Npr 6.1: from Existential to Minimum Deterrence

Gaurav Kampani

FROM EXISTENTIAL TO MINIMUM DETERRENCE: EXPLAINING INDIA’S DECISION TO TEST

by Gaurav Kampani1

Gaurav Kampani is a Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Before joining the Center, he was a Herbert Scoville Peace Fellow at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C. There he worked on issues related to nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Kampani has an M.A. degree in International Politics from American University in Washington, D.C., and an M.A. in Political Science from Delhi University, New Delhi, India. He can be reached at [email protected].

ndia’s decision to conduct change is not best understood as a Party (BJP) has declared its inten- nuclear tests and formally de- simple decision to “go nuclear.” I tion to build openly a minimum de- clare itself a nuclear weapon argue that to a substantial extent, terrent,5 formally articulated a I 6 state marks an important historical India had already become nuclear nuclear doctrine of no first use, and transition. At the regional level in before the tests. Instead, the tests decided to institutionalize a national South Asia, India and Pakistan have reflect a strategic change from exis- command and control authority.7 moved from one nuclear plateau, tential to minimum deterrence, and Second, whereas earlier Indian characterized by a shadow capabil- a political effort to become accepted policy emphasized global nuclear ity, to another, where each country as a member of the nuclear club. disarmament and rejected the non- has a demonstrated nuclear capabil- First, India’s tests have ended a re- proliferation regime as discrimina- ity. At the global regime level, for gime of existential deterrence in tory, India has now signaled a the first time since the 1968 Treaty South Asia, which had prevailed for willingness to put its historical on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear much of this decade. Its central fea- nuclear disarmament agenda on the Weapons (NPT), two states have at- tures were covert weaponization in- back burner and join the global non- tempted to replicate the visibility of volving a small number of fission proliferation regime in exchange for the nuclear force architecture and devices,2 informal articulation of a tacit recognition of its de facto doctrines of the de jure nuclear no-first-use doctrine,3 and the pres- nuclear status.8 weapon states (NWS). ence of only rudimentary organiza- What triggered this dramatic This article seeks to clarify what tional mechanisms to deal with change in policy? Traditional analy- 4 has actually changed in Indian nuclear war planning. In a sharp sis tends to gravitate towards secu- policy, then to explain the decision break with this situation, India’s rity rationales to explain nuclear to make this change. The policy Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata decisionmaking. However, this ar-

12 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Gaurav Kampani ticle argues that the policy changes was influenced more by the rise of a litions with the political and military described above are better explained nuclear coalition led by the bellig- leadership in the country. These by a combination of domestic fac- erent Bharatiya Janata Party. For larger alliances facilitated the BJP’s tors, to be described shortly. At first both ideological and electoral rea- choice of nuclear weapons as an glance, national security consider- sons, the BJP is determined to build ideological and electoral tool. ations would appear paramount in a macho national security state with This article begins by outlining explaining India’s decision. India is nuclear weapons at its center. Ideo- the status of India’s nuclear weap- surrounded by two nuclear weapon logically, the BJP views the con- ons program prior to the May 1998 states. First, India fought a brief bor- struction of such a state structure as tests. It shows that the tests only der war and has an unsettled border essential to cope with India’s inter- made an existing capability overt. dispute with China, a declared nal crisis of governance as well as The article next explains why secu- nuclear weapon state. Second, China to sustain the myth of a great Indian rity considerations do not account has also contributed to the nation stretching back in a for the decision to go openly nuclear. nuclearization of Pakistan, with civilizational continuum for nearly Finally, it argues that domestic fac- whom India is engaged in a bitter 5,000 years. At a subliminal level, tors—a confluence of the ideologies counterinsurgency war over Kash- nuclear status is considered neces- of the BJP and the strategic commu- mir. Indeed, the Indian government sary to exorcise the shameful past nity, electoral calculations, and bu- has pointed to a deteriorating re- of India’s colonial subjugation and reaucratic coalition building— gional security environment as the fortify the national ego against a explain the decision to test. principal reason for crossing the post-colonial denial by the West of nuclear threshold. India as a great power. Electorally, INDIA’S NUCLEAR STATUS more than a short-term effort to However, new information re- BEFORE MAY 1998 viewed below shows that India made boost its poll numbers is involved. India’s nuclear program was far- a discrete decision to weaponize its Instead, having reached the limits of ther advanced in 1998 than many nuclear capability in 1988.9 That Hindu nationalism, the BJP hopes to observers recognized. Since the decision was made precisely to pro- use nuclear nationalism to distin- early 1990s, analysts had described vide India with a hedge against po- guish itself in a fragmented politi- India’s nuclear option through one tential regional nuclear threats. This cal marketplace and establish itself of two frames. The first was the con- fact makes the security rationale for as India’s natural party of gover- cept of “recessed deterrence,” the tests less credible. Since the early nance. The BJP has not been alone, coined by the convenor of India’s 1990s, there has been no visible de- however, in taking India down the National Security Council, Jasjit terioration in India’s security envi- nuclear path. For reasons of mutual Singh. Recessed deterrence meant ronment. While relations with advantage, the BJP and a pre-exist- that, although India had the capabil- Pakistan have remained cool, Sino- ing nuclear establishment have ity to build nuclear weapons, it did Indian relations, until the advent of formed a larger coalition that has not necessarily have a nuclear weap- the BJP, were on the mend. Hence, also shaped Indian policy. The BJP ons program. The recessed capabil- the citing of security rationales to has allied itself with an increasingly ity need never surface because any justify validation of more sophisti- vocal section of India’s strategic state contemplating nuclear coercion cated nuclear weapon designs community (known as the “bomb against New Delhi would have to smacks of an ex post facto rational- lobby”) that has come to identify factor India’s nuclear weapons po- ization. nuclear weapons as the ultimate in- dex of state power in the interna- tential into its strategic calculus.10 The above arguments are not tional system. The BJP has also The second and more enduring meant to dismiss India’s security gained support from a civilian-sci- description was George Perkovich’s concerns. India has real conflicts entific nuclear and defense establish- “non-weaponized deterrence.” It with its neighbors. But security con- ment that hopes to use the tests and characterized India and Pakistan as cerns were not behind the recent further weaponization to increase its having a virtual nuclear capability. tests. India’s decision suddenly to organizational prestige, secure addi- Both countries were believed to have declare itself a nuclear weapon state tional funding, and build stable coa- all the components and the neces-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 13 Gaurav Kampani

