65 Chinese officials were shown the from Soviet policy-making toward China. date (also prepared by Zimyanin) on recent TASS statement before it went out, and they On some issues, such as the effort to gain a personnel changes in the Chinese military did their best to persuade Moscow not to seat for Communist China in the United High Command.75 What is more, Zimyanin release it; but far from helping matters, Nations, the MFA was the only important (who was a member of the MFA Collegium Beijing’s latest remonstrations merely in- actor involved. Also, the foreign minister as well as head of the ministry’s Far Eastern duced Soviet leaders to issue the statement himself at times played a key role, notably in department) and a number of other senior a day earlier than planned, without any the late summer of 1958 when Gromyko was MFA officials were chosen to go to Beijing amendments.66 Mao and his colleagues authorized by the CPSU Presidium to hold to provide on-site advice and support, some- were so dismayed by the Soviet Union’s secret negotiations with Mao about “issues thing that had not happened during refusal to back its chief Communist ally in a of war and peace, the international situation, Khrushchev’s earlier visits to China.76 Al- dispute with a non- that and the policy of American imperialism.”71 though the head of the CPSU CC department they sent a stern note of protest to Moscow Nevertheless, much of the time the Foreign for intra-bloc relations, Yurii Andropov, and on September 13 claiming that “the TASS Ministry’s input was limited. Apart from a few other CC department heads also trav- statement has revealed to the whole world standard diplomatic support, the MFA had eled to China as advisers, the Foreign the divergence of views between China and contributed relatively little during Ministry’s role during the visit was far more the Soviet Union regarding the incident on Khrushchev’s two previous visits to China salient than in the past. (This was reflected the Sino-Indian border, a divergence that (in October 1954 and July-August 1958) as in Gromyko’s own role as well; among other has literally brought joy and jubilation to the well as his visits to most other Communist things, he was the only Soviet official be- Indian bourgeoisie and to American and states. The bulk of the preparations had been sides Suslov who took part in all of British imperialism.”67 The irritation and handled instead by one or more of the CPSU Khrushchev’s talks with Mao and Zhou sense of betrayal in Beijing increased two Central Committee departments and by Enlai.77) Hence, Zimyanin’s report proved days later when Soviet and Indian leaders Khrushchev’s own staff. highly influential. signed a much-publicized agreement that In that respect, the September 1959 trip As things worked out, however, the 177 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

MFA’s expanded role had little effect one nior ideological officials from the CPSU, months after he took over the Far Eastern way or the other on Sino-Soviet relations. especially Leonid Ilyichev and Mikhail department and a month after Khrushchev’s The trip in September-October 1959 left Suslov, ended up handling most of the So- ouster.) During the rest of the 1960s the crucial differences unresolved, and the two viet Union’s polemical exchanges and other Foreign Ministry’s role in policy-making sides clashed bitterly over the best steps to dealings with China. Throughout the late toward China remained well short of what it take vis-a-vis Taiwan. Shortly after 1950s (and even well into 1960) Suslov had had been in September 1959. Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet been the chief proponent within the Soviet The MFA’s diminished impact on Sino- Union quietly began pulling some of its key leadership of a conciliatory posture toward Soviet relations was largely unchanged until military technicians out of China.78 Ten- China; but as attitudes on both sides steadily mid-1970, when the Far Eastern department sions increased rapidly over the next several hardened and the split became irreparable, was bifurcated, and the ministry’s senior months, culminating in the publication of a Suslov embraced the anti-Chinese line with expert on China, Mikhail Kapitsa, was placed lengthy statement by Chinese leaders in April a vengeance, in part to compensate for his in charge of the new “First Far Eastern” 1960 during celebrations of the 90th anni- earlier, more accommodating stance. Oleg department.84 That department, under versary of Lenin’s birthday.79 The state- Rakhmanin, a senior official and expert on Kapitsa’s highly visible direction for well ment, entitled “Long Live Leninism!” re- China in the CPSU CC Department for Ties over a decade (until he was promoted to be moved any doubts that Soviet officials and with Communist and Workers’ Parties of a deputy foreign minister in December 1982), diplomats still had about the magnitude of Socialist Countries, also gained an increas- was responsible for China, Korea, and the rift between the two countries.80 Soon ing role in policy toward the PRC.83 Mongolia, while the “Second Far Eastern” thereafter, in early June 1960, all the East Rakhmanin’s expertise and aggressive anti- department handled Indonesia, Japan, and European governments became aware of the Maoist stance gave Soviet leaders precisely the Philippines.85 Even after separate de- conflict when Chinese officials voiced strong what they needed as the split widened, and partments were established, however, the criticism of the Soviet Union at a meeting in the result was an even more confrontational continued hostility between China and the Beijing of the World Federation of Trade policy toward Beijing. Soviet Union left the MFA’s First Far East- Unions (WFTU). The dispute escalated a Foreign Ministry employees were not ern department with a relatively modest role few weeks later at the Third Congress of the necessarily any more favorably disposed in policy-making, in part because the depart- Romanian Communist Party in Bucharest, toward China than senior party officials were, ment overlapped so much with the sections where Khrushchev sought to rebut the com- but the demand for input from the MFA on China, North Korea, and Mongolia in the ments expressed at the WFTU meeting and tended to decline as bilateral tensions grew. CPSU CC Department for Ties with Com- to retaliate for China’s decision to provide Although Soviet diplomats in China still had munist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist other delegates with copies of a confidential important liaison and information-gather- Countries. Not until the 1980s, when rela- letter that Khrushchev had sent to the CCP ing roles, the expertise of the MFA’s Far tions between Moscow and Beijing finally leadership. The top Chinese official in Eastern department was largely eclipsed dur- began to improve, did the Foreign Ministry Bucharest, Peng Zhen, responded in kind.81 ing the 1960s. Zimyanin left the department regain extensive influence over policy to- Amidst growing rancor, the Soviet as early as February 1960, having been ap- ward China. That trend was under way as Union withdrew all its remaining military pointed ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Sub- early as 1982, but it gathered much greater technicians and advisers from China in July sequently (under Brezhnev), Zimyanin momentum after 1986, as Eduard and August 1960, and simultaneously began served briefly as a deputy foreign minister Shevardnadze consolidated his authority as recalling its thousands of non-military per- and then gained prominence within the CPSU Soviet foreign minister. By the time Mikhail sonnel, causing disarray in many of China’s in various capacities: as the editor-in-chief Gorbachev traveled to Beijing in May 1989, largest economic and technical projects and of Pravda (from 1965 to 1976), as a full the MFA had acquired a dominant role in scientific research programs.82 Although Central Committee member (from 1966 on), policy-making toward China. Soviet and Chinese officials managed to and, most important of all, as a CPSU CC The status of the Foreign Ministry on gloss over the dispute at a “world confer- Secretary, beginning in 1976. this issue was never quite as prominent dur- ence” of 81 Communist parties in Moscow Like Zimyanin, the new head of the ing Andrei Gromyko’s long tenure as for- in November 1960, the polemics and re- Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, eign minister (1957-1985), but the MFA’s criminations soon resumed, with ever greater I.I. Tugarinov, was already a member of the influence did temporarily expand in 1959 on stridency. Subsequently, as news of the MFA Collegium at the time of his appoint- the eve of the Sino-Soviet split. Zimyanin’s conflict spread throughout the world, ment, but aside from that one distinction, report thus symbolized a high point for the Khrushchev and Mao made a few additional Tugarinov was an obscure official whose ministry vis-a-vis China in the pre- attempts to reconcile their differences; but tenure at the department lasted only until Gorbachev era. the split, if anything, grew even wider. Hopes August 1963. His successor, N. G. The translation of Zimyanin’s report of restoring a semblance of unity in the Sudarikov, was not yet even a member of the follows below: international Communist movement were MFA Collegium when he became head of dashed. the Far Eastern department, a telling sign of * * * * * * The downward spiral of Sino-Soviet the department’s waning influence. relations after Khrushchev’s visit in 1959 (Sudarikov was not appointed to the Col- tended to rigidify Soviet policy-making. Se- legium until November 1964, some 15 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 178

Soviet-Chinese Relations tions. It created an atmosphere conducive to ing the rightist elements, did not offer any a more frequent and more amicable exchange open condemnation of statements expressed of candid views. The Chinese friends began by them about so-called “territorial claims The victory of the people’s revolution to speak more openly about their plans and on the USSR.” in China and the establishment of the Chi- difficulties and, at the same time, to express The Soviet government’s declaration of nese People’s Republic marked the start of critical comments (from a friendly position) 30 October 1956 [endorsing the principle of a qualitatively new stage in relations be- about Soviet organizations, the work of So- equality in relations between the Soviet tween the peoples of the Soviet Union and viet specialists, and other issues in Soviet- Union and other communist countries—ed.] China, based on a commonality of interests Chinese relations. The CPC CC [Commu- was received with great satisfaction in and a unity of goals in constructing a social- nist Party of China Central Committee] fully China.94 In January 1957 a government ist and Communist society in both coun- supported the CPSU’s measures to eliminate delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the tries. the cult of personality and its consequences. Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a . . . . It is worth noting, however, that the CPC CC, joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration.95 The When discussing the overall success of while not speaking about this directly, took a Declaration emphasized the complete unity the development of Soviet-Chinese rela- position different from ours when evaluating of the USSR and PRC as an important factor tions during the first three years after the the activity of J. V. Stalin.90 A bit later the in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it formation of the PRC, we must not overlook Chinese comrades reexamined their evalua- exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched several negative features of these relations tion of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in claims about a “struggle between the CPSU connected with the violation of the sover- Mao Zedong’s pronouncements when he was and CPC for the right to leadership of world eign rights and interests of the Chinese visiting Moscow.91 For example, he said: “. Communism.” In accordance with the Dec- People’s Republic, as reflected in bilateral . . Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now laration, the Soviet Union devised and imple- agreements signed between the Soviet Union have the same view as the CPSU.” In a mented concrete measures aimed at the fur- and PRC, including, for example, agree- number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a ther development of Soviet-Chinese friend- ments to prohibit foreigners from entering critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. ship and cooperation on the basis of equal- Manchuria and Xinjiang (14 February 1950), Stalin. ity, mutual interest, and complete trust. to establish Soviet-Chinese joint stock com- Soon after the 20th CPSU Congress, a In 1957 a series of consultations took panies, and to set the rate of exchange for the campaign was launched in China to combat place between the CPSU CC and the CPC ruble and yuan for the national bank (1 June dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to CC on common, concrete matters pertaining 1950), as well as other such documents.86 “let a hundred flowers bloom.”92 In connec- to the international situation and the Com- Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took tion with this the Chinese press began, with munist movement. The Chinese friends measures to eliminate everything that, by increasing frequency, to express criticism of actively participated in the preparations and keeping the PRC in a subordinate position specific conditions and of works by Soviet conduct of the Moscow conference of offi- vis-a-vis the USSR, had impeded the suc- authors in the fields of philosophy, natural cials from Communist and workers’ parties cessful development of Soviet-Chinese re- history, literature, and art. This inevitably in November 1957.96 While the Chinese lations on the basis of full equality, mutual- gave strong impetus to hostile statements by delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong ity, and trust.87 Over time, the above- rightist forces who denounced the Soviet spoke approvingly about the positive expe- mentioned agreements were annulled or re- Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rience of such consultations and the constant vised if they did not accord with the spirit of rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing readiness of the Chinese comrades to under- fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a to uphold principles of equality and mutual- take a joint review of these and other mat- Soviet party and state delegation headed by ity, and they alleged that Soviet assistance ters.97 C[omra]de. N. S. Khrushchev in October was self-interested and of inferior quality. The steps to reorganize the manage- 1954 played an important role in the estab- They also asserted that the Soviet Union had ment of the national economy in the USSR lishment of closer and more trusting rela- not provided compensation for equipment were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The tions. As a result of this visit, joint declara- taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that CPC CC fully supported the decisions of the tions were signed on Soviet-Chinese rela- the Soviet Union was extracting money from June [1957] and other plenary sessions of tions and the international situation and on China in return for weapons supplied to the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press relations with Japan.88 In addition, a com- Korea, which were already paid for with the did not feature an official commentary or munique and additional agreements were blood of Chinese volunteers.93 In addition, reactions to the decisions of these sessions. signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the they lodged a number of territorial demands After details about the activity of the Anti- Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock against the USSR. The airing of these types Party faction had been explained to the CPC companies responsible for scientific-tech- of statements during the struggle against CC, the friends began to speak more reso- nical cooperation, the construction of a rightists can in no way be justified, even if lutely about these matters. “If Molotov’s Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the one takes account of the tactical aims of our line had prevailed within the CPSU,” Mao construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator rail- friends, who were seeking to unmask the declared in Moscow, “that would have been road, and so forth.89 rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against dangerous not only for the USSR, but for The 20th Congress of the CPSU was of them for all their statements. It is also worth other socialist countries as well.”98 exceptionally great importance for the fur- noting that the Chinese friends, despite crush- Taking account of the divisive activity ther improvement of Soviet-Chinese rela- 179 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN of revisionists and the surge of imperialist The letter from Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, began to display a more proper understand- propaganda, which tried to use several ideo- and a variety of reports from the CPSU ing of matters considered by the 21st Con- logical campaigns in China in 1957—and, in CC—about the provision of assistance to the gress, such as the question of the signifi- particular, the campaign to “let a hundred PRC to continue strengthening its defense cance of creating a material-technical base flowers bloom” as well as the publication of capability, about a reduction in the number and increasing the productivity of labor for a work by Mao Zedong “On the Question of of Soviet specialists in the PRC and the the construction of socialism, the question Correctly Resolving Contradictions Among elimination of the network of Soviet “ad- of the role of the principle of material incen- the People”—to provoke a schism in rela- viser-consultants,” about the CPSU CC’s tives and labor distribution under socialism, tions between the Soviet Union and PRC, views of the Yugoslav Communist League’s and other questions. the leadership of the CPC CC and the gov- draft program, and about other matters— The CPSU’s position in offering a prin- ernment of the PRC emphasized the close had important political benefits. cipled explanation of a number of Marxist- unity of the socialist camp and the leading The results of the CPSU’s 21st Con- Leninist precepts and laws of the building of role of the CPSU among Communist and gress provided a great boost to the practical socialism and Communism, which were ig- workers’ parties. Mao Zedong stated this activity of the CPC in overseeing socialist nored in China during the implementation of very definitively in his speech to Chinese construction in the country.104 It is worth the “Great Leap Forward” and the establish- students attending Moscow State University noting that after the publication of the theses ment of communes (see the report and speech (November 1957), and he spoke about it at of the report by Cde. N.S. Khrushchev at the by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev at the 21st Con- length with officials from Yugoslavia and CPSU’s 21st Congress and during the pro- gress and the speeches that followed), helped also during meetings that PRC government ceedings of the Congress, the Chinese friends, the Chinese comrades to evaluate the situa- delegations had with delegations from Po- while giving a generally positive evaluation tion correctly and to begin rectifying the land and other countries of the socialist of the achievements of socialist construction mistakes and shortcomings that had arisen. camp.99 In 1959 the CPC CC, having reex- in the USSR, made almost no mention of the The statement by Cde. N. S. Khrushchev amined the proposal of the CPSU CC to theoretical portions of the report by Cde. about the permanent foundations of Soviet- clarify its formula about the leading role of N.S. Khrushchev and said that those por- Chinese friendship swept the rug out from the Soviet Union in the socialist camp, again tions related only to the practice of socialist under imperialist and Yugoslav revisionist affirmed that this formula must be preserved and Communist construction in the propaganda, which was intended to sow in the future. USSR.105 mistrust between our countries and provoke The durability of Soviet-Chinese rela- In a similar vein, the provisions adopted a deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. tions and the role of Soviet-Chinese friend- at the Second Session of the CPC’s 8th . . . . ship gained new strength as the international Congress (May 1958) regarding a struggle An analysis of Soviet-Chinese relations situation deteriorated in the Middle East and against “blind faith” and regarding the need over the past decade confirms that relations also in connection with the provocations by to foster sentiments of national pride among of fraternal amity and fruitful cooperation the USA around the Taiwan Straits in the the people, as well as some preliminary have been established on a lasting basis and summer of 1958. The most important politi- success in implementing the “Great Leap are growing wider and stronger with every cal event that year in Soviet-Chinese rela- Forward,” caused a number of cadre work- passing year. These relations are a decisive tions, which had an enormously positive ers in the PRC to take on airs.106 They factor in the further growth of the might and influence on the development of the whole began excessively emphasizing China’s cohesion of the world socialist camp and in international situation, was the July-August uniqueness and displaying a guarded atti- the consolidation of world peace and the meeting in Beijing between Comrades N. S. tude toward Soviet experience and the rec- security of nations. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong.100 During ommendations of Soviet specialists.107 an exchange of views they considered a Some began declaring that the Soviet Union 1. N. S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 6 vols. (Moscow: number of matters pertaining to Soviet-Chi- had stayed too long at the socialist stage of typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. 5 (“Vzaimootnosheniya s nese relations and, in particular, questions of development, while China was moving val- sotsialisticheskimi stranami”), Part G 101 (“Vzaimootnosheniya s Kitaem”), pp. 77-78. military cooperation. The speech by iantly ahead toward Communism. The Chi- 2. “Vnutripoliticheskoe, ekonomicheskoe i Cde. N. S. Khrushchev, including his state- nese press quite actively featured criticism mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie KNR,” Fond (F.) 5, Opis’ ment that an attack on the PRC would be of the socialist principles implemented in (Op.) 30, Delo (D.) 307, Listy (Ll.) 49-79, TsKhSD. regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union the USSR for the distribution of material 3. The section, entitled “Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya,” is on Ll. 71-79. itself, was fervently greeted with expres- goods in accordance with one’s labor, for the 4. For two quite different versions of this theme, see sions of gratitude and approval in China.102 compensation of labor on a job-by-job basis, Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956- The government of the PRC displayed great and so forth. Some authors essentially ar- 1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); satisfaction at our assurance about our readi- gued that communes were incompatible with and Steven M. Goldstein, “Nationalism and Interna- 108 tionalism: Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Thomas W. ness to launch a nuclear strike in retaliation kolkhozes. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., Chinese For- for a nuclear strike against China.103 In Later on, after studying materials from eign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon turn, the Chinese government declared that the Congress and after numerous mistakes Press, 1994), 224-265, esp. 224-248. Zagoria argues the PRC will come to the assistance of the arose during the establishment of the peas- that China’s policy vis-a-vis other countries (including the Soviet Union) was largely determined by the shift- USSR in any part of the globe if an attack is ant communes and during the implementa- ing fortunes of “left” and “right” factions within the carried out against it. tion of the “Great Leap Forward,” the CPC Chinese leadership. Goldstein attributes the collapse of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 180

Sino-Soviet cooperation to a “fundamental change in 1818. Predsedatelem Tsentral’nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva [Mao’s own] domestic political priorities,” which el- 9. See, e.g., “The Origin and Development of the Differ- Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Mao Tsze-dunom 16 evated “national” over “internationalist” concerns. ences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Our- dekabrya 1949 g.,” Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Although Goldstein does not dismiss factional politics selves: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Federatsii (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 9-17; and altogether, he argues that “Mao was able to set the tone Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of “Zapis’ besedy I. V. Stalina s Predsedatelem and the agenda of Chinese politics” himself, and that People’s Daily and Red Flag,” 6 September 1963, in Tsentral’nogo Narodnogo Pravitel’stva Kitaiskoi China’s relations with the Soviet Union were therefore Peking Review 6:37 (13 September 1963), 6-23. Narodnoi Respubliki Mao-Tsze-Dunom, 22 yanvarya “decisively altered” when “Mao’s thought about 10. Among countless studies citing 1956 as the start of 1950 g.,” APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38. China’s domestic condition underwent a sea change in the conflict are Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict; Wil- 16. Among many examples of gaps in official tran- the years 1956-9” (emphasis added). For an opposing liam E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, MA: scripts are the exchanges deleted from the Polish record view, see John Gittings, The World and China, 1922- The MIT Press, 1964); Francois Fejto, Chine-URSS, de of the five-power meeting in Warsaw in July 1968 1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). Unlike l’alliance au conflit, 1950-1972 (Paris: Editions due (“Protokol ze spotkania przywodcow partii i rzadow Zagoria and Goldstein (and many others), Gittings Seuil, 1973); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: krajow socjalistycznych: Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, avers that changes in the external climate led to shifts Unity and Conflict, rev. and enlarged ed. (Cambridge, Wegier, i ZSRR,” in Archiwum Akt Nowych, Arch. KC in Chinese domestic politics, rather than the other way MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), esp. 271-308 and PZPR, Paczka 193, Tom 24, Dokument 4) and the around. For a similar, though more qualified, assess- 357-432; Jean Baby, La grande controverse sino- Czechoslovak account of the Soviet-Czechoslovak ment, see Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World sovietique, 1956-66 (Paris: Grasset, 1966); G. F. Hudson, meeting in Cierna nad Tisou in July-August 1968 Affairs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), esp. 11- “Introduction,” in G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, (“Zaznam jednani predsednictva UV KSC a UV KSSS 42 and 102-129. Curiously, very few Western scholars and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dis- v Cierna n. T., 29.7.-1.8.1968,” in Archiv Ustredniho have attempted to connect shifts in Soviet domestic pute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 1-8; and Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska, Prague, politics with changes in Soviet policy toward China (or Thomas G. Hart, Sino-Soviet Relations: Re-Examining F. 07/15, Archivna jednotka 274.). In the former case, vice versa). Alexander Dallin outlined a general frame- the Prospects for Normalization (Aldershot: Gower, discussions held during a formal recess in the talks (as work in “The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign 1987). For a variant of this point, see Goldstein, “Na- recorded verbatim in the diaries of a key participant, Policy,” in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context tionalism and Internationalism,” 224-242, which claims Pyotr Shelest’) were not included in the final transcript. of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Col.: Westview that Mao’s rethinking of Chinese domestic priorities, This omission was important because the discussions Press, 1981), 335-408, but he made no specific appli- rather than Khrushchev’s secret speech, was the water- pertained to military options vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. cation to Soviet ties with China. Carl A. Linden offered shed event in 1956. Among those who cite 1958 as the In the latter case, Shelest’s anti-Semitic slurs about a a few comments about the effect of Soviet leadership beginning of the dispute are Yahuda, China’s Role in Czechoslovak official, Frantisek Kriegel, were omitted politics on Khrushchev’s stance vis-a-vis China in World Affairs, esp. 102-129; Allen S. Whiting, “The from the transcript. Fortunately, these derogatory com- Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-1964 Sino-Soviet Split,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John ments were recorded by several participants, including (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, (fittingly enough) Shelest’ himself in his diaries. and Victor Baras discussed the impact of China on Vol. 14: The People’s Republic, Part I: The Emergence 17. On the need for caution in using memoirs, see Mark Soviet leadership politics (1953-1956) in a brief re- of Revolutionary China 1949-1965 (New York: Cam- Kramer, “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: search note, “China and the Rise of Khrushchev,” bridge University Press, 1987), 478-538; and Roderick Should We Swallow Oral History?” International Se- Studies in Comparative Communism 8:1-2 (Spring- MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, curity 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-218; and Mark Kramer, Summer 1975), 183-191; but most of Baras’s and Vol. 2: The Great Leap Forward 1958-1960 (New “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” Linden’s observations are speculative and (particu- York: Columbia University Press, 1983), esp. 36-40 Cold War International History Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), larly in Linden’s case) not wholly convincing. Even the and 255-292. 1, 14-37. illuminating book by James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s 11. For documentation and analysis of these territorial 18. The transcripts reveal that, in addition to Stalin, the Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic issues, see Dennis J. Doolin, comp., Territorial Claims Soviet participants in the talks included Vyacheslav Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer- in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Andrei Vyshinskii, sity Press, 1994), which focuses on the connection (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1965); George plus Anastas Mikoyan and at some of between Soviet domestic politics and foreign relations, Ginsburg and Carl F. Pinkeles, The Sino-Soviet Territo- the meetings. barely mentions Soviet policy toward China. It may rial Dispute, 1949-64 (New York: Praeger, 1978); W. 19. F. Chuev, ed., Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: Iz well be that domestic-external linkages in Sino-Soviet A. Douglas Jackson, Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone dnevnika F. Chueva (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 114. relations, to the extent they existed for either China or of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict?, rev. ed. 20. “Istoriya i sovremennost’: Dialog Stalina s Mao the USSR, were weaker in the Soviet case, but that (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1968); Tai Sung An, The Tszedunom,” Problemy Dal’nego vostoka (Moscow) remains a fitting topic for study. Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute (Philadelphia: 1/2 (1992), 109. This comes from the second part of a 5. The phrase “reluctant and suspicious ally” comes Westminster Press, 1973), 13-73; and Luke T. Chang, fascinating interview with Kovalev by the historian from two recent essays by Steven M. Goldstein which China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes (New Sergei N. Goncharov. For the first part of the interview, debunk the notion that China was “forced” into an York: Oceana Publications, 1982), 9-38 and 107-197. as well as background on Kovalev’s career, see Problemy alliance with the Soviet Union in 1949-50 because of For an intriguing argument that territorial issues were Dal’nego vostoka 6 (1991), 77-91. hostility on the part of the United States. See Goldstein’s not at the heart of the Sino-Soviet rift, see Klaus Mehnert, 21. “Istoriya i sovremennost’,” 110. “Nationalism and Internationalism,” 231 ff. and “The China nach dem Sturm: Bericht und Kommentar 22. “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937 to 1962: Ideology and (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1971), esp. 228- 1956 g.,” Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Unity,” forthcoming in Harry Harding, ed., Patterns of 234. Although Mehnert’s case is generally persuasive, Yudin, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of China. Zimyanin’s report as well as other new evidence (see TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 93-94. Fedorenko’s 6. For further comments by Khrushchev on Stalin’s below) suggests that China’s territorial claims were a article referred to the meeting that he and Kovalev had treatment of the PRC, see Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part more serious irritant (at least from the Soviet perspec- with Mao, but Fedorenko gave no intimation that Mao G, pp. 5-13. See also Andrei Gromyko’s remarks on tive) than Mehnert implied. had found anything “unpleasant” about it. the same subject in A. A. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, 2 vols. 12. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 6- 23. Mao’s three speeches at the Chengdu conference (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1988), 7. were first published in 1969 in a CCP collection, Mao Vol. 2, pp. 127-130. 13. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 128-129. Zedong sixiang wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong 7. Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson 14. Shi Zhe, “‘Soprovozhdaya Predsedatelya Mao’,” Thought”), pp. 159-172, the text of which was later to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 11 February 1950, in U.S. and N. Fedorenko, “Stalin i Mao: besedy v Moskve,” spirited to the West. The speech cited here is the one Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Problemy Dal’nego vostoka 2 (1989), 139-148 and 149- delivered on 10 March 1958. An English translation of States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 6/China (Washington, D.C.: 164, respectively. A slightly abridged version of the speech first appeared as “Address on March 10,” in U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 309. Fedorenko’s article appeared as “Nochnye besedy: Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95- 8. Memorandum of Eisenhower-Churchill-Bidault Stranitsy istorii,” Pravda (Moscow), 23 October 1988, 98. meeting, 7 December 1953 (Secret), in U.S. Depart- 4. 24. Mao also discussed this point at length in his March ment of State, FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. 5/China, pp. 1808- 15. “Zapis’ besedy tovarishcha Stalina I. V. s 1956 meeting with Yudin, remarking that Dongbei and 181 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Xinjiang had “become a mere zone of Soviet influ- account and the Chinese statement both indicate that the allowed to obscure the real purpose of the operation, as ence.” See “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 Soviet leadership hesitated about what to do vis-a-vis revealed in Mao’s secret speeches in September 1958. marta 1956 g.,” L. 93. Hungary. The Chinese statement does not mention that 38. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 72- 25. For a useful list of collections of Mao’s secret Chinese officials, too, were initially hesitant, but that 73. The present author confirmed this point in an speeches, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: omission is hardly surprising and in no way contradicts interview on 6 October 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in Khrushchev’s account. The September 1963 statement the former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene goes on to claim that Chinese leaders “insisted on the policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: adoption of all necessary measures to smash the coun- Soviet leader during this trip to Beijing. From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward, terrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly op- 39. Ibid., 73. Harvard Contemporary China Series No. 6 (Cambridge, posed the abandonment of socialist Hungary.” This 40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: MA: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard Univer- assertion, too, is compatible with Khrushchev’s claim Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: sity Press, 1989), 78-81. that Mao strongly supported the invasion after the Doubleday, 1965), 293-294, 691-693. 26. A good deal of valuable documentation has been Soviet Presidium had arrived at its final decision on 41. Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air emerging about Soviet policy toward China from the October 31. (Because the Chinese statement omits any Power (New York: Praeger, 1968), 54-55. 1920s through the late 1940s, permitting a far more chronology, it creates the impression that Mao’s back- 42. See, e.g., Mao’s speech on 9 November 1958 at the nuanced appraisal of Stalin’s policy. Among many ing for an invasion preceded the Soviet decision, but the First Zhengzhou Conference, translated in MacFarquhar, items worth mentioning is the multi-volume collection statement would hold up equally well if, as appears Cheek, and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman of documents being compiled under the auspices of the likely, Mao’s support for an invasion followed rather Mao, esp. 460-461. Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents than preceded the Soviet decision.) In short, even if the 43. For a cogent assessment of Sino-Soviet dynamics from Recent History (RTsKhIDNI): Chinese statement is accurate in all respects, it does not during the crisis, see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Kommunisticheskaya partiya (Bol’sheviki), Komintern, necessarily contravene anything in Khrushchev’s ac- Tsou, “The 1958 Quemoy Crisis,” in Morton H. i Narodno-revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae. The first count. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control volume, covering the years 1920-1925, was published 29. “Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 265-303. in 1994. Important documents on this topic from the TsK ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” Halperin’s and Tsou’s conclusions differ markedly Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) also have been No. P49/VI (STRICTLY SECRET), 31 October 1956, from standard Western interpretations of the crisis, published in several recent issues of the journal Problemy in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. which posited it as a case of Chinese aggressiveness and Dal’nego vostoka. Perhaps the most intriguing of these 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41. Soviet timidity. For a typical example of this view is the lengthy memorandum from Anastas Mikoyan to 30. Of the myriad Western analyses of this topic, see in (which, unlike Halperin’s and Tsou’s analysis, does not the CPSU Presidium after his trip to China in January- particular Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese fare well in light of new evidence), see John R. Thomas, February 1949, which is presented along with support- Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National “The Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958,” ing documentation by Andrei Ledovskii in issues No. 2 Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, Orbis 6:1 (Spring 1962), 38-64. John Lewis Gaddis has and 3 for 1995, pp. 70-94 and 74-90, respectively. 1970). noted that U.S. officials at the time “interpreted [the Another set of crucial documents from early 1949, 31. Far too many Western analysts have overstated the bombardment of Quemoy] as a joint Sino-Soviet probe which are a splendid complement to Mikoyan’s report, supposed contrast between Soviet and Chinese ap- intended to test Western resolve.” See “Dividing Ad- were compiled by the prominent Russian scholar Sergei proaches to the Third World in the 1950s, mistaking versaries: The United States and International Commu- Tikhvinskii and published as “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta rhetorical flourishes for actual policy. nism, 1945-1958,” in The Long Peace: Inquiries Into RF: Perepiska I. V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v 32. See Mark Kramer, “Soviet Arms Transfers and the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford yanvare 1949 g.,” Novaya i noveisha istoriya (Mos- Military Aid to the Third World,” in S. Neil MacFarlane University Press, 1987), 186-187. Gaddis seems to cow) 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-140. These include and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., Gorbachev’s Third World believe that this perception was not quite accurate, but six telegrams exchanged by Stalin and Mao in January Dilemmas (London: Routledge, 1989), 66-110, esp. in fact the evidence amply bears out the views of 1949, which are now stored in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, Ll. 68-70. President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. 95-118. 33. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi 44. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 233. Mao’s 27. “Address on March 10,” 98. For Mao’s extended propagandy i kul’turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi reference to “a few rounds of artillery” is disingenuous comments on this point during his March 1956 meeting, stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SE- to say the least, since the Chinese leader himself ac- see “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta CRET) of a speech by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of the knowledged in a secret speech in April 1959 (ibid., 290) 1956 g.,” Ll. 88-92. PRC’s Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, 24 April that some 19,000 shells had been fired at Quemoy on 23 28. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part C (“O 1959, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, L. 26. August 1958 alone. The U.S. Central Intelligence Vengrii”), pp. 17-19 and Part G, pp. 37-40. Khrushchev’s 34. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 6 (“Otnosheniya Agency estimated that the number of shells fired on the version of events is borne out by a close reading of the s kapitalisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisya stranami”), first day was closer to 41,000, but whichever figure may Chinese press in October-November 1956. The Chi- Part H (“Otnosheniya s arabskimi stranami”), pp. 57- be correct, it is clear that far more than “a few rounds of nese media spoke positively about the events in Hun- 58. artillery” were fired. gary until November 2, the day after Nagy announced 35. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao 45. As Allen Whiting points out (“Quemoy 1958,” 266- Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and two Tsze-duna,” Pravda (Moscow), 4 August 1958, 1-2. 267), there is little evidence that Mao intended at this days after the Soviet Presidium decided to invade This point was confirmed in an interview on 6 October point to attack Taiwan. Instead, he was hoping merely Hungary. On November 2, Chinese newspapers sud- 1995 with Oleg Troyanovskii, former Soviet ambassa- to destabilize the Guomintang government. denly began condemning the “counterrevolution” in dor in China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev 46. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (1969), 255. See also Hungary. This point was emphasized by the East during the 1958 trip. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958,” 266-267. German authorities in a secret memorandum on Chi- 36. In Peking und Moskau (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- 47. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, p. 132-133. nese reactions to the Hungarian uprising: see “Bericht Anstalt, 1962), 388-392, Klaus Mehnert argues that 48. Full citations for Khrushchev’s two major state- uber die Haltung der VR China zu den Ereignissen in Sino-Soviet differences during the Middle Eastern cri- ments, as mentioned here and in the next sentence, are Ungarn,” 30 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der sis were negligible, but his analysis applies only to the provided below in my annotations to Zimyanin’s re- Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im period after July 23 (i.e., some ten days after the crisis port. Bundesarchiv, IV 2/20, No. 212/02. Other evidence, began). Mehnert’s comments have no bearing on the 49. On this point, see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, including the memoir by the then-Yugoslav ambassa- initial stage of the crisis, when, as the discussion here China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force dor in the USSR, also tends to corroborate Khrushchev’s has shown, Soviet and Chinese leaders genuinely dif- Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford account. (Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary, trans. by fered in their views about how to respond. University Press, 1994), 16. David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 37. See Allen S. Whiting, “Quemoy 1958: Mao’s 50. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 73- 131-141.) Moreover, Khrushchev’s version is not Miscalculations,” The China Quarterly 62 (June 1975), 74. inconsistent with the official Chinese statement of 6 263-270. The various post-hoc rationalizations that 51. This also was a theme in official Chinese polemics September 1963 (cited in note 9 supra), despite the way Mao offered (so that he could avoid admitting what a beginning in 1963. Reliable documentation from 1958 that statement has often been interpreted. Khrushchev’s failure the whole venture had been) should not be undercuts these post-hoc Chinese accusations. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 182

52. For a slightly different interpretation, see Whiting, also three official Chinese statements released in 1963: 69. For the effect on Khrushchev’s trip, see his “The Sino-Soviet Split,” 499-500. “Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 78-82. For the 53. Ibid. and “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Complete, Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition official Chinese perspective, see The Truth About How Pekine 2 oktyabrya 1959 g.,” Osobaya papka and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,” Peking Review the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with (STRICTLY SECRET), APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, 6:31 (2 August 1963), 7-8; “Statement by the Spokes- India Against China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Ll. 12-15. man of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Press, 1963). 54. For a brief but reliable overview of Sino-Soviet Soviet Government’s Statement of 3 August,” Peking 70. CPSU CC General Department, “Otdel TsK KPSS nuclear weapons cooperation, see the highly acclaimed Review 6:33 (16 August 1963), 7-15, esp. 8-10; and po svyazyam s inostrannymi kompartiyami, mart 1953- book by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Govern- fevral’ 1957 g.,” 1958 (Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, ment: A Comment on the Soviet Government’s State- 28, “Predislovie,” L. 2. 1988), 39-46, 60-65, 71-72, and 221-222. Additional ment of 21 August,” Peking Review 6:36 (6 September 71. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. 2, pp. 132-135. Ac- valuable details, especially about cooperation in deliv- 1963), 7-16. These formed the basis of a booklet cording to Gromyko, the talks focused almost exclu- ery vehicle technology, are provided by Lewis and Xue published in late 1963 by the Foreign Languages Press sively on recent developments in the Taiwan Straits, in their subsequent study, China’s Strategic Seapower, in Beijing, People of the World, Unite for the Complete, and were largely unproductive. He said he was “as- 2-4, 10-18, 47-49, and 130-134. See also Robert S. Thorough, Total, and Resolute Prohibition and De- tounded” when Mao nonchalantly proposed that Ameri- Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, struction of Nuclear Weapons! can troops be allowed to penetrate deep into China so Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5: British, French, 62. On 21 January 1960 the Chinese National People’s that they could be wiped out by a Soviet nuclear strike and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Congress adopted a resolution stipulating that China (p. 133). Gromyko’s retrospective assertions about this Press, 1994), 324-356. For a sample of earlier ac- would not be bound by any arms control agreement particular matter have been controversial from the time counts, see Harold P. Ford, “The Eruption of Sino- unless it had participated in the negotiations and had they appeared in 1988. A leading Western expert on Soviet -Military Problems, 1957-60,” in given its express consent. political-military affairs in China, John Wilson Lewis, Raymond L. Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Rela- 63. For background and widely differing perspectives has discounted Gromyko’s report (see Lewis and Xue, tions (New York: Praeger, 1966), 100-113; Thomas on these matters, see Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China’s Strategic Seapower, 16 and 258), but has W. Wolfe, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cam- China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, adduced no specific evidence to contradict it. What is bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 216- 1990), 9-74; Wilhelm von Pochhammer, Die known about China’s cautious policy during the Quemoy 224; Alice Langley Hsieh, “The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Auseinandersetzung um Tibets Grenzen (Frankfurt am crisis (see above) does raise doubts about Gromyko’s Dialogue: 1963,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 8:2 Main: A. Metzner, 1962); Alastair Lamb, The China- claim, but it seems likely that Mao said something (June 1964), 99-115 (Hsieh uses the Sino-Soviet ex- India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries reasonably close, and that Gromyko may have some- changes of 1963 to look back at the earlier period of (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Alastair what misinterpreted it. After all, on 5 September 1958 nuclear cooperation as well as the subsequent dis- Lamb, The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh (Columbia: Mao told a closed gathering of the PRC’s Supreme putes); Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China’s Strat- University of South Carolina Press, 1975); W. F. Van State Conference that China should be ready, if neces- egy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute sary, for a “war in which hydrogen bombs” would be Hall, 1962), 70-109; Morton H. Halperin, “Sino-So- with China, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, used: “If we must fight, we will fight. If half the people viet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960,” in Halperin, ed., 1967); Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (New York: die, there is still nothing to fear.” (See Mao Zedong Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 117-143; and Pantheon, 1970), esp. 47-134; Allen S. Whiting, The sixiang wansui, 1969, p. 237.) Assuming that Mao said Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina roughly the same thing to Gromyko, it is plausible that Praeger, 1965), 78-82. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 1-41; the Chinese leader also made comments similar to what 55. The information here was first revealed by the R. K. Jain, ed., China-South Asian Relations, 1947- Gromyko alleged. This is the view of Oleg Troyanovskii, former head of the Soviet “missile group” in China, 1980, 2 vols. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities the former Soviet ambassador and foreign policy ad- Major-General Aleksandr Savel’ev, in Aleksandr Press, 1981), Vol. 1: India, pp. 97-151; Chang, China’s viser to Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes, esp. 61-78; leader during his trip to China in 1958, a few weeks Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1995, 6. Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. before Gromyko’s visit. In an interview in Cambridge, 56. Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Seapower, 131- Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Ri- Massachusetts on 6 October 1995, Troyanovskii said, 132. For more on the R-11FM, see Mikhail Turetsky, valry in Ladakh (New York: Praeger, 1963); G. V. “I recall hearing something about this at the time, after The Introduction of Missile Systems Into the Soviet Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., Documents on China’s the crisis began. It fits in with what Mao said during the Navy (1945-1962), Monograph Series on Soviet Union Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) Moscow conference in November 1957, which shocked No. 8 (Falls Church, VA: Delphic Associates, Febru- (New York: Paragon, 1964), 111-186, esp. 111-151; us all.” ary 1983), 65-72. and Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, Misperceptions in For- 72. For background, see A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, 57. This is discussed by Khrushchev in Vospominaniya, eign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959- Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 98-99. 1962 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. 58. Ibid., p. 98. Details of the NDTA and the June 1959 64. “Osnovnye napravleniya vneshnepoliticheskoi I. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K. U. Chernenko i M. letter were first publicly revealed in a Chinese broad- propagandy v kul’turnykh svyazei KNR s zarubezhnymi S. Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye cast on 15 August 1963, which claimed that Khrushchev stranami,” Stenographic Transcript No. 17238 (SE- otnosheniya, 1994), 71-72; and O. Grinevskii, “Na had reneged on the agreement so that he would have “a CRET), 24 April 1959, by Zhan Zhisyan, chairman of Smolenskoi Ploshchadi v 1950-kh godakh,” gift to take to Eisenhower when visiting the USA in the PRC’s Committee on Cultural Ties Abroad, in Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ (Moscow) 11 (November September.” A very similar formulation was used in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 307, Ll. 18, 27. 1994), 120-126, esp. 124. the official Chinese statement cited in note 9 supra. 65. “Zayavlenie TASS,” Pravda (Moscow), 10 Septem- 73. “Pribytie N. S. Khrushcheva v kitaiskuyu stolitsu: 59. “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya ber 1959, 3. Vstrecha na aerodrome Shoudu,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SE- 66. MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 258-260. October 1959, 1. CRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, 67. Cited in O. B. Borisov (pseud.) and B. T. Koloskov, 74. A very useful account of Khrushchev’s interactions Ll. 12-15. For an assessment of the Chinese leadership’s Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii with Gromyko during the trip is in Khrushchev’s perspective on this matter, see Lewis and Xue, China’s ocherk (Moscow: Mysl’, 1972), 155. Vospominaniya, Vol. 6, Part E (“O poezdke v SShA”), Strategic Seapower, 17-18, 133. 68. A more serious incident occurred in late October, pp. 7-25. Khrushchev notes that he “greatly respected 60. Khrushchev deals with this point at length in his two-and-a-half weeks after Khrushchev’s visit to China. Gromyko as foreign minister both during this time and memoirs; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 71- Nine Indian policemen were killed or wounded and ten afterwards” (p. 8). 76. See also Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, vol. 2, pp. 133- were taken prisoner after they clashed with Chinese 75. A cover note on Zimyanin’s report alludes to a one- 134. troops near Kongka Pass in Ladakh (northeastern Kash- page update, but the text has not yet been located. No 61. On this point, see Lewis and Xue, China Builds the mir, along the Tibetan border). The Soviet authorities doubt, the update cited the announcement on 17 Sep- Bomb, 64-65 and Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “The Nuclear again maintained a policy of strict neutrality in their tember 1959 that the Chinese defense minister, Marshal Test Ban and Sino-Soviet Relations,” in Halperin, ed., coverage of this incident, further antagonizing the Chi- Peng Dehuai, was being replaced by Marshal Lin Biao. Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, 146-147. See nese. Numerous other top military officials also were re- 183 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN moved at this time: the chief of the Chinese General sovetskikh gostei: Ot”ezd iz Pekina partiino- other documents cited here by Zimyanin, see Staff, General (who was replaced by pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), “Soglashenie mezhdu Soyuzom Sovetskikh the public security minister, General Luo Ruiching); 5 October 1959, 1. The MFA Collegium was a group of Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi two other deputy defense ministers, General 12-15 of the most senior officials in the ministry, Respublikoi o Kitaiskoi Chanchun’skoi zheleznoi and General ; and a half dozen lower-ranking including the minister, all the first deputy and deputy doroge, Port-Arture i Dalnem,” 14 February 1950; generals. These officers and two deputy foreign minis- ministers, and about a half dozen others, among them “Soobshchenie o podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR ters were all removed because of their purported links Zimyanin. i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii dvukh with Peng Dehuai, who was accused in mid-1959 of 77. See “Zapis’ besedy N. S. Khrushcheva 2 oktyabrya Sovetsko-kitaiskikh aktsionernikh obshchestv,” 29 “rightist opportunism” and forming an “anti-Party 1959 g. v Pekine,” Osobaya papka (STRICTLY SE- March 1950; and “Soobshchenie o podpisanii clique.” These charges, approved by the CCP Central CRET), 2 October 1959, in APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 331, soglasheniya mezhdu SSSR i Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Committee at its plenum in Lushan in the first half of L. 1; and “Beseda N. S. Khrushcheva i Mao Tsze- Respublikoi ob uchrezhdenii Sovetsko-kitaiskogo August, stemmed from a secret “letter of opinion” that duna,” Pravda (Moscow), 1 October 1959, 1. aktsionernogo obshchestva grazhdanskoi aviatsii,” 2 Peng sent to Mao in mid-July, which strongly criticized 78. This is documented in Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red April 1950, all in I. F. Kurdyukov, V. N. Nikiforov, and the “confusion,” “shortcomings,” “extravagance,” and Star: The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen, trans. by A. S. Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, “waste” of Mao’s economic policies. The letter was (Beijing: New World Press, 1988), 572-573. Nie 1917-1957: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo disclosed to other senior officials at an expanded ses- Rongzhen was the long-time head of China’s strategic Vostochnoi literatury, 1959), 221-222, 227-228 and sion of the CCP Politburo in Lushan in the latter half of weapons program; his memoirs were first published in 228-229, respectively. For further commentary on July. Mao regarded the document as a grave threat to Chinese (Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu) in 1984. these agreements, see Chang, China’s Boundary Trea- his authority, and he responded with a furious counter- 79. “Long Live Leninism!” was first published in ties and Frontier Disputes, 9-38, and for a detailed attack, forcing members of the Politburo to side either Hongqi 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in contemporary assessment of the inequitable nature of with him or with Peng. Although several top officials translation in Peking Review 3:17 (April 1960), 14-22. the joint stock companies, see the top-secret memoran- undoubtedly shared Peng’s misgivings about recent This statement and many others from 1959 and 1960 are dum “O nedostatkakh deyatel’nosti Sovetsko-kitaiskikh policies, they were unwilling to take a stand against available in well-annotated translation in Hudson, obshchestv Sovkitmetall i Sovkitneft’ v Sintszyane,” Mao. By the time the enlarged Politburo session in Lowenthal, and MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet from N.V. Vazhnov, secretary of the CPSU branch at Lushan adjourned at the end of July and the Central Dispute and as appendices in John Gittings, ed., Survey the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, 25 February 1954, in Committee plenum convened a few days later, Peng’s of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963-1967 (New York: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 9, D. 1933, Ll. 18-38. fate was sealed. For solid analyses of the Peng Dehuai Oxford University Press, 1968), 287-394. The Gittings 87. For Khrushchev’s version of these efforts, see affair, see Jurgen Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and book also includes key statements from 1963-1967 Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 25-31. the Image (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), organized thematically to shed light on events from the 88. “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel’stva Soyuza esp. 77-106; MacFarquhar, The Great Leap Forward, 1950s and early 1960s. Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitel’stva 187-237; J. D. Simmonds, “P’eng Teh-huai: A Chrono- 80. See, e.g., Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki,” 12 October 1954, and logical Re-Examination,” The China Quarterly 37 (Janu- obuchali,” 6. “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya pravitel’stva Soyuza ary-March 1969), 120-138; and Frederick C. Teiwes, 81. For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i pravitel’stva Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and De- includes details omitted from the official transcript, see Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki ob otnosheniyakh s cline of Party Norms 1950-1965 (White Plains, NY: M. Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Yaponiei,” 12 October 1954, both in Kurdyukov, E. Sharpe, 1979), ch. 9. Another invaluable source on Peking (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963), 97-110. Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie the affair is the “memoir” by Peng Dehuai himself, 82. For a useful account of this process by a participant, otnosheniya, 299-301 and 301-302, respectively which was compiled posthumously on the basis of see Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China 89. “Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o peredache autobiographical notes Peng wrote in response to inter- (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike sovetskoi doli uchastiya rogators during the Cultural Revolution. An English 1964), esp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, “Kak nashi v smeshannykh obshchestvakh,” 12 October 1954, version is now available: Memoirs of a Chinese Mar- raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” 6. “Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe kommyunike o stroitel’stve shal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai 83. For a good indication of Rakhmanin’s views at the zheleznoi dorogi Lan’chzhou-Urumchi-Alma Alta,” (1898-1974), trans. by Zheng Longpu (Beijing: For- time, see his pseudonymously written book, O. B. 12 October 1954, “Sovmestnoe kommyunike eign Languages Press, 1984). The book includes a Borisov, Iz istorii sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnoshenii v 50- pravitel’stv Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh whole chapter on the Lushan plenum (pp. 485-509) and kh godakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981). Although the Respublik, Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki i Mongol’skoi an appendix with the full text of the letter that Peng sent book was written much later, his views were remark- Narodnoi Respubliki o stroitel’stve zheleznoi dorogi ot to Mao in July 1959. For additional documentation, see ably constant over the years. Rakhmanin wrote numer- Tsenina do Ulan-Batora i organizatsii pryamogo The Case of Peng Teh-huai, 1959-1968 (Kowloon: ous other books about China (also under the pseudonym soobshcheniya v 1955 g.,” 12 October 1955, ibid., 303- Union Research Institute, 1968). Contrary to much of O. B. Borisov), which are also worth consulting. See 304, 305, and 305-306, respectively. speculation in the West, there is no reason to believe in particular O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sovetsko- 90. Zimyanin’s chronology here is slightly amiss. In that Peng’s challenge to Mao revolved around military kitaiskie otnosheniya 1945-1970: Kratkii ocherk (Mos- private discussions with Soviet officials as early as issues per se or had anything to do with the Soviet cow: Mysl’, 1972). March 1956 (a few weeks after Khrushchev’s secret Union. Peng undoubtedly was troubled by the growing 84. For background on Kapitsa and his dealings with speech), Mao began condemning the “great and serious frictions with Moscow because he knew how depen- Rakhmanin, see Gilbert Rozman, A Mirror for Social- mistakes committed by Stalin,” including his “errone- dent China still was on the USSR for military technol- ism: Soviet Criticisms of China (Princeton, NJ: ous and ill-considered” actions vis-a-vis China. See ogy, but he never raised this issue in his confrontation Princeton University Press, 1985), 51-53. “Zapis’ besedy s tov. Mao Tsze-dunom, 31 marta 1956 with Mao. Nor is there any evidence to substantiate 85. All other Southeast Asian countries came within the g.,” Report No. 209 (TOP SECRET) by P. F. Yudin, claims about a “Soviet connection” made in David A. purview of the MFA’s Southeast Asian Department, Soviet ambassador in China, 5 April 1956, in TsKhSD, Charles (pseud.), “The Dismissal of Marshal P’eng which remained a unified entity. F. 5, Op. 30, D. 163, Ll. 88-99. Only after the upheavals Teh-Huai,” The China Quarterly 8 (October-Decem- 86. The provisions excluding foreigners from Manchu- in Eastern Europe in October-November 1956 did Chi- ber 1961), 63-76. Charles’s article alleges that Peng’s ria and Xinjiang were not made public in February 1950 nese leaders express strong reservations about the de- letter to Mao was prepared with Moscow’s knowledge, and indeed had not been publicly disclosed at the time Stalinization campaign. Zimyanin is right, however, and that “Khrushchev’s refusal to apologize for this Zimyanin was drafting his report. The existence of that Mao had been uneasy about Khrushchev’s secret intervention in Chinese domestic affairs perhaps pre- these agreements first came to light in 1969 when a speech from the very start. For reasons discussed cipitated the acute phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute.” secret speech delivered by Mao in March 1958 was above, it is unlikely that Mao’s aversion to the reassess- These assertions are no more than dubious speculation. published in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang ment of Stalin stemmed from any great feeling of 76. On the role of senior MFA officials during the trip, wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought”), 159-172. personal warmth toward the late Soviet dictator. The see, inter alia, “Uzhin u Mao Tsze-duna” and An English translation of the speech was published in more probable reasons for Mao’s hostility toward the “Prebyvanie v Pekine sovetskoi partiino- Issues & Studies (Taipei) 10:2 (November 1973), 95- de-Stalinization campaign were threefold: (1) his irri- pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii,” both in Pravda (Mos- 98. Mao emphasized that these provisions relegated tation that Khrushchev had not consulted with him cow), 3 October 1959, 1; and “Kitai teplo provozhaet Manchuria and Xinjiang to the status of “colonies.” For before delivering the secret speech; (2) his concern that COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 184 attacks on the “cult of personality” could affect his own debt was not fully repaid until 1965. During the “anti- title used for eight earlier compilations of secret speeches status as the supreme, all-wise leader of China; and (3) rightist” crackdown after the Hundred Flowers cam- by Mao). All three speeches were translated into his belief that the chief features of , especially paign, Lung was punished for his remarks, but he English, introduced, and annotated by Michael the crash industrialization program of the 1930s, were managed to regain his spot on the National Defense Schoenhals in “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 still relevant, indeed essential, for China. Later on, Council in December 1958. See MacFarquhar, The ‘Moscow Conference’,” The Journal of Communist after the Sino-Soviet split emerged, Chinese support Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellec- Studies 2:2 (June 1986), 109-126. Mao’s comments for Stalin was largely rekindled, no doubt to retaliate tuals, 50. See also Mineo Nakajima, “Foreign Rela- about the Anti-Party Group were as follows: “I endorse against Khrushchev. For a lengthy Chinese statement tions: From the Korean War to the Bandung Line,” in the CPSU Central Committee’s resolution of the from 1963 defending Stalin (while acknowledging that MacFarquhar and Fairbank, eds., The People’s Repub- Molotov question. That was a struggle of opposites. he made a few “mistakes”), see “On the Question of lic, Part I, 270, 277. The facts show that unity could not be achieved and that Stalin: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central 94. See “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i the two sides were mutually exclusive. The Molotov Committee of the CPSU (2) by the Editorial Depart- dal’neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva clique took the opportunity to attack when Comrade ments of People’s Daily and Red Flag,” 13 September mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” Khrushchev was abroad and unprepared. However, 1963, in Peking Review 6:38 (20 September 1963), 8- Pravda (Moscow), 31 October 1956, 1. For the CPSU even though they launched a surprise attack, our Com- 15. Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see “Vypiska rade Khrushchev is no fool; he is a smart man who 91. The reference here is to Mao’s trip in November iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 immediately mobilized his forces and launched a victo- 1957, his first visit to Moscow (and indeed his first trip oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” No. P49/ rious counterattack. That struggle was one between outside China) since early 1950. On the point dis- 1 (STRICTLY SECRET), 30 October 1956, in APRF, two lines: one erroneous and one relatively correct. In cussed in the next sentence, see Khrushchev, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25-30. Zimyanin’s description the four or five years since Stalin’s death the situation Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, Part G, p. 105. of Chinese policy is accurate. The Chinese authorities in the Soviet Union has improved considerably in the 92. In May 1956 the Chinese authorities promulgated immediately hailed the Soviet statement and cited it sphere of both domestic policy and foreign policy. This the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a approvingly on many occasions later on. During a trip shows that the line represented by Comrade Khrushchev Hundred Schools of Thought Contend”; and in the to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in January 1957, for is more correct and that opposition to this line is spring of 1957, after the CCP Central Committee example, Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai repeatedly incorrect. Comrade Molotov is an old comrade with a published a directive inviting public criticism, many praised the October 30 statement as evidence of long fighting history, but this time he made a mistake. Chinese intellectuals took advantage of the opportu- Moscow’s “determination to eliminate certain abnor- The struggle between the two lines within the CPSU nity to express remarkably bold and pointed critiques mal features of its relations with other socialist states.” was of an antagonistic variety because the two sides of the Communist regime, far exceeding what Mao had 95. “Sovmestnoe Sovetsko-Kitaiskoe Zayavlenie,” 18 could not accommodate each other and each side ex- anticipated. After six weeks of growing ferment, the January 1957, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, cluded the other. When this is the case, there need not authorities launched a vehement crackdown under the eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 330-335. be any trouble if everything is handled well, but there is new slogan “the extermination of poisonous weeds.” Zimyanin’s characterization of this declaration (see the danger of trouble if things are not handled well.” Hundreds of thousands of “rightists” and “counter- next sentence) is accurate. 99. “Vstrecha Predsedatelya Mao Tsze-duna s kitaiskimi revolutionaries” were arrested, and more than 300,000 96. The reference here is to a two-part conference in studentami i praktikantami v Moskve,” Pravda (Mos- eventually were sentenced to forced labor or other Moscow on 14-19 November 1957 marking the 40th cow), 22 November 1957, 3. punitive conditions. For a valuable overview of this anniversary of the Bolshevik takeover. The leaders of 100. “Kommyunike o vstreche N. S. Khrushcheva i episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Hundred all 13 ruling Communist parties were invited to the first Mao Tsze-duna,” 3 August 1958, in Kurdyukov, Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New session on 14-16 November, but at the outset Yugosla- Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie York: Praeger, 1960), which includes extensive docu- via declined to take any further part. As Zimyanin otnosheniya, 403-406. mentation as well a lengthy narrative and critical com- accurately observes below, China joined the other par- 101. The “questions of military cooperation” discussed mentaries. For a perceptive analysis of the fundamen- ticipants in issuing a statement that reaffirmed the at this meeting were essentially fivefold. First, China tal differences between the Hundred Flowers cam- CPSU’s preeminent role in the world Communist move- sought new weapons and broader military backing from paign in China and the post-Stalin “Thaw” in the Soviet ment. See “Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei Moscow for a possible operation against Taiwan (see Union, see S. H. Chen, “Artificial Flowers During a kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii above). Second, Khrushchev sought, once again, to Natural ‘Thaw’,” in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostoyavshegosya v Moskve persuade China to permit a long-wave military commu- and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differ- 14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 nications center to be established on Chinese territory ences (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), November 1957, 1-2. Yugoslav officials refused to by 1962 for Soviet submarines operating in the Pacific. 220-254. Useful insights into Mao’s own goals for the endorse the 12-party statement, but they agreed to This idea was first broached to the Chinese by Soviet Hundred Flowers campaign can be gained from 14 participate in the second phase of the conference, which defense minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii in April secret speeches he delivered between mid-February was held immediately afterwards, on 16-19 November. 1958, and over the next few months the two sides and late April 1957, collected in MacFarquhar, Cheek, A total of 64 Communist parties from around the world haggled over the funding and operation rights. At the and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, took part in that session, which culminated in the adop- summit, Khrushchev and Mao concurred that China 113-372. tion of a so-called Peace Manifesto. would build and operate the station with Soviet funding 93. These particular complaints were expressed by a 97. “Rech’ rukovoditelya delegatsii Kitaiskoi Narodnoi and technical assistance, and a formal agreement to that high-ranking Chinese military officer, General Lung Respubliki Mao Tsze-duna na yubileinoi sessii effect was signed. (The withdrawal of Soviet personnel Yun, the vice chairman of the PRC National Defense Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR,” Pravda (Moscow), 7 No- from China in mid-1960 left the communications center Council, in the newspaper Xinhua on 18 June 1957, at vember 1957, 2. See also Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, only half-completed, but the Chinese eventually com- the very end of the Hundred Flowers campaign. He Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 42-46. pleted it on their own.) Third, Chinese prime minister declared that it was “totally unfair that the People’s 98. This is a paraphrase of what Mao said in a speech at Zhou Enlai requested Soviet aid in the development of Republic of China had to bear all the expenses of the the 64-party conference on 18 November 1957, the only nuclear-powered submarines, a proposal that Korean War,” noting (accurately) that China had been time he is known to have offered direct support for Khrushchev quickly brushed aside, as he had in the forced to pay for all the military equipment it received Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group. Excerpts past. Fourth, Khrushchev renewed an earlier proposal from the Soviet Union. Lung contrasted Moscow’s from the speech were later published in Renmin Ribao, for a joint submarine flotilla, which effectively would position with the “more suitable” policy of the United but all references to Khrushchev and the “Molotov have been a reciprocal basing arrangement for Soviet States during and World War II, when clique” were omitted. As a result, until the mid-1980s submarines at Chinese ports and Chinese submarines at Allied debts were written off. He also emphasized that Western scholars assumed that Mao had never spoken Soviet ports. Mao summarily rejected this idea, China’s debt to the Soviet Union should be reduced in out against the Anti-Party Group. Fortunately, in 1985 just as he did when it was first raised via the Soviet any case as compensation for the large amount of the full text of Mao’s 18 November 1957 speech was ambassador in China, Pavel Yudin, ten days before industry that the Soviet Union extracted from Manchu- published, along with the texts of two other other unpub- Khrushchev’s visit. Fifth, the question of nuclear ria in 1945-46. Lung’s appeals went unheeded, and the lished speeches he gave during the November 1957 weapons cooperation came up. In accordance with the Chinese government continued to pay off the bills it conference, in a collection entitled Mao Zedong sixiang NDTA, the Soviet Union at the time was training had accumulated, equivalent to nearly $2 billion. The wansui (“Long Live Mao Zedong Thought,” the same Chinese nuclear weapons scientists and was providing 185 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN information needed to build nuclear weapons. But Strategic Seapower, 15-17 and Whiting, “The Sino- assistance. (In other words, they wanted to receive unbeknownst to Chinese officials, Soviet leaders had Soviet Split,” 499-500. For an earlier study reaching Soviet weaponry and sensitive technology, but to use decided in early 1958 not to transfer a prototype nuclear the same conclusion, see Halperin and Tsou, “The 1958 these in accordance with China’s own doctrine, strat- bomb to China, despite having made a pledge to that Quemoy Crisis,” 265-303. egy, and political goals.) At Mao’s behest, Chinese effect in the October 1957 agreement. Mao raised this 104. “Vneocherednoi XXI S”ezd Kommunisticheskoi officials began speaking against the “mechanical imita- matter during the talks with Khrushchev, but got a non- partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O kontrol’nykh tsifrakh tion of foreign technology” and “excessive reliance on committal response. Information here is derived from: razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistvo SSSR na 1959-1965 assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal (1) an interview with Oleg Troyanovskii, the former gody — Doklad tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva,” Pravda countries,” and warned that “there is no possibility for Soviet ambassador and foreign policy adviser to (Moscow), 28 January 1959, 2-10; and “Vneocherednoi us to make wholesale use of the existing experiences of Khrushchev, who accompanied the Soviet leader dur- XXI S”ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo other countries.” They emphasized that China “must ing this trip to China, in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Soyuza: Zaklyuchitel’noe slovo tovarishcha N. S. carry out advanced research itself” instead of “simply 6 October 1995; (2) Lewis and Xue, China’s Strategic Khrushcheva,” Pravda (Moscow), 6 February 1959, 1- hoping for outside aid.” For more on this point, see Seapower, 14-15; and (3) Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, 3. These speeches and other materials from the Con- Ford, “The Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Vol. 5, Part G, pp. 76-78. gress were republished in XXII S”ezd Problems, 1957-60,” esp. 102-104; Lewis and Xue, 102. Khrushchev declared that “an attack against the Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Mos- China’s Strategic Seapower, 3-4, and MacFarquhar, Chinese People’s Republic, which is a great friend, ally, cow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi The Great Leap Forward, 36-40, passim. For a good and neighbor of our country, would be an attack against literatury, 1962). example of Mao’s own thoughts on the topic, see his the USSR itself. True to its duty, our country will do 105. Zimyanin’s characterization of the Chinese re- secret “Address on March 10” at the Chengdu Confer- everything necessary, in conjunction with People’s sponse to Khrushchev’s report (especially the section ence, published in Issues & Studies 10:2 (November China, to defend the security of both states.” This on “The New Stage in Communist Construction and 1973), 95-98. statement was repeated, in more or less identical phras- Certain Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory”) is ac- 108. For Soviet officials’ views of these ideological ing, in numerous high-level Soviet statements. See, curate. Beijing’s tepid initial response appeared in the disputes, see the voluminous files in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. e.g., “Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR main daily Renmin Ribao on 5 February 1959, and a 30, Dd. 247, 301, 398, and 399. N. S. Khrushcheva Prezidentu SShA D. Eizenkhaueru much more extended commentary was published in the po voprosu o polozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 7 Septem- theoretical journal Hongqi on 16 February. ber 1958, in Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, 106. Zimyanin is referring here to the momentous Mark Kramer, a scholar at the Russian Re- eds., Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniya, 411. According Second Session of the CPC’s 8th Congress, which to Khrushchev’s memoirs, as soon as this statement was adopted a “General Line” of drastically accelerated search Center at Harvard University, con- issued, Mao expressed doubt that the Soviet Union had economic development and ideological fervor. The tributes frequently to the Bulletin. any intention of fulfilling it; see Vospominaniya, Vol. 5, hallmarks of the new line, as it evolved over the next Part F (“Mao Tsze-dun”), pp. 4-5. This assertion is few months, were: (1) the Great Leap Forward, a crash problematic, but there is not yet (and perhaps cannot be) program of industrialization relying primarily on China’s any direct evidence to contravene it. own resources; (2) the establishment of huge “people’s 103. The clearest statement to this effect came in a letter communes” (the “basic social units of a Communist Khrushchev sent to President Eisenhower during the society”), which were intended to replace collective Quemoy crisis, warning that “those who are concocting farms and to combine agriculture with industry (includ- plans for an atomic attack against the PRC should not ing “backyard” steel furnaces) all around the country; forget that it is not only the USA, but the other side as (3) the elimination of virtually all remaining forms of well that possesses atomic and hydrogen weapons and private property; (4) the further leveling of social classes the means of delivering them, and that if such an attack and systematic deprecation of expertise; (5) the aban- is carried out against the PRC, the aggressor will be donment of earlier birth control efforts; and (6) the dealt a swift and automatic rebuff in kind.” See “Poslanie conversion of the army into a full-fledged people’s Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. (via the communes) and the establishment of an Khrushcheva Prezidentu SShA D. Eizenkhaueru o “Everyone a Soldier” campaign requiring Chinese mili- polozhenii v raione Taivanya,” 19 September 1958, in tary officers to spend at least one month a year perform- Kurdyukov, Nikiforov, and Perevertailo, eds., Sovetsko- ing the duties of a common soldier. Chinese leaders’ kitaiskie otnosheniya, 417. At the time, the Chinese hopes of achieving immediate, rapid growth via the authorities warmly praised Khrushchev’s statement, Great Leap Forward were evident from the goals they describing it as “a lofty expression of our fraternal set for steel output (to cite a typical case). In 1957 steel relations.” See “Sotsialisticheskii lager v sovremennoi production in China had been 5.9 million tons, whereas mezhdunarodnoi obstanovke,” Pravda (Moscow), 10 the target for 1958 was nearly twice that, at 10.7 million November 1958, 3. Mao himself said he was “deeply tons, and the targets for subsequent years were even touched by [the Soviet Union’s] boundless devotion to more ambitious. Not surprisingly, these goals proved the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international- unattainable, and the whole effort turned out to be a ism” and wanted to “convey heartfelt gratitude” to debilitating failure. The communes (which became Khrushchev for his support during the Taiwan Straits smaller but more numerous after 1958) produced equally crisis. Several years later, however, Chinese leaders disastrous results, causing widespread food shortages shifted their view (in accordance with the polemics of and starvation in the early 1960s. The Chinese armed the time) and expressed contempt for Khrushchev’s forces also suffered immense damage from both the pledge, arguing that “Soviet leaders declared their demoralization of the officer corps and the disarray support for China only when they were certain there within the military-industrial complex. Of the many was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out Western analyses of Chinese politics and society during and there was no longer any need for the Soviet Union this period, see in particular MacFarquhar, The Great to support China with its nuclear weapons.” See “State- Leap Forward. ment by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A 107. This was indeed the thrust of China’s campaign Comment on the Soviet Government’s Statement of 21 against “blind faith in foreigners” (quoted by Zimyanin August,” 1 September 1963, in Peking Review 6:36 (6 in the previous sentence), as formulated in the spring September 1963), 9. New evidence suggests that these and summer of 1958. Although Chinese officials and accusations were unfounded, and that Khrushchev’s military commanders at this point were still hoping for pledge was far more meaningful than the Chinese an increase in Soviet military-technical aid, they wanted authorities later claimed; see Lewis and Xue, China’s to limit the political and doctrinal effects of Soviet COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 186 New Evidence on The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71

EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTS have become available.4 divided China, the Chinese leadership used ON THE BORDER CONFLICT, 1969 Border disputes between Russia and the conflict over the border to draw attention China had a long historical tradition.5 Com- to Czarist imperial legacies in Soviet foreign by Christian F. Ostermann1 peting territorial claims and differences over policy and serve as proof for what was later borderlines reached back to the seventeenth labeled Soviet “social imperialism.” More- The Sino-Soviet border crisis of March- century. In 1860, the conclusion of the over, Beijing hoped that the incidents would September 1969 is one of the most intrigu- Treaty of Beijing provided for a temporary serve notice to the USSR that the PRC would ing crises of the Cold War. For several settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, Chi- no longer put up with Soviet subversion in months, the Soviet Union and the People’s nese and Russian cultures and territorial am- the volatile border regions. Chinese border Republic of China (PRC) stood on the brink bitions continued to clash in the border areas. violations had occurred in Xinjiang in 1959, of war which—on the Soviet side—in- Following the Communists’ victory in the and continued in the early 1960s.8 volved the threat of nuclear strikes. It re- Chinese Civil War in 1949, and Mao Zedong’s Moscow had initially refused to accept sulted in a sharp increase in Soviet military option for an alliance with Moscow (1950), the Chinese notion of “unequal treaties” and strength in Central Asia and a fierce Soviet- the Chinese Communists apparently accepted enter into negotiations which Beijing had Chinese . Like the Cuban Missile the territorial status quo along the 4,150 demanded possibly as early as 1957 and Crisis, the 1969 border conflict also rein- mile-long border with Russia.6 Largely de- again in 1960. Negotiations, Moscow must forced the trend toward a fundamental re- pendent on the Soviet protection and sup- have felt, would call into question the legiti- alignment in the Cold War international port, the Chinese signed the 1951 Border macy of the border arrangement and open a system: polycentrism within world commu- Rivers Navigation Agreement which implied Pandora’s box of questions. As Soviet- nism, Sino-Soviet tensions, U.S.-Chinese their consent to the existing border regime. Chinese polemics and Chinese border intru- rapprochement and “”.2 This included acceptance of armed Soviet sions mounted in the wake of the Cuban Unlike in the case of Cuban Missile Crisis of control of the Amur and Ussuri border rivers Missile Crisis, and as Beijing demonstrated 1962, however, the documentary evidence and of more than 600 of the 700 islands its readiness to employ its growing military on the crisis is extremely sparse. Both located in these strategically important wa- power in several military campaigns against Moscow and Beijing have published their terways in the extreme northeastern border India in 1962, Moscow finally agreed to mutual recriminations, but beyond official region. The agreement also required the Chi- consultations on the border. Following a notes and journalistic accounts, few sources nese to obtain Soviet permission before us- letter by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev have become available on either side, nor, ing the rivers and the islands. Similar proce- to CCP Chairman Mao Zedong in Novem- for that matter, in the United States.3 dures had been established for the use of ber 1963, secret negotiations began in Feb- Numerous questions remain unan- Soviet-claimed pastures by Chinese herds- ruary 1964 but soon stalemated over Chi- swered: What was the motivation on both men in the northwestern Xinjiang border nese claims to large territories in Siberia and sides behind the 1969 border incidents? province. Disagreements over the border demands for recognition of the “unequal” How likely was the outbreak of a major never ceased to exist but local authorities nature of the historical border arrangement. war? How serious was the Soviet nuclear kept them at a low level.7 Disagreement also existed regarding the threat? Were there divisions within the With the emerging Sino-Soviet split in exact borderline. While Moscow was ready Chinese leadership over the Zhen Bao/ the late 1950s and the open collision of to concede that the thalway—a line follow- Damansky Island Incident? What was the Soviet and Chinese leaders at the Interna- ing the deepest point of a valley or river— debate in Moscow? How much did the tional Conference of Communist Parties in constituted the borderline in the northeast- United States know about the conflict? What Bucharest in 1960, the dormant border issue ern border rivers, the Soviets were unwilling was the U.S. role in the dispute? How was resurfaced again. It now seems evident that to relinquish control over most of the 700 the crisis resolved? Even with the opening the border issue was a symptom rather than a islands in the frontier rivers. When Mao of the former Soviet archives, little new cause of heightening tensions between both publicized the controversy and accused the evidence on the crisis has emerged. The countries. Both sides, however, found the Soviets of “imperialism,” Khrushchev de- following three documents, obtained by the issue extremely useful as an instrument in cided to suspend the talks (October 1964).9 author in the “Stiftung Archiv der Parteien their ideological and power-political rivalry. The onset of the Great Proletarian Cul- und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen For the Chinese, the border incidents were a tural Revolution led to a further decline in DDR im Bundesarchiv” (SAPMO), the ar- way to underline their ideological challenge Sino-Soviet relations. Following an abor- chives which house the records of the former by quasi-military means and to put the Sovi- tive meeting with Soviet premier Aleksei East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in ets on the defensive. Claiming that the bor- Kosygin in February 1965, Mao broke party , are among the first authentic, previ- derline had been “dictated” by the Russian relations with the CPSU in 1966 and re- ously secret documents on the crisis that Empire in “unequal treaties” with a weak and duced communications with Moscow to low- 187 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN level contacts. Concurrently, the situation against China. Soviet border patrol unit on the Zhen Bao/ on the borders worsened. In the spring, Despite heightened Chinese aggressive- Damansky Island in the Ussuri, killing the Beijing unilaterally announced stricter navi- ness and Soviet nuclear sabre-rattling, the Soviet officer and 30 soldiers. Document gation regulations governing “foreign” (thus border conflict did not immediately or inevi- No. 1 (printed below), an informational note Soviet) vessels on the border rivers. Later tably develop into shooting engagements. given to the East German leadership and that year small-scale skirmishes occurred Chinese fishermen and soldiers continued to circulated in the SED Politburo, provides along the Sino-Soviet and Chinese-Mongo- enter border islands on the Ussuri and Amur the first internal Soviet account of this cru- lian borders. Ever more aggressively, the which they claimed as their own, thus en- cial incident. Chinese asserted their claims to the islands croaching on territory controlled by Soviets The document accords with the publi- within their half of the border rivers along border guards. In each case, the Soviets cized Soviet version of the incident, consid- the Chinese Northeast. Groups of Chinese dispatched units which ex- ered by scholars as closer to the truth than the soldiers and fishermen were now sent on the pelled the Chinese from the islands. Fight- opposing Chinese account which claimed border islands instructed to fight if their ing was usually avoided. Over the years, that the Soviets started the gunfire and thus normal patrol routes were blocked by Soviet Soviets and Chinese came to adopt a pattern broke the most significant tacit principle of guards. Later, Beijing claimed that a total of of almost ritualistic practices and unwritten confrontation.16 According to the docu- 4,189 border incidents had occurred between rules to resolve border violations in a non- ment, Soviet observations posts noted the 1964 and 1969 alone.10 shooting fashion. Even after Mao turned presence of thirty armed Chinese soldiers on The new Soviet leadership under Le- toward a more aggressive policy of “forceful the island around 9 a.m. on March 2, causing onid I. Brezhnev (which overthrew forward patrolling” (which implied fighting the Soviets to send a unit of border guards to Khrushchev in October 1964) had responded if necessary) during the Cultural Revolu- the island to expel the Chinese intruders. to Beijing’s confrontational posture by in- tion, shooting engagements were avoided When, according to the long-established creased economic and military pressure. by both sides. Neither Beijing nor Moscow practice, the Soviet post commander and a Early on in the confrontation, the Soviets was apparently interested in starting major small advance contingent of border guards had withdrawn vital economic support and fighting.14 confronted the Chinese and protested the advisers from the PRC. Moscow had also The Sino-Soviet “cold war” on the bor- border violation, demanding that the Chi- initiated a major long-term build-up of its der turned hot in the aftermath of the Soviet nese leave the island, the Chinese opened military power in the Soviet Far East. Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (August 1968) fire. In the ensuing fight, the Soviet com- conventional force levels rose dramatically and the Soviet enunciation of the “Brezhnev mander and thirty Soviet soldiers were killed. after 1965, from approximately 17 divisions doctrine.” It is likely that the Chinese lead- Artillery fire was also opened on the unit to 27 divisions by 1969 (and about 48 divi- ership perceived the Soviet claim to inter- from larger and well-equipped Chinese forces sions in the mid-1970s).11 Moscow also vene in any socialist state where socialism hidden on the island and from the Chinese decided to deploy SS-4 MRBMs as well as was considered “in danger”—and the poten- shore. Only after Soviet reinforcements short-range rockets (SCUD and FROG). tial application of the to arrived were the Chinese expelled from the Other initiatives aimed at strengthening bor- Asia—as a threat and challenge to Chinese island. der controls along the frontier with the PRC. security interests. PRC Defense Minister Despite the assertion that the incident Increasing the geostrategic pressure on Lin Biao, Mao’s heir apparent, allegedly was the “logical consequence” of previous Beijing, Moscow also concluded a twenty- warned the CCP Politburo and the Military border provocations, the memorandum to year treaty of friendship with Mongolia. Affairs Commission that China would be the East German leadership, communicated The treaty provided for joint Soviet-Mongo- attacked by the the Soviet Union. In October a few days after the event took place, reflects lian defense efforts and led to the stationing 1968, he issued Directive No. 1 which put Soviet anxiety over the new level of prepa- of two to three Soviet divisions in the Mon- the People’s Republic on war footing. Oth- ration, violence and weaponry exhibited by golian People’s Republic.12 ers within the Politburo—including Premier the Chinese in carrying out the ambush. The Most importantly, Moscow did not shy Zhou Enlai and probably Mao Zedong— document reveals that the Soviet were noth- away from thinly veiled nuclear threats. As apparently doubted Moscow’s readiness for ing less than stunned over the fact that the early as September 1964, Khrushchev had war with China.15 These differences not- Chinese had departed from the long-estab- announced that the Soviet Union would use withstanding, the Chinese leadership opted lished practice of resolving border viola- all necessary measures including “up-to- for a more forceful attitude towards Russia. tions short of firefights. Was this a prelude date weapons of annihilation” to defend its Chinese border guards were now instructed to a full-fledged war? To some extent, the borders.13 Repeatedly throughout the bor- to carry uniforms and weapons and to con- document thus corroborates evidence by der crisis, Moscow secretly and publicly front the Soviets and shoot if necessary. high-level Soviet defector Arkady N. aired the possibility of a pre-emptive nuclear Incidents of growing violence (though still Shevchenko who has argued that “the events strike against Chinese nuclear installations. non-shooting) occurred in late 1968 and in on Damansky had the effect of an electric Faced with the PRC’s growing military ca- January and February of 1969. But it was shock in Moscow. The Politburo was terri- pabilities and Mao’s apparent “mad” “op- not until 2 March 1969 that the transition fied that the Chinese might make a large- portunism”, Moscow increased its nuclear from non-shooting confrontations to fire- scale intrusion into Soviet territory. ... A strength in Asia and, by 1969, had installed fighting was made. On this day, Chinese nightmare vision of invasion by millions of an anti-ballistic missile system directed soldiers ambushed and opened fire on a Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost fran- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 188 tic. Despite our overwhelming superiority East German Embassy in Beijing in early between June and August alone. Consider- in weaponry, it would not be easy for the April 1969, documents one of the early ing the concurrent hints of potential nuclear USSR to cope with an assault of such mag- Soviet peace feelers. The telegram reports attack, the summer of 1969 can be seen, as nitude.”17 information provided by the Soviet chargé the Thomas Robinson has put it, “as a text- Soviet concerns that the border conflict d’affairs in Beijing according to which book case of the use by Moscow of com- would spin out of control were central to the Kosygin, acting on behalf of the CPSU polit- bined political, military, and propaganda Soviet response to the Chinese challenge. buro, tried to contact Mao on March 21 means to force Peking to take an action— Yet so was the specter of an even more through the existing hotline between Mos- renew the talks—it otherwise resisted....”23 radical shift in Chinese foreign policy evi- cow and Beijing. The Chinese, however, Soviet strategy in the border conflict dent in the offensive posture displayed in refused to put Kosygin through. Reflecting proved successful with regard to the re- the ambush and atrocities. For Moscow, the Moscow’s concern over the crisis, Kosygin sumption of border talks. In May, the Chi- March 2 incident also carried geostrategic reportedly indicated that, “if necessary,” he nese Government signaled its readiness for meaning: it revealed “Beijing’s intention to would agree to meet even with Zhou Enlai. talks through an official government note. activate its opportunistic political flirtation When the Soviet Embassy communicated Contrary to their refusal in previous year, the with the imperialist countries—above all the Soviet desire for talks to the Chinese Chinese, in June, agreed to hold a meeting of with the United States and West Germany.” Foreign Ministry the following day, the So- the Commission on Border Rivers Naviga- The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership viets were informed that a direct line be- tion which had been created by the 1951 adopted a carrot-and-stick approach in re- tween the CPSU Politburo and the CCP was Agreement. After an abortive Chinese walk- sponse to the crisis: First, Moscow sought to no longer “advantageous.” Mao’s intransi- out, negotiations resulted in the signing of a isolate Beijing further and increase military gence may well have stemmed from the new protocol in August. More significantly, pressure on the PRC. The March 2 clash had realization that Moscow had only limited the Chinese finally agreed to a high-level initially provoked a heated debate within military leverage. Moreover, by publicly meeting: on 11 September 1969, a meeting the Soviet leadership. Soviet Defense Min- degrading Moscow, Mao probably sought to between Kosygin and Zhou Enlai took place ister Andrei Grechko reportedly advocated strengthen his position at the Chinese Com- in Beijing which laid the foundations for the a “nuclear blockbuster” against China’s in- munist Party conference in April 1969.21 eventual resolution of the border crisis.24 dustrial centers, while others called for sur- Soviet overtures for border discussions Document No. 3, an informational gical strikes against Chinese nuclear facili- continued, however. On March 29, Moscow memorandum handed by the Soviets to the ties.18 Brezhnev eventually decided to opt publicly called for negotiations on the border East German leadership, is a record of the for a more vigorous build-up of Soviet con- issue. Two weeks later, on April 11, a Soviet meeting which took place between Kosygin ventional forces in the East (including relo- Foreign Ministry note to the PRC again pro- and Zhou Enlai. Few details of this crucial cation of Soviet bomber fleets from the posed the immediate resumption of the bor- meeting have become known. According to West), not necessarily precluding, however, der talks, to no avail. Major Chinese intru- the memorandum, the meeting was the re- the use of tactical nuclear weapons.19 Dem- sions occurred, according to these informa- sult of “one more initiative” on the part of the onstrating their determination to retaliate tional notes given by theSoviets to the East CPSU Central Committee to effect a peace- with superior force, the Soviets, after a 12- Germans, throughout May, climaxing in in- ful resolution of the crisis. The Chinese day stand-off, attacked Chinese positions cursions on May 2, 9, 13, and 14 in the responded “pretty quickly” to the Soviet on the island with heavy artillery and over- western border regions as well as along the proposal to take advantage of Kosygin’s whelming force, foregoing, however, the controversial border rivers in the east. presence in Hanoi on the occasion of Ho Chi use of air or nuclear strikes.20 Facing Chinese intransigence, Moscow Minh’s funeral. The Soviet delegation un- To some extent, the Kremlin’s forceful continued its “coercive diplomacy” through- der Kosygin, however, learned of Chinese but limited military response was influ- out the summer of 1969, launching a further readiness to talk only one hour after its enced by heightened concern over the mili- military build-up to ensure complete superi- departure from Hanoi. Indicative of tarization of the crisis among Moscow’s ority in strategic and conventional weapons. Moscow’s strong interest in de-escalation, European and Asian allies. Moscow, how- Indeed there is every reason to believe that Kosygin, who had already reached Soviet ever, had no interest in escalating the crisis following the March 2 engagement, the So- Central Asia, turned around and flew to beyond control for other reasons as well. viets were largely responsible for incidents Beijing, there he was met by Chinese leaders Added pressure on the PRC would not in- along the Sino-Soviet border, the most im- Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and .25 duce Mao to forego his “political flirtation” portant of which occurred on August 13 The four-hour talk apparently centered with the West—in fact, it might reinforce along the Central Asian border in Xinjiang, on the border issue. According to the Soviet such a move, which would run counter to six miles east of Zhalanashkol.22 Taking account, Zhou Enlai declared that “China Soviet geostrategic interests. Thus, advantage of their superiority in armor and has no territorial pretensions toward the Brezhnev also sought to defuse the crisis by weaponry, the Soviets sought to demonstrate Soviet Union” and—despite his assertions resuming negotiations with the Chinese. to the Chinese their determination through about the unequal nature of the treaties— Within a week of the March 15 incident, repeated border infringements. Apparently “recognizes that border which exists in ac- Moscow sought to re-establish contact with more anxious about Soviet policy, the Chi- cord with these treaties.” While Zhou stated Beijing. nese, by September, were charging the Rus- that China had no intentions of attacking the Document No. 2, a telegram from the sians with 488 “deliberate” border violations Soviet Union, Kosygin denied assertions of 189 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

