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SPECIAL EDITION THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

September-October 2018, Vol. 98, No. 5 Professional Bulletin 100-18-09/10 Authentication no.1822710 Commander, USACAC; Commandant, CGSC; DCG for Combined Arms, TRADOC: Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army

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Gerald B. O’Keefe—Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army MR Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy

Foreword

ince the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of and near-peer threats. Our new doctrine, Field Manual 3-0, large-scale ground combat against a peer adversary Operations, dictates that the Army provide the joint force was remote. During the years following, the U.S. Army four unique strategic roles: shaping the security environ- Sfound itself increasingly called upon to lead multinational ment, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale combat operations in the lower to middle tiers operations, and consolidating gains to of the range of military operations make temporary success permanent.1 and conflict continuum. The events To enable this shift of focus, of 11 September 2001 led to more the Army is now changing a cul- than fifteen years of intense focus on ture shaped by over fifteen years counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, of persistent limited-contingency and stability operations in Iraq and operations. Leaders must recognize Afghanistan. An entire generation of that the hard-won wisdom of the Iraq Army leaders and soldiers were cul- and Afghanistan wars is important to turally imprinted by this experience. retain but does not fully square with We emerged as an Army more capable the exponential lethality, hyperactive in limited contingency operations than chaos, and accelerated tempo of the at any time in our Nation’s history, but multi-domain battlefield when facing the geopolitical landscape continues to a peer or near-peer adversary. shift, and the risk of great power con- To emphasize the importance of the flict is no longer a remote possibility. Army’s continued preparation for large- While our Army focused on Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army scale combat operations, the U.S. Army Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center limited contingency operations in Combined Arms Center has published the Middle East and southwest Asia, the seven-volume Large-Scale Combat other regional and peer adversaries Operations Historical Case Study book scrutinized U.S. military processes and methods and adapted set. The intent is to expand the knowledge and understanding their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and of the contemporary issues the U.S. Army faces by tapping our become accessible in even the most remote corners of the organizational memory to illuminate the future. The reader world, the U.S. military’s competitive advantage is being should reflect on these case studies to analyze each situation, challenged across all of the warfighting domains. In the last identify the doctrines at play, evaluate leaders’ actions, and de- decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist termine what differentiated success from failure. Use them as a and aggressive Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cava- mechanism for discussion, debate, and intellectual examination lier Iranian regime. Each of these adversaries seek to change of lessons of the past and their application to today’s doctrine, the world order in their favor and contest U.S. strategic in- organization, and training to best prepare the Army for large- terests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or regional scale combat. Relevant answers and tangible reminders of what near-peer adversary has increased, and we must rapidly shift makes us the world’s greatest land power await in the stories of our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across these volumes. the full range of military operations. Prepared for War! Over the last three years, the U.S. Army has rapidly shifted the focus of its doctrine, training, education, and Note leader development to increase readiness and capabilities to 1. Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- ment Publishing Office, October 2017), 2. prevail in large-scale ground combat operations against peer TABLE OF CONTENTS

4 Accelerating Multi-Domain 34 The Long Haul Operations Historical Case Studies of Evolution of an Idea Sustainment Operations in Large-Scale Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, U.S. Army Combat Operations Lt. Col. Keith Beurskens, DM, U.S. Army, Retired The commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command describes why the Multi-Domain A summary of the fourth book in the LSCO set that includes elev- Battle concept evolved into the Multi-Domain Opera- en historical case studies of sustainment operations drawn from tions concept. the past one hundred years with lessons for modern large-scale combat operations. 10 Weaving the Tangled Web 39 Deep Maneuver Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations Christopher M. Rein, PhD Jack D. Kem, PhD A summary of the first book in the LSCO set that includes historical case studies on military deception operations from A summary of the fifth book in the LSCO set that includes eleven the First World War to present day. chronologically ordered historical case studies drawn from the past one hundred years with lessons for modern large-scale com- bat operations. 18 Bringing Order to Chaos Combined Arms Maneuver in 46 Into the Breach Large-Scale Combat Operations Historical Case Studies of Lt. Col. Peter J. Schifferle, PhD, Mobility Operations in Large-Scale U.S. Army, Retired Combat Operations Florian L. Waitl A summary of the second book in the LSCO set that includes ten case studies written by a diverse group of military histori- A summary of the sixth book in the LSCO set that includes ten ans that focus on some element of command and control of historical case studies of mobility and countermobility operations combined arms from 1917 through 2003. drawn from the past one hundred years with insights for modern large-scale combat operations. 26 Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires Historical Case Studies of Converging 52 Perceptions Are Reality Cross-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Historical Case Studies of Combat Operations Information Operations in Large-Scale Lt. Col. Thomas G. Bradbeer, PhD, Combat Operations U.S. Army, Retired Col. Mark D. Vertuli, U.S. Army

A summary of the third book in the LSCO set that includes A summary of the seventh book in the LSCO set that includes ten ten historical case studies written by different authors involv- historical case studies and a discussion on the future implications ing lethal and nonlethal fires from the period 1917 through of information operations during large-scale combat operations. 1991 with lessons for military professionals who will be en- gaged in future large-scale combat operations.