sary scientific and engineering ex- fence, the nuclear weapons program of miniaturized fission and boosted- pertise to assemble first-generation was resumed with vigor.15 fission designs.20 nuclear weapons. These weapons There is evidence that, in addition In the early 1980s, India’s nuclear could be assembled at short notice. to work on fission and boosted-fis- weapons capability had several gaps. The actual gap between a virtual and sion devices, India’s program had Although the scientists knew how to real capability was never clear. It for a long time sought to develop a build nuclear bombs, the devices could vary from a few days to weeks hydrogen bomb. Indeed, the chair- designed in the lab were not or even months. But, there existed man of the Atomic Energy Commis- weaponized and had not been built the assumption that neither India nor sion (AEC), R. Chidambaram, to military specifications. Further- Pakistan had either assembled recently told a television audience more, India did not possess delivery nuclear weapons or deployed that India’s nuclear weapons pro- vehicles—modified combat aircraft nuclear delivery systems in the gram had constantly been upgraded or ballistic missiles—to conduct 11 field. in the areas of “explosive ballistics, nuclear missions. The nuclear device However, a wealth of details re- high-pressure physics, neutron ki- tested in 1974 was not an operational leased after the May 1998 tests netics, and physics of ‘secondaries’ design for a weapon. It took about shows that India’s nuclear posture or thermonuclear explosions.”16 A two years to assemble, was large and fit neither of the above models.12 well-known 1985 West German in- unwieldy, and could only be deliv- Instead, India’s nuclear posture was telligence report cited one agent’s ered using a transport aircraft.21 The closer to what Avner Cohen and unconfirmed report that the brief key policy shift apparently came in Benjamin Frankel have described as from the Rajiv Gandhi government 1988. In fact, it was Rajiv Gandhi, “nuclear opacity.”13 This, in India’s to BARC was to “continue working according to the famous Indian de- case, was characterized by a low on the development of a nuclear fu- fense analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, level of weaponization, insulation of sion weapon.” BARC was told to who finally authorized weapon- the nuclear bureaucracy from other ensure that “within two months of a ization in 1988. Shortly afterwards, branches within the government, Pakistani test, the second Indian test in 1990, a secret Indian nuclear ar- non-articulation of a formal doc- should be carried out. Such an In- senal came into existence—eight trine, non-integration of nuclear dian test should simultaneously be years before the current series of weapons into the armed services, used for the development of a fusion tests.22 17 and no overt deployment of nuclear explosion.” Weaponization involved four forces. During the 1980s, India estab- steps. Nuclear devices were minia- We now know that India’s Bhaba lished an inertial confinement fusion turized to facilitate delivery from Atomic Research Centre (BARC) (ICF) program to study the high- aircraft. Weapon designs were made began producing plutonium cores density physics associated with ther- rugged enough for field deployment for nuclear devices soon after India’s monuclear weapons. In 1989, then and transport. Arming and safety sole previous test, in 1974. The cores director of the U.S. Central Intelli- systems were installed in weapon were manufactured on direct orders gence Agency (CIA), William H. systems to prevent unauthorized or from the prime minister’s office and Webster, told the U.S. Senate that accidental detonations. And by were identical to the one used in the several other indicators, such as the 1989, the Indian Air Force had modi- 1974 implosion device.14 According purification of lithium, production of fied combat aircraft and perfected to BARC’s former Director, P.K. tritium, and the separation of lithium techniques for the aerial delivery of Iyengar, the only gap in India’s isotopes, pointed to India’s interest nuclear munitions.23 nuclear weapons program occurred in acquiring a thermonuclear weap- According to new information re- 18 during the 1975-76 “Emergency” ons capability. The critical break- leased by the Indian government, the and for a short time afterwards through in thermonuclear weapon process of weaponization was di- (probably during the Janata regime). design, however, came only in the vided between BARC and the De- 19 Once Raja Ramanna, leader of the mid-1990s. If India had tested in fence Research and Development team that carried out the 1974 test, 1982-83, as it had once planned, it Organization (DRDO). BARC was shifted to the Ministry of De- would have involved the validation worked out concepts related to the

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“long shelf life of the nuclear com- Science Advisor A.P.J. Abdul ferring to the weaponization of war- ponents” and the “optimization of Kalam recently affirmed that New heads for ballistic missiles, A.P.J. the weight-to-yield ratio.” It was Delhi had indeed instituted certain Abdul Kalam admitted recently that also responsible for the fabrication measures to manage its incipient India had “tested the size, weight, of fissile material into suitable nuclear weapons capability. Kalam performance, and vibrations.” He shapes. DRDO labs on the other told a press conference that “we have further acknowledged, “we have hand worked on the components and a command and control system in a been doing this for quite some systems integration needed to different form. Now we have to con- time.”31 27 weaponize the nuclear devices to solidate and establish it.” This evidence suggests that the military specifications. Three other Besides building air-deliverable May 1998 tests marked the “culmi- labs, according to the science advi- fission weapons, BARC also fo- nation” of India’s weaponization sor to the defense minister, A.P.J. cused attention on the design of min- program, not a decision to begin Abdul Kalam, contributed to the iaturized warheads for ballistic weaponization. If current reports at- “arming, fusing, safety interlocks missiles. Concerns about BARC’s tributing the weaponization decision 24 and flight-trials.” interest in ballistic missile warheads to the Rajiv Gandhi government are Weaponization was accompanied caused the Bush administration in true, then India actually exercised its by the establishment of a rudimen- 1989 to deny the sale to India of a nuclear “option” as early as 1988. tary command, control, and commu- $1.2 million Combined Acceleration Thus, the tests do not represent a nications structure to manage Vibration Climatic Test System decision to create a deterrent capa- possible nuclear war contingencies. (CAVCTS) with a force-level capa- bility, since what could at least be In 1990, the former director of bility of 545 kg. Also know as the labeled an existential deterrent was DRDO, V.S. Arunachalam, appar- “shake and bake” system, a already in place. The real question, ently told Harvard academic Stephen CAVCTS can be used to test re-en- therefore, is why did India suddenly P. Rosen that the civilian leadership try vehicle components for their bring its existing nuclear capability in New Delhi had fought a difficult ability to withstand the heat and out of the closet in the spring of struggle with the military over cus- stress of missile flight.28 1998? I first consider possible secu- tody of nuclear weapons. That Nevertheless, India persisted in its rity reasons, then argue that a com- struggle was finally resolved in fa- quest to develop re-entry vehicle bination of domestic factors vor of civilians. Apparently, the technology and, by the time the Con- provides a more convincing expla- military was told neither of the ex- gress government led by Narasimha nation. These domestic consider- act number of nuclear weapons that Rao authorized tests in the winter of ations include ideologically-driven India might have, nor how they 1995, India had developed light and beliefs about security, however, so would be employed in a nuclear war. compact warheads for ballistic mis- security concerns are not entirely ab- But the civilians drew up detailed in- siles.29 Between 1989 and 1994, In- sent from the explanation. structions to deal with problems in dia conducted three flight-tests of its the absence of a formally articulated Agni intermediate-range ballistic THREATS TO NATIONAL nuclear doctrine. These instructions missile (IRBM). Two of these were SECURITY? were given to a certain theater mili- successful and validated the re-en- Since the late 1980s, all Indian tary commander with instructions to try vehicle technology. Results prime ministers have had the option open them in the event of a nuclear showed that the composite carbon- to explode nuclear weapons. But war. Rosen has quoted Arunachalam carbon nose cone of the missile had each prime minister decided against as saying, “If New Delhi goes up in ablated as designed. More signifi- going through with field tests.32 a mushroom cloud, a certain theatre cantly, the payload (which com- What then led Atal Behari Vajpayee commander will go to a safe, open prised the autopilot, a dummy and his BJP coalition to give up ex- his book, and begin reading at page warhead and its arming and fusing istential deterrence, based on an one, paragraph one, and will act step systems, and the inertial navigation opaque but actual capability, in fa- by step on the basis of what he system) survived the stress of re-en- vor of minimal deterrence, based on reads....”25 Arunachalam later denied tering the Earth’s atmosphere.30 Re- demonstrating that capability? Tra- making that statement.26 However,