“contrived imperialist propaganda” that Chinese soldiers violated the border at the liquor bottles (which had obviously been Moscow was “preparing a preventive strike” Damansky Island several times, operating used by the Chinese provocateurs and the against the PRC. Preparatory to further from Hunzy. After by the Soviet participants in this adventure beforehand to negotiations on border issues in Beijing, border guards, the Chinese military returned gain courage) were found. both sides were reported to have agreed to to their border posts or marched along the There are no settlements on the Island three principles: (1) the observance of the line which constitutes the border between of Damansky and it is of no economic im- existing border; (2) the inadmissibility of China and the USSR. portance at all; there are no villages in the armed confrontations; and (3) military dis- In the events of March 2, 1969, the vicinity for dozens of miles. One can obvi- engagement from disputed border areas. border control forces at Hunzy played only ously draw the conclusion that it [the island] Kosygin also proposed the expansion of a secondary role. An especially trained unit was chosen as the site for the provocation trade relations and economic cooperation as of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army because such an endeavor could be prepared well as the normalizing of railroad and avia- with a force of more than 200 men was used there secretly and then presented to the world tion connections. Significantly, the Soviet for the staging of this provocation. Secretly, in a version advantageous to the organizers. premier also acquiesced when Zhou declared this unit was brought on the Island Damanskiy During the provocation, the Chinese that Beijing would not curtail its political during the night of March 2. The men in this military committed incredibly brutal and and ideological criticism of the Soviet Union. unit had special gear and wore cruel acts against the wounded Soviet border Letting the Chinese save face, Kosygin con- clothes. A telephone line to the unit was guards. Based on the on-site inspection and ceded that, while Sino-Soviet disagreements installed from the Chinese shore. Prior to the expert knowledge of the medical com- “played into the hands of world imperial- this, reserves and munitions, among others mission which examined the bodies of the ism,” Moscow considered polemics on con- PAC batteries, mines and armored artillery dead Soviet border guards, it can be stated troversial issues as “permissible” if con- and heavy fire guns, had been pulled to- that the wounded were shot by the Chinese ducted in a “fitting tone.” gether near the Chinese shore. The stabiliz- from close range [and/or] stabbed with bayo- Moscow was successful in forcing the ers, shelling, mines and splinters, nets and knifes. The faces of some of the Chinese to accept the status quo along the and the kind of crates left in the tanks that casualties were distorted beyond recogni- Sino-Soviet border. But this victory came at were hit, found later provided the proof that tion, others had their uniforms and boots a price in ideological and geostrategic terms. these weapons had indeed been used. taken off by the Chinese. The cruelties Not only did the Soviets concede the validity Around 2 o’clock Moscow time (9 committed by the Chinese toward the Soviet of a direct challenge to its leadership within o’clock local time), our observation posts border guards can only be compared with the the Communist bloc in ideological terms, a noted the advance of 30 armed Chinese worst brutalities of the Chinese militarists development long evident but rarely formu- military men on the Island of Damansky. and Chiang Kai-shek’s [Jiang Jieshi’s] men lated as explicitly as in the Beijing meeting. Consequently, a group of Soviet border during the ’20s and ’30s. In the long run, Moscow’s coercive diplo- guards was dispatched to the location where The crime by the Mao Zedong group macy worsened relations with the United the Chinese had violated the border. The which caused loss of lives has far-reaching States and helped drive China into a rap- officer in charge of the unit and a small objectives. prochement with the West, thus altering the contingent approached the border violators The Maoists exacerbate the anti-Soviet balance of power in Asia to Soviet disadvan- with the intention of registering protests and hysteria and produce a chauvinist frenzy in tage.26 demanding (without using force) that they the country, creating an atmosphere which leave Soviet territory, as had been done enables them to establish Mao Zedong’s * * * * * repeatedly in the past. But within the first anti-Soviet and chauvinist-great power minutes of the exchange, our border guards course as the general line of Chinese policy Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR came under crossfire and were insidiously at the IX Party Convention of the CPC. Leadership on 2 March 1969 shot without any warning. At the same time, It is also obvious that the Mao group has Sino-Soviet Border Clashes fire on the remaining parts of our force was the intention of using the anti-Soviet psy- opened from an ambush on the island and chosis it created for its subversive and divi- 5 Copies from the Chinese shore. The guards then sive policy in the international Communist 3/8/69 assumed combat order, and, reinforced by movement. The Maoists apparently strive to the approaching reserve from the nearby make an all-out effort to complicate and On March 2, 1969, at 11 o’clock local border post, threw back the Chinese surprise prevent the convention of the International time, the Chinese organized a provocation attack, and expelled them through decisive Consultation of Communist and Workers’ on the Island Damansky which is located on action from Soviet territory. Parties in order to create distrust in the the river Ussuri south of Khabarovsk, be- There were casualties and wounded men Soviet Union and the CCPU among the tween the points Bikin and Iman (Primorsky on both sides. fraternal parties. Region). When the location on the island where The new dangerous provocations of the The ascertained facts are that this action the incident had happened was inspected, Maoists reveal Beijing’s intention to acti- had been prepared by the Chinese govern- military equipment, telephones, and phone vate the opportunistic political flirtation with ment for a long time. In December 1968 and lines connecting to the Chinese mainland, as the imperialist countries - above all with the in January/February 1969, groups of armed well as large numbers of scattered empty United States and West Germany. It is no COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 190 accident that the ambush on the Soviet bor- nese border and raised territorial claims campaign assumed a military coloration, der unit was staged by the Chinese agencies against the Soviet Union about an area of that an atmosphere of chauvinistic frenzy at a time when Bonn started its provocation altogether 1,575,000 square kilometer. On has been created throughout the country. of holding the election of the Federal Presi- July 10, 1964, Mao Zedong declared in a Faced with this situation the CC of the dent in West Berlin. conversation with Japanese members of par- CPSU and the Soviet government are under- The provocation in the area of the Is- liament with regard to the Chinese territorial taking the necessary steps to prevent further land of Damansky is part of the Maoists’ demands against the Soviet Union that “we border violations. They will do everything policy which aims at forcing a radical rever- have not yet presented the bill for this terri- necessary in order to frustrate the criminal sal in the foreign and domestic policies of tory.” intentions of the Mao Zedong group which the PR [People’s Republic] of China and at On August 22, 1964, the consultations are to create hostility between the Soviet transforming the country de facto into a were interrupted. Despite our repeated pro- people and the Chinese people. power hostile toward the socialist countries. posals the Chinese did not resume the con- The Soviet Government is led in its The Mao Zedong group has prepared versations and did not react even when the relations with the Chinese people by feel- the organization of armed provocations along question was mentioned in the Soviet foreign ings of friendship and is intent on pursuing the Soviet-Chinese border for a long time. ministry note of August 31, 1967. this policy in the future. Ill-considered pro- The Chinese authorities have been creating Meanwhile the Chinese authorities con- vocative actions of the Chinese authorities artificial tensions at the Soviet-Chinese bor- tinued to violate grossly the Soviet-Chinese will, however, be decisively repudiated on der since 1960. Since this time the Chinese agreement of 1951 on the regulation of the our part and brought to an end with determi- have undertaken several thousand border navigation in the border rivers. In 1967 and nation. violations with provocative goals. 1968 they blew up the consultations of the At the beginning of 1967, the number mixed Soviet-Chinese navigation commis- [Source: -BArch J IV 2/202/359; of border violations by Chinese authorities sion which had been established on the basis translation from German by Christian F. increased sharply. In some districts they of the agreement of 1951. Ostermann.] tried to install demonstratively border pa- In the Chinese border areas large mili- trols on the islands and those parts of the tary preparations set in (construction of air- * * * * * rivers belonging to the USSR. In December ports, access routes, barracks and depots, 1967 and in January 1968, the Chinese training of militia, etc.). Document No. 2: Telegram to East undertook large provocative actions on the The Chinese authorities consciously German Foreign Ministry from GDR island of Kirkinsi on the Ussuri [River] and conjure up situations of conflict along the Ambassador to PRC, 2 April 1969 in the area of the Kasakevich Canal. On border and stage provocations there. On our January 23, 1969, the Chinese staged an part, all measures have been taken to avoid Council of Ministers of the armed attack on the Island of Damansky. an escalation of the situation and to prevent German Democratic Republic The border in the area of the Island of incidents and conflicts. The Soviet border The Minister for Foreign Affairs Damansky was established according to the troops have been instructed not to use their Treaty of Beijing of 1860 and the enclosed arms and, if possible, to avoid armed colli- Berlin, April 2, 1969 map which the representatives of Russia sions. The instruction on the non-use of arms and China signed in June 1863. According was strictly enforced, although the Chinese Comrade to the then drawn-up demarcation line the acted extremely provocatively in many cases, Willi Stoph Island of Damansky is located on the terri- employed the most deceitful tricks, picked tory of the USSR. This line has always been fights, and attacked our border guards with Hermann Axen protected by Soviet border guards. stabbing weapons, with steel rod and other Confronted with the Chinese provoca- such things. Berlin tions at the border, the Soviet side, for years, The armed provocation in the area of the has taken active steps towards a regulation Island of Damansky is a logical consequence Dear Comrades! of the situation. of this course of the Chinese authorities and The question of the borderline was dis- is part of a far-reaching plan by Beijing The following is the text of a telegram cussed in the bilateral Soviet-Chinese Con- aiming at increasing the Maoists’ anti-Soviet from Comrade Hertzfeld, Peking, for your sultations on the Determination of the Bor- campaign. information: derline in Certain Controversial Areas of Since March 3, 1969, the Soviet Em- 1964. The Soviet side made a number bassy in Beijing has been exposed again to an “Soviet Chargé stated that there is talk proposals regarding the examination of the organized siege by specially trained groups in Hanoi that wants to go to controversial border question. The Chinese of Maoists. Brutal acts of force and rowdylike Beijing soon to negotiate at the highest level leadership, however, was determined to let excesses against the representatives of So- with the Chinese side since the Vietnamese these consultations fail. The Chinese del- viet institutions are occurring throughout side is very concerned about the aggravation egation put up the completely untenable China every day. All over the country, an of Chinese-Soviet relations. demand to recognize the unequal character unbridled anti-Soviet campaign has been The Ambassador of the Hungarian of the treaties delineating the Soviet-Chi- kindled. It is characteristic that this whole People’s Republic reported that the PR China 191 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN and the DRV [Democratic Republic of Viet- advantageous. nam] [earlier] this year signed an agreement If the Soviet government had to com- on Chinese aid for Vietnam in the sum of 800 municate anything to the PR China, it is The CC CPSU considers it necessary to million Yen. [...] asked to do so via diplomatic channels. inform You about A.N. Kosygin’s conver- The Chargé was called on the evening Allegedly conference in Hongkong on sation with Premier of the State Council of of March 21 by Kosygin on direct line from questions of China policy organized by the the PRC Zhou Enlai which took place on Moscow. Com. Kosygin informed him that US State Department. Dutch Chargé and September 11 of this year in Beijing. he had attempted to contact Mao Zedong Finnish Ambassador here are to attend.” As is well known, relations between the through the existing direct telephone line. USSR and China, and the leadership of the He was not put through by the Chinese side. With Socialist Greetings PRC is to blame for this, are extremely If need be the conversation could also be Oskar Fischer aggravated. The Chinese authorities are held with Zhou Enlai. (Com. Kosygin was exacerbating tension on the border with the acting at the request of the politburo of the [Source: SAPMO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; Soviet Union. In the PRC, appeals to pre- CPSU.) translation from German by Christian F. pare for war against the USSR are openly After various attempts by the Soviet Ostermann.] made. Trade relations have been reduced to Embassy to contact the Foreign Ministry in a minimum, scientific-technological and this matter, a conversation between Kosygin * * * * * cultural exchanges have ceased, contacts and Mao Zedong was refused [by the Chi- along diplomatic lines are limited. For more nese] under rude abuse of the CPSU. Desire Document No. 3: Soviet Report on 11 than three years ambassadors have been for talks with Zhou was to be communicated September 1969 Kosygin-Zhou Meeting absent from Moscow and Beijing. The anti- [to the Chinese]. Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership is Secret being used by the imperialist powers in the 3/22 Aide-mémoire by the deputy head of Only Copy struggle against world socialism and the department in the foreign ministry; it stated Information Communist movement. that, because of the currently existing rela- About A.N. Kosygin’s Conversation With In the report of CC CPSU General Sec- tions between the Soviet Union and the PR Zhou Enlai on retary L.I. Brezhnev to the Moscow meeting China, a direct telephone line was no longer 11 September 1969

The Cold War in Asia: 2) Russo-Chinese, Russo-Japanese, cial Archive and Russian State Archive of Khabarovsk Conference Highlights Russo-Korean and Russo-American diplo- the Far East in Vladivostok. These sites hold Role of Russian Far East matic, economic and cultural relations in materials on such Cold War related topics as Northeast Asia; border disputes and clashes, , by David L. Wolff 3) the special role of the military as a the draft, voluntary organizations to aid the social and economic force in the borderland; Army, civil defense, military education, the On 26-29 August 1995 an international, 4) the great importance of migration in military-industrial complex and cross-bor- interdisciplinary conference focusing on the this region, whether as colonization, intra- der contacts (trade, tourism, intergovern- borderland nature of the Russian Far East regional mobility or expulsion, and mental negotiations, etc.). Two interesting took place in Khabarovsk, Russia. Brought 5) diaspora communities of the Russian documents from the Khabarovsk archive together by funds from the Center for Global Far East: Chinese, Germans, Japanese, Jews, concerning Sino-Soviet border-tensions ap- Partnership (Abe kikin), the Cold War Inter- Koreans and Russians; pear in translation by Elizabeth Wishnick in national History Project (CWIHP), and the The working language of the confer- this issue of the Bulletin. Russian partici- International Research and Exchanges Board ence was Russian, although several talks pants have also made declassification re- (IREX), 40 scholars made 38 presentations were delivered in English with interpreta- quests in the course of preparing conference about their papers and responded to ques- tion into Russian. There were a surprising papers. tions from the other participants. number of people at the table (actually a big Significantly, a large group of the A number of papers focused directly on square of tables) fluent in three or more region’s archivally active scholars, Ameri- Cold War issues, as can be seen in the full languages and I think everyone met and cans, Chinese, Japanese and Russians be- schedule printed below. There was an ap- talked with just about everyone else. came aware of the Cold War International proximately equal number of papers cover- Representatives from local archives pre- History Project’s past accomplishments, ing events prior to the Cold War and those sented papers on specific areas of strength present activities and future plans. Several more contemporary. General themes touched and exhibited lists of holdings, covering are now undertaking research on the Cold on in discussions included: such themes as Russo-Chinese relations, War and plan to attend the January 1996 1) the special nature of the Russian Far Chinese and Koreans in the Russian Far CWIHP conference at the University of Hong East as a borderland, historically much more East, Russians in China and Birobidzhan. Kong on the Cold War in Asia to present in contact with neighbors than most of Rus- Additionally, aside from myself, six other findings. sia; scholars worked in the Khabarovsk Provin- continued on page 206 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 192 of Communist and Workers’ Parties the nese relations. In this regard, Zhou Enlai’s and the PRC. An initiative was revealed by course of our policy in relation to China was various attempts to introduce into the con- us regarding an expansion of trade, the ful- clearly set forth. The CPSU and the Soviet versation polemics on issues of ideological fillment of contracts which had been con- government, proceeding from its unchang- disagreements were decisively deflected. The cluded, the signing of trade protocols for the ing policy oriented towards an improve- Soviet side firmly declared the immutability current and next year, the working out of ment in relations between the USSR and the of our principled positions and political course measures on trade and economic coopera- PRC, has repeatedly appealed to the Chi- in the area of domestic and foreign policy. tion during the present five-year plan. Zhou nese leadership with concrete proposals A consideration of the situation on the Enlai promised to present these proposals to about ways to normalize relations. The Soviet-Chinese border occupied the central the Politburo of the CC CPC, and expressed pronouncements of the government of the place in the conversation. The sides recog- his agreement to exchange supplemental USSR of March 29 and June 13 of this year nized the abnormality of the existing situa- lists of products for 1969. are very well known. The message of the tion and exchanged opinions regarding the We proposed to the Chinese side to Council of Ministers of the USSR to the search for paths to the settlement of the normalize railroad and aviation connections State Council of the PRC sent in July of this border issues. Zhou Enlai declared that between the two countries, and to reestab- year, in which concrete proposals regarding “China has no territorial pretensions toward lish the high-frequency link which had been the improvement of contacts between the the Soviet Union.” At the same time he interrupted by the Chinese authorities in Soviet Union and China along government repeated his previous assertions about the March of this year. lines were put forth, including the organiza- unfair nature of the agreements which define From the Soviet side there also was tion of a bilateral summit meeting, also the border, although he said that the Chinese raised the issue of mutually sending Ambas- served the aims of putting to rights Soviet- side does not demand that they be annulled sadors and the creation of conditions for the Chinese inter-governmental relations. and “recognizes the border which exists in normal activity of diplomatic representa- Undertaking these actions, the CC accord with these treaties.” From the Soviet tives. CPSU and the Soviet government proceeded side a proposal was introduced to move to- Zhou Enlai stated that these proposals from and proceeds from a principled course ward the practical preparation for negotia- will be submitted to Mao Zedong. in Soviet-Chinese relations. According to tions on border issues. Vis-a-vis these goals, During the consideration of issues of our deep conviction, a softening of tensions we proposed to organize over the next week Soviet-Chinese inter-governmental relations in relations between the USSR and the PRC or two a meeting between delegations headed Zhou Enlai stressed that the leadership of the would correspond to the interests of our two by the deputy ministers of foreign affairs of CPC does not intend to curtail its political countries, and also of the whole Socialist the two countries. In this regard it was noted and ideological speeches against the CPSU commonwealth overall, would facilitate the by us that the place where these negotiations and the other fraternal parties. He justified activation of the struggle against imperial- will be held has no particular significance for the current forms of “polemics” which are ism, would be an essential support to heroic us. Zhou Enlai responded to our proposal being used by the Beijing leaders as having Vietnam and to the peoples of other coun- about negotiations and expressed a wish that nothing in common with theoretical discus- tries which are leading the struggle for so- the negotiations would be held in Beijing. sions, and referred to the statement of Mao cial and national liberation. As the bases for normalization of the Zedong to the effect that “polemics will Guided by these considerations, the CC situation on the border during the period continue for 10 thousand more years.” CPSU decided to undertake one more initia- before a final settlement which could be The Soviet side stressed that the CPSU tive aimed at a softening of the situation in achieved as the result of negotiations be- believes that polemics on controversial is- relations between the USSR and the PRC. tween the delegations of the USSR and the sues are permissible; however, it is impor- The Chinese side responded pretty PRC, the following principles were put forth: tant that they be conducted in an appropriate quickly to our proposal to hold a meeting of observance of the existing border, the inad- tone, and argued on a scientific basis. Lies A.N. Kosygin, who was present in Hanoi at missibility of armed confrontations, the with- and curses do not add persuasiveness and Ho Chi Minh’s funeral, with Zhou Enlai. drawal of troops of both sides from direct authority to a polemic, and only humiliate However, the Chinese response arrived in contact in controversial sectors. It was agreed the feelings of the other people and aggra- Hanoi an hour after the departure of the that issues which arise in relation to the vate the relations. Soviet Party-State delegation to Moscow economic activity of citizens of both coun- From our side it was also underlined via Calcutta, and therefore A.N. Kosygin tries in the controversial sectors will be de- that disagreements between the USSR and set off for Beijing already from the territory cided according to the agreement between the PRC play into the hands of the world of the Soviet Union. representatives of the border authorities. Both imperialism, weaken the Socialist system The meeting of the Soviet delegation sides agreed to give an instruction to the and the ranks of fighters for national and headed by Comrade A.N. Kosygin with appropriate border organizations to resolve social liberation. It was noted that over the Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Xie Fuzhi misunderstandings which arise in the spirit whole history of the struggle with Commu- continued for about four hours. From the of benevolence via the path of consultation. nism, imperialism has never received a Soviet side efforts were applied to assure Guided by the instructions of the CC greater gain than that which it has as a result that the conversation took place in the spirit CPSU, the Soviet side put forth concrete of the deepening, which is not our fault, of of a concrete consideration of the knotty proposals on the establishment and develop- the PRC’s differences with the Soviet Union issues of inter-governmental Soviet-Chi- ment of economic contacts between the USSR and other Socialist countries. 193 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

We declared the provocative nature of demonstrate a sober and serious approach to Moscow & Washington, 1949-1988 (Boulder: Lynne the contrived imperialist propaganda to the the proposals which were put forth by us, Riener, 1989), chap. 1; Oleg B. Borisov/B. T. Koloskov, Soviet Chinese Relations, 1945-1970 (Bloomington, effect that the Soviet Union allegedly is that this will frustrate the designs of the IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), 327. preparing a preventive strike on China. It imperialist circles to intensify the Soviet- 8. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 271; Wich, was stressed that in the Soviet Union neither Chinese disagreements, to provoke a con- Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 27-28; Robinson, “Sino- the Party nor the government has ever spo- flict between our countries and in this way to Soviet Border Conflict,” 266. 9. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 68. ken about the unavoidability of war and has weaken the common front of the anti-impe- 10. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 275; Nelson, not summoned the people to war. All of our rialist struggle. Power and Insecurity, 70; Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Bor- documents, party decisions summon the The normalization of relations between der Conflict,” 268. people to peace. We never have said to the the USSR and the PRC, if they will demon- 11. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 72. 12. Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The people that it is necessary to “pull the belt strate a desire to do this in Beijing, undoubt- Soviet Far East Military Buildup, (Dover, MA: Auburn tighter,” that war is unavoidable. Zhou edly will facilitate the growth of the power House, 1986), 26-27; Avigdor Haselkorn, The Evolu- Enlai, in his turn, said that “China has no of the camp of Socialism and peace, will tion of Soviet Security Strategy 1965-1975 (New York: intentions to attack the Soviet Union.” He correspond to the interests of a strengthen- Crane & Russak, 1978), 39-42; Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 70. stressed that from the Chinese side measures ing of unit of the anti-imperialist forces and 13. Cited in Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 68. will be undertaken not to allow armed con- to the successful resolution of the tasks which 14. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 270-276. frontations with the USSR. were posed by the International Meeting of 15. On foreign minister Zhou En-lai’s role see Han The conversation took place overall in a Communist and Workers’ Parties. Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 359. constructive, calm atmosphere, despite the 16. Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account of the sharp posing of a range of issues. [Source: SAMPO-BArch J IV 2/202/359; 1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” The China Quarterly 56 We evaluate the meeting which has translation from Russian by Mark H. (October/December 1973), 730-739; Cohen, “Sino- taken place with representatives of the Chi- Doctoroff, National Security Archive.] Soviet Border Crisis,” 278. 17. Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow nese leadership as useful. The CC CPSU (New York: Knopf, 1985), 164-165. and the Soviet government made a decision 1. I would like to thank Malcolm Byrne and Jim 18. Nelson, Power and Insecurity, 73. about the members of the delegation and Hershberg for their support and advice. Translations of 19. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its documents nos. 1 and 2 are mine; translation of docu- time frames for their meetings with the Chi- International Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: Uni- ment No.3 from Russian was provided by Mark versity of Washington Press, 1992), 191-193. nese representatives for the realization of the Doctoroff (The National Security Archive). 20. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 179. concrete proposals which were put forth in 2. On the changing international system see Raymond 21. According to , Eldest Son, 369-70, the course of the conversation. L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American- Kosygin was “more alert to the changing situation than Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Wash- It goes without saying that for the time Brezhnev,” and tried to reach Zhou Enlai but failed ington, DC: The , 1994), 228-242; “because the young telephone operator in Beijing, full being it is still early to make conclusions Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, of Cultural Revolution spirit, told Kosygin, “We do not about the results which this meeting will 1945-1991 (Cambridge History of American Foreign speak to revisionists.” See also Dick Wilson, The Story bring. The anti-Soviet campaign which is Relations, vol. IV), (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1976 (London: Hutchinson, 1984), sity Press, 1993), 186-187. continuing in the PRC and also the fact that 270. 3. The best study of the crisis based mainly on published 22. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 178. the agreed text of the communiqué about the U.S., Soviet and Chinese sources is Thomas W. 23. Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” 280. See meeting was changed, put us on our guard. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” in Di- also O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia: The “Great Upon its publication in the Chinese press it plomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as an Political Game” (New York: Columbia UP, 1971), 501-506. Instrument (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institu- had been omitted that both sides conducted 24. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, 200. tion, 1981), 265-313. See also Thomas W. Robinson, 25. The Kosygin-Zhou Enlai meeting is not mentioned “a constructive conversation.” Time will “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Devel- in Suyin, Eldest Son. But see Wilson, Zhou Enlai, 359. tell whether Beijing’s intention to move opment and the March 1969 Clashes,” American Politi- Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account, 270; Seymor along the path of normalization will be seri- cal Science Review 66 (December 1972), 1178-1182; Topping, Journey between Two Chinas (New York: and his The Sino-Soviet Border Situation, 1969-1975: ous or if this is only a tactical move dictated Harper, 1972), 356. Military, Diplomatic, and Political Maneuvering, HI- 26. Robinson, “Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” 295-313. by the circumstances of the aggravated do- 2364-RR (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: , mestic struggle in the PRC and also of that November 1975). Other accounts of the crisis include Christian F. Ostermann, a doctoral candi- isolation in which the Chinese leadership Arthur A. Cohen, “The Sino-Soviet Border Crisis of 1969,” in Avoiding War: Problems in Crisis Manage- date at the University of Hamburg based at has found itself as a result of the consistent ment, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview, the National Security Archive in Washing- and firm policy of the Socialist countries, 1984), 269-296; and Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis ton, D.C., contributes frequently to the Bul- Communist parties, and all forces who have Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communica- letin and authored CWIHP Working Paper condemned the peculiar positions of the tion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980). On U.S. policy see National Security Archive, ed., Presidential 11, “The United States, the East German Chinese leadership. We believe it necessary Directives on National Security From Truman to Clinton Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Roll- to follow attentively and vigilantly the fur- (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), 286. back.” This article was adapted from a ther development of the situation in China 4. On research in the SED Archives see my “New longer analysis of SED archival documents itself, the activity of the Beijing leadership Research on the GDR,” Cold War International His- tory Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 34, 39-44. on the Sino-Soviet border conflict to be in the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations, 5. Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute presented at the CWIHP Conference on New and also the international arena overall. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973). Evidence on the Cold War in Asia at the The CC CPSU and the Soviet govern- 6. Cohen, “Sino-Soviet Border Crisis,” 270. University of Hong Kong in January 1996. ment believe that if the Chinese leaders 7. Harvey W. Nelson, Power and Insecurity: Beijing, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 194

IN THE REGION AND ganda in Beijing had not been abated. Bokan’ The new opportunities to examine the hold- IN THE CENTER: urged his comrades to be prepared for any ings of regional party archives will further SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE provocation on the border, while his col- expand our knowledge of regional concerns BORDER RIFT league in the military district, comrade and center-regional relations in the Soviet Popov, noted that Chinese ideological posi- period. by Elizabeth Wishnick tions were dangerous for the international communist movement “and cannot but evoke * * * * * How did Soviet Communist Party offi- alarm” among the Soviet people. Comrade cials and activists in the regions bordering N.V. Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk Document I: Stenographic Record of the People’s Republic of China respond to Pedagogical Institute, called attention to the Meeting of Khabarovsk regional and the news of Aleksei Kosygin’s 11 September fact that Zhou had told Kosygin that China’s city party officials, 22 September 1969 1969 meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing? ideological struggle with the CPSU would The two documents below, from the State continue for another 10,000 years. Archive of Khabarovskiy Kray (territory) in In its report, the Khabarovskiy Kray STENOGRAPHIC RECORD the Russian Far East,1 show the reactions committee expressed the region’s support of several leading party members in the for the Center’s policy toward China. In so of the meeting of the Khabarovsk regional frontier region to Central Committee and doing, the regional committee at times in- and city party aktiv Soviet government efforts to defuse the rup- serted comments which were not in the steno- ture with China. graphic record, for example, praising the 22 September 1969 One document is the stenographic Kosygin-Zhou meeting for being mutually record of a 22 September 1969 meeting of beneficial. First Secretary of the Khabarovsk re- the regional and city party aktiv convened Because the region’s reporting function gional committee of the CPSU, comr. A.P. to discuss the Central Committee’s account had the result of legitimating the Center’s Shitikov, opened the meeting: of Kosygin’s discussion of the border con- policies, comments by the regional aktiv Comrades, we brought you together to flict with Zhou. The second document is the which raised uncomfortable questions for familiarize you with the information of the Khabarovskiy Kray party committee’s re- the party leadership were omitted. For ex- Central Committee of the Communist party port of the same meeting to the CPSU CC in ample, the secretary of the Komsomolsk-na- of the Soviet Union about the question of the Moscow. Amure city committee of the CPSU, Com- visit by the Soviet party-governmental del- In comparing the two documents, it is rade Shul’ga, restated the standard line that egation to Hanoi and the discussion between particularly interesting to note their differ- Soviet efforts to improve relations with China comr. A.N Kosygin and Zhou Enlai. Today ences in emphasis. The Khabarovskiy Kray would resonate with the healthy forces2 in I will acquaint you with the information. report to the CPSU CC accentuates the Chinese society (i.e., among communists) (Reads the information aloud). positive, stressing that Kosygin’s meeting and then noted that in Czechoslovakia the with Zhou represented a step toward resolv- Soviet Union had correctly intervened in Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to com- ing Soviet-Chinese differences through support of communists when the revolution’s rade Pasternak, secretary of the Khabarovsk peaceful means. According to the steno- gains were endangered. Comrade city committee of the CPSU. graphic record, however, many of the speak- Kadochnikov, a Khabarovsk worker, com- Comr. PASTERNAK ers described the problems in the border mented that he had trouble reconciling Chi- Comrades, the communists of the region in much greater detail than was nese anti-Soviet propaganda with the PRC’s Khabarovsk city party organization and all reported to Moscow. Although they all claim to be a socialist state. Comrade the workers of the city of Khabarovsk di- applauded Kosygin’s meeting with Zhou, Sverdlov stated that in the past polemics had rected particular attention to the report of the some speakers noted that little change in the some value for the international communist meeting in Beijing between the President of border situation had been observed since movement, and then cited the polemics with the Council of Ministers of the USSR and their encounter eleven days before. Com- Palmiro Togliatti, the long-time leader of the the President of the State Council of the PRC rade I.K. Bokan’, for example, the head of Italian Communist Party, as an example. Zhou Enlai. It explains the increasingly the political department of a military dis- Still, he concluded that Chinese policies were tense situation between the PRC and the trict in the region, noting that there had so unrestrained that they went beyond the Soviet Union, which is the fault of the Chi- been over 300 incidents of incursions by definition of useful polemics. nese leaders. Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory in his These two documents are valuable for Khabarovsk residents are well aware of district in 1969 alone, commented that no showing the reluctance of the Khabarovskiy the bandit-like character of the armed provo- substantive changes were observed follow- Kray committee to address substantive prob- cations, and therefore the mendacity of the ing the Kosygin-Zhou meeting. The Secre- lems in their reports to the Central Commit- Maoists’ propaganda, the malicious attacks tary of the Khabarovsk City committee of tee in Moscow: the Center only found out on the policy of our party and government, the CPSU, comrade V.S. Pasternak, made a what it wanted to hear. However, the docu- the kindling of hatred towards the Soviet similar remark, describing Sino-Soviet re- ments also demonstrate that as far back as Union, and the direct call for war with the lations as “increasingly tense” and observ- 1969 regional views on China policy did not Soviet Union, were particularly clear to us. ing that the anti-Soviet hysteria and propa- always run exactly in step with Moscow’s. All this requires our government to pur- 195 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN sue a principled and consistent course vis-a- we will be able to say that about the Chinese Chinese leaders went so far as to stage mili- vis China. We understand that the funda- leadership. tary provocations on the Soviet-Chinese mental interests of the Soviet and Chinese From the information we learned that border. It is strange for us workers and all peoples coincide and we support the policy Zhou Enlai, arbitrarily promised, just as the Soviet people to hear such gibberish of our government to resolve disputed issues Mao himself would have, to continue the from people calling themselves communists. at the negotiating table. ideological struggle against our party, and It is fully understandable that we cannot We view the meeting between comrade consequently, against the policy of all com- passively watch the train of events in China. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai as just such an munist parties of the socialist countries, for We approve the steadfast and principled line effort by our government to resolve these another 10 thousand years. of our government for the settlement of issues by peaceful means. We support those This is not accidental and is evoked as a disputed issues through negotiations and principles which were proposed as funda- reserve option for the long-term anti-Soviet consider that our party and government will mental groundwork for negotiations. We campaign, and it is impossible to overlook exert every effort so that normal relations are convinced that the resolution of the dis- this. Our party, proceeding from the prin- with China can be achieved. puted issues will depend on the position of ciples of Marxism-Leninism, from the rich- As far as we are concerned, we consider the Chinese side. est practice of its own and the international that it is necessary to strengthen the might of We are all the more vigilant since after communist movement, considers a polemic our Motherland through work. Our workers the meeting the anti-Soviet propaganda, the about disputed issues to be fully achievable, work calmly, confident in their strength and anti-Soviet hysteria in Beijing has hardly but this polemic must lead to the interests of in the durability of the Soviet borders. I decreased. We fully support the principled the peoples, the interests of the cohesion of assure the regional committee of the party position of our party, directed against the the ranks of the communist parties, on the that the party can count on us workers, can be anti-Leninist position of the Mao Zedong basis of deep scientific argumentation, with- sure of our unreserved support for all its clique. out insults and abuse vis-a-vis another people efforts to strengthen the international com- We will direct all efforts, to mobilize and party. munist movement. the work of the enterprises to fulfill the We saw that on a number of occasions socialist obligations in honor of the 100th polemics were useful in the revolutionary Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. anniversary of V.I. Lenin’s birth. movement. In its time the CC of our party Shul’ga, secretary of the Komsomolsk-na- honestly, openly noted a series of erroneous Amure city committee of the CPSU. Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to com- views by the late respected Palmiro Togliatti. Comr. SHUL’GA rade Sverdlov, the rector of the Khabarovsk There were polemics with other parties. But Comrades, the workers of the city of Pedagogical Institute. such polemics do not have anything in com- Komsomolsk were satisfied with the con- Comr. SVERDLOV mon with the unrestrained policy of the tents of the report about the meeting between Comrades, the information we have been Chinese leaders. the President of the Council of Ministers of listening to clearly and convincingly dem- Therefore it is necessary for us to all the the USSR comr. Kosygin and the President onstrates that our party and its decision- more steadfastly and firmly turn the ideo- of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, making nucleus, in the form of the Leninist logical struggle against the Chinese revi- and hope that the initiative will be under- Central Committee, persistently and consis- sionists. Permit me to state in the name of stood by the healthy forces among the Chi- tently, in the spirit of the decisions of the the workers in higher education that we nese people. Moscow Conference of Communist and unanimously support the proposals and ef- We know that the strengthening of Workers’ Parties, pursues a policy of con- forts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations friendly relations between the peoples of our solidating the international communist move- formulated by our party, and will not spare countries is the basis for Soviet policy. We ment, of surmounting of problems and dis- any effort to contribute to the consolidation provide assistance to many countries in the agreements, temporarily arising in the con- of the strength and might of our great Moth- socialist camp. Now, when the intrigues of temporary revolutionary movement. erland. imperialism are intensifying, it is especially It is natural and understandable that the incumbent upon us to stand on the forefront slightest positive shift in the development of Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. of those forces who are restraining the on- Soviet-Chinese relations would be met with Kadochnikov, a milling cutter at the slaught of the forces of reaction. We could satisfaction by the Soviet people, and all the Khabarovsk heating equipment plant. not do otherwise than go to the assistance of more by us, China’s immediate neighbors. Comr. KADOCHNIKOV real communists, when a threat hung over The information clearly outlined the Comrades, we, workers of the city of the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia. Soviet Union’s proposals for stabilizing Khabarovsk, like the entire Soviet people, It is pleasant for us Soviet communists Soviet-Chinese relations. These proposals, approve the initiative by the Central Com- to realize that we are the members of the which result from the situation at hand, are mittee of our party and the Soviet govern- party, which stands in the avant-garde of the timely, reasonable, and fair, and are capable ment, directed at the normalization of So- international communist movement. Evalu- of fostering the correct resolution of inter- viet-Chinese relations. ating the contemporary policy of the CPC governmental disputes, certainly, once the We were all witnesses to the fact that, as from a principled position, we seek paths to other sides expresses the desire to facilitate the leadership of the CPC [Communist Party normalize relations between our two states. an improvement in relations. It is unlikely of China] loosened its links to our party, the And it is not our fault that at a certain point COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 196 the leaders of China broke off relations gree of restraint. We support the initiative support the general line of our party, di- between the Soviet Union and China. The which took place and the steps taken by our rected at the creation of all the necessary results of this turned out to be deplorable. It government, directed at the stabilization of preconditions for the successful building of began with [China’s] isolation from abso- Soviet-Chinese relations. communism in our country. lutely the majority of the communist par- Fully assessing the danger of the situa- V.I. Lenin’s precepts about the neces- ties. The people of China, who were only tion, we must be prepared for the outbreak of sity of a consistent struggle for the unity of just liberated from feudalism, again found any type of provocation along the border. the international communist movement themselves in a difficult economic situa- The personnel in the district is firmly re- against the forces of imperialist reaction, tion. solved in these days of preparation for the against all forms of opportunism are eter- We approve the policy of the CC of our 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin nally dear to us. These Leninist ideas are the party to decide all disputed issues by peace- to further improve the level of political and basis for all the documents passed by the ful means, not by armed provocations. We military knowledge, increase the military Moscow Conference of Communist and fully understand that today a very difficult preparedness of the forces, to merit with Workers’ parties. situation has been developing on the Far honor the great trust of the party and the The only correct policy - is a policy Eastern borders given the unleashing of people, to defend the inviolability of the which is principled and consistent as is our anti-Soviet propaganda and anti-Soviet hys- borders of our Motherland. policy towards China. We are building our teria. And we support the policy of our party policy on the basis of a long-term perspec- to begin negotiations with China, to resolve Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. tive. all questions through peaceful means, par- Plotkin, the head of the “Energomash” con- The meeting between comr. Kosygin ticularly with a country which considers struction bureau. and Zhou Enlai which took place in Peking itself to be socialist. Comr. PLOTKIN is evidence of the readiness of our party to Comrades, today we heard the report in establish normal relations between our coun- Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to which we were informed about the humani- tries. If the Chinese leaders exhibit pru- comr. Bokan’, the head of the political de- tarian mission fulfilled by our delegation dence and undertake to respond with steps to partment of the Krasnoznamennyi Far East- headed by comr. Kosygin. The entire Soviet stabilize relations, this would be received ern border district. people and we, Far Easterners, in particular, with approval by the Soviet people. Comr. BOKAN’ follow with great interest and undivided at- However the position of the Chinese Comrades, the soldiers of the tention the development of Soviet-Chinese leaders cannot but evoke alarm among our Krasnoznamennyi border district reacted to relations. people. Now, in the period of preparation the report of the meeting between comr. The report about the meeting in Peking for the 20th anniversary [ 1 October 1969] of Kosygin and Zhou Enlai concerning the between Kosygin and the Chinese leaders the founding of the PRC, Peking’s propa- stabilization of relations on the Soviet-Chi- was very brief, but we understood the whole ganda continues to fuel an anti-Soviet cam- nese border with a feeling of deep under- value of this step by our government. The paign. The Peking radio programs talk about standing, satisfaction, and approval. trip to Peking, the organization of the meet- this daily. In the report it is apparent that the ing - all this expressed confidence in the All this conceals a serious danger for improvement of relations along the Soviet- correctness of our cause. the international communist movement and Chinese border was the central question at As a member of the plant collective the world socialism system. We, members this meeting. The border events attracted many times I have heard the workers express of the military, know well that Maoism en- the attention not just of Soviet people but of their concerns about the criminal actions of gendered the military provocations and this people all over the world. Incursions by the Chinese leaders. Therefore we are glad to requires of us continuous vigilance and readi- Chinese citizens onto Soviet territory be- hear that our government is searching for ness to give a worthy rebuff to the provoca- came a daily occurrence. paths to stabilize relations. I totally and fully tions by the Maoists at any moment. In this year alone in the area guarded by approve of the policy of our party. Permit me in the name of the soldiers of the forces of our district there were about our district to assure the Central Committee 300 incidents of incursions by Chinese citi- Comr. Shitikov - The floor goes to comr. of our party, that in the future the commu- zens onto our territory. Ideological diver- Popov, deputy director of the political direc- nists and Komsomol members of our district sions on the Chinese border increased no- torate of the KDVO [Krasnoznamennyi Far will guard our party’s well-equipped weap- ticeably. Eastern Military District]. ons and will always be ready to fulfill any The personnel in the district thoroughly tasks of our party and people. understand the situation and show courage Comr. POPOV Comr. Shitikov - Who else would like to and the ability to counter the provocations. Comrades, communists and all the sol- speak? There are no more speakers. The We feel the constant support of the people of ders of our Krasnoznamennyi Far Eastern following two proposals are put forth for Khabarovskiy Kray, the party, state, and military district are completely satisfied by your consideration. youth organizations. the wise domestic and foreign policy of our I. To approve completely and fully the In the period since the meeting in party and the Soviet government. initiative of the CC of our party and the Beijing, no substantive changes have oc- Along with entire Soviet people the sol- Soviet government concerning the meeting curred, with the exception of a certain de- diers of the army and fleet unanimously between comr. Kosygin and Zhou Enlai, 197 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN designed to ease the situation on the border On 22 September 1969 a regional meet- nies, and institutions to fulfill socialist re- and to consider this meeting to have been ing of the party electoral aktiv was held to sponsibilities in a manner worthy of the very useful. acquaint them with the Information from the meeting in honor of the 100th anniversary of II. The regional party aktiv completely CC CPSU regarding the trip by the Soviet V.I. Lenin’s birth.” and fully approves the policy of the party party-governmental delegation to Hanoi and I.P. Kadochnikov, member of the re- and government, aimed at normalizing rela- comrade A.N. Kosygin’s discussion with gional committee of the CPSU, a milling tions between the Soviet Union and China. Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969. cutter at the Khabarovsk heating equipment What other proposals are there? There The First Secretary of the regional party plant, stated: are proposals to accept such a resolution. No committee read the Information from the CC “We cannot passively observe the course one is opposed? No. CPSU. of events in China, where the leaders in- After this the meeting of the aktiv was 7 people spoke at the meeting. The creasingly aggravate relations with our coun- considered closed. participants noted with great satisfaction try and the situation on the Soviet-Chinese that our party, its Central Committee, persis- border. We, Far Easterners, eagerly approve tently and consistently, in the spirit of the the practical steps by our party and govern- 9/23/69 decisions of the Moscow Conference of ment towards the normalization of Soviet- Stenographer Taran Communist and Workers’ parties [in June Chinese relations. 1969 - translator’s note], take a hard line on Our workers work calmly, confident in [Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy strengthening of the peace and security of their own strength and in the durability of the Kray, f. p-35, op. 96, d. 234, ll. 1-12; peoples, consolidating the ranks of the inter- Soviet borders. I feel this every day, every translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.] national communist movement, and over- hour, working among with the collective of coming the difficulties and disagreements many thousands at the plant.” * * * * * within it. They [the members of the aktiv] The rector of the Khabarovsk pedagogi- unanimously approved the initiative of the cal institute, N.V. Sverdlov, noted: Document II: Information Report Sent CC CPSU and the Soviet government, di- “The Information concisely and clearly by Khabarovskiy Kray (Territory) rected at taking concrete measures to nor- states all the proposals by the Soviet Union Committee to CPSU CC, 22 September malize Soviet-Chinese relations, settle dis- to settle the disputes and conflicts in Soviet- 1969 puted issues through negotiations and the Chinese relations and to improve the situa- organization of the meeting in Peking. tion on the Soviet-Chinese border and ex- Proletariat of all countries, unite! The Secretary of the Khabarovsk city pand economic ties between our countries. committee of the CPSU V.S. Pasternak said These timely, reasonable, and fair propos- COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE in his remarks: als, which stem from our mutual interests, SOVIET UNION “The communists and all the workers of combine firmness and flexibility of policy, the city were particularly attentive to the and, most importantly, are capable of foster- KHABAROVSKIY KRAY news of the meeting in Beijing between the ing the correct resolution of intergovern- COMMITTEE president of the Council of Ministers of the mental disputes, of course, under circum- USSR, A.N. Kosygin, and the president of stances when the other side expresses a ______the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. similar understanding of the situation and Khabarovsk residents always steadfastly the desire to find a way out of it.” City of Khabarovsk follow the development of Soviet-Chinese E.A. Plotkin, member of the regional relations, [and] angrily judge the great power, party committee of the CPSU, director of the (Sent 9/22/69) adventuristic course of the PRC leaders. construction bureau of the Khabarovsk CENTRAL COMMITTEE The armed raids by the Maoists on the So- Energomash plant, stated: OF THE CPSU viet-Chinese border, the malicious slander “The trip to Beijing by the president of DEPARTMENT OF against our Soviet people, our state, the the Council of Ministers, A.N. Kosygin, was ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK Communist party, deeply trouble the work- very brief, but we understood how important ers of our city. this meeting was for the Soviet and Chinese INFORMATION The initiative by the CC CPSU and the peoples. The search for paths to stabiliza- Soviet government to stabilize Soviet-Chi- tion, the reasonable resolution of foreign regarding the familiarization of the nese relations and organize a meeting in policy questions, which the Central Com- electoral aktiv of the Khabarovskiy Kray Beijing in such a difficult current situation mittee of the CPSU and our government put party organization with the Information once again vividly affirms the wise policy of forth meet with approval at the plant.” from the CC CPSU about the trip by the our party to resolve disputed issues by The head of the political department of Soviet party-governmental delegation to peaceful means. the Krasnoznamennyi border district, I.K. Hanoi and comrade A.N. Kosygin’s The city party organization aims to im- Bokan’, expressed the thoughts and feelings discussion with Zhou Enlai on 11 Septem- prove the ideological work among the work- of the border guards as follows: ber 1969 ers in every possible way, to mobilize the “The troops of the Krasnoznamennyi collectives of firms, construction compa- Far Eastern border district reacted to the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 198 report of the meeting between the president sponses to Soviet diplomatic overtures for of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, How did the Central Committee of the normalizing relations. What the document comrade A.N. Kosygin, with the premier of CPSU view Soviet-Chinese relations in the fails to mention is that Soviet negotiating the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, aftermath of the violent 1969 border clashes efforts were backed up by threats. Five days with feelings of deep understanding and between the two communist powers? The after the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, Victor satisfaction and consider that this discus- following document, a February 1971 secret Louis, a Soviet journalist reportedly em- sion was useful for both sides. One of the background report prepared for and ap- ployed by the KGB, published an article in central questions at this meeting was the proved by the CC CPSU, sheds some light on the London Evening News arguing that an question of the mitigation of the situation on Soviet diplomatic initiatives aimed at ame- attack on Chinese nuclear facilities could the Soviet-Chinese border. liorating the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations. not be excluded. Relations along the border exemplify Although the Central Committee analysis is The document also neglects to address the relations between the states. The relatively optimistic about the long-term pros- the discrepancy between the Soviet and Chi- Maoists’ provocative violations of the So- pects for normalizing of Soviet-Chinese re- nese understanding of the results of the viet-Chinese border and their intervention lations, in the short term Chinese territorial Kosygin-Zhou meeting. Contrary to the in Soviet territory attest to the adventuristic claims on Soviet territory and anti-Sovietism Soviet position outlined here, China claimed policy of the Chinese leadership, their aim among Chinese leaders were viewed as ma- that Kosygin had recognized the existence of to decide disputed questions through force. jor obstacles to any improvement in rela- “disputed territories” and agreed to discuss The border forces in the district have at tions. Written not long before the March a withdrawal of forces from the border re- their disposal all that is necessary to fulfill 1971 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Cen- gions. The Central Committee document their sacred duty before the Fatherland in an tral Committee analysis represented an at- would seem to support the Soviet case, but in exemplary way. In these days of prepara- tempt to explain to the Party leadership and the absence of reliable verbatim contempo- tion for the 100th anniversary of the V.I. aktiv why there was only limited progress in raneous documentation from the meeting Lenin’s birth, we will demonstrate our level Soviet-Chinese relations [particularly at a itself it is difficult to evaluate the relative of decisiveness by increasing the military time when Sino-American relations were veracity of the Soviet and Chinese accounts. preparedness of the troops in order to honor- improving]. The document outlines a series One recently published memoir supports the ably merit the great trust of the party, gov- of diplomatic overtures made by the Soviet Soviet position, however. A.I. Elizavetin, a ernment, and people, as well as of the mili- Union in 1969-1971 and attributes the mini- Soviet diplomat in Beijing who took notes tary forces in the Army and Navy, to guar- mal response by the Chinese leadership to during the Kosygin-Zhou meeting, reported antee the inviolability of the Far Eastern their need to perpetuate anti-Sovietism for in his own account of their encounter that border of our beloved Motherland.” domestic reasons. Kosygin suggested the two sides should re- The following resolution was approved One of the most interesting points in the spect the status quo ante on the border and by the participants in the meeting: document pertains to the consequences of open talks on border demarcation as well as 1. Completely and fully approve the the 11 September 1969 discussions between on confidence-building measures.3 initiative by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and The issue of a withdrawal of forces from government about the meeting between the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the bor- the border regions was to remain a stum- president of the Council of Ministers of the der clashes. According to the document, the bling block in bilateral negotiations through USSR A.N. Kosygin and the premier of the People’s Republic of China rejected a later the 1980s. By the early 1980s, the Chinese State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai, aimed Soviet proposal to sign a draft agreement on no longer spoke of disputed territories, but at ameliorating the state of relations be- maintaining the status quo on the border, they contended that the stationing of Soviet tween the USSR and China, and consider based on the oral agreement reportedly military forces in the border regions repre- that this meeting was useful. reached by Kosygin and Zhou during their sented an obstacle to the improvement of 2. Unanimously support the actions of meeting. The document notes that the Chi- Sino-Soviet relations. A recently declassi- the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, nese side insisted on signing an agreement fied transcript of a May 1983 CPSU CC directed at normalizing relations with China, on “temporary measures” as a precondi- Politburo meeting indicates that the Soviet and rebuffing any encroachments by the tion, both at the 1969 meeting and subse- military continued to oppose any withdrawal Chinese leadership on the interests of our quently. By “temporary measures” the Chi- of forces, on the grounds that the Soviet state, on the interests of our people. nese meant the withdrawal of forces from Union had spent considerable time and ef- what they viewed as disputed territories in fort to develop forward bases in the border Secretary of the Khabarovsk the border regions. Such a precondition was region.4 Although Moscow and Beijing (A. Shitikov) unacceptable to the Soviet Union, fearing finally normalized relations in 1989 and regional committee of the CPSU that a withdrawal of troops would pave the have reduced their overall military presence way for a Chinese attempt to occupy the 1.5 due to cuts in their respective armed forces, [Source: State Archive of Khabarovskiy million square kilometers they claimed were the creation of a dimilitarized zone in the Kray, f.p-35, op. 96, d. 374, ll. 16-21; wrested from China by Tsarist Russia. border region continues to present difficul- translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.] The Central Committee document goes ties even today. At present the main stum- on to criticize the Chinese leadership for bling-block is geostrategic: Russia is un- * * * * * their lukewarm if not outright negative re- willing to withdraw beyond 100km from the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 199 than a year ago. This is the main reason and forwarded a draft of such an agreement gaged in amateur artistic performances. Anti- why, despite all the constructive efforts to Beijing through the ambassador of the Soviet films are always playing in movie made by our delegation, the negotiations on USSR. theaters. The Chinese population also is border issues in essence haven’t made any In sending this draft agreement for con- exposed to anti-Soviet messages in radio progress. sideration by the government of the PRC, the and television programs and through verbal To move things forward, the CC CPSU Soviet side expressed its belief that the ful- propaganda. and the Soviet government came out with an fillment of our proposal - the most rapid Feigning a threat of attack by the Soviet important initiative, and sent a letter from conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of Union, the Chinese leadership actively uses the Chairman of the USSR Council of Min- force [—] would create a more favorable anti-Sovietism to continue their propaganda isters, comrade A.N. Kosygin, to the Pre- atmosphere for the normalization of rela- about war and war preparations against the mier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou tions between our two states and, in particu- Soviet Union and to strengthen their control Enlai, in July 1970. Proceeding from the lar, would facilitate the restoration of neigh- over the domestic situation in the country. principled line of Soviet foreign policy, we borly relations and friendship between the The Chinese leadership fears that construc- proposed in this letter to begin negotiations USSR and the PRC. tive steps by the USSR and progress in in Moscow, at the same time as the negotia- A positive answer from the Chinese side stabilizing relations between our countries tions in Beijing, between special govern- to the Soviet initiative could lead to a deci- would undermine the basic ideological mental delegations on a draft agreement sive shift forward in the negotiations. How- premise: to convince the Chinese people that between the USSR and the PRC on mutual ever there is still no answer whatsoever from the difficult situation facing them is, as it non-use of force, including nuclear weap- the Chinese side. There is a growing impres- were, the result of the policy of the Soviet ons, [and] the cessation of war propaganda sion that Beijing, as before, is interested in Union, and not of the anti-Leninist and of preparations for war against the other maintaining the “border territorial issue” in adventeuristic policy of the Chinese leaders side. relations with the Soviet Union and, in bad themselves. At the same time, to eliminate many faith, at times in a provocative way, is aiming Chinese provocations were met with a controversial issues from the negotiations, a to use this for its anti-Soviet and chauvinistic decisive rebuff and furthermore our initia- proposal was made to formulate an inter- goals. tive about carrying out negotiations for a governmental agreement on the demarca- Why have the Soviet steps towards the border settlement created serious obstacles tion of the eastern section of the Soviet- normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations to the organizations of new adventures. Chinese border (4300 km), consisting of encountered such significant difficulties? The The PRC leadership is making efforts to more than half of its length, where most of main reason, as was mentioned previously in emerge from the international isolation in the border incidents took place (from the our party documents, is that anti-Sovietism which China found itself as a result of the point where the borders of the USSR, PRC, was and continues to be the main ingredient Red Guard diplomacy in the years of the MPR [Mongolia] meet in the east and fur- in the anti-Marxist, nationalistic line of the “Cultural Revolution.” China activated its ther to the south along the Amur and Ussuri present Chinese leadership. This is con- diplomatic contacts in a number of coun- rivers). firmed, in particular, by the materials of the tries, achieved diplomatic recognition by a The letter expressed the view that, in 11th plenum of the CC CPC (August-Sep- series of bourgeois states. Today even seven the interests of the improvement of Soviet- tember 1970), the nature of the celebration of NATO countries have diplomatic relations Chinese relations, it would be expedient to the 21st anniversary of the founding of the with Beijing. However, the Chinese leader- hold another meeting of the heads of gov- PRC [in October 1970], the continuing slan- ship is making concessions on major issues, ernment of the USSR and the PRC, this time derous campaign against the CPSU and the on which they previously held implacable on the territory of the Soviet Union, and also Soviet Union, carried out both in the outside positions. It is not surprising that the capi- restated a range of other constructive pro- world and especially through domestic Chi- talist states actively use this flirtation in their posals. Meanwhile Beijing continues to nese channels. The strengthening of the anti- own interests. speculate in the international arena and in Soviet campaign is taking place in the pages The imperialist powers, the USA in domestic propaganda on the alleged of the Chinese press. In the last half a year particular, are playing a complex and sly existance of a “threat of force” from the alone the Chinese central newspapers pub- game in their approach to China. On the one USSR and to disseminate other anti-Soviet lished hundreds of materials containing rude hand they would like to use the anti-Soviet- insinuations. assaults against our party and our country. ism of the Maoists in the struggle against the To deprive the Chinese government of The walls of the houses in Beijing, Shanghai, USSR, but on the other hand, they would a basis for such inventions and facilitate the Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities are like to strengthen their own position in the shift to a constructive discussion of issues, covered with appeals to struggle against “So- PRC, in the vast Chinese market. As a side the subject of the negotiations, on January viet revisionism.” In China anti-Soviet bro- interest these states all the more loudly urge 15th of this year the Soviet Union took yet chures and posters are being published in the PRC “to get actively involved in the another step - it made a proposal to the huge numbers and widely distributed. For international community.” leadership of the PRC to conclude an agree- example, not long ago a series of brochures Recently the Chinese leadership has ment between the USSR and the PRC on the with clearly anti-Soviet content was recom- been rather pointedly making outwardly non-use of force in any form whatsoever, mended for children as study aids as well as friendly gestures towards some socialist including missiles and nuclear weapons, for the repertoire of clubs and circles en- states, promising them to open broad pros- 200 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN pects in the area of trade, economic, and and other fellow socialist countries, the Chi- The Central Committee of the CPSU at- scientific-technical cooperation. The Chi- nese leadership is tactically using the PRC’s tributes great importance to this work, since nese leaders are noticeably disturbed by the opposition to both “superpowers” (USSR positive shifts in Chinese politics can be effective political, economic, and other forms and USA), which allegedly “came to terms” facilitated in the near future only by strug- of cooperation among socialist states, as to “divide the world amongst them.” gling relentlessly against the theory and prac- well as by their interaction, which facilitates All this attests to the fact that the leaders tice of Maoism, in which anti-Sovietism the strengthening of the international posi- of China have not changed their previous figures prominently, by further strengthen- tions of socialism, and their [socialist states’] chauvinistic course in the international arena. ing the cohesion and unity of communist ability to move forward with the resolution Domestically, the Chinese leadership, ranks, and by combining the efforts of the of major issues in world politics. The Beijing having suppressed the enemies of their poli- Marxist-Leninist parties. leadership aims to use any opportunity to cies during the so-called “Cultural Revolu- break the unity and cohesion of the socialist tion”, is now trying to overcome the disor- CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE states, to weaken their existing social struc- der in economic and political life, brought COMMUNIST ture. Thus, Chinese propaganda never ceases about by the actions of the very same ruling PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION its provocative statements on the Czecho- groups over the course of recent years. The slovak question.5 Beijing has acted simi- well-known stabilization of socio-political 45-mz larly with respect to the recent events in and economic life is occurring through all- sa/ka Poland.6 encompassing militarization, leading to an The communist and workers parties of atmosphere of “a besieged fortress.” The [Source: TsKhSD, F. 4, Op. 19, D. 605, Li. the fellow socialist countries, which firmly army is continuing to occupy key positions 13, 43-50; translation by Elizabeth stand on the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the country and serves as the main instru- Wishnick.] and socialist internationalism, understand ment of power. As before a cult of Mao is and respond appropriately to this tactical expanding, the regime of personal power is 1. This archival research was supported by a 1995 grant step of Beijing’s, which is directed at split- being strengthened in the constitution of the from the International Research and Exchanges Board ting the socialist community and isolating PRC, a draft of which is now being discussed (IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the the Soviet Union. in the country. This, of course, cannot but Humanities. None of these organizations is responsible The Moscow conference of communist have a pernicious influence on the social life for the views expressed. and workers parties in 1969 gave a strong of the entire Chinese people. 2. During the period of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Soviet rebuff to the plans of the CPC leadership to In an oral statement made directly to analysts distinguished between the healthy, i.e., com- munist, forces within society, and the Maoist leader- split them. Convinced by the futility of their Soviet officials about the desirability and ship. efforts to turn pro-Chinese splinter groups in possibility in the near future of the normal- 3. A.I. Elizavetin, “Peregovory A.N. Kosygina i Zhou individual countries into influential political ization of intergovernmental relations, the Enlai v pekinskom aeroportu,” with commentary by S. parties, and to cobble them together into an Chinese authorities emphasize that the ideo- Gonacharov and V. Usov, Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka 5 (1992), 39-63, and 1 (1993), 107-119. international anti-Leninist movement, the logical, and to a certain degree, the political 4. Transcript of 31 May 1983, TskhSD, F. 89, Op. 43. Chinese leadership once again is counting struggle between the USSR and China, will D. 53, L.1. 1-14, translated in Cold War International on its ability to either attract individual com- continue for a lengthy period of time. History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 77-81. munist parties to its side, or at least to achieve As long as the Chinese leadership sticks 5. A reference to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush a reformist communist move- their refusal to publicly criticize the ideol- to ideological and political positions which ment and Moscow’s subsequent imposition of ortho- ogy and policy of the CPC leadership. To are hostile to us, the stabilization and nor- dox “normalization” there. this end, Beijing’s propaganda and CPC malization of intergovernmental relations 6. A reference to the use of force by Polish authorities officials are concentrating their main efforts between the Soviet Union and the PRC would to quell anti-government protests that erupted in Gdansk in December 1970, and a subsequent government shake- on slandering and falsifying in the eyes of have to be achieved under conditions of up. foreign communists the foreign and domes- sharp ideological and political struggle. tic policy of the CPSU, the situation in the In informing the party aktiv about the USSR, and in the socialist community. At current status of Soviet-Chinese relations, Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the the same time Chinese representatives are the Central Committee of the CPSU consid- Institute of Modern History, Academica aiming to exacerbate disputes in the commu- ers it important to emphasize that the practi- Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on nist movement. They use any means to heat cal measures, which, within the parameters a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with up nationalistic, separatist, and anti-Soviet of our long-term orientation, would lead to China: The Evolution of Moscow’s China dispositions in the ranks of the communist normalized relations with the PRC and the Policy, 1969-95. and national-liberation movement. restoration of friendly relations with the Beijing is trying to take the non-aligned Chinese people, are being supplemented by movement and the developing countries appropriate measures in case of possible under its own influence. For this purpose, provocations by the Chinese side, as well as and in order to alienate the states of the “third by the necessary consistent ideological-po- world” from their dependable support in the litical struggle against the anti-Leninist, anti- struggle with imperialism - the Soviet Union socialist views of the Chinese leadership. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 201

SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS, 1980: extensive relations with Romania, Yugosla- No. St-200/4s TWO RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS via, and North Korea. China’s efforts to from March 4, 1980 foster economic and even political ties with by Elizabeth Wishnick the “fraternal countries”—Bulgaria, Hun- Excerpt from the protocol No. 200 gary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslova- 4s CC Secretariat The two Central Committee documents kia—are portrayed here as being of utmost from 1980 printed below illustrate Soviet concern to the Central Committee. The docu- ______foreign policy concerns at a time when the ment shows Soviet displeasure at China’s Soviet Union was particularly isolated in interest in improving relations with these the international arena as a result of its states at a time when it refused to continue Regarding the instructions to USSR December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. negotiations with the USSR.1 ambassadors to socialist countries about In these documents, Soviet policymakers In the Soviet view, relations between the the China question express their fears that their principal adver- socialist community and China had to be saries, the United States and China, were coordinated with Soviet policy, and the “fra- Approve the text of the instructions to drawing closer together due to their shared ternal countries” were expected to wait for USSR ambassadors to socialist countries hostility toward the USSR. The documents and then follow the Soviet Union’s lead. To (proposed). contend that the Sino-American this end, representatives from the Interna- rapproachement had two particularly unfor- tional Departments of these countries had CC SECRETARY tunate consequences: the development of been meeting regularly with the CPSU Inter- Sino-American military cooperation and national Department for over a decade.2 * * * * * increased efforts by China to undermine the Despite all these efforts to coordinate China socialist community. policy, the March 1980 document evokes Secret The October 1980 document about Soviet fears that China had been making Sino-American military cooperation was inroads into the socialist community and was Enclosure written for two audiences. On the one hand, achieving a certain measure of success in k.p.4s,pr.No 200 Soviet representatives were given the task using economic cooperation to tempt indi- of convincing Western public opinion that vidual states to stray from the fold. As a BERLIN, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, military cooperation with China could back- result, the document outlines a series of steps PRAGUE, SOFIA, ULAN-BATOR, fire and engulf their countries in conflict. for Soviet ambassadors to follow which would HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE On the other hand, the document showed foster skepticism about China’s intentions Soviet concern that some non-aligned and and thwart efforts by Chinese representa- SOVIET AMBASSADORS socialist states were choosing to ignore the tives to make wide-ranging contacts in these dangerous tendencies in Chinese policies states. Copy: BEIJING, PYONGYANG, and warned of the perils of a neutral attitude PHNOM PENH, BUCHAREST, towards them. Since China had invaded 1. China claimed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan BELGRADE Vietnam soon after the Sino-American nor- made it inappropriate to go ahead with the regularly scheduled political talks in 1980. malization of relations in February 1979, 2. Several documents from these meetings attest to this SOVIET AMBASSADORS (for their Soviet policymakers feared that the im- aim. See, e.g., TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 19, d. 525, ll. 29, 107- information) proved U.S.-China relationship had 110, 21 January 1969; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 19. d. 605, ll. 3, emboldened the Chinese leaders to act on 40-42, 12 February 1971; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 22, d. 1077, Recently Beijing’s policy towards so- ll. 21, 9 April 1973; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 22, d. 242, ll. 4, their hostility toward pro-Soviet socialist 13 April 1975; TsKhSD, f.4, op. 24, d.878; ll. 4, 20 April cialist countries has become noticeably more states and that U.S. military assistance would 1979; TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 24, d. 1268, ll. 5, 19 May 1980. active. Under conditions, when imperialist provide the Chinese with the means to act on circles in the USA have undertaken to aggra- their ambitions. * * * * * vate the international situation, the Chinese Which states were neutral on the China leadership, drawing ever closer to imperial- question and why? The March 1980 docu- Document I: CPSU CC Directive to ism, is increasing its efforts to undermine the ment clarifies this in an analysis of China’s Soviet Ambassadors in Communist position of the socialist community. Beijing’s policy of distinguishing among the socialist Countries, 4 March 1980 goals, as before, are to break the unity and states based on their degree of autonomy cohesion of the fraternal countries, inspire from the USSR, a policy referred to here and mutual distrust among them, incite them to in other Soviet analyses as China’s “differ- Proletariat of all countries, unite! opposition to the Soviet Union, destroy the entiated” approach to the socialist commu- unity of action of socialist states in the inter- nity. The document, a series of instructions COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET national arena including on the China ques- about the China question to Soviet ambassa- UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE tion and finally, to subordinate them to its dors to socialist states, notes China’s hostil- own influence. ity to Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia TOP SECRET Within the parameters of a policy in- and contrasts this with its development of volving a differentiated approach [to social- 202 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN ist states], the Chinese leadership is trying to “study tours,” attempts are being made to intensifying attempts by the Chinese leaders stratify the socialist countries into various send Chinese delegations to some socialist to penetrate into various spheres of the do- groups. With such states as Romania, Yugo- countries and receive their delegations in the mestic life of the socialist countries. With slavia, and the DPRK, China is developing PRC. the participation of the leaders and represen- extensive relations, supporting the national- There are signs that the Chinese may tatives of the political and social circles of istic tendencies in their policies in every reevaluate their relations with the ruling your post countries, direct the following: possible way with the aim of creating its own parties of some socialist countries, and es- 1. Pay attention to the noticeable group on this basis, and using it to counter tablish party-to-party ties with them. Party- activization of Chinese policy towards so- the socialist community. In relations with to-party ties are already developing with cialist states. Using the example of Beijing’s other socialist countries the hostile character Yugoslavia and Romania; the first Chinese recent maneuvers, continuously carry out of China’s policy is strengthening even more, party delegation in recent years went to measures to clarify the danger of the Chi- as the unceasing attacks and pressure on the participate in the RKP [Romanian Commu- nese differentiated approach tactic and ef- SRV [Vietnam], Cuba, DPRL [Laos], and nist Party] congress. forts to penetrate the socialist states. This MPR [Mongolia], attest. China uses a double- Denying in essence the general regu- danger is growing in connection with the dealing tactic including pressure and prom- larities of development of the revolutionary fact that the splitting activity of the Chinese ises in its approach to the PRB [Bulgaria], processes and socialist economic construc- representatives is being coordinated all the HPR [Hungary], GDR, PNR [Poland], and tion in various countries, the Chinese leader- more closely with imperialist circles, above ChSSR [Czechoslovakia]: on the one hand ship has once again returned to the use of the all with the USA, and their intelligence ser- China is continuing its gross interference in conception of the “national model” of so- vices. Expose the false character of Chinese their internal affairs, while clearly ignoring cialism, and especially rises to the defense of assertions, which allege that China is “con- their interests; on the other hand, it is giving the Yugoslav “model”. cerned” about the improvement of relations assurances about its readiness to develop Beijing’s divisive activity shows its lim- with socialist states, and cares about their relations with them on a mutually advanta- ited, but nevertheless negative, influence in interests and security. In fact, Chinese policy, geous basis. Thanks to such a tactic, Beijing certain socialist states. Some of the workers particularly its constant appeals to the USA, is counting on at least forcing these coun- do not always grasp the meaning of the Japan, and the countries of Western Europe tries into positions of “neutrality” regarding Chinese tactic and in certain cases do not to unite with China in a “broad international China’s course, if not to achieve more. provide their own effective rebuff to front” and its pressure on the NATO coun- Within the Chinese leadership dema- Beijing’s hegemonic policy. Moreover, the tries to increase their armaments, including gogic and deceptive practices are widely facts show that responsible leaders of certain nuclear missiles, is totally and fully directed used. It is affirmed, as if China’s struggle fraternal countries, counter to the official against the socialist states, their security. against the USSR need not worry the other positions of their parties, are expressing an Calling for the economic integration and socialist countries, that the development of interest in excluding some important direc- military-political consolidation of the West, relations between them and China could tions in their ties with China from the sphere Beijing is all the more intensively seeking to even facilitate the improvement of Soviet- of multilateral coordination, that in certain undermine the positions of the Organization Chinese relations, that the expansion of ties situations they are taking steps to expand of the Warsaw Pact and the Council of between these states and China meets their ties with the PRC without considering the Mutual Economic Assistance. national interests, and, in particular, could level of relations between China and other One must also keep in mind that the bring them major advantages in the trade- states. changes in domestic policy taking place in economic sphere. Judging from all of this, China’s tactical China, among them the of Liu Beijing has noticeably strengthened its use of a differentiated approach [to socialist Shaoqi at the Vth Plenum of the CC CPC and efforts to penetrate into various spheres of states], which plays on various nuances and the promotion to leading posts of experi- life and activities in the countries of the changes in the domestic political and eco- enced political representatives who were socialist community. Chinese representa- nomic situation in certain socialist states, on victims of the “Cultural Revolution”, do not tives are trying to become more active in any type of temporary difficulties, will not mean, as the facts show, that Beijing has developing relations with official institu- only continue, but may even be more widely renounced its hostile policy towards social- tions and government agencies, social orga- used in the near future. It can be inferred that ist countries. On the contrary, one can nizations, educational institutions, and the attempts by the Chinese to penetrate into expect that this policy will be pursued even mass media; they are establishing contacts various areas of the domestic life of the more tenaciously. with various strata of the population, par- socialist countries will be further intensi- 2. Show the dangerous character of the ticularly with the intelligentsia and youth, fied. Chinese leadership’s aim to undermine the and widely distributing invitations to vari- Under these conditions an important unity of the socialist states, its hypocritical ous events at the PRC embassies. Informa- question in the work of ambassadors is the efforts to separate the questions of bilateral tion is being collected about the domestic effective and systematic opposition of relations between the socialist countries and life of their post country, the decisions of Beijing’s splitting activities in socialist coun- China from Soviet-Chinese relations, to sow party and state organs, the economic situa- tries, the neutralization of its plans to shake illusions concerning its goals in this area, for tion and the military potential, the military the unity of the socialist states, to influence example by using for its own purposes the forces and weapons. Under the guise of their positions. It is necessary to obstruct the fact that Soviet-Chinese negotiations are COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 203 being held. As the leadership of the frater- tries. Under present conditions, when the sector) nal countries was informed, the results of Chinese leadership is strengthening its sub- the Moscow round of Soviet-Chinese nego- versive activities among countries of the Proletariat of all countries, unite! tiations showed that the Chinese side does socialist community, it is all the more impor- not aim, in the near future in any case, to tant to meticulously observe the criteria elabo- COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET come to any agreements about the normal- rated at the meetings of the international UNION. CENTRAL COMMITTEE ization of relations between the USSR and departments of the CCs of the fraternal coun- the PRC; that China knowingly proposes tries for approaching questions of bilateral TOP SECRET unacceptable preconditions, and rejects the relations between socialist countries and the Soviet side’s constructive proposals, directed PRC. These mandate that the rapproche- No. P217/57 at the elaboration of principles of relations ment between Beijing and the USA (as their between the two countries and the building actions in Indochina and Afghanistan attest) To Comrades Brezhnev, of a political-juridical basis for them. is taking a more and more dangerous form Kosygyn, Andropov, Gromyko, As far as the second round is con- and is directed against the interests of peace Kirilenko, Suslov, Tikhonov, cerned, now it is generally difficult to say and the process of detente. Given the way the Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, anything about it, insofar as the Chinese situation is progressing, keep in mind that the Zamiatin, Smirtyukov. press announced that it would be “inappro- task of decisively repelling the strengthening priate” to hold them at present. Recent attacks on the socialist community on the Extract from protocol No. 217 of events attest to the escalation of Beijing’s part of imperialism, reaction, and Chinese the CC CPSU Politburo session hostility towards the Soviet Union. hegemonism, is all the more important. of October 2, 1980 3. Taking into account the hostile char- 5. Note the necessity of a vigilant ap- ______acter of China’s policy towards socialist proach to the activities of Beijing and its states and the strengthening of its aggres- representatives in socialist countries, its at- Re: Carrying out additional measures to siveness, note the necessity of a careful and tempts to penetrate various spheres of the counter American-Chinese military deliberate approach to the development of domestic life of these countries, to spread its cooperation economic ties and scientific-technical co- influence in various strata of the population, operation with the PRC, particularly in those particularly among young people, some of Approve the draft indicated for Soviet areas which would facilitate the growth of whom are a part of the technical, scientific, ambassadors and Soviet representatives its military-industrial potential. Beijing’s and creative intelligentsia. It is important not (enclosed). efforts to exaggerate the brilliant perspec- to weaken control over their contacts with tives of trade and economic cooperation Chinese representatives, to monitor their vis- CC SECRETARY with some socialist countries don’t have any its to various organizations, including gov- real basis and are only a tactical means of ernment agencies, scientific-research and * * * * * influencing these countries. Beijing now educational institutions, and also to limit the considers it advantageous to orient itself attendance by citizens in the post countries of For point 57 prot. No. 217 towards the West, and not to the develop- events at Chinese embassies. ment of trade-economic ties with the coun- It would be inadvisable to consider the Secret tries of the socialist community. The Chi- explanatory work on this question to be an nese side is prepared to give any promises, episodic campaign. It is necessary to con- FOR ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS however, as experience shows, among them duct it consistently, taking into account the AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES the heralded experience of relations with specifics of the post country, and, as much as Romania and Yugoslavia, China does not possible, involve a wide range of leading At the present time the partnership be- have sufficient foreign currency and trade party and government cadres, as well as the tween American imperialism and Beijing’s resources to fulfill these promises. In 1979, creative intelligentsia. As necessary, con- hegemonism, which is spreading to the mili- for example, the planned trade balance with tribute any suitable proposals for effective tary sphere, is a new negative phenomenon the FSRY [Yugoslavia] was fulfilled only to opposition to Beijing’s subversive activities in world politics and dangerous for all of one fourth. China not only is an undesirable and the neutralization of undesirable tenden- humanity. Counting on using “strong and partner, but also often uses trade-economic cies in the policies of specific socialist states. stable” China in its strategic interests, Wash- relations as a means of pressure on socialist ington is expanding the parameters for coop- states (SRV, MNR, Albania), which refuse * * * * * eration with Beijing in the military-techni- to undertake obligations for purely political cal sphere. In particular, the USA adminis- motives. Document II. CPSU CC Politburo tration has affirmed its readiness to deliver 4. Pay attention to the importance of Directive to Soviet Ambassadors and modern American weapons and technology continuing a consistent and broad coordina- Representatives, 2 October 1980 to China, which could be widely used for tion of actions towards China and its at- military purposes. tempts to use a differentiated approach to Subject to return within 7 days to As American-Chinese military coop- undermine the cohesion of the socialist coun- the CC CPSU (General department, 1st eration develops further, destructive elements 204 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN will grow in international relations. ing China into a military “superpower,” and and USA have agreed to follow. In accordance with the instructions you the resolution of the most serious problems, As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, received previously and taking into account such as increasing the extremely low mate- it has every opportunity to defend its inter- the specifics of your post country, continue rial and cultural level of the Chinese people, ests and repel the presumptions of other your work to reveal the dangerous character has been relegated to an indefinite future. In countries, including the PRC. The calcula- of the developing rapprochement between China they don’t hide the fact that “modern- tions of those who try to direct American- aggressive circles in the West, above all the ization” is the best means of preparing for Chinese relations in such as way as to use USA, and the Chinese leadership, calling war. In practice, unrestrained militarization China as a means of pressure and as a mili- attention to the following aspects. accelerates economic collapse and increased tary counterweight to the Soviet Union are 1. In developing military cooperation instability in China. Thus, those countries short-sighted. Those who hope to redirect with China, the ruling circles in the USA who actively take part in the Chinese pro- Chinese expansion to the north risk major count on the possibility of influencing China gram of “modernization,” actually contrib- miscalculation. Encouraging the expansion to act in a “desirable” way, of channeling its ute to the growth of its military potential and of China’s military potential increases the policies in an acceptable direction. Fre- render a disservice to the Chinese people. danger that certain countries would be in- quently the foreign policy activity of the On the other hand, the policy of milita- veigled into Beijing’s orbit, and in the long- PRC is presented as a “stabilizing” factor in rizing the country will inevitably engender term, could lead to a situation in which these the international arena. The Chinese leaders unpredictable turns and zigzags and future very countries could become the victims of themselves are not adverse to playing up to evidence of foreign policy adventurism, lead- Chinese expansion. Therefore, thinking re- such a discussion and, to this end, without ing to the dangerous destabilization of the alistically, it would follow to recognize that withdrawing the thesis of the “inevitability international situation and the inflammation a “strong” China would chose a different of war,” have begun to use a more flexible of international tension. Any injection of direction for its expansionist plans: in all terminology. However, with the help of a aid, particularly by the USA, either directly likelihood it would swallow up neighboring sham “peaceful nature,” invoked to add or indirectly contributing to China’s milita- countries, grab hold of all the vitally impor- greater “respectability” to the PRC’s foreign rization and to the development of the Chi- tant regions of the world, and would cer- policy, Beijing is simply counting on gain- nese military potential, would enable China tainly not serve as an instrument in the hands ing time to accomplish the forced arming of to find the striking power necessary for the of the USA or any other country. the country. Actually, more and more, the realization of its hegemonic schemes. Un- 5. The development of military-politi- Chinese leadership is resorting to a policy of der conditions when Beijing not only op- cal cooperation between China and the USA, diktat and interference in the domestic af- poses all constructive proposals to strengthen which elicits concern among many states, fairs of other countries, and assumes on peace and detente, but also directly pro- has led already to a noticeable worsening of itself the improper functions of “teaching vokes international conflict, this [aid] would the international situation and complicated lessons” and “punishing” the unruly with mean an increased danger of war breaking the search for real paths to strengthening the force of arms. out and the growth of threats to all humanity, peace and security in various regions of the 2. As before, the PRC government including the Chinese and American peoples. world. In an effort to create favorable condi- declines to make any international legal com- The fact that what is proposed for deliv- tions for the realization of its hegemonic mitments to disarmament, tries to diminish ery to China is “non-lethal” equipment and aims, the Beijing leadership counts on ag- the importance of results achieved in this technology, “defensive,” and “dual-use,” gravating relations between countries, set- area, and refuses to take part in measures to etc., does not change the situation. The issue ting some states against others, and provok- limit and stop the arms race. Beijing has set is not that such distinctions are extremely ing military conflicts. Beijing does not hide about to manufacture and experiment with relative, but that cooperation with military the fact that it aims to cause a nuclear con- intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable modernization will free up the forces within flict between the Soviet Union and the USA, of carrying nuclear warheads, and is work- China and the means necessary for building and, from its ashes, assume world domina- ing on the creation of neutron weapons. All up its principal strike force - its nuclear tion. this drives the global arms race forward and capability. Those who insist on the necessity of directly contradicts the interests of detente. 4. The plans Beijing has been develop- “strengthening” China base their calcula- This policy of Beijing’s seriously threatens ing for a long time to change the global tions on the assumption that Beijing would everyone, even the USA and Japan, and not correlation of forces and the entire structure coordinate in a confrontation with the USSR just the Soviet Union and other socialist of contemporary international relations elicit and in its conflicts in Asia, and therefore states. serious alarm. The transfer to China of any would not be dangerous for the West. But 3. There is absolutely no basis for technology or equipment whatsoever—this taking into account the continuing domestic concluding, as some do, that Beijing’s al- would be a step in the direction of the erosion political struggle in China, no one can guar- leged adoption of a “modernization pro- of the established military-balance in the antee that in 5-10 years China would not gram” represents a new political course to world and of a new cycle in the arms race. bring into play an anti-American card or overcome China’s economic backwardness. The destruction of the balance of military anti-Japanese card and use its ICBM force In fact this course was taken above all to forces would erode the basis for the arms against those countries which irresponsibly contribute to the realization of pre-existing limitation negotiations insofar as equal se- connived and assisted with the PRC’s re- plans to speed up the process of transform- curity is the main principle which the USSR armament. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 205

