Tactics – Analysed and Described

Tactics – analysed and described

by Warren Edgar FARMER Graduate Certificate of Management Batchelor of Professional Studies

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Masters of Justice (Research)

School of Justice Faculty of Law

Queensland University of Technology

2019

Keywords: tactics, strategy, techniques, decision, decision making, conflict, delineation between tactics and strategy, relationship of tactics to techniques, tactics as an art and science

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Abstract

This thesis analyses and describes tactics in resolution of conflict. The relationship and delineation between strategy and tactics, both being inherent to conflict, is poorly articulated. Consequently, tactics are inadequately defined, understood and applied. They are frequently confused with physical application of a technique rather than addressing the psychology and science inherent in decision attainment. This definitional inadequacy results in actions that are neither efficient, effective or ethical. Tactics are determined to be not only decision making but the attainment and sustaining of the decision sought in keeping with higher order intentions and constraints in conflict situations.

Contents Page

Chapter 1 – Introduction The gap 2 The dilemma and importance of definition 2 Why the gap must be filled – the provision of a definition 3 How the gap will be filled by this thesis 4 Research Aim 4 Research Objective 4 Research Outcome 5 Research Questions 5 Methodology 5

Chapter 2 – Literature Review - definitions Definitions 8 Etymological roots 10 General English Usage of the term tactics 12 Military usage 13 Conclusion 17

Chapter 3 – Literature Review - relationships

Relationships 18 Relationship to strategy 18 Relationship to understanding, problem solving and decision making 21 Relationship to advantage 23 Relationship to science 25 Conclusion 30

Chapter 4 – The science of decision making Overview 33 The physical component 34 The mental component 35 Inhibitions 37 Motivation 37 Ethics 38 Perception and dominance 40 Conclusion 42

Chapter 5 – Analysis of a decision

Analysis of a decision 44 The relationship of actions to advantage 48 Adaptation 50 Advantage 51 The conditions necessary for attainment of a decision 54 Security 54 Audacity 60 Shock 61

Deception 62 Initiative 63 Decisive ratio 63 Simplicity 64 Command 68 Control 69 Tempo 69 Reaction 70 Sustainment 70 Support 71 Pressure 72 Cost 73

Chapter 6 – Theory proposal Theory proposal 78 Case studies – Decision Model 80 The relationship of actions, effects, conditions, their attainment and success 81

Chapter 7 – Theory Test Case Study – The Battle for Gona Introduction 82 Application of the decision model and relationship matrix to the Case Study 82 Environment 83 The battle – an overview 85 The strategic situation 85 The strategic aim 88 Operational situation 89 Operational objectives 95

The Battle 95 The battle for Gona – operational objectives 105 Underpinning military science 108

Conditions for decision attainment 111 Security 111 Audacity 112 Shock 112 Deception 113 Initiative 114 Decisive Ratio 115 Simplicity 117 Command and Control 117 Tempo 118 Reaction 119 Sustainment 120 Support 120 Pressure 121 Cost 122

Judgement of effectiveness 124 Case study – findings 129 Assessment of decision model, the relationship matrix and tactics definition 130

Chapter 8 - Conclusion Tactics – its relationship to strategy 134 Tactics – its factors and elements 134 Tactics defined 135

Bibliography 138

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List of Diagrams and Figures

Chapter 5 Figure 5-1: Effects required to generate the condition of Security 59 Figure 5-2: Effects required to generate the condition of Simplicity 68 Figure 5-3: Effects required to generate the condition of Sustainment 77

Chapter 6 Figure 6-1: Decision Model 79

Chapter 7 Figure 7-1: Relationship of strategic aim to operational objectives and consequent decisions to the capture of Gona 106 Table 7-1: Attainment of Operational Objectives - battle of Gona 107 Figure 7-2: Relationship of action to effects and attainment of security 116 Figure 7-3: Relationship of action to effects and attainment of simplicity 120 Figure 7-4: Relationship of action of effects and attainment of sustainment 124 Figure 7-5: Relationships inherent in tactics applicable to the battle for Gona 132 Chapter 8 Figure 8-1: Relationships and requirements inherent in tactics 136

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Abbreviations and acronyms

This thesis contains no abbreviations or acronyms requiring further explanation.