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ditional analysts look first to a any form of nuclear coercion against There was thus no increased “China country’s international situation to nuclear weapon or non-nuclear threat” that could justify India’s explain major strategy decisions. weapon states (NNWS). By signing overt nuclearization. Was there deterioration in India’s the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On Vajpayee’s second claim, the external security environment? The (CTBT), China has also accepted precise extent of Chinese assistance short answer is no. Two previous qualitative caps on its nuclear weap- to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons pro- prime ministers, Inder Kumar Gujral ons program. gram is unclear. According to U.S. and Deve Gowda, avowed that there Of course, strategic behavior is intelligence sources, in the 1980s, were no threats to the country’s na- not immutable, and nuclear advo- China helped Pakistan in operating tional security when the United cates in India have always cited the its Kahuta uranium enrichment fa- Front government left office in classic dictum that it is capability cility. China is also believed to have 33 March 1998. Indeed, it could be and not the articulated intentions of supplied Pakistan with a design for argued that India’s security environ- adversaries that needs to be factored a 25 kt fission bomb. This design ment has remained unchanged from into security planning; intentions can was apparently proven in China’s the late 1980s and in some ways ac- change overnight.36 This is true. fourth nuclear test at Lop Nor in tually improved. Chinese nuclear deployments by 1966 and involved the detonation of The current government has tried their very existence pose an implicit a warhead carried across China on a to justify the tests in security terms, threat to India’s security. But India ballistic missile.40 During the 1990s, however. Prime Minister Vajpayee, has had an existential nuclear capa- Chinese nuclear companies supplied in his letter to U.S. President Bill bility since 1974 to deal with any Pakistan with ring magnets for its ul- Clinton, gave two reasons for India’s potential threatening changes in tracentrifuges.41 decision to test. First, he referred to Chinese nuclear behavior. However, China’s role was not India’s unsettled border dispute with Although the border dispute has central to Pakistan’s nuclear weap- China, a declared nuclear weapon bedeviled Sino-Indian relations, ons development. As nuclear prolif- state. Second, he highlighted the dis- both countries have agreed since the eration efforts by South Africa, trust that China had created by co- late 1980s to shelve the dispute and South Korea, North Korea, and Tai- vertly aiding Pakistan’s nuclear not hold their relations hostage to the wan indicate, the key to developing 34 program. Although there is some boundary question. Since Rajiv a nuclear weapons capability is not merit in both claims, the evidence Gandhi’s 1989 visit to China, India the ability to design crude first-gen- will show that the BJP has exagger- and China have agreed to freeze the eration fission devices; the real dif- ated both, and there was no compel- border dispute, abjure the use of ficulty lies in access to sufficient ling security rationale for testing. “military capabilities” in bilateral quantities of fissile material.42 Paki- Admittedly, India’s nuclear de- relations, and implement mutual stan obtained the blueprints for ura- bate was triggered by its defeat at confidence-building measures along nium enrichment technology from the hands of China in 1962, and the border.37 Relations, until the BJP Europe and then organized one of China’s subsequent nuclear capabil- came to power, had thawed suffi- the most elaborate smuggling net- ity first created the clamor for a ciently to permit the Indian army to works in history to import an entire matching nuclear response in New withdraw some of its mountain di- enrichment plant from countries in Delhi.35 But, during the last three visions for internal security and Western Europe. It also acquired decades, Chinese nuclear behavior training purposes, and even to re- components for its nuclear devices only undermined the rationale for store the declining conventional from Europe and the United States overt Indian nuclear deployments. edge against Pakistan.38 China also and then replaced these procurement China restricted its capability to a terminated support to insurgencies efforts with indigenous production. minimum deterrent; it is the only in India’s northeastern provinces. In The delivery of Pakistan’s first-gen- nuclear weapon state (besides India) November 1996, Chinese President eration fission devices is also prob- that remains committed to a doctrine Jiang Zemin publicly advised Paki- ably centered on modified U.S. of “no first use;” China has scrupu- stan to settle the Kashmir question combat aircraft and not Chinese- lously refrained from engaging in with India bilaterally and amicably.39 supplied ballistic missiles.43

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India’s nuclear hawks have also sue of nuclear and missile transfers to test was due to other reasons. A exaggerated Pakistan’s ballistic mis- to Pakistan at the highest levels, combination of four domestic fac- sile capability. Pakistan only became China explicitly stated that it was in tors account for the decision: the serious about building ballistic mis- the market for profit and offered to ideological worldview of the BJP, its siles in 1987, four years after India supply India with matching nuclear domestic electoral compulsions, the had launched its Integrated Guided and missile technology.50 institutional beliefs of India’s stra- 44 Missile Development Program. India’s decision to test was not tegic establishment, and the coali- Pakistan’s earliest ballistic mis- triggered by Pakistan’s test-flight of tion imperatives of India’s nuclear siles—the 80-km Hatf-1 and the the Ghauri in April 1998. The BJP and military research and develop- 300-km Hatf-2—were failures. The made a previous decision to conduct ment bureaucracies. Subsequent sec- missile engines failed to develop nuclear tests as early as March 1996, tions discuss each of these factors sufficient thrust; the missiles also when it briefly came to power. How- in turn. lacked reliable onboard guidance ever, the BJP lasted only 13 days in systems and were grossly inaccu- office, while the scientists and tech- THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC 45 rate. According to a technical nicians needed 30 days to complete FACTORS analysis done by S.Chandrashekar, preparations to test.51 More signifi- Reasons of Ideology, State, and an engineer in the Indian Space Re- cantly, the Indian government does Identity search Organization, the Hatf-1 and not really seem to perceive nuclear 2 were not built with Chinese assis- threats at an operational military Ideologically, the BJP has two tance; they were probably reverse- level. It has done little to create the goals: (1) making Hindu revivalism engineered from French Dauphin specific capabilities that would be the basis of nationhood and (2) con- 46 and Dragon sounding rockets. It called for by a genuine need to bol- structing a masculine national secu- was these earlier failures that forced ster deterrence. To date, there has rity state as the symbol of national Pakistan to turn to China for assis- been no move to define the deploy- myth and achievement. These goals tance. China is believed to have sup- ment plans for a nuclear force, to mark a radical break with India’s plied Pakistan with 30 to 50 300-km integrate nuclear weapons into the Nehruvian past. It is hence useful to 47 M-11 ballistic missiles. Other armed forces, to institutionalize a contrast the Nehruvian consensus, forms of assistance include the sup- national command and control au- which until recently had been the ply of missile subsystems, technolo- thority, or to establish formal pro- basis for national policy, with the gies for propellant production, and cedures for actual nuclear weapons vision of the Sangh Parivar (Hindu 48 inertial guidance systems. Accord- use.52 India’s diplomatic maneuvers brotherhood).54 ing to U.S. intelligence sources, also provide clues to its actual mo- Prime Minister Nehru’s vision for however, Pakistan primarily devel- tivations in conducting the tests. In oped the 1,500 km-range Ghauri bal- India was modernistic. It recognized the months after the tests, Indian di- that India was a nation-state in the listic missile with North Korean plomacy did not focus on discus- assistance.49 making and outlined a three-pronged sions with China or Pakistan about approach to create a viable founda- Indian allegations miss several confidence-building or arms control tion for nationhood. First, it built on points entirely. First, Pakistan’s bal- measures to address the supposed the foundations of the inherited Brit- listic missile program came as a re- threats to national security Indian ish colonial state structure and es- 53 sponse to India’s own larger and leaders said required them to test. tablished a powerful state through more sophisticated ballistic missile Instead, New Delhi’s chief efforts constitutional means. Second, it at- program. Second, unlike the trans- involved attaining recognition as a tempted national unity through the fer of the medium-range CSS-2 bal- nuclear weapon state. creation of a unified market. And listic missiles to Saudi Arabia, China There was thus no significant finally, it sought to create an emo- supplied Pakistan only with short- change in India’s threat environment tional basis for nationhood in India’s range ballistic missiles and did noth- that can account for India’s move plural and secular traditions and ing that would upset the balance of from an existential to a minimal de- through the institutionalization of power on the subcontinent. When terrent posture. The BJP’s decision democracy. Inclusive nationalism the Indian government raised the is-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 17 Gaurav Kampani