2 September-October 2018 MILITARY REVIEW SPECIAL EDITION September-October 2018 Volume 98 ◆ Number 5

60 “Ready Now”—Our Number 88 The Rapid Redesign of the One Priority Captains Career Course Col. Christopher R. Norrie, U.S. Army An Example of Agility in Professional Maj. Thomas E. Lamb, U.S. Army Military Education Capt. Michael J. Culler, U.S. Army Col. Ken Hawley, U.S. Army The National rainingT Center (NTC) ensures that units have William Kuchinski their hardest day in the desert so that no soldier goes un- trained into combat. The commander of Operations Group Two senior academics from the Office of the Provost at Army at the NTC describes how it is changing to provide the train- University explain the redesign of the Captains Career Course ing required to fight and win during large-scale combat op- common core blocks of instruction to provide greater empha- erations in a multi-domain environment. sis on offensive operations against a near-peer threat in a multi-domain environment. 70 How Has the Joint Readiness Training Center Changed to 94 The European War Adapt to Large-Scale Combat Lt. Col. E. M. Benitez, U.S. Army Operations? Col. David Doyle, U.S. Army In this legacy article, first published inMilitary Review in De- cember 1939, the author identifies the need for U.S. forces to Lt. Col. Aaron Coombs, U.S. Army prepare for what was to become known as World War II. This sentiment is echoed by Army leadership today as the Army The ommanderc of Operations Group at the Army’s Joint shifts its focus to face the threat of large-scale combat opera- Readiness Training Center discusses how the combat train- tions against peer or near-peer threats. ing center prepares units and leaders for large-scale combat operations by creating a decisive-action training environ- ment with scalable, flexible scenarios that challenge and stress leaders and force them to consider operations other 111 Meeting the Challenge of than counterinsurgencies. Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations Today and Tomorrow 82 Creating Powerful Minds Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army

Army University Education Initiatives The commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms for Large-Scale Combat Operations Center finishes theMilitary Review special issue with a look to the future of large-scale ground combat operations. Col. Thomas Bolen, U.S. Army Vince Carlisle, PhD

The authors discuss how the Army professional military edu- LETTER TO THE EDITOR cation system is keeping pace with current and future needs of the Army and our soldiers.

119 A reader comments on a previous article.

MILITARY REVIEW SPECIAL EDITION September-October 2018 3 Accelerating Multi- Domain Operations Evolution of an Idea

Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, U.S. Army

This article was originally published by the Modern material, leadership education, personnel, and facilities War Institute at West Point on 23 July 23 2018.1 It has spectrum. Origin stories establish the foundation from been edited by Military Review for style. which lasting ideas emerge. However, for ideas to have a lasting impact they must evolve. ulti-Domain Battle has a clear origin.2 For Multi-Domain Battle, there are two things driving Stemming from the idea that disruptive tech- the need to evolve the concept. First, ideas must evolve to nologies will change the character of warfare, ensure alignment with the strategic direction of the en- Mit recognizes that the way armies will fight and win wars terprise they serve. The 2018 National Defense Strategy will also change. It also reflects the desire to replicate the lays out the missions, emerging operational environ- success of AirLand Battle, which is arguably the most sig- ments, advances in technology, and anticipated enemy, nificant case of developing a concept and then materializ- threat, and adversary capabilities that the Department of ing capabilities across the doctrine, organization, training, Defense envisions for the foreseeable future.3 It provides U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and British Army paratroopers assigned to 3rd Battalion, Para- chute Regiment, Colchester, England, shake hands before jumping from a C-17 Globemaster III over Latvia 8 June 2018 during Exercise Swift Response 18. (Photo by Airman 1st Class Gracie I. Lee, U.S. Air Force) direction for how the joint force must evolve to compete, made clear the Army’s desire to listen, learn, and include deter, and win in future armed conflict. To this end, our joint and multinational partners in the development Multi-Domain Battle must reflect this strategy. of this idea.7 Recently the Navy and the Joint Staff have Second, when I took the reins of U.S. Army also joined the discussion. Training and Doctrine Command, I was specifically Albert Palazzo’s series of articles in the fall of 2017 directed to “operationalize Multi-Domain Battle” by laid out a clear argument. To be successful, Multi- building upon the foundation created by my prede- Domain Battle must translate into radical effects on the cessor and accelerating its application. And, what U.S. military’s culture.8 The concept must force us to I found was an incredible foundation. Gen. Dave reconsider fundamental tenets, like our industrial-age Perkins brought together partners across the joint means of promoting, training, and educating leaders. It force, driving development of the concept to an ar- must also pull us from the comfort of our tactical-level ticulated idea and a vision of how the Army fits into trenches to develop capabilities that inform up to the it. The key players are all here and are committed to strategic level of war.9 Putting “battle” into the name both building and improving the concept and finding real confines the possibilities and limits the result. solutions. The concept is ready to grow. In battles, combatants can win time and space, But for that to happen, we need to confront some and they allow one side to take ground, but they do of the problems others have noted. Over the last not win wars. The world we operate in today is not eighteen months that Multi-Domain Battle has been defined by battles, but by persistent competition that out there for debate, there have been four consistent cycles through varying rates in and out of armed critiques. Some noted that the idea was “old wine in conflict. Winning in competition is not accomplished a new bottle.”4 I think the iPhone analogy articulates by winning battles but through executing integrated why that just is not true.5 What the original iPhone operations and campaigning. Operations are more en- did was not all that compassing, bringing together varied tactical actions Gen. Stephen J. new, but how the iP- with a common purpose or unifying themes. They are Townsend, U.S. Army, hone did it fundamen- the bridge between the tactical and the strategic. is the commanding general tally changed not just In my first months of command at Training and of U.S. Army Training and a market, but people’s Doctrine Command, it became clear that the use of the Doctrine Command. He behavior. This is exactly word “battle” was stifling conversation and growth of the previously served as com- what we seek to achieve concept. There are three concrete reasons why Multi- mander of 18th Airborne with this new concept. Domain Battle evolved to Multi-Domain Operations. Corps and Combined Though the domains of First, if the concept is to be truly joint and Joint Task Force Operation warfare (air, land, sea, multi-service, we need clarity and alignment in Inherent Resolve. His com- space, and cyberspace) how we talk. The Air Force talks of Multi-Domain bat and operational experi- are not new, how the Operations and Multi-Domain Command and ence includes deployments U.S. Armed Forces will Control, while we talk of Multi-Domain Battle—often in support of Operation rapidly and continu- covering similar, if not the same, ideas and capabilities. Urgent Fury, Operation Just ously integrate them in To this point, none of the many people I have talked Cause, Operation Uphold the future is new. to, including my predecessor, are wedded to the use of Democracy, Operation Another critique is “battle”—it was what fit best in time, place, and cir- Enduring Freedom, and that this is an Army-only cumstances. What they are committed to are the ideas Operation Iraqi Freedom. concept.6 However the of converging capabilities across the joint force with He is a graduate of North Air Force and Marine continuous integration across multiple domains. Georgia College with a Corps have been part of Second, we cannot do this alone. The armed services Bachelor of Science in psy- Multi-Domain Battle can win battles and campaigns, but winning wars takes chology and the U.S. Army from the start, and the whole of government. It helps the entire effort if War College with a master recent reporting from our interagency partners are comfortable with and con- of strategic studies. numerous forums has versant in our warfighting concepts and doctrine. As

6 September-October 2018 MILITARY REVIEW SPECIAL EDITION MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS highlighted to me by a former ambassador at a recent Operations, and the next revision of the concept to be forum, talking in terms of operations instead of battles released this fall will reflect this change. brings together those who want to get things done— Language is important. It conveys meaning. This whether they are civilians or the military. change is not cosmetic—it is about growing an idea And third, it is never just about the fight. When to its greatest potential in order to change the way we it comes to combat, there is no one better than the fight today and ensure overmatch against our adver- combined weight of the U.S. military and our allies saries of tomorrow. To do this we need clarity and and partners. However, the operating environment is alignment across the joint force, whole-of-government evolving and nation-state–level competition has re- inclusion, and perspective that reinforces our need to emerged, as evidenced by recent actions by both Russia compete effectively outside periods of armed conflict. and China. Our National Defense Strategy highlights Changing the name does not do this by itself, but it the importance of winning the “competition” that pre- communicates a clear vision of what we need to accom- cedes and follows conflict. However, our use of Multi- plish and where we are headed. Domain Battle seems to indicate our concept was only for the conflict phase. While there are battles within Non-Department of Defense works and authors cited competition, winning them is pointless if they are in in this article are meant to inform the conversation on isolation to the larger context of deliberate operations the topic. Their appearance in this article does not reflect supporting national strategy. the official policy or position of, or constitute endorse- Multi-Domain Battle served its purpose—it ment of their work by, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine sparked thinking and debate and it created a foun- Command, the Department of the Army, the Department dation. But, what we need now is Multi-Domain of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Notes