The experience of history attests to the Asia, but, at a certain stage, also could present COLD WAR IN ASIA fact that the extent of China’s expansion a direct threat to other regions. continued from page 191 will be proportional to the military might of Under these conditions, the Soviet Union the Chinese army. Even today China’s can only draw the requisite conclusions. Not RUSSIA ON THE PACIFIC: neighbors, above all the countries of South- only do we carefully monitor the direction of PAST AND PRESENT east Asia which the Chinese leaders con- American-Chinese cooperation in the mili- (Khabarovsk, 26-29 August 1995) sider to be their traditional sphere of influ- tary sphere, but also we must take the neces- ence, experience an immediate threat. It sary steps to strengthen the security of our 26 August 1995: Multiethnic Demographics would be easy to imagine how China will borders. We cannot tolerate change in the behave in relation to its neighbors once the military-strategic balance in favor of forces Morning: Russians Abroad in the Far East USA and its neighbors assist China to ac- hostile to the cause of peace. quire more modern weapons. Above all, (Only for Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw, Maria Krotova (Herzen Institute, Peters- China is trying to institute its control over Prague, Sofia, Ulan-Bator, Havana, Hanoi, burg): “Russo-Chinese Daily Relations in pre- Southeast Asia all the way to the coast of Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kabul. 1917 Harbin” Malacca and the straits of . The post countries should inform MID Lena Aurilena (Institute of History, Under these conditions, attempts to ig- [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that Soviet Vladivostok): “Youth Politics in Russian Emigre nore the dangerous tendencies in Chinese ambassadors were sent instructions about Organizations in , 1930s-40s” policy and to remain neutral will only en- carrying out work to counter the negative Nadezhda Solov’eva (Khabarovsk Provin- courage Beijing to undertake new adven- counsequences for the causes of socialism, cial Archive): “Khabarovsk’s Archival Holdings tures and to extend its expansion. Collec- peace, and detente, of the establishment of an on Russo-Chinese Relations” tive efforts by Asian states could, on the American-Chinese military alliance. Famil- David Wolff (Princeton U.): “Interlocking contrary, impede China’s path to increased iarize the recipient with the content of the Diasporas: The Jews of Harbin, 1903-1914” military might, which is directed above all aforementioned instructions. Shuxiao LI ( Trade Corpora- against countries of this region. Carry out your work in coordination tion): “The Chinese Eastern Railway and Harbin’s (For only. The connivance with the embassies (missions of) Cuba, the Rise as an Economic Center” and outright support of the USA for military Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), the Alexander Toropov (Central Archive of the preparations in China can only contradict People’s Republic of Bulgaria (PRB), the Far East, Vladivostok): “Russia’s Far Eastern India’s interests. Although the Chinese Hungarian People’s Republic (HPR), the Ger- Neighbors” leadership is holding talks about normaliz- man Democratic Republic (GDR), the Lao- Iurii Tsipkin (Ped. Institute, Khabarovsk): ing relations with India, there is an entire tian People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR), “The Social Composition of the Harbin Emigra- array of means of pressure against it in the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR), tion, 1920s-30s” China’s arsenal of strategies. In American- the Polish People’s Republic (PPR), and the Chinese plans, the role which is allotted to Czechoslovak People’s Republic (CPR).) Afternoon : “Foreigners” in the Russian Far East Pakistan as a key factor in pressuring India It is necessary to attentively follow all (RFE): Settlement and Resettlement and as a base of support for the aggressive foreign policy steps taken to carry out plans actions of the USA and China in Southeast for the expansion of American-Chinese mili- Tatiana Ikonnikova (Ped. Institute, Asia is expanding more and more. In coop- tary cooperation, to regularly and effectively Khabarovsk): “German Intelligence in the RFE eration with the USA, Beijing is flooding inform the Center about them, and to take the during WWI: Suspicions and Realities” India’s neighbors with arms and, by creat- measures required to neutralize the tenden- Vladimir Mukhachev (Institute of History, ing an atmosphere of war psychosis, is at- cies that are undesirable for our interests. Vladivostok): “Intervention and Civil War : New tempting to maintain in power unpopular Documents and Approaches” regimes such as the current one in Pakistan. [Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 34, Dok. 10; Teruyuki HARA (Slavic Research Center, Beijing is speeding up its military prepara- translation by Elizabeth Wishnick.] Sapporo, Japan): “The Japanese in Vladivostok, tions along the Chinese-Indian border, con- 1906-1922” structing missile bases and strategic roads in Elena Chernolutskaia (Institute of History, Vladivostok): “Forced Migrations in the Far East Tibet, and activating its support for separat- Elizabeth Wishnick is a visiting fellow at the from the 1920s till mid-1950s” ist movements in northeast India, where it is Institute of Modern History, Academica Natsuko OKA (Institute of Developing practically waging an “undeclared war” Sinica (Taiwan). She is completing work on Economies): “Koreans in the Russian Far East: against this country.) a monograph entitled, Mending Fences with Collectivization and Deportation” There is no doubt that as China strength- China: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Viktoriia Romanova (Ped. Institute, ens its military-industrial potential, it will Policy, 1969-95. advance further along the path to the real- Khabarovsk): “The Jewish Diaspora in the mak- ization of Chinese leadership’s openly de- ing of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast” clared territorial pretensions against neigh- Chizuko TAKAO (Waseda U., Tokyo, Ja- boring countries in Southeast, South, and pan): “Reevaluating the ‘Birobidzhan Project’: West Asia. This will not only lead to a The Regional Context” serious destabilization of the situation in 206 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

27 August 1995: Civilian and Military in the Vladivostok): “Foreign Investment in the Rus- Borderland: Options and Tensions sian Fishing Industry 1920s-1930s” COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL Lidiia Varaksina (Khabarovsk Provincial HISTORY PROJECT Morning: Regional Political-Economy Archive): “Foreign Concessions in the Russian WORKING PAPERS Far East, 1920s-1930s” Pavel Minakir and Nadezhda Mikheeva (In- Igor Sanachev (Far Eastern State U.): “For- CWIHP Working Papers are available free upon stitute of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “The eign Capital in the Far East in the 1920s” request. Requests can be sent to Jim Hershberg, Economy of the Russian Far East : Between Takeshi HAMASHITA (Tokyo U.): “Japa- Director, CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center, Centralization and Regionalization” nese Currency and Banking in Northeast Asia” Smithsonian Castle, 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW, Vladimir Syrkin (Institute of Economic Washington, DC 20560; faxed to (202) 357- 4439; or e-mailed to [email protected] Research, Khabarovsk): “Economic Regional- 28 August 1995: The Crossborder Learning ism: Conditions, Factors and Tendencies” Process: Perceptions, Research and Compari- #1. Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and Katherine Burns (Massachusetts Inst. of sons China’s Entry into the Korean War” Technology): “The Russian Far Eastern Initia- tive: Autonomous Decision-Making and Coop- Morning : International Economic Considerations #2. P.J. Simmons, “Archival Research on the eration in Northeast Asia.” (II) Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague, Cristina Sarykova (Univ. of Calif. at San and Warsaw” Diego): “Politics and the Reform of the Primorsk Elizabeth Wishnick (Independent Scholar): Fuel and Energy Complex” “Current Issues in Russo-Chinese Border Trade” #3. James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Toward Germany during the Beria Interregnum” Weixian MA (Institute of E. Europe and Afternoon: The RFE as “Outpost” Central Asia, CASS): “Sino-Russian Border #4. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence and Trade” the Cold War: The ‘Small’ Committee of Infor- Oleg Sergeev (Institute of History, Natal’ia Bezliudnaia (Far Eastern State U.): mation, 1952-52” Vladivostok): “The Cossack Revival in the Far “‘Geopolitical’ Projects in the Southern Part of East: From Borderguards to Émigrés to Interest the Maritime Province” #5. Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Con- Group” Jingxue XU (Institute of Siberia, Harbin): crete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Vladimir Sokolov (Primor’e Provincial “Sino-Russian Border Trade” Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and Museum): “Russian Nationalism and the Cos- Andrei Admidin and E. Devaeva (Institute the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961” sacks of the Far East” of Economic Research, Khabarovsk): “Economic #6. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Jun NIU (Institute of American Studies, Relations of the Russian Far East in the Asian- Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)” CASS): “Soviet Policy towards Northeast China, Pacific Region” 1945-49” Douglas Barry (U. of Alaska - Anchorage): #7. Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, “Viet- Ping BU (Institute of Modern History, “Alaska and the Russian Far East : Finding Friends, namese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold Heilongjiang Province Academy of Social Sci- Making Partners” War Period: Two Reports” ences): “Sino-Soviet Disposal of Japanese Chemi- cal Weapons after 1945” Afternoon: Perceptions, Images & Area-Studies #8. Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea Evgeniia Gudkova (Institute of Economic and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives” Research, Khabarovsk): “Military Conversion in Viktor Larin (Institute of History, the Russian Far East” Vladivostok): “Putting the Brakes on Regional #9. Scott D. Parrish and Mikhail M. Narinsky, James Hershberg (Cold War International Integration: Chinese Migration and the Russian “New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the History Project, Wilson Center, Washington, Far East in Two Periods, 1907-14 and 1988- Marshall Plan, 1947: Two Reports” DC): “Northeast Asia and the Cold War” 1995” Tamara Troyakova (Institute of History, Zhengyun NAN (Beijing Normal U.): “The #10. Norman M. Naimark, “‘To Know Every- Vladivostok): “The Maritime Province on the Roots of Russian Studies in China : Harbin, thing and To Report Everything Worth Know- Road to Openness: Khrushchev in Vladivostok” 1950s-60s” ing’: Building the East German Police State, Stephen Kotkin (Princeton U.): “Frank 1945-1949” Late Afternoon: International Economic Consid- Golder, Robert Kerner and the Northeast Asian #11. Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, erations (I) Seminar, 1920s-1950s” the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits Evgenii Plaksen (Institute of History, of ” Natal’ia Troitskaia (Far Eastern State U.): Vladivostok): “Public Opinion in the Russian Far “The Effect of Changing Border Regimes on East: Accentuations and Priorities” #12. Brian Murray, “Stalin, the Cold War, and the Large-scale Trade between late-Imperial Russia Thomas Lahusen (Duke University) : Division of China: A Multi-Archival Mystery” and China” “Azhaev’s Far East” Mikhail Koval’chuk (Institute of Transport, Tatsuo NAKAMI (Tokyo Foreign Lan- #13. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three Khabarovsk): “Foreign Trade and Transport in guages U.), “Japanese Conceptions of Northeast After World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the the Russian Far East, 1860-1930s” Asia in the ” United States and Great Britain” Anatolii Mandrik (Institute of History, NEWCOL D WEAR IVIDENCENTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT ON BULLETIN 207 MAO ZEDONG’S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958: CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Translated and Annotated by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson

Translators’ Note: On 23 August 1958, as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul- Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian scholars have been forced to resort to “edu- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, area along the People’s Republic of China’s cated guesses” to answer these questions. 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery The materials in the following pages, Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled translated from Chinese, provide new in- Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese- Jinmen Island. In the following two months, sights for understanding Beijing’s handling British-American Relations, 1949-1958 several hundred thousand artillery shells of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by it. At one point, a Chinese Communist Lengxi, then the director of the New China Thomas Christensen to be published by invasion of the Nationalist-controlled off- News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin Princeton University Press.] shore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) ribao (People’s Daily). Wu was personally Rendering Chinese- or English-lan- and Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In involved in the decision-making process in guage materials into the other language is response to the rapidly escalating Commu- Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and difficult because the two languages have no nist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the attended several Politburo Standing Com- common linguistic roots. Thus, the materi- Eisenhower Administration, in accordance mittee meetings discussing the events. His als provided below are sometimes free rather with its obligations under the 1954 Ameri- memoir provides both a chronology and an than literal translations from Chinese to can-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. insider’s narrative of how Beijing’s leaders, English. Great care has been taken to avoid naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. Mao Zedong in particular, handled the cri- altering the substantive meaning intended naval vessels to help the Nationalists pro- sis. The second part comprises 18 docu- by the author of the documents. Material tect Jinmen’s supply lines. Even the leaders ments, including two internal speeches de- appearing in the text in brackets has been of the Soviet Union, then Beijing’s close livered by Mao explaining the Party’s exter- supplied to clarify meaning or to provide ally, feared the possible consequences of nal policies in general and its Taiwan policy missing words or information not in the Beijing’s actions, and sent Foreign Minis- in particular. The two parts together provide original text. Additional problems with in- ter Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to in- a foundation to build a scholarly under- dividual documents are discussed in the quire about China’s reasons for shelling standing of some of the key calculations notes. The notes also include explanatory Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the underlying the Beijing leadership’s man- information to place key individual and Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly events in context or to provide further infor- on October 6, when Beijing issued a “Mes- interesting is the revelation that Mao de- mation on the material being discussed. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the cided to shell Jinmen to distract American name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it attention from, and counter American moves Part I. Memoir, “Inside Story of the was speculated by many at that time, and in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his Decision Making during the Shelling of later confirmed, that this message was extensive explanation of how China should Jinmen” drafted by Mao Zedong). The message use a “noose strategy” to fight the “U.S. By Wu Lengxi1 called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan imperialists.” Equally important is his em- [Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Lit- problem, arguing that all Chinese should phasis on the connection between the tense erature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]] unite to confront the “American plot” to situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass divide China permanently. From this day mobilization in China leading to the Great In August 1958, the members of the on, the Communist forces dramatically re- Leap Forward. It should also be noted that Standing Committee of the Chinese Com- laxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the despite the aggressive appearance of munist Party (CCP) Central Committee Po- Taiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war Beijing’s Taiwan policy, Mao paid special litburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular top between China and the United States. attention to avoiding a direct military con- leaders’ working conference. The meeting In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of frontation with American forces present in originally planned to focus on the nation’s the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. industrial problems, and later the issue of the Cold War history, it is particularly impor- Although these materials are not directly people’s commune was added to the discus- tant to understand Beijing’s motives. Why from Chinese archives, they create a new sion. did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the basis for scholars to deepen their under- The Politburo convened its summit shelling relate to China’s overall domestic standing of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: For meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in and international policies? Why did the recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis newly available Chinese sources, see Shu the meeting several days later. On the 20th, 208 CSOLDINO WAR INTERNATIONAL-AMERICAN HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN RELATIONS however, the General Office of the Central bly had passed a resolution requesting Ameri- though Mao believed that the imperialists Committee called, urging me to go to can and British troops to withdraw from were more afraid of us, he told me that our Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American media and propaganda should state that first August on a scheduled flight arranged by the occupation of Taiwan became even more we were not afraid of war, and second we Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was opposed war. Another point he made was with Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe’s that American armed forces should with- that international tension had a favorable central district. This seaside resort area was draw from Taiwan, and Jiang’s army should aspect for the people of the world. Our used only for the leading members of the withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they propaganda, however, should declare that Central Committee during summers. All of did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far we must prevent the imperialists from mak- the villas in the resort area were built before away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen ing any international tension, and work on the liberation4 for high officials, noble lords, and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bom- relaxing such tension. These were only and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman bardment would certainly shock the interna- some examples, he continued. There were Mao’s large, one-story house was newly tional community, not only the Americans, so many bad things happening in our world. constructed. but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab If we were too distracted with worries by At noon on 23 August, the third day world would be delighted, and African and everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People’s Lib- Asian peoples would take our side. psychologically under pressure. We should eration Army’s artillery forces in Fujian Then Chairman Mao turned to me and learn how to use a dichotomous method to employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces said that [the reason for] rushing me to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], attend the meeting was to let me know about international tension was certainly a bad Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding off- this sudden event. He directed me to instruct thing, we should see the good side of it. The shore islands occupied by the Nationalist the New China News Agency (NCNA) to tension had made many people awaken and army. collect international responses to the bom- decide to fight the imperialists to the end. In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the bardment. Important responses should be Employing such an analytical method could Politburo’s Standing Committee meeting immediately reported to Beidaihe by tele- help us achieve a liberation in our mind and chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I phone. Mao asked me not to publish our get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks. learned the reason [for the bombardment]. own reports and articles on the bombard- Chairman Mao said that the bombard- In mid-July, American troops invaded Leba- ment at present. We needed to wait and see ment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our non and British troops invaded Jordan in for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao turn to create international tension for a order to put down the Iraqi people’s armed also asked me to instruct editorial depart- purpose. We intended to teach the Ameri- rebellion. Thereafter, the Central Commit- ments of the NCNA, the People’s Daily, and cans a lesson. America had bullied us for tee decided to conduct certain military op- national radio stations that they must obey many years, so now that we had a chance, erations in the Taiwan Straits to support the these orders and instructions in all their why not give it a hard time? For the present Arabs’ anti-imperialist struggle as well as to reports. Our military troops must follow the we should first wait and see what interna- crack down on the Nationalist army’s fre- orders, as well as our media and propaganda tional responses, especially American re- quent and reckless harassment along the units, Mao emphasized. sponses, there were to our shelling, and then Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Chairman Mao continued his talk. Sev- we could decide on our next move. Ameri- Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announced eral days earlier, at the beginning of the cans started a fire in the Middle East, and we on 17 July that Taiwan, [Pescadores], summit meeting, he addressed eight interna- started another in the Far East. We would Jinmen, and Mazu were all “to be on emer- tional issues. He had been thinking of these see what they would do with it. In our gency alert.” It showed that Jiang’s army issues for many years. His thinking had propaganda, however, we still need to con- was going to make some moves soon. We gradually formulated some points and opin- demn the Americans for causing tension in therefore deployed our air force in Fujian ions, and his mind thereby became clear. the Taiwan Straits. We did not put them in Province at the end of July.5 Our fighters Those viewpoints, however, could not be all the wrong. The United States has several had been fighting the Nationalist air force brought forth without considering time, thousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plus and had already taken over control of the air place, and circumstance in our public propa- two air force bases there. Their largest fleet, space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, ganda, Mao said to me. We had to use a the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Tai- our artillery reinforcement units arrived at different tone in our media work. What he wan Straits. They also have a large naval the front one after another. And mass rallies used as the first example was that at the base in Manila. The chief of staff of the and parades were organized all over the meeting a couple days earlier he predicted American navy had stated not long ago country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples that world war would not break out. But our (around 6 August) that the American armed and to protest against the American and military should still be prepared for a total forces were ready anytime for a landing British imperialists’ invasions of the Middle war. And our media should still talk about campaign in the Taiwan Straits just as they East. the danger of world war and call for oppos- did in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof [of Chairman Mao talked first at the meet- ing the imperialists’ aggressive and war- America’s ambition], Mao said. ing of August 23. He said that the day’s provoking policies to maintain world peace. Two days later, during the afternoon of bombardment was perfectly scheduled. The next example in his explanations was 25 August, Chairman Mao held another Po- Three days earlier, the UN General Assem- which side feared the other a bit more. Al- litburo Standing Committee meeting in the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 209 lounge hall of the swimming area at bardment of Jinmen [to the America’s land- America’s responses. During these days, I Beidaihe’s beach. Mao chaired the meeting ing in Lebanon]. Our major propaganda asked NCNA to report to me every morning in his bathrobe right after swimming in the target was America’s aggressions all over by telephone about headline news from for- ocean. Among the participants were Liu the world, condemning its invasion of the eign news agencies. I reported the important Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Middle East and its occupation of our terri- news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Peng Dehuai.6 Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, tory, Taiwan, Mao said. The People’s Daily The Central Committee’s working con- Hu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meet- could begin our propaganda campaign by ference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August. ing.7 criticizing an anti-China memorandum re- Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to Chairman Mao started the meeting by cently published by the U.S. State Depart- chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 saying that while we had had a good time at ment, enumerating the crimes of America’s September, one day before the conference, this summer resort, the Americans had ex- invasion of China in the past and refuting the Mao called for another Politburo Standing tremely hectic and nervous days. Accord- memorandum’s calumny and slander against Committee meeting, which mainly discussed ing to their responses during the past days, us. We could also organize articles and the international situation after the bom- Mao said that Americans were worried not commentaries on the resolution passed by bardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed only by our possible landing at Jinmen and the UN General Assembly, requesting Ameri- the American responses. Both [Dwight] Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate can and British troops to withdraw from Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles made Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request public speeches. They ordered half of their with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We the withdrawal of American armed forces warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. did not say if we were or were not going to from their military bases in many countries Meanwhile, the American government also land. We were acting as circumstances across the world, including Taiwan. Our suggested resuming Chinese-American am- dictated. We had to be doubly cautious, media should now conduct an outer-ring bassadorial talks at Warsaw.9 Seemingly, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was propaganda campaign. After we learned the the American leaders believed that we were not a small matter because it had a bearing responses and moves of America, of Jiang going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to on much more important international is- Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to sues. The problem was not the 95,000 issue announcements and publish commen- have made up their mind whether or not to Nationalist troops stationed there—this was taries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower easy to handle. The problem was how to Mao said that at the present our media should and Dulles slurred over this matter without assess the attitude of the American govern- build up strength and store up energy—draw giving a straight answer. The participants at ment. Washington had signed a mutual the bow but not discharge the arrow. the meeting agreed that the Americans feared defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, Peng Dehuai suggested that the media a war with us. They might not dare to fight however, did not clearly indicate whether should write some reports and articles about us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombard- the U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen the heroic fighting of our commanders and ment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accom- and Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The plished our goal. We made the Americans Americans wanted to carry these two bur- participants at the meeting agreed that our very nervous and mobilized the people of dens on their backs. The main purpose of reporters on the front could prepare articles, the world to join our struggle. our bombardment was not to reconnoiter and we would decide later when they could At the Politburo’s Standing Committee Jiang’s defenses on these islands, but to publish their reports. meeting, however, the participants decided probe the attitude of the Americans in Wash- That evening I informed the editors of that our next plan was not an immediate ington, testing their determination. The the People’s Daily in Beijing, through a landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose Chinese people had never been afraid of secured telephone line, of the Politburo’s [around America’s neck] tighter and provoking someone far superior in power instructions on how to organize our propa- tighter—putting more pressure on and strength, and they certainly had the ganda campaign. But I did not say anything America—and then looking for an opportu- courage to challenge [the Americans] on about the Politburo’s decisions, intentions, nity to act. All participants agreed with such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, Premier Zhou’s suggestion of announcing a and Mazu, which had always been China’s which were a top military secret at that time. twelve-mile zone as our territorial waters so territories. For the next two days, the Politburo’s as to prevent America’s warships from reach- Mao said that we needed to grasp an Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe ing Jinmen and Mazu.10 Chairman Mao opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen focused its discussions upon how to double considered it righteous for us to defend our was an opportunity we seized when Ameri- steel and iron production and upon issues of territory if American ships entered our terri- can armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15 establishing the people’s commune. Chair- torial water. Our batteries, however, might July 1958]. Our action therefore not only man Mao, however, still paid close attention not fire on them immediately. Our troops allowed us to test the Americans, but also to to the responses from all directions to our could send a warning signal first, and then support the Arab people. On the horns of a bombardment of Jinmen, especially to act accordingly. dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to America’s response. Mao’s secretary called Chairman Mao also said that we were cope with both the East and the West at the me several times checking on follow-up in- preparing another approach as well. Through same time. For our propaganda, however, formation after the NCNA’s Cangao ziliao the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, we should not directly connect the bom- [Restricted Reference Material]8 printed which would be resumed soon in Warsaw, 210 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN we would employ diplomatic means to coor- Jinmen-Mazu]. Although their policy of People’s Daily the next day (9 September). dinate our fighting on the Fujian front. We escape was acceptable, the Americans also There was another interesting episode. now had both an action arena and a talk needed to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang’s troops Khrushchev did not have any idea about our arena. There was yet another useful means— from Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americans intentions in shelling Jinmen. Afraid of the propaganda campaign. Then Chairman continued to stay and kept Jiang’s troops being involved in a world war, he sent Mao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and said there, the situation would not be affected as Gromyko to Beijing to find out our plans on that at present our media should give wide a whole but they would put the noose around 6 September. During the Supreme State publicity to a condemnation of America for their necks. Conference, Chairman Mao and Premier causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We During Chairman Mao’s speech on the Zhou met with Gromyko, informing him of should request America to withdraw its armed 8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxi our decisions and explaining that we did not forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. was attending the meeting. I answered. intend to have a major war. In case a major Our propaganda should emphasize that Tai- Chairman Mao told me that his speech needed war broke out between China and America, wan and the offshore islands were Chinese to be included in that day’s news, and asked China did not intend to involve the Soviet territory, that our bombardment of Jinmen- me to prepare it immediately. I discussed Union in the war. After receiving our mes- Mazu was aimed at punishing Jiang’s army this with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us found sage, Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, ask- and was purely China’s internal affair, and it difficult to decide which part of Mao’s ing the American government to be very that no foreign country would be allowed to speech should be published, we agreed even- cautious in the Taiwan Straits and warning interfere with what happened there. Our tually to write the part about the noose first. that the Soviet Union was ready to assist propaganda organs, the People’s Daily, I drafted the news and then let Hu read it. China anytime if China was invaded. NCNA, and radio stations should use a fiery When the conference adjourned, Chairman Right after the Supreme State Confer- rhetorical tone in their articles and commen- Mao and other members of the Politburo’s ence, Chairman Mao left Beijing on an in- taries. Their wording, however, must be Standing Committee gathered in the lobby spection trip of the southern provinces. From measured, and should not go beyond a cer- of Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed over 10 to 28 September, he visited , , tain limit, Mao emphasized. the news draft to Mao for his checking and , and Shanghai, and other places. On From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Mao approval. While talking to the others, he 30 September, one day after Mao returned to chaired the Supreme State Conference. He went over the draft and made some changes. Beijing, his secretary called to tell me that made two speeches on the 5th and the 8th.11 Mao told me that only publishing the noose Chairman Mao wanted to see me. I immedi- Besides domestic issues, his speeches fo- issue was all right. It was not appropriate at ately went to Fengzeyuan in .13 cused on international issues similar to the that moment to publish all the issues dis- When I walked into the eastern wing of the eight issues which he had explained at the cussed because it was merely an exchange of Juixiang Study,14 Chairman Mao was read- Beidaihe meeting. When Chairman Mao opinion among the top leaders. Moreover, ing a book. He asked me to sit down and said talked about pulling the noose, he said that Mao did not want to relate the noose issue that during his trip he was impressed by the our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu made directly to Jinmen-Mazu. This was different boundless energy of the people across the the Americans very nervous. Dulles seem- from writing articles or editorials for news- country, especially in their great efforts to ingly intended to put his neck into the noose papers. In our articles, Mao continued, we develop a steel and iron industry and to of Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan, should not write about our policy toward mobilize massive militias. Mao had drafted Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good for Jinmen-Mazu, which was a top military se- a news story for NCNA, which was being us to get the Americans there. Whenever we cret. Our writing, however, could clarify our typed and would be ready soon. Chairman wanted to kick them, we could do so. Thus position toward the Chinese-American am- Mao also told me that he particularly invited we had the initiative, and the Americans did bassadorial talks which would resume soon,12 General Zhang Zhizhong15 to join in the trip. not. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troubles expressing that whatever the outcome would Besides his interests in a rapid growth of for us mainly through the breach at Fujian. It be, we placed hopes on the talks. We were industry and agriculture, Zhang showed spe- was indeed troublesome to let Jiang’s army now shelling on the one hand and talking on cial concerns during the trip about the situa- occupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could an the other—military operations combined tion in the Taiwan Straits. Zhang did not enemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed? with diplomatic efforts. Our bombardment understand why we took so long to land on We, however, did not intend to launch an was a test. Mao said that we had fired 30,000 Jinmen. His advice was that even though we immediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. [Our shells that day in coordination with the mass were unable to liberate Taiwan at that time, bombardment] was merely aimed at testing rally at Tiananmen Square to make a great we must take over Jinmen and Mazu by all and scaring the Americans, but we would show of strength and impetus. Our talks possible means. Zhang suggested not letting land if circumstances allowed. Why should were a test through diplomacy in order to get slip an opportunity which might never come we not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there came to the bottom of American reaction. Two again. an opportunity? The Americans in fact were approaches were better than a single one. It Chairman Mao told me that in fact we afraid of having a war with us at the bottom was necessary to keep the negotiation chan- were not unwilling to take over Jinmen and of their hearts so that Eisenhower never nel open, Mao emphasized. After checking Mazu. Our decision [on the landing], how- talked publicly about an absolutely “mutual and polishing my manuscripts, Chairman ever, not only concerned Jiang Jieshi, but defense” of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americans Mao asked me to instruct NCNA to transmit also had to give special consideration to seemingly intended to shy away [from the news that evening and to publish it in the America’s position. The Americans feared COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 211 a war with us. After we announced a twelve- Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead pub- Straits. Our test by artillery fire in August mile zone of territorial waters, American lic thinking about relations with the Nation- and September was appropriate because the warships at first refused to accept it. They alists. According to Chairman Mao’s in- Americans were forced to reconsider what invaded the boundary line of our territorial struction, the article was published as the they could do in the area. At the same time, waters many times, though they did not sail headline news on the front page of the we restricted our shelling to Jiang’s ships, into the eight-mile territorial waters which People’s Daily on that National Day (1 Oc- not American ships. Our naval and air forces they recognized. Later, after our warnings, tober 1958). all strictly observed the order not to fire on American ships did not dare to invade our After the National Day, Chairman Mao American ships and airplanes. We acted twelve-mile territorial waters. Once some held continuous meetings of the Politburo’s with caution and exercised proper restraint. American gunships escorted a Nationalist Standing Committee to discuss the situation Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping transportation flotilla shipping munitions in the Taiwan Straits. From 3 to 13 October, also said that we put up quite a pageant in our and supplies to Jinmen. When this joint the committee members met almost every- propaganda campaign to condemn America’s flotilla reached Jinmen’s harbor, I ordered day. The meetings of the 3rd and 4th focused occupation of our Taiwan territory and to heavy shelling. As soon as our batteries on an analysis of Dulles’s speech on 30 protest American ships and aircraft invading opened fire, the American ships turned September. In his speech, Dulles blatantly our territorial waters and air space. Our around and quickly escaped. The National- proposed a “two Chinas” policy, requesting propaganda had mobilized not only the Chi- ist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently, that the Chinese Communists and the Tai- nese masses but also the international com- America was a paper tiger. wan government “both should renounce the munity to support the Arab peoples and put America, however, was also a real ti- employment of force” in the straits. Mean- very heavy pressure on the American gov- ger, Mao continued. At present, America while, he criticized Taiwan’s deployment of ernment. They both emphasized that this concentrated a large force in the Taiwan large numbers of troops on Jinmen and Mazu was the right thing to do. Straits, including six out of its twelve air- as unnecessary, “unwise and not cautious” Chairman Mao said at the meeting that craft carriers, three heavy cruisers, forty actions. A reporter asked him if America’s our task of probing [the American response] destroyers, and two air force divisions. Its Taiwan policy would change if the Chinese had been accomplished. The question now strength was so strong that one could not Communists made some compromises. was what we were going to do next. He underestimate it, but must consider it seri- Dulles said that “our policy in these respects pointed out that regarding Dulles’s policy ously. Thus, our current policy [toward is flexible. . . . If the situation we have to meet we shared some common viewpoints with Jinmen] was shelling without landing, and changes, our policies change with it.”16 Jiang Jieshi—both opposed the two-China cutting-off without killing (meaning that Premier Zhou pointed out at the meeting policy. Certainly Jiang insisted that he should without a landing, we would continue bomb- that Dulles’s speech indicated America’s be the only legal government, and we the ing Jinmen to blockade its communication intention to seize this opportunity to create bandits. Both, therefore, could not renounce and transportation and to cut off its rear two Chinas, and Dulles wanted us to commit the use of force. Jiang was always preoccu- support and supplies, but not to bottle up the to a non-military unification of Taiwan. Using pied with recovering the mainland; and we enemy [on the island]). this as a condition, America might ask Tai- could never agree to abandon Taiwan. The Chairman Mao also told me that the wan to give up its so-called “returning to the current situation, however, was that we were Chinese-American ambassadorial talks had mainland” plan and withdraw its troops from unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain resumed at Warsaw. After several rounds of Jinmen and Mazu. In one word, Dulles’s period; Jiang’s “returning to the mainland” talks, we could tell that the Americans were policy was designed to exchange Jinmen and also included “a very large measure of illu- certain about defending Taiwan but not sure Mazu for Taiwan and Penghu. This was the sion” as even Dulles recognized. The re- about Jinmen. Some indications suggested same hand of cards we had recently discov- maining question now was how to handle that the Americans intended to exchange ered during the Chinese-American ambassa- Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang was unwilling to their abstaining from defending Jinmen- dorial talks in Warsaw. Zhou emphasized withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, and we did Mazu for our recognition of their forcible that the American delegates even spoke more not need to land on Jinmen-Mazu. Mao occupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We needed undisguisedly at the talks than had been asked us about the proposal of leaving Jinmen to work out a policy concerning this situa- suggested in Dulles’s speech. and Mazu in the hands of Jiang Jieshi. The tion. It was not adequate for us to accept Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] advantage of this policy was that we could General Zhang Zhizhong’s advice at that Xiaoping believed that both China and maintain contact with the Nationalists point. Mao asked the People’s Daily and America were trying to find out the other’s through this channel since these islands were NCNA to suspend the ongoing propaganda real intention. The two sides did the same very close to the mainland. Whenever nec- campaign and wait for the Central thing at both Warsaw and Jinmen. By now essary, we could shell the Nationalists. Committee’s further decision. both had some ideas about the other’s bottom Whenever we needed tension, we could pull Chairman Mao asked for my comments line, they said. Americans knew that we the noose tighter. Whenever we wanted a on his news draft after it was typed out. I neither intended to liberate Taiwan in the relaxation, we could give the noose more noted that the article particularly mentioned near future nor wanted to have a head-to- slack. [The policy of] leaving these islands at its end that General Zhang had joined head clash with America. Fairly speaking, hanging there neither dead nor alive could be Mao’s inspection trip. I agreed with Mao’s both sides adopted a similar cautious policy employed as one means to deal with the manuscript except the last paragraph about toward their confrontation in the Taiwan Americans. Every time we bombed, Jiang 212 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Jieshi would ask for American help; it would Later on, our shelling could be at some formally suggested that both sides hold ne- make Americans anxious, worrying that intervals; sometimes heavy shelling, some- gotiations to search for peaceful resolutions Jiang might bring them into trouble. For us, times light; and several hundred shells fired to the Chinese civil war which had been not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little randomly in one day. However, Mao said fought for the past 30 years. It also an- impact on our construction of a socialist that we should continue to give wide public- nounced that our forces on the Fujian front country. Jiang’s troops on Jinmen-Mazu ity to our propaganda campaign. We in- would suspend their shelling for seven days alone could not cause too much damage. On sisted in our propaganda that the question of in order to allow the [Nationalist] troops and the contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu, Taiwan was China’s internal affair, that residents on Jinmen to receive supplies. Our or if we allow the Americans to force Jiang bombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuation suspension of bombardment, however, to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would of the Chinese civil war, and that no foreign would be with the precondition of no Ameri- lose a reliable means by which we can deal country or international organization should can ships providing escort. with the Americans and Jiang. be allowed to interfere in China’s affairs. This statement drafted by Chairman Mao All the participants at the meeting agreed America’s stationing of its land and air forces was a very important turning point in our with Chairman Mao’s proposal to allow on Taiwan was an invasion of China’s terri- policy toward Jinmen. That is, our focus Jiang’s troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu and tory and sovereignty; concentrating a large shifted from military operations to political force the American government to continue number of naval ships in the Taiwan Straits (including diplomatic) efforts. with this burden. The latter would be always revealed American attempts to cause ten- After watching the situation for two on tenterhooks since we could kick it from sions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawn days, Chairman Mao called for another Po- time to time. from that area. We must oppose America’s litburo Standing Committee meeting at his Premier Zhou expected the Americans attempts to create two Chinas and to legalize quarters in the afternoon of 8 September. All to propose three resolutions during the Chi- its forcible occupation of Taiwan. We would the committee members noticed that the nese-American talks. Their first proposition solve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or even world had made magnificent and strong re- might ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiang the problem of Taiwan and Penghu, with sponses to the “Message to the Compatriots would reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazu Jiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chair- in Taiwan.” Some Western newspapers and and America would announce that Jinmen- man Mao emphasized that our media propa- magazines even saw the message as a straw Mazu was included in the American-Jiang ganda should explicitly address the above in the wind that augured dramatic change in mutual defense perimeter. The second pro- principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw the relations between both Chinese sides and posal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiang talks should also follow these principles between China and America. Meanwhile, reduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, while while using some diplomatic rhetoric. All American ships stopped their escorts and no America would declare that their mutual these points would not be publicly propa- longer invaded our territorial waters around defense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. The gated until we had issued a formal govern- Jinmen. Only Jiang’s Defense Department last plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang’s ment statement. At the present, the People’s believed the message to be a Chinese Com- withdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a com- Daily could have a “cease-fire” for a couple munist “plot.” mitment by both sides not to use force against of days to prepare and replenish munitions. Chairman Mao then asked me about each other. All three propositions were Then, Mao said, ten thousand cannons would how the People’s Daily prepared its edito- unacceptable, Zhou emphasized, because boom after our orders. rial. I answered that the paper had already they were essentially aimed at creating two After the meeting of the 4th, Chairman finished one article to attack Americans in Chinas and legalizing America’s forcible Mao issued an order to the frontal forces on particular. Mao told me to work on the occupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, con- 5 September to suspend their bombardment Guomindang (GMD) first by writing an ar- sidered it favorable for us to continue the for two days. The same day Mao himself ticle which focused on a dialogue with Jiang Chinese-American talks, which could oc- drafted the “Message to the Compatriots in Jieshi, while at the same time posing some cupy the Americans and prevent America Taiwan,” which was published on the 6th in difficult questions for the Americans. This and the European countries from bringing the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. article should explain that our message was the question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN. The message began with “We are all Chi- not a crafty plot, but part of our consistent We also needed to explain clearly the situa- nese. Out of the thirty-six stratagems, the policy toward Taiwan. The message showed tion to our friends in Asia and Africa so as to best is making peace.” It pointed out that our stretching out both our arms once again, give them the truth and prevent [the crisis] both sides considered Taiwan, Penghu, Mao said. The article might try to alienate from doing us a disservice. All the partici- Jinmen, and Mazu as Chinese territories, Jiang from America, saying that Taiwan pants agreed with Premier Zhou’s sugges- and all agreed on one China, not two Chinas. suffered from depending on other people for tions. The message then suggested that Taiwan a living, and that getting a lift on an Ameri- Chairman Mao concluded at the meet- leaders should abolish the mutual defense can ship was unreliable. Then the article ing that our decision had been made—con- treaty signed with Americans. The Ameri- could criticize Dulles’s so-called cease-fire tinuation of shelling but not landing, block- cans would abandon the Taiwanese sooner and ask the Americans to meet five require- ading without bottling up and allowing or later; and one could discern certain clues ments for a cease-fire (stopping naval es- Jiang’s forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Our about this in Dulles’s speech of 30 Septem- corts, stopping the invasion of China’s terri- shelling would no longer be daily, with no ber. After all, the American imperialists torial waters and air space, ending military more 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time. were our common enemy. The message provocation and war threats, ending inter- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 213 vention in China’s internal affairs, and with- Standing Committee meeting on 4 October. one more time about this particular matter. drawing all American armed forces from Zhou gave the editorial his final check and Then we wrote another editorial to re-criti- Taiwan and Penghu). Chairman Mao asked approval. Its main content was our critiques cize the Dulles-Jiang meeting. me to finish my writing that evening. He and refusal of an American request for a Chairman Mao also said at the Polit- was going to wait to read and check the cease-fire on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The buro Standing Committee meeting that there article that night. Mao told me that I could editorial clearly stated that there was no war were many problems in the relationship be- leave right now to write the article without between China and America, so where did tween America and Jiang. The Americans waiting for the end of the meeting. the cease-fire come from? It asked America wanted to make Jiang’s “Republic of China” Leaving Zhongnanhai, I rushed back to to withdraw all of its naval and air forces one of their dependencies or even a man- the People’s Daily’s building. After order- from Taiwan and surrounding areas around dated territory. But Jiang desperately sought ing a dish of fried noodles as my dinner from the Taiwan Straits. It was a perfect timing for to maintain his semi-independence. Thus a restaurant across the street, I began to draft this editorial, corresponding to the “Defense came conflicts between Jiang and America. the editorial hurriedly in my office. With Ministry’s Order,” which was issued on 13 Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Chairman Mao’s instruction, my writing October and drafted by Chairman Mao. In Ching-kuo] still had a little bit of anti-Ameri- was very smooth and fast. A little bit after that order, the Defense Ministry announced can initiative. They would resist America if the midnight, I finished my draft. It was two a continuation of the suspension of our bom- it drove them too hard. Among such cases in or three o’clock in the early morning of the bardment for two more weeks. The suspen- the past were Jiang’s condemnation of Hu 9th when the final proof of the article was sion, however, still contained the precondi- Shi []17 and his dismissal of General sent to Chairman Mao for checking and tion that no American ships could be escorts. Sun Liren18—actions taken because Jiang approval. Mao read the editorial early the We would resume shelling immediately if believed that the troublemakers against him same morning and made important changes there were any American escort vessels. were supported by the Americans. Another in its last paragraph. He re-wrote the para- Two days later, Eisenhower ordered all good example of Jiang’s independence was graph as follows: “Seemingly, the problem the warships from the Sixth Fleet which had the recent smashing and looting of the Ameri- still needs to have more tests and observa- been sent as reinforcements to the Pacific to can Embassy in Taipei by Taiwanese tions. We are still very far away from the return to the Mediterranean. He also sent masses.19 Jiang permitted American armed time of solving the problem. After all, the Dulles to Taiwan to confer with Jiang Jieshi. forces stationed in Taiwan only at the regi- imperialists are the imperialists, and the The Editorial Department of the People’s mental level, while rejecting larger units at reactionaries are the reactionaries. Let us Daily, without really knowing what was go- the divisional level which America had wait and see how they will make their ing on, wrote an editorial entitled “Having planned to send to Taiwan. After our shell- moves!” Chairman Mao noted his approval Only Themselves to Blame,” saying that ing of Jinmen began, Jiang allowed only on the final proof: “Not very good, barely Dulles and Jiang played a “two-man show.” 3,000 more American marines to reinforce publishable.” The time written down below After the editorial was published on 21 Octo- Taiwan and they were stationed in [a his signature was six o’clock of 9 October. ber, Premier Zhou called us during the same city in southern Taiwan]. As Chairman Mao I received my manuscript sent back by morning and gave a pungent criticism that had pointed out two days earlier, we and Chairman Mao on the morning of 9 Octo- we were neither consistent with the facts nor Jiang Jieshi had some common points. The ber. Meanwhile, I received a telephone call with the policy made by the Central Commit- conflict at the Dulles-Jiang meeting sug- from Mao’s secretary, Lin Ke. Lin told me tee. When Chairman Mao chaired a Polit- gested that we might be able to ally with that Chairman Mao wanted to include buro Standing Committee meeting that after- Jiang to resist America in a certain way. Our Dulles’s 8 October announcement of Ameri- noon, he also criticized our editorial as book- policy of not liberating Taiwan in the near can ships stopping their escorts in the edito- ish and naive, reeling and swaggering, which future might help Jiang relax and concen- rial. Mao also suggested postponing its had a one-sided understanding of the Central trate on his fight against America’s control. publication for one day. After reading Mao’s Committee’s policy and gave an inappropri- We neither landed on Jinmen nor agreed revision and corrections, I felt that the ate emphasis to the American-Jiang solidar- with the American proposal for a “cease- editorial’s title was not a very bold headline. ity. Chairman Mao believed that Dulles’s fire.” This clearly caused problems between So, according to the changes he made in the mission to Taiwan was to persuade Jiang Americans and Jiang. In the past months, last paragraph, I changed the title to “Let’s Jieshi to withdraw his troops from Jinmen- our policy had been one of shelling without See How They Make Their Moves.” After Mazu in exchange for our commitment not to landing and blockading without driving the editorial was published on 11 October, it liberate Taiwan so that America could gain a Jiang’s troops to the wall. While continuing was thought to be Chairman Mao’s writing total control of Taiwan’s future. Disagree- the same policy, we should from now on because of its striking title and special style ing with Dulles, however, Jiang demanded implement it more flexibly in favor of sup- close to that of the “Message to the Compa- that America commit to a “mutual defense” porting Jiang Jieshi to resist America’s con- triots in Taiwan.” of Jinmen-Mazu. Jiang and Dulles had a big trol. Two days later, the People’s Daily pub- argument in which nobody gave in to the All the participants at the meeting agreed lished another editorial, “Stop Talking about other. As a result, the meeting ended in with Chairman Mao’s ideas. Premier Zhou Cease-fire; To Leave Is the Best,” on 13 discord and was not a “two-men show” of added that “shelling” was coordinated with October. This editorial was based upon solidarity. After the Politburo meeting, Chair- “blockading.” Since we relaxed our “block- Premier Zhou’s opinion at the Politburo man Mao asked Premier Zhou to talk to me ading,” we might also need to relax our 214 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

“shelling.” Mao agreed with him by sug- live under somebody’s thumb and lose your Part II. Documents gesting that we should announce an odd- sovereignty, you will eventually have no numbered-day shelling, with no shelling on place to call your home and be thrown out 1. Notation, Mao Zedong on ’s even-numbered days. For the odd-num- into the sea.” The message announced that Report, 18 December 195722 bered-day shelling, our targets might be lim- we had already ordered PLA batteries on the Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji [A Col- ited only to the harbors and airport, not the Fujian front not to fire on the airport, har- lection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers] defense works and residential buildings on bors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on even (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), the island. From now on, our shelling would days. On odd days, we might not bomb 6:373 be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light either, as long as there were no ships or shelling might not be on a regular basis. airplanes coming to Jinmen. Return to Comrade Peng Dehuai: Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such The same day the statement was issued, [What has been suggested in the report] policy was unknown in the history of Chi- Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying20 and is absolutely necessary. You should super- nese or world warfare. However, we were me for a conversation. Besides asking us to vise and push the air force to go all out [to engaged in a political battle, which was make a survey of the current condition of fulfill the task], so that we are sure that the supposed to be fought this way. Chairman people’s communes in Henan Province, Mao invading enemy will be annihilated. Please Mao said that we only had “hand ” talked about the bombardment of Jinmen consider the question regarding our air force’s right now, but no atomic bombs. “Hand and Mazu. He said that during this event moving into Fujian in 1958. grenades” could be successful for us to use both we and the Americans adopted a in beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], policy. America concentrated 2. Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai but not a good idea to use in fighting against many warships which invaded our territorial and Huang Kecheng, 27 July 195823 Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, waters and escorted Jiang’s transportation Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao when everybody had nuclear weapons, very fleets, but never fired on us. We fired 10,000 [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the For- likely nobody would use them. or 20,000 shells a day, or even more when- mation of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] ever there were American escort ships. Our The Central Press of Historical Documents, Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meet- shells, however, fell only on Jiang’s ships 1992), 7:326 ing whether we should issue a formal state- not on American ships. Some shells fell near ment announcing future shelling on odd American ships, which frightened them and Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] days only but not on even days. Chairman caused them to turn around. While confront- Kecheng: Mao believed it necessary. He also required ing each other in the Taiwan Straits, both [I] could not sleep [last night], but me to understand that the editorial men- sides continued talks in Warsaw. Ameri- thought about it again. It seems more appro- tioned early in the meeting should not be cans were on one side of the brink, and we on priate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen for published until our formal statement was the other. Even though both were at the several days. While holding our operations, issued. brink of war, no one ever crossed the line. [we will] observe the situational develop- On 25 October, the “Second Message to We used our brinkmanship policy to deal ment there. We will not attack whether or the Compatriots in Taiwan” drafted by Chair- with American brinkmanship. Mao contin- not the other side relieves a garrison. Until man Mao was issued in the name of Defense ued that there were many stories written in they launch a provocative attack, [we will] Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analy- Liaozhai Zhiyi (The Chinese Ghost Sto- then respond with a counterattack. The sis of Dulles’s speech published by the U.S. ries)21 about people without fear of ghosts. solution of the problem in the Middle East State Department on 23 October, the mes- One of the stories was titled “Qing Feng,” takes time. Since we have time, why should sage pointed out that on the one hand Dulles which talked about a bohemian scholar we be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack finally saw a “Communist China” and was named Geng Qubing. One night, Geng was plans now, but one day we will put it into willing to make contact with it. On the other reading late in a remote village house. “A implementation. If the other side invades hand, however, this American bureaucrat ghost walks into his house with long hair and Zhang[zhou], Shan[tou], Fuzhou, and still considered the so-called “Republic of black face, and stares at the scholar. Laugh- Hangzhou, a best scenario [for us to take China” in Taiwan as a “political unit which ing, dipping his fingers into the black , action] would emerge. How do you think was factually existing.” The American plan and painting his face black himself, Geng about this idea? Could you have a discus- was first to separate Taiwan from the main- looked directly at the ghost with keen, spar- sion about this with other comrades? It is land, and second to mandate Taiwan’s spe- kling eyes. The ghost felt embarrassed and extremely beneficial [for our decision-mak- cial status. The message read, “China’s ran away.” Chairman Mao told us that if we ing] with politics in command and going affairs must be handled by the Chinese them- were not afraid of ghosts, ghosts would be through repeated deliberations. To make a selves. For any problem unable to be solved unable to do anything to us. He said that our plan too quickly usually results in an un- at once, we can give it further thought and experience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was the thoughtful consideration. I did such things discuss it later between us. . . . We are not case in point. quite often and sometimes had unavoidable advising you to break up with Americans I can say that what Chairman Mao told miscalculations. What is your opinion? Even right now. These sort of ideas are not prac- us here is his summary of our management if the other side attacks us, [we still] can wait tical. We simply hope that you should not of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1958. for a couple of days for a clear calculation, yield to the pressure from Americans. If you and then start our counterattack. Can all of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 215 the above points be accounted as working ments] at the Military Commission’s meet- tion from now on. You can observe the out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy ing. situation for one, two, three, or four years by in battles a thousand miles away, and having using this point. You will eventually find some certainty of success that we will be Part II out whether the West fears the East a bit ever-victorious? We must persist in the Distribute them to the Fujian Military Dis- more, or the East fears the West a bit more. principle of fighting no battle we are not trict and all other military districts; the party According to my opinion, it is Dulles who sure of winning. If you agree [with the committees of all provinces, metropolises, fears us more. Britain, America, Germany, above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and regions; all departments of the Central France, and other western countries fear us a and ask him to think about it very carefully. Military Commission and all special forces lot more. Why do they have more fears? Let me know his opinion. headquarters; all members of the Politburo This is an issue of strength, and an issue of Have a peaceful morning! and the Secretariat of the Central Commit- popularity. Public attitude is indeed strength. tee; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lu There are more people on our side, and fewer Mao Zedong Dingyi;29 and Wu Lengxi. on their side. Among the three doctrines [in 10 A.M., 27 July24 today’s world]—communism, nationalism, 5. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth and imperialism, communism and national- 3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Peng Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 5 ism are relatively closer. Nationalism domi- Dehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.25 September 1958 (Excerpt) nates a large part of the world, including the Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Se- three continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin 7:348 lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] America. Even though the ruling groups of (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical some countries in these continents are pro- Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: Documents, 1994), 341-348 West, such as those in Thailand, Pakistan, [We are] preparing to shell Jinmen, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and , dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the As far as the international situation is among the people in these countries many, Americans indirectly. Therefore, do not concerned, our view has always been opti- probably quite a few, are pro-East. Only the conduct military maneuvers in Guangdong mistic, which can be summarized as “the monopoly-capitalists and a few people who and Shengzhen, so that the British would East Wind prevails over the West Wind.” have been totally poisoned by the monopoly- not be scared. At present, America commits itself to an capitalists want a war. Except for them, the “all-round contract” policy along our coast. rest of the people, or the majority of the Mao Zedong It seems to me that the Americans will only people (not all of them) do not want a war. In 1 A.M., 18 August feel comfortable if they take complete re- northern European countries, for example, sponsibility for Jinmen and Mazu, or even the ruling classes, though belonging to the P.S.: Please call air force headquarters for such small islands as Dadan, Erdan, and capitalists, do not want a war. The balance attention to the possibility that the Taiwan Dongding. America gets into our noose. of strength is like this. The truth is in the side might counterattack us by dispatching Thereby, America’s neck is hanging in hands of the majority of the people, not in the large groups of air force (such as dozens, or China’s iron noose. Although Taiwan is [for hands of Dulles. As a result, while they feel even over one hundred, airplanes) to try to the Americans] another noose, it is a bit rather diffident, we are solid and dependable take back air control over Jin[men] and farther from [the mainland]. America now inside. We depend on the people, while they Ma[zu]. If this happens, we should prepare moves its head closer to us, since it wants to support those reactionary rulers. This is to use large groups of air force to defeat take responsibility for Jinmen and other is- what Dulles is doing right now. He special- them immediately. However, in chasing lands. Someday we will kick America, and izes in such people as “Generalissimo Jiang,” them, [our planes] should not cross the it cannot run away, because it is tied up by [South Korean leader] Syngman Rhee, and space line over Jinmen and Mazu.26 our noose. [South Vietnam leader] Ngo Dinh Diem. I would like to present some viewpoints, My viewpoint is that both sides are afraid [of 4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Huang offering some ideas for the participants at each other], but they fear us a bit more. Kecheng, 3 September 195827 this meeting. Do not treat them as a decision, Thus, it is impossible for a war to break out. Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, or some kind of law. As law, they might not The second question is what is the na- 7:376 be changed; as opinions, they are alive and ture of the international military alliances flexible. Let us use these points to review organized by the Americans and the other Part I and analyze the current international situa- imperialists, such as the North Atlantic Comrade [Huang] Kecheng: tion. [Treaty Organization], the Baghdad [Treaty Both the instruction and the appendix28 The first question is who fears whom a Organization], and the Manila [Treaty Orga- are well written. Please send them to Com- bit more. I believe that the Americans are nization].30 We say that they are of an ag- rade Peng Dehuai immediately for his read- afraid of fighting a war. So are we. But the gressive nature. It is absolutely true that ing. Then, they should be approved by the question is which side actually fears the other these military organizations are of an ag- Central Military Commission’s meeting and a bit more. This is my point, as well as my gressive nature. However, against which issued thereafter. Please give a detailed observation. I would like to invite every- side do these organizations direct their spear- explanation of the reasons [for these docu- body here to apply this point to your observa- head? Are they attacking socialism, or na- 216 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tionalism? It seems to me that they are supports America among so many countries again. It is advantageous when France has currently attacking the nationalist countries, in the world. Probably the Philippines can trouble with Britain and America. Domesti- such as Egypt, Lebanon, and the other weak be added to the list, but it offers only “con- cally, he would become a necessary teacher countries in the Middle East. But they will ditional support.” It is a tense situation, for who can educate the French proletarians, attack the socialist countries until, say, when example, that caused the Iraqi revolution, is just like “Generalissimo Jiang” in China. Hungary completely has failed, Poland has it not? The current tense situation is caused Without “Generalissimo Jiang,” it would collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Ger- by the imperialists themselves, not by us. In not be enough for the Chinese Communist many have fallen down, and even the Soviet the final analysis, however, the tense situa- Party’s positive education alone to educate Union and us have encountered troubles. tion is more harmful for the imperialists. [China’s] 600 million people. Currently, de They will attack us when we are shaking and Lenin once introduced this point in his dis- Gaulle is still enjoying his reputation. If you crumbling. Why should they fail to attack cussions about war. Lenin said that a war defeat him now, people are still missing him you when you are falling down? Stable and could motivate people’s spiritual condition, as he is still alive. Let him come to power, strong, we are not falling down now, and making it tense. Although there is no war he will run no more than five, six, seven, they are unable to bite the hard bone. So they right now, a tense situation caused by the eight, or ten years. He will be finished turn to those more bitable countries, gnaw- current military confrontation can also bring sooner or later. After he is finished, no ing at Indonesia, India, Burma, and Ceylon. every positive factor into play, while at the second de Gaulle will be there and his poison They have attempted to overthrow [Gamal same time stimulating groups of backward will be completely released. You must al- Abdul] Nasser,31 undermine Iraq, and sub- people to think. low his poison to be released, just like that jugate Algeria. By now Latin America has The fourth point is about the issue of we did to our Rightists.32 You have to let made a significant progress. As [U.S.] vice withdrawing armed forces from the Middle him release the poison. If not, he always has president, [Richard] Nixon was not wel- East. American and British troops of ag- the poison. You can eliminate the poison comed in eight countries, where people spat gression must withdraw. The imperialists only after he releases it. and stoned him. When the political repre- now refuse to withdraw and intend to stay The sixth point is the embargo, that is, sentative of America was treated with saliva there. This is disadvantageous for the people, no trade with us. Is this advantageous or and rocks there, it means contempt for but it will at the same time educate the disadvantageous to us? I believe that the America’s “dignity,” and an unwillingness people. In order to fight against aggressors, embargo benefits us a lot. We do not feel it to treat it “politely.” Because you are our you need to have a target; without a target, it [to be] disadvantageous at all. It will have enemy, we therefore treat you with saliva is difficult for you to fight against the ag- tremendous beneficial impact on our [han- and rocks. Thus, we should not take the gressors. The imperialists now come up dling of] clothing, food, housing, and trans- three military organizations too seriously. there themselves to become the target, and portation, as well as on our reconstruction [We] need to analyze them. Even though refuse to leave. This arouses the people of (including the production of steel and iron). aggressive, they are not steady. the entire world to fight against the Ameri- The embargo forces us to work out all the The third point is about the tension in can aggressors. After all, it seems to me that solutions ourselves. My appreciation goes the international situation. We are calling it is not so harmful for the people when the to He Yingqin33 all the time. In 1937 when every day for relaxing international tensions aggressors put off their withdrawal. Thereby our Red Army was re-organized into the because it will benefit the people of the the people will yell at the aggressors every- Eighth Route Army under the Nationalist world. So, can we say that it must be harmful day: why do you not leave [our country]? Revolution Army, we received 400,000 yuan for us whenever there is a tense situation? I The fifth question is whether it is a good of fabi every month. After we were paid the do not think it necessarily so. A tense thing or bad thing to have [Charles] de money, we became dependent on it. In 1940, situation is not necessarily harmful for us in Gaulle in power. At present, the French however, the anti-Communist movement every circumstance; it has an advantageous Communist Party and the French people reached its peak, and the payment stopped. side. Why do I think this way? It is because should firmly oppose de Gaulle coming to No more money was paid [to us]. We had to besides its disadvantageous side, a tense power, and veto his constitution. Mean- find out our own means [to support our- situation can mobilize the population, can while, they should also be prepared for the selves] from then on. What did we find out? particularly mobilize the backward people, struggle after he takes office in case they We issued an order that as there was no more can mobilize the people in the middle, and cannot stop him. Once in power, de Gaulle fabi, each regiment had to find out its own can therefore promote the Great Leap For- will oppress the French Communist Party way of self-support. Thereafter, all [of our] ward in economic construction. Afraid of and the French people. His taking office, base areas launched a production move- fighting a nuclear war? You have to think it however, may also have advantageous ef- ment. The value yielded from the produc- over. Look, we have fired a few shells on fects in both domestic and foreign affairs. tion reached not 400,000, not 4 million, even Jinmen and Mazu, and I did not expect that Internationally, this person likes to make not 40 million yuan, but about 100 or possi- the entire world would be so deeply shocked, trouble for Britain and America. He likes to bly 200 million yuan, if we combined the and the smoke and mist is shading the sky. argue. He had some miserable experiences production of all the base areas together. We This is because people are afraid of war. in the past. In his memoirs, de Gaulle have since relied on our own efforts. Who is They are afraid that the Americans will blamed Britain and America all the time, but today’s ? It is Dulles, a different make trouble everywhere in the world. Ex- said some nice words about the Soviet Union. name. Currently, they are carrying out an cept for Syngman Rhee, no second country It seems to me that he will make trouble embargo. We are going own way. We have COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 217 initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwing Thinking about the history of the entire uni- I am going to discuss something we away dependence and breaking down blind verse, I do not see any reason to be pessimis- have talked about before. About the noose faith. The result is good. tic about the future. I had a debate with issue we discussed at the last meeting, did The seventh is the non-recognition is- Premier [Jawarharlal] Nehru34 over this is- we not? Now I want to say that we need to sue. Is [imperialist countries’] recognition sue. He said that [as the result of a nuclear place nooses on Dulles, Eisenhower, and [of the PRC] or non-recognition relatively war] no government could remain and every- other warmongers. There are many places more advantageous to us? Same as on the thing would be destroyed. Even though where the nooses can be used on the Ameri- embargo issue, imperialist countries’ non- someone might want to seek peace, no gov- cans. In my opinion, wherever an [Ameri- recognition of us is more advantageous to us ernment would be there. I told him that it can] military base is located, [America] is than their recognition of us. So far there are would never be like that. If your government tied up by a noose. [This happens], for ex- about forty some countries which refuse to would be eliminated by atomic bombs, the ample, in the East, in South Korea, Japan, recognize us. The main reason lies in people would form another one which could the Philippines, and Taiwan; in the West, in America. For instance, France intends to work out a peace. If you fail to think about West Germany, France, Italy, and Britain; in recognize China, but it does not dare to do it things in such extreme terms, how can you the Middle East, in Turkey and Iran; and in because of America’s opposition. Many ever sleep? This is no more than a matter of Africa, in Morocco and other places. In each other countries in Central and South people being killed, and [what is reflected of these countries, America has many mili- America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and here] is the fear of fighting a war. But if the tary bases. For instance, in Turkey there are Canada, dare not to recognize us because of imperialists definitely want to fight a war more than twenty American military bases, America. There are only nineteen capitalist and attack us first, using atomic bombs, it and it is said that in Japan there are about countries which recognize us now, plus does not matter whether you fear fighting a 800. In some other countries, although there another eleven countries in the socialist war or not; in any case they will attack you. is no [American] military base, they are camp, plus Yugoslavia, totaling thirty-one If that were the case, what should be our occupied by the troops [of the imperialists]. countries. It seems to me that we can live attitude? Is it better to fear or not to fear? It For example, American troops in Lebanon with this small number. Non-recognition is extremely dangerous [for us] to fear this and British troops in Jordan. [of us], in my opinion, is not a bad thing. and fear that every day, which will make our Here I am focusing on two of these Rather, it is relatively good. Let us produce cadres and people feel discouraged. So I nooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan. more steel. When we can produce 600 or believe that [we] should be case-hardened Taiwan is an old noose since America has 700 million tons of steel, they will recognize toward fighting a war. We will fight it if we occupied it for several years. Who ties us at last. They may still refuse to recognize have to. We will rebuild our country after the America there? The People’s Republic of us by then, but who cares? war. Therefore, we are now mobilizing the China ties it there. 600 million Chinese have The last issue is about preparations for militias. All people’s communes should a noose in their hands. This is a steel noose an anti-aggression war. I said in my first organize their militias. Everyone in our and it ties America’s neck. Who tied point that as both sides are afraid of war, war country is a soldier. We should arm the America? The noose was made by America should not break out. Everything in the people. We can distribute several million itself and tied by itself, and it throws the world, however, needs a safety factor. Since guns at the beginning. Later on we will other end of the noose to mainland China, there exists a monopoly-capitalist class in distribute several dozen million guns among letting us grasp it. [America] was tied in the world, I am afraid that it will make the people. All provinces should be able to Lebanon only recently, but the noose was trouble recklessly and abruptly. We must construct light weapons, including rifles, also made by America itself, tied by itself, therefore be prepared to fight a war. This machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, and the other end of the noose was thrown point needs to be explained clearly to our and light mortars. Each people’s commune into the hands of Arab nations. Not only so, cadres. First, we do not want a war, and we should have a military office to supervise America also throws the [other end of the] oppose any war. So does the Soviet Union. [combat] training. Some of our participants noose into the hands of the majority of the If war comes, it will be started by the other here today are intellectuals. You need to people in the world. Everyone condemns side and we will be forced to enter the make a call for holding a pen in one hand and America, and no one gives it any sympathy. fighting. Second, however, we do not fear gripping a gun in the other. You cannot only The noose is held by the people and govern- fighting a war. We must fight it if we have have pens in your hands. You should be ments in many countries. In the Middle to. We have only grenades and potatoes in culturalized as well as militarized. East, for example, the UN held meetings [on our hands right now. A war of atomic and These eight points are my opinions. I the Lebanon issue], but [America’s] main hydrogen bombs is of course terrible since offer them to you for your observation of the problem is that it has been tied by the Arab many people will die. That is why we international situation. people and cannot escape. At present, oppose a war. Unfortunately, the decision America is caught in a dilemma—is it better will not be made by us. If the imperialists 6. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth to withdraw earlier or later? If an early decide to fight a war, we have to be prepared Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 8 withdrawal, why did it come in the first for everything. We must fight a war if we September 1958 (Excerpt) place? If a late withdrawal, [the noose] will have to. I am saying that it is not so terrify- Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 348- be getting tighter and tighter, and will be- ing even if half of our population perishes. 352 come an encased knot. How can this be This is certainly talk in extreme terms. handled? Lebanon is different from Taiwan 218 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN with which America has signed a treaty. The made any decision yet, and that they would To make a long story short, you [Ameri- situation in Lebanon is more flexible as no make the decision in accordance with the cans] are noosed here. You may be able to treaty is involved there. It is said that one situation after the Communists landed there? get away if you take the initiative to leave issued the invitation, and the other came, The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomindang slowly and quietly. Is there not a policy for and [the noose] is hitched up. As far as troops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 on getting away? In my view, you had a policy Taiwan is concerned, this is an encased knot Mazu. America has to pay attention to them for getting away from Korea, and now a since a treaty was signed. There is no differ- as long as these two large garrisons are on policy for getting away from Jinmen-Mazu ence between the Democrats and Republi- the islands. This concerns the interest and is being shaped. As a matter of fact, those in cans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on the feelings of their class. Why do the British your group really want to get away, and the treaty and [Harry] Truman sent the Seventh and Americans treat the governments in public opinion also asks you to do so. To get Fleet there. Truman could come and go at some countries so nicely? They cannot fold away is to extricate yourself from the noose. will since there was no treaty during his their hands and see these governments col- How can this be done? That is, the 110,000 time. Eisenhower signed the treaty. America lapse. Today the Americans and Jiang are troops should leave. Taiwan is ours, and we is tied up [in Taiwan] because of the having a joint under the will never compromise on this issue, which Guomindang’s panic and request, and also command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] is an issue of internal affairs. The dealing because America was willing [to be tied up Beakley, commander of the Seventh Fleet. between us and you [the Americans] is an there]. Also is there is [Roland] Smoot,35 the person international issue. These are two different Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen and who ordered the firing, which made the issues. Although you Americans have been Mazu? I think that it has also been tied up at [U.S.] State Department and Defense De- associated with Jiang Jieshi, it is possible to Jinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Did partment unhappy. He is there, together dissolve this chemical combination. This is not the Americans say that they had not with Beakley, to take the command. just like electrolytic aluminum or electro-

Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise of China (PRC) would result in Soviet nuclear lishment of the PRC the previous fall, stated To Beijing During the 1958 Crisis retaliation. Researchers have assumed for that, “in the event of one of the Contracting some time that Soviet leaders were unhappy Parties being attacked by Japan or any state introduction by Vladislav M. Zubok with the new Sino-American confrontation allied with her and thus being involved in a and considered the Chinese brinkmanship as state of war, the other Contracting Party The history of the “second” Taiwan a dangerous development that interfered with shall immediately render military and other Straits crisis (August-October 1958) has Kremlin plans for “detente” with the West. assistance by all means at its disposal.”4 gotten a second wind lately, due to the emer- In their memoirs, Khrushchev and, more (The United States was not mentioned by gence of new Chinese evidence.1 While this recently, Gromyko both described how name in the text, but the implication was research has greatly illuminated Chinese puzzled and alarmed they were by Mao’s clear enough.) decision-making, scholars still have been seemingly reckless attitude toward nuclear What emerged from the Gromyko-Chi- unable to ascertain precisely what transpired war as not only possible, but actually desir- nese talks in early September 1958 and what between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships able for the communist camp.2 However, appeared to have worried the Kremlin lead- after the outbreak of the crisis. The docu- Khrushchev’s September 7 public declara- ership was not that the Chinese might pro- ment printed below, a previously secret 27 tion to Eisenhower—stating that “An attack voke a general war with the United States. September 1958 communication from the on the Chinese People’s Republic, which is Rather, as the text of the Soviet letter below Central Committee of the Communist Party a great friend, ally and neighbor of our implies, it was the general assumption of the of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) to the Cen- country, is an attack on the Soviet Union”3— Chinese Politburo that if the United States tral Committee of the Chinese Communist seems to contradict this general thesis. “should start a war against the People’s Party (CC CPC), an internally circulated The secret letter from the CC CPSU to Republic of China” and used tactical nuclear version of which is now declassified and the CC CPC printed below links the two weapons against the PRC (in response to available to researchers at the Russian For- puzzling events noted above, and helps point Chinese attacks against the offshore islands eign Ministry archives in Moscow, adds one toward possible answers to the questions or Taiwan), the Soviet Union should remain more piece of evidence to this puzzling they raise. It attests to the fact that, in spite passively on the sidelines, as a strategic story. of the genuine tension between the two com- reserve in case the Americans decided to Two episodes relating to Soviet-Chi- munist giants, the Khrushchev leadership at broaden the war by using high-yield (e.g., nese interactions during the 1958 crisis have that time still was determined to stand with thermonuclear) weapons. This interpreta- attracted particular attention: the secret visit Beijing at a moment of crisis, and took tion of the Soviet commitments diverged of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko additional steps to prove that it remained significantly from Article I of the Treaty to Beijing and his talks with Chinese leaders loyal to the spirit and letter of the Sino- signed in Moscow eight years earlier. on September 6-7; and the letter of Soviet Soviet Treaty of February 1950. In a forthcoming book, Constantine Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to President The first article of that treaty, concluded Pleshakov and I argue that many in the Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 warn- at the end of Mao Zedong’s summit meet- Soviet leadership were unhappy to see the ing that an attack on the People’s Republic ings in Moscow with Stalin after the estab- continued on page 226 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 219 lytic copper, the combination will be dis- it continues to stay, let it be noosed here. This cans. Only a few people blame us. The solved when it is electrolyzed. Jiang Jieshi will not affect the overall situation, and we Americans blame us, Jiang Jieshi blames us, is [for us] a domestic issue, and you [Ameri- can continue the Great Leap Forward. and Syngman Rhee blames us. Maybe there cans] are [for us] a diplomatic issue. [The We should strive to produce eleven mil- are some others [who blame us], but mainly two] cannot be mixed up. lion tons of steel, doubling last year’s output. these three. Britain is a vacillating element. America now attempts to dominate four Next year another twenty million tons, striv- While it will not be militarily involved, it is out of the five continents, except for Austra- ing to reach thirty million tons. The year said that it has strong sympathy politically. lia. First of all, in North America, this is after next, another twenty million tons. Is it This is because Britain faces problems in mainly America’s own place, and its armed not fifty million tons by then? Three years of Jordan. How can it handle the situation in forces are there. The next is Central and hard efforts, fifty million tons of steel. At Jordan if the Americans withdraw from Leba- South America where it intends to provide that time, we will occupy third place in the non because [the British] failed to show “protection,” although it does not have gar- world, next only to the Soviet Union and the sympathy [to the Americans]? Nehru issued risons there. Then, there are Europe, Africa, United States. The [steel] output of the a statement, which basically echoed us, sug- and Asia, to which [America] has given its Soviet Union reached fifty million [tons] last gesting that Taiwan and other [offshore] main attention, and deployed its main force year. In three years, they can make it sixty islands should be returned to us, but hoping in Europe and Asia. I do not know how it million [tons]. If we make hard efforts in the that a peaceful solution can be reached. The [America] can fight a war with a few sol- next three years, it is possible that [our steel countries in the Middle East, especially Egypt diers scattered everywhere. Thus, I believe output] may surpass fifty million tons. In and Iraq, warmly welcomed [our artillery that it focuses on occupying the intermedi- another two years, by 1962, it is possible [for bombardment] this time. They praise us ate zone. As far as the territories of our us to produce] eighty to a hundred million every day, saying that we have done the right [socialist countries] are concerned, I be- tons [of steel], approaching the level of the thing. This is because our [artillery bom- lieve that the Americans do not dare to United States (because of the impact of bardment] here has reduced the pressure the come, unless the socialist camp encounters economic recessions, America’s [steel out- Americans put on them. big trouble and they are convinced that the put] will probably only reach a hundred I think that we can tell the people of the Soviet Union and China will totally collapse million tons at that time). [At the end of] the world publicly that, in comparison, a tense as soon as they come. Except for [the second five-year plan, we will approach or situation is more disadvantageous to the countries belonging to] our camp, America even surpass America. In another two years, western countries, as well as more disadvan- is seeking hegemony everywhere in the in seven years, [we may] produce a hundred tageous to America [than to them]. Why is world, including Latin America, Europe, fifty million tons of steel, and surpass America it advantageous to them [the people of the Africa, Asia, and, also, Australia. Australia to become the number one in the world. It is world]? Does the tense situation in the has linked itself with America through a not good for us to name ourselves as the most Middle East do any good for America? Does military alliance and follows its orders. Is it superior in the world, but it is not bad to it do any good for Britain? Or is it more better for America to try to control these become the number one steel producer. [We advantageous to the Arab countries and to places by utilizing the banner of “anti-com- should also] make hard efforts in the next the peace-loving people in Asia, Africa, munism” or by fighting a real war against three years to [increase] grain production. Latin America, and other continents. To communism? To fight [a real war] against The output of this year is between three which side is the tense situation in the Tai- communism means to dispatch its troops to hundred fifty to four hundred million tons. wan [Straits] more advantageous? Let us fight us and fight the Soviet Union. I would [The output] will double next year, reaching, take our country as an example. Our country say that the Americans are not so stupid. probably, seven hundred fifty million tons. is now experiencing a nationwide mobiliza- They only have a few soldiers to be trans- We should slow down a little bit the year tion. If during the Middle East crisis about ferred here and there. After the incident in after next, for we have to find outlets for thirty to forty million people participated in Lebanon, American troops were transferred [extra] grain. Food will be grain’s main the rallies and protest parades, this time there from the Pacific. After they arrived in outlet; but we also need to find other outlets [during the Taiwan crisis] we will probably the Red Sea area, the situation changed in industry. For example, [using grain] to mobilize 300 million people [to participate unfavorably [in the Pacific], and they turned produce ethyl alcohol, and, through ethyl in rallies and parades], educating them and around quickly and landed at Malaya. They alcohol, to produce rubber, artificial fiber, toughening them. This event will also ben- announced that [the troops] were taking a plastic, and other things. efit our unity with all democratic parties36 in vacation there, and kept quiet for seventeen Let me talk a little bit more about the China because all the parties now share a days. Later, after one of their reporters tense situation. You [Americans] cause the common goal. As a result, those who in the claimed that [America] was taking charge tense situation, and you think it advanta- past had knots in their hearts, who were of the Indian Ocean, everyone in the India geous to you, do you not? You may be unhappy, and who were criticized will now Ocean [area] expressed opposition. When wrong. The tense situation can mobilize the feel a little bit more comfortable. If we can we began our artillery bombardment, people in the world, making everyone blame continue to handle the situation in this way, America came here since there were not you Americans. When a tense situation doing it again and again, we will all belong enough [of its] troops here. It will probably emerges in the Middle East, everyone blames to the working class one day. Therefore, in better serve America’s interests if it leaves the Americans. When tension comes to my view, the tense situation caused by the such places like Taiwan in an earlier time. If Taiwan everyone again blames the Ameri- imperialists eventually becomes advanta- 220 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN geous to hundreds of millions of Chinese 300 shells a day) will make the enemy changes in America’s position. Although people who oppose imperialism, to peace- panic[ky] and restless day and night. It Dulles’s talks with reporters do not clearly loving peoples all over the world, and to all seems to me that [doing this] is a big, or at indicate [America’s new position], he ex- social classes, all social ranks, and the gov- least moderate, advantage [to us]. What is pressed ambiguously that if China commits ernments [in various countries]. They now your opinion about it? On the days of heavy to a cease-fire, America can persuade Jiang’s have to believe that America, always arro- shelling we will not fire scattered shells. On troops to withdraw from the offshore islands gant and aggressive, is no good after all. the days of light shelling we will use this [under his control]. Apparently America [The U.S. government] moved six of its method. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowan intends to carry out basically a policy to help thirteen aircraft carriers [to the Taiwan at night, [we] should accurately calibrate Jiang slip away from Jinmen. Straits]. Among these carriers, there are battery emplacements during daytime, which After Dulles made this suggestion, Jiang some big ones with the size reaching 65,000 will make the shelling at night more accu- Jieshi became very upset. Jiang knew the tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it forms rate. Please seek opinions from [the people content of Dulles’s talks in advance. Thus, the strongest fleet in the world. It does not at] the front, to see if this method is workable he gave a speech on 29 September, and matter if you want to make it even stronger. or not. another on 1 October, stating that the Ameri- It does not matter if you want to concentrate As far as the Warsaw talks are con- cans had done a disservice to him. Two days all of your four fleets here. I welcome you cerned, in the next three to four days, or one later, when he talked to British reporters all. After all, what you have is useless here. week, [we] should not lay all of our cards on from The Times [of London], Jiang asked Even though you move every ship you have the table, but should test [the Americans]. It Britain to advise America not to be fooled here, you cannot land. Ships have to be in the seems that it is unlikely for the other side to [by the communists]. This is really funny. water, and cannot come to the land. You can lay all of their cards out, and that they will Last night the Indian ambassador [to do nothing but make some threatening ges- also test us. What is your opinion, Zhou Beijing] hurriedly informed me of V. K. ture here. The more you play, the more the [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Wentian],40 Krishna Menon’s plan [at the United Na- people in the world will understand how and Qiao [Guanhua]41? tions].46 Menon believes that current changes unreasonable you are. Congratulations for the success from in the situation have already become a ten- the very start. dency. Thus, he is planning to make a 7. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh, general speech at the UN meeting, including 10 September 1958 9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19 a suggestion that Jiang’s troops withdraw Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, September 1958 from the offshore islands and a request to us 7:413 Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 353 to stop fighting against Jiang. Britain at- tempted to mediate this affair in the past, but Comrade President: Comrade [Zhou] Enlai: we refused it. Dag Hammarskjold47 of the Your letter of 8 September37 has been Your letter dated the night of the 18th UN intended to talk to us through Norway, received. Thank you. has been received. It is indeed very good.42 [but] we also turned it down. Even though I believe that (1) the Americans are [I am] very happy after reading it since [we] America was not willing to invite India [to afraid of fighting a war. As far as the current have gained the initiative. Please take due mediate] before, it had no choice but to situation is concerned, it is highly unlikely actions immediately. Please also pass your invite Menon this time. Menon was unwill- that a big war will break out; and (2) it seems letter and my reply here at once to Comrades ing to come himself, if America did not send to me that the business in your country Wang Bingnan43 and Ye Fei. Make sure that an invitation to him, or if he was unsure should go on as usual. they understand [the key to] our new policy about the situation. At the present, since and new tactics is holding the initiative, Menon feels certain about the situation be- 8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and keeping the offensive, and remaining rea- cause America has asked for his help, he is Huang Kecheng, 13 September 195838 sonable. We must conduct our diplomatic planning to deliver this proposition. Our Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, struggle from a far-sighted perspective so assumption is as follows: after Menon makes 7:416-417 that it will develop without any difficulty. his proposition, it will be accepted by UN members, and then by most countries in the Part One Mao Zedong world. Through this approach, the UN can Premier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng: 4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei put pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhile [I] have received [the documents] you ask us to make compromises. Thereby, sent to me, including two intelligence re- 10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Conversation America can maneuver between Jiang and ports on Jinmen’s situation and the order of with S.F. Antonov44 on the Taiwan Issue, us to make a bargain. our military.39 In addition to carrying out 5 October 1958 (Excerpt)45 We calculate that America has three [the operations] in accordance with the lines Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 262- cards to play: set up by the order, it is also necessary to fire 267 First, to defend Jin[men]-Ma[zu]. some scattered shells day and night around America’s proposition on 18 September re- the clock, especially at night, shelling espe- The entire situation has already changed quested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we re- cially the area within the three-mile radius of at this point. Dulles’s press conference jected it immediately. We have been ever Liaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to published on 30 September reveals some since condemning America’s occupation of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 221