became the central theme and legacy nomic” model was import substitu- juxtaposing India’s Hindu majority of the Nehruvian era.55 tion. Tariff walls were erected to al- against other religious minorities. During the last five decades, sev- low a level playing field for Indian Not only does it hope to convert eral factors have eroded the capital. The state also intervened India’s Hindu majority into “Hindu Nehruvian consensus in Indian poli- directly in the economy to foster majoritarianism,” or a system that tics. One major factor is the decay development and economic growth. privileges Hindus, it also seeks to re- in the civil institutions of the state. But this approach failed. Local pri- mold the secular and laissez faire From the late 1960s onward, the vate capital took advantage of tariff characteristics of Hinduism into a 59 spread of democratic ideas and con- barriers to establish domestic mo- more doctrinaire version. sciousness led to greater social and nopolies. On the other hand, the gov- At a subliminal level, the Hindu political mobilization. This resulted ernment-financed public sector, right is driven by historical memo- in the emergence of “political de- plagued by inefficiency and corrup- ries of a socially divided, technologi- mand groups” that placed increas- tion, showed little by way of growth cally inferior, and organizationally ing demands on the resources of the or capital generation. These twin weak India that for centuries was the state. In response, leaders at both the processes resulted in what econo- final destination for invading hordes. state and central government levels mists deride as India’s “Hindu rate It now seeks to pursue a “proactive” 57 centralized and personalized power. of growth.” policy to prevent such a scenario They created top-heavy political in- Finally, political mobilization from recurring in the future. Thus, stitutions where political, economic, along regional, sectarian, and caste it has sought to rebuild the eroded and administrative favors came to be identities has thrown a wrench into institutions of the state and restore dispensed through a network of po- the state’s plans to build a more ho- the centrality of the state in the po- litically loyal appointees. This pro- mogeneous brand of nationalism. litical life of the Indian nation. As cess undermined the civil This has combined with India’s po- the eminent Indian sociologist institutions of the state—police, bu- litical, administrative, and economic Arvind Das remarked in a different reaucracy, and judiciary—with two failures to produce a collective sense context, in a perverse neo-Hegelian negative consequences. of national failure. Frustration stem- sense, the reconstruction of the state First, the state in India now finds ming from this sense of national fail- has almost been raised to an art 60 itself unable to cope with the social ure has in turn led to a crisis of form. Domestically, the goal of the demands of a developing society. self-esteem and confidence and pro- Sangh Parivar is to build a grand, Second, the state has become in- vided a fertile ground for the vota- powerful, and masculine national creasingly unable to resolve con- ries of an exclusivist brand of Hindu security state that will emerge as the flicts in civil society. This has led to nationalism. symbol of national mythology and a gradual “militarization” of con- Hindu nationalism draws its roots the converging point of high science, 61 flicts within India, which have of- from a century of Hindu reform national identity, and achievement. ten mutated into armed insurgencies. movements that first arose in the 19th In foreign affairs, Hindu nation- Delegitimization of the state has fol- century in response to British colo- alism aims to dispense with the old lowed swiftly and, according to Atul nialism. These Hindu revival move- Nehruvian vision of moral, legalis- Kohli, India is now faced with the ments constructed the notion of a tic, and universal values in interna- amazing paradox of an civilizational Indian nation based on tional relations. The goal is to overcentralized state apparatus that the myth of an unbroken brahamanic replace it with a hardboiled vision is afflicted by a “crisis of gover- tradition, language, and symbols— of realpolitik in which India aggres- nance.”56 a nation that was independent of the sively pursues its national interests. 58 A second important element in the British colonial state structure. The As the deputy chairman of India’s decline of the Nehruvian consensus BJP, as the dominant political arm Planning Commission, Jaswant is the fact that India’s “mixed of the Hindu right, draws on this Singh, remarked in the wake of the economy” has been unable to repli- cultural nationalism. However, it nuclear tests, “the transition has been cate Asia’s economic miracle. The has turned it into an exclusionary and from the moralistic to the realistic. key feature of Nehru’s “mixed eco- atavistic notion of nationhood, by It is one-sixth of humanity seeking

