Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) Vol-3, Issue-6, 2017 ISSN: 2454-1362, http://www.onlinejournal.in

Military Orientalism: Contrasting Western and Eastern Ways of War

Hamid Kbiri Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences / University Mohammed V, Rabat

Abstract: Military orientalism is a novel concept perceived superiority even in the scrum of war, which refers to the centrality of orientalist irrespective of History’s ebbs and flows. representations in the construction of oriental enemies and their warfare traditions, in 2. Western vs. Eastern Ways of War contradistinction with glorified self-perceptions and Western “way of war.” The concept is particularly In this respect, the strong emphasis put by several manifest in the insistence among Western military prominent Western historians on the existence of a historians and strategists on the contrast between perpetually superior Western Way of War is one of Western and Eastern ways of wars based on binaries the salient manifestations of Military orientalism. that give, in a typically orientalist way, the higher This emphasis has resulted in a fictitious contrast ground to the West on every aspects of warfare, between a supposedly decisive Western way of war irrespective of History’s ebbs and flows . and its failing, apolitical and archaic Eastern counterpart. This highly ethnocentric outlook is 1. Introduction symptomatic of self-aggrandizing orientalism, as it favors the contradistinctive celebration of the West’s The present article outlines a critique of the military tradition as unique and implacable. From culturalism which became prevalent among Western this perspective, war in its Western and Eastern military historians concerning the East at war declensions has been made into an historical especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 events. These construct and a site of knowledge/power production attacks gave a powerful thrust to cultural as is further explicated hereafter. determinism in war studies particularly in a context saturated by the debate spurred in the 90s by Following the 9/11 events which took the United- Huntington’s presumably inevitable clash of States by surprise as the first ever attack on the civilizations. This cultural determinism is manifest in “main land”, there was a widespread tendency the insistence among Western military historians and among academia and strategists to divert attention strategists on the distinction between Western and from US failure to avert such devastating attacks by Eastern ways of wars based on binaries that give, in a blaming the modus operandi of the attackers on a typically orientalist way, the higher ground to the supposedly quintessential oriental way of war based West on every aspects of warfare. It is about the on deceit and cunning; and conversely sublimating systematic essentializing of the West and East on the the ensuing response as proceeding from a superb, basis of their allegedly distinctive military and frontal and unambiguous ‘Western way of war’ warring traditions. which allegedly dates back to the Greeks [5,6]. It is said to surpass all other civilizations’ warrior It is in this context that the concept of Military traditions with America being its ultimate incarnation Orientalism emerged as lately as 2006 thanks to and the guardian of its ‘formidable’ legacy, given its Taraq Barkawi [1,2] and other scholars such as unparalleled technological and military supremacy. Patrick Porter [3] who contributed later to this This orientalist move was also meant, inter alia, to conceptualizing effort within the fledgling discipline have therapeutic effects on the hurt US ethos and to of Critical War Studies. Military Orientalism can be mobilize the public opinion for a long and global roughly defined as the insights of Orientalism [4] “war on terror” as evidenced by the initial name applied to the military realm. Indeed, orientalism as a given to the War on Afghanistan “Operation Infinite cultural apparatus and a style of thought is pervasive Justice.” to all domains of human endeavors involving oriental others, including war. In this sense, the concept of This highlights that, in war more than in any other Military Orientalism serves to highlight the tendency realm of human interaction, orientalist identities, as of Western identity to make the East a foil to its self- Patricia Owens contends, are “relational and performative.” They do not exist factually but are