Taiwan. America now attempts to expand selves. I said to him it was better not to have is extremely beneficial [to us] that Jiang its occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we must this kind of joint statement. If the statement stays at Jinmen and Mazu, and America oppose it firmly. America dares not engage mentioned a cease-fire, it would benefit continues to intervene. It will educate the in a war merely for the sake of Jinmen, America; we had to oppose it. If the state- people of the world, especially the Chinese because the American people and its allied ment criticized both America and China, it people. We will not let America go, when it countries oppose it. Moreover, if America would be unable to tell right from wrong, we wants to get away from Jinmen and Mazu. wants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared to had to disagree as well. A just statement We demand that America withdraw its armed fight against it. In addition, the Soviet should include the following major points: to forces form Taiwan. Under this circum- Union supports us. After our rejection, recognize firmly that Taiwan is China’s ter- stance, if we need tension, we can shell America took back its first card, that is, ritory, and that no foreign countries are al- Jinmen and Mazu; if we want relaxation, we defending Jinmen and Mazu. lowed to intervene; America should with- can stop shelling. As Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi Its second card is about “two Chinas.” draw from the Taiwan Straits; no creation of said to you, [we can] have small-, or me- America’s proposition on 30 September had “two Chinas”; China and America should dium-, or large-scale shelling of Jinmen. a central point of lining up China with the continue their talks. Obviously, some coun- We can have shelling while negotiating, and Soviet Union on the one side, and Jiang tries that follow America will not agree to we can stop shelling anytime we like. This Jieshi with the United States on the other these points. Thus, if the Asian and African is advantageous for us. So we are not going side. It puts forth a “two Chinas” scheme countries cannot issue a just statement, it is to recover these offshore islands in the near and pushes us to accept the status quo. We better for them not to issue any joint state- future. We will take back them together with firmly oppose it now, and will continue to ment. the Penghus and Taiwan later. oppose it. Moreover, this morning Comrade Chen Thus, we decided to issue a “Message to The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits. Yi49 met diplomatic envoys from eight con- the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the name of America intends to persuade Jiang’s troops cerned Asian and African countries that have our defense minister. [It indicates that] we to withdraw from the offshore islands as an diplomatic relations with China. Regarding will suspend our shelling for seven days exchange to freeze the situation in the Tai- these countries’ discussion about issuing a from 1:00 p.m. on 6 October so as to allow wan Straits, requesting our renouncing the joint statement, he clarified the above posi- Jiang’s troops to transport their logistic sup- use of force on Taiwan, or our accepting tion of the Chinese government and made plies easily. Our suspension of bombard- America’s occupation of Taiwan as legiti- further explanations. ment, however, has a precondition that no mate and “two Chinas” as “an existing fact.” I talked to you on 30 September [about American ships provide escort. Moreover, America may not play its third card at once. our policy toward Taiwan]. Originally, our [it] suggests a direct negotiation with Jiang As soon as Dulles’s meeting with press plan had two steps: the first was to recover Jieshi searching for peaceful solutions to the caused Jiang Jieshi’s big complaints, Dulles the offshore islands; the second to liberate conflicts between both sides. Since our wrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort. Taiwan. Later, after we began shelling shelling is actually a punitive operation At the same time, Eisenhower informed the Jinmen, our bombardment played a role to against Jiang’s troops, we can slow it down Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign mobilize the people of the world, especially as long as Jiang is willing to cooperate [with Relations Committee that America could the Chinese people. Thereafter, many coun- us]. If he is not, we will continue to punish not yield to force. He, however, also said tries launched and joined a new anti-Ameri- him. Therefore, we will always be in a that if Communist China ceased fire, can movement on a much larger scale than positive position. [America] could reconsider [the situation that after the Lebanon event. The situation Our purpose in publishing this “Mes- there]. It shows that America is still waver- already becomes clear. America knows that sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” is to ing, though it wants to get away from Jinmen- we do not want to fight a war against it. deepen the conflicts between America and Mazu. When it escorted Jiang Jieshi’s ships, we did Jiang. Jiang’s current garrison on Jinmen, According to the above calculations, I not fire [on them]. We have no intention to about 80,000 men under the command of told the Indian ambassador yesterday that liberate Taiwan immediately. We know that ,50 is the main strength of Jiang’s we did not want Menon to deliver his propo- America does not want to fight a war against forces. Jiang Jieshi wants to defend Jinmen sition to the UN. We cannot trade a settle- us over Jinmen either. It strictly restrained its to the last and drag America down to the ment of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition of air and naval forces from entering our terri- water. Chen Cheng, however, wants to save America’s occupation of Taiwan as legiti- torial waters between three and twelve miles these troops. If we bottle up the troops on mate and acceptance of the existence of so- from our coast. Currently America works on Jinmen, it is easier for America to encourage called “two Chinas.” how to persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw Chen to persuade Jiang to withdraw his Meanwhile, some Asian and African from Jinmen-Mazu to prevent its forces from troops from the offshore islands. If we let countries are suggesting that the Eight-na- being pinned down in this region. these troops stay on Jinmen, Jiang and Chen tion Committee48 can draft a statement about As I said to you on 30 September, we can use them to drive a hard bargain with the Taiwan situation. I also told the Indian realized that it was better to keep Jiang Jieshi America. In our message to the compatriots ambassador yesterday that we believed that on Jinmen-Mazu. After the Central [in Taiwan], we warn them that America the Asian and African countries could hardly Committee’s discussions, we still believe will abandon them sooner or later. There is issue such a joint statement since there ex- that it is the best to keep Jiang Jieshi on no need to fight for America’s interests isted two different positions among them- Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It between the two Chinese sides. Although 222 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN we can possibly fight for thirty more years, 8:00 A.M., 5 October it is better [for both sides] to talk for solu- P.S.: After you have handled this letter, 14. Notation, Mao Zedong on Zhou Enlai’s tions. please convey it to the Premier.52 Report, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” 20 To be sure, [on the one hand,] Jiang October 195857 Jieshi will likely hold a press conference [as 12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, soon as we publish our message], accusing and Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958 7:466 us of attempting to cast a bone between him Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, and America, saying that he will never sit 7:437 Part I down with the Chinese Communists for ne- The report is approved. gotiations, and so forth. In his mind, how- Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng]: ever, Jiang can figure out himself that there Please pass on to Han [Xianchu] and Ye Part II is a lot behind this, and that he can make a [Fei]: It is more appropriate to start shelling one further bargain with America. This is his old Yesterday I said not to issue any public hour after, or half hour after, the reading [of trick. On the other hand, Americans will statement, and to wait and see for two days. the order] is finished.58 also criticize the Chinese Communist at- Later [I] thought about this again, and con- tempt to drive a wedge between them and sidered it more appropriate to issue a state- 15. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Jiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect in ment first. This is the reason for [me to Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 31 October their minds that we suddenly let up pressure write] the “Message to the Compatriots in 1958 on Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death, Taiwan.”53 This statement is about to be Source: Mao Zedong Wengao, 7:479 because there might be a tacit agreement issued, please instruct the Fujian Front radio between us and Jiang. The louder Jiang station to broadcast it repeatedly. Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and yells, the more suspicious the Americans [Huang] Kecheng: will become. Mao Zedong [We] should extend the areas where no Therefore, we cause a new dilemma for 2:00 A.M., 6 October shelling is allowed on even-numbered days. America, and it does not know how to cope Send this to [Huang] Kecheng for handling That means shelling will be prohibited on with it. America is facing a very difficult immediately.54 even days on all fronts. Allow Jiang’s troops situation right now. It originally planned to to come outdoors and get some sunshine so persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw [from 13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, that they can continue to stay there. Only fire Jinmen]. If it again suggests withdrawal, 11 October 1958 a few shells on odd days. Instruct the Fujian Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandons Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, [front] by internal channels to carry it out. him. If America stops persuading Jiang to 7:449-450 Do not issue public statement at this point. If withdraw, we will achieve our goal. there is a need later, [we] will consider Comrade [Zhou] Enlai: making an announcement then. Please dis- 11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng No hurry to reply to the letters from the cuss and decide on this matter. and Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958 Soviets.55 Need to discuss them first. I am leaving for a southern trip this Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Cao Juren56 has arrived. Ignore him for afternoon. 7:437 a few days, do not talk to him too soon. [I] will think about whether I need to meet him Mao Zedong Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] or not. 2:00 A.M., 31 October Kecheng: Tell [Huang] Kecheng to double-check Our batteries should not fire a single accurate numbers of how many enemy air- 16. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, shell on 6 and 7 October, even if there are planes we shot down, and how many of our Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 2 November American airplanes and ships escorts. If the planes were shot down in more than fifty 1958 enemy bombs us, our forces should still not days of air engagements since the Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, return fire. [We should] cease our activities, air battle on 19 August. Prepare the statistics 7:490 lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then, for the Soviets’ information. They believed we will know what to do. Although the air the enemy’s false information and do not Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and force must carry on our defense, the air- know the true story. [The Soviets] should [Huang] Kecheng: planes should not fly off the coast. One more sell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let us Suggest having a heavy all day shelling thing: do not issue any public statement control the employment of them. The Sovi- tomorrow (the 3rd, an odd day). Fire at least during these two days because we need to ets may send a few people to teach us how to 10,000 shells and bomb all the military tar- wait and see clearly how the situation will use them. I intend to adopt this policy. [We gets [on Jinmen] in order to affect America’s develop. Please carry out the above order can] discuss and decide whether it is appro- election, promoting the Democrats’ victory immediately. Or [you can] pass this letter priate tonight or tomorrow night. and the Republicans’ defeat. Meanwhile, [as an order] to Ye Fei and .51 give Jiang’s troops an excuse for refusing to Mao Zedong withdraw [from Jinmen]. Please consider Mao Zedong 10:00 A.M., 11 October and decide if this is proper. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 223

13. Zhongnanhai is the compound where top Chinese leaders live and work, and Fengzeyuan was Mao Mao Zedong 1. Wu Lengxi, a member of the CCP Central Committee, Zedong’s residence in the 1950s. served as director of Xinhua (New China) News Agency 5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou 14. The Juixiang Study was the location of Mao’s office and editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) in in Zhongnanhai. 1958. 15. General Zhang Zhizhong, who had been Jiang 17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2 2. Beidaihe is a beach area located at the border of Hebei Jieshi’s subordinate, shifted to the Communist side in November 1958 and Liaoning provinces, where Chinese leaders regu- 1949 and was then vice chairman of China’s national larly take vacations and hold meetings during summer. defense commission. 3. Hu Qiaomu, a CCP theorist, was Mao Zedong’s Part One59 16. For the transcript of Dulles’s answers, see The New political secretary and a member of the CCP Central York Times, 1 October 1958, 8. Attention, Military and Civilian Compatri- Committee. 17. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a prominent Chinese scholar ots on the Jinmen Islands: 4. This refers to the Communist takeover in China in and Chinese ambassador to the United States during the 1949. Tomorrow, 3 November, is an odd- Second World War, had a pro-American reputation. He 5. In late 1957, the Beijing leadership began to plan to numbered day. You must make sure not to then served as president of the Central Academy deploy air force units in the Fujian area, so that the [] in Taipei. come outside. Do be careful! Guomindang air force would no longer be able to 18. Sun Liren, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, control the air (for more information on this matter, see commanded the Taiwan garrison in 1949, when the document 1). On 18 July 1958, the CCP Central Military Part Two Guomindang government moved from mainland China Commission held an urgent meeting attended by heads Deliver to Premier Zhou. to Taiwan. In 1955, Jiang dismissed Sun and placed him of the PLA’s different arms and branches. Peng Dehuai, under house arrest. The Front must broadcast [the the defense minister, conveyed to the meeting Mao 19. This is also known as the “May 24th Incident.” On message] this afternoon (2 November) for Zedong’s instructions: Under the circumstances that 20 March 1957, an American army sergeant, Robert R. America and Britain continued to dispatch troops to the three times. Reynolds, shot a Chinese, Liu Zhiran, in Taipei’s Ameri- Middle East, the Guomindang planned a diversion by can military residence area. On 23 May 1957, an Ameri- causing a tense situation in the Taiwan Straits. In order can court-martial found Reynolds not guilty. The next 18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on “Huan to provide effective support to the anti-imperialist day, a riot involving tens of thousands protesters erupted Xiang on the Division within the Western struggle by the people in the Middle East, it was neces- in Taipei, with the American Embassy and other Ameri- 60 sary for China to take action. First, air force units should World,” 25 November 1958 can agencies as the target. Guomindang authorities be deployed in Fujian. Second, Jinmen islands should be Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, announced martial law in Taipei on the same evening to shelled. The air force units must enter the air bases in control the situation. 7:581-582 Fujian and eastern Guangdong by July 27. The next day, 20. Tian Jiaying (1922-1966) was Mao Zedong’s secre- the Air Force Headquarters issued the operation order. tary from to May 1966, when he commit- After extensive preparations, on July 27, 48 MiG-17 Part I ted suicide. planes finally took position in the two air bases located Huan Xiang’s viewpoint is right. The 21. This is a collection of bizarre stories by Pu Songling respectively at Liancheng, Fujian province, and Shantou, written during Qing times. situation in the is indeed Guangdong province. (See Wang Dinglie et al., Dongdai 22. Mao Zedong wrote his remarks on the 9 December disintegrating. Even though currently it is zhongguo kongjun [Contemporary Chinese Air Force] 1957 report of Chen Geng, the PLA’s deputy chief of (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 334- in the middle of a gradual disunification and staff, to Peng Dehuai. Chen Geng’s report stated: “This 336.) not yet breaking into pieces, the West is year, planes from Taiwan have frequently invaded [the 6. Liu Shaoqi, vice chairman of the CCP Central Com- air space] of important coastal cities and the inner land moving toward its inevitable final disinte- mittee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the of the mainland, dropping large numbers of reactionary gration. It will probably take a long time, People’s National Congress, was China’s second most leaflets and ‘condolence gifts,’ creating a very bad important leader; Zhou Enlai was vice chairman of the not overnight nor a single day, for this impression on the masses. Because some leading mem- CCP Central Committee and China’s premier; Deng process. The so-called united West is purely bers of our army failed to take anti-aircraft operations Xiaoping was the CCP’s general secretary seriously and their superiors failed to supervise them empty talk. There may be a kind of unity 7. Wang Shangrong headed the operations department closely, [we have been] unable to shoot down any of the that Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants of the PLA General Staff; Ye Fei was political commis- invading planes [dispatched by] Jiang [Jieshi]. In order sar of the Fuzhou Military District. [the West] to “unite” under the control of to improve quickly this situation, we have arranged for 8. Cangao ziliao [Restricted Reference Material], an America, and asks all his partners and pup- the air force and all military regions to take every internal publication circulated among high ranking Chi- positive and effective step necessary to attack the Jiang pets to get close to America in front of its nese Communist officials, published Chinese transla- planes that are invading the mainland, trying our best to atomic bombs, paying their tributes and tions of news reports and commentaries from foreign shoot them down.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, news agencies, newspapers, and journals in a timely kowtowing and bowing as America’s sub- 6:372.) Chinese air force units finally took position in fashion. jects. This is America’s so-called unity. Fujian on 27 July 1958. See note 5. 9. On 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai stated at the Bandung 23. Mao Zedong composed this letter on the eve of the The current situation must move toward the Conference that China was willing to hold talks with the deadline previously established by the CCP leadership so-called unity’s opposite—disunity. Com- United States to discuss all questions between the two to shell Jinmen. On 15 July 1958, the Eisenhower countries. On 13 July 1955, through Britain, the U.S. rades, please take a look at today’s world administration dispatched 5,000 American marines to government proposed holding bilateral meetings at and ask which side has the real control. land in Lebanon. On July 17, the Beijing leadership Geneva, Switzerland. The Chinese-American ambassa- made the decision to bombard Jinmen, and China’s dorial talks began on 1 August 1955 at Geneva and defense minister, Peng Dehuai, conveyed the decision Mao Zedong lasted until December 1957. In September 1958, during to the General Staff. On the evening of July 18, Mao the Taiwan crisis, the Chinese-American ambassadorial Part II Zedong spoke at a decision-making meeting attended talks resumed in Warsaw, Poland. Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping: by vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission 10. On 4 September 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai formally and leading officers of the air force and navy, emphasiz- Please print and distribute this report. announced a twelve-mile zone off the Chinese coast as ing that the Arab people’s anti-imperialist struggle China’s territorial waters. needed more than moral support and China would take 11. For the minutes of these two talks, see documents 5 Mao Zedong real action. He stated that since Jinmen and Mazu were and 6. 10:00 A.M., 25 November China’s territory and the shelling of Nationalist troops 12. See note 9. there was China’s internal affair, it would be difficult 224 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN for the enemy to use this as an excuse [to attack 31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt’s 44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d’affaires to mainland China) while at the same time it would play president from 1956 to 1970. China. the role in checking American actions in the Middle 32. The “Rightists” referred to by Mao were intellectu- 45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to als who had been criticized and purged during the alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired “Anti-Rightist” campaign in 1957. 3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing, a Central Military Commission meeting, which sched- 33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a high holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and uled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. ranking Nationalist officer. During China’s War of other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however, During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to “pre- chief of the general staff and headed the Military- bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the pare for an operational order at any moment.” At this Political Department of the Military Commission of the Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter. . Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing’s leaders told the 24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the 34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India’s premier Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the from 1947 to 1964. confrontation between China and the United States, let bombardment and focus on making further prepara- 35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the Taiwan alone one between the Soviet Union and the United tions for the shelling. Defense Command. States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively 25. After three weeks of “waiting and seeing,” Mao 36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis. Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This eight “democratic parties” existed, all claiming to fol- 46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the letter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of low the CCP’s leadership. Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962. the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to 37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of 47 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplo- order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), mat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of telegraphed to Mao Zedong: “Considering the tense 1961. Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu) situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. 48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible established by Asian and African countries at the UN to shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen for a war to break out between China and the United draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations and Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at that States? (B) What preparations should we make here in included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, time if the shelling should be followed by landing Vietnam?” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Japan, and the Philippines. operations in accordance with the actual situation. On 7:413-414.) 49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Polit- August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the 38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships buro, was China’s vice premier and foreign minister. order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particu- began escorting Guomindang transport vessels deliver- 50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice presi- larly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the ing supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted dent and prime minister in Taiwan. enemy’s headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This 51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also becomes the background of this letter and the CMC’s PLA’s Fuzhou Military District. made it clear that the initial shelling would last for three order cited in the next note. 52. The italics are Mao’s. days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next 39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’s 53. The “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” was action could be taken in accordance with the responses order, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” issued at 11:15 broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al., a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: “(1) If the all major newspapers in mainland China the same day. Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The American ships continue their escort today and anchor The message announced that the PLA would stop Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.) shell Jiang’s transport ships entering the Liaoluowan troops to receive supplies. 26. The italics are Mao’s. harbor to unload and the people working there. The 54. The italics are Mao’s. 27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese ships not entering the harbor, be they America’s or 55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita military planners believed that they had succeeded in Jiang’s, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing’s intentions on supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities needed to sink or to expel Jiang’s transport ships, while handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the repeatedly requested American assistance to support at the same time damaging the enemy positions on reliability of Beijing’s statistics on the results of air their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and anti- battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to aircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with China with ground-to-air missiles. stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to the air raids by Jiang’s planes. The air force and anti- 56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had exten- observe the responses of the other side. aircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If sive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he 28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’s enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from “Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him, and the Offshore Islands under Jiang’s Occupation.” handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had The instruction emphasized that “because the struggle sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang’s principles, you may make your own decisions on spe- the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring occupation is a complicated international struggle, which cific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the about Taiwan’s “peaceful liberation.” After returning has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and situation changes, [you] must report immediately so to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou propaganda should follow the principles of concentra- that [we] can report it to the Central Committee to make Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again tion and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on new decisions.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages his own.” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 6:380.) between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao 7:376-377) 40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP mentioned Cao’s name on the eve of the second “Mes- 29. , an alternate member of the CCP Polit- Politburo, was China’s first vice foreign minister. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” announcing that buro, headed the CCP’s Central Propaganda Depart- 41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign the PLA would stopping shelling Jinmen for another ment. minister; he later served as China’s foreign minister in two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12. 30. The Organization (CENTO), estab- the mid-1970s. 57. At 12:30 p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the lished in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, 42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American following report to Mao Zedong: “The broadcasts to and Turkey. The United States was related to the ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in warn America against using its escort vessels in the organization as an “observer.” The Manila Treaty Or- this letter, concluding that China had gained the initia- waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The ganization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, tive at the meeting. broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and 43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Ameri- of the Defense Ministry’s order has been completed. It Treaty Organization (SEATO). cans in Warsaw. is also enclosed here for your consideration. Please COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 225 return it to me right after you have read and approved KHRUSHCHEV’S NUCLEAR PROMISE year later, in the autumn of 1959. it. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Huang continued from page 219 ********* [Kecheng] for their reading and checking. Everything Chinese leadership developing their own is ready on the Xiamen front. Our order [for the shelling] has already been issued [to the front] sepa- school of brinkmanship that threatened to From the CC CPSU’s letter to the rately by telephone and in writing which was signed by draw the USSR into a conflict with the United Central Committee of the CPC About [Huang] Kecheng. The order limits shelling to fortifi- States. Yet, there is no reason to believe that the USSR’s Readiness to Provide cations, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Khrushchev, the real authority behind the Jinmen islands. No shelling of civilian villages, garri- Assistance to the PRC in the Event of son camps, and command headquarters is allowed, Soviet letter, was dismayed by the Chinese an Attack on It From the Side of the particularly no shelling of any American ships. Our air position (though he may well have been USA or Japan, 27 September 1958 and naval forces will make no movement at this time. miffed that Mao failed to tip him off during The Defense Ministry’s order will be broadcast at 3:00 his summit in Beijing only a few weeks [p.m.] in Chinese and foreign languages at the same ... Comrade Gromyko informed us about time. As soon as the reading of the order is finished, before the PRC opened the crisis by shelling his conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai [our batteries] will open fire.” (Source: Jiangguo yilai the offshore islands on August 23). which took place in Peking on 7 September. Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466-467.) Khrushchev, it appears, actually supported Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the consid- 58. The italics are Mao’s. nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achiev- 59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast. eration of the situation in the Taiwan region 60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d’affaires in ing China’s reunification, provided that the the Politburo of the Central Committee of Britain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the policy was fully coordinated with the Krem- the Communist Party of China proceeded Chinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the 5 lin. He therefore took the Chinese position, from the fact that should the USA start a war report “Huang Xiang on the Division within the West- reported to him in an urgent cable from ern World.” The main points of the report were as against the People’s Republic of China and follows: The two-year long British-French negotiation Gromyko, as an indication that the Chinese in this event uses tactical nuclear weapons, to establish a free trade zone in Western Europe had leaders had begun to put their national inter- then the Soviet Union will make a stern recently failed, and a trade war between imperialist ests above the common interests of the “en- warning to the USA but will not take part in countries had started. The British plans to divide West tire Socialist camp.” This effective unilat- Germany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland, the war. Only in the event that the United and sabotage the European Common Market had failed. eral Chinese revision of the Treaty signified States uses large yield nuclear weapons, and In an economic sense, this was not a big failure for an implicit challenge to the unity of the in this way risks widening the war, will the Britain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was the communist bloc under Kremlin leadership— Soviet Union make a retaliatory strike with first serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplo- and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaders macy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced two nuclear weapons. important choices: it could take retaliatory measures on both political and ideological grounds. We carefully considered this issue and and thus destroy the political and economic coopera- Hence the letter decries the peril of disunity decided to express to you our opinion... We tions between European countries, or it could return to in the strongest terms possible: “...a crime cannot allow the illusion to be created among negotiations, searching for the basis of a temporary before the world working class ... a retreat compromise. It seemed that only one choice was fea- our enemies that if an attack will be launched sible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort to from the holy of holies of the Communists— against the PRC by the USA or Japan—and find ways to compromise with France and Germany, from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.” these are the most likely adversaries,—or by and to seek the support of the United States. This failure Khrushchev evidently dictated his letter any other state, that the Soviet Union will on the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain’s to Eisenhower immediately after he received position as the “second power” in the capitalist world stand on the sidelines as a passive observer. had been weakened further, and that the postwar Brit- the warning from Gromyko. It took him 20 Should the adversary even presume this, ish hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughly more days to address the Chinese leadership a very dangerous situation would be created. shaken. The balance of power in continental Western through party channels. It is still unclear It would be a great calamity for the entire Europe now tilted toward France and West Germany, what happened inside the Kremlin in the and against Britain. As far as the triangular relations Socialist camp, for the Communist working between Britain, France, and Germany were concerned, interim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about the class movement, if, when atomic bombs it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to take same time to respond to the CC CPSU’s have begun to fall on the Chinese People’s advantage of French-West German contradictions in letter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he Republic and China has begun to pay with order to divide the two countries, making them check thanked him “heartily” for his stand and each other. This balance of power policy would cer- the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet tainly last a long time. The balance of power among wrote that the Chinese leadership had been Union, possessing terrible weapons which imperialist countries in West Europe was changing, “deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to could not only stop but could also devastate and the contradictions between the imperialists over the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in- our common enemy, would allow itself not West European problems had never been so sharp. ternationalism.”6 (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:582- to come to your assistance. This would be a 5823.) In sum, this episode testifies to the am- crime before the world working class, it biguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese rela- would be a retreat from the holy of holies of tionship: for the majority of the leadership on the Communists—from the teaching of Li Xiaobing is Assistant Professor of History, both sides, it continued the grim comedy of Marxism-Leninism. University of Central Oklahoma; Chen Jian is misunderstandings; only Khrushchev began Thank you for your nobility, that you Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois to suspect what was occurring in faraway University at Carbondale, and author of China’s are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian Soviet Union. However, we believe, and are Road to the Korean War: The Making of the internationalism the Sino-Soviet rift was Sino-Soviet Confrontation (New York: Colum- convinced, that you also agree that the main deepening and would erupt in earnest only a bia University Press, 1994); David L. Wilson is thing now consists of the fact that everyone Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. 226 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN has seen—both our friends and, especially, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129- our enemies—that we are firm and united in 142; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 our understanding of the tasks, which flow (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959 (Kent, brother Communist parties is unshakeable, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and documents translated, annotated, and introduced by that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to Xiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed in the aggressor in the event of an attack on any this issue of the Cold War International History Project Socialist state. This is necessary so that no Bulletin. hopes will arise in our enemies that they will 2. Khrushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 469-470; Khrushchev be able to separate us, so that no cracks will Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, ed. Jerrold L. Schecter be created which the enemy could be able to with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, use to break the connection between the and Co., 1990), 147-150; “Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Socialist countries. Khrushcheva,” Voprosi istorii [Questions of History] 2 (1993), 90-91; Andrei A. Gromyko, Memoirs (New ...It is necessary that neither our friends York: Knopf, 1989), 251-252; see also Philip Taubman, nor our enemies have any doubts that an “Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used on attack on the Chinese People’s Republic is a G.I.’s,” New York Times, 22 February 1988, 1, 6-7. war with the entire Socialist camp. For 3. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul- ture, 255; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the ourselves we can say that an attack on China Eagle, 198. is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also 4. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assis- convinced that in the event of an attack on tance Between the People’s Republic of China and the the Soviet Union the Chinese People’s Re- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 14 February 1950, reprinted in English translation as an appendix to Sergei public would fulfill its brotherly revolution- N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncer- ary duty. If we in this way will build our tain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260. depending on the unity of our goals, on the 5. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- might of our states, on our joint efforts, the versity Press, forthcoming, March 1996), 226-227. uniting of which is favored by the geo- 6. “We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to graphical disposition of our countries, then the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international- this will be an invincible shield against our ism. In the name of all my comrades-members of the Communist Party of China, I express to you my heart- enemies.... felt gratitude.” Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949- 1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents [Source: Information and Documentation and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry Administration, First Far Eastern Depart- of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. ment, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949- 1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) National Security Archive, contributes fre- (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; quently to the Bulletin. His book, Inside the internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders from The letter appears in a formerly classified Stalin to Khrushchev, co-authored with Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary col- Constantine Pleshakov, will be published in lection on the history of Sino-Soviet rela- March 1996 by Harvard University Press. tions, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.; Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]

1. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 227

MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES’S the expense of individuals. Despite these taking effect in the Soviet Union, given “PEACEFUL EVOLUTION” drawbacks, Bo’s memoirs contain many valu- Khrushchev’s fascination with peaceful co- STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM able new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Es- existence with the capitalist West. Mao BO YIBO’S MEMOIRS pecially notable are Bo’s references to Mao’s wanted to prevent that from happening in statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo China. Here lie the roots of China’s subse- Introduction, translation, and played a major role in Chinese economic quent exchange of polemics with the Soviet annotation by Qiang Zhai decision-making during the period, his mem- Union and Mao’s decision to restructure the oirs are especially strong on this topic. He Chinese state and society in order to prevent sheds new light on such domestic events as a revisionist “change of color” of China, Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chi- the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, culminating in the launching of the Cultural nese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. the Gao Gang- Affair, the Anti- Revolution in 1966. Mao’s frantic response During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposi- to Dulles’s speeches constitutes a clear case leading member of the CCP-led resistance tion to Rush Advance, the Great Leap For- of how international events contributed to force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was ward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, eco- China’s domestic developments. It also elected a member of the CCP Central Com- nomic rectification in 1961-1962, and the demonstrates the effects of Dulles’s strat- mittee at the Party’s Seventh Congress. Socialist Education Campaign. Although egy of driving a wedge between China and During the Chinese Civil War in 1946- international relations in general does not the Soviet Union. 1949, he was First Secretary of the CCP receive much attention, the volumes do in- North China Bureau and Vice Chairman of clude illuminating chapters on some key * * * * * the CCP-led North China People’s Govern- foreign policy decisions.2 ment. After the establishment of the People’s The translation below is taken from To Prevent “Peaceful Evolution” and Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138- Train Successors to the Revolutionary he became Finance Minister. As a revolu- 1146). This section is very revealing about Cause tionary who survived the Cultural Mao’s perception of and reaction to John Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of Foster Dulles’s policy toward China in 1958- by Bo Yibo the most powerful figures in China today. 1959. The CCP leader took seriously state- Between 1991 and 1993, Bo published ments by the U.S. Secretary of State about According to the general law of social- two volumes of his memoirs, Ruogan encouraging a peaceful change of the Com- ist revolution, only through the leadership of zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recol- munist system. In November 1959, accord- a proletarian political party directed by Marx- lections of Certain Major Decisions and ing to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao’s secretary, prepared ism, reliance on the working class and other Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang for Mao translations of three speeches by laboring masses, and waging of an armed dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful struggle in this or that form can a revolution volume covers the period 1949-1956 and evolution within the Communist world. Af- obtain state power. International hostile the second volume 1957-1966. In the pref- ter reading the documents, Mao commented forces to the newly born people’s govern- ace and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes on them before having them circulated among ment would always attempt to strangle it in that in preparing his memoirs he has con- a small group of Party leaders for discussion. the cradle through armed aggression, inter- sulted documents in the CCP Central Ar- Thus Bo’s memoirs not only provide fresh vention, and economic blockade. After the chives and received the cooperation of Party texts of what Mao said, but also an important victory of the October Revolution, the So- history researchers. Bo’s reminiscences window into what he read. As a result, the viet Union experienced an armed interven- represent the most important memoirs of a interactive nature of Mao’s activities—with tion by fourteen countries. In the wake of high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966 his top colleagues and his secretary—is open World War II, imperialism launched a pro- period. to examination. A sense of the policy-mak- tracted “Cold War” and economic contain- As a still active senior leader, Bo is not ing process, as well as Mao’s opinions, ment of socialist countries. Immediately a disinterested writer. His arguments and emerges from Bo’s memoirs. after the triumph of the revolution in China conclusions are completely in line with the The years 1958-1959 were a crucial and the Democratic People’s Republic of 1981 Resolution on Party History.1 Mem- period in Mao’s psychological evolution. Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea, oirs in China usually have a didactic pur- He began to show increasing concern with blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and imple- pose that encourages the creation of edify- the problem of succession and worried about mented an all-out embargo against China. ing stereotypes. Bo’s memoirs conform to his impending death. He feared that the All of this shows that it will take a sharp a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the political system that he had spent his life struggle with external hostile forces through PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo’s creating would betray his beliefs and values an armed conflict or other forms of contest memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little and slip out of his control. His apprehension before a newly born socialist country can description of the character and personali- about the future development of China was consolidate its power. ties of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo’s closely related to his analysis of the degen- History suggests that although the armed volumes follow another memoirs-writing eration of the Soviet system. Mao believed aggression, intervention, and economic tradition in the PRC, which tends to empha- that Dulles’s idea of inducing peaceful evo- blockade launched by Western imperialists size the role of groups and societal forces at lution within the socialist world was already against socialist countries can create enor- 228 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mous problems for socialist countries, they a joint fleet with China in order to control In 1959, Sino-Soviet relations were even have great difficulty in realizing their goal of China militarily; he also openly opposed our more strained and Sino-Soviet differences overthrowing socialist states. Therefore, Party’s “Three Red Flags”4 and objected to even greater. In January, the Soviet Union imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a our just action of “shelling Jinmen5.” (Chair- officially notified China that it would scrap “soft” method in addition to employing man Mao once said that whether we bom- unilaterally the agreement to help China “hard” policies. In January 1953, U.S. Sec- barded Jinmen or suspended our bombard- build nuclear industry and produce nuclear retary of States Dulles emphasized the strat- ment, our main purpose was to support the bombs. In September when the Sino-Indian egy of “peaceful evolution.” He pointed out Taiwan people and the Taiwan regime to Border Incident occurred, the Soviet Union that “the enslaved people” of socialist coun- keep Taiwan [from being] invaded and an- announced neutrality, but in actuality it sup- tries should be “liberated,” and become “free nexed by foreign countries.—Bo’s note). ported India. It openly criticized China after people,” and that “liberation can be achieved The above events alerted Chairman Mao. the incident. At the Soviet-American Camp through means other than war,” and “the In the meantime, the United States ac- David Talks during the same month, means ought to be and can be peaceful.” He tively practiced its strategy of promoting a Khrushchev sought to improve relations with displayed satisfaction with the “liberaliza- “peaceful evolution” of socialist countries. the United States on the one hand and vehe- tion-demanding forces” which had emerged In 1957, the Eisenhower administration in- mently attacked China’s domestic and for- in some socialist countries and placed his troduced the “strategy of peaceful conquest,” eign policies on the other.8 All these events hope on the third and fourth generations aiming to facilitate “changes inside the So- convinced Chairman Mao that the Soviet within socialist countries, contending that if viet world,” through a “peaceful evolution.” leadership had degenerated and that the leader of a socialist regime “continues On October 24, 1958, in an interview with a Khrushchev had betrayed Marxism and the wanting to have children and these children BBC correspondent, Dulles asserted that proletarian revolutionary cause and had will produce their children, then the leader’s communism “will gradually give way to a turned revisionist. At the Lushan Confer- offsprings will obtain freedom.” He also system that pays more attention to the wel- ence held during July-August that year, when claimed that “Chinese communism is in fare of the state and people,” and that at the Peng Dehuai9 criticized the “Three Red fatal danger,” and “represents a fading phe- moment, “Russian and Chinese Commu- Flags,” Chairman Mao erroneously believed nomena,” and that the obligation of the United nists are not working for the welfare of their that this reflected the combined attack on the States and its allies was “to make every people,” and “this kind of communism will Party by internal and external enemies. Fac- effort to facilitate the disappearance of that change.” ing such a complex situation, Chairman Mao phenomena,” and “to bring about freedom in Considering the situation in both the felt deeply the danger of a “peaceful evolu- all of China by all peaceful means.”3 Soviet Union and at home, Chairman Mao tion.” Accordingly, he unequivocally raised Chairman Mao paid full attention to took very seriously Dulles’s remarks. In a the issue at the end of that year. these statements by Dulles and watched care- speech to the directors of the cooperation In November 1959, Chairman Mao con- fully the changes in strategies and tactics regions6 on , 1958, Chairman vened a small-scale meeting in Hangzhou used by imperialists against socialist coun- Mao noted that Dulles was a man of schemes attended by Premier Zhou [Enlai], Peng tries. That was the time when the War to Aid and that he controlled the helm in the United Zhen,10 Wang Jiaxiang,11 Hu Qiaomu,12 Korea and Resist America had just achieved States. Dulles was very thoughtful. One had among others, to discuss and examine the victory, when the United States was con- to read his speeches word by word with the international situation at the time. Before the tinuing its blockade of the Taiwan Straits help of an English dictionary. Dulles was opening of the meeting, Chairman Mao asked and its embargo, and when our domestic really taking the helm. Provincial Party his secretary, Lin Ke, to find Dulles’s situation was stable, “the First Five-Year Committees should assign special cadres to speeches concerning “peaceful evolution” Plan” was fully under way, economic con- read Cankao ziliao.7 Chairman Mao has for him to read. Comrade Lin Ke selected struction was developing rapidly, and ev- always insisted that Party leaders at all lev- three such speeches: Dulles’s address titled erywhere was the picture of prosperity and els, especially high-ranking cadres, should “Policy for the Far East” delivered before vitality. At that moment, Chairman Mao did closely follow international events and the the California Chamber of Commerce on not immediately bring up the issue of pre- development of social contradictions on the December 4, 1958, Dulles’s testimony made venting a “peaceful evolution.” The reason world scene in order to be well informed and before the House Foreign Affairs Commit- for his later raising the question has to do prepared for sudden incidents. It is very tee on January 28, 1959, and Dulles’s speech with developments in international and do- necessary for Mao to make that demand. titled “The Role of Law in Peace” made mestic situations. Chairman Mao read Cankao ziliao every before the New York State Bar Association In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the day. For us leading cadres, we should con- on January 31, 1959. Chairman Mao had Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev at- sider not only the whole picture of domestic read these three speeches before. After re- tacked Stalin, causing an anti-Communist politics but also the whole situation of inter- reading them, he told Comrade Lin Ke of his and anti-Socialist wave in the world and national politics. Thus we can keep clear- opinions about them and asked him to write triggering incidents in Poland and Hungary. headed, deal with any challenges confidently, commentaries based on his views and insert In 1957, a tiny minority of bourgeois Right- and “sit tight in the fishing boat despite the them at the beginning of each of Dulles’s ists seized the opportunity of Party reform to rising winds and waves.” This is a very statements. After Comrade Lin Ke had attack the Party. In 1958, Khrushchev pro- important political lesson and a leadership completed the commentaries, Mao instructed posed to create a long-wave radio station and style. him to distribute Dulles’s speeches, along COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 229 with the commentaries, to the members couraging a “peaceful evolution” plication. We will only expose the attending the meeting. inside socialist countries. For ex- American deception and lay bare The three speeches by Dulles all con- ample, at his testimony before the the nature of the so-called “peace” tained the theme of promoting a “peaceful House Foreign Affairs Committee by the United States. evolution” inside socialist countries. The on January 28 Dulles remarked that three commentaries based on Chairman basically the U.S. hoped to encour- This is the first time that Chairman Mao Mao’s talks highlighted the key points in age changes within the Soviet world. clearly raised and insightfully elaborated on Dulles’s remarks and warned of the danger By the Soviet world, Dulles did not the issue of preventing a “peaceful evolu- of the American “peaceful evolution” strat- mean just the Soviet Union. He was tion.” From that time on, he would pay more egy. The first commentary pointed out: referring to the whole socialist camp. and more attention to the matter. In a series “The United States not only has no intention He was hoping to see changes in our of meetings that followed, he would repeat- to give up its policy of force, but also wants, camp so that the Soviet world would edly alert the whole party on the issue and as an addition to its policy of force, to pursue no longer be a threat to freedom on gradually unfold the struggle against the so- a ‘peaceful conquest strategy’ of infiltration the globe and would mind its own called revisionism both at home and abroad. and subversion in order to avoid the pros- business instead of thinking about From 1960 forward, differences between pect of its ‘being surrounded.’ The U.S. realizing the goal and ambition of the Chinese and Soviet Parties increased. desires to achieve the ambition of preserv- communizing the world.... On April 22, an editorial titled “Long Live ing itself (capitalism) and gradually defeat- Leninism” published by the journal Hongqi13 ing the enemy (socialism).” After noting In commenting on Dulles’s statement of denounced Comrade Tito of Yugoslavia by the main theme of Dulles’s testimony, the January 31, 1959, Chairman Mao asserted: name and criticized Khrushchev of the So- second commentary contended: Dulles’s viet Union without mentioning his name. words “demonstrate that U.S. imperialists Dulles said that justice and law On internal occasions, we unequivocally are attempting to restore capitalism in the should replace violence and that war pointed out that the Soviet Union had be- Soviet Union by the method of corrupting it should be abandoned, and law and come revisionist and that we should learn so as to realize their aggressive goal, which justice should be emphasized. Dulles the Soviet lesson. We also felt that “revi- they have failed to achieve through war.” also argued that the abandonment of sionists” already existed in China and that The third commentary first took note of force under the circumstances did Peng Dehuai and some other comrades were Dulles’s insistence on “the substitution of not mean the “maintenance of the examples. We warned against the emer- justice and law for force” and his contention status quo,” but meant a peaceful gence of revisionism in order to prevent a that the abandonment of force did not mean “change.” (laughter) Change whom “peaceful evolution.” In his meeting with the “maintenance of the status quo,” but peacefully? Dulles wants to change Jespersen,14 Chairman of the Danish Com- meant a peaceful “change.” Then it went on countries like ours. He wants to sub- munist Party, on May 28, 1960, Chairman to argue that “Dulles’s words showed that vert and change us to follow his Mao said: “There are also revisionists in our because of the growing strength of the so- ideas.... Therefore, the United States country. Led by Peng Dehuai, a Politburo cialist force throughout the world and be- is attempting to carry out its aggres- member, they launched an attack on the cause of the increasing isolation and diffi- sion and expansion with a much more Party last summer. We condemned and culties of the international imperialist force, deceptive tactic.... In other words, it defeated him. Seven full and alternate mem- the United States does not dare to start a wants to keep its order and change bers of our Central Committee followed world war at the moment. Therefore, the our system. It wants to corrupt us by Peng. Including Peng, there are eight revi- United States has adopted a more deceptive a peaceful evolution. sionists. The total number of full and alter- tactic to pursue its aggression and expan- nate members in our Central Committee is sion. While advocating peace, the United Chairman Mao believed that 192. Eight people are merely a minority.” States is at the same time speeding up the Khrushchev’s speeches reflected the “peace- At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Con- implementation of its plots of infiltration, ful evolution” advocated by Dulles and that ference”15 held in January 1962, Comrade corruption, and subversion in order to re- our principle should be: [Liu] Shaoqi delivered a “written report” on verse the decline of imperialism and to behalf of the Party Central Committee. He fulfill its objective of aggression.” Under the existing complex interna- made a special reference to the question of At the meeting on November 12, Chair- tional conditions, our policy is to opposing contemporary revisionism. In his man Mao further analyzed and elaborated resist the pressures head-on—pres- remarks concerning the issue of practicing on Dulles’s speeches and the commentar- sures from two directions, , Chairman Mao ies. He said: Khrushchev and Eisenhower. We stated: “Without a highly developed democ- will resist for five to ten years. To- racy, there cannot be a high level of central- Comrade Lin Ke has prepared for ward the United States, we should ism. Without a high level of centralism, we me three documents—three do our best to expose it with facts cannot establish a socialist economy. What speeches by Dulles during 1958- and we should do so persuasively. will happen then to our country if we cannot 1959. All three documents have to We will not criticize Khrushchev, create a socialist economy? China will be- do with Dulles’s talks about en- nor will we attack him through im- come a revisionist country, a bourgeois coun- 230 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN try in fact. The proletarian will last to July 1964, our Party used the name of 13. Hongqi (Red Flag) is the official journal of the CCP become not only a bourgeois dictatorship the editorial boards of the Renmin ribao and Central Committee. 14. Knud Jespersen, leader of the Danish communist but also a reactionary and fascist dictator- Hongqi to issue nine articles, refuting the Party. ship. This is an issue that deserves full Soviet open letter and condemning 15. The conference was held between January and attention. I hope our comrades will consider “Khrushchev Revisionism” by name. Thus February, 1962 to review methods of Party leadership it carefully.” (Selected Readings of Chair- the Sino-Soviet polemics reached a high and examine problems caused by the Great Leap For- ward. man Mao’s Works, Vol. II, pp. 822-823.) point. In the meantime, the struggle to op- 16. Hysni Kapo, a leader of the Albanian Labor (Com- Here Chairman Mao officially sounded an pose “revisionism” and to prevent a “peace- munist) Party. alarm bell for the whole party. In his meeting ful evolution” was accelerated at home. 17. Bequir Balluku, Defense Minister and a Politburo with Kapo16 and Balluku17 of Albania on member of the Albanian Communist Party. 18. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist February 3, 1967, Mao contended: At the Party. “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” in 1. The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History 19. Maurice Thorez, leader of the French Communist 1962, “I made a speech. I said that revision- of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Repub- Party. ism wanted to overthrow us. If we paid no lic of China was adopted by the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981. While attention and conducted no struggle, China affirming the historical role of Mao Zedong, the resolu- Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn Uni- would become a fascist dictatorship in either tion also blames him for the Cultural Revolution. After versity at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the a few or a dozen years at the earliest or in an analysis of all the crimes and errors in the Cultural author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the several decades at the latest. This address Revolution the resolution describes it as, after all, “the error of a proletarian revolutionary.” It concludes that Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, was not published openly. It was circulated although Mao has made “gross mistakes” during the 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State Univer- internally. We wanted to watch subsequent Cultural Revolution, “if we judge his activities as a sity Press, 1994). developments to see whether any words in whole, his contribution to the Chinese revolution far the speech required revision. But at that time outweighs his mistakes.” For the text of the resolution, see Resolution on CPC History (1949-1981) (Beijing: we already detected the problem.” Foreign Languages Press, 1981). At the Beidaihe Meeting and the Tenth 2. I have previously translated the chapter in the first Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee volume concerning Mao’s decision to make an alliance during August and September, 1962, Chair- with the Soviet Union in 1949-1950. It was first pub- lished in Chinese Historians 5 (Spring 1992), 57-62, man Mao reemphasized class struggle in and later in Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill, order to prevent the emergence of revision- eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: ism. On August 9, he clearly pointed out the Volume II: Since 1914, 4th ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. necessity of educating cadres and training Heath, 1995), 332-34. 3. Bo does not mention precisely when and where them in rotation. Otherwise, he feared that Dulles made those remarks about Chinese communism. he had devoted his whole life to revolution, I have not been able to identify Dulles’s speech to which only to produce capitalism and revisionism. Bo is referring. On September 24, he again urged the party to 4. The “Three Red Flags” refer to the General Line of Socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the People’s heighten vigilance to prevent the country Commune. from going “the opposite direction.” The 5. Jinman (Quemoy). communiqué of the Tenth Plenum published 6. These refer to the economic cooperation regions on September 27 reiterated the gist of Chair- established during the Great Leap Forward. China was divided into seven such regions. man Mao’s remarks and stressed that 7. Cankao ziliao (Reference Material) is an internally “whether at present or in the future, our Party circulated reading material, which provided Party lead- must always heighten its vigilance and cor- ers with translations and summaries of international rectly carry out the struggle on two fronts: news from foreign news agencies and press. 8. According to the U.S records of the Camp David against both revisionism and dogmatism.” talks, in his discussions with President Eisenhower, From the end of 1962 to the spring of Khrushchev actually defended China’s position on 1963, our Party published seven articles in Taiwan. See memorandum of conversation between succession, condemning such so-called “con- Eisenhower and Khrushchev, 26 and 27 September 1959, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958- 18 temporary revisionists” as Togliatti of Italy, 1960, Vol. X, Part I: Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Thorez of France,19 and the American Com- Union; Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government munist Party. On June 14, 1963, the CCP Printing Office, 1993), 477-482. Central Committee issued “A Proposal for a 9. Peng Dehuai, Defense Minister and a Politburo member. General Line of the International Commu- 10. Peng Zhen, Party Secretary of Beijing and a nist Movement.” On July 14, the Central Politburo member. Committee of the Communist Party of the 11. Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP International Soviet Union (CPSU) published “An Open Liaison Department and a Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat. Letter to Party Units at All Levels and to All 12. Hu Qiaomu, Mao’s political secretary and an Alter- Members of the CPSU,” bringing the Sino- nate Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secre- Soviet dispute to the open. From September tariat. NEW COLED WARVIDENC INTERNATIONAL HISTOREY PROJECTON BULLETIN 231

THE VIETNAM WAR AND SOVIET- his research into a far broader study of Soviet DRV and PRC. All those interconnected AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1964-1973: involvement in the Vietnam conflict, utiliz- relations crucially influenced the relevant NEW RUSSIAN EVIDENCE ing sources in both Russian and American Soviet policies. archives (the latter during a CWIHP fellow- The escalation of the conflict in Viet- by Ilya V. Gaiduk ship for research in the United States); that nam after the Tonkin Gulf incident in Au- study, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam gust 1964 and the February 1965 attack by The Vietnam War stands out among War, is scheduled for publication by Ivan R. armed units of the National Front for the Cold War crises for its scale, length, inten- Dee (Chicago) in Spring 1996. Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV, also sity, and global repercussions. The litera- The SCCD archives contain materials known as the NLF) on the base of American ture on the war and the American role in it related to a broad range of the former CPSU military advisers in Pleiku (triggering U.S. encompasses thousands of volumes, from CC’s work, primarily correspondence with a aerial bombardment of North Vietnam in political memoirs to soldiers’ eyewitness wide range of Soviet organizations and es- retaliation), coincided with a certain cooling accounts to historical and journalistic stud- tablishments dealing with various socio-eco- in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations. This ies, to novels and political science trea- nomic, domestic, and foreign policy issues. chill between Moscow and Hanoi, in turn, tises.1 With the passage of time, ever more The archive collections (fondy) include a documents have been declassified, enabling considerable number of documents on the more thorough and comprehensive analy- subject of the Vietnam War and Soviet- This section of the Bulletin presents ses. Now that there is substantial access to American relations which were sent to the new evidence from Russian, Chinese, and archives in the former USSR, researchers CPSU CC—mostly to the CC International Polish sources on one of the Cold War’s have at their disposal a whole set of previ- Department and the CC Socialist Countries’ most costly conflicts: the Vietnam War, which ously unavailable materials which shed new Communist and Workers’ Parties Depart- consumed more than 58,000 American lives light on unresolved issues as well as on ment—by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign and, according to recent estimates, more problems which have either escaped the Affairs, Defense Ministry, and Committee than 3.2 million Vietnamese lives. Pre- attention of Western scholars or have not of State Security (KGB). Considerably less sented here are articles by Ilya V. Gaiduk yet been analyzed in detail. frequently encountered, alas, is documenta- (Institute of Universal History, Russian Acad- One of those problems relates to the tion illuminating recommendations, draft emy of Sciences, Moscow), who employs Soviet Union’s participation in the Vietnam decisions, and top-level decision-making. documents from the CPSU Central Commit- conflict, particularly the nature of Soviet- Thus, the top leadership’s decisions and the tee archives to illuminate Soviet policy to- American relations during the war and mechanism of decision-making on this level ward the Vietnam conflict (in a foretaste of Moscow’s role as a potential mediator. are only indirectly reflected in the SCCD his soon-to-be published book on the sub- Although many U.S. researchers have stud- materials. This unfortunate gap, naturally, ject), and by Zhai Qiang (Auburn University ied these problems and, on the basis of the creates problems for historians trying to de- at Montgomery), who uses newly released documents analyzed, drawn certain conclu- termine how policy was actually made by the Chinese sources to explore Beijing’s han- sions, their analyses of the subject were far top Soviet leadership on important foreign dling of the escalation of the war in 1964-65; from exhaustive and quite often insuffi- policy questions, and necessitates continued and a precis of a secretly-prepared memoir ciently corroborated by the necessary archi- efforts to increase access to materials in by Jerzy Michalowski, a Polish diplomat val sources. Russian archives that remain off-limits, par- who was deeply involved in secret mediation The present article assesses Soviet ticularly the so-called Kremlin or Presiden- efforts between the United States and North policy toward Vietnam and the war’s im- tial Archives, known officially as the Archive Vietnam in the mid-1960s. pact on U.S.-Soviet relations from 1964 to of the President of the Russian Federation However, recognizing that the most the early 1970s on the basis of materials (APRF). important “other side” for Americans dur- bearing on this subject in the archive of the At the same time, the SCCD materials ing the Vietnam War was, of course, the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union enable historians not only to reconstruct many Vietnamese themselves, the Cold War Inter- Central Committee (CPSU CC)—a reposi- events related to the Vietnam War during the national History Project has launched an tory now known as the Storage Center for period in question, and to present matters Contemporary Documents (SCCD, or which were previously interpreted only in- was partly attributable to the growing differ- TsKhSD, in its Russian acronym)—located ferentially, but also to assess the develop- ences between the USSR and the PRC, the in the CC’s former headquarters in Staraya ment of U.S.-Soviet relations in close inter- two chief patrons and supporters of the Viet- Ploschad’ (Old Square) in Moscow. This connection with the conflict in Southeast namese struggle against the Saigon regime.2 report was originally prepared for presenta- Asia. This last factor is of obvious import, Besides the impact of the Sino-Soviet split, tion at the January 1993 Moscow Confer- for one can hardly study U.S.-Soviet rela- the tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese re- ence on New Evidence on Cold War His- tions during the Vietnam War in isolation lations during this stretch was also tied to the tory, organized by the Cold War Interna- from an understanding of relations between relatively moderate stand adopted by the tional History Project (CWIHP) in coopera- the Soviet Union and North Vietnam (the then Soviet government, under the leader- tion with the Institute of General History of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV), ship of Nikita S. Khrushchev prior to his the Russian Academy of Sciences and between the Soviet Union and the People’s downfall in October 1964. Owing to the SCCD. Subsequently, the author expanded Republic of China (PRC), and between the continued on page 250 232 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

BEIJING AND THE VIETNAM Hanoi? How and why did a close relation- does not explain why Giap had to make a CONFLICT, 1964-1965: ship between Beijing and Hanoi turn sour second visit to China shortly after his first NEW CHINESE EVIDENCE during the fight against a common foe? tour and why the Soviet participants at the Drawing upon recently available Chinese talks changed. Perhaps disagreement by Qiang Zhai materials, this paper will address these ques- emerged during the discussions of Giap’s tions.1 The first half of the article is prima- first trip, leaving some issues unresolved. In The years 1964-1965 marked a crucial rily narrative, while the second half provides fact, according to the study by the research- period in the Vietnam War. The Gulf of an analysis of the factors that contributed to ers at the Academy of Social Sci- Tonkin Incident and subsequent U.S. esca- China’s decision to commit itself to Hanoi, ences, the Chinese and the Russians differed lation of war against North Vietnam repre- placing Chinese actions in their domestic over strategies to reunify Vietnam. The sented a major turning point in the American and international context. Soviet advisors favored peaceful coexist- approach to Indochina, as the Johnson Ad- ence between North and South Vietnam, ministration shifted its focus from Saigon to China’s Role in Vietnam, 1954-1963 urging Hanoi to “reunify the country through Hanoi as the best way to reverse the deterio- peaceful means on the basis of indepen- China played an important role in help- dence and democracy.” The Chinese Com- ing Ho Chi Minh win the Anti-French War munists, conversely, contended that because effort to organize collaborative research and in concluding the Geneva Accords in of imperialist sabotage it was impossible to with Vietnamese scholars and to collect Viet- 1954.2 In the decade after the Geneva Con- reunify Vietnam through a general election namese sources on the international history ference, Beijing continued to exert influence in accordance with the Geneva Accords, and of the Vietnam and Indochina conflicts. To over developments in Vietnam. At the time that consequently North Vietnam should this end, CWIHP has begun contacts with of the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese prepare for a protracted struggle.6 the Institute of International Relations (IIR) Communists asked the Chinese Communist On 24 December 1955, the Chinese in Hanoi on the possibility of organizing an Party (CCP) to help them consolidate peace government decided to withdraw the CMAG international scholarly conference on the in the North, build the army, conduct land from Vietnam; Peng Dehuai notified Vo history of U.S.-Vietnam relations since World reform, rectify the Party, strengthen diplo- Nguyen Giap of this decision. By mid- War II. CWIHP, along with the National matic work, administer cities, and restore March 1956, the last members of the CMAG Security Archive at George Washington the economy.3 Accordingly, Beijing sent had left the DRV. To replace the formal University, is also collecting declassified to head a team of Chinese economic CMAG, Beijing appointed a smaller team of archival evidence from Vietnamese, Ameri- experts to North Vietnam.4 military experts headed by Wang Yanquan can, and other sources in connection with an According to the official history of the to assist the Vietnamese.7 oral history conference of senior former Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG), These developments coincided with a Vietnamese and American decision-makers on 27 June 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap headed a major debate within the Vietnamese Com- (including Kennedy and Johnson Adminis- Vietnamese military delegation on a secret munist leadership in 1956 over who should tration Defense Secretary Robert S. visit to Beijing accompanied by Wei bear responsibility for mistakes committed McNamara), to be organized by the Council Guoqing, head of the CMAG in Vietnam. during a campaign which had on Foreign Relations, the Center for For- The Vietnamese visitors held discussions been instituted since 1953 in an imitation of eign Policy at Brown University, and the with Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, the Chinese model. Truong Chinh, General IIR. (Agreement in principle to hold the and General Petroshevskii, a senior Soviet Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party conference was reached during discussions military advisor in China, regarding the (VWP), who was in charge of the land re- in Hanoi in November 1995.) Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s recon- form program, was removed from his posi- CWIHP also plans to devote a special struction of the army and the war plan for the tion at a Central Committee Plenum held in issue of the Bulletin to new evidence on the future. The DRV delegation visited the September. Le Duan, who became General war, primarily from Vietnamese sources. Chinese North Sea Fleet before returning to Secretary later in the year, accused Truong --Jim Hershberg, Editor Hanoi in mid-July. That fall, on 15 October Chinh of applying China’s land reform ex- 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap led another secret perience in Vietnam without considering the 8 rating trend in South Vietnam and to per- military delegation to China, where he talked Vietnamese reality. suade the North Vietnamese leadership to with Peng Dehuai and Soviet General Gushev The failure of the land-reform program desist from their increasing involvement in again about the DRV’s military develop- in the DRV dovetailed with a growing real- the South. How did Beijing react to ment and war planning. The Vietnamese ization that the reunification of the whole of Washington’s escalation of the conflict in inspected Chinese military facilities and Vietnam, as promised by the Geneva Ac- Vietnam? How did Mao Zedong perceive academies and watched a Chinese military cords, would not materialize, primarily as a U.S. intentions? Was there a “strategic exercise before traveling back to North Viet- result of U.S. support for the anti-Commu- 5 debate” within the Chinese leadership over nam on December 11. nist South Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh the American threat and over strategies that The official CMAG history states that Diem, who refused to hold elections in 1956. China should adopt in dealing with the United during both of Giap’s journeys to Beijing, he As hopes for an early reunification dimmed, States? What was in Mao’s mind when he “reached agreement” with the Chinese and the DRV had to face its own economic decided to commit China’s resources to the Russians “on principal issues.” But it difficulties. The rice supply became a major COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 233 problem as Hanoi, no longer able to count fundamental, the most crucial, and the most strategy but simply stated that disintegration on incorporating the rice-producing South urgent task” for the Vietnamese revolution was replacing stability in the South. To take into its economy, was forced to seek alterna- was to carry out socialist revolution and advantage of this new situation, the Con- tive food sources for the North and to pre- socialist construction in the North. As to the gress urged the party to carry out both politi- pare the groundwork for a self-supporting South, the Chinese reply continued, Hanoi’s cal and military struggle in the South and economy. In this regard, leaders in Hanoi task should be to promote “a national and called for an increase of support from the continued to seek Chinese advice despite .” But since it was North.15 This emphasis on a combination of the memory of the poorly-implemented land- impossible to realize such a revolution at the political and military struggle in the South reform program. There are indications that moment, the Chinese concluded, the VWP reflected to some degree the Chinese sug- the Chinese themselves had drawn lessons should “conduct a long-term underground gestion of caution. from the debacle of the Vietnamese land work, accumulate strength, establish contact In the spring of 1961, U.S President reform and had become more sensitive to with the masses, and wait for opportuni- John F. Kennedy approved an increase in the Vietnamese realities when offering sugges- ties.”12 Clearly, Beijing did not wish to see Military Assistance and Advisory Group tions. In April 1956, Deputy Premier Chen the situation in Vietnam escalate into a major (MAAG) of 100 advisers and sent to Viet- Yun, an economic specialist within the CCP, confrontation with the United States. Judg- nam 400 Special Forces troops to train the paid an unpublicized visit to Hanoi. At the ing by subsequent developments, the VWP South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency tech- request of Ho Chi Minh, Chen proposed the did not ignore the Chinese advice, for be- niques. This escalation of U.S. involvement principle of “agriculture preceding industry tween 1958 and 1960 Hanoi concentrated on in Indochina aroused Chinese leaders’ con- and light industry ahead of heavy industry” economic construction in the North, imple- cern. During DRV Premier Pham Van in developing the Vietnamese economy. menting the “Three-Year Plan” of a socialist Dong’s visit to Beijing in June 1961, Mao The Vietnamese leadership adopted Chen’s transformation of the economy and society. expressed a general support for the waging advice.9 Given the fact that the CCP was The policy of returning to revolutionary of an armed struggle by the South Vietnam- putting a high premium on the development war adopted by the VWP Central Committee ese people while Zhou Enlai continued to of heavy industry at home during its First in May 1959 did not outline any specific stress flexibility in tactics and the impor- Five-Year Plan at this time, Chen’s empha- strategy to follow. The resolution had merely tance of “blending legal and illegal struggle sis on agriculture and light industry was mentioned that a blend of political and mili- and combining political and military ap- very unusual, and demonstrated that the tary struggle would be required. During the proaches.”16 Chinese were paying more attention to Viet- next two years, debates over strategy and 1962 saw a major turning point in both namese conditions in their assistance to the tactics continued within the Hanoi leader- U.S. involvement in Vietnam and in Chinese DRV. Zhou Enlai echoed Chen’s counsel of ship.13 Ho Chi Minh continued to consult the attitudes toward the conflict. In February, caution in economic planning during his Chinese. In May 1960, North Vietnamese Washington established in Saigon the Mili- tour of Hanoi on 18-22 November 1956, and Chinese leaders held discussions in both tary Assistance Command, Vietnam when he told Ho Chi Minh to refrain from Hanoi and Beijing over strategies to pursue (MAC,V), to replace the MAAG. The haste in collectivizing agriculture: “Such in South Vietnam. Zhou Enlai and Deng Kennedy Administration coupled this move changes must come step by step.”10 Xiaoping argued that in general political with a drastic increase in the number of Donald S. Zagoria argues in his book struggle should be combined with armed American “advisers” and the amount of mili- Vietnam Triangle that between 1957 and conflict and that since specific conditions tary hardware it was sending to the Diem 1960, the DRV shifted its loyalties from varied between the city and the countryside regime, marking a new level of U.S. inter- Beijing to Moscow in order to obtain Soviet in South Vietnam, a flexible strategy of vention in Vietnam. assistance for its economic development.11 struggle should be adopted. In the city, the That spring, an important debate broke In reality, the Hanoi leadership continued to Chinese advised, political struggle would out within the Chinese leadership over the consult the CCP closely on such major is- generally be recommended, but to deliver a estimation of a world war, the possibility of sues as economic consolidation in the North final blow on the Diem regime, armed force peaceful coexistence with capitalist coun- and the revolutionary struggle in the South. would be necessary. Since there was an tries, and the degree of China’s support for With the completion of its economic recov- extensive mass base in the countryside, mili- national liberation movements. On Febru- ery in 1958, the VWP began to pay more tary struggle should be conducted there, but ary 27, Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP attention to strengthening the revolutionary military struggle should include political Foreign Liaison Department, sent a letter to movement in the South. It sought Chinese struggle.14 The Chinese policymakers, pre- Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi advice. In the summer of 1958, the VWP occupied with recovery from the economic (the three PRC officials directly in charge of presented to the CCP for comment two disasters caused by the Great Leap Forward, foreign policy), in which he criticized the documents entitled “Our View on the Basic clearly did not encourage a major commit- tendency to overrate the danger of world war Tasks for Vietnam during the New Stage” ment of resources from the North in support and to underestimate the possibility of peace- and “Certain Opinions Concerning the Uni- of a general offensive in the South at this ful coexistence with imperialism. In terms fication Line and the Revolutionary Line in juncture. of support for national liberation movements, the South.” After a careful study, the Chi- In September 1960, the VWP convened Wang emphasized restraint, calling atten- nese leadership responded with a written its Third National Congress, which made no tion to China’s own economic problems and reply, which pointed out that “the most major recommendations affecting existing limitations in resources. On the issue of 234 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Vietnam, he asked the party to “guard against North Vietnamese officials discussed ing covert operations in North Vietnam, a Korea-style war created by American im- Beijing’s assistance in constructing defense including intelligence overflights, the drop- perialists,” and warned of the danger of works and naval bases in the northeastern ping of propaganda leaflets, and OPLAN “Khrushchev and his associates dragging us part of the DRV.22 According to a Chinese 34A raids along the North Viet- into the trap of war.” Wang proposed that in source, in 1963 China and the DRV made an namese coast, the Johnson Administration order to adjust and restore the economy and agreement under which Beijing would send also conveyed to Pham Van Dong through a win time to tide over difficulties, China combat troops into North Vietnam if Ameri- Canadian diplomat on June 17 the message should adopt a policy of peace and concilia- can soldiers crossed the Seventeenth Paral- that the United States was ready to exert tion in foreign affairs, and that in the area of lel to attack the North. The Chinese soldiers increasingly heavy military pressure on the foreign aid China should not do what it would stay and fight in the North to free the DRV to force it to reduce or terminate its cannot afford.17 But Mao rejected Wang’s North Vietnamese troops to march to the encouragement of guerrilla activities in South proposal, condemning Wang as promoting a South.23 But the precise date and details of Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese leader “revisionist” foreign policy of “three ap- this agreement remain unclear. refused to yield to the American pressure, peasements and one reduction” (appease- In sum, between 1954 and 1963 China declaring that Hanoi would not stop its sup- ment of imperialism, revisionism, and inter- was closely involved in the development of port for the struggle of liberation in the national reactionaries, and reduction of as- Hanoi’s policy. The CCP urged Ho Chi South.25 sistance to national liberation movements).18 Minh to concentrate on consolidating the Mao watched these developments The outcome of the debate had major DRV and to combine political and military closely. Anticipating new trouble, the chair- implications for China’s policy toward Viet- struggles in the South. Although before man told General Van Tien Dung, Chief of nam. If Wang’s moderate suggestions had 1962 Beijing policy makers were not eager Staff of the (North) Vietnamese People’s been adopted, it would have meant a limited to see a rapid intensification of the revolu- Army, in June: “Our two parties and two Chinese role in Indochina. But Mao had tionary war in South Vietnam, neither did countries must cooperate and fight the en- switched to a militant line, choosing con- they discourage their comrades in Hanoi emy together. Your business is my business frontation with the United States. This turn from increasing military operations there. and my business is your business. In other to the left in foreign policy accorded with Between 1956 and 1963, China provided the words, our two sides must deal with the Mao’s reemphasis on class struggle and radi- DRV with 270,000 guns, over 10,000 pieces enemy together without conditions.”26 Be- cal politics in Chinese domestic affairs in of artillery, nearly 200 million bullets, 2.02 tween July 5 and 8, Zhou Enlai led a CCP 1962. It also anticipated an active Chinese million artillery shells, 15,000 wire trans- delegation to Hanoi, where he discussed role in the unfolding crisis in Vietnam. With mitters, 5,000 radio transmitters, over 1,000 with leaders from the DRV and Pathet Lao the rejection of Wang’s proposal, an oppor- trucks, 15 aircraft, 28 war ships, and 1.18 the situations in South Vietnam and Laos.27 tunity to avert the later Sino-American hos- million sets of uniforms. The total value of Although the details of these talks are un- tility over Indochina was missed. China’s assistance to Hanoi during this pe- known, clearly the three Communist parties In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh riod amounted to 320 million yuan.24 1962 were stepping up their coordination to con- and Nguyen Chi Thanh came to Beijing to was a crucial year in the evolution of China’s front the increasing threat from the United discuss with Chinese leaders the serious attitudes toward Vietnam. Abandoning the States. situation created by the U.S. intervention in cautious approach, Mao opted for confron- Immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin Vietnam and the possibility of an American tation with the United States and decided to Incident, Zhou Enlai and sent a attack against North Vietnam. Ho asked the commit China’s resources to Hanoi. cable on August 5 to Ho Chi Minh, Pham Chinese to provide support for the guerrilla Beijing’s massive supply of weapons to the Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung, asking them movement in South Vietnam. Beijing satis- DRV in 1962 helped Ho Chi Minh to inten- to “investigate the situation, work out coun- fied Ho’s demand by agreeing to give the sify in the South, trigger- termeasures, and be prepared to fight.”28 In DRV free of charge 90,000 rifles and guns ing greater U.S. intervention. By the end of the meantime, Beijing instructed the that could equip 230 infantry battalions. 1963, Chinese leaders had become very ner- Kunming and Guangzhou Military Regions These weapons would be used to support vous about American intentions in Vietnam and the air force and naval units stationed in guerrilla warfare in the South.19 In March but were ready to provide full support for the south and south-west China to assume a 1963, Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of the DRV in confronting the United States. state of combat-readiness. Four air divi- Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), sions and one anti-aircraft division were visited the DRV and discussed with his hosts China’s Reaction to U.S. Escalation dispatched into areas adjoining Vietnam and how China might support Hanoi if the United put on a heightened alert status.29 In August, States attacked North Vietnam.20 Two In the first half of 1964, the attention of China also sent approximately 15 MiG-15 months later, Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the U.S. officials was shifting increasingly from and MiG-17 jets to Hanoi, agreed to train PRC, traveled to Hanoi, where he told Ho South Vietnam toward Hanoi. This trend North Vietnamese pilots, and started to con- Chi Minh: “We are standing by your side, reflected mounting concern over the infiltra- struct new airfields in areas adjacent to the and if war broke out, you can regard China as tion of men and supplies from the North and Vietnamese border which would serve as your rear.”21 Clearly Beijing was making a a growing dissatisfaction with a policy that sanctuary and repair and maintenance facili- major commitment to Hanoi in early 1963. allowed Hanoi to encourage the ties for Hanoi’s jet fighters.30 By moving Toward the end of the year, Chinese and without punishment. In addition to expand- new air force units to the border area and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 235 building new airfields there, Beijing in- means war. The war can not have In discussions with Luo Ruiqing and tended to deter further U.S. expansion of boundaries. It is impossible for the Yang Chengwu, Zhou said: “According to war in South Vietnam and bombardment United States to finish the war sim- Pham Van Dong, U.S. blockade and bomb- against the DRV. Between August and ply by relying on a policy of bomb- ing has reduced supplies to South Vietnam September 1964, the PLA also sent an in- ing.33 through sea shipment and road transporta- spection team to the DRV to investigate the tion. While trying to resume sea transporta- situation in case China later needed to dis- This was the most serious warning issued by tion, the DRV is also expanding the corridor patch support troops to Vietnam.31 the Chinese government to the United States, in Lower Laos and roads in the South. Their The first months of 1965 witnessed a and given the caution exercised by President troops would go to the South to build roads. significant escalation of the American war Johnson in carrying out the “Rolling Thun- Therefore they need our support to construct in Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S. der” operations against the DRV, it was one roads in the North.” Zhou decided that the aircraft struck North Vietnamese military that Washington did not overlook. Clearly, Chinese military should be responsible for installations just across the 17th Parallel, U.S. leaders had drawn a lesson from the road repair and construction in North Viet- ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong at- Korean War, when the Truman nam. Yang suggested that since assistance tacks on American barracks near Pleiku and Administration’s failure to heed Beijing to the DRV involved many military and in Qui Nhon. On March 1, the Johnson warning against crossing the 38th parallel government departments, a special leader- Administration stopped claiming that its air led to a bloody confrontation between the ship group should be created to coordinate attacks on North Vietnam were reprisals for United States and China. the work of various agencies. Approving the specific Communist assaults in South Viet- The U.S. escalation in early 1965 made proposal, Zhou immediately announced the nam and began a continuous air bombing the DRV desperate for help. Le Duan and Vo establishment of the “Central Committee campaign against the DRV. On March 8, Nguyen Giap rushed to Beijing in early April and State Council Aid Vietnam Group” with two battalions of Marines armed with tanks to ask China to increase its aid and send Yang and (Deputy Chief of Staff) and 8-inch howitzers landed at Danang.32 troops to Vietnam. Le Duan told Chinese as Director and Vice Director.39 This epi- Worried about the increasing U.S. in- leaders that Hanoi needed “volunteer pilots, sode demonstrates Zhou’s characteristic ef- volvement in Vietnam, Zhou Enlai on April volunteer soldiers as well as other necessary fectiveness in organization and efficiency in 2 asked Pakistani President Ayub Khan to personnel, including road and bridge engi- administration. convey to President Johnson a four-point neers.” The Vietnamese envoys expected In early June, Van Tien Dung held dis- message: Chinese volunteer pilots to perform four cussions with Luo Ruiqing in Beijing to functions: to limit U.S. bombing to the south flesh out the general Chinese plan to assist (1) China will not take the initiative of the 20th or 19th parallel, to defend Hanoi, Vietnam. According to their agreement, if to provoke a war with the United to protect several major transportation lines, the war remained in the current conditions, States. (2) The Chinese mean what and to boost morale.34 On behalf of the the DRV would fight the war by itself and they say. In other words, if any Chinese leadership, Liu Shaoqi replied to the China would provide various kinds of sup- country in Asia, Africa, or else- Vietnamese visitors on April 8 that “it is the port as the Vietnamese needed. If the United where meets with aggression by the obligation of the Chinese people and party” States used its navy and air force to support imperialists headed by the United to support the Vietnamese struggle against a South Vietnamese attack on the North, States, the Chinese government and the United States. “Our principle is,” Liu China would also provide naval and air force people will definitely give it sup- continued, “that we will do our best to pro- support to the DRV. If U.S. ground forces port and assistance. Should such vide you with whatever you need and what- were directly used to attack the North, China just action bring on American ag- ever we have. If you do not invite us, we will would use its land forces as strategic re- gression against China, we will not go to your place. We will send whatever serves for the DRV and conduct military unhesitatingly rise in resistance and part [of our troops] that you request.You operations whenever necessary. As to the fight to the end. (3) China is pre- have the complete initiative.”35 forms of Sino-Vietnamese air force coop- pared. Should the United States In April, China signed several agree- eration, Dung and Luo agreed that China impose a war on China, it can be ments with the DRV concerning the dispatch could send volunteer pilots to Vietnam to said with certainty that, once in of Chinese support troops to North Viet- operate Vietnamese aircraft, station both China, the United States will not be nam.36 Between April 21 and 22, Giap dis- pilots and aircraft in Vietnam airfields, or fly able to pull out, however many men cussed with Luo Ruiqing and First Deputy aircraft from bases in China to join combat it may send over and whatever weap- Chief of Staff Yang Chengwu the arrange- in Vietnam and only land on Vietnamese ons it may use, nuclear weapons ments for sending Chinese troops.37 In May, bases temporarily for refueling. The third included. (4) Once the war breaks Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Mao in option was known as the “Andong model” (a out, it will have no boundaries. If Changsha, the chairman’s home province, reference to the pattern of Chinese air force the American madmen bombard where he asked Mao to help the DRV repair operations during the Korean War). In terms China without constraints, China and build twelve roads in the area north of of the methods of employing PRC ground will not sit there waiting to die. If Hanoi. The Chinese leader accepted Ho’s troops, the two military leaders agreed that they come from the sky, we will request and instructed Zhou Enlai to see to the Chinese forces would either help to fight back on the ground. Bombing the matter.38 strengthen the defensive position of the DRV 236 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN troops to prepare for a North Vietnamese nicated to U.S. intelligence through aerial that will determine the final victory of the counter offensive or launch an offensive photography and electronic intercepts. This war.”47 At first Mao did not expect that the themselves to disrupt the enemy’s deploy- evidence, along with the large base complex United States would attack North Vietnam ment and win the strategic initiative.40 that China built at Yen Bai in northwest directly.48 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident But despite Liu Shaoqi’s April promise Vietnam, provided credible and successful came as a surprise to him. In the wake of the to Le Duan and Luo Ruiqing’s agreement deterrence against an American invasion of incident, Mao pointed out on October 22 that with Van Tien Dung, China in the end failed North Vietnam.45 China must base its plans on war and make to provide pilots to Hanoi. According to the The specter of a Chinese intervention in active preparations for an early, large-scale, Vietnamese “White Paper” of 1979, the a manner similar to the Korean War was a and nuclear war.49 Chinese General Staff on 16 July 1965 noti- major factor in shaping President Johnson’s To deal with what he perceived as U.S. fied its Vietnamese counterpart that “the gradual approach to the Vietnam War. military threats, Mao took several domestic time was not appropriate” to send Chinese Johnson wanted to forestall Chinese inter- measures in 1964, the most important of pilots to Vietnam.41 The PRC’s limited air vention by keeping the level of military which was the launching of the massive force capacity may have caused Beijing to actions against North Vietnam controlled, project. This program called for have second thoughts, perhaps reinforcing exact, and below the threshold that would heavy investment in the remote provinces of Beijing’s desire to avoid a direct confronta- provoke direct Chinese entry. This China- southwestern and and envi- tion with the United States. Whatever the induced U.S. strategy of gradual escalation sioned the creation of a huge self-sustaining reasons for China’s decision, the failure to was a great help for Hanoi, for it gave the industrial base area to serve as a strategic satisfy Hanoi’s demand must have greatly Vietnamese communists time to adjust to reserve in the event China became involved disappointed the Vietnamese since the con- U.S. bombing and to develop strategies to in war. The project had a strong military trol of the air was so crucial for the DRV’s frustrate American moves. As John Garver orientation and was directly triggered by the effort to protect itself from the ferocious has aptly put it, “By helping to induce Wash- U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam.50 U.S. bombing, and undoubtedly contributed ington to adopt this particular strategy, On 25 April 1964, the War Department to North Vietnam’s decision in 1965 to rely Beijing contributed substantially to Hanoi’s of the PLA General Staff drafted a report for more on the Soviet Union for air defense. eventual victory over the United States.”46 Yang Chengwu on how to prevent an enemy Beginning in June 1965, China sent surprise attack on China’s economic con- ground-to-air missile, anti-aircraft artillery, Explaining PRC Support for the DRV struction. The report listed four areas vul- railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and nerable to such an attack: (1) China’s indus- logistical units into North Vietnam to help Mao’s decision to aid Hanoi was closely try was over-concentrated. About 60 per- Hanoi. The total number of Chinese troops linked to his perception of U.S. threats to cent of the civil machinery industry, 50 in North Vietnam between June 1965 and China’s security, his commitment to na- percent of the chemical industry, and 52 March 1973 amounted to over 320,000.42 tional liberation movements, his criticism of percent of the national defense industry were To facilitate supplies into South Vietnam, Soviet revisionist foreign policy, and his concentrated in 14 major cities with over one China created a secret coastal transportation domestic need to transform the Chinese state million people. (2) Too many people lived in line to ship goods to several islands off and society. These four factors were mutu- cities. According to the 1962 census, in Central Vietnam for transit to the South. A ally related and reinforcing. addition to 14 cities of above one million, 20 secret harbor on China’s Island was Sense of Insecurity: cities had a population between 500,000 and constructed to serve this transportation route. Between 1964 and 1965, Mao worried one million. Most of these cities were lo- Beijing also operated a costly transportation about the increasing American involvement cated in the coastal areas and very vulner- line through Cambodia to send weapons, in Vietnam and perceived the United States able to air strikes. No effective mechanisms munitions, food, and medical supplies into as posing a serious threat to China’s secu- existed at the moment to organize anti-air South Vietnam.43 When the last Chinese rity. For him, support for North Vietnam works, evacuate urban populations, continue troops withdrew from Vietnam in August was a way of countering the U.S. strategy of production, and eliminate the damages of an 1973, 1,100 soldiers had lost their lives and containment of China. The Communist suc- air strike, especially a nuclear strike. (3) 4,200 had been wounded.44 cess in South Vietnam would prevent the Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and The new materials from China indicate United States from moving closer to the harbors were situated near big and medium- that Beijing provided extensive support (short Chinese southern border. size cities and could easily be destroyed of volunteer pilots) for Hanoi during the On several occasions in 1964, Mao when the enemy attacked the cities. No Vietnam War and risked war with the United talked about U.S. threats to China and the measures had been taken to protect these States in helping the Vietnamese. As Allen need for China to prepare for war. During a transportation points against an enemy at- S. Whiting has perceptively observed, the Central Committee conference held between tack. In the early stage of war, they could deployment of Chinese troops in Vietnam May 15 and June 17, the chairman con- become paralyzed. (4) All of China’s reser- was not carried out under maximum security tended that “so long as imperialism exists, voirs had a limited capacity to release water against detection by Washington. The Chi- the danger of war is there. We are not the in an emergency. Among the country’s 232 nese troops wore regular uniforms and did chief of staff for imperialism and have no large reservoirs, 52 were located near major not disguise themselves as civilians. The idea when it will launch a war. It is the transportation lines and 17 close to impor- Chinese presence was intentionally commu- conventional weapon, not the atomic bomb, tant cities. In conclusion, the report made it COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 237 clear that “the problems mentioned above While emphasizing the “big Third Front” that intruded into Chinese airspace in order are directly related to the whole armed forces, plan on the national level, Mao also ordered to avoid a direct military clash with the to the whole people, and to the process of a provinces to proceed with their “small Third United States.59 national defense war.” It asked the State Front” projects. The chairman wanted each In April, however, Mao rescinded the Council “to organize a special committee to province to develop its own light armament “Six Point Directive.” Between April 8 and study and adopt, in accordance with the industry capable of producing rifles, ma- 9, U.S. aircraft flew into China’s airspace possible conditions of the national economy, chine guns, canons, and munitions.55 The over Hainan Island. On April 9, Yang practical and effective measures to guard Third Five-Year Plan was revised to meet the Chengwu reported the incidents to Mao, against an enemy surprise attack.”51 strategic contingency of war preparation. In suggesting that the order not to attack invad- Yang Chengwu presented the report to the modified plan, a total of three billion ing U.S. airplanes be lifted and that the air Mao, who returned it to Luo Ruiqing and yuan was appropriated for small Third Front force command take control of the naval air Yang on August 12 with the following com- projects. This was a substantial figure, but units stationed on Hainan Island. Approv- ment: “It is an excellent report. It should be less than 5 percent of the amount set aside for ing both of Yang’s requests, Mao said that carefully studied and gradually imple- the big Third Front in this period.56 In sum, China “should resolutely strike American mented.” Mao urged the newly established the Third Front was a major strategic action aircraft that overfly Hainan Island.”60 It is State Council Special Committee in charge designed to provide an alternative industrial quite possible that the further U.S. escala- of the Third Front to begin its work imme- base that would enable China to continue tion of war in Vietnam in the intervening diately.52 Mao’s approval of the report production in the event of an attack on its months caused Mao to abandon his earlier marked the beginning of the Third Front large urban centers. restrictions against engaging U.S. aircraft. project to relocate China’s industrial re- In addition to his apprehension about a It is important to point out that the entire sources to the interior. It is important to note strike on China’s urban and coastal areas, Chinese leadership, not just Mao, took the the timing of Mao’s reaction to the report— Mao also feared that the enemy might deploy strategic threat from the United States very right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The paratroop assault forces deep inside China. seriously during this period. Zhou Enlai told U.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnam In a meeting with , Deputy Chair- Spiro Koleka, First Deputy Chairman of the had confirmed Mao’s worst suspicions about man of the Central Military Commission, Council of Ministers of Albania, on 9 May American intentions. Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu on 28 1965 in Beijing that China was mobilizing Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun be- April 1965, Mao called their attention to its population for war. Although it seemed came Director, Deputy Prime Minister Bo such a danger. He ordered them to prepare that the United States had not made up its Yibo and Luo Ruiqing became Vice Direc- for the landing of enemy paratroopers in mind to expand the war to China, the Chi- tors of the Special Committee. On August every interior region. The enemy might use nese premier continued, war had its own law 19, they submitted to Mao a detailed pro- paratroops, Mao contended, “to disrupt our of development, usually in a way contrary to posal on how to implement the Third Front rear areas, and to coordinate with a frontal the wishes of people. Therefore China had ideas.53 In the meantime, the CCP Secre- assault. The number of paratroops may not to be prepared.61 Zhou’s remarks indicated tariat met to discuss the issue. Mao made be many. It may involve one or two divisions that he was familiar with a common pattern two speeches at the meetings on August 17 in each region, or it may involve a smaller in warfare: accidents and miscalculations and 20. He asserted that China should be on unit. In all interior regions, we should build rather than deliberate planning often lead to guard against an aggressive war launched caves in mountains. If no mountain is around, war between reluctant opponents. by imperialism. At present, factories were hills should be created to construct defense In an address to a Central Military Com- concentrated around big cities and coastal works. We should be on guard against en- mission war planning meeting on 19 May regions, a situation deleterious to war prepa- emy paratroops deep inside our country and 1965, Liu Shaoqi stated: ration. Factories should be broken into two prevent the enemy from marching unstopped parts. One part should be relocated to inte- into China.”57 If our preparations are faster and rior areas as early as possible. Every prov- It appears that Mao’s attitudes toward better, war can be delayed.... If we ince should establish its own strategic rear the United States hardened between January make excellent preparations, the base. Departments of industry and trans- and April 1965. In an interview with Edgar enemy may even dare not to in- portation should move, so should schools, Snow on January 9, Mao had expressed con- vade.... We must build the big Third science academies, and Beijing University. fidence that Washington would not expand Front and the small Third Front The three railroad lines between Chengdu the war to North Vietnam because Secretary and do a good job on every front, and Kunming, Sichuan and , and of State Dean Rusk had said so. He told including the atomic bomb, the hy- Yunnan and Guizhou should be completed Snow that there would be no war between drogen bomb, and long-distance as quickly as possible. If there were a China and the United States if Washington missiles. Under such circum- shortage of rails, the chairman insisted, rails did not send troops to attack China.58 Two stances, even if the United States on other lines could be dismantled. To days later, the CCP Central Military Com- has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the implement Mao’s instructions, the meet- mission issued a “Six-Point Directive on the Philippines, its ships are big tar- ings decided to concentrate China’s finan- Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in gets out on the sea and it is easy for cial, material, and human resources on the the South China Sea,” in which it instructed us to strike them. We should de- construction of the Third Front.54 the military not to attack American airplanes velop as early as possible new tech- 238 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