18 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Gaurav Kampani its rightful place in the sun of the toral base is limited to north, north- alism has replaced religious nation- calculus of the great powers.”62 western, western, and central India. alism as the BJP’s marketing brand Nuclear weapons are very attractive Electoral gains in the southern and in domestic politics.67 This is evident in this worldview. They help sustain eastern parts of the country have in the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s the mythology of a great Indian na- come by teaming up with regional (World Hindu Council’s) proposal tion and build a fortified self-image allies. As a consequence, the BJP is to build a temple dedicated to against what is perceived as post- 70 seats short of a working majority “Shakti” (divine energy) at the colonial denial by the imperial West in Parliament and depends on the nuclear test site at Pokhran.68 By pro- of India’s emergence as a great support of a fragile 13-party coali- posing to ferry radioactive sands power in the international system. tion to remain in power.65 around the BJP-ruled state of The absence of a parliamentary Rajasthan, it has also sought to make Electoral Concerns majority has prevented the BJP from a fetish out of India’s nuclear sta- Besides its ideological attraction, implementing the more controver- tus. Addressing a public meeting in nuclear nationalism has also permit- sial items on its right-wing agenda. the aftermath of the tests, India’s ted the BJP to position itself strate- These include changing the special home minister, L.K. Advani, admit- gically for mid-term elections with status of the state of Jammu and ted that the nuclear tests had been the goal of fashioning a winning Kashmir through the repeal of Ar- the BJP’s sole achievement in its 69 majority in Parliament. India’s do- ticle 370 in the constitution, the in- first 100 days in power. mestic political scene, since the mid- troduction of a uniform civil code Since the late 1960s, Indian po- 1980s, has been characterized by as a way to end the perceived pref- litical parties have won national political fragmentation and the de- erential treatment of minorities, and elections on the strength of unusual cline of the dominant Congress party the construction of a grand Ram circumstances that produced huge system. Since 1989, this has resulted temple on the ruins of a vandalized electoral swings in their favor, a pro- in the emergence of weak minority mosque in Ayodhya. Any attempts cess commentators describe as the governments or governments with to translate these planks into actual “wave” phenomenon in Indian poli- razor thin majorities in Parliament. policy would most likely lead to tics. For example, Indira Gandhi The larger national parties have be- sharp cracks in the 13-party coali- won the 1971 elections by pro- come dependent on smaller regional tion and the subsequent collapse of pounding the slogan of Garibi Hatao allies. In this political scenario, al- the BJP government. Even if this did (Away with Poverty). She later con- though the BJP has emerged as the not occur, the social and political solidated power by calling elections largest party in Parliament, it has not turmoil that would probably result in the wake of India’s triumph in the gathered enough momentum to es- would hurt the party’s support 1971 Bangladesh War. In 1977, the tablish itself as India’s natural party among its upper-caste, middle- and Janata coalition rode to power on a of governance.63 upper-middle class electoral base.66 wave of popular anger against the The BJP made its greatest politi- Thus, the BJP is on the horns of a Emergency. Once again, in 1985, the cal gains between the late 1980s and political dilemma. It has risen to Congress under Rajiv Gandhi re- the early 1990s. It used the plank of power by riding the tiger of Hindu ceived its largest mandate in history Hindu nationalism to distinguish it- nationalism. However, political mo- by reaping a “sympathy wave” gen- self in the political market place and bilization along religious lines has erated by Indira Gandhi’s assassina- 70 increase its polling percentage from reached its natural limits. Electoral tion. Following this logic, the BJP a mere seven percent in 1984 to 21 compulsions and the need to main- saw nuclear detonations in part as a percent by the 1996 elections.64 Fi- tain alliances with coalition partners way to generate nationalist hysteria nally, in the 1998 elections, the BJP have forced the BJP to moderate its and trigger a similar wave of sup- increased its voting share to about aggressive religious stance. Inherent port from the Indian masses. Opin- 25 percent with the help of regional in this approach, however, is the risk ion polls immediately afterward allies. Despite emerging as the larg- of reducing the BJP’s distinguishing showed that more than 90 percent 71 est party in Parliament, the BJP is ideological profile in the political of Indians approved the tests. The hampered on several fronts. Its elec- marketplace. Hence, nuclear nation- BJP has thus positioned itself for a

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 19 Gaurav Kampani mid-term election with the hope that in which a prominent strategic ana- further tests. Under U.S. pressure, nuclear nationalism will translate lyst compared nuclear weapons to the Agni IRBM program was into a parliamentary majority, facili- classical music. According to him, capped. Similarly the short-range tate the implementation of its radi- just as classical music was an ex- ballistic missile, Prithvi, was “in- cal “Hindutva” agenda, and finally pression of higher culture, nuclear ducted” into the armed forces but allow it to replace the Congress as weapons were symbolic of a higher never formally deployed. More sig- India’s natural party of gover- strategic culture.74 India therefore nificantly, and unlike China and nance.72 needed nuclear weapons to consoli- North Korea, India refrained from date its strategic profile as the sixth the export of technologies of mass Prevailing Institutional Beliefs pole in a hexagon of powers in the destruction. Nevertheless, the gov- However, the BJP did not develop post-Cold War polycentric world ernors of the nuclear nonprolifera- on its own the ideas about the ben- order.75 tion regime refused to ease sanctions efits of nuclear status that inform its During the 1990s, New Delhi’s against India’s civil nuclear program nuclear nationalism. Instead, the nuclear priesthood became con- and insisted on “full-scope safe- BJP’s ideological and electoral com- cerned that India could not keep its guards.” India was also denied tech- pulsions have led it to draw on pre- nuclear option open indefinitely. nologies for its civilian space 78 vailing institutional beliefs within First, nuclear design teams could not program. The example of China India’s security establishment. This be kept on stand-by forever. Scien- was very much on the bomb lobby’s establishment, comprising sections tists would move elsewhere or re- mind. Although China had repeat- of the civilian bureaucracy, think tire. Hence, weapon designs needed edly violated its nonproliferation tanks, media, and armed forces, validation so that successive genera- commitments, the United States of- views nuclear weapons as an essen- tions of scientists could build on the fered Beijing technology sweeteners tial element of great power status. work of their predecessors. Second, as incentives to secure its adherence 79 India’s strategic elite regards nuclear by not formally exercising the op- with technology denial regimes. weapons, ballistic missiles, and tion, India invited outside pressure Thus, it was felt that India needed other high-tech weaponry as sym- to close the option, on the assump- to conduct nuclear tests to negotiate bols of modernity and technological tion that the Indian government did a grand nuclear bargain with the excellence that place India on par not regard security threats as acute. United States. Under such a bargain, with the most advanced states in the Hence, some felt the need to exer- India would accept restraints on its world. Ironically, this reflects cise the option formally purely for weapons program in return for tacit India’s quest for modernization, an the sake of doing so.76 Third, there recognition of its nuclear status and 80 effort that has led India’s state and was fast emerging a global norm the lifting of technology curbs. political managers to try to repro- against any further horizontal pro- The perception also gained duce Western paradigms of devel- liferation of nuclear weapons. After ground in New Delhi that India’s opment and national security.73 the NPT’s indefinite extension in moralistic positions and idealistic Thus, for example, India’s strategic 1995, and adoption of the CTBT in proposals for time-bound nuclear community has attempted to repro- 1996, the strategic community be- disarmament were non-starters.81 duce Western norms of rationality gan to argue that India needed to The process of global nuclear disar- and planning in decisionmaking. conduct tests and validate its more mament would be a gradual one. The BJP’s institution of a National sophisticated nuclear weapon de- Nuclear bargaining would first be Security Council is an excellent ex- signs before the political window of determined by the equation among ample of this cultural isomorphism. opportunity closed forever.77 the nuclear weapon states them- More ominously, however, influ- Those lobbying for tests also ar- selves, which would then bring in the ential sections of the strategic com- gued that nuclear ambiguity had be- states that are formally part of the munity have come to regard nuclear gun to yield diminishing returns. nuclear proliferation regime. Only weapons as symbols of a higher stra- India’s tacit nuclear restraint had then would India’s views be taken 82 tegic culture that they ascribe to the gone unappreciated. After 1974, In- into account. India’s purist position West. The author recalls one article dia refrained from conducting any had become a hindrance to its influ-

