Characterization in Ancient Rhetorical Theory Types Of

CHAPTER THREE

Characterization in Ancient Rhetorical Theory

Types of Rhetoric1

Ancient Greek and Roman rhetorical handbooks almost universally agree that there are three kinds of rhetoric.2 The first, judicial rhetoric (also known as juridical, forensic, or dicanic rhetoric), belongs to the law-court. Judicial rhetoric can be divided into accusation and defense. According to Aristotle, judicial rhetoric is oriented towards the past since it is dealing with actions already committed.3 The second type, deliberative (or sym- bouleutic) rhetoric, takes place in the assembly and can be divided into persuasion and dissuasion. Deliberative rhetoric is oriented towards the future since it is concerned with decisions regarding what course of action to take.4 Epideictic rhetoric (also known as demonstrative or panegyric

1 A small portion of this chapter appeared in an earlier version in my article: Brian C. Small, “The Use of Rhetorical Topoi in the Characterization of Jesus in the Book of Hebrews,” PRSt 37 (2010): 53–69. 2 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3.3; Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1421b; Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.2.2; Cicero, De inventione 1.5.7; 2.4.12; idem, De oratore 1.31.141; idem, De partitione oratoria 20.69–70; Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 3.4.12–16; Theon, Progymnasmata 61; Aphthonius, Progymnasmata 74–75; Nicolaus, Progymnasmata 4, 47; Menander, Γενεθλιῶν διαίρεσις τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν 331. Maxey identifies various names given to each of these three classifications (“Rhetoric,” 35). The following editions are used in this study: Aristotle, The “Art” of Rheto- ric (trans. John Henry Freese; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926); Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (trans. H. Rackham; rev. ed.; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Rhetorica ad Herennium (trans. Harry Caplan; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Cicero, De inventione (trans. H. M. Hubbell; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1949); idem, De oratore (trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham; 2 vols.; LCL; Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1942); idem, De partitione oratoria (trans. H. Rackham; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942); Quintilian, Institutio oratoria (trans. H. E. Butler; 4 vols.; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920–1922). All translations and references of the progymnasmatists (Theon, Hermogenes, Aphthonius, Nicolaus) are based on: George A. Kennedy, trans., Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric (SBLWGRW 10; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003). For the Greek text of the progymnasmatists, the following edition was consulted: Leonardi Spengel, Rhetores graeci (vols. 2–3; Leipzig: Teubneri, 1854). Translation of Menander is based on: Menander Rhetor (eds. and trans. D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson; Oxford: Clarendon, 1981); Russell and Wilson also provide a translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, On Epideictic Speeches, in an appendix, pages 362–381. 3 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3.4. 4 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3.4. 102 chapter three rhetoric) deals with topics of praise and blame.5 Sometimes words like laudatory, eulogistic, or encomiastic are used to designate epideictic, but these terms are best used to describe the branch of epideictic rhetoric dealing with praise. The branch of epideictic rhetoric dealing with blame is vituperation or invective. Epideictic rhetoric is oriented towards the present, for it is the present state of things that is normally in view. Aris- totle, however, adds that it “is not uncommon . . . for epideictic speakers to avail themselves of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or of the future by way of anticipating it.”6 Quintilian remarks that the division between the three kinds of rhetoric “is easy and neat rather than true: for all three kinds rely on the mutual assistance of the other.”7

The Rhetorical Genre of Hebrews

It is appropriate at this point to consider just exactly what kind of rhetoric we are dealing with in the book of Hebrews. Hans von Soden analyzed the structure of the book along the lines of ancient judicial rhetoric,8 and his arrangement was followed with slight modifications by Theodor Haering9 and Hans Windisch.10 Scholars today generally agree that Hebrews does not fall under this category of rhetoric. Instead, scholars are divided as to whether Hebrews should be considered deliberative, epideictic, or a combination of both. Barnabas Lindars asserts that Hebrews is deliberative because its primary purpose is persuasion.11 He discounts Hebrews as epideictic rhetoric because “it cannot account for the passionate anxiety of the author and the harsh warnings which frequently interrupt the theo- logical exposition.”12 Proponents of the view that Hebrews is deliberative rhetoric point to such features as the following: (1) focus on the future time; (2) usage of exhortation; (3) proof by examples; (4) usage of certain persuasive appeals such as the advantageous (συμφερόν; 12:10), the neces- sary (ἀναγκαῖος, 8:3; ἀνάγκη; 7:12, 27; 9:16, 23), the appropriate (πρέπω; 2:10; 7:26), and the possible (ἀδύνατον; 6:4, 18; 10:4; 11:6); and (5) appropriate

5 See Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 3.4.12–14 for a discussion of the various terms. 6 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3.4 (Freese, LCL). 7 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 3.4.16 (Butler, LCL). 8 Von Soden, Hebräerbrief, 11. See chapter one for the rhetorical structure. 9 Haering, “Gedankengang,” 153–63. 10 Windisch, Hebräerbrief, 8. 11 Lindars, “Rhetorical Structure,” 82–83. 12 Lindars, “Rhetorical Structure,” 383.