Statement of Original Authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

QUT Verified Signature

Warren FARMER

30 December 2019

Statement of Acknowledgement

The work in any thesis is never completed in total isolation; it always has several significant influences. I therefore wish to acknowledge the influence of my mother who initially encouraged my curiosity and established the desire to learn in me. Her efforts have been perpetuated after her passing by the encouragement of my brothers Roland and Shuan. I also wish to acknowledge the many of my colleagues in the Australian Army that entertained discussions on much of what is contained within this endeavour. This includes the naysayers who variously told me to not think that I knew tactics or that it was something innate rather than something that could be acquired through study and learning. Due recognition must also be given to the guidance of the famous military theorist Carl von Clausewitz whose goal for any theory was:

Theory will have fulfilled its main task if used to analyse the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical enquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgement, and help him to avoid pitfalls.1

The efforts and patience of my supervisory team of Doctor Carmel O’Sullivan and Professor Mark Lauch cannot be praised or appreciated too much. Finally, the perseverance, support and consideration given by my wife while I have disappeared into another world, yet again, must be lauded.

As always, any and all errors or omissions are mine alone.

1 Clausewitz C von, 1982, On War, ed. A Rapoport, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p 141.

Tactics – analysed and described

Chapter One – Introduction

As will be demonstrated in the literature review neither the component elements of tactics nor the concept of tactics as a whole is articulated with any great degree of fidelity or clarity in either general or professional arenas.

A simple internet search using the parameters ‘tactics’, ‘tactics definition’ or ‘strategy tactics difference’ rapidly results in counts exceeding half a million hits.2 Those results generate four observations. The first observation is that the terms tactics and strategy, and their definitions, often overlap and are confused. The second is a subservient placement of tactics to strategy. The third observation is that tactics are limited to discrete physical actions. Tactics are not described as something conceptual, abstract or anchored in science. The fourth observation is that tactics is mentioned in terms of a conflict or contention. These four observations appear to be based on two assumptions.

The first assumption is that tactics are apparent and known, that is well defined, adequately described and known. The second underpinning assumption appears to be that there is vacillation between the ideas that tactics are either imposed, almost without consideration of opposition, or that as any issue is decided on chance due to the presence and interaction of an enemy or opponent. Both views then seem to generate a stance that therefore the subject defies description or understanding.

If the currently available definitions lack adequate description and are confusing the question must then be posed as to why this situation exists. Put differently, what is it that is missing or understood? Could it be that tactics, given the emphasis on discrete physical actions, are less confused with strategy but more so with techniques?

This academic effort is derived from the above observations and deductions.

2 An example is: Minuteshttps://dougseven.com/2013/02/12/strategy-the-art-of-the-product-manager/

The gap

This thesis will demonstrate that when placed under scrutiny, tactics are revealed to be profoundly ambiguous and full of latent meaning and contradiction – they are inadequately described – their theory is “formless, chaotic, and inconsistent”.3 This thesis seeks to address the identified gap by providing a more complete description of tactics which may assist where competition and contention apply.

The dilemma and importance of definition

A definition is a description or explanation of a word or thing, by its attributes, properties, or relations, that distinguishes it from all other things.4 Based on a view that how we conceptualise and understand something has a direct correlation to how we then employ that concept the relevance of a comprehensive definition is important.5

A complete description (definition) of tactics is important because it provides clarity of thought, communication and execution of concepts. The lack of a clear description of tactics raises the likelihood of confusion and misunderstanding which then hinders one’s ability to articulate and apply them as well as limiting one’s ability to train others, notably subordinates, in the concept. The effect of limited training is very likely to impact on the subordinate’s ability to implement and apply tactics, especially in a conflict situation which can be uncertain, dynamic and dangerous.