20 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Gaurav Kampani ence in a world that had tacitly come program because the consensus that with either electrical utilities or agro- to favor arms control over time- sustained the civil nuclear program industrial conglomerates. Its sole bound nuclear disarmament. from the 1950s to the 1970s has col- purpose became the production of Nuclear testing and the formal dec- lapsed. Nuclear energy during the unsafeguarded fissile material. laration of nuclear status were thus 1960s and early 1970s was consid- In the military nuclear sector, viewed as legitimate mechanisms to ered the wave of the future. It was weaponization of BARC’s nuclear increase India’s bargaining leverage then believed that, just as steam and weapon designs has also provided and secure a better deal as part of electricity had powered the indus- DRDO an opportunity to bolster its 83 any global nuclear bargain. trial revolution in the West, nuclear flagging prestige, stem demoraliza- Many of these observations— power would serve as the engine of tion within its ranks, and win sup- such as the reduced prospects for growth in energy-deficient India. port from the political leadership for India’s existing diplomatic positions Ambitious plans were drawn up for big-budget defense research and de- and the closing window of opportu- nuclear power generation. Huge velopment (R&D) projects. Accord- nity to test—were reasonable. But agro-industrial complexes were ing to Eric Arnett, DRDO has they depended on underlying as- planned around nuclear power traditionally been weak in advanced 84 sumptions that nuclear weapons are plants. system design and integration. a unique key to prestige and influ- But the civil nuclear power sec- Hence, although DRDO has had lim- ence in international politics, and tor failed. Mounting cost-overruns, ited success, it has been unable to only by brandishing them openly can technical bottlenecks, international move from “limited import substi- a state attain great power status. sanctions, safety problems, and ra- tution to indigenous innovation.”89 These assumptions are at least ques- diation hazards destroyed the con- DRDO’s high-profile projects, such tionable and were not shared by all sensus that once made nuclear power as the Arjun Main Battle Tank of India’s leading political parties. the mythical symbol of Indian sci- (MBT), Light Combat Aircraft They thus reflect an ideological view ence. With the loss of international (LCA), and the Advanced Technol- within the security community that collaboration as a result of the 1974 ogy Vehicle (nuclear submarine) are military power is more valuable than test, India’s nuclear power program years behind schedule. These orga- improved political or trading rela- mutated into a white elephant. nizational failures have prevented tions or moral consistency. The BJP Nuclear energy was supposed to the coalescing of stable alliances benefited from the fact that such generate 10,000 megawatts (MW) of between India’s premier military re- ideas about the importance of power by 1980. Today, it generates search and development agency and nuclear weapons and the reasons for 1,800 MW—a mere two percent of the armed services, and the latter testing had already been articulated the country’s electricity.85 have traditionally preferred imports and were well developed when it India’s civil nuclear program was over indigenous defense products. took office. This made it both more to have unfolded in three stages, cul- Ambitious coalition builders in likely and easier for the BJP to turn minating in reactors fueled by Ura- the Department of Atomic Energy to the nuclear option. It would find nium-233 and thorium.86 But the (DAE) and DRDO have therefore both allies and a ready-made ratio- dismal performance of the nuclear used weaponization and the tests as nale for overturning the previous sector and stagnation of the nuclear props to build and sustain coalitions Nehruvian approach. power industry worldwide led to a with the political leadership and the situation where governments from military bureaucracy. Budgets for Bureaucratic Pressures 1984 onwards refused to fund the both agencies have increased sharply Finally, the tests also reflect rec- program beyond its first stage.87 In and India’s big-ticket conventional ognition of the benefits of mutual 1992-97, instead of the proposed R&D programs and the civil nuclear support between the BJP and India’s Eight Year Plan outlays of 140 bil- sector will now probably ride pig- nuclear and military research and lion rupees, actual expenditures gyback on a weaponization pro- development bureaucracies. India’s were only six billion rupees.88 The gram.90 Because of the other goals nuclear establishment has a strong civilian atomic energy sector was tests would serve, therefore, sections vested interest in a nuclear weapons thus unable to build strong alliances of the security community and sci-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 21 Gaurav Kampani entific bureaucracy eagerly lobbied India’s state and political managers trine,” Times of India, August 5, 1998 (http:// www.timesofindia.com). for tests, when they might otherwise have faithfully reproduced Western 7 Raj Chengappa, “Worrying Over Broken Ar- have kept their distance from the norms and culture in the area of na- rows,” India Today, July 13, 1998 (http:// BJP and its anti-modernist platform. tional security. In doing so, they www.india-today.com); “Nuclear command to rest with political leadership: Fernandes,” Rediff have come to regard a nuclear de- on the Net, August 10, 1998 (http:// CONCLUSION terrent as the ultimate measure of www.rediff.com). 8 national power and a symbol of Praful Bidwai, “Faustian Bargain,” Times of In- It is thus clear that the BJP autho- dia, August 18, 1998 (http://www. modernity, scientific excellence, rized a series of tests for which there timesofindia.com). technological prowess, and a higher 9 Raj Chengappa, “The Bombmakers,” India To- was no compelling strategic neces- strategic culture. Nuclear weapons, day, June 22, 1998 (http://www.india- sity. The party came into office de- today.com). they hope, will bolster India’s pres- 10 Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, “Prospects for termined to carry out the tests. It did tige and consolidate its profile as an Nuclear Proliferation,” in S. Sur, ed., Nuclear not consult Parliament nor conduct Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the emerging great power in the inter- a promised strategic defense review 1990s (New York: United Nations Institute for national system. Disarmament Research, 1993), p. 66. before reversing the national consen- 11 George Perkovich, “A Nuclear Third Way in sus on maintaining nuclear ambigu- At the core of India’s decision, South Asia,” Foreign Policy, Number 91 (Sum- therefore, is the socialization of its mer 1993), pp. 85-104. ity. The Hindu-right in India has 12 The technical information released after the advocated nuclearization since 1951, ruling elite into a cultural belief that May 1998 tests may be part of an orchestrated 13 years before China acquired nuclear weapons and status consti- campaign on part of the BJP to suggest continu- 91 ity in India’s policy. However, a multiplicity of nuclear weapons. Now, the holy tute legitimate means to enhance the other sources, including intelligence leaks, tends cow of national security has been domestic prestige of the state and to support the information released by the BJP. invoked to mask the ideological and expand its power in the international 13 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” in Benjamin Frankel, ed., electoral interests of the ruling coa- system. Ironically, such beliefs are Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological lition, as well as the vested interests themselves the expression of a colo- and Policy Implications (London: Frank Cass & nized mindset that lacks self-esteem Co. Ltd., 1991), pp. 14-18. of India’s nuclear and defense civil- 14 Mark Hibbs, “India Made ‘About 25 Bomb ian-scientific establishment. and a nation-state that suffers from Cores’ Since First Test In 1974,” Nucleonics a historical inferiority complex. Week, June 17, 1998, p. 15. Authorization of the tests and the 15 “India: Indian Scientist on Cost of Nuclear proclamation of India’s nuclear sta- Weapons”; in FBIS-NES-98-140 (20 May, 1998). 16 Cited in David Albright, “The Shots Heard tus, although inter-related, must be ‘Round The World,” The Bulletin of the Atomic distinguished for purposes of analy- Scientists (July/August 1998), p. 24. sis. On the one hand, the timing of 17 Mark Hibbs, “India Was Ready In 1996 To Test A-Bombs On A ‘Few Days’ Notice,” Nucle- the Indian tests was determined pri- onics Week, May 14, 1998, pp. 10, 12; Albright, marily by the electoral compulsions “The Shots Heard ‘Round The World,” p. 23. of a politically shaky coalition in 18 Ibid. 19 Chengappa, “The Bombmakers.” New Delhi; it was also influenced 20 W.P.S. Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Tests: Techni- by arguments from India’s “bomb 1 The author wishes to thank Dr. M.V. Ramana cal and Military Imperatives,” Jane’s Intelligence and Dr. Jeff Knopf for their helpful comments Review (April 1996), pp. 172-173; India’s former lobby,” which feared that a growing and suggestions. President, R.Venkataraman, recently confirmed international norm against horizon- 2 “India Capable of Making Neutron Bomb: that India had planned to conduct nuclear tests tal proliferation might foreclose Santhanam,” Indian Express, September 10, 1998 in 1983. See, “R.Venkataraman Praises Vajpayee (http://www.indian-express.com). for N-Tests,” Rediff on the Net, May 26, 1998 India’s option to test forever. On the 3 K.Subrahmanyam, “Nuclear Force Design and (http://www.rediff.com). other hand, India’s decision to de- Minimum Deterrence Strategy for India,” in 21 Chengappa, “The Bombmakers.” clare itself a nuclear weapon state Bharat Karnad, ed., Future Imperilled: India’s 22 K.Subrahmanyam, “Arms Race Myth: Fallout Security in the 1990s and Beyond (New Delhi: of Over-Active Minds,” Times of India, May 30, has more to do with the Hindu- Viking, 1994), p. 188. 1998 (http://www.timesofindia.com); right’s ideological motivations and 4 Stephen P. Rosen, “India and Its Army After Chengappa, “The Bombmakers.” Independence,” in Societies and Military Power: 23 Ibid. the changing self-perceptions of India and Its Armies (London; Ithaca: Cornell 24 “Joint Statement by Department of Atomic India’s strategic elite, in their search University Press, 1996), pp. 251-252. Energy and Defence Research and Development for a separate Indian national iden- 5 Manoj Joshi, “Nukewatch: Indo-US Talks,” In- Organization,” May 17, 1998, Embassy of India dia Today, August 3, 1998 (http//www.india- website (http://www.indianembassy.org). tity. today.com). 25 Rosen, “India and Its Army After Indepen- 6 In their quest for modernization, Prakash Nanda, “India Evolves Nuclear Doc- dence,” pp. 251-252.