nology to and war- revisionism). Although the article included tries in Europe, Asia, and Africa,” and that it ships so that we can knock out one some of Lin Biao’s previous statements, Lin was difficult for “the U.S. reactionaries to enemy ship with a single missile. himself was not involved in its writing. When attack the Soviet Union before they could The enemy’s strength is in its navy, Luo Ruiqing asked Lin for his instructions subjugate these countries.”71 In the late air force, atomic bombs, and mis- about the composition of the article, the 1940s and throughout the greater part of the siles, but the strength in navy and Defense Minister said nothing. Zhou Enlai 1950s, Mao leaned to the side of the Soviet air force has its limits. If the enemy and other standing Politburo members read Union to balance against the perceived sends ground troops to invade the piece before its publication.67 The ar- American threat. But beginning in the late China, we are not afraid. There- ticle was approved by the Chinese leader- 1950s, with the emergence of Sino-Soviet fore, on the one hand we should be ship as a whole and was merely published in differences, Mao came to revise his charac- prepared for the enemy to come Lin Biao’s name. Luo Ruiqing was purged terization of the international situation. He from all directions, including a joint in December 1965 primarily because of his saw China confronting two opponents: the invasion against China by many dispute with Lin Biao over domestic mili- United States and the Soviet Union. To countries. On the other, we should tary organization rather than over foreign oppose these two foes and break China’s realize that the enemy lacks justifi- policy issues.68 Luo did not oppose Mao on international isolation, Mao proposed the cation in sending troops.... This Vietnam policy. In fact he carried out loy- formation of an international united front. will decide the difference between ally every Vietnam-related order issued by Operating from the principle of making a just and an unjust war.62 the chairman. Mao completely dominated friends with countries in the “Two Interme- the decision making. The origins of the diate Zones,” Mao promoted such anti- Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that “People’s War” article point to the danger of American tendencies as French President “so long as we have made good preparations relying on public pronouncements to gauge De Gaulle’s break with the United States in on every front, the enemy may not dare to inner-party calculations and cast doubts on the first zone and championed national lib- come. We must defend our offshore islands. the utility of the faction model in explaining eration movements in the second zone. For With these islands in our hands, the enemy Chinese foreign policy making.69 Mao, the Vietnam conflict constituted a part will find it difficult to land. If the enemy of a broader movement across Asia, Africa, should launch an attack, we will lure them Commitment to National Liberation and Latin America, which together repre- inside China and then wipe them out com- Movements: sented a challenge to imperialism as a whole. pletely.”63 The second factor that shaped Mao’s China reached out to anti-colonial guerrillas Scholars have argued over Beijing’s decision to support the DRV was his desire in Angola and Mozambique, to the “pro- reaction to the threat posed by U.S. interven- to form a broad international united front gressive” Sihanouk in Cambodia, to the left- tion in Vietnam. Much of this argument against both the United States and the Soviet ist regime under Sukarno in Indonesia, and focuses on the hypothesis of a “strategic Union. To Mao, national liberation move- to the anti-U.S. Castro in Cuba.72 Toward debate” in 1965 between Luo Ruiqing and ments in the Third World were the most the former socialist camp dominated by the Lin Biao. Various interpretations of this important potential allies in the coalition Soviet Union, Mao encouraged Albania to “debate” exist, but most contend that Luo that he wanted to establish. In the early persuade other East European countries to was more sensitive to American actions in 1960s, the chairman developed the concept separate from Moscow.73 Indochina than either Lin or Mao, and that of “Two Intermediate Zones.” The first zone During this increasingly radical period Luo demanded greater military preparations referred to developed countries, including of Chinese foreign policy, Mao singled out to deal with the threat, including accepting capitalist states in Europe, Canada, Japan, three anti-imperialist heroes for emulation the Soviet proposal of a “united front.”64 Australia, and New Zealand. The second by Third World liberation movements: Ho However, there is nothing in the re- zone referred to underdeveloped nations in Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella, the Alge- cently available Chinese materials to con- Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These two rian nationalist leader. In a speech to a firm the existence of the “strategic debate” zones existed between the two superpowers. delegation of Chilean journalists on 23 June in 1965.65 The often cited evidence to sup- Mao believed that countries in these two 1964, Mao remarked: “We oppose war, but port the hypothesis of a strategic debate is zones had contradictions with the United we support the anti-imperialist war waged the two articles supposedly written by Luo States and the Soviet Union and that China by oppressed peoples. We support the revo- Ruiqing and Lin Biao on the occasion of the should make friends with them to create an lutionary war in Cuba and Algeria. We also commemoration of V-J day in September international united front against Washing- support the anti-U.S.-imperialist war con- 1965.66 In fact, the same writing group ton and Moscow.70 ducted by the South Vietnamese people.”74 organized by Luo Ruiqing in the General Mao initially developed the idea of the In another address to a group of visitors from Staff was responsible for the preparation of “intermediate zone” during the early years Asia, Africa, and Oceania on July 9, Mao both articles. The final version of the of the Cold War. In a discussion with Anna again mentioned the names of Ho Chi Minh, “People’s War” article also incorporated Louise Strong in 1946, the CCP leader first Castro, and Ben Bella as models of anti- opinions from the writing team led by Kang broached the idea. He claimed that the colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.75 Sheng. (Operating in the Diaoyutai National United States and the Soviet Union were Envisioning China as a spokesman for Guest House, Kang’s team was famous for “separated by a vast zone including many the Third World independence cause, Mao writing the nine polemics against Soviet capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial coun- believed that the Chinese revolutionary ex- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 239 perience was relevant to the struggle of the October Revolution celebrations. Beijing Hanoi on 7-10 February 1965, Kosygin called liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and dispatched Zhou Enlai and He Long to Mos- for a total U.S. withdrawal from South Viet- Latin America. By firmly backing the Viet- cow for the primary purpose of sounding out nam and promised Soviet material aid for namese struggle against the United States, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin on the Ho Chi Minh’s struggle. The fact that a he wanted to demonstrate to Third World many issues in dispute: Khrushchev’s long- group of missile experts accompanied countries and movements that China was postponed plan to convene an international Kosygin indicated that the Kremlin was pro- their true friend. Victory for North Communist meeting, support for revolution- viding support in that crucial area. The two Vietnam’s war of national unification with ary movements, peaceful coexistence with sides concluded formal military and eco- China’s support would show the political the United States, attitudes toward Tito, and nomic agreements on February 10.81 Clearly correctness of Mao’s more militant strategy “revisionist” domestic policies within the the Soviets were competing with the Chi- for coping with U.S. imperialism and the Soviet Union. The Chinese discovered dur- nese to win the allegiance of the Vietnamese incorrectness of Khrushchev’s policy of ing their tour on November 5-13 that nothing Communists. Through its new gestures to peaceful coexistence. basic had changed in the Soviet position: the Hanoi, Moscow wanted to offset Chinese A number of Chinese anti-imperialist new leaders in Moscow desired an improve- influence and demonstrate its ideological initiatives, however, ended in a debacle in ment in Sino-Soviet relations on the condi- rectitude on issues of national liberation. 1965. First Ben Bella was overthrown in tion that Beijing stopped its criticisms and The new solidarity with Hanoi, however, Algeria in June, leading the Afro-Asian limited competition in foreign policy, prob- complicated Soviet relations with the United movement to lean in a more pro-Soviet ably in return for the resumption of Soviet States, and after 1965, the Soviet Union direction due to the influence of Nehru in economic aid.77 found itself at loggerheads with Washing- India and Tito in Yugoslavia. The fall of Instead of finding an opportunity to im- ton. While Moscow gained greater influ- Ben Bella frustrated Mao’s bid for leader- prove mutual understanding, the Chinese ence in Hanoi because of the North Viet- ship in the Third World through the holding visitors found their stay in Moscow unpleas- namese need for Soviet material assistance of a “second Bandung” conference of Afro- ant and the relationship with the Soviet Union against U.S. bombing, it at the same time lost Asian leaders. Then in September, Sukarno even worse. During a Soviet reception, flexibility because of the impossibility of was toppled in a right-wing counter-coup, Marshal suggested to retreat from the commitment to a brother derailing Beijing’s plan to promote a mili- Zhou Enlai and He Long that just like the Communist state under attack by imperial- tant “united front” between Sukarno and the Russians had ousted Khrushchev, the Chi- ism. Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The nese should overthrow Mao. The Chinese Before 1964, Hanoi was virtually on Chinese behavior, nevertheless, did con- indignantly rejected this proposal: Zhou even China’s side in the bifurcated international vince leaders in Washington that Beijing registered a strong protest with the Soviet communist movement. After the fall of was a dangerous gambler in international leadership, calling Malinovsky’s remarks “a Khrushchev and the appearance of a more politics and that American intervention in serious political incident.”78 Zhou Enlai told interventionist position under Kosygin and Vietnam was necessary to undermine a the Cuban Communist delegation during a Brezhnev, however, Hanoi adopted a more Chinese plot of global subversion by proxy.76 breakfast meeting in the Chinese Embassy balanced stand. Leaders in Beijing were on November 9 that Malinovsky “insulted nervous about the increase of Soviet influ- Criticism of Soviet Revisionism: Comrade Mao Zedong, the Chinese people, ence in Vietnam. According to a Vietnam- Mao’s firm commitment to North Viet- the Chinese party, and myself,” and that the ese source, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary Gen- nam also needs to be considered in the current leadership in the Kremlin inherited eral of the CCP, paid a secret visit to Hanoi context of the unfolding Sino-Soviet split. “Khrushchev’s working and thought style.”79 shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in By 1963, Beijing and Moscow had com- Before Zhou’s journey to Moscow, the an attempt to wean the Vietnamese away pletely broken apart after three years of Chinese leadership had suggested to the Viet- from Moscow with the promise of US$1 increasingly abusive polemics. The conclu- namese Communists that they also send billion aid per year.82 China’s strategy to sion of the Soviet-American partial Nuclear people to travel with Zhou to Moscow to see discredit the Soviet Union was to emphasize Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 was a major whether there were changes in the new So- the “plot” of Soviet-American collaboration turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. There- viet leaders’ policy. Zhou told Ho Chi Minh at the expense of Vietnam. During his visit after the Beijing leadership publicly de- and Le Duan later in Hanoi, on 1 March to Beijing on 11 February 1965, Kosygin nounced any suggestion that China was 1965, that he was “disappointed” with what asked the Chinese to help the United States subject to any degree of Soviet protection he had seen in Moscow, and that “the new to “find a way out of Vietnam.” Chinese and directly criticized Moscow for collabo- Soviet leaders are following nothing but leaders warned the Russians not to use the rating with Washington against China. The Khrushchevism.”80 Clearly Zhou wanted Vietnam issue to bargain with the Ameri- effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Vietnam the Hanoi leadership to side with the PRC in cans.83 Immediately after his return to Mos- soon manifested itself as Beijing and Mos- the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, and cow, Kosygin proposed an international con- cow wooed Hanoi to take sides in their Beijing’s extensive aid to the DRV was de- ference on Indochina. The Chinese con- ideological dispute. signed to draw Hanoi to China’s orbit. demned the Soviet move, asserting that the After the ouster of Khrushchev in Oc- The which suc- Russians wanted negotiation rather than con- tober 1964, the new leadership in the Krem- ceeded Khrushchev was more forthcoming tinued struggle in Vietnam and were con- lin invited the CCP to send a delegation to in support of the DRV. During his visit to spiring with the Americans to sell out Viet- 240 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN nam. But as R.B. Smith has observed, the because of China’s objection.85 happening in China. Chinese “may have oversimplified a Soviet The problem of succession preoccupied strategy which was... more subtle.... Domestic Need to Transform the Chinese Mao throughout the first half of the 1960s. Moscow’s diplomatic initiative of mid-Feb- State and Society: His acute awareness of impending death ruary may in fact have been timed to coin- Beginning in the late 1950s, Mao be- contributed to his sense of urgency. The cide with—rather than to constrain—the came increasingly apprehensive about the U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam made him Communist offensive in South Vietnam.”84 potential development of the Chinese revo- all the more eager to the put his own house in The Chinese criticism of the Soviet peace lution. He feared that his life work had order. He was afraid that if he did not nip in initiative must have confirmed the Ameri- created a political structure that would even- the bud what he perceived to be revisionist can image of China as a warmonger. tually betray his principles and values and tendencies and if he did not choose a proper The Sino-Soviet rivalry over Vietnam become as exploitative as the one it had successor, after his death China would fall certainly provided leaders in Hanoi an op- replaced. His worry about the future of into the hands of Soviet-like revisionists, portunity to obtain maximum support from China’s development was closely related to who would “change the color” of China, their two Communist allies, but we should his diagnosis of the degeneration of the abandon support for national liberation not overstate the case. Sometimes the ben- Soviet political system and to his fear about struggles, and appease U.S. imperialism. efits of the Sino-Soviet split for the DRV the effects of U.S. Secretary of State John Mao was a man who believed in dialectics. could be limited. For example, the Hanoi Foster Dulles’ strategy of “peaceful evolu- Negative things could be turned into posi- leadership sought a tion.”86 Mao believed that Dulles’ approach tive matters. The American presence in united front to assist their war effort. They to induce a peaceful evolution within the Indochina was a threat to the Chinese revo- wanted Moscow and Beijing to agree on socialist world was taking effect in the So- lution. But on the other hand, Mao found common support actions, particularly on a viet Union, given Khrushchev’s fascination that he could turn the U.S. threat into an single integrated logistical system. They with peaceful coexistence with the capitalist advantage, namely, he could use it to inten- failed to achieve this objective primarily West. Mao wanted to prevent that from sify domestic anti-imperialist feelings and

POLISH SECRET PEACE career as ambassador to Great Britain, the was simply to end the bloodshed in Indochina INITIATIVES IN VIETNAM United Nations and the United States, by moving the conflict from the battlefield Michalowski found himself out of favor to the negotiating table. Poland’s peace by Jerzy Michalowski with the government of Communist Party proposals did not attempt to specify the boss Edward Gierek. Removed from posi- terms of any final settlement. The focus was This summary was prepared by the author’s tions of responsibility, he was nonetheless on defining the principles and conditions son, Stefan Michalowski. given access to secret Ministry archives, and that would being the two sides together. In was able to prepare this 120-page report. the end, even this limited goal could not be This is the story of peace initiatives Eventually, after being expelled from the achieved. The author’s analysis of this fail- undertaken by Polish diplomats during the Party, he retired from the foreign service. ure constitutes perhaps the most interesting height of the Vietnam war. It was written by The manuscript was brought to the United and instructive part of the narrative. Both one of the main participants, Jerzy States shortly before his death in March of sides were committed to the military struggle. Michalowski, who was, at the time, a senior 1993. The Vietnamese had an almost absolute be- official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, and a Polish Secret Police Initiatives in Viet- lief in final victory. They were convinced of close friend and colleague of Foreign Minis- nam is terse, honest, and highly readable. the similarity of their situation to the previ- ter Adam Rapacki. The events took place The author describes events that he actually ous conflict with the French, and were will- during the years 1963-1966, when Poland took part in. Whenever possible, he supplies ing to absorb even the most horrendous was in a unique position to act as broker references from the Foreign Ministry ar- blows that the United States could inflict. between the U.S. and North Vietnam. While chives or from published material. He pro- Michalowski reserves his most critical com- formally allied with the latter, and subject to vides accounts of personal meetings with ments, however, for the Johnson Adminis- Soviet domination in numerous ways, Po- Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Leonid Brezhnev, tration. America’s “carrot and stick” policy land was able to steer a course of limited Ho Chi Minh, Phan Van Dong, Lyndon of cautious peace feelers combined with a independence in its internal and interna- Johnson, Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk and campaign of savage bombing raids was di- tional affairs. Polish diplomats were liked others. Whenever he feels that the historical sastrous, for it served only to strengthen the and respected in the West, where they main- record has been distorted, he does not hesi- enemy’s resolve, and deepened suspicions tained many useful contacts. Jerzy tate to put forth his own version. He takes about America’s true motives and inten- Michalowski, for instance, had been a mem- strong issue, for example, with the published tions. Time and again, during the most ber of the UN Control and Monitoring Com- memoirs of Henry Cabot Lodge. critical and sensitive diplomatic maneuvers, mission that was set up under the 1954 Michalowski’s perspective, both as the bombing raids turned the diplomats’ Geneva Accords following the French de- peace-maker and author, is that of a profes- carefully crafted arrangements into rubble. feat in Indochina. sional diplomat, rather than an official rep- In the late 1970s, after a distinguished resentative of a Soviet Bloc nation. His goal continuied on page 258 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 241 mobilize the population against revision- upon against the West. Thus Ho Chi Minh Soviet Union to support Vietnam. Miyamoto ists. Mao had successfully employed that avidly sought advice and weapons from first discussed the idea with a CCP delega- strategy during the Civil War against Jiang China. But sentiments of distrust were never tion led by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. Now he could far below the surface. Friction emerged Peng Zhen in Beijing. The two sides worked apply it again to prepare the masses for the between Chinese military advisers and Viet- out a communiqué that went part of the way Great Cultural Revolution that he was going namese commanders during the war against toward the “united action” proposal. But to launch. Accordingly, in the wake of the the French in the early 1950s.88 Vietnamese when Miyamoto, accompanied by Deng, Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Mao unleashed a distrust of the Chinese also manifested itself came to see Mao in Conghua, Guangdong, massive “Aid Vietnam and Resist America” when Chinese support troops entered Viet- the chairman burst into a rage, insisting that campaign across China.87 nam in the mid 1960s. the communiqué must stress a united front When Chinese troops went to Vietnam against both the United States and the Soviet Sino-Vietnamese Discord in 1965, they found themselves in an awk- Union. Miyamoto disagreed, so the Beijing ward position. On the one hand, the Viet- communiqué was torn up.93 Clearly, Mao In its heyday the Sino-Vietnamese namese leadership wanted their service in by this time had connected the criticism of friendship was described as “comrades plus fighting U.S. aircraft and in building and Soviet revisionism with the domestic struggle brothers,” but shortly after the conclusion of repairing roads, bridges, and rail lines. On against top party leaders headed by Liu, the Vietnam War the two communist states the other hand, the Vietnamese authorities Deng, and Peng. It was no wonder that these went to war with each other in 1979. How tried to minimize their influence by restrict- officials soon became leading targets for did it happen? In fact signs of differences ing their contact with the local population. attack when the Cultural Revolution swept had already emerged in the early days of When a Chinese medical team offered medi- across China a few months later. China’s intervention in the Vietnam con- cal service to save the life of a Vietnamese In the meantime the Vietnamese made flict. Two major factors complicated Sino- woman, Vietnamese officials blocked the their different attitude toward Moscow clear Vietnamese relations. One was the histori- effort.89 Informed of incidents like this, Mao by deciding to send a delegation to attend the cal pride and cultural sensitivity that the urged the Chinese troops in Vietnam to “re- 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnamese carried with them in dealing frain from being too eager” to help the Viet- the Soviet Union (CPSU), which was to be with the Chinese. The other was the effect namese.90 While the Chinese soldiers were held between March 29 and April 8 and of the Sino-Soviet split. in Vietnam, the Vietnamese media reminded which the Chinese had already decided to Throughout their history, the Vietnam- the public that in the past China had invaded . The Vietnamese were walking a ese have had a love-hate attitude toward Vietnam: the journal Historical Studies pub- tightrope at this time. On the one hand they their big northern neighbor. On the one lished articles in 1965 describing Vietnam- relied on the vital support of Soviet weap- hand, they were eager to borrow advanced ese resistance against Chinese imperial dy- ons; on the other hand, they did not want to institutions and technologies from China; nasties.91 damage their ties with China. Thus Le Duan on the other hand, they wanted to preserve The increasing animosity between and Nguyen Duy Trinh traveled from Hanoi their independence and cultural heritage. Beijing and Moscow and their efforts to win to Beijing on March 22, on their way to When they were internally weak and facing Hanoi’s allegiance put the Vietnamese in a Moscow. Although no sign of differences external aggression, they sought China’s dilemma. On the one hand, the change of appeared in public during Duan’s talks with help and intervention. When they were Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam from reluc- Zhou Enlai, China’s unhappiness about the unified and free from foreign threats, they tant to active assistance in late 1964 and early Vietnamese participation in the 23rd Con- tended to resent China’s influence. A pat- 1965 made the Vietnamese more unwilling gress can be imagined.94 tern seems to characterize Sino-Vietnamese to echo China’s criticisms of revisionism. In sum, the Beijing-Hanoi relationship relations: the Vietnamese would downplay On the other hand, they still needed China’s included both converging and diverging in- their inherent differences with the Chinese assistance and deterrence. Mao’s rejection terests. The two countries shared a common when they needed China’s assistance to of the Soviet proposal of a “united action” to ideological outlook and a common concern balance against a foreign menace; they would support Vietnam alienated leaders in Hanoi. over American intervention in Indochina, pay more attention to problems in the bilat- During Kosygin’s visit to Beijing in Febru- but leaders in Hanoi wanted to avoid the eral relations with China when they were ary 1965, he proposed to Mao and Zhou that danger of submitting to a dependent rela- strong and no longer facing an external Beijing and Moscow end their mutual criti- tionship with China. So long as policymakers threat. cisms and cooperate on the Vietnam issue. in Hanoi and Beijing shared the common This pattern certainly applies to the But Mao dismissed Kosygin’s suggestion, goal of ending the U.S. presence in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship during the asserting that China’s argument with the region, such divergent interests could be 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The Soviet Union would continue for another subordinated to their points of agreement. Vietnamese Communists during this period 9,000 years.92 But the turning point came in 1968, when confronted formidable enemies, the French During February and March, 1966, a Sino-Soviet relations took a decisive turn for and the Americans, in their quest for na- Japanese Communist Party delegation led by the worse just as Washington made its first tional unification. When the Soviet Union Secretary General Miyamoto Kenji, visited tentative moves toward disengagement from was reluctant to help, China was the only China and the DRV, with the purpose of South Vietnam. In the new situation, source of support that Hanoi could count encouraging “joint action” by China and the Beijing’s strategic interests began to differ 242 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN fundamentally from those of Hanoi. Whereas supply of weapons to Hanoi in 1962, had population between 500,000 and one mil- the Chinese now regarded the United States helped precipitate the U.S. escalation of the lion. Most of these cities are located in the as a potential counterbalance against the war) and adopted significant measures at coastal areas and are very vulnerable to air Soviet Union, their Vietnamese comrades home to prepare for war. China’s assistance strikes. No effective mechanisms exist at continued to see Washington as the most to the DRV, to use John Garver’s words, the moment to organize anti-air works, evacu- dangerous enemy. After the withdrawal of “was Mao’s way of rolling back U.S. con- ate urban population, guarantee the continu- U.S. troops from Vietnam and the unifica- tainment in Asia.”96 From the viewpoint of ation of production, and eliminate the dam- tion of the country, Hanoi’s bilateral dis- ideology, China’s support for North Viet- ages of an air strike, especially the of putes with Beijing over Cambodia, a territo- nam served Mao’s purposes of demonstrat- a nuclear strike. rial disagreement in the South China Sea, ing to the Third World that Beijing was a (3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and the treatment of Chinese nationals in spokesman for national liberation struggles and harbors are situated near big and me- Vietnam came to the fore, culminating in a and of competing with Moscow for leader- dium-size cities and can easily be destroyed direct clash in 1979. ship in the international communist move- when the enemy attacks cities. No measures ment. have been taken to protect these transporta- Was China Bluffing During the War? If the actions recommended by Sum- tion points against an enemy attack. In the mers had been taken by Washington in Viet- early stage of war, they can become para- The fact that Beijing did not openly nam, there would have been a real danger of lyzed. acknowledge its sizable presence in North a Sino-American war with dire consequences (4) All reservoirs have a limited capac- Vietnam raised questions about the justifi- for the world. In retrospect, it appears that ity to release water in an emergency. Among cation for Washington’s restraint in U.S. Johnson had drawn the correct lesson from the country’s 232 large reservoirs with a conduct of war, both at the time and in later the Korean War and had been prudent in his water holding capacity between 100 million years. Harry G. Summers, the most promi- approach to the Vietnam conflict. and 350 billion cubic meter, 52 are located nent of revisionist critics of President near major transportation lines and 17 close Johnson’s Vietnam policy, asserts that the * * * * * to important cities. There are also many United States drew a wrong lesson from the small and medium-size reservoirs located Korean War: “Instead of seeing that it was NEW CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON near important political, economic, and mili- possible to fight and win a limited war in THE VIETNAM WAR tary areas and key transportation lines. Asia regardless of Chinese intervention, We believe that the problems mentioned we...took counsel of our fears and accepted Translated by above are important ones directly related to as an article of faith the proposition that we Qiang Zhai the whole armed forces, to the whole people, should never again become involved in a and to the process of a national defense war. land war in Asia. In so doing we allowed our Document 1: Report by the War Depart- We propose that the State Council organize fears to become a kind of self-imposed de- ment of the General Staff, 25 April 1964. a special committee to study and adopt, in terrent and surrendered the initiative to our accordance with the possible conditions of enemies.” Summers contends that “whether Deputy Chief of Staff Yang97: the national economy, practical and feasible the Soviets or the Chinese ever intended measures to guard against an enemy surprise intervention is a matter of conjecture,” and According to your instruction, we have attack. that the United States allowed itself “to be made a special investigation on the question Please tell us whether our report is ap- bluffed by China throughout most of the of how our country’s economic construction propriate. war.” He cites Mao’s rejection of the Soviet should prepare itself for a surprise attack by 1965 proposal for a joint action to support the enemy. From the several areas that we The War Department of the General Staff, Vietnam and Mao’s suspicions of Moscow’s have looked at, many problems emerge, and April 25, 1964. plot to draw China into a war with the United some of them are very serious. States as evidence for the conclusion that (1) The industry is over concentrated. [Source: Dangde wenxian98 (Party Docu- Mao was more fearful of Moscow than Wash- About 60 percent of the civil machinery ments) 3 (1995), 34-35.] ington and, by implication, he was not seri- industry, 50 percent of the chemical indus- ous about China’s threats to intervene to try, and 52 percent of the national defense help Hanoi.95 industry (including 72.7 percent of the air- Document 2: Mao Zedong’s Comments Was China not serious in its threats to craft industry, 77.8 percent of the on the War Department’s April 25 Re- go to war with the United States in Indochina? industry, 59 percent of the radio industry, port, 12 August 1964. As the preceding discussion has shown, and 44 percent of the weapons industry) are Beijing perceived substantial security and concentrated in 14 major cities with over one To Comrades Luo Ruiqing99 and Yang ideological interests in Vietnam. From the million population. Chengwu: security perspective, Mao and his associates (2) Too many people live in cities. were genuinely concerned about the Ameri- According to the census conducted at the This report is excellent. We must care- can threat from Vietnam (although they did end of 1962, 14 cities in the country have a fully study and gradually implement it. The not realize that their own actions, such as the population over one million, and 20 cities a State Council has established a special com- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 243 mittee on this question. Has it started its million population. (g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be re- work? (b) For those currently on-going con- sponsible for the protection of city buildings struction projects in the First Front and par- and government departments and institu- Mao Zedong ticularly in the fifteen big cities, except those tions. August 12. that can be completed and put into effective We will spend the months of September operation next year or the year after, all the and October investigating the various as- [Source: Ibid., 33.] rest must be reduced in size, undergo no pects and produce detailed plans that can be expansion, and be concluded as soon as pos- implemented gradually. The special com- sible. mittee will synthesize the plans before sub- Document 3: “Report on How Our (c) For existing old enterprises, espe- mitting them to the Central Committee for Country’s Economic Construction cially those in cities with high industrial inclusion in the general plan for the next year Should Prepare Itself Against an Enemy concentration, we must remove them or some and in the Third Five-Year Plan. Surprise Attack” by Li Fuchun100, Bo of their workshops. Particularly for military (3) We propose to revive the People’s Yibo101, and Luo Ruiqing102, 19 August and machinery enterprises, we must break Anti-Air Committee. Premier104 should 1964. them in two parts if possible, and shift one still serve as Director and Comrade Xie part to the Third and Second Fronts. If we Fuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade Luo Chairman103 and the Central Committee: can remove them as a whole, we must do that Ruiqing was Secretary General originally). with careful planning and in steps. The Ministry of Public Safety will be re- In accordance with Chairman’s com- (d) Beginning in next year, no new large sponsible for the daily work of the commit- ments on the General Staff War and medium-size reservoirs will be built. tee. Department’s report of how our country’s (e) For key national universities and We should restore the Planning Office economic construction should prepare itself colleges, scientific research and planning for the Construction of Underground Rail- for a surprise attack by the enemy, we have institutes in the First Front, if they can be way in Beijing and carry out an active prepa- gathered comrades with responsibility in removed, we must relocate them to the Third ration for the building of underground rail- these areas for a meeting. All of us agree and Second Fronts with careful planning. If way in Beijing. In the meantime, we should that Chairman’s comments and the War they can not be removed, we must break consider the construction of underground Department’s report are extremely impor- them into two parts. railway in Shanghai and Shenyang. The tant. We must pay serious attention to and (f) From now on, all new projects, in Ministry of Railway will be responsible for do our best on such an important issue whatever Front they will be located, must this task. concerning our country’s strategic defense. comply with the principle of dispersion, close- (4) If the central leadership approves The meeting has decided: ness to mountains, and concealment. They the above suggestions, we propose to dis- must not be concentrated in certain cities or tribute our report along with the General (1) To establish a special committee on areas. Staff War Department report as well as this case within the State Council. We We have divided labor to deal with the Chairman’s comments as guidelines to all suggest that the committee consist of thir- above work: Party Bureaus, to all provincial, municipal, teen people including Li Fuchun, Li (a) The State Economic Commission and district Party committees, and to all Xiannian, , Bo Yibo, Luo and the State Planning Commission will be Party committees within government minis- Ruiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Zhang responsible for the arrangement of the indus- tries. Jichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, , trial and transportation systems. Please inform us whether our report is Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchun (b) The Ministry of Railway will be correct. serves as Director, and Bo Yibo and Luo responsible for preparation measures con- Ruiqing Deputy Directors. cerning railroad junctions. Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Luo (2) In addition to the four areas men- (c) The Office of National Defense In- Ruiqing tioned by the War Department, our prepara- dustry will be responsible for the arrange- August 19, 1964. tion measures also need to include universi- ment of national defense industry. ties and colleges, scientific research and (d) The General Staff will be respon- [Source: Ibid., 33-34.] planning institutions, warehouses, govern- sible for the division of the First, Second, and ment departments and institutions as well as Third Fronts on the national level and for the civil shelters in cities and mines. We must arrangement of national defense fortifica- Document 4: Zhou Enlai’s Conversation follow Chairman’s principle of “careful tions and war preparation mobilizations. with Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 2 study and gradual implementation” in con- (e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be re- April 1965. ducting our investigation into various areas sponsible for preparation measures concern- as early as possible and pay attention to the ing reservoirs. (1) China will not take the initiative to pro- following issues. (f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and Han voke a war (with the United States). (2) (a) All new construction projects will Guang will be responsible for the arrange- China means what it says and will honor the not be placed in the First Front, especially ment of universities and colleges, scientific international obligations it has undertaken. not in the fifteen big cities with over a research and planning institutes. (3) China is prepared. China’s policies are 244 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN both prudent and prepared.... (4) If the Ameri- the other hand we should realize that the number of enemy troops invades China and can madmen carry out an extensive bomb- enemy lacks reasons and justifications in cuts us into parts will the leadership go to the ing, China will not sit still and wait to be sending troops. If the enemy invades us mountains. It will not do that when China is killed. If they come from the sky, we will without our attacking it first, the enemy’s not cut into parts. For instance, if the enemy take action on the ground. Bombing means morale cannot be high. This will decide the does not occupy cities like Xian and war, and war will have no boundaries. It is difference between a just and an unjust war. Tongguan, Shaanxi109 will not create a impossible for the United States to resolve In addition, there is the issue of increas- Shaanan Military region and a Shaanbei the issue of war simply by relying on a policy ing the size of troops. In order to build military region. The leadership will decide of bombing. fortifications, we can organize some engi- on this matter after the enemy has invaded, neer units. After working for a period and and there is time to do that. There is also time [Source: The Diplomatic History Research completing fortifications, they can be dis- to mobilize troops. At present, we can begin Office of the People’s Republic of China missed. Troops engaged in agricultural pro- the organization of the militia....(the rest of Foreign Ministry, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao duction and divisions on semi war alert the speech is about how to organize the huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Chronology should also construct fortifications. Produc- militia). of Zhou Enlai’s Major Diplomatic Activi- tion troops are busy with agricultural work, ties, 1949-1975) (Beijing: World Knowl- but during slack seasons they should spend [Source: Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.] edge Press, 1993), 445.] most of their time building fortifications. This means that they can work on fortifica- tions for half a year in North China and for Document 6: Mao’s Conversation with Document 5: Liu Shaoqi’s Speech to the four to five months in the Yangtze valley. If the Party and Government Delegation of Central Military Commission war plan- war begins and we have to expand troops, we the Democratic Republic of Vietnam110 , ning meeting on 19 May 1965. just need a mobilization. This matter will be 20 October 1965. easy. At the moment, we need to do a good The enemy has many contradictions, job in organizing militia forces. You are fighting an excellent war. Both weaknesses, and difficulties. Its problems What we cannot have time to prepare the South and the North are fighting well. are no less than ours. If our preparations are when war begins includes fortification con- The people of the whole world, including faster and better, war can be delayed. The struction, third fronts, bases as well as com- those who have already awakened and those enemy will find it difficult to invade. If we munications, a reconnaissance network, and who have not awakened, are supporting you. make excellent preparations, the enemy may new technology. We must pay attention to The current world is not a peaceful one. It is even dare not to invade. If it does not invade, these issues. We should start work on the big not you Vietnamese who are invading the we will not fight out. Such a prospect is not Third Front, the small Third Front, material United States, neither are the Chinese who impossible. But we must work hard to storage, state-of-the-art technology, scien- are waging an aggressive war against the achieve this goal. We must build the big tific investigation, and research on new weap- United States. Third Front and the small Third Front and do ons. If we delay work on these matters, we Not long ago the Japanese Asahi a good job on every front, including the will find ourselves unprepared later. To do Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun published atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long- these things needs time. several reports filed by Japanese correspon- distance missiles. Under such circumstances, As to the issues of the size of troops, the dents from South Vietnam. U.S. newspa- even if the United States has bases in Japan, number of military regions, and a unified pers described these reports as unfair, thus Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big leadership between the local civilian gov- provoking a debate. I am not referring to the targets out on the sea and are easy for us to ernment and the military, we can have time Japanese Communist newspaper, Akahata. strike. We should develop as early as pos- to deal with them when war begins. Some of I am talking about Japanese bourgeois news- sible new technology to attack aircraft and the issues will be dealt with only after the papers. This shows that the direction of the warships so that we can knock out one en- enemy has invaded our country. In case that media is not favorable to the United States. emy ship with a single missile. Our Red Flag the enemy occupies the Longhai Railroad,106 Recently the demonstration by the Ameri- 1 and Red Flag 2105 can shoot down the or the Yangtze valley, or the Jinghan Rail- can people against the American enemy’s high-altitude airplanes. If we have road107, or the Jinpu Railroad108, our coun- government’s Vietnam policy has devel- assurance to shoot down high-altitude air- try will then be divided into sections. If that oped. At the moment it is primarily Ameri- planes, we can have more assurance to knock happens, we have to practice a unified lead- can intellectuals who are making trouble. down low-altitude ones. The enemy’s ership of the party, the government and the But all this are external conditions. In strength lies in its navy, air force, atomic army. But this will be decided at that time, fact what will solve the problem is the war bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy not now. With trains and airplanes at its you are fighting. Of course you can conduct and air force has its limits. If the enemy disposal, the enemy will not do things ac- negotiations. In the past you held negotia- sends ground troops to invade China, we are cording to our methods. Only when that tions in Geneva. But the American did not not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we time comes will our leadership go to moun- honor their promise after the negotiations. should be prepared for the enemy to come tains. At present, the leadership must live in We have had negotiations with both Chiang from all directions, including a joint inva- the city because it will be inconvenient if it Kai-shek and the United States. Rusk said sion against China by many countries. On does not live in the city. Only when a large that the United States has had most negotia- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 245 tions with China. But we stick to one point: naval bases. The Algerian revolution is a (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong) the United States must withdraw from Tai- national democratic revolution led by the (Beijing: Central Documentary Press and wan, and after that all other problems can be bourgeoisie. Our two parties are Commu- World Knowledge Press, 1994), 570-573.] easily resolved. The United States does not nist. In terms of mobilizing the masses and accept this point. China and the United carrying out people’s war, our two parties are States have been negotiating for ten years different from Algeria. Document 7: Mao’s Conversation with and we are still repeating the same old I talked about people’s war in my article. Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968. words. We will not give up that point. The Some of the statements refer to specific prob- United States once wanted to exchange press lems of ten to twenty years ago. Now you Because there has been no battle to fight delegations with us. They argued that when have encountered some new conditions. recently, you want to negotiate with the we began with minor issues, we could better Many of your methods are different from our United States. It is all right to negotiate, but settle major problems later. We contended methods in the past. We should have differ- it is difficult to get the United States to that only by starting from major issues could ences. We also learn about war gradually. At withdraw through negotiations. The United minor problems be easily resolved. the beginning we lost battles. We have not States also wants to negotiate with you be- You withdrew your armed forces from done as smoothly as you have. cause it is in a dilemma. It has to deal with the South in accordance with the Geneva I have not noticed what issues you have problems of three regions: the first is the Accords. As a result, the enemy began to negotiated with the United States. I only pay Americas—the United States, the second is kill people in the South, and you revived attention to how you fight the Americans and Europe, and the third is Asia. In the last few armed struggle. At first you adopted politi- how you drive the Americans out. You can years the United States has stationed its cal struggle as a priority supplemented by have negotiations at certain time[s], but you major forces in Asia and has created an armed struggle. We supported you. In the should not lower your tones. You should imbalance. In this regard American capital- second stage when you were carrying out raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared ists who have investments in Europe are political and armed struggles simulta- that the enemy may deceive you. dissatisfied. Also throughout its history the neously, we again supported you. In the We will support you until your final United States has always let other countries third stage when you are pursuing armed victory. The confidence in victory comes fight first before it jumps in at halfway. It is struggle as a priority supplemented by po- from the fighting you have done and from the only after World War Two that the United litical struggle, we still support you. In my struggle you have made. For instance, one States has begun to take the lead in fighting, view, the enemy is gradually escalating the experience we have is that the Americans can first in the Korean War and then in the war; so are you. In the next two and three be fought. We obtained this experience only Vietnam War. In Vietnam the United States years you may encounter difficulties. But it after fighting the Americans. The Ameri- is taking the lead, but it is followed by only is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need cans can be fought and can be defeated. We a small number of other countries. Whether to take this possibility into consideration. should demolish the myth that the Ameri- the war is a special war or a limited war, the So long as you have made all kinds of cans cannot be fought and cannot be de- United States is totally devoted to it. Now it preparations, even if the most difficult situ- feated. Both of our two parties have many cannot afford to pay attention to other coun- ation emerges, you will not find it too far experiences. Both of us have fought the tries. Its troops in Europe, for example, are from your initial considerations. Isn’t this a Japanese. You have also fought the French. complaining, saying that there is a shortage good argument? Therefore there are two At the moment you are fighting the Ameri- of manpower and that experienced soldiers essential points: the first is to strive for the cans. and commanders have been removed and most favorable situation, and the second to The Americans have trained and edu- better equipment has been relocated. The prepare for the worst. cated the Vietnamese people. They have United States has also redeployed its troops The Algerian experience can serve as a educated us and the people of the whole from Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia. reference for you. Possibly in the fourth or world. In my opinion it is not good without Did not the United States claim that it has a fifth year of their war, some Algerian lead- the Americans. Such an educator is indis- population of two hundred million? But it ers became worried. At that time, their pensable. In order to defeat the Americans, cannot endure the war. It has dispatched Prime Minister Arbas came to talk with us. we must learn from the Americans. Marx’s only several hundred thousand troops. There They said that Algeria had a very small works do not teach us how to fight the Ameri- is a limit to its troops. population of ten million. A million had cans. Nor do Lenin’s books write about how After fighting for over a dozen years already died. While the enemy had an army to fight the Americans. We primarily learn you should not think about only your own of 800,000, their own regular forces pos- from the Americans. difficulties. You should look at the enemy’s sessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops. The Chinese people and the people of difficulties. It has been twenty-three years To add the guerrillas, their total forces were the whole world support you. The more since Japan’s surrender in 1945, but your less than 100,000. I told them at the time that friends you have, the better you are. country still exists. Three imperialist coun- the enemy was bound to defeat and that their tries have committed aggression against you: population would increase. Later, after ne- [Source: The People’s Republic of China Japan, France, and the United States. But gotiations France began to withdraw its Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Commu- your country has not only survived but also troops. Now it has completed the with- nist Party Central Documentary Research developed. drawal, only leaving behind a few small Office, comp., Mao Zedong Waijiao wenxuan Of course imperialism wants to fight. 246 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

One purpose for its war is to put out fire. A Asia. At first I did not believe that the United tions for another two years and fails to solve fire has started in your country, and imperi- States would attack North Vietnam. Later the problem, he will have difficulties in alism wants to put out that fire. The second the United States bombed North Vietnam, winning another term of presidency. purpose is to make money through produc- proving my words wrong. Now the United One more point. It is the puppet regime ing munitions. To put out fire they must States has stopped bombing. My words are in South Vietnam who is afraid of the Na- produce fire-extinguishing machines, which correct again. Maybe the United States will tional Liberation Front of South Vietnam. will bring about profits. Every year the resume bombing, proving my words wrong Some people in the United States have United States expends over 30 billion dol- a second time. But eventually my words will pointed out that the really effective govern- lars in your country. prove correct: the United States has to stop ment popular among the South Vietnamese It has been an American custom not to bombing. Therefore I believe that it is all people is not the Saigon government but the fight a long war. The wars they have fought right for you to make several contingency Liberation Front. This is not a statement average about four to five years. The fire in plans. attributed to someone in the U.S. Congress. your country cannot be put out. On the In sum, in the past years the American It is reported by journalists, but the name of contrary, it has spreaded. Capitalists in the army has not invaded North Vietnam. The the speaker was not identified. The state- United States are divided into factions. When United States has neither blockaded ment was attributed to a so-called U.S. gov- this faction makes more profit and that fac- Haiphong nor bombed the Hanoi city itself. ernment individual. The statement raises a tion make less profit, an imbalance in booty- The United States has reserved a method. At question: Who represents the government sharing will occur and trouble will begin one point it claimed that it would practice a with real prestige in South Vietnam? Nguyen domestically. These contradictions should “hot pursuit.” But when your aircraft flew Van Thieu or Nguyen Huu Tho? Therefore be exploited. Those monopolized capital- over our country, the United States did not although the United States publicly praises ists who have made less money are unwill- carry out a “hot pursuit.” Therefore, the Nguyen Van Thieu, saying that he will not ing to continue the war. This contradiction United States has bluffed. It has never go to Paris to attend the negotiations, it in can be detected in election speeches made by mentioned the fact that your aircraft have fact realizes that problems can not be solved the two factions. Especially the American used our airfields. Take another example, if the National Liberation Front of South journalist Walter Lippmann has published China had so many people working in your Vietnam does not participate in the negotia- an article recently, warning not to fall into country. The United States knew that, but tions. another trap. He says that the United States had never mentioned it, as if such a thing did has already fallen into a trap in Vietnam and not exist. As to the remaining people sent by [Source: Ibid., 580-583.] that the current problem is how to find ways China to your country who are no longer to climb out of that trap. He is afraid that the needed, we can withdraw them. Have you 1. Using recent Chinese sources, Chen Jian’s “China’s United States may fall into other traps. There- discussed this issue? If the United States Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,” The China Quarterly 142 (June 1995), 357-387, provides an infor- fore your cause is promising. comes again, we will send people to you as mative and insightful analysis of China’s decision to In 1966, I had a conversation with Chair- well. Please discuss this issue to see which assist Hanoi during the Vietnam War, but he does not man Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou. At that Chinese units you want to keep and which address the historiographical controversy of whether time, the United States had already resumed units you do not want to keep. Keep the units there was a “strategic debate” in Beijing in 1965. Fresh materials released in China in 1994 and 1995 shed new attack on North Vietnam, but had not re- that are useful to you. We will withdraw the light on this issue. newed bombing. I said that the United States units that are of no use to you. We will send 2. See Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model: might end the war that year because it was an them to you if they are needed in the future. Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, American election year. No matter which This is like the way your airplanes have used 1950-1954,” The Journal of Military History 57 (Octo- ber 1993), 698-715; idem., “China and the Geneva president came to power, he would encoun- Chinese airfields: use them if you need and Conference of 1954,” The China Quarterly 129 (March ter the problem of whether the United States not use them if you do not need. This is the 1992), 103-122; Chen Jian, “China and the First should continue the war or withdraw now. I way to do things. Indochina War, 1950-1954,” The China Quarterly 133 believed that the difficulties that the United I am in favor of your policy of fighting (March 1993), 85-110. 3. Guo Ming, ed., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian States faced would increase if it continued while negotiating. We have some comrades [The Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations over the the war. Countries in all of Europe did not who are afraid that you may by taken in by Last Forty Years] (Nanning: Guangxi People’s Press, participate in the war. This situation was the Americans. I think you will not. Isn’t 1991), 65. The contributors in this volume are from the different from that of the Korean War. Japan this negotiation the same as fighting? We Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, a major research center on Sino-Vietnamese relations in China. probably would not enter the war. It might can learn experience and know patterns 4. Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., Zhonghua renmin lend some help economically because it could through fighting. Sometimes one cannot gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949-1956 [A Diplomatic His- make money by producing ammunition. I avoid being taken in. Just as you have said, tory of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1956] think the Americans overestimated their the Americans do not keep their words. (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 94; Hoang Van Hoan, Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geming strength in the past. Now the United States Johnson once said publicly that even agree- huiyilu [A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s is repeating its past practice by overstretch- ments sometimes could not be honored. But Revolutionary Reminiscences] (Beijing: Liberation ing its forces. It is not just us who make this things must have their laws. Take your Army Press, 1987), 267. argument. Nixon has also said so. The negotiations as an example, are you going to 5. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi United States has stretched its forces not negotiate for a hundred years? Our Premier guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Histori- only in the Americas and Europe but also in has said that if Nixon continues the negotia- cal Facts about the Role of the Chinese Military Advi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 247 sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and Resist Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, 33. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History France] (Beijing: Liberation army Press, 1990), 126- comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949- Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong 127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selected 1975, 313-314. Remarks by Mao and Zhou are taken dashiji, 1949-1975, 445; Xue and Pei, Dangdai Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and as mem- from Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67. Zhongguo waijiao, 160-161. bers of the Chinese delegation for the forthcoming 17. Cong Jin, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue [Years of Twist- 34. Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingjiao, chief comp., Dangdai discussions during Giap’s second visit. See Mao to Liu ing Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press, zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Work Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16 1989), 500-502. The author is a party history researcher of the Contemporary Chinese Armed Forces] (Beijing: October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Re- at the Chinese National Defense University. See also Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 1:539-40; Li and search Office, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao Zhu Zhongli, Liming yu wanxia: Wang Jiaxiang wenxue Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, [Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the zhuanji [Dawn and Dusk: A Literary Biography of 415; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69-70; PRC] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419. Wang Jiaxiang] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986), Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis- Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had served 394-396. The author is the wife of Wang Jiaxiang. tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31. as China’s chief military advisor to the Vietminh in 18. Ma Qibin, Chen Wenbin, et al. Zhongguo 35. Han and Tan, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi 1950, was not mentioned during Giap’s first visit; gongchandang zhizheng sishinian, 1949-1989 [The Forty gongzuo, 539-540; Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 44; evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chinese Years of the Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949- Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis- team to talk with Giap during his second trip. 1989] (Beijing: CCP Party History Material Press, 1989), tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31. 6. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. 213; Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 502; Zhu, Liming yu 36. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161. 7. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese wanxia, 396-399. 37. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 45. Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi 19. Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., 38. Ibid. 35, 44; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi, 142-143. Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese de renmin jiefangjun, 422. R. B. Smith also mentions 8. During the Vietnamese land reform, an excessive Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, Ho’s meeting with Mao in Changsha. He dates the of so-called landlords and rich peasants 1990), 159; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, meeting at May 16-17. His source is the diary of Ho’s occurred, creating serious resentments among the peas- 69; Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [A Factual personal secretary. See R. B. Smith, An International ant population against the party. Hoang, Canghai yisu, Record of Assistance to Vietnam against the United History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of 279-285. Truong Chinh was often regarded by West- States] (Beijing: International Culture Press, 1990), 25. a Limited War, 1965-66 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, ern observers as a member of the “pro-Chinese” wing Wang Xiangen was a secretary at the headquarters of the 1991), 139. of the VWP. PLA Engineering Corps in the late 1970s and is cur- 39. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 46-48. According to 9. Pei, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949- rently working with the PLA General Staff. His book Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, to facilitate the transporta- 1956, 94. contains much useful data on the role of Chinese army tion of materials to Vietnam, Beijing in 1965 also 10. For Zhou’s visit to Hanoi, see the PRC Foreign engineer troops in Vietnam. established a special leadership group in charge of Ministry’s Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., 20. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. transportation to Vietnam. Luo Ruiqing was director. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [A 21. Ibid. Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Yang Chengwu, Li Tianyou, Chronology of Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities, 22. Li Ke, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Fang Yi, , and Liu Xiao were vice-directors. Li 1949-1975] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” Junshi and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 169-170; Huang Zheng, Hu Zhiming he Zhongguo [Ho lishi [Military History] 4 (1989), 30. This bi-monthly 413. Chi Minh and China] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, journal is published by the Chinese People’s Revolu- 40. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin 1987), 182-183. Zhou’s quote is taken from Han tionary Military Museum in Beijing. jiefangjun, 417. Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of 23. Interview with a Chinese military history researcher, 41. Quoted in Smith, An International History of the Modern China, 1898-1976 (New York: Hill and Wang, Beijing, 13 July 1995. Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited 1994), 260. 24. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming War, 1965-66, 171. According to Luu Doan Huynh, 11. Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The People’s Liberation from the International Relations Institute of the Minis- Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 102-104. Army during the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: CCP try of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Beijing informed 12. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. Ac- Historical Materials Press, 1989), 409. Hanoi in June 1965 that it would not be able to defend cording to a recent study by William J. Duiker, Le 25. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The North Vietnam from U.S. air attacks. Quoted in Allen Duan as General Secretary was “a powerful advocate United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 2nd Whiting, “China’s Role in the Vietnam War,” in Jayne of an aggressive strategy to achieve national reunifica- ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 117-119. Werner and David Hunt, eds., The American War in tion with the South.” At the Fifteenth Plenum of the 26. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia VWP held at the end of 1958, the Central Committee 27. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Program, 1993), 71-76. adopted a new policy which advocated a return to Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng of 42. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161; Guo, revolutionary war to unify the South. But the new line the CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 70. also included the ambivalence that had shaped atti- Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang 43. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese tudes in Hanoi from the time of the Geneva Confer- Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; and Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31; ence. Though urging a return to revolutionary war, the Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, and Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69. For a Central Committee report, which was not issued until Phoumi Vongvochit of the Lao People’s Revolutionary description of the Chinese use of the Cambodian port of May 1959, asserted that the “political strength of the Party. The PRC Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic History Sihanoukville to send military supplies to the National masses” would remain the principal from of struggle, Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong Liberation Front in South Vietnam between 1966- although it would now be supplemented by low-level dashiji, 1949-1975, 413. 1967, see Kang Daisha, “My Days in Cambodia,” in military operations conducted by local guerrilla forces 28. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin Cheng Xiangjun, ed., Nu waijiaoguan [Women Diplo- and village self-defense units of the type that had been jiefangjun, 408. mats] (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1995), 482-483. employed during the August 1945 Revolution. Will- 29. Chen, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War,” Kang Daisha is the wife of Chen Shuliang, who was the iam J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Con- 364. Chinese ambassador to Cambodia between 1962-1967. flict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 30. Allen S. Whiting, “How We Almost Went to War For a detailed treatment of Chinese aid to the DRV 1994), 235. It is possible that China’s advice for cau- with China,” Look, 29 April 1969, p. 76; Melvin Gurtov between 1965-1969, see Chen, “China’s Involvement tion in waging revolutionary struggle in the South and Hwang Byong-moo, China Under Threat: The in the Vietnam War,” 371-380. contributed to the ambivalence in Hanoi’s policy. Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns 44. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 71. 13. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict Hopkins University Press, 1980), 160-161. 45. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deter- in Indochina, 265. 31. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese rence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of 14. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67. Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 30. Michigan Press, 1975), 186; idem., “Forecasting Chi- 15. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict 32. Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat: The Poli- nese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,” in Indochina, 266. tics of Strategy and Diplomacy, 162; Herring, America’s in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., 16. For Pham Van Dong’s visit to China, see the PRC Longest War, 128-131. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: 248 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Clarendon Press, 1994), 506-523. “Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965- 16. 46. John W. Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Viet- 66,” The China Quarterly 49 (January-March 1972), 71. Mao Zedong, “Talks with the American Correspon- nam War,” Parameters 22 (Spring 1992), 73-85, quo- 32-75. dent ,” in Selected Works of Mao tation on 75. 65. Barry Naughton has made a similar criticism. Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 47. Sun Dongsheng, “The Great Transformation in the Naughton, “The Third Front,” 370-371. 4:99. Strategic Planning of Our Country’s Economic Con- 66. Luo Ruiqing, “The People Defeated Japanese Fas- 72. For a recent study of China’s policy toward Angola struction,” Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 3 cism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism and Mozambique, see Steven F. Jackson, “China’s (1995), 42-48. Sun’s indirect quotation of Mao’s re- Too,” Peking Review, 3 September 1965, 31-39; Lin Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and marks is on p. 44. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War,” ibid., Mozambique, 1961-93,” The China Quarterly 143 (June journal published by the CCP Central Documentary 9-30. 1995), 387-422. Research Office and the Central Archives. It often 67. Xu Yan, Junshijia Mao Zedong [Military Strategist 73. On Beijing’s attempt to divide the Soviet-led bloc, contains important party documents. Sun Dongsheng is Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1995), see the putative memoirs of Enver Hoxha, Reflections a researcher at the Central Documentary Research 149; Huang Yao, Sanci danan busi de Luo Ruiqing on China, 2 vols., (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1979). For an Office. Dajiang [Senior General Luo Ruiqing who Survived overview of Chinese-Albanian relations, see Fan 48. Mao’s conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 Three Deaths] (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 1994), Chengzuo, “The ‘Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Win- November 1968, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the 263, 265, 270-271. This book is based on sources from ter’ in Chinese-Albanian Relations,” Waijiao xueyuan Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao the Central Archives, the PLA General Staff Archives, xuebao [Journal of Foreign Affairs College] 3 (1993), Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Works and the Ministry of Public Security Archives. 50-52. of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press and It is possible that the two articles published in Luo 74. Mao’s conversation with the Chilean Journalist World Knowledge Press, 1994), 582. and Lin’s names were written in response to Soviet Delegation, 23 June 1964, in the PRC Foreign Ministry 49. Yuan Dejin, “The Evolution of Mao Zedong’s arguments on war and peace. On 30 January 1965, Mao and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Theory of War and Peace since the Founding of New asked Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, Deputy Director Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 529-533. China,” Junshi lishi [Military History] 4 (1994), 36. of the Combat Department of the General Staff, to find 75. Mao’s talk with delegates from Asia, Africa, and 50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, develop- a person well versed in political and military issues to Oceania on 9 July 1964, in ibid, 534-539. These del- ment and consequences of the Third Front, see Barry prepare a commentary on the book egates came to China after participating in Pyongyang Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization edited by Soviet Chief of Staff V. D. Sokolovsky and in the Second Asian Economic Forum. in the Chinese Interior,” The China Quarterly 115 published by the Soviet Defense Ministry’s Military 76. For a good discussion of anti-imperialism in Chi- (September 1988), 351-386. Press in 1962. See Mao to Yang Chengwu and Lei nese foreign policy, see Edward Friedman, “Anti-Im- 51. For the complete text of the report, see Dangde Yingfu, 30 January 1965, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, perialism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S. wenxian 3 (1995), 34-35. 6:402. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Rela- 52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in ibid, 33. 68. For a detailed discussion of the Luo-Lin dispute, see tions in the Post Cold War Era, 3rd ed. (Boulder: 53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19 Huang, Sanci danan busi de Luo Riqing Dajiang, Westview Press, 1994), 60-74. August 1964, see ibid., 33-34. chapters 24-34. Allen Whiting attempts to establish a 77. Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat, 161. 54. Mao’s remarks are quoted in Sun, “The Great causal relationship between Luo’s purge and China’s 78. For a detailed, first-hand account of Zhou Enlai’s Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our foreign policy change in mid-1965. Citing the Viet- visit to Moscow, see Yu Zhan, “An Unusual Visit: Country’s Economic Construction,” 45. namese claim that China decided in June 1965 to Remembering Zhou Enlai’s Last Visit to the Soviet 55. Sun, “The Great Transformation in the Strategic provide no air cover for North Vietnam, Whiting argues Union,” Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 2 (1992), Planning of Our Country’s Economic Construction,” that this timing dovetails with a major personnel change 85-91. It is also included in the Foreign Ministry Dip- 44. in the Chinese leadership: “At some point between May lomatic History Research Office, comp., XinZhongguo 56. Naughton, “The Third Front,” 368. and September Luo Ruiqing fell from office, after waijiao fengyun [Episodes of New China’s Diplomacy] 57. Mao’s conversation with He Long, Luo Ruiqing, which Lin Biao published a major treatise on guerrilla (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 3:14-30. Yu and Yang Chengwu, 28 April 1965, in Mao Zedong war implicitly rejecting Luo’s forward strategy and Zhan was Director of the Department of the Soviet junshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military with it any advanced air combat. Chinese ground sup- Union and Eastern Europe of the Chinese Foreign Writings] 6 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press and port apparently came as a substitute form of help for Ministry in 1964 and accompanied Zhou to Moscow. Central Document Press, 1993), 6:404. Hanoi.” Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy,” 79. The PRC Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic History 58. For Snow’s version of his conversation with Mao, 516. In fact, Luo did not fall from office until December Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong see Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: 1965. dashiji, 1949-1975, 428. Random House, 1971), 215-216. For the Chinese ver- 69. Michael H. Hunt has also criticized the emphasis on 80. Zhou’s conversation with Ho Chi Minh and Le sion, see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central factions to account for Chinese foreign policy forma- Duan, 1 March 1965, in ibid., 438. Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong tion. He poses the question sharply: “Does the factional 81. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam waijiao wenxuan, 544-562. model transpose on China the competitive ethos of War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965- 59. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin American politics and underestimate the restraining 66, 54. jiefangjun, 341. authoritarian and hierarchical qualities of China’s po- 82. The Vietnamese claim is quoted in Nayan Chanda, 60. Ibid., 341-342; Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:403. litical culture?” See Michael H. Hunt, “CCP Foreign “Secrets of Former Friends,” Far Eastern Economic 61. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Policy: ‘Normalizing the Field,’” in Michael H. Hunt Review (15 June 1979), 38-39. I have not seen any Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong and Niu Jun, eds., Toward a History of Chinese Com- Chinese material that confirms the Vietnamese claim. dashiji, 1949-1975, 455. munist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities 83. Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghua 62. Liu Shaoqi’s speech at the war planning meeting of and Interpretive Approaches (Washington, DC: renmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 [A Diplomatic the Central Military Commission, 19 May 1965, in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars History of China: The Period of the People’s Republic Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40. Asia Program, 1995), 163-191. The quotation is on p. of China, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s 63. The CCP Central Documentary Research Office, 170. Press, 1988), 344. comp., Zhu De nianpu [Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing: 70. For Mao’s statements on the “Two Intermediate 84. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam People’s Press, 1986), 537-538. Zones,” see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965- 64. Harry Harding, “The Making of Chinese Military Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao 66, 55. Power,” in William Whitson, ed., The Military and Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 506-509. See also Chi Aiping, 85. Douglas Pike describes Hanoi’s strategy to put the Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: “The Evolution of Mao Zedong’s International Strate- Sino-Soviet dispute to its own use in service of its war Praeger, 1973), 361-385; Uri Ra’anan, “Peking’s For- gic Thought,” in Dangde wenxian 3 (1994), 46-52; Li as “the alternating tilt gambit.” See Douglas Pike, eign Policy ‘Debate’, 1965-1966,” in Tang Tsou, ed., Jie, “Study of Mao Zedong’s International Strategic Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance China in Crisis, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Thought,” in the International Strategic Studies Foun- (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 54-55. Press, 1968), 23-71; Donald Zagoria, “The Strategic dation, ed., Huanqiu tongci liangre [All Is the Same in 86. For Mao’s reaction to Dulles’ policy, see Bo Yibo, Debate in Peking,” in ibid., 237-268; Michael Yahuda, the World] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1993), 1- Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollec- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 249 tions of Certain Important Decisions and Events], vol. GAIDUK curator of relations between the CPSU and 2 (Beijing: CCP Party School Press, 1993), 1137-1157. other parties, accepted that advice.4 87. For more discussions of Mao’s attempt to use the continued from page 232 escalation of the Indochina conflict to radicalize China’s Meanwhile, faced with the Soviet political and social life, see Chen, “China’s Involve- palpable improvement in Soviet-American leadership’s unwillingness to plunge into ment in the Vietnam War,” 361-365. relations following the shared fright of the the Southeast Asian conflict, Hanoi re- 88. For a description of this problem, see Zhai, “Trans- 1962 Caribbean (Cuban missile) crisis, the doubled its efforts to improve relations with planting the Chinese Model,” 712-713. 89. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 60-68. Kremlin sought to minimize Soviet involve- China. According to the information of the 90. Ibid., 74-75. ment in the Vietnam conflict, which was not Soviet Defense Ministry, PRC and DRV 91. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 102. only problematic from the viewpoint of pos- officials opened talks in 1964 on a bilateral 92. Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 607. sible foreign-policy advantages but was also treaty of military cooperation. North Viet- 93. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, “The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung,” The China Quarterly 35 (July-Sep- fraught with possible new clashes between nam hosted a delegation of PRC military tember 1968), 58-77; Smith, An International History the USSR and the USA. Moreover, the leaders, led by the Defense Minister, and in of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Soviet leaders were apprehensive of radical December 1964 a bilateral treaty was signed Limited War, 1965-66, 285-304. views held by North Vietnam’s leaders, who which provided for the introduction of PRC 94. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam 5 War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965- had a clearly pro-Chinese orientation. troops to the DRV. Prior to that, the DRV 66, 298-299. For Zhou’s reception of the Vietnamese The extent of the difference in the posi- General Staff had informed the Soviet mili- delegation led by Le Duan, see The PRC Foreign tions held by the two countries became clear tary attaché in Hanoi that there was no longer Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., after a visit to Moscow in Jan.-Feb. 1964 by any need for Soviet military experts to stay Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 491. 95. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical a delegation of the Workers Party of Vietnam in the country and they should leave the Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publish- (WPV), led by Le Duan, the party’s First DRV without replacement by other Soviet ing Co., Inc., 1982), 93-94, 96. Secretary. The DRV Communists came out advisors as soon as they completed their 96. Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War,” in support of their Chinese colleagues with current business.6 The rapprochement be- 75. 97. Yang Chengwu. such zeal and expressed such radical ideas tween Hanoi and Beijing was facilitated by 98. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly journal published about the role of the national liberation move- common views on the need to fight against by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and ment in Third World countries that their “U.S. imperialism.” Although the North the Central Archives. It often contains important party Moscow interlocutors were obliged to switch Vietnamese leaders never fully trusted China documents 99. Chief of Staff. from “the patient explanation of the CPSU (as later conflicts demonstrated), coolness 100. Deputy Prime Minister, Director of the State stand and the general line of the world com- in relations with the Soviet Union predeter- Council Special Committee on war preparation. munist movement” to direct warnings about mined their official position.7 101. Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Director of the the possible consequences such views could Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 State Council Special Committee on war preparation. 102. Luo was also named Deputy Director of the State have for “the Vietnamese friends’” relations marked a turning point in Soviet-North Viet- Council Special Committee on war preparation. with the Soviet Union.3 namese relations.8 For reasons that remain 103. Mao Zedong. Further evidence that the two sides were unclear, the Soviet Union made an about- 104. Zhou Enlai. slowly but surely drifting apart surfaced dur- face and again oriented itself toward closer 105. These are the names of Chinese missiles. 106. A major railway trunk running east and west ing a July 1964 visit to Moscow by an NLF cooperation with North Vietnam. Probably between Lianyungang and Lanzhou. delegation at the invitation of the Soviet Leonid I. Brezhnev and his entourage feared 107. A major railway trunk running north and south Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The rep- a loss of Soviet influence in the region, between Beijing and Wuhan. resentatives of the patriotic forces of South particularly in the context of the mounting 108. A major railway trunk running north and south between Tianjin and Nanjing. Vietnam presented to the Soviet leaders a differences between Beijing and Moscow 109. A province in North China. number of requests and proposals, including which threatened to develop into an open 110. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Pham Van requests for increased supplies of arms and conflict. In that context, the consolidation of Dong. ammunition. They also expressed a desire China’s position in Southeast Asia at the that a permanent mission of the NFLSV be USSR’s expense posed a potential threat to Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn Uni- opened in the USSR. The CPSU CC viewed the Soviet authority in the world communist versity at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the skeptically all those requests. In his report to movement.9 Furthermore, the assassination author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the the CC about that delegation’s visit, D. of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in No- Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, Shevlyagin, deputy head of the CC Interna- vember 1963 and advent to power of Lyndon 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State Univer- tional Department, advised that no definite B. Johnson (whose election as president in sity Press, 1994). This article is adapted answer about the opening of such a mission 1964 was regarded in the USSR as an indi- from a paper prepared for presentation at be given and that all talks be held exclusively cator of greater right-wing influence in the CWI HP Conference on New Evidence via the North Vietnamese state agencies. In American politics) dimmed the hopes of on the Cold War in Asia at the University of view of this, it was decided not to receive the improvement in Soviet-American relations Hong Kong on 9-12 January 1995. delegation at the CPSU CC, for that would that had arisen in the last year of Kennedy’s have raised the awkward necessity for the life. This development offered a certain Kremlin leaders to state in clear terms their freedom of action to Moscow’s new leader- stand on the above-mentioned issues. CC ship, which had reverted to the policy of Secretary Boris Ponomarev, who was the confrontation—a policy which was, in turn, 250 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN facilitated by Johnson’s escalation of U.S. Soviet dispute, or otherwise rely exclusively and U.S. military contingents in Germany. involvement in Vietnam. on only one communist patron. Rather, after Why? Because, they explained, the Soviet From late 1964 on, Soviet policy with Moscow changed its attitude to the DRV, troops had allegedly been transferred to the respect to Vietnam pursued several goals. Hanoi took steps to secure maximum profit Soviet-Chinese border, which provoked ten- First and foremost, the USSR emphasized by exploiting its friendship with both of its sions there and diverted Beijing from North moral and political support to what it de- mighty allies—the PRC and the USSR—as Vietnamese military requirements, and the scribed as the Vietnamese people’s war they competed for influence in Southeast U.S. troops were immediately transferred to against American aggression. The Soviet Asia. Precisely this policy was pursued by South Vietnam.15 mass media now promptly and frequently the WPV Central Committee grouping which The Vietnamese side’s egoism and its carried official statements by Soviet leaders was formed in late 1964-early 1965 and desire (in the words of a Soviet Embassy denouncing U.S. aggressive actions in South- included Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo political letter) “to have a monopoly on the east Asia, no longer delaying as it had with Nguyen Giap.13 This group sought to rid correct assessment and methods of solution TASS’s statement on the Tonkin Gulf inci- North Vietnam of China’s excessive ward- to the Vietnam conflict,” often verged on dent. Steps were taken to expand contacts ship, on the one hand, and, on the other, to cynicism. Indicative in this respect was a both with Hanoi and representatives of the avoid any kind of dependence on the Soviet complaint by the Soviet Ministry of Com- South Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, ac- Union. As a result, in that period reports by mercial Shipping, dated 18 July 1966, sent cordingly, the CPSU CC now approved the Soviet representatives in Vietnam, the USSR to the CPSU CC, in connection with the opening in Moscow (at the Soviet Afro- Defense Ministry, and the KGB regarding actions by the Vietnamese in Haiphong, the Asian Solidarity Committee), on 24 Decem- reduced Chinese influence in the DRV were DRV’s chief port. The port authorities, the ber 1964, of a permanent mission of the accompanied by complaints of insincerity, ministry complained, had artificially delayed NFLSV. egoism and unmanageability on the part of the unloading of Soviet vessels, evidently Second, Soviet material assistance (eco- “the Vietnamese friends.” believing that the longer they held the large- nomic and, primarily, military) to the DRV For instance, back in 1966, in his analy- tonnage vessels flying the Soviet flag in the and NLF expanded. Soviet military supplies sis of the prospects of Soviet-Vietnamese port and its vicinity, the less risk of damage in the period from 1963 to 1967 (particularly relations, Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Ilya they would run of U.S. bombing raids. More- after 1965) exceeded one billion rubles, ac- Shcherbakov pointed out: “Just as before, over, they usually placed those Soviet ves- cording to the data of the Soviet Embassy in the Embassy believes that the process of sels in close proximity to the most danger- Hanoi.10 Prior to 1965, German models of promotion of our relations with the WPV ous areas (e.g., near anti-aircraft guns), in arms were sent to North Vietnam from the and the DRV will hardly be steady or rapid hopes of ensuring their safety during air Soviet Union, but from then on the Kremlin in view of the policy pursued by the Viet- raids. Moreover, during air raids Vietnam- provided only Soviet-made arms to the “Viet- namese comrades. This was, regrettably, ese military boats lurking behind Soviet namese friends,” including the latest de- confirmed in the past few years. Even the vessels fired at the enemy, thus making the signs of surface-to-air missiles, jet planes, manifestation of a more serious discord be- Soviet “shields” the targets of U.S. bombers rockets, and field artillery, as well as a large tween the WPV and the Communist Party of (and those vessels contained loads of car- array of especially sophisticated arms and China will not probably mean automatic or goes meant as assistance to “the embattled combat hardware for the DRV air defense proportionate Soviet-Vietnamese rapproche- Vietnamese people”). The clearly outraged system.11 And Soviet economic and mili- ment. The year 1966 showed once more that ministry officials demanded that Soviet com- tary assistance to Vietnam kept on increas- we are obliged constantly to display initia- mercial vessels be kept out of danger while ing. According to estimates of the Soviet tive and unilaterally, as it were, drag the discharging their noble mission.16 Embassy in Hanoi, by 1968 Soviet material Vietnamese comrades to greater friendship No less complicated was the situation assistance accounted for 50 percent of all aid and independence.” The ambassador then concerning Soviet-North Vietnamese mili- to the DRV, and as of 1 January 1968 the stressed the “general positive nature” of the tary cooperation. The USSR Defense Min- total value of Soviet assistance over that WPV’s tendency for independence but istry and embassy in Hanoi repeatedly in- period was in excess of 1.8 billion rubles, pointed to its negative aspects, primarily to formed Moscow about “the Vietnamese with military supplies accounting for 60 indications that the Vietnamese conducted friends’ insincere attitude” toward the So- percent.12 its foreign policy, including its relations viet Union, the Soviet people, and the Soviet Such a turnabout in Soviet policy with with Moscow, from a narrow, nationalistic Defense Ministry. They pointed out that respect to cooperation with Vietnam was viewpoint. Soviet aid was regarded by Hanoi they received slanted reports from the received with satisfaction by the Hanoi lead- exclusively from the standpoint of their ben- People’s Army of (North) Vietnam regard- ers, who increasingly stressed the impor- efit to Vietnam, rather than for the good of ing the situation in South Vietnam, belittling tance of Soviet moral, political, and material the international socialist cause.14 the role and importance of Soviet military assistance in their conversations with the This undercurrent of tension in Soviet- assistance to the DRV and discrediting the officials of the Soviet Embassy and those of North Vietnamese relations, produced by performance of Soviet arms and military other socialist countries. However, the North what Moscow viewed as Hanoi’s parochial hardware. They also reported that the North Vietnamese leaders’ appreciation for this perspective, cropped up repeatedly. In 1966, Vietnamese had raised obstacles in the way largesse by no means signified that they for example, the North Vietnamese expressed of Soviet military experts who wished to would now take the USSR’s side in the Sino- indignation at the partial reduction of Soviet inspect U.S. military hardware, and displayed COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 251 other signs of distrust and suspiciousness pendently from China was not yet pro- nam would be hard put to do without Chi- toward Soviet Defense Ministry representa- nounced, the DRV’s trust in Beijing had nese assistance in its struggle and in future tives. The Soviet leadership was informed already been undermined. However, the peaceful construction. So it would be pre- about violations of storage rules for Soviet report admitted that one could hardly hope mature to ask the Vietnamese now to state military hardware, wasteful use of missiles for the WPV leadership to display initiative their clear-cut position with respect to the and ammunition, and neglect of Soviet ex- to opt for one patron over the other, for “the USSR and China.”21 And the following fact perts’ advice on the rules of exploitation of comrades probably have not yet risen to the is quite indicative: Hanoi named Xuan Thuy, military hardware, which led to its spoilage. level of clear-cut choice.” In view of this, the well-known for his pro-Chinese views and a All this coincided with Hanoi’s requests for Soviet Embassy set itself the task “to render past president of the Vietnamese-Chinese more assistance, but the DRV leaders evi- all-round assistance to the Vietnam leader- Friendship Association, as the head of the dently saw no contradiction in this: It was ship in its adoption of an independent stand DRV delegation to the Paris talks. pointed out in the 1970 political report of the on the issues of home and foreign policy.” The details of relations among the USSR, Soviet Embassy in Hanoi that, while “at- That “independent” policy naturally was DRV, and PRC also throw light on the So- taching great importance to the Soviet mili- meant to be independent from China, for the viet Union’s relations with the USA. Soviet tary assistance, the command of the People’s report then underlined the need “to react leaders could hardly react indifferently or Army of Vietnam at the same time regarded more firmly to any action by Vietnamese simplistically to the Vietnam conflict and it exclusively as the obligatory discharge of comrades which may be directly or indi- the dramatic escalation of American mili- its internationalist duty by the Soviet rectly damaging to Soviet-Vietnamese friend- tary activity in Southeast Asia. From a Union.”17 ship.”20 purely propaganda viewpoint, the conflict All the above-mentioned facts suggest Sino-Vietnamese contradictions tended played into Soviet hands. While U.S. sup- how complicated and contradictory Soviet- to sharpen as the DRV leadership came to port for an unpopular neo-colonial regime in Vietnamese relations were, and demonstrate realize the need for a diplomatic settlement Saigon offered a ripe target for condemna- the great discrepancy between the scale of with the USA. The DRV’s consent to hold tion and undermined Washington’s interna- Soviet assistance to Vietnam and the degree talks with Washington in 1968 profoundly tional stature, the USSR could simulta- of Soviet influence on Hanoi’s policy. As a irritated Beijing, which was dead-set against neously pose as a consistent fighter for the Vietnamese journalist in his conversation any compromise settlement leading to a ces- triumph of a just cause, acting in the spirit of with M. Ilyinsky, an Izvestia correspondent, sation of hostilities. To advance its more proletarian internationalism—as evidenced put it: “Do you know,” the Vietnamese militant policy, the Chinese leaders began to by its moral-political, economic, and mili- journalist asked, “what is the Soviet Union’s expand separate contacts (bypassing Hanoi) tary assistance to North Vietnam—and also share in total assistance, received by Viet- with the NLF, urging it to carry on protracted as a potential mediator in the forging of a nam, and what is the share of Soviet political warfare. Moreover, the PRC started to ob- peaceful settlement. Furthermore, the likely influence there (if the latter can be measured struct carriages of Soviet arms and ammuni- protracted nature of the conflict promised to in percent)? The respective figures are: 75- tion delivered by rail through Chinese terri- sap the strength of the Soviet Union’s prin- 80 percent and 4-8 percent.” The Soviet tory, with the express aim of undermining cipal rivals, distracting the United States and journalist noted: “If the Vietnamese jour- Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Although the China and thereby enhancing Soviet secu- nalist has exaggerated the former figures PRC leadership’s approach to the talks issue rity interests in other regions (especially (by 15-20 percent), the share of Soviet influ- later softened, Sino-Vietnamese relations Europe and the Soviet Far East). ence is probably correct.”18 remained strained. Yet the Vietnam War also presented Sino-Vietnamese relations were no less Although discord between the Beijing long-term difficulties and dangers for Mos- complicated and contradictory. That Mos- and Hanoi leaderships affected Sino-Viet- cow, especially to the extent that there was a cow monitored their development closely is namese relations, no major conflict between real threat of its escalating from a local into testified to by the vast number of reports in the two countries threatened a complete rup- a world war, if (as was sometimes specu- the CPSU CC archives on this subject, sent ture during the course of the war. Vietnam lated) the USA were driven to desperation by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, the KGB, still needed Chinese assistance and support, and resorted to the use of nuclear weapons. and the Military Intelligence Agency (GRU) so it took steps to reduce or contain the level In that case, the USSR could hardly have of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed of tensions. The DRV’s party and govern- kept neutral—and yet retaliating against the Forces. An early sign of the incipient dis- ment leaders, as before, regularly visited United States might have led to disastrous cord between the two countries seems to Beijing to discuss with “the Chinese friends” consequences. All the same, even if no have appeared in a still-classified 21 Febru- important foreign policy issues. No matter nuclear conflict broke out, the risk of a direct ary 1966 KGB report to the CPSU CC how riled, Hanoi carefully avoided giving clash between the two superpowers arising stating that Chinese leaders were concerned categorical assessments of Chinese policy— from the Southeast Asian crisis was too about the WPV’s increasingly independent either regarding the world communist move- great and this was precisely what the Soviet foreign policy, especially in relations with ment or Soviet-Chinese relations. “The WPV leadership wished to avoid at all costs. Plus, the PRC and the conduct of the war.19 And leaders realize full well,” the Soviet Em- to the extent Kremlin leaders genuinely de- the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi pointed out in bassy in Hanoi explained to Moscow, “that sired an improvement in relations with Wash- its 1966 report that, although the WPV China is situated quite close to Vietnam, ington, the war would inevitably serve as a tendency to settle the Vietnam issue inde- whereas the Soviet Union is far away. Viet- distraction and potential sticking point. 252 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