Why the gap in the literature must be filled - the provision of a description

Before launching into the considerable effort of researching a topic such as tactics it is pertinent to consider whether it is a necessary or nugatory endeavour. In short, why is this subject of importance or relevance?

Put bluntly, it is of relevance to anyone involved in the resolution of conflict, especially when it is to be done by the application of force.

3 Friedman, B.A., 2017, On Tactics A Theory of Victory in Battle, Naval Institute Press, p 3. 4 Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedic Edition Volume One, 1982, J.G. Ferguson Publishing Company, p 336 entry definition. 5 Strauss A. & Corbin J., 1994, Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, p 275.

The impact on the collective and the individual decision maker is significant. In particular one is struck by the sense of ownership and responsibility, together with their consequences across time. Writing in 1902 of the U.S. Civil and Franco- Prussian Wars of the mid 1800’s Colonel Henderson stated ‘[i]t is possible that the same faults and deficiencies will be conspicuous in the twentieth century, unless a knowledge of the real nature of war is far more widely diffused than it is at present.’6 Then, within 30 years, as stated by Liddell Hart after WW1: [t]o throw away men’s lives where there is no reasonable chance of advantage is criminal. In the heat of battle mistakes in command are inevitable and amply excusable. But the real indictment of leadership arises when attacks that are inherently vain are ordered merely because if they could succeed they would be useful.7

John White, the commander of an outpost located at Ngok Tavak in Vietnam during 1968 provides further clarity at the personal level. He admitted to being seduced by ‘superior’ experience and knowledge of the officers in his headquarters stating ‘I shudder now to think how ill-prepared we were but I naively thought that these people knew what they were doing, that my activities were part of a big plan. The whole concept was a disaster in the making from the beginning. If I had been older than my 25 and had some experience, I may have had the nerve to refuse to do the operation; or, at least, withdrawn before we got clobbered. In my naivety, I really believed that there was a grand plan by more competent people than myself.’8

These observations spanning in excess of 100 years experience support statements that “[s]uccess will be unlikely for commanders who do not possess both a thorough understanding of tactics and the ability to apply it to each battlefield situation.”9 (emphasis supplied) and “I rate the skilful tactician above the skilful strategist, especially him who plays the bad cards well.”10

6 Henderson Col. G.F.R., 1910, The Science of War, Longmans, Green and Co., p 9. 7 Hart, Basil Liddell, 1970, A History of the First World War, (originally published as The Real War (1914–1918) in 1930), Cassell, p 192. 8 Davies Bruce, 2008, The Battle at Ngok Tavak A bloody defeat in South Vietnam, 1968, Allen & Unwin, p 92. 9 Australian Army publication Manual of Land Warfare 1.1.4 Formation Tactics, 1991, p 1-5 para 1.10. 10 Quote attributed to Filed Marshall Earl Wavell in Australian Army publication Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3-0-1 Formation Tactics 2003, p 1-1.

This leads one to a point that, philosophically speaking, a complete description of tactics is important because it provides clarity of thought, communication and execution of concepts. The immediate consequence of definitional confusion is a danger that actions undertaken will be inappropriate, ineffectual and costlier than is necessary or sustainable. Put differently, anyone engaging in conflict needs a sound understanding of what tactics is in order to apply them proficiently and gain the desired advantage and outcome in both the short and longer terms. It is the intention of this thesis to provide a more complete understanding of tactics via the provision of a comprehensive description within a theoretical or conceptual framework.

How the gap will be filled by this thesis

Providing a complete definition of tactics is challenging in both scope and magnitude. Given the plethora of linkages involved, tactics cannot be a simple lineal process or dependent on a single act or action. Rather, tactics must be the result of relationships that are best understood within a framework involving reaction to a range of inputs. Given the complexity and number of the potential relationships a point of delineation or demarcation between those that are imposed from a higher order and those that arise from a lower order needs to be identified. Once that delineation is determined the conditions for success at the point of delineation can be identified. Thereafter the importance or relevance of specific acts or actions can be assessed. Throughout the following chapters I will argue that tactics are the sum of thought and action within a conceptual framework using the following research aim, objective and methodology.