22 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Gaurav Kampani

26 V.S. Arunachalam, personal e-mail to author, Street,” Arms Control Today 23 (June 1993), pp. Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of April 1998. 15-16. Governability (New York: Cambridge University 27 Dinesh Kumar, “N-weaponisation is now com- 41 Jane Morse, “China and Non-Proliferation: In- Press, 1990), pp. 3-22. plete: Kalam,” Times of India, May 18, 1998 terview With Senior US Official,” Disarmament 57 Sunil Khilnanai, “Temples of the Future,” in (http://www.timesofindia.com). Diplomacy (January 1998), pp. 30-31. The Idea of India (New York: Farrar, Straus and 28 Brahma Chellaney, “An Indian Critique of U.S. 42 David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Giroux, 1997), pp. 61-106. Export Controls,” Orbis 38 (Summer 1994), p. Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” The Bulletin of the 58 Das, “Religion, Culture, and Ethnicity,” India 446. Atomic Scientists (January/February 1998), pp. Invented, pp. 73-82. 29 India had plans to conduct nuclear tests in the 54-60; Michael J. Siler, “U.S. Nuclear Nonpro- 59 Ibid. winter of 1995. See, Chengappa, “The liferation Policy in the Northeast Asian Region 60 Ibid. Bombmakers”; Tim Weiner, “India Suspected of During the Cold War: The South Korean Case,” 61 Harish Khare, “Resurrecting the Macho State,” Preparing of A-Bomb Test,” The New York Times, paper delivered to the Western Political Science The Hindu, May 20, 1998 (http:// December 15, 1995, p. A6. Association Meeting, Los Angeles, California, www.hinduonline.com); Suvir Kaul, “Pokhran 30 Pravin Sawhney, “Standing Alone: India’s Spring 1998; David Albright, “South Africa and and the Phobia of Partition,” Times of India, Au- Nuclear Imperative,” Jane’s International De- the Affordable Bomb,” The Bulletin of the Atomic gust 28, 1998 (http://www.timesofindia.com). fense Review (November 1996), p. 28. Scientists, 1994 (http://www.bullatomsci.org); 62 Raj Chengappa and Manoj Joshi, “Hawkish 31 “Weaponisation Now Complete, Say Scien- Robert Carlin, “North Korea,” in Mitchell Reiss India,” India Today, June 1, 1998 (http:// tists,” The Hindu, May 18, 1998 (http:// and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Prolifera- www.india-today.com). www.hinduonline.com). For technical details on tion after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The 63 Atul Kohli, “Can the Periphery Control the how DRDO proposed to simulate flight-tests for Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 129- Center? Indian Politics at Crossroads,” The Wash- nuclear warheads over land to ensure that their 144. ington Quarterly 19 (Autumn 1996), pp. 115-127. subsystems functioned in accordance with design 43 Leonard S. Spector, “Pakistan,” in The Unde- 64 “Will the BJP Cross the 20 percent mark?” In- parameters, see Sawhney, “Standing Alone.” clared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub- dia Today, December 15, 1997 (http:// 32 [Interview with former Prime Minister, Inder lishing Company, 1988), pp. 120-130; Albright, www.india-today.com). Kumar Gujral,] ”We have it, they have it, that’s “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Arms Race,” p. 16. 65 “Poll ’98 Results: How They Voted,” India To- all,” The Times of India, May 16, 1998 (http:// 44 Abha Dixit, “Missile Race in South Asia: Lin- day, March 16, 1998 (http://www.india- www.timesofindia.com). ear Progression Required to Cap Race?” Strate- today.com). 33 “No security threat when I stepped down: gic Analysis XXI (September 1997) (http:// 66 Swapan Dasgupta and Saba Naqvi Bhaumik, Gujral,” Rediff on the Net, May 30, 1998 (http:// www.idsa-india.org). “Crown of Thorns,” India Today, March 16, 1998 www.rediff.com); “Deve Gowda Blasts Vajpayee 45 Ibid. (http://www.india-today.com); Saba Naqvi for dumping ‘consensus’,” Rediff on the Net, May 46 S. Chandrashekar, “An Assessment of Bhaumik, “Can the BJP change its colour?” In- 30, 1998 (http://www.rediff.com). Pakistan’s Missile Capability,” Missile Monitor dia Today, December 15, 1997 (http:// 34 “Indian’s Letter to Clinton on Nuclear Test- (Spring 1993), pp. 4-11. www.india-today.com) ing,” The New York Times, May 13, 1998 (http:/ 47 John Mintz, “Signs of Chinese Arms Sales Dis- 67 Amulya Ganguly, “From Babri to the Bomb,” /www.nytimes.com). missed, Ex-Official,” Washington Post, May 12, The Hindustan Times, May 18, 1998 (http:// 35 Ziba Moshaver, “The Politics of Nuclear Weap- 1998, p. A20. www.hindustantimes.com). ons In India,” in Nuclear Weapons Prolifera- 48 Dixit, “Missile Race in South Asia.” 68 “Shakti” or “divine strength” was the code tion in the Subcontinent (New York: St. Martin’s 49 Joseph Bermudez, “A Silent Partner,” Jane’s name given to the nuclear tests conducted by In- Press, 1991), pp. 29-43. Defence Weekly, May 20, 1998, pp. 16-17. dia on May 11, 1998. See, “It was ‘Operation 36 Brahma Chellaney, “Our Babbling Power, 50 J.N. Dixit, “India’s China Policy in Disarray,” Shakti’ on Budh Purnima,” Rediff on the Net, May China’s Biting Power,” The Pioneer, November The Hindu, May 7, 1998 (http://www. 16, 1998 (http://www.rediff.com/); also see, 5, 1997, p. 8; K.Subrahmanyam, “Dealing With hinduonline.com); Achin Vanaik, “Crossing the “Singhal reiterates resolve to erect temple at China: Coming Upfront on the N-Option,” Times Rubicon,” Economic and Political Weekly, June Pokhran,” Rediff on the Net, June 8, 1998 (http:// of India, October 23, 1996, p. 14. 13, 1998, p. 1435. www.rediff.com). 37 Agreement Between The Government Of The 51T.V.R. Shenoy, “The BJP was ready for nuclear 69 “BJP will make India a superpower: Advani,” Republic Of India And The Government Of The tests as far back as May 1996,” Rediff on the Net The Hindu, July 2, 1998 (http:// People’s Republic Of China On Confidence (http://www.rediff.com), May 14 1998. www.hinduonline.com); Amberish K. Diwanji, Building Measures In The Military Field Along 52 George Iype, “The Day After,” Rediff on the “BJP Looks Up, Finally,” Rediff on the Net, Au- The Line Of Actual Control In The India-China Net, September 5, 1998 (http://www.rediff.com); gust 24, 1998 (http://www.rediff.com). Border Areas (New Delhi: November 29, 1996) Brahma Chellaney, “Indo-US Talks: CTBT as 70 Kohli, “Can the Periphery Control the Center? (http://www.stimson.org); Agreement On The Camouflage,” The Pioneer, September 30, 1998, Indian Politics at the Crossroads,” pp. 116-118. Maintenance Of Peace And Tranquillity Along p.8. 71 The polls were confined to India’s four largest The Line Of Actual Control In The India-China 53 Amit Baruah, “Indo-Pak talks on the basis of cities (New Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta, and Border Areas (Beijing: September 7, 1993) (http:/ agreed agenda,” The Hindu (http:// Chennai). Although they may not accurately re- /www.stimson.org). www.hinduonline.com), 15 October 1998. flect political opinion within the country as a 38 Shekhar Gupta and Sudeep Chakravarti, “Sino- 54 Arvind Das, “National Integration in a Frag- whole, especially rural India, yet the tests were Indian Relations: Vital Breakthrough,” India To- mented Society,” in India Invented: A Nation In extremely popular. day, September 30, 1993, pp. 22-26. The Making (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers and 72 “Sangma’s Report Foresees Snap Poll,” Rediff 39 “China: Jiang Zemin Urges South Asia Stabil- Distributors, 1994), pp. 135-143. on the Net, May 16, 1998 (http://www.rediff. ity,” Xinhua, December 4, 1996; in FBIS-CHI- 55 Das, “India Invented, Disinvented, and Re-In- com/); also see, “BJP ready for mid-term polls: 96-234 (4 December, 1996); also see Sumit vented,” India Invented, pp. 1-4. Venkaiah Naidu,” The Hindu, August 18, 1998 Ganguly, “Strategies and Options for Resolving 56 Atul Kohli, “Centralization and Powerlessness: (http://www.hinduonline.com/). the Crisis,” in The Crisis in Kashmir (Washing- India’s Democracy in Comparative Perspective,” 73 Ashish Nandy, “The Political Culture of the ton, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, in Joel S. Midgal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, Indian State,” Daedalus 18 (Fall 1989), pp. 9- 1997), pp. 142-143. eds., State, Power and Social Forces (New York: 11; Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear 40 David Albright, “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 89-106; Weapons,” International Security 21 (Winter Arms Race: Out of the Closet But Not in the Atul Kohli, “Introduction,” in Democracy and 1996/97), pp. 65-69.