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Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) Vol-3, Issue-6, 2017 ISSN: 2454-1362, http://www.onlinejournal.in rather “produced and reproduced through discourse” One of the most prominent adepts of this [7]. In normal times, i.e. peace, attached to these eminently ideological current is the renowned British identities, is what Roxanne Doty identifies as “a historian John Keegan. Keegan, who gained in chain of equivalences that was created between the notoriety in the 2000s for obvious reasons, terms civilized, rationality, reason, and sovereign, on emphasized the key idea that war is intrinsically the one hand, and uncivilized, instinctual, and cultural and claimed the existence of a separate dependent on the other hand” [8]. Such qualities, or Oriental warrior tradition, characterized mainly by rather signifiers, have been clustering together to “evasion, delay and indirectness” [12]. He also form a particular identity, a "totality" of attributes contended that this long standing tradition which separate and distinct from other identities [8]. Stuart dates back to ancient China and Persia had Hall for his part sees these identities as involving a reappeared in a variety of forms throughout history. violent hierarchy which he ascribes to the rampant One instance is the tactics of evasion and retreat used ethnocentrism that flows from the gross inequalities by the Vietcong against the United States in the of power between West and East [9]. On the eve of Vietnam war and more recently in the 9/11 attacks war, other context specific attributes add up to those [6]. While he aligns himself with Samuel already identified as congealing around adversary Huntington, by arguing for hermetic and monolithic identities. Accordingly, the figure of the oriental civilizations with their distinctive warring traditions, warrior is constructed as deceitful, irrational, he still takes issue with him for overlooking the emotional, vengeful and capable of unruly violence. “fundamental” dissimilarities in ways of war: Whereas, Western soldiers are, contrastingly, represented as rational individuals who operate If I thought Huntington's view had a defect, it within armies that are “made for industrial battles, was that he did not discuss what I think the decisive plots of organized force, and orchestrated crucial ingredient of any Western-Islamic manoeuvres” [10]. These armies are furthermore conflict, their quite distinctively different ways celebrated as “rational, orderly, calculated of making war. Westerners fight face to face, in bureaucracies with a sophisticated division of labor, stand-up battle, and go on until one side or the high-tech weapons systems and clear lines of other gives in. They choose the crudest weapons authority from civilian politicians” [10]. available, and use them with appalling violence, but observe what, to non-Westerners may well This inclination to differentiate between Western seem curious rules of honor. Orientals, by and Eastern ways of war seems to draw on past contrast, shrink from pitched battle, which they legacies. Already in the nineteenth century, Colonel often deride as a sort of game, preferring Charles E. Callwell whose 1896 book Small Wars: ambush, surprise, treachery and deceit as the Their Principles and Practice had an enduring best way to overcome an enemy. [6] influence on counterinsurgency doctrine and asymmetric warfare, had distinguished between Keegan goes on to trace this “devious” way of savage and civilized modes of warfare. According to war as far as the Middle-East is concerned to what he Callwell, savage wars were waged by foreign calls the “Islamic mind” --an expression that echoes cultures along different lines. He maintains that Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind; the very book that savages were easily impressed by “a bold and had an overriding orientalist influence on the conduct resolute procedure”, i.e., in modern day language by of the counterinsurgency and the whole Iraq war in overwhelming force, and were readily suppressed by general. According to Keegan, the Islamic mind was shows of firmness [3]. Callwell’s argument seems to inspired by nomadic horse-riding marauders, who have enshrined the prevalent theorem that a society’s predate the prophet of Islam. It has remained mode of war is linked its degree of civilization. No unchanged from the time it allowed the raiding wonder that on the occasion of the global war on Muslim Arabs to become conquerors of terrifying terror whose subjects are situated in oriental power, “able to overthrow the ancient empires both territories, this idea of a culture-bound “Eastern” of Byzantium and Persia and to take possession of way of war, has resurfaced with force. Underpinned huge areas of Asia, Africa and Europe” [6]. as it is by a set of concepts and behavior that Accordingly, Arabs resorted again to their traditional distinguishes East from West, it constitutes, for its methods on September 11, 2001, “appearing most radical proponents, an unbroken strategic and suddenly out of empty space like their desert raider military tradition. It unites cultures as diverse as ancestors, assaulted the heartlands of Western power, ancient China, medieval Arabia, and modern Turkey, in a terrifying surprise raid and did appalling stretching from the writings of Sun Tzu through the damage” [6]. Hence, the most efficient way to defeat modus operandi of modern day Islamist insurgencies the Islamic mind, which is bent on surprise, is to [11]. apply overwhelming force by launching massive retaliation and persisting relentlessly until “the

