Commanders' Considerations in Assaulting a Fortified Position
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1991-03 If you don't like this, you may resign and go home: Commanders' considerations in assaulting a fortified position Woodgerd, Michael E. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/28268 SSEStVGse VHnnn Kg mBBBBmm H HM(5I KMH« HO B¥B SesfSa 29 BWBHwWlWBW«MWwMM(w* ' asm HHHttK19 Sjj&agfi iia mm NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS If You Don't Like This, You May Resign And Go Home: Commanders' Considerations In Assaulting A Fortified Position by Michael Woodgerd March, 1991 Thesis Advisor: Russel H. S. Stolfi Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited T254010 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS Unclassified 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School (If applicable) Naval Postgraduate School 65 6c. ADDRESS (Crty, State, and ZIP Code) 7b ADDRESS {City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93943-5000 8a NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (If applicable) 8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS Program Element No Pro/ect No Work Unit Accejvon Number 1 1 TITLE (Include Security Classification) IF YOU DONT LIKE THIS, YOU MAY RESIGN AND GO HOME: COMMANDERS' CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSAULTING A FORTIFIED POSITION 12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Woodgerd, Michael E. 13a TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (year, month, day) 15 PAGE COUNT Master's Thesis From To March 1991 16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 17 COSATI CODES 1 8 SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP Military Operations, Military Tactics, Fortifications, I^and Mine Warfare, Tactical Reconnaissance, Mine Countermeasures, Assault, Tanks, Infantry, Kursk, El Alamein, Normandy, Okinawa, Siegfried Line, Manchuria, Flame Warfare, National Training Center. 1 9 ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The author studies the experiences of British, German, American and Soviet armies in assaults on fortified positions to find critical considerations for contemporary commanders. A fortified position is a series of mutually supporting areas comprising bunkers, pillboxes, weapons emplacements, entrenchments, wire, mines and other obstacles. Assaulting such a position held by determined defenders is a uniquely brutal and bloody event. The author systematically studies fighting at El Alamein, the Normandy Campaign, Okinawa, the Siegfried Line, Kursk, Manchuria and the Petsamo-Kirkenes area. Each battle is examined in terms of the use and importance of intelligence, smoke, armor, infantry, engineers, artillery, air support, C2 and special weapons. A portion of this study also examines current training at the U.S. Army's National Training Center to find if current training reflects battle proven techniques. The conclusion offers the author's recommendations to assist commanders and staffs in determining the organization, equipment, tactics, training and means of control of forces in the assault of a fortified position. 20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ¥% UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED Fl SAMt AS REPORT J DTIC USERS Unclassified 22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area code) 22c OFFICE SYMBOL Russel H.S. Stolfi < 408 >-646 2981 NK DD FORM 1473. 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE All other editions are obsolete Unclassified Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. If You Don't Like This, You May Resign And Go Home: Commanders' Considerations In Assaulting A Fortified Position by Michael Woodgerd Captain, United States Army B.S., United States Military Academy 1982 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY (Command, Control and Communications) from the NAVAL PpSTGRADUATE SCHOOL ABSTRACT The author studies the experiences of British, German, American and Soviet armies in assaults on fortified positions to find critical considerations for contemporary commanders. A fortified position is a series of mutually supporting areas comprising bunkers, pillboxes, weapons emplacements, entrenchments, wire, mines and other obstacles. Assaulting such a position held by determined defenders is a uniquely brutal and bloody event. The author systematically studies fighting at El Alamein, the Normandy Campaign, Okinawa, the Siegfried Line, Kursk, Manchuria and the Per amo- Kirkenes area. Each battle is examined in terms of the use and importance of intelligence, smoke, armor, infantry, engineers, artillery, air support, C2 and special weapons. A portion of this study also examines current training at the U.S. Army's National Training Center to find if current training reflects battle proven techniques. The conclusion offers the author's recommendations to assist commanders and staffs in determining the organization, equipment, tactics, training and means of control of forces in the assault of a fortified position. in TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1 A. PURPOSE 1 B. BACKGROUND 2 C. SIGNIFICANCE 3 D. ASSUMPTIONS 3 E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 4 1. Chapter I 4 2. Chapter II 4 3. Chapters m through VI 4 4. Chapter VH 4 5. Chapter VH1 5 II. EVOLUTION OF ASSAULTS AGAINST FORTIFIED POSITIONS - 52 B.C. through A.D. 1939 6 A. ALESIA: ONE HUNDRED YARDS OF HORROR 6 1. Background 6 2. Narrative 7 IV B. INTERLUDE 7 C. 19th CENTURY: THE SPADE REDISCOVERED 8 1. The American Civil War 8 2. 