Research Aim

The aim of this research is to provide a complete description of tactics within a conceptual framework.

Research Objective

The objective of this research effort is to identify discrete characteristics and relationships which support a definition of tactics in order to generate consistency of thought and expression which would allow an increase in the effectiveness of military philosophy, education, training and operations.

Research Outcome

The intended outcome of this research is a complete description of tactics based on consistently discernible characteristics and relationships which provide a framework to understand and better react to a conflict situation.

Research Questions

The research aim and objective generates four questions which inform the research. The questions are:

What is the relationship between strategy and tactics?

What is tactical success?

What conditions are required for tactical success?

What factors and elements support the conditions for tactical success?

Methodology

The research undertaken is of two parts. The first part is an etymological examination to identify any conceptual basis for an understanding of tactics. The second part is to then examine several military history case studies in order to address the research questions.

The various military history case studies employed are undertaken using grounded theory and associated case study methodology. Grounded theory, first articulated by Glaser and Strauss in 1967, is an approach for theory development ‘grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed.’11 Thomas defines a case study, its methodology and typology as: analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of

11 Strauss A. and Corbin J., 1994, Grounded Theory Methodology, in NK Denzin and YS Lincoln (Ed) Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, pp 217-285.

phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object – within which the study is conducted and which case illuminates and explicates. 12

The overall object of this research effort is tactics. The subject is composed of the varied historical military case studies considered. These are analysed to identify their components and their relationships determinant to success or failure throughout history. In this way the object is framed by the pertinent research question throughout the research to build or demonstrate the basis of a theory.

The case studies are drawn from across the three levels of war covering a range of geography, conflict types and political situations across time. The common elements identified will then be coalesced to identify what is critical to attain decisions contextual to higher objectives and goals. This will determine whether there is a basis for the prediction of tactical success. The outcome will determine whether tactics are a process, concept, relationship, science or art and thereby support proposal of a complete definition of tactics. This approach aligns with de Vaus to combine theory building and testing through consideration of case studies.13

Consideration of a broad range of case studies allows distillation of the essence of tactics, their relationships and bounds in keeping with the utility of case study methodology as argued by Eisenhardt and Graebner that research is done through theory building from cases, particularly multiple cases.14 Their model involves using one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions, and/or midrange theory from case-based, empirical evidence. Replication logic means that each case serves as a distinct experiment that stands on its own merits as an analytic unit.15

The use of multiple case studies complies with Field Marshal Sir William Slim’s injunction that militarily, tactical success is directly linked to a willingness to learn, anticipate and adapt based on keen study of a range of [potential] enemies and how

12 Thomas Gary, 2011, A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and Structure as downloaded from Qualitative Inquiry 17(6) at http://qix sagepub.com at Victoria University of Technology on 28 June 2011, p 513. 13 de Vaus DA, 2001, Research Design in Social Research, SAGE. 14 Eisenhardt K.E. and Graebner M.E., Theory Building From Cases: Opportunities And Challenges, ACAD MANAGE J February 1, 2007 50:1, pp 25-32. 15 ibid, p 30.

7 they operate. (emphasis supplied)16 Employment of multiple case studies also redresses B.H. Liddell-Hart’s argument against narrowly selective, exhaustive study of one or two examples leading to an outlook that is narrow, composed of fallacious lessons and dangerous military theory.17

16 Slim W. Field Marshal Sir,1961, Defeat Into Victory, pp 98-99. 17 B.H. Liddell Hart, 1991, Strategy, 2nd Ed, Penguin, p 4.

Chapter Two – Literature Review - definitions

The objective of this chapter is to review general and technical definitions pertinent to tactics in order to identify any conceptual basis for an understanding of tactics.