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Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) Vol-3, Issue-6, 2017 ISSN: 2454-1362, http://www.onlinejournal.in raiders have either been eliminated or so cowed by demonstrate that deception and overwhelming force the violence” [6] . are not “mutually exclusive absolutes” [3] and are not the preserve of one particular culture or In spite of the authority of Sir John Keegan as a civilization. military historian, holder of many awards and lecturer in the most prestigious British and American Conversely, there are many historical facts that universities and military colleges, his orientalist refute the hypothesis of Eastern armies’ exclusive biases seem to have overwhelmed him when he inclination to use the indirect approach based on addressed the warfare traditions of the “orient.” First, stealth and guile. The tactics of the French resistance surprise and deceit have been a constant and against the Nazis, the methods of the Irish Republic universal component of war and strategy. Army militants against their British enemies are stark Clausewitz, the ultimate reference of Western counterexamples. In fact weaker belligerents military thought, is clearly in agreement with all regardless of their geographical location or “ethnic” other writers on strategy concerning the universal extraction, seek, out of strategic calculation, to avoid desirability of achieving surprise [13]. And, as direct exposition to the devastating attacks of a much Mikkel Thorup argues, Keegan must be the only stronger foe using disproportionate force and military historian who has never heard of cruise sophisticated weaponry. It is a human pattern of missiles, predator drones and stealth bombers whose behavior that is as old at least as the Torah’s action is essentially based on surprise and furtiveness recounting of David and Goliath’s confrontation. In [14]. Additionally, Zygmunt Bauman describing the fact such a behavior is much rational than the new global power makes astonishingly similar otherwise rather suicidal direct clash in a context of portrayals to those made by Keegan of 9/11 oriental extreme power imbalance, which runs counter to the attackers. According to Bauman, global powers most primordial of instincts, that of self-preservation. based on their technological advances are “resting their superiority on the speed of their own Another much publicized military historian, movement; their own ability to descend from thanks to 9/11, is Victor Davis Hanson, who has nowhere without notice and vanish again without indulged in military orientalism especially in his best warning” [15]. known 2001 book, Carnage and Culture [5]. This bestseller was published in some countries like the Regarding deception, Machiavelli, one of the UK and Australia, under a very telling tittle: Why the most popular figures of European statecraft, asserted West Has Won. The main contention of the book is that “he who overcomes the enemy by fraud is as that the military dominance of Western Civilization, much to be praised as he who does so by force.” [6]. starting with the ancient Greeks, is the consequence The very word stratagem, which evokes strategy, of several fundamental characteristics of Western means artifice and "trick, especially to outwit an culture. Western societies can suffer military defeats enemy." Another key military term, maneuver, is at the hands of Non-Western societies, according to defined by Edward N. Luttwak along similar lines to Hanson, but these are only occasional setbacks since mean “paradoxical action that seeks to circumvent the "Western way of war" supported with its lofty the greater strengths of the enemy and to exploit his values and institutions prevails in the ends. These weaknesses” [6] higher standards which consist of consensual government, political freedom, rationalism, scientific Western warfare history is itself replete with inquiry, individualism, democracy and civic battles where military deception was decisive. militarism constitute “the real ingredients of a most Several key European battles in World War II were murderous brand of battle” [5]. Thus Western man’s definitely won on ruse. One of the most remarkable military prowess echoes larger social, economic, deception ploy in history was instigated by the allied political, and cultural practices that seemingly have forces in 1944 under the name of “Operation Body little to do with war. But, once in war there is “a Guard.” It was meant to induce the Nazi Germans cultural crystallization,” in which the insidious and into believing that the D-Day Normandy landings more subtle institutions that “heretofore were murky were only a bluff. Operation Bertram was another and undefined become stark and unforgiving in the major Second World War deception operation. It had finality of organized killing” [6]. Hanson further been orchestrated by the allied forces in Egypt under posits that even if technological breakthroughs and Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery in preparation sophisticated weaponries have given a military edge for the Second Battle of El Alamein in 1942. The to Western societies, cultural differences remain the objective was to mislead German most determinant elements in winning battles and Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel about the wars. Ultimately, Hanson argues that the unique timing and location of the main attack, through the cultural traits of the West is what makes the use of decoys, camouflage and false electromagnetic "Western way of war" unparalleled in its radio traffic. These and numerous other examples