There were naturally other “pros” and transferred as a gift. Soviet assistance in promise of cooperation with the United “cons” which Moscow must have taken into 1969 was planned to remain on the same States; or, better still, 3) warned it that if account in determining its policy toward the level (525 million rubles), but with the open- Soviet cooperation were not forthcoming struggle: Military factors constituted one ing of peace talks and reduction of the scale the United States might resort to rapproche- major positive incentive favoring a more of hostilities in Vietnam, part of the funds ment with China—or some optimal combi- active Soviet involvement, according to ar- originally assigned for military deliveries nation of all those approaches. When in chival documents. There were two princi- was reallocated for other purposes, so Soviet retirement, Johnson disclosed his calcula- pal, interconnected perceived opportunities: assistance to Vietnam in 1969 totaled 370 tions as president in a conversation at his Vietnam offered a live battlefield testing million rubles and in 1970, 316 million Texas ranch with Soviet citizens that was ground for Soviet military hardware, includ- rubles.25 reported to the Kremlin leadership by the ing the latest models, and also a chance to One negative factor, from the Soviet KGB in December 1969. The USSR could obtain a windfall of hard information about leaders’ viewpoint, in decision-making on be instrumental in helping the United States up-to-date U.S. weaponry, by inspecting the aid to the DRV was what they saw as the to bring the Vietnam War to a conclusion, war booty captured or obtained by the DRV Vietnamese allies’ unmanageability and Johnson argued, for “if we take Soviet stra- forces. The North Vietnamese air defense unpredictability. Hanoi’s independent course tegic, not tactical, interests, the end of the was fully equipped with modern Soviet hard- in relations with the USSR hardly inspired Vietnam War fully accords with the Soviet ware, whose effectiveness was shown by the Moscow to greater enthusiasm in its support Union’s interests,” considering that, “after fact that even the Vietnamese personnel for the war, and as time went on, those all, it is the United States, not Vietnam, managed to operate it successfully, despite a Vietnamese properties might have led to which is the main partner of the USSR.” frequent lack of training or competence. undesirable consequences—perhaps an open And Johnson rejected the argument that the Those systems were being constantly im- break. So from that standpoint, at least, Soviet Union was not in a position to exert proved, taking into account the capabilities Moscow had every reason to favor an early pressure on the DRV as groundless from the of U.S. warplanes.22 Apart from the anti- cease-fire and political solution. viewpoint of realpolitik. “It’s highly doubt- aircraft defense system, the archival docu- In fact, the hope for a peaceful settle- ful for a country supplying Vietnam with 75 ments note, the North Vietnamese used the ment was shared by both Soviet and Ameri- percent of [its] arms not to have real levers of Soviet-made Grad artillery shelling systems, can leaders, and their tactics on this issue, influence on it,” the ex-president was quoted which were highly effective in attacks on paradoxically enough, were surprisingly as saying.28 U.S. bases, airfields, ammunition depots, similar. However, the Soviet government Thus, the problem, from the U.S. per- etc.,23 as well as MiG-21 jets. backed a settlement on Hanoi’s terms, spective, consisted only in discovering how The Soviet military also relished the whereas the U.S. sought to ensure the maxi- best to approach Moscow. The United States opportunity to pore over the latest U.S. mili- mum consideration of the Saigon might have acted through official channels, tary hardware. In accordance with a Soviet- government’s interests. Moreover, of course, since although Soviet-American relations North Vietnamese agreement signed in the as a direct participant in the conflict, the were rather cool at that time, they were spring of 1965, the Vietnamese undertook to United States could not possibly play the maintained. And the United States certainly transfer to the USSR models of captured part of an arbiter, which remained a privi- probed what could be done in that direction. U.S. military hardware for inspection. All lege of the Soviet Union. For this reason, For instance, at an August 1966 meeting difficulties notwithstanding, according to with U.S. armed forces directly involved in between Colonel C.C. Fitzgerald, a military the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, a hostilities, the Johnson Administration was attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, total of 700 models were delivered to the obliged to rely on intermediaries in its at- with officers of the Department of External USSR between May 1965 and . tempts to convince Hanoi to sit down at the Relations of the Soviet Defense Ministry, The embassy pointed out that the work done negotiating table rather than pursue a purely the American stressed the important role the was very valuable: the CPSU CC adopted a military outcome. And in this respect Wash- USSR could play in the settlement of the decision to apply in Soviet industry of a ington pinned much of its hopes on the Vietnam conflict as the initiator of and ac- number of selected and studied models.24 Soviet Union.26 tive mediator in peace negotiations. Col. However, apart from obvious assets the U.S. leaders had every reason for such Fitzgerald drew the attention of his inter- USSR gained in the course of the Vietnam hopes, for they believed that since the USSR locutors to the Johnson Administration’s War, its expenditures were likewise enor- rendered massive and ever-growing mili- constant efforts to open talks, stating that the mous, primarily in the sphere of ever in- tary and economic assistance to Vietnam (of visit to Moscow of Senator Mike Mansfield creasing material assistance to Vietnam. (See which Washington was well aware),27 so the and Averell Harriman’s appointment as a the figures cited above.) In 1966-1968 the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the special presidential advisor aimed at pre- Soviet Union undertook to render to the DRV leadership. Both Johnson and, after cisely this purpose.29 However, worried DRV economic assistance to the tune of January 1969, his successor Richard M. that a formal, top-level overture to Moscow 121.6 million rubles, but in fact the assis- Nixon were convinced that Moscow would might result in a rebuff or even denunciation tance was far greater in view of Hanoi’s press Hanoi to agree to open negotiations, by the Kremlin leaders, the White House incessant requests for additional supplies. once Washington: 1) demonstrated to the opted not to run the risk, but to first sound out In 1968 Soviet assistance to the DRV totaled Soviet Union that the Vietnam War was Soviet officials in order to ascertain their 524 million rubles, with 361 million rubles hardly in its interests; 2) seduced it by the attitudes and try to reach agreement unoffi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 253 cially. was largely produced in accordance with Boris Ponomarev, who was in charge of the Regrettably, we do not yet have access recommendations and draft decisions sent Party’s international relations, submitted to to all the documents, including the still- by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi—not by the the CPSU CC Secretariat a memorandum, classified “special dossiers” (osobaya papki) Politburo, the CC Secretariat, nor the For- entitled “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese at SCCD, as well as KGB, Foreign and eign Ministry—and only later were those Friends,” in which he raised the issue of Defense Ministry, and Presidential Archive recommendations and draft decisions rub- establishing and promoting relations between materials, that are necessary to reconstruct ber-stamped by the top Soviet leaders. This the CPSU and the communist parties of fully from Soviet sources all of the many conclusion, albeit preliminary, is based on several Southeast Asian countries by mak- conversations and probes connected to vari- ample documentary evidence, when, for in- ing use of the authority wielded by the WPV ous diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the stance, the Soviet Ambassador sets out a in the communist movement in the region. Vietnam conflict in 1965-67, including, per- number of ideas in his political letter to In other words, he suggested possible Soviet haps most importantly, the so-called MARI- Moscow about what should be done, and penetration of Thailand, Indonesia, Malay- GOLD and SUNFLOWER initiatives (to later the same considerations were put for- sia, and the Philippines. After inconclusive use the secret U.S. government code names), ward as the official views of the CPSU and discussion of the proposal, Ponomarev, along in both of which the Soviet Union played an Soviet government in conversations with with CC secretaries Suslov, Kirilenko, important role.30 An initial survey of the Pham Van Dong or Nguyen Duy Trinh.32 So Demichev, Katushev, and Rakhmanin, de- SCCD archives disclosed only cryptic traces Moscow obviously deemed it advisable to cided to consult the Soviet Ambassador in of Soviet contacts with potential intermedi- consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Hanoi on the matter.35 aries. For instance, documents failed to before adopting decisions. The new importance attached to the role clarify what was discussed in conversations Take the following two examples. The of ambassadors and embassies in the process with L. Mulkern (vice-president for interna- political letter33 of the Soviet Embassy in the of decision-making on foreign-policy issues tional relations of the Bank of America), DRV, entitled “Soviet-Vietnamese Relations reflected a general trend, typical of the who asked for assistance in establishing After the Talks Held in April 1968,” pre- Brezhnev era: the growing influence of the unofficial contacts between U.S. President pared for Moscow Center on 1 September bureaucratic apparatus, especially medium- Johnson and the Soviet government, or with 1968, assessed the results and significance of level officials, on policy-making. Since top Marshall D. Shulman (then an associate of the opening of the Paris peace talks. Regard- Soviet leaders had little idea of the reality in Harvard University’s Russian Research ing the situation as favorable for achieving a Vietnam, they willingly entrusted decision- Center), both of which were recorded by the settlement in the best interests of the Viet- making in the sphere of current policy to KGB (the latter with the recommendation namese people, the Ambassador, who signed experts, signing ready-made decisions or that Shulman be advised that his informa- the letter, believed that the prime task at the intervening only in extraordinary situa- tion had to be confirmed by the U.S. Presi- moment was “to help the Vietnamese com- tions.36 dent). While the documents encountered rades to put an end to the hostilities this year Thus, indirect evidence suggests that in during this early stage of research left these and switch over to a political settlement of defining its stand on the Vietnam War, Mos- and many other questions unresolved, they the Vietnamese issue.” With this aim in cow largely drew on the opinion of its diplo- certainly pointed at the high intensity of view, Shcherbakov believed, it would be matic representatives in the DRV. And in unofficial Soviet-U.S. contacts apparently advisable to invite a higher-level DRV gov- 1965-1966 the Soviet Embassy was far from related to the war (either directly or through ernment delegation to Moscow in October optimistic about the prospects for a peaceful mediators, as, for instance, through the ser- and “try once more to analyze jointly the settlement. Meetings and conversations be- vices of Austrian Ambassador in the USSR situation and convince the DRV government tween the Soviet Embassy officials and Vodak) in the summer-autumn of 1965.31 to express its opinion on the whole package members of the diplomatic corps and jour- Moscow’s seeming reluctance to meet of the Vietnamese settlement.” nalists accredited in Hanoi revealed that Washington half-way in its diplomatic ef- Soon afterward, V. Chivilev, the Soviet North Vietnam’s leaders were fully commit- forts was probably at least partly attribut- charge d’affaires in the DRV, presented Pham ted to continuing the hostilities against the able to the fact that the Kremlin was acutely Van Dong with a letter of invitation from USA. Indicative in this respect was a con- aware of its limited ability to exert influence Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin for a DRV versation at the WPV CC on 23 August 1966 on Hanoi’s policy—an awareness due in party and government delegation to visit the between Soviet charge d’affaires P. Privalov large measure to the complete and objective Soviet Union. The date of the visit was later and Nguyen Van Vinh, Chairman of the information sent to Moscow by the Soviet settled and a decision was adopted on a visit Committee for the Unification of the Coun- Embassy in the DRV, led by Ambassador to the USSR by a Vietnamese government try. Gen. Vinh firmly believed that the Shcherbakov. Perusing the great number of delegation led by Le Duan in November situation was hardly favorable for opening minutes of conversations between Soviet 1968. Though the materials on the visit North Vietnamese-U.S. talks. “Had we been Embassy officials and Vietnamese leaders, remain inaccessible, it seems highly likely defeated by the Americans,” Vinh said, “we WPV members, and Vietnamese citizens, that Soviet leaders followed the recommen- would have had no other choice than to agree as well as informational letters and reports dations of their man in Hanoi.34 to hold talks, but we are confidently dealing sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Another example of the importance of blows at the enemy and winning decisive CPSU CC, one gets the impression that the Soviet ambassador’s advice in decision- victories. What would it mean for us to hold decision-making on the Vietnamese issue making dates to early 1974. CC Secretary talks now? That would mean losing every- 254 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN thing....”37 This viewpoint was shared by information regarding the requests and of- and advising that the DRV leadership take the entire WPV top leadership. fers of U.S. representatives, conveyed dur- steps to snatch the diplomatic initiative. In That is why the Soviet Embassy’s re- ing meetings with Soviet diplomats, and order to convince Hanoi to change its intrac- port for 1966 included very cautious fore- delivered messages between the two sides. table stand on talks with Washington, the casts about possible changes in the DRV For instance, on 24 April 1967, “Vietnamese Soviet Embassy advised Moscow to inform stand. The embassy, in the belief that it was comrades” were informed about a request of the North Vietnamese at their next summit necessary to “exert and broaden, with the the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet with Soviet leaders that the USSR could not support of all peace-loving forces and the government take the necessary steps for the afford to pursue a policy of brinkmanship socialist countries, strong political and dip- DRV government to give access to represen- with respect to the United States by getting lomatic efforts in order to bring the matter to tatives of the international commission of more deeply involved in the Vietnam con- the settlement of the conflict in the current the Red Cross to American POWs then held flict, and that therefore the best plan for both year,” suggested that the USSR might even- in North Vietnam. And on April 28, the the Soviet Union and Vietnam would be if tually have to elaborate and present its own DRV leaders learned that Johnson envoy the hostilities drew to a close in 1968.43 peace plan to the Vietnamese comrades. Averell Harriman had handed over a U.S. The fact that talks on the settlement of That supposition was made on the basis of statement on the withdrawal of U.S. troops the Vietnam issue in fact finally started in what the embassy viewed as a certain coin- from the demilitarized zone to the Soviet 1968 may be regarded as a matter of pure cidence of the CPSU and WPV “assessment charge d’affaires in the United States.41 coincidence. At the same time, the Soviet of the situation and active promotion of There is no doubt that Hanoi also received Embassy in Hanoi was farsighted in its as- politico-diplomatic struggle for Vietnam.”38 exhaustive information about the June 1967 sessments—what mattered was not that its In that contest, the USSR sought to Glassboro summit between Kosygin and forecasts had proved correct but rather the evade the issue of acting as a formal media- Johnson. factors on which those forecasts were based. tor at the U.S.-DRV talks (which was what In 1967, too, the Soviet Union failed to And in this respect, the Soviet Embassy had the USA sought). The only role the Soviet convince the Vietnamese leaders to hold every reason to hope that the pressure ex- Union was then prepared to play was that of talks with the USA on a peaceful settlement. erted by Moscow on the Vietnamese leaders a “postman,” who would carry both sides’ The Soviet Embassy in Hanoi believed that to accept a political rather than military messages, and that of “a night watchman” by the DRV leadership would accept the idea of solution, would finally bear fruit. offering an opportunity for unofficial meet- such a settlements only under the following Preliminary U.S.-North Vietnamese ings between U.S. and North Vietnamese conditions: a worsening of the military situ- talks opened on 13 May 1968, followed on embassy officials in Moscow.39 At the same ation; U.S. acceptance of North Vietnam’s 18 January 1969 by the official quadripartite time, Moscow spared no effort to convince main demands; a change in China’s attitude (U.S.-South Vietnam-North Vietnam-NLF) its “Vietnamese friends” of the need to switch to the Vietnam War; and finally, the socialist Paris negotiations. Soviet diplomats justifi- from military to political-diplomatic meth- countries’ clear declaration to the North ably regarded the event as their own success, ods to attain a settlement. Vietnamese that they could not afford to at least in part. “Without acting as an official The USSR undertook the mission of “a bear the ever growing burden of that war for mediator,” the Soviet Embassy in the DRV postman” and “a night watchman” very re- reasons of an international nature or for fear pointed out, “the Soviet Union rendered an luctantly, probably for fear of being turned of its protracted nature. So in assessing the important service for the two sides to sit into an official mediator. At least it did not results of the Soviet-Vietnamese talks in down at the negotiating table and open offi- wish to perform those functions on a perma- April 1967 and the subsequent DRV policy, cial talks. The USSR spared no effort to nent basis. So the United States had to use the Soviet Embassy drew the conclusion that convince world opinion and national gov- the services of other countries, in particular, at that juncture, “not a single [one] of the ernments to support an end to bombing raids Poland, Canada, India, etc. However, early above-mentioned situations makes the Viet- on the DRV, and exerted pressure on the in 1967 a new flurry of activity was observed namese comrades take the road of active USA. At the same time it emphasized to the in Moscow. In Jan.-Feb., DRV Foreign searching for ways to a peaceful settle- Vietnamese comrades that the year 1968 Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh received ment.”42 was most favorable for a number of reasons Shcherbakov and familiarized him with the Nevertheless, summing up the results for launching the process of the political gist of President Johnson’s letter to Ho Chi of 1967, Soviet diplomats in Hanoi reached settlement of the Vietnam issue.”44 Minh, handed over at a regular meeting in the optimistic conclusion that the year 1968 The USSR did much to organize the Moscow of representatives of the DRV and would be the most favorable for starting the Paris meeting, including influencing the the US embassies. And Ho Chi Minh’s process of settlement. They strongly de- choice of venue. The record of a conversa- reply, according to Trinh, was to be sent nounced Hanoi’s rejection of Johnson’s San tion between V. Chivilev, Soviet acting along the same channels.40 Those facts Antonio formula—so-named after a speech charge d’affaires, and Le Duan, First Secre- make it possible for us to suppose that by in the Texas city on 29 September 1967 in tary of the WPV CC, held on 2 May 1968, 1967, meetings of diplomats of the two war- which LBJ declared that Washington would suggests that on the eve of the opening of ring parties were held in Moscow on a regu- stop bombing North Vietnam when assured U.S.-DRV peace talks, the Vietnamese side lar basis. that this would “lead promptly to productive offered Paris as the venue with due regard As to its function of “a postman,” in discussions”—pointing out that that formula for the Soviet opinion. By that time Soviet 1967 Moscow regularly supplied Hanoi with could not be regarded as “insurmountable” diplomacy had already performed “a certain COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 255 amount of work with the French.” The main reasonably conclude that the USSR did its States Anatoly F. Dobrynin reported to Mos- factor behind Hanoi’s choice of the French utmost to ensure a favorable outcome of the cow: “All indications are that his [Nixon’s] capital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “the talks, naturally with due account of its own attempts to convince the USSR to help the opportunity to maintain contacts with Mos- interests. USA in the settlement of the [Vietnam] cow from it.”45 Moscow continued to play an important conflict, will be repeated in the future, and The same factor was taken into account role at the Paris talks after Nixon came to this will probably be felt in the course of our by Moscow, which faced the task of keeping power in 1969. The Soviet leaders kept talks with this administration on other inter- the sides at the negotiating table. With this abreast of the latest developments and did national issues, if not directly, then at least in aim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constant their best to influence the Vietnamese posi- the form of procrastination in the course of pressure on North Vietnam not to disrupt tion through the services of the USSR em- such talks or in decision-making on other the process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CC bassies in Hanoi and Paris. At his regular issues.”50 and Soviet government sent a letter to the meetings with the leaders of the DRV and In this respect, however, former CIA WPV CC and DRV government stressing NLF delegations, the Soviet Ambassador in chief William Colby was probably right that the Paris talks were vitally important France, V. Zorin, asked the Vietnamese what when he wrote in his memoirs about his deep for achieving a settlement of the Vietnam questions they considered it necessary for skepticism with respect to the Soviet Union’s issue. The Soviet leaders also emphasized him to raise in his conversations with the ability to exert pressure on its friends, who that they were living through an important U.S. delegation. At the same time, Zorin were “stubborn and full of determination.”51 period from the viewpoint of opportunities expressed his “desire” for the Vietnamese Nevertheless, in spite of its limited opportu- for diplomatic struggle, offering to put the side to put forward some specific proposals nities, the USSR managed to make a consid- entire weight of Soviet authority in the world on military issues and for the NLF to elabo- erable contribution to the peaceful settle- in order to triumph in the political and rate a specific diplomatic program. Simulta- ment of the Vietnam conflict. So the signing diplomatic contest.46 In an effort to influ- neously, the Soviet ambassador in the DRV, of the bilateral agreement by the DRV and ence the North Vietnamese side and as a Shcherbakov, warned “the Vietnamese USA, on 27 January 1973, on the end of hedge against the DRV’s sometimes unpre- friends” against following an extremist path, hostilities and restoration of peace in Viet- dictable behavior, the Soviet Embassy in such as the temptation to pursue a purely nam, irrespective of all its weak points, was Hanoi offered to send experts on Vietnam- propagandist policy or to resort exclusively an important result of the efforts of Soviet ese affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Paris.47 to military methods in relations with the diplomacy as well. Moreover, Moscow reached an agreement USA.49 In conclusion, in assessing Soviet policy with the DRV leadership for the Vietnam- ’s victory in the 1968 toward the Vietnam War in the 1964-1973 ese regularly to inform Moscow on the elections marked a turning point in U.S. period, including in the sphere of Soviet- situation at the talks and their future strat- policy toward the USSR, as the incoming American ties, it may be asserted that in spite egy, tactics, and plans. In turn, the USSR administration made every effort to obtain of all the difficulties, complications, and gave the Vietnamese exhaustive informa- greater Soviet involvement and cooperation human costs associated with the conflict in tion about U.S. intentions. in the process of achieving a peaceful settle- Southeast Asia, the superpowers avoided Nevertheless, despite its promises, ment in Vietnam. The newly elected U.S. grave crises, upheavals, or direct confronta- Hanoi on several occasions confronted Mos- president and his national security adviser, tions in their bilateral relations—thus pre- cow with a fait accompli. Yet, having Henry A. Kissinger, decided that all prob- serving a degree of general international “forgotten” to inform its ally about a planned lems in Soviet-American relations were stability and paving the way toward the action, the Vietnamese leadership neverthe- linked to the Soviet stand on the Vietnam U.S.-Soviet détente of the early-mid-1970s. less insisted on Moscow’s immediate sup- issue. And if efforts in Moscow did not port. This happened, for instance, when the quickly or sufficiently pay dividends, Nixon 1. Space precludes a full listing of relevant titles here: NLF published its program of ten points and and Kissinger were prepared not to miss an for detailed references see Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, established the Provisional Revolutionary opportunity to play “the Chinese card” to forthcoming [1996]). Government of South Vietnam (RSV PRG). make the Soviet leaders more tractable. 2. According to data of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Although Le Duc Tho met with Kosygin on Like his predecessors, Nixon was con- Affairs, in the period from 1961 to 1966 the Soviet the eve of the program’s publication (during vinced that the USSR had unlimited control Union supplied the NLF via the DRV as disinterested assistance 130 recoilless weapons and mortars, 1400 a stopover in Moscow on his way to Paris), over Hanoi’s policy and that as soon as it machine guns, and 54,500 fire-arms with ammunition. the leading DRV negotiator never men- issued the appropriate orders, the Vietnam- Prior to 1965 the USSR supplied to North Vietnam tioned the planned steps.48 ese leaders would be ready, willing, and German models of arms. (Top Secret Memorandum of However, in attempting to convince obliged to conclude the talks. As a result, the Southeast Asia Department, USSR Foreign Minis- try, “Soviet Moral and Political Support of and Material Soviet leaders to exert greater pressure on each time the Paris talks reached a blind Aid to the South Vietnam Patriots,” 24 March 1966, Vietnam to achieve progress in the talks, alley, the White House turned to Moscow to SCCD, fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 50, delo (d.) 777, listy (ll.) U.S. officials often forced an open door. help find an acceptable escape route. After a 58-59.) This aid supplemented the economic assistance Assessing the steps taken by Moscow for meeting with Kissinger on 12 June 1969, Moscow rendered to the DRV. China, in turn, in the period from 1955 to 1965, supplied the DRV with the settlement of the Vietnam conflict along- when the American openly asked the USSR economic assistance to the total value of 511.8 million side the difficulties it encountered in deal- for assistance to overcome the latest crisis in rubles, including 302.5 million rubles as gift. (Memo- ing with Hanoi’s foreign policy, one may the talks, Soviet Ambassador in the United randum of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, “CPR’s 256 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

[Chinese People’s Republic’s] Economic Assistance to SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 141, 259. 35. Memorandum from B. Ponomarev for the CPSU the Socialist Countries,” 30 March 1966, SCCD, f. 5, 21. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, CC, “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends,” at- op. 58, d. 254, l. 172.) SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104. tached to resolution of the CPSU CC Secretariat, SCCD, 3. Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to France, SCCD, 22. A memo by Defense Minister Grechko to Brezhnev f. 4, op. 22, d. 1240, Art. No. 113/10, 12 February 1974. f. 4, op. 18, d. 582, St.-95/462 g., 14 February 1964. serves as testimony to this fact. Grechko wrote that on 36. Sometimes the situation looked simply ridiculous. 4. International Department of the CPSU CC to the CC, 30 March 1968 a U.S. F-111A plane was brought down Mentioned in the list of materials, included in “special 25 July 1964, SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 163-164. by an anti-aircraft Dvina complex in the area of Hanoi. dossiers,” is the draft decision on the reply to Le Duan’s 5. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Defense to the He also mentioned measures, adopted by Soviet experts personal message to Brezhnev, presented by the CC CPSU CC, 14 July 1967, SCCD, f. 4, op. 59, d. 416, l. to improve the anti-aircraft complexes after they had Department and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs 119-120. obtained information about the use of high-speed air- on 24 December 1974. There is the following note on 6. Top Secret Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy craft (up to 3700 km per hour) by the US air forces the card of that document, written by Brezhnev’s aide, in the DRV, “On the Political Situation in South Viet- (SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 232, ll. 9-10). Alexandrov: “to C-de K.U. Chernenko. Leonid Ilyich nam and the Position of the DRV,” 19 November 1964, 23. Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy asked to hold a vote on this proposal (he has not read the SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 253. Chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Southeast Asia text).” It turns out that top Soviet leaders signed 7. See, e.g, , Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, Department S. Nemchina and Head of the NFLSV documents either having learned the gist of the docu- the United States and the Modern Historical Experi- Permanent Mission in Moscow Dang Cuong Minh, 2 ment at best, or having read only its title. ence (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 157. September 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 416, l. 139. 37. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet 8. For further analysis of the impact of Khrushchev’s 24. Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the Charge d’Affaires in Hanoi P. Privalov and Chairman overthrow on Soviet policy toward Vietnam, see the DRV, 14 March 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 329, l. 43. of the Lao Dong Party’s Committee on the Unification paper presented by Ilya V. Gaiduk to the conference on 25. Memorandum from the State Committee on the of the Country Nguyen Van Minh, 23 August 1966, the Vietnam War held in October 1993 at the Lyndon B. Economic Relations (GKES), “On the Economic and SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264, ll. 173-174. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Technical Assistance to the Democratic Republic of 38. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 9. A memo, sent to the CPSU CC by I. Shchedrov, a Vietnam,” 29 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, ll. 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 259. Pravda correspondent in Southeast Asia, may serve as 54-55; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 39. For details, see Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy an indirect basis for such suppositions. In it Shchedrov 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 48; Soviet Embassy of the Vietnam War, and Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and analyzes the situation in the region in the first half of the in the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. the Vietnam War (forthcoming). 1960s from the viewpoint of Soviet and Chinese influ- 61, d. 459, l. 123; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political 40. KGB Memorandum, 28 January 1967, SCCD, f. 5, ence on the events in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. He Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104. op. 60, d. 680; Memorandum of Conversation between not only criticizes the Soviet Union’s restraint, shown 26. Washington’s first attempts to reach agreement Soviet Ambassador Shcherbakov and DRV Foreign before the end of 1964, and expresses concern in view with the DRV leaders were made back in 1962, under Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 15 February 1967, SCCD, of stepped-up activities by the PRC in those countries, President Kennedy’s administration, so we can only f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 145. but also offers a series of measures to improve the suppose what could be the results of those contacts, had 41. USSR Foreign Ministry, list of questions on which situation. In their time the top CPSU leadership famil- President Kennedy been alive. A. Goodman, for in- the Vietnamese comrades were informed, SCCD, f. 5, iarized themselves with that memo, and the following stance, believes that as a result of President Kennedy’s op. 60, d. 369, l. 15. note by Boris Ponomarev testifies to this: “Please read assassination, the USA lost an opportunity to reach 42. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “So- this memo and submit proposals and measures on issues agreement with Hanoi. (A.E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: viet-North Vietnamese Talks of April 1967 and the which call for them.” (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264.) America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Policy of the PTV [Workers’ Party of Vietnam] on the 10. Political Report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi for Vietnam War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, Settlement of the Vietnamese Problem,” August 1967, 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 148. 1978), 14.) SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 263. 11. Memorandum, “Soviet Moral and Political Sup- 27. To this testifies the KGB information of President 43. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for port,” SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 773, l. 59; Soviet Embassy Johnson’s talks with Italian Foreign Minister A. Fanfani 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 332, l. 133-138. in Hanoi Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, (SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 690, l. 93). 44. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for d. 263, l. 148. 28. KGB Memorandum, 11 December 1969, SCCD, f. 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 30-31. 12. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1967, 5, op. 61, d. 558, l. 178-179. 45. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 331, l. 26. 29. Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), USSR Charge d’Affaires in the DRV V. Chivilev and Le 13. Shchedrov Memorandum, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. Ministry of Defense, to CPSU CC, 23 August 1966, Duan, 2 May 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 376, l. 47. 264, l. 96. SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 262, ll. 237-238. (For an English 46. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “So- 14. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966, translation of this document, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 viet-North Vietnamese Relations After the April 1968 SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 130. (Fall 1993) 61-62.) Talks,” SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 109. 15. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet 30. The most complete records of these and other secret 47. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for Embassy in Hanoi interpreter M. Isaev and Ho Hai Vietnam peace efforts during the period 1964-68, based 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 31. Thuy, 25 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 261, l. on classified U.S. government records, can be found in 48. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 167. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459, l. 117. 16. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Commercial Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Penta- 49. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Shipping for the CPSU CC, 18 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, gon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, Ambassador V. Zorin and Xuan Thuy and Tranh Byu op. 58, d. 263, l. 38-41. The report by the Ministry of 1983). MARIGOLD and SUNFLOWER are covered Khiem, 21 February 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 460, Commercial Shipping was a source of concern by the in greater detail, using additional Soviet and U.S. sources, ll. 56-60, 131-134. (For an English translation, see Soviet leadership. It was decided to make use of the in Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 62-63. information contained in it, in the course of talks with (forthcoming). 50. Memorandum of Conversation between A. Dobrynin the DRV party and government delegation to be held in 31. KGB Memoranda, 5 and 21 July 1965 and 7 October and H. Kissinger, 12 June 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. Moscow (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 43). 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 379, 389, 533. 558, l. 103. (For an English translation of this docu- 17. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, 32. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Demo- ment, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 63-67.) The SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 109. cratic Republic of Vietnam. contents of this conversation, as the note on the docu- 18. Memorandum from Izvestia correspondent M. 33. Political letters from Soviet embassies were in fact ment testifies, were reported to Brezhnev, so the top Ilyinskii for CPSU CC, 29 January 1968, SCCD, f. 5., detailed reports of the situation in the respective coun- Soviet leadership had been informed about op. 60, d. 368, l. 19. tries, their domestic and foreign policy, and usually Washington’s intentions. 19. Memorandum from Committee of State Security written in connection with particular events. 51. William Colby and James McCargar, Lost Victory: (KGB), 21 February 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 511. 34. Political Letter, “Soviet-North Vietnamese Rela- A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year In- Regrettably, this document is kept in a “special dos- tions after the April 1968 Talks,” 1 September 1968, volvement in Vietnam (Chicago, N.Y., 1989), 335. sier,” so we have had no opportunity as yet to study it. SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 114; see also SCCD, f. 5, 20. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966, op. 60, d. 369, ll. 129, 131-132, 133. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 257

Ilya V. Gaiduk, a research scholar at the Institute MICHALOWSKI Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnam- of Universal History (IUH), Russian Academy of continued from page 241 ese would eventually express a willingness Sciences, Moscow, is the author of The Soviet to negotiate. Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. After returning to Warsaw, Michalowski Dee, forthcoming). A recipient of fellowships Operation Lumbago joined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts to from CWIHP and the Norwegian Nobel Institute, he originally presented the findings in this ar- persuade the Vietnamese that a positive sig- ticle to the January 1993 Conference on New In the early morning of 29 December nal of some kind was in their best interests. Soviet Evidence on Cold War History in Mos- 1965, Jerzy Michalowski was awakened by Working through U.S. Ambassador John cow, organized by CWIHP and IUH. The author Polish military authorities, who informed Gronouski, they made it clear that a resump- gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Oganez him that U.S. Air Force One, with ambassa- tion of bombing raids in the North would V. Marinin, then a staff archivist at SCCD (now dor Averell Harriman on board, was request- eliminate any chance for peace. Norman at the State Archive of the Russian Federation ing permission to land in Warsaw. Harriman’s Cousins, a personal friend of Lyndon [GARF]), in locating archival documents for peace mission was part of a broad diplomatic Johnson, tried to play the role of intermedi- this article. offensive that coincided with the Christmas ary in this process, but to no avail. To the bombing halt of 1965. A 14-point peace dismay of the Polish diplomats, the United plan, including immediate face-to-face ne- States resumed bombing raids on January gotiations, was presented to the Poles, with 31, and Operation Lumbago came to an the request that it be passed on to the North unsuccessful end. Vietnamese government. A meeting with Communist Party Secretary Wladislaw Operation Marigold1 RESEARCH IN MOSCOW Gomulka followed (Michalowski was not present, but he could hear Gomulka harangu- This was another attempt to bring the Scholars needing research performed ing Harriman through a thick oak door). The United States and North Vietnam together in in the Russian archives may contract next day, Michalowski departed for Hanoi, secrecy and with a minimum of precondi- with scholars at the Russian Center “Ar- with intermediate stops in Moscow and tions. This time, Polish diplomats worked chival Conversation at the Historical Beijing. Friends and co-workers were told closely with their colleagues from Italy. Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian that his absence was due to a severe bout of Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end of State University for the Humanities in lumbago. the operation. Poland’s representative to the Moscow. For further information please In Moscow, Michalowski met with For- International Control Commission, Janusz direct inquiries to: eign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who ex- Lewandowski, Italy’s ambassador to South pressed support for the mission, but pre- Vietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Am- Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov dicted (correctly) that Chinese leaders would bassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the main Historical Archives Institute (HAI) try to sabotage it in any way they could. In protagonists in Saigon. Russian State University for the Hu- Beijing, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Phase I of Marigold developed from a manities Bingnan angrily denounced any offers of discussion between Lewandowski and Pre- Moscow, Russian Federation peace and condemned Poland’s participa- mier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 in Fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964- tion in the American scheme. Michalowski Hanoi. Lewandowski learned that the North 3534 decided to terminate the meeting when Wang Vietnamese would be willing to begin peace Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or became abusive. This stormy session was negotiations, provided the U.S. suspended (7-095) 925-5019 followed by a lavish banquet, with many the bombing campaign. He relayed this cordial toasts and remarks. Arriving in Hanoi information to Orlandi who, in turn, notified Scholars may also address inquiries on January 4, Michalowski was met by For- U.S. ambassador Lodge. The American side regarding possible collaboration for re- eign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, whose was anxious to know whether Hanoi would search in Russian archives to: initial response to the American offers was make any overt sign of accommodation (such unenthusiastic. The Vietnamese, he claimed, as refraining from offensive military opera- Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian were doing well on the battlefield, and the tions in the South, or reducing traffic along Director time had not yet come to exploit these suc- the Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bomb- Institute of Universal History cesses at the negotiating table. The same ing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polish Leninsky prospekt 32a sentiments were echoed during the next two diplomats could obtain no assurances from 117334 Moscow, Russian Federation days by Prime Minister Phan Van Dong (less Hanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries. Fax: (7-095) 938-2288 emphatically) and Party Secretary Ho Chi Phase II was a lengthier and more com- Telephone: (7-095) 938-1009 Minh (in much stronger terms). plex operation that began when ambassador Michalowski’s account of these discussions Lodge requested that Lewandowski present makes clear that the Poles were acting as a 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnam- strong advocates of the peace process, pre- ese. This time, an unconditional bombing senting the American plan in as favorable a halt would precede the substantive negotia- light as possible. As he left Hanoi, tions. Rapacki and Michalowski under- 258 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN stood the importance of this new develop- conveyed to Phan Van Dong by Poland’s building. Following the toasts and ment, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid ambassador Siedlecki. The Vietnamese, sentimental speeches I was prepar- Brezhnev, who encouraged them to pro- still smarting from the bombing raids of ing to leave, when Dean Rusk’s ceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went to early December, and under intense pressure secretary informed me that he would Beijing at about the same time, where he from China, refused to discuss the matter like to have a few words with me in received contradictory advice from Mao any further. Operation Marigold had failed. private. Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The great hopes that were raised by Rusk was subdued as he spoke Phan Van Dong’s reply to Lewandowski Marigold, and its dramatic collapse, gave at length about his upcoming aca- generated considerable excitement since it rise to many commentaries, explanations, demic work, and his retirement contained a request to arrange an unprec- and to some finger-pointing. In his report, plans. Then he said: “During my edented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw, Jerzy Michalowski provides a detailed re- long tenure as Secretary of State, between the Americans and the North Viet- buttal of certain claims made by Henry Cabot I’m sure I made many erroneous namese. Rapacki and Michalowski began a Lodge in his memoirs. Michalowski had the judgments and bad decisions. But series of consultations with John Gronouski, opportunity to discuss Marigold with Presi- my intentions were always pure, to set the stage for these critical talks. From dent Johnson in September of 1967. LBJ did and I acted according to the dictates the beginning, however, difficulties emerged. not accept Michalowski’s interpretation of of my conscience. Thus, I have no First, the American side began to express the events, nor would he acknowledge the regrets. Except for one thing—that doubts about certain unspecified details of continuing determination of the North Viet- in 1966 we did not take advantage the 10-point plan as it had been recorded by namese to keep fighting. In time, he would of the opportunities and your role Lewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese gov- change his views. as go-between. We should have ernment, opposed to any talks, increased its After personally witnessing some of the begun a negotiating process that, pressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all, unsuccessful attempts to end America’s en- with your help, could have ended a the tempo and brutality of American bomb- tanglement in Vietnam, after discussing the conflict that has cost us so much ing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up. events with many of the participants, and blood and treasure, and that now On December 13 and 14, the center of the after studying many of the relevant docu- has cost us the election. I wanted to city was hit for the first time. Stunned by ments, Michalowski closes his report with a say this to you today, to thank you these attacks, the North Vietnamese with- strong indictment of U.S. policy. He is for your efforts, and to ask that you drew their offer to meet. In a dramatic convinced that Lyndon Johnson and his circle convey my words to Minister confrontation on December 19, when of hawkish advisors never understood how Rapacki.” Gronouski accused the Poles of acting in bad diplomatic efforts could lead to the resolu- faith, Rapacki’s frustration overflowed: he tion of what they saw as an essentially mili- 1. [Ed. note: For the declassified U.S. account of Opera- smashed his glasses down on the table, and tary crisis. Thus, the President’s half-hearted tion Marigold, see George C. Herring, ed., The Secret they flew into the American ambassador’s attempts to seek non-military solutions (such Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Vol- umes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University face. Operation Marigold appeared to be as Marigold) were doomed, mocking the of Texas Press, 1983), 209-370.] dead. hard work and good will of dozens of com- The Poles continued to hope that a basis mitted professional diplomats all around the for face-to-face talks still existed, however. world. They briefed UN General Secretary U Thant, Here is what Michalowski writes on the who promised to do whatever he could. last page of his report: They also contacted Pope Paul VI (using Italian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary). Based on newly-revealed The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and to documents and memoirs, we now Washington, begging both sides to save the know that Secretary of State Dean peace process. Gronouski left Warsaw to Rusk was one of the chief “hawks” consult with President Johnson, while in the ornithological roster of Presi- Rapacki drafted an urgent appeal from mem- dent Johnson’s advisors. Thus, the bers of the Polish Politburo to their counter- surprising nature of the event that I parts in Hanoi, calling for a reconsideration now relate in closing this account of the American proposals. As snowstorms of Polish peace initiatives in Viet- closed down airports all over Europe, nam. Gronouski returned to Warsaw unexpect- January 19, 1969 was the eve edly, and requested a meeting with Rapacki of the inauguration of President on Christmas Eve. He announced that all Richard Nixon. The departing Sec- bombing with 10 miles of the center of retary of State met with the Wash- Hanoi had been suspended, and that he was ington diplomatic corps in a sad, ready to meet with a Vietnamese representa- but formal, ceremony on the sev- tive in Warsaw. This message was promptly enth floor of the State Department COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 259 CAMBODIA AND THE COLD WAR

THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS: ARCHIVES THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROGRAM

by Kenton J. Clymer [Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the Cambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, On a graceful boulevard radiating out Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center for from Wat Phnom in Cambodia’s capital, International Human Rights, Yale University.] Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly reno- vated National Library of Cambodia. Built Executive Summary by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24 December 1924), the library also housed the The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the country’s archives. A separate archives documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of building, located directly behind the Na- ’s Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement tional Library (and thus not visible from the “the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library, Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 it still awaits renovation. Designed with and January 7, 1979.” [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year high ceilings, large windows, and electric mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit: ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated the best available technology for preserving 1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress books and manuscripts in tropical climates. Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to During the French colonial period and organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime’s crimes. The after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the 1975, the library and archives were admin- genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian istered jointly. In 1986, however, following Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference, the Vietnamese model, they were separated. chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21 The library is controlled by the Ministry of and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by Information and Culture, while the archives the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal reports to the Council of Ministries.1 violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in During the terrible period of the Khmer Cambodia. Cambodia’s two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both Rouge (1975-78), the library and archives praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others, were home to pig keepers, who served the including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of Chinese advisers living in the hotel next Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers. door. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gar- dens. All of the staff from the library and 2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide archives, about forty people, fled. Only a Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators handful survived the Khmer Rouge regime, of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in and only two or three returned to work in the assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian library once the Khmer Rouge were driven genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the out in 1979. Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites The library’s holdings today are only a across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom fraction of what they were in 1975. But comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal may not have systematically destroyed books acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot’s and documents.2 To be sure many books 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer were ruined, some simply pushed off the Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare shelves to make room for cooking pots, documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the others used for cooking fires or for cigarette first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages papers.3 Subsequent neglect and misman- on the Pol Pot regime. Yale’s CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of agement made matters worse, arguably much Yale’s singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal worse. Many books that did survive the resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute Khmer Rouge years were improperly stored this complex research undertaking. and soon succumbed to insects and the ele- ments. Two Australians archivists, Helen 3. Recreating Lost Histories Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge continued on page 265 260 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN regime had been contemplated. The Cam- genocide and crimes against humanity ever contract with the U.S. Department of State, bodian Genocide Program has nine new perpetrated. While those responsible for the Mr. Jason Abrams of the Open Society Insti- histories already underway, comprising de- Nazi Holocaust in the first half of the 20th tute and Professor Steven Ratner of the Uni- tailed and original research on the fates of century were punished, there has been little versity of Texas are now completing a study various regions and population groups into effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice of options for legal redress of criminal hu- which Pol Pot’s regime divided Cambodia. for the atrocities they committed. In 1994, man rights violations during the Democratic In the process, Cambodian scholars are be- the U.S. Congress sought to address this Kampuchea (DK) regime between 17 April ing trained in both social science methods problem by enacting the Cambodian Geno- 1975 and 7 January 1979. When it is com- and computer documentation. In addition to cide Justice Act. A team of world-class pleted, the study will offer an analysis of the these nine separate studies in preparation, Cambodia scholars based at Yale was cho- most probable cases of violations of crimi- others are in the planning stage. The first sen to receive funding from the U.S. Depart- nal human rights laws under the DK regime, volume of these studies is to be published in ment of State, and subsequently, by the and the most likely avenues for redress. 1997. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs Abrams and Ratner have tentatively con- and Trade. That team has now, in three cluded that the Khmer Rouge are culpable 4. Training Cambodian Lawyers quarters of a year, made tremendous progress on several counts of violating international Until now, the legal expertise did not in remedying this omission of justice and criminal laws concerning genocide, war exist in Cambodia to support a trial of Khmer accountability. Four major problems face crimes, and crimes against humanity. They Rouge leaders utilizing due process guaran- any effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to further have concluded that there are several tees and unimpeachable evidentiary stan- justice: possible avenues for legal redress of these dards. The Cambodian Genocide Program 1) a paucity of specific documen- criminal violations, including an ad hoc in- has just graduated the first class of seventeen tary evidence linking high-level ternational tribunal, a domestic Cambodian Cambodian legal professionals, government policymakers and military person- tribunal, and/or some form of an interna- officials, and human rights workers from nel to acts of genocide and crimes tional commission of inquiry. CGP’s nine-week intensive summer school against humanity; At the Striving for Justice Conference, on international criminal law and interna- 2) insufficient training of Cambo- Abrams and Ratner presented their draft tional human rights law. The school was dian officials and lawyers with the conclusions to an invitation-only audience held in Phnom Penh from June to August political will and legal skills to bring of nearly 100 distinguished guests. The au- 1995, with the participation of the Orville H. the Khmer Rouge to justice; dience consisted of representatives from the Schell Jr. Center for International Human 3) insufficient awareness among Offices of the Co-Prime Ministers, the Rights at the Yale Law School. A second Cambodian policymakers of the op- Deputy Prime Minister, the Council of Min- summer school will be held in Cambodia in tions available for legal redress of isters, several key ministries including Inte- mid-1996. The individuals trained in the genocide and crimes against human- rior and Justice, numerous Cambodian and CGP program will be able to staff a domestic ity; and international human rights organizations, or international tribunal. 4) the lack of a permanent, indig- members of the Cambodian National As- enous Cambodian NGO tasked to sembly, a representative of the United Na- 5. Creating a Permanent Cambodian carry out independent research and tions Secretary General, a member of the Documentation Center documentation on the Cambodian U.S. Congress, and others. The conference Until now, no “center of gravity” ex- genocide. was also addressed by the First Prime Min- isted in Cambodia to provide a spark for the Yale University’s Cambodian Geno- ister, His Royal Highness Samdech Krom serious study of what happened to Cambo- cide Program is making excellent progress Preah Norodom Ranariddh, and the Second dian society during the Khmer Rouge re- toward solution of these four problems. Prime Minister, His Excellency Samdech gime. The Cambodian Genocide Program That progress is described in this First In- Hun Sen. The conference offered extensive has established an international non-gov- terim Progress Report of the Cambodian opportunities for discussion and exchange ernmental organization in Phnom Penh, Genocide Program. of ideas among the participants. Conference known as the Documentation Center of Cam- Identifying Legal Options for Redress. participants reached a clear consensus on the bodia. The Documentation Center is facili- Until now, no conference of Cambodian and need for accountability, and outlined impor- tating the field operations of the CGP, train- international observers has examined spe- tant specific next steps to be taken to bring ing Cambodians in research and investiga- cific legal options for redress of Cambodia’s the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice. tive techniques, and will enable an indig- genocide. On 21 and 22 August 1995, the Documentation Databases. The Cam- enous organization to continue the work of Cambodian Genocide Program hosted an bodian Genocide Program is assembling an the program after the conclusion of the CGP international conference under the banner, elaborate family of databases collectively mandate in January 1997. “Striving for Justice: International Criminal known as the Cambodian Genocide Data Law in the Cambodian Context.” The Striv- Base (CGDB). Using the Computerized Introduction ing for Justice Conference brought together Documentation System (CDS/ISIS) de- a wide range of interested observers and signed by UNESCO and modified to suit In Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the decisionmakers for discussions with two CGP’s particular needs by our program- world witnessed one of the worst cases of international criminal law experts. Under a mers, CGP is making rapid progress in the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 261 compilation of all known primary and sec- mately 1000 records representing some plished the scanning of several hundred rel- ondary material relating to the Khmer Rouge 50,000 pages of documentation had been evant documents, including a near-complete regime. The Program has already obtained entered into the bibliographical database. set of the records in Khmer from the 1979 in access to several little-known caches of The Victim Database. The Cambodian absentia genocide tribunal of Pol Pot and documents, including a DK Foreign Minis- Genocide Program has made arrangements Ieng Sary. Using custom software already try archive, archives of the DK Trade Min- to obtain and make electronically accessible designed specifically for CGP, CGDB users istry, the only known surviving archive from to an international audience Dr. Justin will be able to browse through the biblio- a DK regional prison, original maps of Corfield’s biographical database containing graphic database and, upon finding a record Khmer Rouge killing fields, and several more than 40,000 entries on the Cambodian of particular interest, “jump” to a full digital collections of rare photographs taken by the elite. We express our thanks to Dr. Corfield. image of that specific document with the DK regime itself. Another collection made We have plans to expand this database with “click” of a mouse. This capability can available to the CGP includes a set of inter- additional information obtained as a result of considerably expedite the search for incrimi- nal minutes of key meetings of the DK our original research. Given the patterns of nating evidence of genocidal intent. “Party Center” held in 1975 and 1976. CGP violence in Democratic Kampuchea, it is The Geographic Database. The Cam- currently has two missions at work in Viet- likely that a large number of the individuals bodian Genocide Program is also in the nam, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, listed in this database became victims of the process of constructing an elaborate com- searching for relevant documentation in state Khmer Rouge. Thus this database may be- puter-based map showing the physical loca- and private archives. come useful for identifying and cross-ref- tions of facilities of the Khmer Rouge “inter- These databases will bridge a huge gap erencing victims of genocide and crimes nal security” apparatus, including prison and in the case against the Khmer Rouge. Be- against humanity. “killing field” sites. The Cambodian Mine cause these databases did not previously The Photographic Database. The Cam- Action Center established by the United exist, policymakers could not precisely iden- bodian Genocide Program is preparing to Nations Transitional Authority in Cambo- tify victims and perpetrators, nor could they scan several large collections of photographs dia has designed standardized software for establish empirical links between the two on into the CGDB. These collections contain a mapping work in Cambodia, and CGP has a national scale. Yale’s CGDB resolves this significant number of items which are likely obtained access to this system for our pur- problem. When the databases are complete, to have a high degree of evidentiary value for poses. Utilizing the Global Positioning Sys- an investigator using them could, for ex- the prosecution. Examples include a large tem to pinpoint the precise coordinates of ample, identify individual victims and per- number of photos of DK leaders, of forced locations identified by our researchers, CGP petrators of a particular atrocity, perhaps labor brigades, and the entire collection of will accurately map the Khmer Rouge terror with photographs and biographies of the prisoner photographs from the Tuol Sleng system and the resting places of its victims. individuals in question. Yale’s CGP is Genocide Museum. Most of the 4,000 pris- The resulting display is likely to constitute uniquely qualified to carry out this work oner mugshots are currently not accompa- an incriminating indictment of the scope of because of Yale’s singular combination of nied by any identification of the prisoners. Khmer Rouge terror, providing strong evi- Cambodia area and archival studies, geno- By making these photographs available on dence of widespread crimes against human- cide research, legal resources, information the internet, and adding to the database a ity. systems, and geographical expertise neces- special field for readers to key in suggested Disseminating the Databases. In addi- sary to effectively execute this complex names for each photograph, we hope to ob- tion to publishing analytical indexes of the research undertaking. tain identities for many of the victims of the databases, user access to the computer data- The Bibliographic Databases. The bib- Khmer Rouge. The names could be used to bases themselves will be enabled in several liographic database will contain records on prosecute perpetrators on charges of killing ways. First, physical copies of the database this new material and on all other known specific persons. will be deposited at several locations in the primary and secondary sources of informa- The Khmer Rouge Biographical Data- United States and Cambodia. Second, we tion pertaining to the Khmer Rouge regime, base. The Cambodian Genocide Program is hope to make the entire database available including books, articles, monographs, docu- assembling a second biographical database on CD-ROM. Finally, through the Internet, ments, reports, interviews, tapes, films and containing data on members of the Khmer the database will be made accessible to all videos, transcripts, and so forth. As noted, Rouge organization between 1975 and 1979. interested parties worldwide. The projected CGP research efforts have already led to a This database will include both political and implementation date for the online genocide dramatic increase in existing documentary military leadership, down to the srok (dis- database is early 1997. evidence through discovery of previously trict) level. Thus this database will be useful Collecting and compiling data on Cam- unknown archival sources. Rapid progress for identifying the chain of command in bodia under the Khmer Rouge will be one of has been made with the design and estab- various regions at various times, and in es- the most significant contributions of the lishment of this database. The initial pro- tablishing command responsibility for par- CGP, for both historical and legal reasons. gram timelines projected the creation of ticular atrocities. Organizing this mass of new information some three hundred records in a biblio- The Imaging Database. The Cambo- into a structured whole will enable citizens graphic database by the end of December dian Genocide Program is in the process of to fully comprehend the nightmare of what 1995. That milestone was achieved in Feb- scanning images of original DK documents happened in Cambodia under the Khmer ruary 1995. As of August 1995, approxi- into the database. We have already accom- Rouge. It will allow historians to compile a 262 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN more compelling and accurate picture of the tance in synthesizing the general and the for MA’s at Yale, in History and Interna- past. It will allow policymakers to fashion a particular in Cambodia’s genocide. Few tional Relations. Training of Khmer staff case for the necessity of accountability for detailed studies exist of particular regions and researchers in Cambodia on all aspects the Cambodian genocide. And it will pro- under the Khmer Rouge, and so up to now it of operating the Documentation Center of vide prosecutors with critical information has been impossible to assemble a complete Cambodia is also occurring on a weekly on crimes committed by specific individu- picture of what happened on a national scale. basis. als. By breaking down the research task into Until now, no one in Cambodia had the Research. Cambodian Genocide Pro- particular regions, and simultaneously se- range of legal skills required to bring the gram Director Ben Kiernan’s new book, The lecting several integrating themes such as Khmer Rouge to justice in fair and procedur- Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide the Party Center, Cham Muslims, Buddhists ally sound trials. The CGP’s training pro- in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975- and women, the CGP studies will recon- grams have directly addressed this short- 1979, will soon be available from Yale Uni- struct the nexus between the local situation coming. This is consistent with the Cambo- versity Press. A comprehensive survey of and national policy. This will provide cru- dian Genocide Justice Act, which states that the Cambodian genocide, it provides a cial analytical evidence of the extent of it is “the policy of the United States to baseline of existing information from which national control by the Khmer Rouge, and support efforts to bring to justice members more specific research can be initiated. The the impact of this control on all the people of of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against CGP has already begun implementing a wide Cambodia. humanity committed in Cambodia between range of new social science research on the Legal Training Project. On 18 August April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979.” [PL Cambodian genocide. 1995, the Cambodian Genocide Program 103-236, Sec. 572.] For instance, six professional Cambo- produced its first graduates in international The Documentation Center of Cambo- dian researchers and an American have been criminal law and international human rights dia. The Documentation Center of Cambo- at work for several months on new histories law. Seventeen Cambodian legal profes- dia (“DC-Cam”) is a non-profit international of the seven geographic zones and regions of sionals successfully completed the nine-week non-governmental organization (NGO) es- the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime: training program, including officials from tablished in January 1995 by the CGP to the Southwest Zone, the Western Zone, the the Ministries of Justice and Interior, the facilitate training and field research in Cam- Northwest Zone, the Siemreap-Oddar Council of Ministers, and three Cambodian bodia related to the CGP’s mission. With Meanchey Region, the Northern Zone, the non-governmental human rights organiza- offices in Phnom Penh, the DC-Cam serves Northeast Zone (including Kratie) and the tions. The training covered principles of as a base of operations for the documenta- Eastern Zone. One of these 70-page mono- international criminal law pertaining to geno- tion, research and training activities carried graphs is already well on the way to comple- cide, crimes against humanity and war out under the auspices of the CGP. The staff tion, and the others are expected to be com- crimes; the structure of national and interna- of DC-Cam is entirely Cambodian in com- pleted in 1996, for publication in 1997. tional legal enforcement mechanisms, in- position, and weekly staff development train- The Cambodian Genocide Program has cluding national courts, ad hoc international ing is already in progress to prepare indig- also commissioned several additional stud- tribunals, the International Court of Justice, enous personnel to assume full responsibil- ies, including one of the DK “Party Center” and truth commissions; and the requirements ity for all aspects of operations in 1997. (whose members included Pol Pot, Nuon of due process and evidentiary standards. In January 1997, at the conclusion of the Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, The Cambodian Genocide Program will CGP’s mandate, DC-Cam will be trans- Ieng Thirith, Yun Yat, Mok, Ke Pauk and build on this foundation next year to further formed into a Cambodian NGO to serve as a Vorn Vet). This monograph will examine enhance the capacity of the Cambodian legal permanent institute for the study of topics the Khmer Rouge chain of command and the system to cope with the anticipated political related to the Khmer Rouge regime, and as a degree of central authority over events in the decision to move forward with legal redress resource for Cambodians and others who zones and regions. This study will com- for crimes committed during the Pol Pot may wish to pursue legal redress for geno- mence in September 1995, and is expected regime. After consulting with the Royal cide, war crimes and crimes against human- to be completed in 1996. The CGP has Cambodian Government and other inter- ity perpetrated under that regime. The docu- commissioned a further study of the geno- ested observers as to the preferred fora for mentation and research products of the CGP cide against the Cham Muslim minority un- seeking redress, the CGP will fashion a will be deposited with the Documentation der the Pol Pot regime, and work on this second training project designed to incul- Center of Cambodia for access by the Cam- monograph will also commence in Septem- cate the skills necessary to implement those bodian people. ber 1995. In addition, the CGP plans new means of redress selected by the appropriate [For those who have access to the monographs on the Buddhist monkhood, on political authorities. internet, DC-Cam has a World Wide Web women, and on the Vietnamese, Chinese Several additional varieties of training HomePage containing more information and tribal minorities, focussing on the fate of under CGP auspices are in progress. Train- about that organization, located at http:// these population cohorts under the Pol Pot ing of Khmer researchers in Cambodia on www.pactok.net.au. The Documentation regime. We expect at least one and possibly social science methods, historiography and Center e-mail address is two collected volumes of these monographs database management has been proceeding [email protected].] to be published in 1997 and 1998. since June 1995 on a weekly basis. Two Research Collaboration. The Cambo- These studies will be of crucial impor- Cambodian scholars are currently enrolled dian Genocide Program has won strong sup- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 263 port from the worldwide Cambodia studies Cambodians have become full partners in the Khmer Rouge violated the most central community (see “Scholars Speak out on CGP’s work. His Majesty King Norodom norms of international law and this clearly Cambodia Holocaust,” letter to the Wall Sihanouk wrote to CGP Manager Dr. Craig affected the interests of all states in general Street Journal, signed by 29 Cambodia Etcheson on 21 July 1995, “I infinitely thank and Cambodia in particular.” His Royal scholars and specialists, 13 July 1995). These the distinguished promoters of this research Highness the First Prime Minister added, scholars represent virtually the entire field program, especially Dr. Ben Kiernan and “The Royal Government is determined to of Cambodian studies. Leading Cambodian yourself, for the care that you have mani- bring those responsible for the perpetration scholars David P. Chandler, Milton E. fested, thanks to the ‘Cambodian Genocide of these heinous crimes against the Cambo- Osborne, and Michael Vickery have already Program,’ in nourishing truth and promoting dian people to face justice.” In his closing provided help in various ways. Others who and assuring respect for human rights in my address to the conference, His Excellency have responded positively to requests for country.” Samdech Hun Sen summed up the view of information on their personal archival hold- Since the earliest days of the CGP in many participants by saying of the confer- ings include Justin Corfield, Mark Dodd, January 1995, the Royal Cambodian Gov- ence, “This is not about politics, it is about Stephen Heder, Henri Locard, and Judy ernment has been unreservedly supportive of justice. If we do not bring the Khmer Rouge Ledgerwood. Additional Cambodia schol- the mandate given to Yale University by the to justice for killing millions of people, then ars like David Ashley and Jason Roberts U.S. government. The Co-Prime Ministers, there is no point in speaking about human have generously offered to work with the the Deputy Prime Minister, the Co-Ministers rights in Cambodia.” CGP on a volunteer basis. of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Co- Large numbers of ordinary Cambodian An Australian professional working Ministers of Defense, and the President of citizens seem to concur with the Co-Prime with the CGP has also initiated a project to the National Assembly have all pledged their Ministers. Many Cambodians in Cambodia, begin the computer mapping of Khmer personal and institutional cooperation with the U.S., and other countries have volun- Rouge prison and mass grave sites. This the CGP. Enthusiasm about the goals of the teered their assistance. Since June 1995, a project has now been funded by the Austra- program transcends political affiliation, with team of Cambodian volunteers in New Ha- lian government at the level of A$24,300. support coming from the leadership of all ven, CT, has been preparing a biographical Additional funding is being sought. This is three parties represented in the government. index of Khmer Rouge political leaders and the first time anyone has attempted to con- But the cooperation of the Royal Govern- military commanders. As of September struct a comprehensive inventory of the ment has gone far beyond pledges. The 1995, Cambodian-American citizens’ terror apparatus used by the Khmer Rouge Royal Government is providing the CGP groups in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, regime to murder up to two million people. with a wide range of resources to facilitate Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, California, and In June, July, and August 1995, CGP our work in Cambodia and in the region at Texas have offered to compile witness testi- Director Ben Kiernan presented the large. mony on behalf of the CGP. The thirst for Program’s work-in-progress at the U.S. Fo- At the Striving for Justice Conference in justice is powerful among the survivors of rum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995, First Pol Pot’s genocide. New York), at Monash University and the Prime Minister Samdech Krom Preah Consistent with these feelings of ordi- University of New South Wales (in Austra- Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Min- nary Cambodians and the policy of the gov- lia), and at the Foreign Correspondents’ ister Samdech Hun Sen publicly committed ernment, the CGP has received from the Club in Phnom Penh. These occasions all the Royal Cambodian Government to bring Royal Cambodian Government significant produced new collaboration from foreign the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice for assistance to our research program. One of scholars and specialists, ranging from an their crimes against humanity. In his open- the most useful forms of this aid is the offer of a large biographic database to a ing address to the conference, the First Prime unprecedented assistance from the Royal promise of rare photographs of the Pol Pot Minister complimented the CGP, saying, Government in retrieving documentation leadership. The ability of the CGP to attract “On behalf of the Royal Government, on from Vietnam unavailable to researchers up the cooperation of Cambodia scholars, along behalf of Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime until now. In combination with previously with legal and technical experts worldwide, Minister, and on my own behalf, I would like unexamined archives from the Cambodian is a key factor in explaining the success of to express my deepest appreciation and warm- People’s Party, Royal Government minis- the Program to date. est congratulations to the Office of Cambo- tries, and private archives now being opened Cambodian Reception of the CGP. dian Genocide Investigation and Yale Uni- to the CGP in Cambodia, a wealth of new Cambodian leaders have complained for versity for embarking on the two years data pertaining to criminal culpability dur- years that the outside world had not recog- programme of documentation, research and ing the Khmer Rouge regime seems destined nized the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and training on the Cambodian genocide. I would to come to light. It is the expressed policy of the tragedy of the Cambodian people. The also like to express my sincere thanks equally the Royal Government to assist the CGP in initiation of the Cambodian Genocide Pro- to the United States to create the Cambodian uncovering such important information. gram helped answer this complaint on an Genocide Justice Act and its appointment of Evaluation. To ensure objectivity and international scale. This measure of recog- Yale University to carry out the two year quality control, the CGP has instituted a nition sparked a new willingness among the programme.” rigorous two-tier system of program evalu- Cambodian political elite to squarely face Substantively, the First Prime Minister ation. In the first tier, the Steering Group of the darkest chapter of Cambodian history. argued, “The international crimes of the the Department of State’s Office of Cambo- 264 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN dian Genocide Investigations conducts peri- CAMBODIAN ARCHIVES very unlikely that a reply will be sent even if odic external reviews of CGP operations. continued from page 260 the letter is received), but I was able to obtain As a basis for these evaluations, in May 1995 permission in Phnom Penh without great CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson produced Jarvis and Peter Arfanis, who visited the difficulty. It may, however, take a few days. a 209-page Implementation Plan outlining archives at the end of 1992 were “dismayed (The first time I applied on the Friday before the Program’s strategy for achieving its ob- at what we saw. . . . Valuable records from a holiday week. Nevertheless, permission to jectives. The first external evaluation, held the French colonial days are on the floors use the archives was received the Monday in June 1995, termed the progress of CGP and shelves rotting away. About 50% of the following the holidays.) operations “excellent” (Time Magazine, 26 records—and there are about 2000 linear The archives is open only about four or June 1995). metres of records all up—are either wrapped five hours per day. Many documents remain CGP also carries out an internal review in brown paper or still in their original boxes. wrapped in paper. The documents them- process, staffed by distinguished experts in The boxes have been constructed from acidic selves are often in very fragile condition, international law and genocide investiga- pasteboard, starch-filled cloth, and protein and insects sometimes scurry out from among tion, such as Professor Cherif Bassiouni, adhesive which has promoted insect infiltra- the pages. There is no working electricity in former Chair of the United Nations Com- tion, mainly termites and beetle larvae. Other the building, and plumbing is rudimentary. mission of Experts for the inquiry on viola- records are sitting unwrapped gathering dust, Miss Kim Ly, the archivist, is helpful, as are 4 tions of international humanitarian law in mould and also being attacked by insects.” other members of the staff. Kim Ly under- the Former Yugoslavia (predecessor to the By the end of 1994, conditions were still stands French and some English. Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal). The first far from good. During my two visits to the In May 1994, there were few research- round of internal evaluation of CGP opera- archives that year, stacks of books, most ers (often I was alone in the building), and tions began in June 1995. This evaluation beyond repair, still stood on the floor of the the rainy season added to a sense of gloom has already produced numerous useful ideas library’s storage areas and in the archives. and foreboding resulting from reports of for improving various aspects of our opera- Wrapped and unwrapped documents re- rebel Khmer Rouge gains in the countryside. tions, and yielded an overall positive ap- mained on dusty shelves in the archives, and But by December the Khmer Rough threat praisal of CGP progress. According to one insect damage was evident everywhere. Nev- seemed to have receded. Now government evaluator, “Your thoughtful and methodical ertheless, thanks to the dedication of some officials and private citizens did come by to explanations for the preparation of such a Cambodians and some foreign (mainly Aus- consult the archive’s records. School chil- project should serve as a model for the tralian) assistance, there have been improve- dren also visited. The library was heavily documentation and analysis of crimes against ments, and the archives can in any event be used, especially in December when there humanity in other countries.... The training used. There are now typescript guides to was a very well attended celebration of the program designed to support the project is some of the more important documentary library’s seventieth anniversary. Perhaps outstanding.” collections, and proper archival storage this is a hopeful sign of Cambodia’s return- Summary. In 1994 the prospect of a boxes, a gift from Australia, are increasingly ing health. trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders seemed being used. The archives contain numerous, if eclec- remote. Now, through the work of the Cam- 1. Peter Arfanis and Helen Jarvis, “Archives in Cambo- bodian Genocide Program, it has become a tic, works including official journals, the dia: Neglected Institutions,” Archives and Manuscripts strong probability. In 1994, the information United States Civil Code, Russian encyclo- [Australia] 21:2 (1993), 252-62. 2. Ibid., 255. George Smith, a librarian employed by the resources and legal evidence necessary for a pedias, and works from the French period. More significant are the collections of pub- state of Alaska, made the same point in a paper deliv- judicial accounting of the genocide had yet ered at the “Seminar on the Khmer Culture’s Revival,” to be identified or assembled, and the re- lished and unpublished documents that have Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 21 December 1994. quired legal skills did not yet exist. These survived. The bulk of the collection consists 3. Helen Jarvis, “The National Library of Cambodia: Suriving Seventy Years of Drastic Socio-Economic prerequisites are now well on the way to- of those colonial records which the French did not take with them when they left, par- Impact,” Paper delivered at CONSAL9, the Ninth Con- ward fulfillment. By the end of 1996, when gress of Southeast Asian Librarians, Bangkok, Thai- the CGP’s mandate will expire, an interna- ticularly records of the Résidence Supérieure land, 2-6 May 1993. tional Cambodian genocide tribunal may du Cambodge. Some of the manuscripts 4. Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambodia,” 256-57. 5. For a more complete description of the archive’s have already commenced functioning. By date to the late nineteenth century and con- cern a wide range of mostly domestic mat- holdings, see Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambo- then, the CGP will certainly have provided dia.” the scholarly and legal resources for Cambo- ters. These, along with some printed For- dians to pursue their own justice for the eign Affairs records from the 1950s and victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. In 1960s, were the documents most useful to Kenton J. Clymer, professor of history and short, the Cambodian Genocide Program me. However, other records concern the department chair at the University of Texas has taken major steps to fulfill its own three- Buddhist Institute, Norodom Sihanouk, and at El Paso, is researching a history of U.S.- 5 part mandate: to expose and document the the Khmer Rouge period. Cambodian relations. His most recent book crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and to hold the Permission is required to use the ar- is Quest for Freedom: The United States and perpetrators accountable. chives, and prospective researchers need to India’s Independence (New York: Colum- apply at the Council of Ministers. There is bia University Press, 1995). no fee. Writing ahead might be useful (it is COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 265