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 23 Gaurav Kampani

74 I could not obtain a copy of the original source for this statement before this issue went to press. I remember it as being an article by Uday Bhaskar, deputy director of the New Delhi-based Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), in the Times of India in the May to July period of 1997. 75 Uday Bhaskar, “Post-Cold War Security,” Stra- tegic Analysis XXI (November 1997) (http:// www.idsa-india.org/). 76 K. Subrahmanyam, “Articulating Our Nuclear Policy,” The Economic Times, June 15, 1994, p. 10. 77 C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Nuclear Options,” The Hindu, December 19, 1995, p. 12; Raj Chengappa, “Testing Times,” India Today, De- cember 31, 1995, pp. 49-50; Muchkund Dubey, “Nuclear Options: The Choice Cannot Wait,” Frontline, January 26, 1996, pp. 4-11. 78 Virginia Foran, “The Case for Indo-US High- Technology Cooperation,” Survival 40 (Summer 1998), pp. 71-95. 79 Chintamani Mahapatra, “American Approach to Sino-Pakistan Nuclear and Missile Coopera- tion,” Strategic Analysis XXI (January 1998), pp. 1407-1417. 80 Selig Harrison, “The United States and South Asia: Trapped by the Past,” Current History 96 (December 1997), pp. 401-406. 81 C. Raja Mohan, “The Politics of Nuclear Abo- lition,” The Hindu, January 23, 1997, p. 10. 82 William Walker, “India’s Nuclear Labyrinth,” The Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 68-70. 83 C. Raja Mohan, “Finessing a Nuclear Deal,” The Hindu, July 7, 1998 (http://www. hinduonline.com/); C. Raja Mohan, “Indo-US Nuclear Reconciliation,” The Hindu, September 12, 1998 (http://www.hinduonline.com/). 84 Itty Abraham, “Science and Power in the Post- Colonial State,” Alternatives 21 (1996) pp. 321- 323; G.S. Bhargava, “Nuclear Power in India: The Costs of Independence,” Energy Policy, August 1992, pp. 735-743. 85 Praful Bidwai, “Nuclear Meltdown,” Times of India, February 28, 1997 (http://www. timesofindia.com). 86 For details, see Moshaver, “India’s Nuclear Development,” pp. 78-95. 87 Vijay Menon, “Fast Breeder Reactors: Mov- ing at a Snail’s Pace,” India Today, November 30, 1994, pp. 66-67. 88 N.D. Nalapat, “India’s Nuclear Power Sector Stalled Since 1984,” Times of India, January 15, 1996, p. 11; “No Money for India’s Nuclear Power Program,” Rediff on the Net, April 26, 1997 (http://www.rediff.com). 89 Eric Arnett, “The Case of India,” SIPRI Year- book 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 343. 90 Eric Arnett, “Big science, small results,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1998), pp. 46-47; “DAE revises target to gener- ate 20,000MW atomic power by 2020,” Rediff on the Net, June 2, 1998 (http://www.rediff.com/). 91 Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, “A Very Po- litical Bomb,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- tists (July/August 1998), p. 52.

24 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998