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Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) Vol-3, Issue-6, 2017 ISSN: 2454-1362, http://www.onlinejournal.in destructiveness and decisiveness and this since both Afghanistan and Iraq and the emergence of ancient Greece: hybrid warfare have clearly demonstrated the limits of the two military historians’ orientalist theories The circumstances of the birth of decisive about uninterrupted Western superiority in the battle—wars of small property-owning citizens, historical contest of culturally determined “ways of who voted for and then fought their own battles— war.” Paradoxically, the resort to the explanatory account for its terrifying lethality. Only freemen potential of culture in the outcome of wars has who voted and enjoyed liberty were willing to regained in vitality despite these setbacks. The endure such terrific infantry collisions, since orientalist unshakeable belief in Western superiority shock alone proved an economical method of may account for its insistence on asserting and battle that allowed conflicts to be brief, clear- reasserting cultural ascendency even in war. The cut—and occasionally deadly. [6] advent of the so-called “cultural turn,” rehabilitated culture by putting it back on center stage. This In a statement which betrays the orientalist testifies to the extreme resilience of orientalism ideological posture of Hanson, he suggests that the which, as a cultural apparatus, is built on the events of the last decades of the twentieth Century, dichotmization of West and East in every realm of namely what he calls “the ongoing fighting in human interaction. Palestine and the Gulf War” confirm his book’s thesis of “some 2,500 years of general Western Actually, the books of Hanson and Keegan and military superiority across time and space” [6]. He other military historians who belong to their also clearly outlines his subscription to the Clash of community of interpretation attest to the relevance of Civilization paradigm as he claims that September Edward Said’s concept of worldliness for the texts of 11 “was not an aberration, but in some sense the war studies and military thought. As Said claims, the culmination of a growing divide between the Islamic great imbalance in power in which texts are produced and Western world” [6]. Furthermore, he describes makes their worldliness crucial [17], especially since the engagement of American ground troops these texts were produced in an atmosphere fraught following in the “War on Terror” in quite orientalist with triumphalist and revengeful calls for punitive terms: “thirteen centuries after Poitiers, Western expeditions in the Middle-East. These works about infantrymen were once again fighting warriors who warfare and confrontation between the East and identified themselves as emissaries of Islam” [6]. West, in a period profoundly marked with “the clash of civilizations” and the “Global war on Terror,” Hanson and Keegan are not isolated scholars but conform to the statement of Said that “no production they are the leading figures of a whole scientific of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore community of interpretation whose ideas cut across or disclaim its author’s involvement as a human scholarly, professional military and political subject in his own circumstances” [4]. The idea of audiences [3]. Hanson’s book on the democratic worldliness has been expressed differently by West’s military superiority enhanced the Bush Barkawi and Brighton who speak about the Administration’s conviction of victory in the war. historicity or the historically contingent character of His influence is no less important than that of other war and military history writing [18]. Jeremy Black eminent orientalist scholars like Bernard Lewis. for his part describes military historiography as Dick Cheney, as vice president, organized evenings another form of cultural activity [19] since, as to host both of them as “great thinkers, analysts” and evidenced by these scholars who spoke “leading experts” [16]. Besides, their widely authoritatively about war to a wider audience, they circulated concepts about the primacy of culture in cannot be separable from the vociferously orientalist Western ascendency in war have been the organizing regime of truth prevailing at the time they were principle behind authoritative reference books like drafting and publishing their work. The Cambridge History of Warfare published as recently as 2005 [11]. 3. Conclusion