1865 to 1914 9 D. A MUDDY CORNER OF HELL: THE FIRST WORLD WAR EXPERIENCE 9 1. The Somme 10 2. Deadlock: A Search For A Solution 12 3. Deadlock: The German Solution 13 a. Verdun 14 b. Storm Troops 15 4. Summation 15 III. THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE: A TRADE UNION APPROACH TO WAR . 17 A. EL ALAMEIN: WORLD WAR ONE REVISITED 17 1. Terrain 17 2. Defenders: Fighting A Battle Without Hope 19 3. Attackers 22 4. Narrative 24 5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling 25 6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke 26 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 27 . 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 27 8. Engineers 30 9. Artillery 32 10. Air Support 34 11. C2 35 12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets 36 13. Historical Lessons 36 B. OPERATION GOODWOOD: DEATH RIDE OF THE ARMOURED DIVISIONS 38 1 Terrain: A Stamping Ground for Armour 39 2. Defenders 41 3. Attackers: On The Threshold of Great Events 42 4. Narrative 43 5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling 45 6. Obscuration/Smoke 46 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 46 8. Engineers 47 9. Artillery 47 10. Air Support 48 11. C2 49 12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets 49 13. Historical Lessons 50 VI IV. THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE: INTO THE CAULDRON 52 A. KURSK 52 1. Terrain 52 2. Defenders 54 3. Attackers: Cold Blood and Warm Underwear 57 4. Narrative: The Swan-Song of the German Armored Force 60 5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling 63 6. Obscuration/Use of Smoke 66 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 67 8. Engineers: The Most Dangerous Job in the German Army 70 9. Artillery 72 10. Air Support 73 11. C2: The Nerves of an Army 75 12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets 78 13. Historical Lessons 79 V. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 83 A. THE NORMANDY BOCAGE: A TERRIBLE BLOOD-LETTING ... 83 1. Terrain: This goddamn country 85 2. Defenders 85 a. Normandy 85 b. Siegfried Line 87 vu 3. Attackers 90 4. Narrative 91 5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling 93 a. Normandy 93 b. Siegfried Line 94 6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke 94 a. Normandy 94 b. Siegfried Line 95 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 96 a. Normandy 96 b. Siegfried Line 100 8. Engineers 101 9. Artillery 102 a. Normandy 102 b. Siegfried Line 103 10. Air Support: The bomb carpets unrolled in great rectangles 104 a. Normandy 104 b. Siegfried Line 106 11. C2 106 12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets 108 a. Normandy 108 b. Siegfried Line 109 vui . 13. Historical Lessons 110 B. THE MARINE EXPERIENCE: CORKSCREW AND BLOWTORCH 112 1 Terrain 112 2. Defender 112 3. Attackers 115 4. Narrative 116 5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling 117 6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke 118 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 119 8. Engineers 121 9. Artillery 122 10. Air Support 123 11. C2 124 1 2. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets 1 24 13. Historical Lessons 125 VI. THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE: THE SCHOOL OF HARD KNOCKS 127 A. INSTRUCTIONS ON THE BREAKTHROUGH OF POSITIONAL DEFENSES 127 1. Terrain 128 2. Attacker 128 3. Defender 128 IX 4. Narrative 129 5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling 129 6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke 130 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 131 8. Engineers 133 9. Artillery 134 10. Air Support 135 11. C2 135 12. Special Weapons/Unique Employment of Assets 136 B. THEORY INTO PRACTICE 137 1. Terrain 138 a. Manchuria 138 b. Petsamo-Kirkenes 138 2. Attackers 140 a. Manchuria 140 b. Petsamo-Kirkenes 141 3. Defenders 141 a. Manchuria 141 b. Petsamo-Kirkenes 143 4. Narrative 144 a. Manchuria 144 b. Petsamo-Kirkenes 145 5. Use of Intelligence/Patrolling 146 a. Manchuria 146 6. Use of Obscuration/Smoke 146 7. Tank/Infantry Cooperation 147 a. Manchuria 147 b. Petsamo-Kirkenes 148 8. Engineers 148 a. Manchuria 149 b. Petsamo-Kirkenes 149 9. Artillery 150 a. Manchuria 150 b. Petsamo-Kirkenes 151 10. Air Support 152 11. C2 153 12.