1. Stephen Townsend, “Accelerating Multi-Domain Opera- 5. Nathan Finney, “Integration in Warfare,” The Strategist tions: Evolution of an Idea,” Modern War Institute at West Point, (blog), The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 October 23 July 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/ 2017, accessed 8 August 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ accelerating-multi-domain-operations-evolution-idea/. integration-in-warfare/. 2. Kelly McCoy, “The Road to Multi-Domain Battle: An Origin 6. Dan Goure, “Will the U.S. Army Tolerate a U.S. Air Force ‘Bait Story,” Modern War Institute at West Point, 27 October 2018, and Switch’ on J-Stars Replacement?,” The National Interest (website), accessed 8 August 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/road-multi-do- 10 October 2017, accessed 8 August 2018, https://nationalinterest. main-battle-origin-story/. org/blog/the-buzz/will-the-us-army-tolerate-us-air-force-bait-switch- 3. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 j-stars-22662. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America” (Wash- 7. Mark Pomerleau, “In the Move to Multi-Domain Operations, ington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), accessed 8 August 2018, What Gets Lost?,” C4ISRNET (website), 11 April 2018, accessed https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-Nation- 8 August 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2018/04/11/ al-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. in-the-move-to-multi-domain-operations-what-gets-lost/. 4. Bob Scales, “Battle For Army’s Soul Resumes: Lessons From 8. Albert Palazzo, “Multi-Domain Battle: Meeting the Cultural Army After Next,” Breaking Defense, 28 March 2017, accessed 8 Challenge,” The Strategy Bridge, 14 November 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/battle-for-ar- August 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/11/14/ mys-soul-resumes-lessons-from-army-after-next/; Shmuel Shmuel, multi-domain-battle-meeting-the-cultural-challenge. “Multi-Domain Battle: Airland Battle, Once More, With Feeling,” War 9. Albert Palazzo, “Multi-Domain Battle: Getting the Name Right,” on the Rocks, 20 June 2017, accessed 8 August 2018, https://waron- Small Wars Journal, 2018, accessed 8 August 2018, http://smallwars- therocks.com/2017/06/multi-domain-battle-airland-battle-once- journal.com/jrnl/art/multi-domain-battle-getting-name-right. more-with-feeling/.

MILITARY REVIEW SPECIAL EDITION September-October 2018 7 On 19 February 2019, the Army University Press will release paigns in a wide variety of scenarios to include support to the eighth book in its Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) the European and Pacific theaters in World War II, the Span- series, titled The Quiet Professionals: Historical Case Studies in ish Civil War, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, British and Arab Special Operations in Large-Scale Combat Operations, edited operations in the Levant, Israeli responses at the outbreak by Dr. Robert Toguchi. of the Yom Kippur War, and support to the Coalition 2003 This collection features twelve articles detailing special invasion of Iraq. operations support to diverse LSCO operations and cam- BOOK RELEASE COMING SOON!

Group of soldiers from Army of the Republic of Vietnam in September 1968 with Sfc. Norman A. Doney, 5th Special Forces Group Airborne, 1st Special Forces in Vietnam. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center) A  U  P  ARMY UNIVERSITY PRESS

he Army is shifting its focus and updating its doctrine to prevail in large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer threats. To support the new doctrine codified in Field TManual 3-0, Operations, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center commander, Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, directed the Army University Press to publish the seven-volume Large-Scale Combat Operations Historical Case Study book set. As he explains in this issue’s “Foreword,” his intent is “to expand the knowledge and understanding of the contemporary issues the U.S. Army faces by tapping our organizational memory to illuminate the future.” To introduce readers to this set, the following special section of Military Review provides an overview of each volume by its author. The downloadable version of the book set will be available online at https:// www.armyupress.army.mil beginning in October 2018. A dummy tank being erected in 1942 at the Middle East School of Camouflage in Cairo. (Photo by Capt. Gerald Leet, British Army, via Imperial War Museum, HU 59574)