RESEARCH NOTE: ing World War II. When the GKO was for Internal Affairs (NKVD) since 1941, DOCUMENTING THE EARLY disbanded on 4 , the Special serving with the rank of general. SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS Committee was recast as a “Special Commit- Fourth, Vannikov was appointed chair- PROGRAM tee of the USSR Council of People’s Com- man of the Technical Council, and Alikhanov missars.” (The Council of People’s Com- was appointed the scientific secretary of the by Mark Kramer missars was itself renamed the USSR Coun- Council. The text of Stalin’s edict does not cil of Ministers in March 1946.) Shortly after bear out David Holloway’s assertion (in Two recent developments pertaining to Beria’s arrest on 26 June 1953, the Special Stalin and the Bomb, p. 135) that Pervukhin, the early Soviet nuclear weapons program— Committee of the USSR Council of Minis- Zavenyagin, and Kurchatov were appointed the declassification of an edict promulgated ters (as it was then known) was dissolved, deputies to Vannikov on the Council. In by Josif Stalin in August 1945, and the and the staff and organizations under its fact, Pervukhin, as noted above, was not on issuance of a directive by the Russian gov- control were transferred to the newly formed the Technical Council at all. Zavenyagin ernment in mid-1995—are worth noting. Ministry of Medium Machine-Building. and Kurchatov were members of the Coun- Each development is covered here briefly, Second, the edict provided for the cre- cil, but were not listed as deputy chairmen. and the relevant documentation is provided ation of a Technical Council, which was to Fifth, the other new subordinate organ at the end. report directly to the GKO’s Special Com- created by Stalin’s edict—a First Main Di- mittee. Until now, Western experts such as rectorate of the Council of People’s Com- The Establishment of Beria’s David Holloway had thought that the Tech- missars—also was placed under Vannikov’s Special Committee nical Council was set up as an integral part of supervision, and Zavenyagin was appointed the newly-created First Main Directorate of a first deputy. Vannikov and Zavenyagin Exploration of the basic processes in- the Council of People’s Commissars (an thus enjoyed the distinction of serving on all volved in nuclear fission began in the Soviet entity that is discussed below).1 A close look three of the main bodies created by Stalin’s Union well before World War II, and seri- at Stalin’s edict shows that on this point edict. Four officials who were not on either ous work aimed at building nuclear weap- Holloway was incorrect. The Technical the GKO’s Special Committee or the Tech- ons was initiated at a top-secret research Council was established as a separate body nical Council were appointed deputy heads facility in Moscow, known simply as Labo- under the Special Committee, not under the of the First Main Directorate: Nikolai ratory No. 2, in early 1943. Over the next First Main Directorate (which itself was sub- Borisov, the deputy chairman of Gosplan; two years the Soviet nuclear bomb program ordinated to the Special Committee). Pyotr Meshik, the head of the NKVD’s eco- was spurred on by intelligence disclosures Third, of the nine members of the GKO’s nomic directorate and deputy head of the about the Project in the United Special Committee, five were also members “Smersh” Main Counterintelligence Direc- States, but it was not until after the fighting of the 11-man Technical Council. The ex- torate; Andrei Kasatkin, the First Deputy ended—and the technical feasibility of ceptions were Beria, Georgii Malenkov, People’s Commissar for the Chemical In- nuclear weaponry had been vividly demon- Nikolai Voznesenskii, and Mikhail dustry (which Pervukhin headed); and Pyotr strated by the bombs dropped on Hiroshima Pervukhin. (N.B.: Nikolai Voznesenskii, Antropov, a geologist and deputy member and Nagasaki—that an all-out program was the director of the State Planning Commit- of the GKO. Antropov was placed in charge launched in the USSR. On 20 August 1945, tee—known as Gosplan for short—should of a commission responsible for the explora- the supreme leader of the Soviet Union and not be confused with the distinguished physi- tion and mining of uranium. chairman of the wartime State Defense Com- cist Ivan Voznesenskii, who was a member Sixth, the document was forthright about mittee (GKO), Josif Stalin, formed a nine- of the Technical Council.) It stands to reason the need for the Soviet Union to ensure member “Special Committee” under the that the three senior political officials on the access to foreign sources of uranium, in- GKO’s auspices to oversee the whole So- Special Committee—Beria, Malenkov, and cluding deposits “in Bulgaria, Czechoslova- viet bomb effort. The Special Committee Nikolai Voznesenskii—would not have been kia, and other countries.” Although it did was placed under the direction of Stalin’s included on the Technical Council, but not specifically mention eastern Germany as top aide, Lavrentii Beria, the notorious se- Pervukhin’s absence is somewhat more puz- a source of uranium, the Soviet zone in cret police chief. The edict that Stalin issued zling, since he was in charge of the USSR’s Germany (which was transformed into the (No. GKO-9887ss/op) to establish the Spe- chemical industry at the time. The Technical German Democratic Republic in 1949) be- cial Committee and its two main subordi- Council consisted predominantly of re- came the largest supplier by far for the nate organizations was declassified and pub- nowned physicists: Igor Kurchatov, Pyotr Soviet bomb program. The importance of lished in the July-August 1995 issue of Kapitsa, Abram Ioffe, Abram Alikhanov, uranium in Soviet policy toward Germany in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (“Military- Yulii Khariton, Isaak Kikoin, and Ivan the late 1940s should not be underestimated, Historical Journal”), pp. 65-67. The full Voznesenskii. The other four members in- as Norman Naimark points out in his recent text is provided below in translation. cluded a radiochemist, Vitalii Khlopin, and book, The Russians in Germany: A History Several points about the document are three highly capable industrial managers and of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945- worth noting: engineers: Boris Vannikov, Avraamii 1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University First, Stalin’s edict placed the Special Zavenyagin, and Vasilii Makhnev. Press, 1995), pp. 235-250.2 Committee under the control of the GKO, Zavenyagin, among other things, had been a Seventh, the GKO’s Special Committee the supreme organ in the Soviet Union dur- deputy to Beria at the People’s Commissariat was given almost unlimited discretion over 266 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN its own funding and operations, a sign of the cables recently declassified by the U.S. Na- gazeta on 7 June 1995 (p. 5), listed 20 overriding priority that Stalin attached to the tional Security Agency, see below).4 individuals who were given responsibility development of nuclear weapons. An entire Merkulov had been giving periodic reports for “studying archival documents and devel- directorate was set up within Gosplan to to Beria before August 1945 about the tech- oping proposals concerning their declassifi- ensure that all necessary resources were nical progress of the and cation” for an official anthology.6 The full available. Despite the ravages of the war and about the prospects of locating adequate text of that directive, including the 20 mem- the need for mass reconstruction, no ex- stores of fissionable material. In mid-Octo- bers of the Working Group, is featured be- pense was spared in the drive to build a ber 1945, shortly after the GKO’s Special low. nuclear bomb. Although the extravagance Committee was formed, Merkulov sent a The combination of Yeltsin’s decree of Beria’s efforts proved troubling to some follow-up report to Beria, which drew on and Chernomyrdin’s directive provides some of the participants, their objections were on elaborate information supplied by the spy cause for concern. The announcement of practical, not moral, grounds. Pyotr Kapitsa Klaus Fuchs in June and September. The plans for an official anthology is a welcome cited this matter (as well as his sharp per- report provided a detailed technical over- step, but unless it is followed by a more sonal differences with Beria) when he wrote view of the design, dimensions, and compo- systematic declassification of archival ma- a letter to Stalin in November 1945 asking to nents of a plutonium bomb (the type of bomb terials, the proposed anthology will give be removed from the program. Kapitsa dropped on Nagasaki). In subsequent only a very limited—and perhaps mislead- argued that the path chosen by Beria was months, Merkulov and Kuznetsov contin- ing—depiction of the early Soviet nuclear “beyond our means and will take a long ued to furnish invaluable data about bomb weapons program. Unfortunately, judging time,” and he insisted that a “methodical and technology and uranium supplies. The in- from the instructions approved by Yeltsin well-planned” program would enable the clusion of Point 13 in Stalin’s edict is one and Chernomyrdin, it appears that, at least Soviet Union to build nuclear weapons further indication of the crucial role of intel- for now, no broader release of documents is “quickly and cheaply.”3 ligence in the Soviet nuclear bomb program. under consideration. Eighth, Stalin’s edict specified the need The composition of the Working Group for increased espionage vis-a-vis the U.S. The Russian Government’s also does not bode well. The affiliations and nuclear program. Until this time, responsi- May 1995 Directive backgrounds of most of the 20 members bility for Soviet foreign intelligence had imply that archival openness will not be been spread among several agencies (and On 17 February 1995 Russian President their paramount concern: the NKVD’s role in the process was very Boris Yeltsin issued a decree “On the Prepa- *** The panel is chaired by Lev limited), but the edict gave Beria direct con- ration and Publication of an Official Compi- Dmitrievich Ryabev, a first deputy Minister trol over all nuclear espionage carried out by lation of Archival Documents Pertaining to of Atomic Energy. Ryabev has decades of Soviet intelligence organs, including the the History of the Development of Nuclear experience in the Soviet/Russian nuclear People’s Commissariat on State Security Weapons in the USSR.”5 This decree (No. weapons program, including several years (NKGB, later renamed the Committee on 180) was published in the 1 March 1995 (beginning in 1986) when he served as head State Security, or KGB), the Intelligence issue of Rossiiskaya gazeta, and an English of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Build- Directorate of the Red Army (RUKA, later translation was provided in the Spring 1995 ing, the body now known as the Ministry of renamed the Main Intelligence Directorate, issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (p. 57). The Atomic Energy. (Although Ryabev cur- or GRU, of the Soviet General Staff), and decree stipulated that certain archival mate- rently is only a first deputy minister rather other unspecified intelligence bodies. Cop- rials were to be released for an official com- than a minister, his retention of a senior post ies of this part of the edict (Point 13) were pilation (sbornik) of documents (presum- in the former Soviet nuclear weapons com- distributed to Vsevolod Merkulov, the ably a single volume) on the Soviet Union’s plex is a sign of his trustworthiness and People’s Commissar for State Security, and pursuit of nuclear weapons between 1945 political acumen.) As an institution, the Fyodor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, the chief of and 1954. It did not, however, provide for Ministry of Atomic Energy has been ex- the RUKA. (Incidentally, the mention of any broader declassification of materials tremely wary of releasing documents that Kuznetsov’s surname on the distribution list related to the early Soviet nuclear program. would shed any light on Soviet nuclear weap- confirms, for the first time, that he was head The February 1995 decree indicated ons developments. Ryabev has been among of Soviet military intelligence in the 1940s. that a Working Group was to be established those who have expressed the need for “great Kuznetsov is described in Soviet military within one month (i.e., by mid-March 1995) caution.” reference works as having been the deputy to begin considering which documents might *** One of the two deputy chairmen of chief of the General Staff from 1943 to 1949, be released for an official compilation. This the Working Group, G. A. Tsyrkov, is also a but he was never explicitly identified as head Working Group, formed under the auspices senior official in the Ministry of Atomic of the RUKA.) of the Russian government’s Commission Energy. Like Ryabev, Tsyrkov has been Both Merkulov and Kuznetsov had been for the Comprehensive Solution of the Prob- leery of divulging any information about overseeing a massive operation to gain intel- lem of Nuclear Weapons, was not actually Soviet nuclear technology and design prac- ligence about nuclear weapons technology, set up until 24 May 1995, some two months tices. as the newly released “Venona” documents behind schedule. Directive No. 728-R, *** Of the other 18 members of the amply show (for more about these docu- signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Working Group, five are senior officials ments, partially decrypted Soviet intelligence Chernomyrdin and published in Rossiiskaya from the Atomic Energy Ministry and five COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 267 are high-ranking military officers from the July 1995, contained numerous documents programs, and he provided useful informa- Ministry of Defense, including the General that shed light on the activities of Soviet tion to David Holloway for the book Stalin Staff. The Defense Ministry, like the Atomic spies in the Manhattan Project. The disclo- and the Bomb. No doubt, Khariton is more Energy Ministry, has been highly skeptical sure of these materials may erode the tradi- inclined than the other panel members to as an institution about the merits of releas- tional secrecy about such matters in Mos- urge the release of extensive documentation, ing documents for scholarly purposes. Rus- cow. Second, some officials in the Russian especially materials that would shed light on sian military archivists have been especially security and intelligence organs may want to the role of espionage versus indigenous sci- disinclined to release items pertaining to release sensitive documents to spotlight the entific achievements. But because he is in nuclear weapons, ostensibly because of con- role of espionage in the Soviet nuclear and his early 90s, it is unlikely that he will be able cerns about nuclear proliferation. (This thermonuclear bomb projects. A fierce de- to play a central role on the Working Group. policy can be taken to ludicrous extremes. bate emerged in Russia in the early 1990s Quite apart from obstacles posed by the When I worked in the Russian General Staff about the relative importance of espionage composition of the Working Group, it is archive in the summer of 1994, I was told versus indigenous scientific achievements in possible that the Russian government’s di- that all documents pertaining to nuclear the Soviet nuclear/thermonuclear programs. rective (and Yeltsin’s decree) will go largely operations—just operations, not technol- Most observers in both Russia and the West unimplemented. Several impressive-look- ogy—would be sealed off until the year now agree that information provided by So- ing decrees and directives about the declas- 2046. I asked why that particular year was viet spies was vital in accelerating the con- sification of archival materials have been chosen, but no one seemed to know.) struction of the first Soviet fission bomb, but issued by Yeltsin and the Russian govern- *** Other members of the Working that espionage was of much less importance ment over the past two years, but very little Group include senior officials from the For- for the Soviet thermonuclear program. If the has come of them.7 Now that the political eign Intelligence Service, the Federal Secu- release of documents could show that the outlook in Russia is so uncertain, there is rity Service, the Department for the Defense extent of Soviet nuclear spying was even little chance that the archival situation will Industry, and the State Technical Commis- greater than previously thought, the Russian improve anytime soon. If anything, the sion. (The first two bodies are the main Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal increased strength of Communist delegates successors to the Soviet KGB, and the last Security Service might be somewhat less in the Russian parliament could lead to fur- two bodies are under the jurisdiction of the averse to the prospects of declassification. ther restrictions on access to major reposito- Russian President’s apparatus. The State *** Two heads of research institutes ries. Technical Commission is housed in the same specializing in the history of science and If an official anthology of documents building as the General Staff of the Russian technology—V. V. Alekseev and V. M. about the early Soviet nuclear weapons pro- Armed Forces.) These four agencies have Orel—are included on the Working Group, gram is eventually published, it undoubt- hardly been noted as champions of archival but even if they are inclined to press for edly will contain many interesting and valu- openness. Documents held by the Foreign greater openness (which is by no means able materials. Even the release of indi- Intelligence Service and Federal Security certain), they will be far outweighed by offi- vidual documents can add a good deal to the Service, in particular, have been kept tightly cials from the nuclear weapons complex and historical record (see above). But in the sealed away. The role of these two agencies military establishment. absence of a wider declassification of rel- is bound to be critical in the release of *** Rudolf Pikhoya, the director of the evant items, the one-time compilation of an documentation, whether for an official an- Russian State Archival Service (Rosarkhiv), official anthology will not reveal as much thology or for other purposes. The Foreign is the only panel member from Rosarkhiv. about early Soviet nuclear developments as Intelligence Service archive houses the most Even if Pikhoya seeks the release of as many one might hope. sensitive documents on the role of espio- documents as possible—and it is far from nage in the Soviet nuclear weapons pro- clear that he will—his influence on the Work- 1. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet gram, and the Federal Security Service ing Group is inherently limited, despite his Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: archive contains documents generated by position as a deputy chairman. The most Yale University Press, 1994), 135. Holloway’s book is by far the best source available on the early Soviet the Special Committee headed by Lavrentii valuable documents on the early Soviet nuclear program. Beria from August 1945 until his arrest in nuclear weapons program are stored in ar- 2. See also Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 174-180. late June 1953 (see above). So far, there is chives outside Rosarkhiv’s jurisdiction. 3. P. L. Kapitsa, Pis’ma o nauke (Moscow: Moskovskii little indication that access to either agency’s *** The presence of Yulii Khariton on rabochii, 1989), 237-247. On Kapitsa’s withdrawal from the program, see Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, document holdings will be expanded. the Working Group is encouraging, but it 138-144. However, two factors may induce the may be largely symbolic. Khariton, who was 4. Some new details about spies in the Manhattan Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal born in 1904, was one of the key physicists in Project are also available from , John Earl Security Service to be more willing to re- the early Soviet nuclear program, and is the Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, eds., The Secret World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale lease documents about nuclear espionage: only living member of the Technical Council University Press, 1995), esp. 216-226. In addition, see First, the U.S. National Security Agency that was established in August 1945 to advise Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 82-88, 90-95, 102-108, has begun declassifying some of its huge Beria’s Special Committee (see above). 129, and 137-138. collection of “Venona” transcripts of inter- Khariton has given lengthy written and oral 5. In Russian: “O podgotovke i izdanii ofitsial’nogo sbornika arkhivnykh dokumentov po istorii sozdanii cepted Soviet communications from 1939 testimony over the past few years about the yadernogo oruzhiya v SSSR.” through 1945. The initial batch, released in early Soviet nuclear and thermonuclear bomb 6. The directive was published under the rubric “Sbornik 268 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN arkhivnykh dokumentov” (A Compilation of Archival facilities, and the development and produc- torate of the USSR CPC the level of funding, Documents). tion of an atomic bomb. the size of the workforce, and the volume of 7. For one such decree, approved in September 1994, see “Yeltsin’s Directive on Declassification,” which I 3. That a Technical Council be created material-technical resources that it requires, translated and introduced in CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall under the GKO’s Special Committee to con- so that USSR Gosplan can include these 1994), 89, 100. For a more recent, though similar, duct a preliminary examination of scientific resources in the spending category listed as directive adopted by the Russian government, see “Ob and technical matters submitted for review “Special Exenditures of the GKO.” ustanovleniya poryadka rassekrechivaniya i prodleniya srokov zasekrechivaniya arkhivnykh dokumentov by the Special Committee, as well as an 8. That the chairman of USSR Gosplan, Pravitel’stva SSSR,” Sobranie zakonodatel’stva examination of plans for scientific research Cde. N. A. Voznesenskii, organize within Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow) 9 (27 February 1995), and accounts for it, plus technical designs of Gosplan a directorate to help carry out the 1539-1542. installations, structures, and facilities for the assignments of the GKO’s Special Commit- use of atomic energy of uranium. The Coun- tee. * * * * * cil will consist of the following: That the dep. chairman of USSR 1. Vannikov, B. L. (chairman) Gosplan, Cde. N. A. Borisov, be placed in DOCUMENT 1: 2. Alikhanov, A. I. — academician (sci- charge of the aforementioned directorate, entific secretary) and that he be relieved of other work for TOP SECRET 3. Voznesenskii, I. N. — corresponding Gosplan and the GKO. SPECIAL DOSSIER member, USSR Academy of Sciences 9. That the financial expenditures and 4. Zavenyagin, A. P. upkeep of the GKO’s Special Committee, of STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE 5. Ioffe, A. F. — academician the First Main Directorate of the USSR EDICT No. GKO-9887ss/op 6. Kapitsa, P. L. — academician CPC, of the First Main Directorate’s scien- 7. Kikoin, I. K. — corresponding mem- tific research, design, and engineering orga- 20 August 1945 ber, USSR Academy of Sciences nizations and industrial enterprises, as well Moscow, the Kremlin. 8. Kurchatov, I. V. — academician as the work carried out by other agencies and 9. Makhnev, V. A. departments at the behest of the Directorate, On a Special Committee Under the GKO’s 10. Khariton, Yu. B. — professor are to be included in the union budget through Auspices 11. Khlopin V. G. — academician the category “Special Expenditures of the 4. That a special directorate be orga- GKO.” The State Defense Committee orders: nized under the USSR Council of People’s That financing of capital construction Commissars—the First Main Directorate of for the First Main Directorate be carried out 1. That a Special Committee be formed the USSR CPC, subordinated to the GKO’s through the State Bank. under the GKO’s auspices consisting of Special Committee—to exercise direct su- That the First Main Directorate and the C[omra]des.: pervision over scientific research, develop- institutes and enterprises under its auspices 1. Beria, L. P. (chairman) ment, and design organizations and indus- be freed from the registration of staffs in 2. Malenkov, G. M. trial enterprises for the use of atomic energy financial organs. 3. Voznesenskii, N. A. of uranium and the production of atomic 10. That Cde. B. L. Vannikov be con- 4. Vannikov, B. L. bombs. firmed as the deputy chairman of the GKO’s 5. Zavenyagin, A. P. 5. That the GKO’s Special Committee Special Committee and director of the First 6. Kurchatov, I. V. be obligated to devise a work plan for the Main Directorate of the USSR CPC, and that 7. Kapitsa, P. L. Committee and the First Main Directorate of he be discharged from his duties as People’s 8. Makhnev, V. A. the USSR CPC and measures to carry out Commissar of Munitions. 9. Pervukhin, M. G. this plan, and to present it to the Chairman of That the following be approved as 2. That the GKO’s Special Committee the GKO for approval. deputy directors of the Main Directorate: be empowered to supervise all work on the 6. That the GKO’s Special Committee — A. P. Zavenyagin — first deputy use of atomic energy of uranium: take operative measures to ensure the fulfill- — N. A. Borisov — deputy — the development of scientific re- ment of tasks assigned to it under the present — P. Ya. Meshik — deputy search in this sphere; edict; that it promulgate directives requiring — P. Ya. Antropov — deputy — the broad use of geological surveys fulfillment by agencies and departments; — A. G. Kasatkin — deputy. and the establishment of a resource base for and that when a government decision is 11. That the First Main Directorate of the USSR to obtain uranium, as well as the needed, the GKO’s Special Committee the USSR CPC and its enterprises and insti- exploitation of uranium deposits outside the should presents its recommendations directly tutes, as well as work carried out by other USSR (in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and for the approval of the Chairman of the agencies and departments for it, are to be other countries); GKO. controlled by the GKO’s Special Commit- — the organization of industry to pro- The GKO’s Special Committee will tee. cess uranium and to produce special equip- have its own staff and funding estimates and Without special permission from the ment and materials connected with the use of an expense account at the USSR State Bank. GKO, no organizations, institutes, or indi- atomic energy; and 7. That the GKO’s Special Committee viduals have any right whatsoever to inter- — the construction of atomic energy define and approve for the First Main Direc- fere in the administrative or operational ac- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 269 tivities of the First Main Directorate and its Group) is to be set up to study archival directorate in the Federal Security Service of enterprises and institutes, or to demand in- documents connected with the history of the the Russian Federation; formation about its work or work carried out development of nuclear weapons in the USSR B. V. LITVINOV — senior designer at at the behest of the First Main Directorate. and to devise recommendations for their the Russian Federal Nuclear Center and the All records of such work are to be directed declassification. The Working Group is to All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of only to the GKO’s Special Committee. consist of the following: Experimental Physics, Atomic Energy Min- 12. That within 10 days the Special L. D. RYABEV — first deputy Minister istry of Russia; Committee be instructed to provide recom- of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation V. M. OREL — director of the S. I. mendations for approval by the Chairman of (director of the Working Group); Vavilov Institute of the History of Natural the GKO concerning the transfer of all nec- R. G. PIKHOYA — director of Science and Technology, Russian Academy essary scientifc, design, engineering, and Rosarkhiv (deputy director of the Working of Sciences; production organizations and industrial en- Group); V. A. PIDZHAKOV — deputy head of terprises to the First Main Directorate of the G. A. TSYRKOV — head of a main the Central Physics and Technical Institute USSR CPC, and to affirm the structure, directorate in the Atomic Energy Ministry of at the Defense Ministry of Russia; organization, and number of workers on the Russia (deputy director of the Working Yu. B. KHARITON — honorary re- staffs of the Committee and the First Main Group); search director of the Russian Federal Directorate of the USSR CPC. V. V. ALEKSEEV — director of the Nuclear Center and the All-Russian Scien- 13. That Cde. Beria be instructed to Institute of History and Archaeology of the tific Research Institute of Experimental Phys- take measures aimed at organizing foreign Urals Division of the Russian Academy of ics, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia. intelligence work to gain more complete Sciences; 2. Within three months, the Atomic technical and economic information about V. I. ANIKEEV — deputy head of a Energy Ministry of Russia, the Defense Min- the uranium industry and about atomic direcorate in the Foreign Intelligence Ser- istry of Russia, the State Committee on the bombs. He is empowered to supervise all vice of Russia Defense Industry of Russia, the Federal Se- intelligence work in this sphere carried out V. V. BOGDAN — chief of affairs at the curity Service of the Russian Federation, the by intelligence organs (NKGB, RUKA, etc.). Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia; Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, A. A. BRISH — senior designer at the Rosarkhiv, and the Russian Academy of Chairman of the State Defense Committee All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Sciences will prepare, and present to the J. STALIN Automation, Atomic Energy Ministry of Working Group, lists of archival documents Russia; proposed for declassification and for inclu- Distributed to Cdes.: V. N. VERKHOVTSEV — head of a sion in an official compilation of archival Beria, Molotov, Voznesenskii, command sector in a main directorate of the documents pertaining to the history of the Malenkov, Mikoyan: all points; Borisov: General Staff of the Russian Federation development of nuclear weapons in the USSR 8, 10; Zverev, Golev: 9; Meshik, Armed Forces; during the period through 1954. Abakumov, Antropov, Kasatkin: 10; G. A. GONCHAROV — department 3. In the third quarter of 1995, the Pervukhin: 1, 10; Merkulov, Kuznetsov head at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center Working Group will determine a thematic (RUKA): 13; Chadaev: 4, 9, 10, 11. and the All-Russian Scientific Research In- way of dividing archival documents pro- stitute of Experimental Physics, Atomic En- posed for declassification in accordance with * * * * * ergy Ministry of Russia; established procedures and for inclusion in Yu. V. GRAFOV — deputy head of a an official compilation of archival docu- DOCUMENT 2 directorate of the Navy; ments pertaining to the history of the devel- S. A. ZELENTSOV — consultant for a opment of nuclear weapons in the USSR Directive of the Government of the main directorate of the Defense Ministry of during the period through 1954, and will Russian Federation Russia; prepare a general list of these documents. No. 728-r, Issued on 24 May 1995 in E. A. IVANOV — deputy head of a 4. In the fourth quarter of 1995, the Moscow section in the Department of Defense Indus- State Technology Commission of Russia, in try, Administrative Staff of the Government conjunction with the Atomic Energy Minis- To implement the decree “On the Prepa- of the Russian Federation; try of Russia, the Defense of Russia, the ration and Publication of an Official Compi- A. P. KALANDIN — deputy chairman State Committee on the Defense Industry of lation of Archival Documents Pertaining to of the State Technology Commission of Russia, the Federal Security Service of the the History of the Development of Nuclear Russia; Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence Weapons in the USSR,” issued on 17 Febru- N. I. KOMOV — senior specialist in a Service of Russia, Rosarkhiv, and the Rus- ary 1995 by the President of the Russian main directorate of the Atomic Energy Min- sian Academy of Sciences will, on the basis Federation: istry of Russia; of established procedures, arrange for the 1. A Working Group of the Govern- V. N. KOSORUKOV — senior engi- declassification of archival documents per- ment Commission on the Comprehensive neer in a main directorate of the Defense taining to the history of the development of Solution of the Problem of Nuclear Weap- Ministry of Russia; nuclear weapons in the USSR during the ons (referred to hereinafter as the Working A. A. KRAYUSHKIN — head of a period through 1954, drawing on the list 270 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN specified in Point 3 of this directive. 3. After that date, Chinese press reports The form of reporting in the Chinese press was 5. The Atomic Energy Ministry of were virtually identical to the coverage in obviously geared toward the Chinese reader. Even Russia is responsible for providing organi- other Communist countries, all of which though the Chinese people were following the zational and technical support for the activ- condemned the Hungarian revolution and crisis in Hungary very closely, it is quite natural that for the Chinese people the crisis seemed more ity of the Working Group and for the prepa- strongly supported the Soviet invasion. Until distant than it did for, say, the peoples of the ration of materials needed to publish an November 2, however, the Chinese press European People’s Democracies. In addition, the official compilation of archival documents was bolder and more evenhanded in its treat- Anglo-French aggression against Egypt at that pertaining to the history of the development ment of the Hungarian crisis than the other time was given priority coverage in the Chinese of nuclear weapons in the USSR during the East-bloc newspapers were, as Liebermann’s press. This explains why until the formation of the period through 1954. report makes clear. The East German diplo- Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Govern- 6. The Russian Committee on the Press mat even expressed anxiety about the detail ment, much more information about Hungary and Publishing, in conjunction with the of Chinese coverage, saying that “they would appeared in the Chinese press than in the GDR press. Under the special conditions of the PRC, Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia, is to have been better off leaving out” some of the they can pursue this type of reporting without fear ensure the publication in 1996 of an official most vivid descriptions of the revolutionary that it will cause agitation and disquiet among the compilation of archival documents pertain- ferment. Liebermann left no doubt that the Chinese people of the sort one can detect among ing to the history of the development of kind of reports featured in the Chinese press some of the GDR citizens currently here in Pe- nuclear weapons in the USSR during the would have been unacceptable in East Ger- king. period through 1954. Funding is to come many. Although the Chinese press during the early from outlays in the Federal budget for the The concluding paragraph of Lieber- days was factual and objective in its reports on the periodical press and publishing outlets. mann’s report is intriguing insofar as it re- crisis in Hungary, there were some things re- ported in the press that they would have been veals high-level East German concerns about better off leaving out, even if one takes account of Chairman of the Government of the China’s efforts to establish a “‘special posi- the special conditions in the PRC. Two examples Russian Federation tion’ within the socialist camp” and about will suffice to illustrate this point. V. Chernomyrdin Beijing’s general commitment to the Com- 1) The “People’s Daily” on 1 Nov. quoted the munist bloc. Although Liebermann assured following passage from a speech by Nagy: “The ****** his superiors that China “stands solidly be- continual growth of the revolution in our country hind” the socialist camp and “is not taking has brought the movement of democratic forces to RESEARCH NOTE: a crossroads.” SECRET EAST GERMAN REPORT up any sort of ‘special position,’” the very fact that he had to rebut these accusations 2) The “People’s Daily” on 1 Nov. also reported ON CHINESE REACTIONS that Nagy on 30 Oct. had commenced negotia- implies that some officials in Eastern Eu- TO THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLT tions with representatives of the armed forces rope already sensed that the “steadfast alli- committee of the freedom fighters and the revolu- ance” between the Soviet Union and China Introduced and Translated tionary committee of the revolutionary intelligen- might one day be called into question. by Mark Kramer tsia and students. Thus, the document is valuable in show- A clear statement about the crisis in Hungary Following are excerpts from a docu- ing how even a seemingly arcane item from was published in a lead article in the “People’s ment prepared by a senior East German the East-Central European archives can shed Daily” on 3 Nov. In this lead article, which covers the Soviet Union’s declaration on ties with social- diplomat, H. Liebermann, a few weeks after light on the dynamics of Sino-Soviet rela- ist countries, a portion concerns the crisis in Soviet troops crushed the revolution in Hun- tions. Hungary: “The Chinese people are wholeheart- gary in 1956. The full report, entitled, “Berich edly on the side of the honest Hungarian workers uber die Haltung der VR China zu den No. 212/02/ Peking, 30 November 1956 and on the side of the true Hungarian patriots and Ereignissen in Ungarn,” is now stored in File resolute socialist fighters for Hungary. We are No. 120, Section IV 2/20, of the former East Report dismayed to see that a small group of counterrevo- on the Stance of the People’s Republic of lutionary conspirators are exploiting the situation German Communist party archives, known China toward the Crisis in Hungary as Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massen- with the aim of restoring capitalism and fascist organisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv The first report in the Chinese press about the terror and of using Hungary to disrupt the unity of the socialist countries and undermine the Warsaw (SAPMDB, or SAPMO), in Berlin. (A copy crisis in Hungary was published on 27.10.56. It should be noted that up through 2 Nov. this Pact.” of the document was recently located at the . . . Berlin archive by Christian F. Ostermann, a information was published without commentary, for example in the foreign policy section of Judging by the stance of the PRC toward the researcher currently based at the National “People’s Daily” on pages 5/6. Nevertheless, crisis in Hungary, one again can confidently em- Security Archive in Washington, D.C., and through daily published reports (except on 30 phasize that the PRC stands solidly behind the provided to the author by CWIHP.) Oct., when nothing about Hungary was published camp of socialism and friendship with the Soviet Liebermann’s six-page report, compiled in “People’s Daily”) the PRC informed the Chi- Union. It is also clear that the PRC is not taking up at the request of the East German Foreign nese people in detail about the crisis in Hungary. any sort of “special position” within the socialist This information, however, was not enough to camp, as certain Western circles would have pre- Ministry, traces Chinese press coverage of ferred. The stance of the People’s Republic of provide a clear picture of the crisis. This situation events in Hungary from late October to mid- China toward the crisis in Hungary was no differ- remained essentially unchanged until the forma- November 1956. The portions translated ent from the stance of the other socialist countries. tion of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government. here pertain to coverage through November (H. Liebermann) COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORBY POOROJECT BKULLETIN 271

“A VOICE CRYING are a sterling example, concentrating par- Though he claims to have based his accounts IN THE WILDERNESS”: ticularly on moments when diplomats’ pre- on his own experiences and on his conversa- THE PROFESSIONAL’S REVENGE rogatives were violated, whether by party tions with other Soviet diplomats, in particu- functionaries, military officers, or the high- lar Gromyko, the reader finds little from an by David R. Stone est leadership of the Soviet state. After insider’s point of view. As a low-ranking ’s April 1972 visit to Mos- diplomat, Kornienko may indeed have seen Georgii Markovich Kornienko, Kholodnaia cow, in which he worked closely with and done little worthy of reporting. Even so, voina: svidetel’stvo ee uchastnika [The Cold Kornienko, the innocuously bland final state- an occasional personal glimpse of life in War: Testimony of a Participant] (Moscow: ment noted that talks had been “open and Soviet intelligence and the diplomatic corps International Relations, 1995). productive.” N. V. Podgornyi, Chair of the slips through. Kornienko relates, for ex- Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and thus ample, that hawkish officials in the KGB, After a Soviet fighter plane shot down nominally Soviet head of state, objected to hoping to present Stalin with a translation of Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September this positive spin on Soviet-American rela- George Kennan’s seminal 1947 Foreign Af- 1983, Georgii Kornienko was assigned by tions despite his complete ignorance of di- fairs article, “The Sources of Soviet Con- his superior Foreign Minister Andrei plomacy. Only Kissinger’s acquiescence duct,” in which “containment” was trans- Gromyko to prepare TASS’s official press avoided more serious diplomatic conse- lated as “suffocation,” pressured Kornienko release on the incident. In particular, quences. Still later, as political instability in to spice his translation. The cooler heads of Gromyko instructed Kornienko to claim Afghanistan grew at the end of the 1970s, the Kornienko and his fellow translators suc- that the Soviet Union had absolutely no universal opinion within the Soviet Foreign ceeded in standing up for the integrity of the knowledge of the fate of the airliner, though Ministry against military intervention was translator’s art. the Soviet leadership was quite certain that disregarded—Andropov and Ustinov even- These earlier chapters are most note- it had indeed shot down the plane. Kornienko tually browbeat Gromyko into agreeing to an worthy for the general theory Kornienko vehemently protested that the truth of the invasion, Kornienko informs us, producing a offers of the Cold War and its origins, which matter would inevitably come out and that bloody and ultimately frustrating war with has a direct bearing on his interpretation of the best course was to reveal just that: the disastrous consequences at home and abroad. how the Cold War ended. For Kornienko, Soviet Union had shot down an unidentified Despite these tales of underappreciated there were no vast impersonal forces or intruder in the full conviction that it was an diplomats, Kornienko’s book is surprisingly inevitable class contradictions dictating the American spy plane. Gromyko was indeci- unrevealing about the inner workings of So- growth of U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Neither class sive, but invited Kornienko to call KGB viet foreign policy; while discussing Ustinov struggle nor geopolitical necessity mandated head Yurii Andropov to state his case. In and Andropov’s pressure on Gromyko for confrontation. Soviet policy in Eastern Eu- Kornienko’s opinion, Andropov was pre- intervention in Afghanistan, he never satis- rope was also no obstacle to normal rela- pared to accept an honest account of the factorily explains why they themselves had tions, as Kornienko argues that American event, but was swayed by Defense Minister abandoned the general conviction that mili- methods in Japan did not differ from Stalin’s Dmitrii Ustinov, long-time master of Soviet tary intervention in Afghanistan was a ter- methods in Eastern Europe. (Poles and defense industry, and the Soviet military rible idea. Extraordinarily cagey, he never Czechoslovaks might be puzzled here at leadership. At the meeting to make the final draws upon personal experience or Soviet their implicit inclusion in the camp of de- decision, Ustinov won this internal battle documentary evidence when a Western sec- feated .) Instead, the Cold War and Kornienko was only “a voice crying in ondary source will do. Personal observa- stemmed from the pragmatic Roosevelt’s the wilderness.” The consequences proved tions in his work serve either to prove his untimely death and his replacement by the Kornienko right; a human tragedy was turned own acuity and point up the mistakes of ideologue Truman. Kornienko notes by the Soviet leadership’s short-sightedness others or to disparage the talents and charac- Truman’s notorious suggestion that the Na- and the Reagan Administration’s intense ter of those Kornienko worked with. His zis and Soviets be left to kill each other off; criticism into a public-relations disaster for memoirs produce the impression that he likes it so much he repeats it twice. the USSR. Kornienko had no friends, was particularly Kornienko asks rhetorically, “Was another Moments like these, in which political unimpressed by Brezhnev, Ford, and Reagan, path possible? It seems to me yes. But leaders ignore at their peril the advice of and of all those he dealt with admired only Truman consciously rejected it.” That is, their professional advisors, recur frequently Gromyko and Andropov. This does not confrontation was a specific political choice, in Kornienko’s memoirs. Covering his over mean that Kornienko’s book is without value, and one for which the Soviets bore at least forty years of serving the Soviet state from but it must be used to understand the mind- some measure of responsibility, for “if the junior translator in intelligence work to set and mental world of a member of the American side said ‘A’ in the Cold War, then Deputy Foreign Minister, Kornienko’s ob- Soviet foreign policy elite, not to find new Stalin didn’t hold himself back from saying servations are those of a Soviet patriot intent facts and revealed secrets. ‘B’.” Since the West never seriously under- on settling scores both with the West and Kornienko’s first three chapters, on the took an end to the Cold War, when the end with his Soviet comrades. It is perhaps a sources of the Cold War, on the Eisenhower finally did come under Gorbachev, the only universal failing of memoirs that they em- presidency, and on Kennedy and Khrushchev, possible explanation was unilateral Soviet phasize those times when the hero-author is offer very little that is new or especially surrender. right and all about are mistaken; Kornienko’s interesting to students of the Cold War. Chapter 4 on the Cuban missile crisis is 272 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN nearly as frustrating as the first three in terms of the most important stages of détente— Soviet efforts in foreign policy were sabo- of lacking new revelations. Kornienko ap- Kissinger’s secret visit to Moscow, Nixon’s taged by bungling and short-sightedness. proves the document collections that have Moscow summit and Ford’s Vladivostok He tells us that West German Chancellor been published since the advent of glasnost, summit with Brezhnev—only to comment Helmut Schmidt suggested to Aleksei but does not enrich the story they tell with bitingly on Brezhnev and Ford’s lack of Kosygin that the replacement SS-20s be any significant new information of his own. mental ability, or to claim that Kissinger limited to a quantity significantly less than Despite serving as a counselor in the Soviet deliberately scheduled meetings in Moscow the outgoing SS-4s and SS-5s, given the Union’s Washington embassy during the to keep his deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt away qualitative superiority of the new missiles, crisis, Kornienko tells us little of his own from discussions on the Middle East (alleg- and that this policy be linked explicitly to an experiences. He does relate (as does then- edly due to fear of Sonnenfeldt’s “zionist attempt to head off a new arms race in Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in inclinations”). Europe. Kornienko, an invited guest at the his recently published memoirs) that the Détente was short-lived. In Kornienko’s Politburo meeting that discussed Schmidt’s Soviet embassy was kept in complete igno- interpretation, the beginning of the end was suggestion, spoke above his station and out rance of the installation of Soviet missiles in the 1975-76 ; Carter’s of turn to support this initiative. Ustinov Cuba, and was in fact unwittingly used to presidency only furthered the deterioration challenged him with the possibility of an pass along disinformation. of U.S.-Soviet relations already begun and American arms buildup even after concilia- The meat of Kornienko’s story is his represented another missed chance at an end tory Soviet gestures. Even in this worst-case role in one of the key moments of the crisis: to the Cold War. The main obstacle to outcome, Kornienko believed, any tempo- Khrushchev’s two letters to Kennedy, the improving relations, in Kornienko’s account, rary advantage the Americans might gain in first of 26 October 1962 promising with- was not Carter’s concern for human rights, medium-range missiles would be far out- drawal of Soviet missiles in return for an which was irritating but rather insignificant weighed by the beneficial effects of the American pledge of non-intervention in to Soviet leaders, but instead more concrete resulting strains in the Western alliance and Cuba, the second of the next day addition- issues of international politics. While Carter strengthening of Western Europe’s anti- ally demanding the corresponding with- himself might have been prepared for a more nuclear movement. With Brezhnev too feeble drawal of American missiles from Turkey. open-minded approach to the Soviet Union, to make his presence felt, and Gromyko’s According to Kornienko, his own detective the Carter Administration, hamstrung by refusal to speak up for Kornienko, Ustinov work played a central role in Khrushchev’s unnamed (but easily identifiable) hawks simply proved too powerful. Once again decision to sharpen his demands. Soviet within its ranks, was not prepared for a full Kornienko, the lone voice of reason, had his intelligence sources reported a conversation settlement. The United States’ fundamental advice unthinkingly disregarded, and the with an American journalist on his immedi- goals still included superiority not equality upgrade went forward as planned. ate departure for Florida to cover the immi- in arms control policy, and even the Carter- The second half of Chapter 10 exam- nent American invasion. Hearing these re- brokered Camp David accord only under- ines the fate of the SS-23 “Oka” missile. ports as well as taking into account the mined the chances for a general Mideast This is one episode of the Cold War whose heightened alert status of American armed peace via U.S.-Soviet joint action, Kornienko significance is interpreted in radically dif- forces, Khrushchev accordingly acted to calm alleges. ferent ways on either side of the former iron the situation by sending his first letter. Chapters 8 and 9 cover the war in Af- curtain. Barely noticed in the West, Kornienko himself knew the journalist, ghanistan and the downing of KAL 007 as Gorbachev and Shevardnadze’s decision to scheduled lunch with him (itself proving discussed above; Chapter 10 brings us to the include the SS-23 with its 400km range in that the journalist was not due for immediate Reagan years and the beginnings of glasnost, the list of intermediate range (that is, with departure), and convinced himself that the for which Kornienko has saved his bitterest range 500 km and higher) missiles slated for earlier intelligence reports of imminent in- venom. His target is not Stalin, Brezhnev, or elimination is the touchstone of Russian vasion had been mistaken. Armed with any Western cold warrior, but his last two military and conservative condemnation of Kornienko’s information, Khrushchev felt superiors: Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Gorbachev, what one officer terms the “crime prepared to drive a harder bargain with the Shevardnadze. In Chapter 10 and his con- of the century.” While the opposition to Americans. clusion, he presents the case for the prosecu- Gorbachev can hardly argue that the elimi- Chapter 5 on the prelude to détente and tion in Mikhail Gorbachev’s treason trial. nation of a single missile system was the root Chapter 6 on détente itself offer slightly Traitor is not too strong a word to express cause of the downfall of the Soviet Union, more. Détente came not from any alter- Kornienko’s evaluation of Mikhail they do see the case of the Oka as an example ations on the Soviet side, but from Nixon and Gorbachev, but Kornienko admits that blun- of all the worst in Gorbachev’s diplomacy: Kissinger’s decision to undertake a more ders began before Gorbachev took power in unpreparedness, unwillingness to listen to pragmatic and conciliatory policy towards 1985. Chapter 10 first examines at the pre- expert opinion, and, most seriously, sacri- Moscow. In early 1972, Kornienko worked Gorbachev decision to replace aging Soviet fice of Soviet national interests in the name closely with Henry Kissinger on the “Basic medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in of agreement, any agreement, with the West. Principles” statement on Soviet-American Europe with SS-20s. In keeping with As Kornienko puts it, the inclusion of the relations. Despite being at the heart of Kornienko’s general portrait of the late Oka under the provisions of a treaty that did political decision-making at the highest lev- Brezhnev years, in contrast with more effec- not concern it was “only one of the examples els, Kornienko strays from standard accounts tive policy under Stalin and Khrushchev, of what serious consequences occur when COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 273 high-placed leaders ignore the competent unacceptability of German NATO member- never heard, but the rejection of Soviet rule judgment of specialists and as a result sacri- ship to George Bush in Washington only in in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of fice the very interests of the state trying for February 1990 and then conceding the Soviet state itself are what truly demol- one thing—to that much quickly finish the Germany’s right to remain in NATO without ished Soviet foreign policy. It is just these preparation of this or that treaty and light off receiving guarantees and concessions in re- events that Kornienko cannot bring himself fireworks in celebration.” turn. to look at, and to ask whether he and his The conclusion of Kornienko’s book, a Here Kholodnaia voina particularly suf- fellow professionals bear any responsibility shortened version of a case set forth earlier fers by comparison to Kornienko’s 1992 for them. at greater length and in greater detail in collaboration with Marshal Sergei Nezavisimaia Gazeta (16 August 1994), is Akhromeev, former Chief of the General David Stone is a Ph.D. candidate in the what his argument has been leading to all Staff and one-time personal aide to Mikhail History Department of Yale University. along: the Gorbachev era as the epitome of Gorbachev. This earlier book, Glazami unprofessionalism in foreign policy. It is a marshala i diplomata [Through the Eyes of * * * * * full-fledged condemnation of almost every a Marshal and a Diplomat] (Moscow, 1992), action undertaken by Gorbachev and covers in book-length form the Gorbachev CHEN HANSHENG’S MEMOIRS Shevardnadze from 1985 through the final years which Kornienko discusses in a chap- AND CHINESE COMMUNIST collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, ter. The lion’s share is Akhromeev’s work, ESPIONAGE Kornienko strives to discredit the idea that and he was a much more sensitive and forth- Gorbachev offered something truly new and coming observer, on occasion even reveal- by Maochen Yu revolutionary in international politics. As ing the details of Soviet tactics in arms con- Kornienko reminds us, it was Lenin who trol negotiations. While nearly as condem- Chen Hansheng, My Life During Four Eras first enunciated the principle of “peaceful natory of Gorbachev as Kornienko, [Sige shidai de wo] (Beijing: China Culture coexistence” with the capitalist world (as Akhromeev as Chief of the General Staff was and History Press [zhongguo wenshi chupan another form of class struggle), and Stalin in a position to truly appreciate the steady she], 1988). actively endorsed the idea of coexistence decline of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev with the West as late as 1951. Ever since a and the need for radical reform, though he Post-Mao China has been marked by a rough nuclear parity had been achieved in parted company with Gorbachev on how transition from a combination of totalitari- the 1960s, reasonable people on each side precisely reform needed to be implemented. anism and socialism to one of had seen the need for an end to the arms race (Akhromeev killed himself in the wake of the authoritarianism and a “socialist market and confrontation. Gorbachev’s innovation failed coup of August 1991.) What Kornienko economy.” Along with this transition is the was not living in peace with the West, but misses in his evaluation of the Gorbachev gradual “withering away of the state,” which the unilateral “betrayal of the Soviet Union’s years is precisely how desperate Gorbachev’s in turn has resulted in a looser government vital interests.” position was by the end of the 1980s. With control over publication on some historical Kornienko enunciates a number of spe- opposition to Gorbachev growing on all sides, issues previously considered taboo during cific examples of Gorbachev’s craven be- an economy spiraling into free fall, Soviet the Mao era. One of the most fascinating havior—submission to the United States troops on hostile ground in Eastern Europe, new academic interests in China is the sud- over the Krasnoyarsk radar station and So- and the specter of nationalism haunting the den surge of materials on Chinese Commu- viet acquiescence in the use of force against Soviet Union, Gorbachev simply had no nist intelligence, triggered by a massive “po- Iraq—but his most substantial comments ground to stand on. It is this last factor— litical rehabilitation” of those Chinese Com- are reserved for the reunification of Ger- nationalism—that Kornienko (and for that munist Party (CCP) intelligence veterans many. Kornienko, having passed over in matter Akhromeev) consistently ignores. It who were vanquished in Mao’s ruthless cam- silence the Soviet interventions in Czecho- seems he imagines that a stable end to the paigns.1 The publication of Chen Hansheng’s slovakia and Hungary, takes pains to em- Cold War could have occurred with Eastern memoirs, My Life During Four Eras, is just phasize the right of the German people to Europe still occupied by Soviet troops, and one of the telling examples. self-determination, free from outside influ- he never noticed that half the Soviet Union’s Chen Hansheng became an agent for ence. His objection is to the manner in population was non-Russian. the Comintern in 1926 while a young profes- which this unification took place and the Kornienko, then, continues to be a de- sor at Beijing University (p.35). His life as status of the resulting German state. Why, voted patriot of the collapsed empire he a communist intelligence official spans many he asks, should Germany remain in NATO served for four decades. While there is likely decades of the 20th century and involves and why should NATO troops remain in some truth to his assertions that Gorbachev some of the most important espionage cases. Germany with Soviet troops completely might have driven marginally harder bar- Chen Hansheng’s memoirs add some new evacuated from Eastern Europe? The fact gains with the West than he in fact did, the and revealing dimensions to the present un- that Germany has stayed in NATO he at- real significance of any diplomatic triumphs derstanding of the much debated history of tributes to the absolutely incompetent way Gorbachev might have achieved is question- Chinese and international communism. In in which Gorbachev handled the German able. What can any diplomat achieve when an authoritative manner, this publication question, avoiding the enunciation of any the state he or she represents crumbles away? helps answer many nagging questions long clear policy until too late, insisting on the Kornienko can complain that his voice was in the minds of historians, chief among which 274 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN are the following: ders from Moscow. In 1935, when the significant contribution to reconnecting this To What Extent Were the Chinese Com- Soviet Union was threatened by rising fas- CCP-Moscow tie. munists Involved in Soviet-Dominated Com- cism in Europe and Asia, the CCP followed Was Agnes Smedley A Comintern Agent? munist International Espionage in China in Moscow’s order to adopt a policy of a “United Despite vigorous denials by Smedley her- the 20th Century? Recent memoirs in Chi- Front” () with the Nationalists self, Chen Hansheng discloses unequivo- nese, notably by Chen Hansheng and Shi in a joint effort to fight Japanese expansion cally that Smedley was no less than an agent Zhe,2 suggest that the Chinese Communists in Asia. Yet, when Stalin stunned the world of the Comintern (p.52). (Historian Stephen were deeply involved. In the 1930s and by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in late Au- MacKinnon has only established that 1940s, for example, as the Shi Zhe memoirs gust 1939, the United Front policy collapsed Smedley was Sorge’s mistress in Shanghai.) reveal, both the NKVD and GRU of the in China. Mao Zedong followed Stalin most Further, we also know from Chen’s mem- USSR and the Department of International closely among all the Comintern party chiefs, oirs that Smedley was involved in every Res. (OMS) of the Comintern ran a large spy hailing the Hitler-Stalin deal as a major major step of the Sorge group’s espionage training school in Yanan; Chinese Commu- victory against the West and the of activities. In fact, it was Smedley herself nist spies penetrated deep into the National- Poland as necessary for the communist who recruited Chen into Sorge’s Tokyo op- ists’ (GMD) wartime intelligence organiza- cause.6 In , Mao Zedong pro- erations (p.58). Recent Comintern archives tions for Moscow.3 Chen Hansheng’s story claimed that “the center of the Anti-Soviet also confirm Smedley’s identity as a further illustrates this Moscow-Yanan tie. movement is no longer , but Comintern agent.9 Chen was recruited by the Russians as a among the so-called democratic countries.”7 Was Owen Lattimore A Communist Spy? Comintern intelligence agent in 1926. One The modus vivendi of communism and fas- Lattimore topped Senator Joseph McCarthy’s year later, the warlord raided cism in late 1939 created such intense fric- list of alleged communist spies in the early the Soviet Embassy in Beijing which was tion between the Chinese Nationalists, who 1950s. McCarthy accused Lattimore of not being used as an intelligence base. This raid had been engaged in an all-out and bitter war only having manufactured a Far East policy exposed a large international espionage with the Japanese imperial army in China, leading to the loss of China to the commu- scheme controlled by Moscow.4 Chen and the Chinese Communists, who were nists, but also of being a “top Soviet agent.”10 Hansheng then fled to Moscow and returned following Stalin’s rapprochement with Ger- Chen’s memoirs provide surprising insights to China in 1928 to become a member of the many, whose ally was Japan, that in early on this matter from the perspective of a well-known Spy Ring, then 1940, an army of communist troops was communist intelligence agent. After Chen based in Shanghai. When Sorge was reas- ambushed by the Nationalists in Southern fled from Tokyo to Moscow in 1935 to signed by Moscow to Tokyo, Chen went Anhui, an event which essentially ended the prevent the Sorge Ring’s operations from along and worked closely with Ozaki Hozumi superficial United Front. Yet when Hitler exposure, Owen Lattimore, then the editor and others of the ring until 1935, when the attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, of the New York-based journal Pacific Af- unexpected arrest of a messenger from Mos- Stalin reversed his policy on the Popular fairs, the mouthpiece of the Institute of Pa- cow almost exposed Chen’s real identity. Front: all member parties of the Comintern, cific Relations (IPR), asked the Soviet Union, Chen sensed the danger and fled to Moscow both in Europe and in Asia, were now or- a member nation of IPR, for an assistant again (pp.61-62). For much of his early life, dered to fight . Unfortunately, in (p.63). In 1936, Moscow recommended he was directly controlled by Moscow, and China this did not mean the re-establishment Chen Hansheng to Lattimore, who readily highly active in international intelligence. of the former United Front against the Japa- accepted the nomination. Chen then went to Chen’s identity as a Comintern agent was so nese, because the Soviet Union had already New York, this time under the direct control important and secret that Richard Sorge, signed the notorious Neutrality Pact with of , who was also in Moscow, to during his marathon interrogation in Tokyo Japan. The Chinese Nationalists, not the work with Lattimore from 1936 until 1939, by the Japanese police, never gave out Chen’s Japanese, remained the CCP’s main enemy. when Chen was reassigned by Kang Sheng real name to the Japanese.5 In fact, a stunning recent discovery at to a Hong Kong-based operation. What Was the True Relationship Be- the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives of a However, Chen states in his memoirs tween the Soviets and the Chinese Commu- secret Soviet-Japanese treaty at the outset of that Lattimore was kept in the dark as to his nists during WWII? Some historians have WWII reveals a deeply conspiratorial scheme true identity as a Communist agent directly minimized the extent and importance of the worked out between Moscow and Tokyo. dispatched from Moscow (p.64). Lattimore’s relationship between the Chinese Commu- On 3 October 1940, Soviet and Japanese scholarly activities were only to be used as a nist Party and the Soviet Union during World diplomats reached a secret deal that stipu- cover for Chen. Further, Kang Sheng spe- War II. Chen Hansheng’s memoirs and lated, “The USSR will abandon its active cifically instructed Chen that while in New other recently available documents from vari- support for Chiang [Kai-shek; Jiang Jieshi] York, his position at the IPR should only be ous sources fundamentally challenge this and will repress the Chinese Communist used as a means of getting a salary; and that interpretation. Party’s anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Chen’s real task was to help Rao Shushi, a Instead, these new publications show Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chi- Comintern and CCP chief also in New York, that from the very beginning the CCP was nese Communist Party will retain as a base organize underground activities (p.65). intrinsically connected with the international the three (Chinese) Northwest provinces Therefore, Chen’s memoirs seem to clear communist movement centered in Moscow. (Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia).”8 Lattimore from any complicity associated Every major step of the CCP followed or- Chen Hansheng’s memoirs has made a with Chen Hansheng’s secret operations in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 275

New York. When Intellect And Intelligence Join, China (Berkeley, California, 1994). Was Solomon Adler A Communist? What Happens? Chen is a seasoned intelli- 4. For an example of one Western country’s exploita- tion of this raid in uncovering communist spy rings in Solomon Adler, chief intelligence agent for gence officer with high academic accom- England, see Anthony Cave Brown’s biography of the U.S. Treasury Department in China dur- plishment as an economic historian. While Stewart Menzies, “C,” published in Britain as Secret ing WWII, was also prominent on his erudition has provided him with excellent Servant: The Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Head of McCarthy’s communist list. In the 1950s, covers for intelligence operations, it was also British Intelligence, 1939-52. 5. Stephen MacKinnon, “Richard Sorge, Agnes , a courier of a Soviet to become a source of his own demise. Chi- Smedley, and the Mysterious Mr. ‘Wang’ in Shanghai, apparatus in Washington, further identified nese intellectuals are frequently willing to 1930-1932,” conference paper for the American His- Adler as a member of Soviet intelligence.11 serve the state, to be its ears and eyes, yet in torical Association, Cincinnati, 29 December 1988. Adler at the time denied Bentley’s accusa- the end the state often turns against the intel- 6. Niu Jun, From Yenan to the World [cong yanan zouxiang shijie] (Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 1992), tion. Surprisingly, in Chen’s memoirs, as lectuals without mercy. Chen Hansheng’s 64-65; also Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, well as in some other recent Chinese docu- life thus becomes a classic example of this vol. 2. (Beijing: People’s Press, 1961), 597-599. ments, Adler has resurfaced in Beijing as a supreme irony. While in Moscow in 1935 7. Interview with Edgar Snow, in Freta Utley, Odyssey bona fide communist intelligence official.12 and 1936, Chen witnessed the bloody purge of A Liberal: Memoirs (Washington, D.C.: Washington National Press, 1970), 213. According to these sources, Adler moved to of the intelligence apparatus in the Soviet 8. Bruce A. Elleman, “The 1940 Soviet-Japanese Se- Beijing permanently in the late 1950s and Union by Stalin. Many of his Soviet com- cret Agreement and Its Impact on the Soviet-Iranian has since worked in various capacities in rades, some of them highly respected schol- Supply Route” (Working Paper Series in International CCP intelligence. Today, he is identified in ars, including the former Soviet Ambassador Studies, I-95-5, Hoover Institution, on War, Revolu- tion, and Peace), 1-3 Chinese documents as an “Advisor” to the to Beijing who originally recruited Chen in 9. Harvey Klehr, , and Fridrikh External Liaison Department of the in 1926, were shot by Stalin as traitors Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Com- Committee of the CCP, the department that and foreign spies. Chen wrote in raw pessi- munism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), handles such well-known figures as Larry mism about the Soviet purge, “I could not 60-70. 10. Senate floor speech by McCarthy, in Ralph de Wu-tai Ching of the CIA, who was arrested understand what was going on then. Yet it Toledano, Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats (New York: by the FBI in 1983 for espionage, and com- was beyond my imagination that some thirty Arlington House Press, 1967), 185. mitted suicide in jail in 1986. years later, this horrible drama would be re- 11. Text of testimony by Bentley, in Toledano, Spies, Were the Chinese Communists Part of played in China and I myself would be a Dupes, and Diplomats, 132-133. 12. See Adler’s photo in Chen’s memoirs, and Selected the International Communist Movement or target of the persecution” (p.64). During the Shanghai Culture and History Materials [Shanghai Merely “Agrarian Reformers” in the 1930s Cultural Revolution, Chen did not escape the wenshi ziliao xuanji] 43 (April 1983), Shanghai People’s and 1940s? Chen Hansheng’s memoirs Dictatorship of the Proletariat. From 1966 to Press. provides much new information about the 1968, Chen was put under house arrest. His 13. For more details on this, see Maochen Yu, American Intelligence: OSS in China. Chinese Communist Party’s extensive in- wife was tortured to death in late 1968. By 14. Many top leaders of the CPUSA, including Earl ternational connections. Besides the Sorge 1971 when Chen was allowed to leave the Browder and Eugene Dennis, had served as Comintern and Lattimore cases, Chen served as a chief “thought reform” Cadre School in remote agents in China. See Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, Secret communist intelligence officer in Hong Hunan province, he had become almost com- World of American Communism 8, 12. Kong in the late 1930s and early 1940s, pletely blind. running a cover organization funnelling huge Maochen Yu, who teaches history at the U.S. amounts of funds—$20 million in two and Naval Academy, is completing for publica- a half years—from outside China to Yanan, 1. The most revealing case was the rehabilitation of Pan tion a revision of his Ph.D. dissertation on mostly for the purpose of purchasing Japa- Hannian in 1982, after which a large amount of materi- the OSS in China during World War II. nese-made weapons from the “Puppet” als on Pan’s role as a Comintern intelligence chief in China and CCP spymaster during WWII became avail- troops in North China, with considerable able for scholars. For more details, see the article by this Japanese acquiescence.13 When wanted in author, “OSS in China: New Information About An Old 1944 by the Nationalist secret police for Role,” International Journal of Intelligence and Coun- pro-Soviet activities in (China), Chen terintelligence, Spring 1994, pp.94-95 2. Shi Zhe, Alongside the Great Men in History: Mem- was rescued by the British and airlifted to oirs of Shi Zhe [zai lishi juren shengbian:shizhe huiyi lu] India where he was miraculously put on the Beijing: Central Documents Press [zhongyang wenxian payroll of British intelligence in New Delhi. chupan she], 1991. Shi Zhe served as an OGPU (NKVD Between 1946 and 1950, while undercover since 1934) agent for nine years in the Soviet Union until he was dispatched from Moscow to Yenan in 1940. He as a visiting scholar at the Johns Hopkins subsequently worked as Mao’s intelligence aid in charge University in Maryland, Chen became of encoding and decoding the heavy secret communica- Beijing’s secret liaison with the Communist tions between Mao and Stalin during WWII, and as a Party of the U.S.A. (CPUSA) (p.81).14 After Chinese-Russian interpreter. Shi Zhe also was Kang Sheng’s deputy at the Social Affairs Department (SAD) the CCP took over mainland China, Chen and the chief liaison in Yenan between the NKVD team was summoned back from America to and the SAD. Beijing by Zhou Enlai in 1950 and has 3. Yan Baohang and others’ aggressive intelligence remained a major figure in his own business penetration into the GMD, see the doctoral dissertation by this author entitled American Intelligence: OSS in for much of the rest of his life. 276 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

THE 1980-1981 POLISH CRISIS: Yakov Grishin’s narrative, is often prob- and the debate is likely to continue for many THE NEED FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS lematic. Robert Zuzowski’s volume pro- years to come. vides cogent insights into the origins and Zuzowski devotes less attention than by Mark Kramer functions of the Workers’ Defense Commit- Bernhard to Laba’s thesis, and as a result his tee (KOR) and Grishin’s monograph has a book leaves some key questions unresolved. Robert Zuzowski, Political Dissent and few bright moments, but neither book offers For example, Zuzowski acknowledges that Opposition in Poland: The Workers’ De- as much as one might hope. when the decisive moment came in mid- fense Committee “KOR” (Westport, CT: Zuzowski’s study of the origins, activi- 1980, top KOR members were skeptical Praeger, 1992). ties, and consequences of KOR is enriched about the prospects for achieving a genu- by citations from a wide range of open and inely independent trade union. (Some KOR Ya. Ya. Grishin, Dramaticheskie sobytiya v underground publications. Of necessity, his officials even hoped that striking workers Pol’she, 1980-1981 gg (Kazan: Izdatel’stvo book relies extensively on (and overlaps would not press too hard for this goal, lest it Kazanskogo Universiteta, 1993). with) Jan Jozef Lipski’s acclaimed two- become a pretext for a harsh crackdown.) volume history of the Workers’ Defense This is difficult to square with the author’s Many books about the rise of Solidarity Committee, which was first published in contention that “KOR significantly contrib- in Poland and the subsequent martial-law 1983. Zuzowski’s analysis, however, has uted to the formation of Solidarity and to its crackdown have been published in the West, three advantages over Lipski’s book. First, performance, shaping the union’s program, but nearly all of them appeared in the early as one would expect, Zuzowski is more structure, and strategy (p. 169). Nor does to mid-1980s. In recent years, particularly detached and critical than Lipski, whose Zuzowski explain why so many workers since the collapse of Communism in Eastern perspective as one of the co-founders and who had probably never heard of KOR and Europe, scholarly interest in the 1980-81 leading members of KOR was unavoidably never seen its publications were neverthe- Polish crisis has largely subsided. Although reflected in his lengthy account. Second, less ready to demand a wide array of funda- a few laudable books about the origins of Zuzowski’s book extends chronologically mental political changes. It may well be, as Solidarity, notably those by Roman Laba well beyond Lipski’s, which ended with both Zuzowski and Bernhard argue, that (The Roots of Solidarity), Lawrence C. KOR’s formal dissolution in September KOR decisively changed the broader milieu Goodwyn (Breaking the Barrier), and 1981. Third, Zuzowski uses his case study in which the strikes of 1980 occurred and Michael H. Bernhard (The Origins of De- of KOR to derive broader conclusions about that this helped Polish workers eschew vio- mocratization in Poland), were published in the nature and methods of political dissent in lence and sustain an organized protest move- the early 1990s, the large majority of West- highly authoritarian societies. His discus- ment. But it is not clear that the evidence ern scholars no longer seem interested in sion of the term “intelligentsia” and his produced by Zuzowski is enough to contra- reexamining the dramatic events of 1980- overall analytical framework are not always vene Laba’s basic point. 81. Even in Poland only a handful of ex- persuasive, but his assessment provides a This reservation notwithstanding, the perts, mainly those connected with the par- useful basis for historical and cross-country surveys of KOR that Zuzowski and Bernhard liamentary Committee for Constitutional comparisons. provide, combined with Laba’s earlier book, Oversight, are still devoting much effort to a Hence, the overlap with Lipski’s book are about as far as one can go with non- reassessment of the 18-month confrontation does not really detract from Political Dis- archival sources. Both authors have done an that followed the emergence of Solidarity in sent and Opposition in Poland. A more admirable job of poring over KOR’s publi- the summer of 1980. The dearth of academic serious problem arises, however, from the cations and other dissident works as well as interest in the Polish crisis is ironic, for it is overlap with a recent book by Michael relevant secondary sources. Both have only now, when the archives in Poland, Bernhard (cited above), which was pub- brought new analytical perspectives to bear Russia, and other former Communist coun- lished at almost the same time as Zuzowski’s on their topic. Now that Zuzowski’s and tries have become accessible and when a monograph. Bernhard’s volume, like Bernhard’s books have appeared, other schol- large number of valuable first-hand accounts Zuzowski’s, focuses on the origins and po- ars who wish to write about KOR will have of the crisis have appeared, that a fuller and litical significance of KOR. Both books to draw on recently declassified materials in more nuanced analysis of the events of 1980- depict the Workers’ Defense Committee as the Archiwum Akt Nowych and other ar- 81 is finally possible. a crucial factor in the rise of Solidarity and a chives in Poland (materials not consulted by For that reason alone, the two books leading influence on the opposition move- Zuzowski or Bernhard) if they are going to under review could have made a far-reach- ment in 1980-81. This view of KOR’s add anything of significance to the historical ing contribution. Both were completed after importance has been accepted by many schol- record. several of the former East-bloc archives had ars, but it has been challenged in recent years Zuzowski’s failure to make use of newly been opened and after the initial spate of by Roman Laba, who has claimed that Pol- released documentation is regrettable, but memoirs and other first-hand accounts of the ish workers, rather than Polish intellectuals, by no means wholly unreasonable. Several Polish crisis had appeared. But unfortu- provided the overwhelming impetus for Soli- features of his book (e.g., his frequent use of nately, neither author has made any use of darity and were themselves responsible for the present tense to describe things that archival sources. Although both draw on at shaping the union’s agenda. Laba’s publica- ceased to exist after 1989) suggest that he least a few of the new first-hand accounts, tions (including the book cited above) have wrote most of the text in the 1980s before the the use of this new evidence, especially in prompted spirited replies from Bernhard, continued on page 294 R E S P O NCOLD WSAR INTERNATIONAL E HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 277

THE SUDOPLATOVCONTROVERSY (CONT.)