After the first campaign in Afghanistan, Keegan The present article has been intended as a and Hanson, out of orientalist fervor, were among the contribution to the concept of Military Orientalism. first to euphorically and rather prematurely celebrate This has been done based on the centrality of the rapid rout of the Taliban. Such defeat according orientalist representations in the construction of to them bears proof to the superior lethality of liberal oriental enemies and their warfare traditions, in democracies. But they seem to have overlooked two contradistinction with Western self-perceptions and basic principles of war: War is the sum of battles and glorified “way of war.” Awareness of such a concept the changing and context-bound nature of war – which emerged in response to the premium put on a Clausewitz describes it, by the way, as “more than a supposedly unique and decisive Western way of war, mere chameleon.” The subsequent developments in in the aftermath of the 9/11 events, is necessary to

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Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) Vol-3, Issue-6, 2017 ISSN: 2454-1362, http://www.onlinejournal.in the understanding of how unexpected operational [13] Clausewitz, Carl Von. On war, Michael Howard and shortcomings --undergirded by orientalist Peter Paret, eds and tr. (1832−4; Princeton, NJ: Princeton worldviews-- have led to the upside down review of University Press, 1976. military strategy under the flamboyant expression of [14] Thorup, Mikkel, An Intellectual History of Terror: Cultural Turn. When absolute faith in “ ” War, Violence and the State. Routledge, 2010. technological supremacy and overwhelming force (decisive battle), due to orientalist representations, [15] Bauman, Zygmunt. "Wars of The Globalization Era." proved them wrong, the US military sought a European Journal of Social Theory 4, (2001): 11-28. solution in social sciences, namely anthropology. They thought that these disciplines, operationalized [16] Cheney, Richard B, and Liz Cheney. In My Time: A through Counterinsurgency doctrine, would help Personal and Political Memoir. New York: Threshold them grasp the unforeseen complexity of the oriental Editions, 2011. other, which complexity they located in the latter’s [17] Ashcroft, Bill, and Pal Ahluwalia, Edward Said. culture. Ultimately, this much hailed original turn, “ ” Routledge critical thinkers. New York, NY: Routledge, as demonstrated by critical war studies and critical Revised 2nd edition, 2009. anthropology, is but a reversion to past practices and revivified alternative orientalist categories [18] Barkawi, Tarak and Shane Brighton, “Powers of War: [2,3,20,21,22]. Fighting Knowledge, and Critique.” International Political Sociology 5, no. 2 (2011): 126–43. 4. References [19] Black, Jeremy. “Determinisms and Other Issues,” The [1] Barkawi, Tarak. Globalization and War. Rowman & Journal of Military History, 68 (October 2004). Littlefield: New York. 2006 [20] Gregory, Derek, “Adversary Knowledges, Dissident [2] Barkawi, Tarak, and Keith Stanski, (eds.) Orientalism Voices: the Cultural Turn in Late Modern War”. University and War. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd London/GB. 2012 of British Columbia at Vancouver. (2006) . [3] Porter, Patrick, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes. Hurst & Co: London. 2009. [21] Gregory, Derek, "'The Rush to the Intimate': Counterinsurgency and the Cultural Turn." Radical [4] Said, Edward, Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. Philosophy 150:8 (2008) : 8-23. Print. [5] Hanson, Victor Davis. Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. First [22] Gusterson, Hugh, “The Cultural Turn in the War on Anchor Books: New York, 2001. Terror”. In John Kelly, Beatrice Jaurequi, Mitchell Sean and Walton Jeremy (eds.) Anthropology and Global [6] Keegan, John "In this War of Civilizations, the West Counterinsurgency. University of Chicago Press, 2010: will Prevail." Daily Telegraph, October 8, 2001. 279-96.

[7] Owens, Patricia, Torture, Sex and Military “ Orientalism. Third World Quarterly, 31, (2010): 1041 ” – 1056.

[8] Doty, Roxanne Lynn. Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations. University of Minnesota Press. Borderlines, 1996.

[9] Hall, Stuart, “The Spectacle of the Other.” In Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. By Stuart Hall (ed.) London: Sage in association with the Open University, 1997: 225-279.

[10] Rid, Thomas. " Review of Patrick Porter’s Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes." Journal of Strategic Studies, 33: 5, (2010): 784-787.

[11] Porter, Patrick, “Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War”. Parameters, (Summer 2007): 45-58.

[12] Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. Pimlico: London. 1994. Print.

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