Weaving the Tangled Web Military Deception in Large- Scale Combat Operations

Christopher M. Rein, PhD

10 September-October 2018 MILITARY REVIEW SPECIAL EDITION MILITARY DECEPTION

hroughout the recorded history of warfare, If principles of war can be sifted out of military military planners and commanders have sought history, as the master, Carl von Clausewitz, attempted to deceive their adversary as to the size, tim- to do with Napoleon’s campaigns, then these twelve Ting, or location of an attack in order to gain a decisive case studies also ought to provide us with some advantage. From the famous Trojan Horse to modern “universal truths” regarding deception operations.3 efforts to use the electromagnetic spectrum to “spoof” or Admittedly, considering successful deception op- jam sensors, deception in some form remains an essential erations primarily involving the U.S. Army and its component of military operations. Whether attack- principal allies and antagonists may omit a number ing an unsuspecting enemy on Christmas morning, as of relevant examples. But, these cases are sufficient Washington did at Trenton, or emplacing “Quaker guns” to provide several enduring threads of continuity in (logs painted black to resemble cannons) to provide the successful operations that, most importantly, remain impression of strength, U.S. forces have successfully built relevant for current and future practitioners. on a long legacy of military deception (MILDEC) in One of the first is the importance of coordination order to prevail in the Nation’s wars. While technology in deception campaigns, especially since the addition of continues to advance at a dizzying pace, threatening to warfare in the third dimension (air warfare), which co- render previous lessons obsolete, MILDEC operations incides with the beginning of this book. Many thought have successfully withstood previous developments and that the airplane, and later radar and satellite imagery, even incorporated new technologies to continue to form marked the end of successful deception by pulling back an important part of combat operations. While in some the veil that had shielded terrestrial armies for millen- cases MILDEC is potentially capable of enabling mili- nia. Instead, deception remained a key, if significantly tary forces to prevail without a fight, as the theorist Sun more complicated aspect of many campaigns. While Tzu postulated, more often it confers an advantage that previously deception had to be coordinated between the helps the side that successfully harnesses it prevail, often military and political instruments of national power, at a much lower cost than it would have otherwise.1 now it also had to be practiced in multiple domains Thus, MILDEC, and its long and successful history, re- simultaneously. In what could be labeled multi-domain main an important, even vital, tool for any future leader. deception, these plans Given the voluminous and excellent body of liter- required close and careful Christopher M. Rein, ature currently available on military deception, it is coordination across the PhD, is a historian with the certainly worth asking why we need another volume on warfighting domains to Combat Studies Institute, 2 the topic. Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception ensure that lapses in one Army University Press, in Large-Scale Combat Operations is not intended to area did not undo efforts Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. displace, even if it could, the deeply-researched and in other areas. A heavy He earned his doctorate lengthy treatises on the long history of military decep- bombing campaign focused in history in 2011 from tion operations. Rather, it is intended as a primer and a exclusively on Normandy the University of Kansas thought piece for how strategists, operational planners, would have undone the and is the author of one staff officers and, ultimately, commanders have histori- ruse of an Allied landing book, The North African cally integrated military deception into large-scale com- at Pas-de-Calais, just as Air Campaign, published bat operations, focusing on the last one hundred years belligerent rhetoric from by the University Press of conflict. The individual chapters, while certainly -ex Egyptian political leaders of Kansas in 2012, as well cellent stand-alone treatments of the deception aspects would have undermined as several articles. He is a of the operations and campaigns considered, likewise efforts to “lull” the Israelis retired Air Force lieutenant are of insufficient length to become the definitive works to sleep prior to the 1973 colonel and served as on their individual topics. Instead, they build upon the Yom Kippur/6 October a navigator aboard the extensive secondary literature and, in several cases, pri- War. With the prolif- E-8C Joint STARS during mary sources in order to provide a comprehensive but eration of warfare into Operations Enduring accessible understanding of how military deception has space and cyberspace, the Freedom and Iraqi successfully enabled victory on the battlefield. difficulty of coordinating a Freedom.

MILITARY REVIEW SPECIAL EDITION September-October 2018 11

MILITARY DECEPTION successful deception campaign has expanded exponen- to “mirror image” themselves and ask what precon- tially and greatly complicated the efforts of its archi- ceived notions they have that an adversary might turn tects, but it has not made their task impossible. against them. One of