1 September 1995 ered it: several years ago already Professor It will be useful to pose still one ques- To the Editor: Igor Golovin mentioned this operation of tion. Was the U.S. government decision to Beria’s department in the Soviet press. publish in the summer of 1945 Henry Smyth’s I read with great interest “The I do not believe it possible here to dwell well-known treatise “Atomic Energy for Sudoplatov Controversy” in the CWIHP particularly on Sudoplatov’s new fantasies, Military Purposes” really dictated by a wish Bulletin (Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 155- contained in his letter to the Bulletin and to share atomic secrets with the Soviet Union? 158). In its own time I also read Special which repeat his Appendix Eight of the pa- Especially since from the point of view of Tasks with no less interest. perback edition of Special Tasks (p. 491). informativeness it exceeded by many times I believed earlier and now presume that In such a way as was already, for ex- Bohr’s responses to Terletskii’s questions. the appearance of the recollections of such ample, analyzed by me, it was shown that the Responding to this principal issue, it is easier a high-ranking employee of the Stalinist reader should very, very critically regard to understand why the attempts to find non- NKVD is an outstanding event, no matter Sudoplatov’s “improvisations:” the princi- existent “flaws,” from the point of view of what they are like in terms of quality. In any pal defect of the “recollections” was evident the demands of secrecy, in Niels Bohr’s case, such recollections better than any- even in a “limited space.” Here the assis- responses, are continuing. And in precisely thing else characterize the era, and the story- tance and co-authorship in the drafting of the same way, it will become clear why the teller. We can only be sorry that the recol- Special Tasks of such brilliant journalists as efforts to defend the indefensible fantasies lections, of, for example, Lavrentii Beria, Jerrold L. Schecter and Leona P. Schecter, of Sudopatov are continuing. do not exist. and the fact that the flattering foreward to Finally, let’s turn to the eloquent ac- Of course, I cannot read without a smile this book belongs to the pen of the famous knowledgment of the former Soviet intelli- Pavel Sudoplatov’s “assertion” that in the historian , are . gence officer Col. Mikhail Liubimov (Top development of my career I am obliged Of course, the point of view of the Secret 3 (1994), 27): “Reading Sudoplatov, “through KGB connections.” This is a Schecters is interesting, when they assert one ought to remember that in intelligence desperate (consistent with the time!) lunge, that “the battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov’s activity (possibly like science) there is an a relic of the past, at a time when it is already memoirs continues. On one side are Russian inclination to twist facts, particularly be- impossible, as was done in the Stalinist scientists who fear the downgrading of their cause under the conditions of the totalitarian time, to register innocent people as German, prestige and a threat to the medals they regime it was easy to do without fear of English, and other “spies,” and to make received for building the atomic bomb” (Spe- consequences. An intelligence officer or short work of them. Now this relapse of the cial Tasks, Addendum, Paperback Edition). agent could meet and talk with Oppenheimer past is nothing more than an expressive And in “The Sudoplatov Controversy,” they or with Fermi, who would not have had any coloring on the portrait of Sudoplatov him- even introduce a list of former intelligence idea to whom they were talking, and then self. And it is evidence of the fact that my operatives and historians who, evidently, do later they could give them a code name and article offended him very much. not know atomic technology professionally, with dispatch submit the information to his In Special Tasks the episode connected but who applaud Sudoplatov. The truth, superiors and cast their deed in bronze.” A with Yaacov Terletskii’s mission to Niels however, is that in the fact of the matter, the trusting man in the street could be misled by Bohr. My critical article, published in the “battle in Moscow over Sudoplatov” ended the report on the meeting between Terletskii Bulletin (Issue 4, Fall 1994), touched only long ago. People understood that only spe- and Bohr. But for Liubimov, who saw that on that episode. Since I am not a specialist cialists, physicists-atomic scientists, are in a “in every line (of the report) the traditional, in Sudoplatov’s professional element, but position to resolve whether or not Niels Bohr old-fashioned character of the operation is do have a definite conception of the Soviet gave atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. revealed,” it was as clear as two times two atomic project and its history, in this letter, Then why did the Schecters, while ig- equals four that “Sudoplatov would portray expressing myself, I will limit myself only noring the opinion of Russian physicists, not the whole trip to Bohr as a colossal success, to the mission to Niels Bohr. wish to listen, for example, to one of the Beria would be pleased, and he will report I assert that nothing in Sudoplatov’s leading U.S. authorities, the prominent par- everything to Joseph Vissarionovich (Stalin). version regarding this mission stands up to ticipant in the American atomic project, Prof. And Kurchatov would not dare to articulate a comparison with the facts (reason for the Hans A. Bethe? In a recent article in Scien- any doubts about the success of the opera- trip, significance for the Soviet physicists of tific American together with his co-authors tion, [for] like other scientists, he is subordi- the information which was brought; the observed: “Thus, the allegation that Bohr nate to the system. And just try to squeal shadow which Sudoplatov casts on Niels shared nuclear secrets with the Soviets is about the organs.” Bohr, etc.), and it is a total hoax. Only the refuted by Beria’s own account of the en- naked fact that the trip to visit Bohr really counter between his agent and Bohr.” (Sci- Sincerely, did take place remains certain. But even entific American, May 1995, p. 90.) Or does here Sudoplatov is not the one who discov- he too fear for his awards and prestige? Yuri N. Smirnov (Moscow) 278 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORYR P ROJECET B ULLETINS P O N S E

To the Editor: call a “leak” at the suggestion of a highly- social contact with me, I am in a better placed church official. Simply put, having position than anyone else to say that Yuri In the letter from the well-known KGB invited an opponent of the victim to visit him Smirnov is a professional atomic scientist functionary Pavel A. Sudoplatov, published on some pretext, the police official slips who received his training at Arzamas-16, in the American journal Cold War Interna- him, as if by accident, a specially-prepared who took part in the design and testing of the tional History Project Bulletin (Issue 5, Fall letter which refers to payments received 50-megaton nuclear bomb, who completed 1995, pp. 156-158), a suggestion or, rather, from the police department by the individual his doctoral work under the direction of the direct charge, is made against my colleague to be compromised. well-known scientist D.A. Frank- of many years, Yuri Smirnov, all of whose In this and similar situations, the “patri- Kamenetsky. During the period in which he scientific and literary efforts I have wit- otic” attitude of these employees towards worked at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, he nessed, that these efforts were in some way their agencies is touching. They of all people was responsible for a major line of research connected with the KGB. As is usual in such understand that the discovery of an into the peaceful use of nuclear explosions. cases, in place of evidence the letter pro- individual’s links to their services lead to Such a list of accomplishments does not vides only murky references to a conversa- compromising him in the public’s eyes, and require any embellishments, and any profes- tion between Sudoplatov and his former that this works. It is not clear whether they sional would be pleased to call it his own. It colleagues on this matter. consider that such actions strengthen the was entirely natural that Yuri Nikolaevich, Fairly or unfairly, the reputation of the negative image of their agencies. Perhaps, as a possessor of such a rich and varied set of KGB, as well as that of similar agencies in considering its own reputation to be beyond experiences, would turn his sights to the other countries has always been very low. salvage, this is of no concern to them. history of science, and particularly the his- There has never been a better way to ruin a Knowing Yuri N. Smirnov to be a histo- tory of nuclear explosive technology. These person in the eyes of public opinion and his rian of science, who has objectively evalu- efforts have borne fruit, as is witnessed by close friends than to suggest that he has ated the contribution of our agents in obtain- his string of publications. He is recognized connections with these services. ing “atomic secrets,” who neither dimin- among historians of modern science, and no An unparalleled expert in the life of ishes nor exaggerates this contribution, attempts by Sudoplatov and his colleagues Russian bureaucrats and behind the scenes Sudoplatov and his colleagues, apparently, to blacken his reputation will stick. dealings, the author Nikolai Leskov, de- decided to “smear” Smirnov as a protective scribed a similar intrigue in his story Admin- measure. Sincerely, istrative Grace. In this story, a police offi- As a colleague of Yuri Nikolaevich, cial wishing to compromise a provincial who began to work with me 35 years ago and Victor Adamsky public figure organizes what we would now to this day is in constant professional and Arzamas-16

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MORE ON THE1956 POLISH CRISIS

9 October 1995 ment of Soviet forces based in Poland in his “...a number of comrades who are support- meeting with Marshals Konev and ers of a Polish-Soviet union...” (p. 40). To the Editor: Rokossowski in the Soviet embassy on Octo- ber 19, also referred to in his memoirs (p. 41). Sincerely yours, I read the essay “Poland, 1956: The troop movements, which the Soviets Khrushchev, Gomulka and the Polish Octo- then claimed were a long-planned army “ex- Milton Leitenberg ber,” by L.W. Gluchowski, and the accom- ercise” (p. 44), were certainly very much Senior Fellow panying documents in CWIHP Bulletin 5 larger than the “one military battalion” (p. Center for International and Security Stud- (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49, with enormous 40) that Rokossowski admitted to putting ies at Maryland (CISSM) interest, the reason for which will be evident “on alert” (p. 44). Gomulka’s phrase is “the University of Maryland (College Park) in a moment. Soviet Army stationed in Poland” (p. 44). Upon completion of the reading, how- In 1980 or thereabouts, I was given a ever, I was thoroughly puzzled by what I description of the same climactic meeting L.W. Gluchowski responds: saw as a major omission from the author’s between the Soviet and Polish leaderships by introductory essay. Though the material a former Polish party and government offi- I would like to thank Mr. Leitenberg for appears in the documents and in footnotes to cial who had before 1956 been close to the his thoughtful comments on my documen- them, there is no mention at all in the body Polish First Secretary, Central Committee tary essay, “Poland 1956: Khrushchev, of the essay concerning one of the most Chairman and Prime Minister, Boleslaw Gomulka, and the ,’” in the crucial aspects that determined the ultimate Bierut. That rendition adds information be- Spring 1995 issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. outcome of the confrontation between the yond that which appears in Gomulka’s de- With regard to Mr. Leitenberg’s comment Soviet and Polish communist party leaders scription to the Chinese party in Document 4. that he was “thoroughly puzzled” by “a in Warsaw. It concerns the movement of I recorded the comments at the time. The major omission from” my “introductory es- Soviet military forces toward Warsaw, the note which a Polish official handed to say” concerning “one of the most crucial circumstances in which the Polish party Gomulka during the meeting with the Sovi- aspects that determined the ultimate out- leadership learned of the movements, and ets and which informed him of the Soviet come of the confrontation,” notably “the the threatened response of Polish military troop movements resulted from information movement of Soviet military forces towards units. It appears as a single line in Docu- reported to Warsaw by Polish military offic- Warsaw...[and] the circumstances in which ment 3 (p. 43), is amplified in Gomulka’s ers (“colonels”). In addition, Polish Air the Polish party leadership learned of the rendition of the events to the Chinese in Force General Frey-Bielecki requested per- movements,” I shall be brief. Any discus- Document 4 (p. 44), and in footnote 61, mission to bomb the Soviet columns as they sion about the military aspects of the Soviet- quoting Mikoyan’s notes. The threatened converged on Warsaw. Some Polish Air Polish confrontation of October 1956 is response of Polish military units is not men- Force units apparently threatened such ac- bound to be controversial at this early stage tioned in the documents at all, or by the tion whether they received authority to do so of archival research in Poland. In any case, author. or not. (As I recall, Frey-Bielecki agreed to I decided to let this set of documents speak Gluchowski also quotes two of the com- make the request when some of his officers for themselves, and no less than six endnotes ments in Khrushchev’s memoirs; the first— informed him of those threats, telling him include extensive discussions of military “...the people of Warsaw had been prepared what they intended to do. With that, he matters during the crisis. Even Mr. to defend themselves and resist Soviet troops decided to approach the political leadership.) Leitenberg acknowledges that “the material entering the city...”—without asking what The Polish internal security forces were also appears in the documents and in the foot- “Soviet troops,” from where; and the sec- preparing some sort of resistance. Gomulka notes to them.” Furthermore, in the body of ond—“...our own armed strength far ex- was the source of Khrushchev’s assessment my essay, I noted: “Three days in October ceeded that of Poland, but we didn’t want to that “the people of Warsaw had been pre- [18 to 20] 1956 resolved four outstanding resort to the use of our own troops”— with- pared to defend themselves.” Gomulka ap- and interrelated conflicts of the de- out pointing out that it is belied by parently told him, in effect, “Leave us alone Stalinization period in Poland.” The second Khrushchev’s outburst at the October 19 and everything will be OK; if not, there will conflict I outlined reads as follows: “the meeting (quoted on page 40): “That number be a popular uprising.” And the Russians Soviet threat to intervene militarily in the won’t pass here. We are ready for active thought that the Poles would fight; in the affairs of the Polish Party ended with a intervention....I would like the comrades to words of the Polish official, “All the Czech compromise agreement on the part of the voice their views on this matter: interven- traditions are different.” CPSU leadership and the PUWP leader- tion or...” One might add one more point. ship.” It is clear that I agree with Mr. It seems very likely, even obvious, that Gluchowski never comments on the propos- Leitenberg: “one of the most crucial as- Khrushchev gave the order for the move- als for union, although Khrushchev refers to pects” of the confrontation in Warsaw had to 280 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORYR P ROJECET B ULLETINS P O N S E do with the threat of Soviet military inter- put the 8th Plenum on hold, to fur- the readers of the Bulletin decide for them- vention. ther discuss the Polish position to- selves the merits of my case when I present My first departure with Mr. Leitenberg wards Khrushchev, while the Sovi- it in full, in a second documentary essay I comes when he elevates “the circumstances ets went to their own embassy. have begun to put together, this time with in which the Polish party leadership learned Rokossowski attended all the meet- Edward Nalepa of the Military Historical of the movements” to some kind of special ings of the Polish Politburo during Institute in Warsaw, before I was made aware moment in the negotiations. We still don’t this tense period. The Stenographic of Mr. Leitenberg’s letter, for an upcoming have enough Soviet evidence to draw Mr. report of the 8th Plenum also notes issue of the Bulletin. Our documents include Leitenberg’s conclusions. This is particu- that Rokossowski attended all sit- a series of reports prepared by Polish mili- larly true when we consider his comment: tings of the 8th Plenum from 19-21 tary counter-espionage (Informacja) offic- “It seems very likely, even obvious, that October 1956. It would be difficult ers throughout the period of the crisis. Khrushchev gave the order for the move- to imagine Rokossowski not attend- In my first essay I wanted to focus on the ment of Soviet forces based in Poland in his ing meetings of the only legal bod- political aspects of the crisis, particularly the meeting with Marshals Konev and ies that could force him from the bottom line positions staked out by the two Rokossowski in the Soviet embassy on Oc- leadership. Khrushchev probably key personalities in this struggle: Khrushchev tober 19, also referred to in his memoirs.” In decided to let the Poles begin the 8th and Gomulka. Reflecting the tendency at this case, an omission on my part may have Plenum for a number of reasons, these high level meetings to focus on per- resulted in the confusion, and I am grateful including the necessity of providing sonalities, both sides argued over the sym- to Mr. Leitenberg for bringing it to my Gomulka with the legal status he bolic significance of Marshal Rokossowski’s attention. needed to negotiate on behalf of the continued presence in People’s Poland. Al- In my attempt to edit out a number of Polish side at the Belvedere talks. most all other outstanding issues that di- long historiographical comments about the More important, Rokossowski was vided the Soviets and the Poles were left for documents from the essay I submitted to the a full member of the PUWP Polit- further negotiations. I am currently prepar- Bulletin, I deleted a remark about the reli- buro and Central Committee. ing a list of the documents that cover this ability of Khrushchev’s memoirs on the Gomulka had to treat Rokossowski vast subject. The documents I selected for Polish crisis, which was originally included as part of the Polish negotiation team, translation or cited in the footnotes of my with Molotov’s characterization of at least officially, and no one on first Bulletin essay make up the most up to Rokossowski in the Felix Chuev interview either side would have suggested, at date collection on the Polish version of what (contained in One Hundred and Forty Con- least in public, otherwise. happened at the Belvedere Palace on 19-20 versations with Molotov) cited in endnote October 1956. The Czech document record- 28. I should have left in place the following Military aspects of the 1956 crisis, with ing a 24 October 1956 meeting at the Krem- observation: which I have been grappling since 1986, lin, which outlines the Soviet version of have been among the most difficult issues to events—a document introduced and trans- This is another example of how date to discuss with any degree of confi- lated by Mark Kramer and published in the Khrushchev’s memoirs are accurate dence. Documentary evidence, until re- same issue of the Bulletin (pp.1, 50-56)— in so far as the general atmosphere cently, has been limited, while humanist helps to complete the documentary part of of the discussions are concerned, sociology, brushed with rumors, hearsay, the whole puzzle, but more Soviet docu- and at the same time confusing be- and unsubstantiated gossip, grows with ev- ments are still required to draw less tentative cause he again tends to take what ery memoir. With some exceptions, the conclusions. were obviously a series of discus- latter part of the little story from the long My thesis, not in dispute insofar as Mr. sions and compress them into one Belvedere meeting recited to Mr. Leitenberg Leitenberg’s letter is concerned, is that the important conversation. Surely, as by his Polish source has a ring of truth. I can Polish crisis of October 1956 ended in a Document 1 clearly shows, imagine, during the most heated moments, political settlement. Khrushchev made the Rokossowski could not have gone Khrushchev and Gomulka exchanging veiled final compromise which ended the standoff: with Khrushchev to the Soviet em- threats, using language that spawned images Rokossowski’s future was left to the PUWP bassy on 19 October [1956], al- of heroic Polish resistance and Soviet mili- CC; and they later voted to oust him from the though Khrushchev’s emphasis on tary glory. Khrushchev and Gomulka were Politburo. Both sides compromised and Rokossowski as a main source of not the quiet diplomatic types. But it would claimed victory, although Gomulka came information for what was happen- be a leap to suggest that “one of the most out of the stormy negotiations especially in ing in Poland at the time tells us a lot crucial aspects” determining the “ultimate a strong position. Khrushchev, on the other about what everyone in Poland took outcome of the confrontation” was the “cir- hand, managed, as I argue, “to put the Polish for public knowledge: Rokossowski cumstances in which the Polish party leader- question to rest for almost 25 years.” The was Moscow’s man in Warsaw. The ship learned of the [Soviet military] move- Soviet compromise should not go unno- Polish Minister of Defense was at ments,” at least with the limited selection of ticed. the Politburo meeting, held imme- documents I included in my essay. Indeed, all this was accomplished at a diately after First Secretary Ochab However, I will let Mr. Leitenberg and time of great international tension, ideologi- R E S P O NCOLD WSAR INTERNATIONAL E HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 281 cal confusion, social unrest in the country with “a former Polish party and government China, dated 27 October 1956, Stanislaw where the negotiations were taking place, official who had before 1956 been close to Kiryluk wrote: and led by two leaders who still had to the Polish First Secretary...Bierut.” At this operate within some kind of collective lead- stage, I will only emphasize that this too is a ...at two in the morning I was invited ership framework. Other than “active inter- problem. How Polish communists, sharply to meet with the CPCh [Communist vention,” as Khrushchev called it, could the divided before October 1956, immediately Party of China] leadership. Talks Soviet leader (or Gomulka for that matter) after the crisis, appropriated and transformed with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Chen have guaranteed anything other than the the October events and then continued to re- Yun lasted for three hours ... [The threat of military intervention during the invent the “Polish October” after each suc- Chinese leaders stated:] “Between talks at the Belvedere Palace, without a cessive period of conflict during the Cold 19-23 October a CPCh delegation ... prolonged and exhaustive period of face-to- War, is worthy of note. in Moscow convinced Khrushchev face negotiation? We already know, for I take full responsibility for a number of about the rightness of the political example, that Khrushchev only knew what misprints that appear in the published text. changes in Poland ... Matters of in- others had told him about Gomulka or the Mr. Leitenberg’s final critical remark to me, dependent Polish activities cannot situation in Poland, and that he was already “Gluchowski never comments on the [So- be questioned despite the reserva- suspicious of half the Polish Politburo, whom viet] proposal for union,” is one of the most tions of the CPSU Politburo, which he met in March 1956. In fact, Khrushchev serious errors. Three separate letters with has become accustomed to methods positively despised Roman Zambrowski, corrections were sent to the Bulletin, but it and forms of behavior that must be the leading Gomulka supporter in the PUWP appears the last one did not make it into the eliminated from relations within the Politburo at the time. Mikoyan’s warning to final text. The sentence from which Mr. socialist camp.” Mao used, in this Gomulka that he would “be pulled to the top Leitenberg cites (p. 40), where Gomulka is context, the phrase “great power by the Jews and then again they will drop outlining to the Polish Politburo chauvinism.” [See Archive of the him” was directed at Zambrowski, who Khrushchev’s comments, should read as fol- Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, again became the target of Soviet scorn lows: “They are upset with us because the Collection of telegrams from Beijing during informal Soviet-Polish meetings over Politburo Commission proposed a new list of in 1956, Telegram no. 17599, 27 the future of Soviet-Polish relations after members to the Politburo without a number October 1956] October 1956. of comrades who are supporters of a Polish- With regard to the second assertion by Soviet alliance [not union—sojuszu polsko- It appears the Chinese may also need to Mr. Leitenberg; namely my refusal to dis- radzieckiego]; namely, comrades be given some credit for the success of the cuss “the threatened response of Polish mili- Rokossowski, [Zenon] Nowak, Mazur, “Polish October.” tary units” to the Soviet troop movements, Jozwiak.” The next two sentences should which “is not mentioned in the documents at read: “I explained to them that we don’t have Centre for Russian and East European all, or by the author,” I will add this for the such tendencies. We do not want to break the Studies. University of Toronto moment. The Soviet control of the Polish friendly relations [not alliance—zrywac 25 November 1995 Army, acknowledged in the body of my przyjazni ze Zwiazkiem Radzieckim] with the essay, extensively discussed in my foot- Soviet Union.” notes, and covered by Document 5 Incidentally, Khrushchev’s comment to (Khrushchev’s letter to Gomulka on 22 Oc- Gomulka about Poland’s leading supporters tober 1956), as well as the Soviet threat to of a Soviet-Polish alliance is closely related intervene militarily in the affairs of the to Khrushchev’s previous comment, cited by Polish party, cannot be separated. If any Gomulka in Russian: “The treacherous ac- communist in Poland at the time can make a tivity of Comrade Ochab has become evi- claim to have threatened to go to battle dent, this number won’t pass here.” It was against Soviet tanks and troops, who also not obvious to me when I prepared the first marched with some Polish military units essay, although I now hope to make my case towards Warsaw, it was the commanders of shortly elsewhere, but it appears that the security troops under the command of Khrushchev’s anger, directed as it was to- the Polish interior ministry, and perhaps wards Ochab, probably stemmed from some individual Polish Army officers who Ochab’s September 1956 meeting with the turned to them. But all these matters need Chinese, as mentioned in Document 5, and further clarification. Edward Nalepa and I subsequent negotiations between Warsaw will try to sort through the myth and draw and Beijing. Soviet-Chinese talks over Po- some more appropriate conclusions in the land appear to have led Beijing to demand essay we will present in a future Bulletin. from Moscow a more collective approach to We will also try to put into context Mr. the way the Kremlin dealt with the Warsaw Leitenberg’s presentation of the observa- Treaty Organization states. In a telegram to tions shared to him during a talk in 1980 Gomulka from the Polish ambassador to 282 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORYR P ROJECET B ULLETINS P O N S E MORE ON THE 1956 HUNGARIAN CRISIS

23 October 1995 curred—that the time for reform ten years ago, Professor Granville’s article had passed, and his all but impos- must be regarded as a “restatement” of that To the Editor: sible historic mission was to rec- interpretation, albeit a useful one. I am not oncile Soviet power-political in- aware of a single scholarly book or article The Spring 1995 issue of the Bulletin, as terests with those of a new—some- published anywhere in recent years that has rich and as informative as ever, contains two what independent and somewhat claimed that Nagy was anything but “hesi- stimulating articles by Professor Johanna pluralistic—Hungarian political tant.” Granville. Permit me to make a few com- order. He consulted with Anastas In her second article and in the docu- ments on both. Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslov, ments from the archives of the KGB that are In the first article—“Imre Nagy, Hesi- the two Politburo members who attached to it—“Imre Nagy, aka ‘Volodya’— tant Revolutionary”—Professor Granville were in Budapest, and with Yuri V. A Dent in the ’s Halo?”—Professor correctly argues that Prime Minister Nagy, a Andropov, the Soviet ambassador Granville does offer a reassessment of Nagy’s lifelong Communist, hesitated to side with to Hungary, to gain their approval life in Moscow in the 1930s. While the the revolutionaries during the early days of for the transfer of the functions of documents make wild claims, Professor the 1956 Hungarian uprising (October 23- the hapless Central Committee to a Granville prudently and correctly indicates 27); that he created a new, reform-minded new, six-member party Presidium. some of the circumstances under which they party leadership that was more congenial to So anxious was Nagy not to cir- were released in mid-1989. She puts it well: his way of thinking only on October 28th; cumvent Moscow that he called “The story of how these materials came to and that, finally, he embraced the revolution’s the Kremlin from Andropov’s of- light is a story that has more to do with main demands of neutrality and political fice that morning to obtain confir- Soviet, Hungarian, and communist party pluralism on November 1st, after he realized mation of the authorization he had politics amidst the revolutionary upheaval that Moscow had deceived him. just received from the Soviet rep- of the late 1980s and early 1990s than with Alas, this is not a new interpretation, resentatives in Budapest.... historical or scholarly investigation” (p. 34). nor do the documents that follow Professor Only his second turning point, My purpose here is to add a few comments, Granville’s article provide important new which came on November 1, signi- including some new information on the role evidence to confirm it. Hence your claim, fied a parting of the ways between of a key player, about how and why the KGB not hers, made in the Table of Contents Box Nagy and Moscow. Soviet troops released parts of its file on “Volodya.” on p. 1—“Imre Nagy Reassessed”—is mis- having reentered Hungary the night On the basic issue at hand: Having read leading. Ten years ago, and thus long before before, Nagy realized that morn- the four KGB documents published by Pro- the archives opened, this is what I wrote in ing that the Kremlin was no longer fessor Granville (pp. 36-37), and having Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, 1986, pp. 128- interested in finding a political so- read fragments of others in 1991-92, I share 29 (all emphases in the original): lution to the crisis under his leader- Professor Granville’s suspicion that Imre ship. He felt betrayed. In vain had Nagy was almost certainly an informer for [I]t is one of the paradoxes of he consulted with the Kremlin; in the NKVD, the KGB’s predecessor, in the political life in Eastern Europe that, vain had he gained Soviet approval 1930s. Like most other Communist exiles, until the last days of this short- for every major measure he had Nagy was also a Soviet citizen and a member lived revolution, Nagy was the man adopted between October 23 and of the Soviet Communist Party. He was Moscow counted on, and could 31. The party was over. From the attached to the Soviet-dominated Commu- count on, to save its cause in Hun- loyal Muscovite he had been all his nist International. gary. Indeed, from the time of the life, this is when Nagy became a However, the claims about the conse- first demonstration on October 23 Hungarian revolutionary. On No- quences of Nagy’s reporting made by KGB to October 31, Nagy could only vember 1, acting for the first time Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov in his letter of envisage a Hungarian future based without Soviet concurrence, his transmittal to the Soviet Central Committe on Soviet tutelage. With Soviet government declared Hungary’s on 16 June 1989 (p. 36) are almost certainly consent, he sought to make order withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact not true. His suggestion that Nagy alone was by promising ‘reforms,’ assuming and the country’s neutrality. On responsible for the arrest, exile, or execution that the promise of such reforms November 4, when its troops of dozens of high-ranking Communist ex- would end the uprising. reached the Hungarian capital, the iles defies common sense. Nagy, after all, Nagy’s first turning point came Soviet Union overthrew the Nagy was hardly an important figure at that time; on October 28 when he reached the government and crushed the revo- he did not even belong to the inner circle of conclusion that the party had to be lution. Hungarian activists. He was a lonely man, changed, too. He had come to writing on Hungarian agriculture in an ob- understand—and the Kremlin con- To the extent this was a “reassessment” scure émigré journal no one read and com- R E S P O NCOLD WSAR INTERNATIONAL E HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 283 menting on the Hungarian-language broad- János Kádár earlier that year and of the By the time Rajnai “authenticated” casts of Radio Moscow no one heard, let character, composition, and objectives of the Nagy’s handwriting in July or early August alone listened to. As one of his Muscovite democratic opposition. His visit confirmed of 1989, Nagy had received—on 16 June colleagues would observe many years later, what he must have known: that the critics 1989—a ceremonial reburial at Budapest’s even the leading émigrés “had nothing of both inside and outside the party were gain- Heroes Square in front of hundreds of thou- consequence to do but they behaved as if ing new adherents by using Imre Nagy’s sands of people while millions watched the they had. They practiced assiduously some- execution in 1958 to discredit not only Kádár event live on Hungarian TV all day. Still, thing they referred to as politics, plotted one and his associates but to undermine the whole Rajnai clung to the hope that he could save another’s downfall, and generally pranced post-1956 Hungarian political order. As in the regime in which he believed and his own and cantered and whinnied like superannu- 1955-56, Nagy—a man Kryuchkov knew skin, too, by publicizing damaging informa- ated parade horses at the knacker’s gates.” while he was the Soviet Embassy’s press tion about Nagy—by portraying him as a (Julius Hay, Born 1900: Memoirs [La Salle, attaché in Budapest—had once again be- false pretender, a deceiver who sold out his Ill.: Library Press, 1975], pp. 218-19.) Given come the flag for the gathering storm. friends and comrades, a Stalinist stooge. the atmosphere of suspicion prevailing in I do not know if it was Kryuchkov who Only in this way could Rajnai help the Moscow at the time, the Russian commis- then initiated the KGB’s search for informa- hardliners in the HSWP, notably Károly sars did not trust information conveyed by tion on Nagy’s past. Nor does it much Grósz, to defeat such critics as Imre Pozsgay foreign Communists. matter. Both he and Grósz were anxious to who used Nagy’s name to gain political Could Nagy, a nonentity among the discredit Nagy in order to deprive the Hun- ground. Not incidentally, only in this way nonentities, have been a petty mole, then? garian people—and the anti-Kádár, anti- could Rajnai justify his own past and clarify Yes. Could his reporting have contributed to Grósz reformers in the HSWP—of a symbol the meaning of his life. He told me as much the bloody purge of foreign, especially Hun- of courage and sacrifice, of a reformer who during the course of some 40 hours of con- garian, Communists in the 1930s? Yes. broke ranks with Moscow. An astute versation over several months in 1991 and Could he have been directly responsible for Kremlinologist may also interpret their ef- ’92. the arrest of 25 Hungarian Communist fort as an attempt to disparage Nagy in order As it happened, Rajnai forwarded the émigrés, of whom 12 were executed and the to undermine Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s repu- “Volodya File” to Grósz; it was translated rest sent to prison or exile? No. One: The tation. from Russian into Hungarian by Mrs. Soviet authorities were always both suspi- I do know, however, who went over to Thürmer. Grósz presented a verbal sum- cious of and contemptuous toward all for- the headquarters of the KGB to authenticate mary, similar to Kryuchkov’s, to the HSWP eign Communists; the NKVD surely did not Nagy’s handwriting and pick up the newly Central Committee on 1 September 1989. In rely on one such informant’s reports. Two: found “Volodya File.” Accompanied by his speech Grósz told the Central Committee As Kryuchkov put it, the 1989 release of the Gyula Thürmer—Grósz’s special assistant of Nagy’s direct responsibility for the arrest “Volodya File” to Károly Grósz, General for Soviet affairs who, married to a Russian and sentencing of 25 leading Hungarian Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Work- woman, spoke excellent Russian—and pos- cadres in Moscow and the execution of 12 of ers Party (HSWP), was meant to be “expe- sibly by a “Third Man,” also from Budapest, them. But then Grósz declined to open the dient” and Grósz was to be advised “about the Hungarian in charge of the transaction floor for discussion or answer any questions. their possible use” (p. 36). Three: Given the was Sándor Rajnai, the Hungarian Ambassa- The Central Committee resolved to send the KGB’s aptitude for falsifying documents, dor to Moscow. Unlike the young Thürmer “Volodya File” to the archives where it was the authenticity of anything emerging from and the “Third Man,” Rajnai had long known shelved. Oddly enough, even Grósz seemed its archives must be carefully scrutinized. Nagy and his handwriting very well indeed. doubtful of Volodya’s political value at this A few hitherto unknown details will For, in 1957-58, Lieutenant-Colonel Rajnai late date. “It is my conviction,” he declared, amplify the skepticism implicit in these of the Hungarian political police was respon- “that what you have just heard will not be reservations and supplement Professor sible for Nagy’s arrest in and forced return decisive when it comes to making the ulti- Granville’s able account of the political from his involuntary exile in Romania; for mate judgment about Imre Nagy’s whole circumstances of 1989. Nagy’s year-long interrogation in a Budapest life.” (The text of Grósz’s speech was pub- In 1988, KGB Chief Vladimir jail where even his presence was top secret; lished on 15 June 1990—ten long months Kryuchkov flew to Budapest on a secret and for the preparation of Nagy’s equally later—in the hardline Szabadság, a small- fact-finding mission. Long familiar with, secret trial whose scenario Rajnai had drafted. circulation Communist weekly edited by and reportedly very fond of, Hungary, he (Loyal, competent, sophisticated, and ad- Gyula Thürmer.) stayed for several days. He met a few party mired by his superiors and subordinates alike, In the end, Rajnai’s hope of saving the leaders, the head of the political police, and this creative author of the last bloody Com- one-party Communist regime by publiciz- at least one mole the police had planted in munist purge was subsequently richly re- ing the “Volodya File” was dashed, and his the country’s increasingly vocal democratic warded for a job well done. After a long fear of being held accountable for the phony opposition movement. Judging by the ques- tenure as head of Hungarian foreign intelli- charges he had concocted against Nagy in tions he asked and the people he met, he gence, he served as Ambassador to Romania 1957-58 turned out to be unwarranted. For, wanted to gain a first-hand impression of and then—the top prize—to the Soviet Union. while the Hungarian Supreme Court in 1989 the bitter struggle that engulfed the HSWP In the 1980s he became a member of the declared the trial of Imre Nagy and his leadership after the forced resignation of HSWP Central Committee as well.) associates null and void, it declined to charge 284 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORYR P ROJECET B ULLETINS P O N S E those responsible for it. (Several Politburo If a decision to intervene had been taken the Bulletin on pp. 30-31. In para. 5 (on p. members deeply involved in the case, in- earlier, what was there to “reexamine in its 31) he cites an alleged conversation by a cluding Kádár’s Minister of Internal Af- entirety”? Moreover, the Soviet public dec- KGB Hungarian source with some Ameri- fairs, were then—and are still—alive and laration of October 30 advanced a liberal cans (named but not identified) who were well. However, the chief prosecutor com- interpretation of Warsaw Pact relationships, reported to have said that “if the uprising is mitted suicide in the 1970s; János Kádár, the and included an explicit promise to negoti- not liquidated in the shortest possible time, main culprit, died minutes before the Court ate a possible complete Soviet military with- the UN troops will move in at the proposal of “retried” and rehabilitated his nemesis; and drawal from Hungary. That may, of course, the USA and a second Korea will take place.” the head of the kangaroo court that had sent have been intended only to deceive Hungar- Nagy had told Andropov on November 1 Nagy to the gallows in 1958, who remained ian, Western and world opinion. But if so, it that Hungary was not only withdrawing from unrepentant to the end, died in 1991.) was a costly device—its brutal repudiation the Warsaw Pact immediately, but would As for Rajnai, by the time we got ac- in practice a few days later was a serious seek UN and Big Four guarantees of its quainted in 1991 he had resigned his ambas- blow to the Soviet Union in the Western neutrality. Did the Soviet leaders on Octo- sadorship and retired. He was in semi- socialist world as well as in Eastern Europe. ber 30-November 1 fear a U.S. intervention, hiding, worried about retribution. A few I continue to believe what I first wrote in possible under UN auspices circumventing months after our last conversation in 1992, I a RAND paper (P-984) on November 28, their veto, if they withdrew? Perhaps new received a letter from him in which he asked 1956 (first published in Problems of Com- documents will clarify that issue. for my help in getting an American visa. I munism in January 1957, and later in my In closing, I would like also to correct have since heard that he died abroad, not in book Soviet Military Policy): while Soviet one small error in the translation of one of the United States, of natural causes. Perhaps contingent preparations for possible inter- the documents. A report by Deputy MVD so. But in his last years, the memory of Imre vention were no doubt underway, it was only Minister Perevertkin on 24 October 1956, is Nagy appeared to consume his mind and on October 30-31 that the final decision to cited (on p. 22 of the Bulletin) as saying that cripple his will . intervene was made. the Soviet intervention force at that time On October 31, when Mikoyan and numbered in all “128 rifle divisions and 39 Sincerely, Suslov met with Imre Nagy and Zoltan Tildy, mechanized divisions”—which would have the latter rejected an offer to withdraw im- meant almost the entire Soviet Army! The Charles Gati mediately all Soviet troops that had not figures evidently refer to 128 rifle and 39 earlier been present in the country. More- mechanized companies, not divisions. As * * * * * over, Tildy told Mikoyan that Hungary would correctly noted in the text of Mark Kramer’s definitely repudiate the Warsaw Pact in any commentary (on p. 51), the Soviet force in case—that is, even if the Soviet leaders Hungary on October 24 totaled some 31,500 22 November 1995 accepted their demand to withdraw all So- men drawn from five divisions in and near viet forces immediately. (This was dis- Hungary. To the Editor: closed in a monitored broadcast by [Hungar- ian Defense Minister] General Pal Maleter Sincerely, The articles by Janos Rainer and Johanna on November 1 or 2.) I believe that that was Granville in Issue 5 of the Bulletin make a the final straw that tipped the decision to Raymond L. Garthoff major contribution to our understanding of intervene. The new documents, while not the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the conclusive, are consistent with that interpre- Soviet decisions relating to it. Both articles tation. We can hope that other documents tend to conclude that the Soviet decision to not yet discovered or published will clarify intervene decisively to suppress the Nagy this matter. government was probably made in the pe- I do not argue that the thesis I have riod October 26-30. The documents avail- outlined briefly above has been confirmed, able to date do not answer the question, but but it has not been disconfirmed by the new I read them as consistent with a conclusion evidence available, and in my view the new that the Soviet decision was not made until material tends to substantiate it. I believe we October 30-31—after the Hungarians had should continue to regard the question as an disclosed their intention to declare neutral- open one. ity and leave the Warsaw Pact. Mikoyan and Other important developments were also Suslov, in their telegram of October 30, may occurring, including the Anglo-French in- have been reporting on their assurances to tervention in Suez on October 30 (which, as Nagy as implementation of a deception plan, Vladislav Zubok has pointed out, the Soviet but why then would they say to their Polit- leaders initially interpreted as blessed by the buro colleagues “If the situation deteriorates United States). Further attention should also further, then, of course, it will be necessary be given to the intriguing comment in KGB to reexamine the whole issue in its entirety.” Chief Serov’s report of October 28, cited in COLD WUAR I NTERNATIONALP D HISTOR YA PROJECT T BULLETIN E 285

The Update section summarizes items in the War II Losses,” Moscow News [English] 16 66.) popular and scholarly press containing new (28 April-4 May 1995), 7.) information on Cold War history emanating Inquiry into events surrounding Stalin’s death from the former Communist realm. Readers Stalin’s handling of as- and struggle to succeed him. (Y. Zhukov, are invited to alert CWIHP to relevant cita- sessed by historian Natalya Lebedeva. “Krelenskiie Laini: Stalin otetranili ot vlasti tions. Readers should consult references in (“Stalin and the Nuremberg Trial,” Moscow b 1951 godu?” [Kremlin Secrets: Did Stalin Bulletin articles for additional sources. News [English] 11 (24-30 March 1995), 12.) step down from power in 1951?], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 21 December 1994, Abbreviations: Russian evidence on Soviet-Italian relations 3.) and the Italian Communist Party, 1944-48. DA = Deutschland Archiv (Elena Aga-Rossi and Victor Zaslavsky, Beria’s letters from prison, 1953. (Istochnik FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Ser- “L’URSS, il PCI e l’Italia: 1944-1948,” Storia 4 (1994), 3-14.) vice Contemporanea 25:6 (December 1994), 929- NYT = New York Times 982.) Party and state archives inform study of RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Kremlin power struggles, 1945-62. (Y.N. VjZ = Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte Problems of Post-Communism 42:5 (Sep- Zhukov, “The Struggle for Power in the WP = Washington Post tember-October 1995) spotlights new find- Soviet Leadership from 1945 to 1962,” ZfG = Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft ings from Soviet archives: Vladislav M. Voprosi Istorii 1 (1996), 23-29.) Zubok, “Soviet Activities in Europe After Russia/Former Soviet Union World War II,” pp. 3-8; Hope M. Harrison, Archival evidence yields new view on Beria’s “Soviet-East German Relations After World role in post-Stalin power struggle. (Boris Interview with Stalin granddaughter Galina War II,” pp. 9-17; Scott Parrish, “Soviet Starkov, “Koe-chto noven’koe o Berii” Iakovkevnoi Dzhugashvili. (Yuri Dmitriev Reaction to the Marshall Plan: Opportunity [Something New About Beria], Argumenty i and Samarii Gurarii, “Syn Stalina” [Stalin’s or Threat?” pp. 18-24; and Kathryn Fakty 46 (November 1993), 6.) Son], Trud, 31 May 1994, 3.) Weathersby, “New Russian Archival Mate- rials, Old American Debates, and the Korean Nina Vacil’evna Alekseeva on her relation- 1945 letter on postwar strategy from senior War,” pp. 25-32. ship with L.P. Beria. (Irina Mastykina, “Ya Soviet diplomat I.M. Maisky to Stalin from Byla Ne Liubovnitsei Berii, a Ego Zhertvoi” Foreign Ministry archives printed. (“The Report on persecution and isolation of Rus- [I Was Not Beria’s Lover, I Was His Vic- Fiftieth Anniversary of the Conference of sians who returned from WW II German tim], Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 25-28 March the Three Allied Powers in Yalta,” POW camps includes April 1956 recom- 1994, 8-9; 8-11 April 1994, 6-7.) Diplomaticheskii Vestnik 3-4 (February mendation from commission headed by De- 1995), 78-79.) fense Minister Zhukov to relax measures. Ex-CPSU official L.N. Efremov discusses (Vladimir Naumov and Alexander Korotkov, memories of Nikita Sergeevich. (Valery documents from Russian “WWII POWs Condemned as Traitors,” Alekseev, “Takoi Raznoi Khrushchev” [The Foreign Ministry archives illuminate Moscow News [English] 17 (5-11 May 1995), Varied Khrushchev], Pravda, 16 April 1994, Moscow’s refusal to join International Mon- 11. 4.) etary Fund and International Bank for Re- construction and Development. (Harold Recounting of Soviet policy toward early Son of G.M. Malenkov on father’s relation- James and Marzenna James, “The Origins Cold War flashpoint on basis of Communist ship with N.S. Khrushchev. (Andrei of the Cold War: Some New Documents,” Party and Foreign Ministry archives. (N.I. Malenkov, “Malenkov i Khrushchev,” The Historical Journal 37, 3 (1994), 615- Egorova, “‘Iranskii Krisis’ 1945-1946 gg. Gudok [Whistle], 16 April 1994, 4; 19 April 622.) po rassekrechennym arkhivym dokumentam” 1994, 3; 20 April 1994, 3.) [“The Iran Crisis” 1945-1946 on the Basis of Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov announces (2 Declassified Archival Documents], Novaia i Recollections of Russo-Ukrainian relations December 1994) plans to revise estimate of Noveishaia Istoriia 3 (1994), 24-42.) under Khrushchev. (Andrei Barkovskii, total Soviet deaths during World War II; “Velikodushno, bez vsiakikh kolebanii” says 44 Soviet soldiers and officers remain Stalin’s postwar policy in Eastern Europe [Magnanimous, Without Hesitation], MIA from the 1956 invasion of Hungary, assessed. (Vadim Tarlinskii, “Sud’ba Rabochaia Tribuna, 22 January 1994, 3.) 300 were still missing from the war in Af- federatsii” [Fate of the Federation], ghanistan, and a Col. Udanov, missing in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 December 1993, Dissident perspective on 1956 Soviet inva- Ethiopia in 1978, was reported to be alive 4.) sion of Hungary. (Viktor Trofimov, and working in a Somali stone quarry as late “Neordinarnye otnosheniia” [Unusual rela- as 1989. (RFE/RL Daily Report 229 (6 Cominform reassessed on basis of party ar- tions], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 17 June 1994, December 1994).) Dispute over number of chives. (G.M. Adibekov, “An Attempt at the 4.) Soviet deaths in World War II reviewed. ‘Cominternization’ of the Cominform,” (Boris Sokolov, “New Estimates of World Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 4-5 (1994), 51- Conversations recalled with Prime Minister S286 COLDE WA R INTERNATIONALC T HISTORYI POROJECT BULLETINN

Kosygin. (Nikolai Sergeev, “Vyzval secret germ warfare plant for worst known and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Kosygin...” [Kosygin Called...], Trud, 17 outbreak of anthrax, near Sverdlovsk in Urals Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union March 1994, 4.) in 1979. (’79 Anthrax Traced to Soviet Mili- (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, tary,” NYT, 18 November 1994, A10.) 1995); A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Recollections of Soviet policy-making from Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya 1950 on. (Oleg Grinevskii, “No Smolenskoi Story of search for rare German stamps to diplomata, sovetnika A.A. Gromyko, Ploshchadi v 1950-kh godakh,” give Brezhnev on 1979 trip to GDR. (Mikhail pomoshchnika L.I. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’ 11 (November Pogorelyi, “‘Tseppelin’ dlia Brezhneva” Andropova, K.U. Chernenko i M.S. 1994), 120-126.) [Zeppelin for Brezhnev], Krasnaia Zvezda, Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye 7 May 1994, 6.) otnosheniya, 1994); G.M. Kornienko, Previously unpublished 1963 interview with Kholodnaia voina: svidetel’stvo ee Khrushchev from CPSU CC archives. Memoir of more than three decades in uchastnika [The Cold War: Testimony of a (“Vesloe ozhivelenie” [A Happy Revival], Soloviev Psychiatric Hospital. (Maiia Participant (Moscow: International Rela- Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 27 November Mikhailovna Korol’, “Sudby zhen sovetskoi tions, 1995); Vojtiech Mastny, The Cold 1993, 3.) elity” [The Fate of the Wives of the Soviet War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years, Elites], Rosskiiskie Vesti, 20 May 1994, 5.) 1947-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Account of Soviet officials’ reaction to as- Press, forthcoming, 1996). sassination of John F. Kennedy. (Melor Diplomat recalls negotiations leading to 1975 Sturua, “22 Noiabria 1963 goda” [22 No- Accords. (, “The Nuclear Weapons Issues: vember 1963], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 20 No- Thorny Path to Helsinki 1975,” Novaia i vember 1993, 8.) Noveishaia Istoriia 4-5 (1994), 177-194.) Historian Zhores Medvedev on various as- pects of the Soviet atomic program, includ- Documents on Khrushchev’s 1964 meet- Excerpts from personal papers of late For- ing the roles of prison labor and the KGB. ings with Danish leaders. (“About a 1964 eign Ministry official, focusing on Soviet (Zhores Medvedev, “KGB i Sovetskaia Visit to Denmark on the Highest Level,” involvement in Afghanistan. (Anatoly Atomnaia Bomba” [The KGB and the So- Diplomaticheskii Vestnik 7-8 (April 1994), Adamoishin, “Evreiskii Anekdot” [Jewish viet Atomic Bomb], Smena [Change], 24 70-5.) Anecdote], Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 Sep- August 1994, 4; Medvedev, “Bomba c tember 1994, 5.) kleimom LON” [Bomb with the Mark of New CPSU CC documents on Soviet policy LON (Camp of Special Significance)], toward 1968 Czech crisis. (R.G. Pikhoia, Memories of Chernenko from his niece. Rabochaia Tribuna, 30 September 1994, 5; “Czechoslovakia, 1968: The View from (Aleksandr Khinshtein, “Ne uspel nichego 1 October 1994, 3; Medvedev, “The KGB Moscow: According to Documents of the delat” [I Did Not Have Time to Do Any- and the Atomic Bomb,” Rossiia, 31 January Central Committee of the Communist Party,” thing], Moskovskaia Komsomolets, 25 De- 1995, 6.) Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 6 (1994), 3 ff.) cember 1993, 8.) More Soviet documents on fall-out from Assessment of role of espionage in Soviet . (“‘Prague Spring 1968’ ech- Police officer “S” recalls Soviet policy to- atom bomb. (Vladimir Skomorokhov, “From oes...,” Istochnik 4 (1994), 95-99.) ward Sakharov. (German Orekhov, Where Was It Born, Our Atom?” Delovoi “Vospominania Sakharova” [Memories of mir [Business World], 22-23-25-28 June Eyewitness account of 1969 assassination Sakharov], Smena [Change], 14 December 1994.) Interview with Prof. Balentin attempt against Brezhnev. (Mikhail 1993, 4.) Belokon’ on debate over origins of Soviet Rudenko, “‘I broneboinaia pulia dala atomic bomb. (Oleg Moroz, “Sovetskaia A- rikoshet...’” [And the Armor-Piercing Bul- Behind the scenes in the Russian air trans- bomba: Sobstvennoe izobretenie ili plagiat” let Ricocheted...], Moskovskaia Pravda, 5 port authority in the late Soviet era. [The Soviet A-Bomb: Indpendent Invention October 1994, 4. (Vozdushnyy Transport 4 (January 1995), 2- or Plagiarism], Literaturnaia Gazeta 26 (29 3, in FBIS-SOV-95-038-S (27 February June 1994), 10.) Several secret letters printed Khrushchev’s interrogation upon Western 1995), 13-17.) in commentary on book by ex-KGB officer publication of his memoirs in 1970. (Istochnik Pavel Sudoplatov. (Aleksandr Minkin, 4 (1994), 64-75.) Publications: Vladislav M. Zubok and “Bomba” [Bomb], Moskovskii Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Komsomol’ets, 29 June 1994, 1.) Previously classified KGB reports on Rich- Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to ard Nixon’s visits to Moscow in 1959 and Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- Evidence from the archives of D.V. 1972. (Ludmilla Velichanskaia et al., “Ne versity Press, forthcoming, Spring 1996); Skobel’tsyn. (Mikhail Rebrov, “Mog li znaiushchi broda Richard Nikson” [Richard Michael Scammell, ed. and intro., The Sovetskii Soiuz pervym sdelat’ atomnuiu Nixon, Who Didn’t Know the Ford], Kuranty, Solzhenitsyn Files: Secret Soviet Documents bombu?” [Could the Soviet Union Have 12 August 1994, 7.) Reveal One Man’s Fight Against the Mono- Been the First to Make an Atomic Bomb?] lith (Chicago, Berlin, Tokyo, Moscow: edi- Krasnaia Zvezda, 30 April 1994, 5.) U.S.-Russian scientific team blames Soviet tion q, inc., 1995); Aleksandr’ G. Savel’yev p

Update COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 287

Interview with Arkadii Brishch on his work pearance of several tons of uranium in 1989. on Soviet atom bomb. (Oleg Moroz, according to German report. (Berlin DDP/ Naval commander on Soviet atomic subma- “Skopirovna byla ne bomba, a skhema ADN, 21 August 1994, in “Secret Nuclear rine progream. (Ivan Gulaev, “K-27: zariada” [It wasn’t the Bomb that Was Cop- Depots Reported in FRG, East Europe, in Podvodnyi rekord 1964 goda” [K-27: The ied, It Was the Storage System], FBIS-WU-94-162 (22 August 1994), 12.) 1964 Underwater Record], Krasnaia Zvezda, Literaturnaia Gazeta 36 (7 September 1995), 25 June 1994, 6.) 10.) Publications: Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Investigation into 1970 fire aboard nuclear New data on atomic bomb project from Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boul- submarine “K-8.” (Vladimir Shigin, family archives of Lt.-Gen. Boris L’vovich der, CO: Westview Press, 1995). “Tragediia v Biskaiskom Zalive” [Tragedy Bannikov. (Mikhail Rebrov, “Atomnaia in the Bay of Biscay], Moskovskaia Pravda, bomba: Kak nachinalsia otchet vremeni” Military Issues: 12 April 1994, 9.) [The Atom Bomb: How the Countdown Began], Krasnaia Zvezda, 20 August 1994, Dmitrii Volkogonov interviewed on search New data on disaster aboard nuclear subma- 7.) for missing U.S. military from World War II. rine PL-574 which claimed 89 lives. (“Taina (Valerii Rudnev, “Rossiia prodolzhaet iskat’” gibeli PL-574” [The Secret of the Disaster of Interview with I. Zavashin, director of [Russia Continues to Search], Izvestiia, 28 PL-574], Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 30 De- “Avangard” factory at Arzamas-16, formerly October 1993, 6.) U.S.-Russian commission cember 1993, 7.) secret Soviet nuclear center. (Vladimir frustrated by lack of evidence behind claims Gubarev, “Yuri Zavashin: Pontiatie ‘nado’ captured US pilots were held on USSR terri- Former vice-admiral recalls 1974 mine- my vpitali s molokom materi” [Yuri tory. (“MIA’s from the cold war,” Moscow sweeping operation in Gulf of Suez. Zavashin: The Concept of “Must” We Im- News [English] 23 (10-16 June 1994), 14.) (Aleksandr Apollonov, “6.000 chasov na bibed with our Mother’s Milk], Segodnia, On 15 September 1952, Russia returns body minnykh poliakh” [6,000 Hours on the 28 September 1994, 9.) of U.S. Air Force captain whose RB-29 re- Minefields], Krasnaya Zvezda, 17 Septem- connaissance aircraft was downed over the ber 1994, 6.) Description of Soviet Air Force 1956 train- Kurile Islands on 7 October 1952. (Reuters ing maneuver for nuclear war, in which 272 cited in RFE/RL Daily Report 178 (19 Sep- Series on Pacific Ocean battles covered up troops were ordered to land at ground zero. tember 1994).) Revelations on plight of by Soviet regimes. (Nikolai Burbyga, (Aleksandr Kyrov, “Dernyi Desant” [Turf Americans shot down over USSR, Vietnam, “Zhertvi heob iavlennykh voin” [Victims of Landing], Rossiskaia Gazeta, 26 May 1994, including case of B-52 crewman Lt.-Col. Unannounced Wars], Izvestia, 5 January 7.) Robert Standervik. (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 1994, 6; 9 February 1994, 8.) in FBIS-SOV-95-040 (1 March 1995).) Account of secret Soviet 1959 testing of Reports on investigation of wreck of the atomic weapons in Pacific. (Mikhail Rebrov, Detailed account of postwar Soviet subma- Soviet atomic submarine “Komsomolets.” “Otriad osobnogo naznacheniia: Khronika rine building program. (I. Spasskiy and V. (Vladimir Svartsevich, “Poligon nashei neob ‘iavlennoi ekspeditsii’” [An Order of Semenov, “First Soviet Submarine With sovesti” [Proving-Ground of Our Con- Special Significance: The Story of an Unre- Turbine Power Plant (Design Project 617),” science], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 11 August ported Expedition], Krasnaia Zvezda, 7 May Morskoy Sbornik (Moscow) 7 (July 1994), 1994, 5-6; Kirill Dybskii, “Mstislav Keldysh’ 1994, 6.) 65-69, in JPRS-UMA-94-053 (15 December vernulsia ‘so shchitom’” [The “Mstislav 1994), 19-23. Keldysh” Returns “with the Shield”], Hidden history and environmental costs of Segodnia, 17 August 1994, 7.) Interview Soviet program of “peaceful nuclear explo- Report on early plans for development of with Tengiz Borisov, former KOPRON di- sions” (PNEs) from 1965-88 probed. (Judith Russian “PKO” defense system. (Anatolii rector, on new data concerning Perera, “Revealed: 23 Years of Soviet Nuk- Dokuchaev, “The Russians Weren’t Shoot- “Komsomolets.” (Eduard Lunev, “Poslednii ing,” The Daily Telegraph (London), 8 Feb- ing American Satellites,” Krasnaia Zvezda, parad ‘Komsomol’tsa’” [The Last Parade of ruary 1995, 16, in JPRS-TAC-95-001 (14 30 June 1994, 6.) the “Komsomolets”], Rossiia 25 (6-12 June February 1995), 27-28.) 1994), 6.) Report on 1955 disaster aboard Environmental impact of nuclear tests on Novorossisk. (Ol’ga Musafirora, New data on Soviet ballistic missile devel- Totskii proving grounds, and increased can- “Herazgadannyi vzryv” [Unsolved Explo- opment. (Krasnaia Zvezda, 18 June 1994, cer rates in city of Orenburzh, assessed by sion], Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 28 October 6.) Duma representative. (Tamara Zlotnikova, 1993, 3.) “Zabytyi genotsid” [Forgotten Genocide], Sino-Soviet Relations: Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 14 September 1994, On 1962 Soviet naval campaign in Indone- 2.) sia. (Andrei Zhdankin, “Do voiny ostavalos’ Correspondence printed between Stalin and tri chasa” [There Were Three Hours Left Mao from January 1949 reveals disagree- Soviet KGB head Kryuchkov noted disap- Until War], Rossiia, 1-7 June 1994, 1.) ment on tactics regarding potential media- 288 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Update tion of Chinese Civil War. (Sergei L. and indicate Julius Rosenberg indeed ran 136 (20 July 1994).) Russian Academy of Tikhvinskii, “Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF: Communist spy ring, though some key evi- Sciences devotes meeting to discussion of Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom v dence of atomic espionage still lacking. book, various comments cited in yanvare 1949 g.” [From the Presidential (Walter Schneir and Miriam Schneir, “Cryp- Literaturnaya gazeta on 27 July 1994. (RFE/ Archives of the RF (Russian Federation): tic Answers,” The Nation, 14/21 August RL Daily Report 145 (2 August 1994).) Correspondence of I.V. Stalin with Mao 1995, 152-53.) Zedong of January 1949], Novaya i noveisha Moscow publishers Mezhdunarodnye istoriya 4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.) Christine Keeler, call-girl who was key fig- otnosheniye to release six-volume history of ure in 1963 Profumo spy scandal in England, Russian foreign intelligence service, reports Newly released Soviet documents on reportedly admitted for first time to having Trud on 15 October 1994. (RFE/RL Daily Mikoyan’s secret visit to Mao and CCP been a Soviet spy. (British magazine OK, 4 Report 201 (21 October 1994).) leaders, 31 January-7 February 1949. (Andrei November 1994, quoted in RFE/RL Daily Ledovskii, “Secretnaia missiia A.I. Report 211 (7 November 1994).) Interview with ex-KGB official Lt.-Gen. Mikoyana v Kitai” [Secret Mission of A.I. (ret.) Nikolay Leonov, author of Seditious Mikoyan to China], Problemi Dalnego Story behind publication of Yuri Shvets’s Times (1994); comments on Ames case, Vostoka 2, 3 (1995).) Washington Station: My Life as a KGB Spy KGB defectors, etc. (“KGB Lieutenant in America. (Dmitry Radyshevsky and General Nikolay Leonov: Failure by Ames New Russian evidence on Sino-Soviet rela- Nataliya Gevorkyan, “The memoirs of a in the United States was Impossible: He Was tions, 1949-52. (B. Kulik, “Kitaiskaiia Soviet intelligence officer have created a big Betrayed in Moscow,” Komsomolskaya Narodnaiia Respublika v period stanovleniia panic,” Moscow News [English] 16 (22-28 Pravda, 22 December 1994, 6, in FBIS- (1949-1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva April 1994), 14.) SOV-94-248 (27 December 1994), 17-19.) vneshnei politik RF” [The Chinese People’s Republic in the Founding Period (Materials Recollections of Andropov from ex-KGB Interview with Vladimir Stanchenko about from the Archive of foreign policy of the colleagues. (Aleksandr Cherniak, Soviet and Russian espionage. (“The Spy Russian Federation], Problemi Dalnego “Andropov—Izvestnyi i neizvestnyi” Who Returned to the Cold,” Izvestiia, 2 Vostoka 6 (1994).) [Andropov—The Known and Unknown], September 1994, 9.) Pravda, 15 June 1994, 3; Aleksei Grishin, Mao’s reactions to Khrushchev’s 20th Party “V ego stikakh bylo mnogo ostrykh CIA’s record vis-a-vis USSR in Cold War’s Congress speech, as told to Soviet ambassa- slovochek” [In His Poems There Were Many closing years assessed. (Walter Pincus, dor in Beijing. (P. Yudin, “Zapis besedy s Sharp Words], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 21 June “Reagan Buildup at CIA Spawned Current tovarischem Mao,” Problemi Dalnego 1994, 6.) Woes,” Washington Post, 29 December Vostok 5 (1994). 1994.) Interview of Vladimir Barkovskii, who New information on 1971 crash of Lin Biao worked with Soviet spies in London, on role KGB watched Russian National Unity Move- during flight from China. (Andrei Kosyrev, of espionage in development of Soviet atomic ment leader Aleksey Vedenkin for “keen- “‘Delo Lin Biao’: Zagadka Pochti bombs. (Andrei Vaganov, “Sorok piat’ let ness on fascist ideas” since 1981, authorities Rasreshena” [“The Lin Biao Affair”: The nazad, 29 avgusta, byla ispytana pervala v say; other report says Vedenkin probably Mystery is Nearly Solved], Moskovskaia CCCR atomnaia bomba” [Forty-Five Years belonged to KGB. (Moscow RIA, 1 March Pravda, 24 March 1994, 4; Yuri Dmitriev, Ago, On August 29, the USSR’s First Atom 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-046-A (9 March “Poslednii polet kitaiskogo marshala” [The Bomb Was Tested], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1995), 3-4; also Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Last Flight of the Chinese Marshal], Trud, 9 30 August 1993, 1.) 1 March 1995, 1, as “Article Links Vedenkin April 1994; Ivan Iavnok, “Marshal Lin Biao to KGB,” FBIS-SOV-95-055 (22 March Razbilsia v Mongolii” [Marshal Lin Biao On the controversy over the book by ex- 1995), 20.) Died in Mongolia], Krasnaia Zvezda, 7 May KGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov et al., Special 1994, 6.) Tasks, and its allegations that prominent Interview with ex-KGB double agent-de- Western scientists knowingly provided in- fector Oleg Gordievsky on publication of his Interview with Li Iuzhan, Mao’s interpreter formation to Soviet intelligence. (Vladimir memoirs; Sunday Times (London) publishes for meetings with Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Nadein, “Proval po vsei semi:—Pochemu excerpt with names of KGB sources. (“Ex- (Andrei Kabannikov, “Mao v okruzhenii nashemu velikomu shpionu ne posvolili Spy Causes Uproar in Britain” and “Times vragov i tantsovshchits” [Mao, Surrounded klevat’ v Amerike” [Malfunction of All Sys- Publishes Names of British KGB Inform- by Enemies and Dancers], Komsomolskaia tems:—Why Our Great Spy Was Not Al- ers,” Moscow News [English] 8 (24 Febru- Pravda, 6 January 1994, 14.) lowed to Slander America], Izvestiia, 4 June ary-2 March 1995), 11; see also “KGB: 1994, 5.) Lavrenti Beria’s son Sergo claims Michael Foot was our agent,” The Sunday Intelligence/Espionage Issues: on Russian television no 15 July 1994 that Times (London), 19 February 1995.) J.Robert Oppenheimer secretly visited his Former defenders of Rosenbergs say Venona father in the USSR in 1939; historians dis- New official publication, White Paper on decrypts of KGB messages seem genuine miss story as absurd. (RFE/RL Daily Report Russian Secret Services (Moscow: Update COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 289

Obozrevatel, 1995), on problems and Higher than the World Standard], Novaia Joint Task Force on Archives, American achievements of Russian secret services Ezhednevnaia Gazeta, 1 September 1994.) Association for the Advancement of Slavic published. (Itar-Tass, 11 October 1995, in Studies and The American Historical Asso- FBIS-SOV-95-196 (11 October 1995), 39- Russian presidential decree (no. 489-rp, dated ciation, 1 April 1995,” Slavic Review 54:2 40.) 22 September 1994) is supposed to lead to (Summer 1995), 407-426.) massive declassification of materials more Publications: Oleg Gordievsky, Next Stop than 30 years old. (“Decree to Reveal Se- Interview with Rosarkhiv head R.G. Pikhoia. Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg crets,” Moscow News [English] 40 (7-13 (“‘Rossiia atnositsoa l chislu belikikh Gordievsky (London: Macmillan, 1995); October 1994), 14.) archivnikh derzhav’” [“Russia Acts Toward Harvey Klehr, John Haynes, and Fridrikh a Time of Great Archival Power”], Rossiiski Igorevich Firsov, eds., The Secret World of State Duma passes legislation on Freedom of Vesti, 22 June 1995, 7.) American Communism (New Haven, CT: Information giving citizens rights to state Yale University Press, 1995). information resources, reports Rossiiskie vesti Interview with head of the Russian Presi- on 23 November 1994. (RFE/RL Daily Re- dential Archives (APRF) Aleksandr Archival/Research Developments: port 223 (28 November 1994).) Korotkov. (“Dla chevo otkrivaiem ‘osobuyu papki’” [Why Open the “Special Files”], Complaints persist on difficulties of archi- State Duma passes Russian “Federal Law on Krasnaia Zvezda, 9 August 1995, 2.) val access. (Anna Repina, “Komu oni Information, Informatization, and the Pro- nuzhny, eti tainy” [They are Secrets to those tection of Information” on 25 January 1995; Armenia Who Need Them], Smena, 12 October 1993, signed by Yeltsin on 20 February 1995. (Text 4.) in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 22 February 1995, Document published purporting to confirm 15-16, in FBIS-SOV-95-048-S (13 March secret collaboration between Dashnak party Archive official’s report, based on a De- 1995), 29-37 (Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)) cember 1993 speech at RTsKhIDNI. (V.P. and KGB during Soviet era. (Aragil Elec- Kozlov, “Zarubezhnaia arkhivnaia Rossika: Yeltsin signs decree no. 180 dated 17 Febru- tronic News Bulletin (Yerevan), 4 March Problemy i Napravleniia Raboty” [Foreign ary 1995 to declassify and publish docu- 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-043 (6 March 1995), Archives Relating to Russia: Problems and ments on Soviet nuclear weapons program 93.) the Direction of Work], Novaia i Noveishaia up to 1954. (“Yeltsin Opens Archives On Istoriia 3 (1994), 13-23.) Soviet Nuclear History,” Washington Post, Ex-KGB officer describes work in 1980s. 19 February 1995, A46; OMRI Daily Digest (Golos Armenii (Yerevan), 6 July 1995, 1-2, Russia and France complete first of series of 36:1 (20 February 1995); Rossiskaya Gazeta, in FBIS-SOV-95-136 (17 July 1995), 92- planned archival exchanges. (“Archival Files 1 March 1995, 14, in FBIS-SOV-95-058-S 94.) Are Returned to Russia from France,” (27 March 1995), 1.) Commission formed to Diplomaticheskii Vestnik 3-4 (February implement decree; members listed. 1994), 79.) (Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 7 June 1995, 5, in FBIS- SOV-95-115-S (15 June 1995), 67.) Belarus body aiding U.S.-Russian MIA/ Archival regulations. (“Polozheniie ob POW commission facing disbandment. arkhivom fonde Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [The Russian government decree on declassifica- (Yevgeny Sulyga, “About Traces of the Viet- State of the Archives in the Russian Federa- tion and archives adopted. (“Ob ustanovleniya nam War in the City of Minsk,” tion], Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 1 April 1994, 4.) poryadka rassekrechivaniya i prodleniya Komsomolskaya Pravda [Moscow], 28 Feb- srokov zasekrechivaniya arkhivnykh ruary 1995, 1, 3, in FBIS-SOV-95-040 (1 Sakharov’s archives open. (Marina dokumentov Pravitel’stva SSSR,” Sobranie March 1995), 51-52.) Lebedeva, “Otkryvaetsia arkhiv Sakharova” zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 9 (27 [Sakharov’s Archive Opens], Izvestiia, 21 February 1995), 1539-1542.) Estonia May 1994, 4; Pavel Kol’tsov, “Arkhiv Sakharova v Moskve” [Sakharov’s Archives Interagency regional conference in Estonian government concerned by reports in Moscow], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 21 May Novosibirsk discusses need to protect secret of KGB documents being sold on black 1994, 6; Viola Egikova, “Zemlianoi val. information. (Vecherniy Novosibirsk, 19 June market; Estonia’s Archives Department ac- Arkhiv Sakharova” [Earthern Rampart: 1995, 2, in FBIS-SOV-95-121 (23 June 1995), knowledges loss of “thousands of files on Sakharov’s Archive], Moskovskaia Pravda, 34.) the activity of the KGB and other intelli- 24 May 1994, 9.) gence agencies.” (Interfax report of 20 No- Probe of archival situation in Russia, recom- vember 1994, in RFE/RL Daily Report 221 Interview with Rosarkhiv head R.G. Pikhoia. mendations, by panel of American scholars. (21 November 1994).) (Sergei Barshavchik, “Tseny na (Norman Naimark, William G. Rosenberg, gosudarstvennye tainy v Rossii po- William Taubman, Kathryn Weathersby, Parliamentary committee reports results of prezhdemy vyshe mirovykh” [As Before, Donald J. Raleigh, Gregory Freeze, and David two-year investigation of KGB activities in the Prices on State Secrets in Russia are Ransel, “Discussion: Final Report of the Estonia, including review of archives. 290 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Update

( ETA, 20 February 1995, iin FBIS- Archiv 28:3 (1995), 290-298; Gerhard SOV-95-034 (21 February 1995), 99. Ukrainian archives yield new data on 1986 Wettig, “Stalin - Patriot und Demokrat fur Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. Deutschland?” and Loth, “Kritik ohne Law calling on ex-KGB agents in Estonia to (N.V. Makovs’ka, “Politichnaia Gundlagen. Erwiderung auf Gerhard confess or face public exposure working Retrospektiva Chornobyl’s’koi Katastrofi v Wettig,” Deutschland Archiv 28:7 (1995), “surprisingly well,” police say. (Tallinn Dokumentakh” [A Political Retrospective 743-750; Wettig, “Die beginnende BNS, 3 April 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-064 (4 of the Chernobyl Catastrophe in Documents], Umorientierung der sowjetischen April 1995), 73.) Arkhiv Ukrainy 1-3 (1993), 99-105.) Deutschland-Politik im Fruhjahr und Sommer 1953,” Deutschland Archiv 28:5 Latvia Detailed recounting of how glasnost in late (1995), 495-507. 1980s permitted freer airing of true dimen- Court finds Saeima deputy Roberts Milbergs sions of 1933 in Ukraine. (James E. files disclose data on notorious terror- not guilty of having collaborated with KGB. Mace, “How Ukraine Was Permitted to Re- ist “Carlos” and lawyer now defending him, (RFE/RL Daily Report 22 (23 November member,” The Ukrainian Quarterly 49:2 Jacques Verges. (Peter Sandmeyer, “The 1994).) (Summer 1993), 121-151.) Jackal and the Villain,” Stern (Hamburg), 22 September 1993[4], 202-204, in FBIS-WEU- KGB recruiter says current parliamentarian /Former Czechoslovakia 94-185 (23 September 1994), 14-15.) Andrejs Silins was listed as KGB agent in 1972 without his knowledge. (Tallinn BNS, Czech parliamentary commission investi- Social Democratic Party (SPD) chair 9 December 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-238 gating late 1980 Warsaw Pact maneuvers Rudolph Scharping seeks Stasi files to rebut (12 December 1994), 86-87.) may have had political overtones, but link to charges by and others that the possible still unclear. SPD betrayed the goal of German unifica- KGB document found dating from 1982 (Prague CTK, 8 February 1995, in “‘No tion in talks with GDR officials. granting access to secret documents to present Direct Proof’ of 1980 Poland Invasion (Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 8 Febru- day Defense League volunteer paramilitary Found,” FBIS-EEU-94-027-A (9 February ary 1994, 4, in “Scharping Rejects CDU organization head Johannes Kert, who says 1995), 6-7.) Accusations of SPD-Stasi Cooperation,” he cannot explain document. (Rahva Haal, FBIS-WEU-94-027 (9 February 1994), 31.) 21 December 1994, in Tallinn ETA, 21 Government approves principle of opening December 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-246 (22 StB (secret police files), Interior Minister Reports cite Stasi files showing Party of December 1994), 52.) Estonian security Ruml denies it will lead to wave of lawsuits. Democratic Socialism (PDS) politician policy say KGB files refute allegations that (Prague CTK, 30 March 1995, in “Ruml Gregor Gysi collaborated with secret police Kert was linked to the KGB. (Tallinn BNS, Outlines Provisions of Bill on StB Files,” against his client, dissident Robert 24 January 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-016 (25 FBIS-EEU-95-062-A (31 March 1995), 5.) Havemann; Gysi denies charges. (“Meeting January 1995), 52.) at ‘Ellen,’” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 17 Oc- Former East Germany tober 1994, 21-26, in FBIS-WEU-94-201 Controversy erupts in parliament over fate (German Democratic Republic) (18 October 1994), 23-25; “Gregor’s Re- of unopened archives of Latvian KGB. ports,” Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 7 Novem- (Tallinn BNS, 5 May 1995, in FBIS-SOV- Evidence on Soviet occupation of Germany ber 1994, 26-30, in “Files Incriminate Gysi 95-087 (5 May 1995), 88.) after World War II. (Norman M. Naimark, for Stasi ‘Collaboration,’” FBIS-WEU-94- “Die Sowjetische Militaradministration in 216 (8 November 1994), 22.) Lithuania Deutschland und die Frage des Stalinismus,” Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft 43:4 Charges lodged against couple for spying Mystery and controversy continue to sur- (1995), 295-97; Naimark, “The Soviets and for Stasi against West Germany between round status and fate of estimated 300,000 the Christian Democrats: The Challenge of a 1971 and 1976. (Berlin DDP/ADN, 27 Oc- files left behind by Lithuanian KGB. ‘Bourgois’ Party in Eastern Germany, 1945- tober 1994, in FBIS-WEU-94-209 (28 Oc- (Nikolay Lashkevich, “Lithuania: Who Has 1949,” 9:3 (Fall 1995), 369-92; see also tober 1994), 18.) Got the KGB Archives,” Izvestiia (Mos- Naimark’s The Russians in Germany, cited cow), 10 March 1995, 4, in FBIS-SOV-95- below. Interview with Markus Wolf, former head of 049 (14 March 1995), 103-105.) GDR external intelligence service. (“East Debate continues on 1952 Stalin Notes and Germany’s Old Spymaster Talks: So Many Ukraine question of early opportunity for German Regrets, but Uncontrite,” NYT, 6 June 1995, unification. (Manfred Kittel, “Genesis einer A11.) Letters pertaining to 1969 arrest of Ukrai- Legende. Die Discussion um die Stalin- nian activist Maj.-Gen. P.G. Grigorenko. Noten in der Bundesrepublic 1952-1958,” Publications: R.C. Raack, Stalin’s Drive to (“Petr Grigorenko: Iz Khroniki Tavli” [Pe- Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 41:3 the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the ter Grigorenko: From the Chronicle of his (1994), 355-389; Wilfried Loth, “Stalin die Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer- Persecution], Segodnia, 12 April 1994, 9.) deutsche Frage und die DDR,” Deutschland sity Press, 1995); Norman Naimark, The Update COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 291

Russians in Germany: A History of the So- Engelmayer, Hungarian ambassador to Po- Radio, 30 March 1995, in FBIS-EEU-95- viet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cam- land, recounting influence of 1956, 1968, 061 (30 March 1995), 23. bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970, etc. (“Ambassador with a Rucksack,” 1995); Inventar der Befehle des Obersten The Hungarian Quarterly 35:133 (Spring Student groups demand release of secret Chefs der Sowjetischen Militaradministra- 1994), 123-128.) police files on 1977 death of anti-govern- tion in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-1949 ment activist Stanislaw Pyjas. (RFE/RL Daily (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1995); Wilfried Loth, Publications: Die Ungarische Revolution Report 41 (1 March 1994). ed., Die deutsche Frage in die Nachkriegszeit 1956 [findings of an Austrian-Hungarian (Berlin: Akademie, 1994); Philip Zelikow Conference in Vienna, 6 April 1995] (Wien: Publications: Tajne Dokumenty Biura and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified Collegium Hungaricum, 1995). Politycznego: Grudzien 1970 [Secret Docu- and Europe Transformed: A Study in State- ments of the Politbureau of the Polish Com- craft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Poland munist Party (PUWP) on Events of Decem- Press, 1995). ber 1970] (London: Aneks Publishers, 1991); Sejm considering State Secrets Bill barring Tajne Dokumenty: Biura Politycznego: Hungary release of information on intelligence activi- PZPR a “Solidarnosc” 1980-1981 [Secret ties for 80 years, national security or defense Documents of the Politbureau of the Polish Recounting of case of school-teacher ar- information for 40 years, and economic se- Communist Party (PUWP). Party versus rested in connection with show trials in crets for 30 years; media, liberals, oppose “Solidarity” 1980-1981] (London: Aneks Hungary under Matyas Rakosi in Stalin’s bill, which is returned to committee. (RFE/ Publishers, 1992); Tajne Dokumenty Biura last years. (Eva V. Deak, “A Show Trial RL Daily Report 163 (29 August 1994).) Politycznego i Sekretariatu KC: Ostatni rok Case History: The Story of Gyorgyi Government and media agree new constitu- wladzy 1988-1989 [Secret Documents of the Tarisznyas,” The Hungarian Quarterly tion will guarantee freedom of information, Politbureau of the Polish Communist Party 35:134 (Summer 1994), 75-91.) press; parliament rejects restrictive secrecy (PUWP) and the Secretariat of the Central law. (Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza Committee: The Last Year in Power, 1988- Budapest Military Prosecutor’s Office on reports, 25 October 1994, quoted in RFE/RL 1989) (London: Aneks Publishers, 1994); 28 October 1994 presses charges against Daily Report 203 (25 October 1994).) Andrzej Garlicki, Z Tajnych Archiwow [From three army officers accused of killing un- the Secret Archives] (Warsaw: Polska armed demonstrators during 1956 events, Ex-Soviet base near Szczecin seen as Oficyna Wydawnicza ‘BGW’, 1993); Pawel according to MTI. (RFE/RL Daily Report econological hazard. (Glos Szczecinski, 1 Machcewicz, Polski Rok 1956 [The Polish 207 (31 October 1994).) February 1995, 1, in JPRS-TEN-95-004 (28 Year 1956] (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza February 1995), 21-22.) ‘Mowia Wieki’, 1993); Andrzej Garlicki Survey of international dimension of 1956 and Andrzej Paczkowski, eds., Zaciskanie Hungarian crisis, using new Eastern, West- Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on 9 Petli: Tajne Dokumenty Dotyczace ern, and Hungarian sources. (Csaba Bekes, September 1994 meets Polish team investi- Czechoslowacji 1968 r. [Tightening of the “The 1956 Revolution and World Politics,” gating . (Gazeta Wyborcza Noose: Secret Documents Concerning The Hungarian Quarterly 36 (Summer cited in RFE/RL Daily Report 173 (12 Sep- Czechoslovakia 1968] (Warsaw: 1995), 109-121.) tember 1994).) Polish president Walesa, at Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1995); Michael ceremony marking 55th anniversary of Katyn Bernhard and Henryk Szlajfer, eds., From Recordings of Radio Free Europe/Radio massacres, calls on Russia to reveal full the Polish Underground: Selections from Liberty broadcasts during 1956 Hungarian truth. (Warsaw TV, 3 April 1995, in FBIS- Krytyka, 1978-1993 (University Park, PA: crisis discovered. (NYT, 24 October 1995.) EEU-96-064 (4 April 1995), 32-33.) Crimi- Pennsylvania State Press, 1995). nal probe begun in 1993 by Smolensk Mili- Newly-available Hungarian archives inform tary Prosecutor’s Office drawing to a close. Romania account of Budapest’s role in 1968 Czecho- (Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 29 April slovak crisis. (Istvan Vida, “Janos Kadar 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-085 (3 May 1995), Report on Soviet policy toward December and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” The 6-7.) Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, and 1989 Romanian events, including letter from Hungarian Quarterly 35:135 (Autumn Belarusian prosecutors sign accord on coop- Shevardnadze to Gorbachev and minutes of 1994), 108-123.) eration regarding Katyn investigations. (War- meetings. (“On the Events of 1989 in Roma- saw PAP, 31 May 1995, in FBIS-EEU-95- nia,” Diplomaticheskii Vestnik (Moscow) Government abolishes Historical Investi- 107-A (2 June 1995), 23.) Walesa speaks at 21-22 (November 1994), 74-80.) gation Committee established by previous Katyn. (FBIS-EEU-95-107 (5 June 1995), Hungarian government to investigate “blank 48-49.) Yeltsin sends message to ceremony. Appearing before “December 1989” parlia- spots” in recent history, says radio Budapest (Moscow Interfax, 3 June 1995, in FBIS- mentary commission, President Ilescu de- on 22 December 1994. (RFE/RL Daily SOV-95-107 (5 June 1995), 9.) nied allegations he sought Soviet assistance Report 241 (22 December 1994).) on 22 or 23 December 1989. (Adevarul Ministry of Internal Affairs considers open- (Bucharest), 20 December 1994, 2, in FBIS- Biographical interview with Akos ing up archives up to 1956. (Warsaw Polskie EEU-94-249 (28 December 1994), 17.) 292 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Update

Target Zhou Enlai: The ‘’ English translations of newly released Rus- Controversy erupts over documents claim- Incident of 1955,” The China Quarterly 139 sian materials, with commentary. (Vladimir ing past collaboration by Bishop Laszlo (September 1994), 766-782.) Petrov, “Soviet Role in the Korean War Tokes, ethnic Hungarian priest whose arrest Confirmed: Secret Documents Declassified,” sparked 1989 revolt, with Romanian Article based on CCP sources explores Zhou Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13:3 Securitate secret police [Romanian Intelli- Enlai’s handling of the 1958 Taiwan Straits (Fall 1994), 42-67.) gence Service, or SRI]. (Gyorgy Jakab, crisis, including data on secret communica- “UDMR Will Ask to See the SRI Files of All tions between PRC and Taiwan. (Liao Kathryn Weathersby, “New Russian Archi- Political Leaders,” Adevarul (Bucharest), Xinwen, “Zhou Enlai yu heping jiejue taiwan val Materials, Old American Debates, and 29 December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-001 (3 wentide fangzhen” [Zhou Enlai and the Ini- the Korean War,” Problems of Post-Com- January 1995), 24.) Paper publishes pur- tiative to Peacefully Solve the Taiwan Prob- munism 42:5 (September-October 1995), 25- ported documents showing Tokes was paid lem], Dangde Wenxian [Party Documents] 32. Securitate informer. (“According to 5 (1994), 32-38.) Renasterea Banateana, Laszlo Tokes In- A conference on “The Korean War: An formed the Securitate Under the Name of Reassessment, using new Chinese sources, Assessment of the Historical Record,” was Laszlo Kolozsvar,” Curierul National of Mao’s evolving views of U.S. (He Di, held at Georgetown University, Washing- (Bucharest), 31 December 1994, in FBIS- “The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong’s ton, DC, on 24-25 July 1995, sponsored by EEU-95-003 (5 January 1995), 19.) Perception of the United States,” The China The Korea Society, Korea-America Soci- Quarterly 137 (March 1994), 144-158.) ety, and Georgetown University. Please Mongolia consult the sponsors for copies of papers Publications: Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, delivered. Account of Soviet intervention in 1984 Mon- eds., Toward a History of Chinese Commu- golian putsch. (Zorik Tsedenbal, “Novoe nist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Per- Publications: William Stueck, The Korean ‘Delo Vrachei’” [A New “Doctor’s Plot”], sonalities and Interpretive Approaches War: An International History (Princeton, Nezavisimaia Gazeta (Moscow), 2 March (Washington, DC: Asia Program, Woodrow NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Shu 1994, 8.) Wilson International Center for Scholars, Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: n.d.); John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 People’s Republic of China China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age 1995) [Ed. note: For detailed lists of recent sources, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, see the essays by Michael Hunt and Chen 1994); Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelli- Vietnam/Vietnam War Jian elsewhere in this issue of the Bulletin.] gence Operations (Annapolis, MDL Naval Institute Press, 1994); Robert S. Ross, Nego- USSR sent 3,000 troops to Vietnam during Evidence on early wrangling between Chi- tiating Cooperation: The United States and U.S. involvement there, and 13 were killed, nese Communist Party (CCP) and Moscow China, 1969-1989 (Stanford, CA: Stanford writes former Tass correspondent, citing in- over Soviet seizure of Chinese industrial University Press, 1995); Thomas J. terviews with ex-Soviet ambassador I. equipment in Manchuria at close of World Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Shcherbakov and other former officials. (AP War II. (Liu Guowu, “Zhanhou zhongsu Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino- dispatch citing article Aleksandr Minaev in liangguo chuli dongbei rewei chanyede American Conflict, 1947-58 (forthcoming Ekho Planety [Echo of the Planet], Novem- jiufen” [The Argument Between China and in 1996 from Princeton University Press). ber 1995.) the USSR After the War Over How to Deal with the Japanese Puppet’s Industry], Mod- Korean War Vietnamese evidence on reactions to 1965 ern Chinese History (Chinese People’s Uni- U.S. peace overtures. (Robert K. Brigham, versity Publications Reprint Series) 1 (1995), Soviet policy toward Korea immediately “Vietnamese-American Peace Negotations: 100-104. following World War II assessed. (Kan In The Failed 1965 Initiatives,” forthcoming in Gu, “The Soviet Union’s Korean Policy The Journal of American-East Asian Rela- Reassessment of early stages of relations Following the Second World War (1945- tions.) (and non-relations) between U.S. and PRC. 1948), Vestnik Sankt Peterburgskogo (Thomas J. Christensen, “A ‘Lost Chance’ Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta 16 (1994), Survey of PRC policy toward Vietnam War, for What? Rethinking the Origins of U.S.- 91-93.) using recently opened Chinese sources. PRC Confrontation,” The Journal of Ameri- (Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement in the can-East Asian Relations 4:3 (Fall 1995), Soviet documents on the Korean War, in- Vietnam War, 1964-1969,” The China Quar- 249-278.) cluding military reports to Stalin. (“The Par- terly 142 (June 1995), 356-378.) ticipation of the USSR in the Korean War Account of alleged attempt by Guomindang (New Documents),” Voprosi istorii 11 Former Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Kuomintang) to murder PRC Premier Zhou (1994), 30-46.) official Zhu Kaiyin writes that Mao scaled Enlai in 1955. (Steve Tsang, “Research Note: back military aid to North Vietnam in late Update COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 293

1960s because he believed weapons were POLISH CRISIS on Jaruzelski’s own account, Stan wojenny: being wasted. (Reported in Xinwen ziyou continued from page 277 dlaczego (published in Poland in 1992), and daobao [Press Freedom Guardian], 29 Sep- collapse of Communism. Although he added his book often seems little more than a tember 1995, 3.) some observations about events through the reprise of the memoir. Aside from reiterat- end of 1991, he decided to proceed with the ing Jaruzelski’s arguments, Grishin’s other Publications: Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet publication of his book before he had con- main goal (as he declares without any subtlety Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan sulted any newly opened archives. This in his introduction) is to depict Solidarity in R. Dee, scheduled for publication Spring decision was unfortunate, but it was not as negative a light as possible. For polemical 1996); Commission for Research on Party inexcusable for a scholar who had already purposes his book may have some value, but History, ed., Ho Chi Minh, 4th ed. (Hanoi: completed a manuscript and who would have from a scholarly standpoint it is sorely defi- The Gioi Publishers, 1995); Ho Chi Minh, had to travel many thousands of miles to cient. Prison Diary, 9th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi work in the former East-bloc archives, per- It is a pity that neither of the books under Publishers, 1994); Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, haps delaying the appearance of his book for review takes advantages of opportunities Dien Bien Phu, 5th ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi a considerable time. The delay would have afforded by the post-. Publishers, 1994); Gen. Giap, Unforget- been worthwhile, but it was a judgment call Zuzowski’s analysis has much to recom- table Days, 3rd ed. (Hanoi: The Gioi Pub- for Zuzowski in 1992, and he obviously mend it, and even Grishin occasionally has lishers, 1994); Vien Su Hoc et al., Lich Su’ believed he should press ahead. interesting things to say, but an authoritative Viet Nam, 1954-1965 (Hanoi: Nha Xuat In Grishin’s case, the decision to forgo reassessment of the Polish crisis will require Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1995); William J. archival research is far less explicable. His detailed and critical archival research. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the overview of the Polish crisis covers very Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA: familiar ground, and thus he should have COLD WAR Stanford University Press, 1994); Xiangen done his best to adduce new documentary INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT Wang, Zhongguo mimi da fabing: Yuang evidence. Grishin did not complete his mono- yue hang Mei shilu [China secretly dis- graph until early 1993, well after secret ma- The Cold War International History Project was patched many troops: The real record of established at the Woodrow Wilson International Cen- terials in both Warsaw and Moscow had been ter for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the supporting Vietnam to resist America] released and at the very time when sensitive help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur (: Jinan, 1992); Yinhong Shi, Meiguo files on the 1980-81 events were still freely Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt zai Yuenan de ganshe he zhanzheng, 1954- available at the former CPSU Central Com- release of historical materials by governments on all 1968 [American intervention and war in sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new mittee archive in Moscow. (Severe restric- information and perspectives on Cold War history Vietnam, 1954-1968] (Beijing: World tions were reimposed at the former Central emerging from previously inaccessible sources on Knowledge, 1993). Committee archive in April 1983, but that “the other side”—the former Communist bloc— was after Grishin’s book was finished.) Al- through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meet- Cuba/Cuban Missile Crisis ings and conferences. The project is overseen by an though Grishin is based at Kazan University advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman in Tatarstan, rather than in Moscow, he could (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Piero Gleijeses, “Ships in the Night: The have traveled to the Russian capital (and Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Con- CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs,” ideally to Warsaw, too) at relatively little gress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Mary- Journal of Latin American Studies 27:1 land-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio Uni- expense to consult the archives. His decision versity-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy (February 1995), 1-42. to rely exclusively on contemporaneous Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon newspaper articles and on a few recent first- Wolchik (George Washington University). Within Publications: Fabian Escalante, The Secret hand accounts largely negates whatever con- the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of War: CIA covert operations against Cuba, International Studies, headed by Amb. Robert tribution his book might have made. Hutchings, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. 1959-1962 (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Perhaps if Grishin had pursued archival Readers are invited to submit articles, letters and Press, 1995); Claudia Furati, trans. Maxine research, he would have been able to come Update items to the Bulletin. Publication of articles Shaw, ZR Rifle: The Plot to Kill Kennedy up with a more sophisticated presentation. does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request. and Castro: Cuba Opens Secret Files To be sure, his book is a vast improvement (Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1994); over the lurid Soviet-era publications on the Cold War International History Project Bulletin Carlos Lechuga, In the Eye of the Storm: Polish crisis (e.g., Georgii Korchadnze’s Issues 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996) Castro, Khrushchev, Kennedy and the Cu- Zagovor protiv Pol’shi), and Grishin’s dis- Woodrow Wilson International Ctr. for Scholars ban Missile Crisis: The inside story by 1000 Jefferson Drive, SW cussion of Soviet policy toward Poland in Washington, D.C. 20560 Cuba’s former UN ambassador (Melbourne, 1980-81 is often insightful. But his book is Tel.: (202) 357-2967; fax: (202) 357-4439 Australia: Ocean Press, 1995); Mark White, a far cry from the scholarly standards that e-mail: [email protected] The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: most Western (and, increasingly, many Rus- Macmillan, and New York: New York Uni- Editor: James G. Hershberg sian) analysts would accept. Grishin is pri- Managing Editor: P.J. Simmons versity Press, January 1996). marily interested in showing why the Polish Associate Editor: Bonnie Southwick leader, Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, was justi- Researchers: Andrew Grauer, Mark Torok, fied in crushing Solidarity in December 1981. Michelle King, Sara Kirchhoff, Anne Chiorazzi, Helen Christakos Grishin draws extensively and uncritically