A literature review regarding tactics is difficult as military theorists usually take war and strategy as their starting point: tactics is subsumed or disregarded in an effort to clarify the higher order subject. This is then compounded by a range of complicating factors such as the untimely death of the theorist, changes in their approach/thinking or refutation of their ideas by the nature of subsequent events. Consequently, no military theorist has produced what would be called a complete product regarding tactics.18 Friedman asserts that tactics theory is ‘formless, chaotic and inconsistent’ and that there has never been a ‘true tactical theorist’.19 Sloan argues that the basis of an incomplete product lies in a lack of agreement among military writers on definitions of the terms strategy, military doctrine and tactics.20

Definitions

General definitions drawn from the Oxford Dictionary and technical definitions drawn from the Australian Defence Force considered pertinent to subsequent discussion are rendered below.

a. Procedures: Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. The term is considered synonymous with that of a drill.21

18 Edited and Translated by Jay Luvaas, 1989, Frederick the Great on The Art of War, Da Capo Press and Baron Antoine de Jomini, 2006, The Art of War, Greenhill Books as well as Clausewitz essentially developed theory on the conduct of war rather than on the phenomena of war or on tactics. Henderson Col G.F.R, 1912, The Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures 1891-1903, facsimile copy – no publisher details, pp v, vi, indicate that it was compiled after his death. Clausewitz’s work (Clausewitz C von, 1982, On War, ed. A Rapoport, Penguin, Harmondsworth, pp xi, xii) was compiled after his death by his wife. Other authors such as Foch (Foch Marshal, 1918, The Principles of War, Chapman & Hall) had cause to later change their views due to subsequent military operations refuted them. Fuller, Colonel J.F.C., DSO, The Foundations of the Science of War, 1925, reprinted by the U.S. Army Command and Staff Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993. Fuller continually refined and developed his ideas over time without ever coming to a definitive conclusion although aspects of his work was eventually adopted by many militaries across the world. 19 Friedman B.A., 2017, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle, Naval Institute Press, pp 1, 3. 20 Sloan, Geoffrey, 2012, Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory, International Affairs Vol. 88 No. 2, p 244. 21 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 2355 and ADF Glossary located at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/home.asp

9 b. Techniques: Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions or tasks.22

c. Mission: A clear, concise statement of the task of a commander and its purpose.23 d. Task: No ADF definition is provided for a task (anything from work to be done, job, chore, duty to assignment or mission in general English usage). For the purpose of this thesis a task is defined as an assigned duty with the implication that little, if any, latitude is allowed in its execution.24 e. Method: In general English usage, a method is a procedure for attaining an object whereas to the ADF it is a description of the means by which a commander achieves their purpose explained in terms of effects created on the enemy. Note that the ADF Glossary definition gives no recognition to a blue (friendly force) or terrain focussed effect being generated.25 f. Objective: A clearly attainable goal for a military operation or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander’s plan and towards which the operation is directed.26 g. Tactics: The ordered arrangement and manoeuvre of units in relation to each other and the enemy in order to utilise their full potentialities.27 h. Strategy: The art and science of developing and employing the instruments of national power in a synchronised and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national and/or multinational objectives.28

22 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 3194 and ADF Glossary, op cit. 23 ADF Glossary, op cit. 24 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 3185 and ADF Glossary, op cit. 25 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 1767 and ADF Glossary, op cit. 26 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 1969 and ADF Glossary, op cit. 27 ADF Glossary, op cit. General English usage and other military definitions will be expanded on later. 28 ADF Glossary, op cit. General English usage and other military definitions will be expanded on later.

10 i. Art: In general English usage, a skill, acquired as a result of knowledge and practice, a practical application of any science.29 j. Science: In general English usage, an activity or discipline concerned with theory rather than method, or requiring the systematic application of principles rather than relying on traditional rules, intuition and acquired skill.30 It must be noted that this definition emphasises a reliance on theory rather than what is enacted, however well it is done.

Underpinning most of the above definitions is physical application of an essentially mechanical or structured task. There is no linkage to any specific science or suggestion of application to situations involving chance, variables or opposition. This then aligns the definitions with the application of an art based on chance and feel rather than on science. The overall deficit of imprecise language and a lack of clarity dictate a need for greater precision. This is not to say that what is written regarding tactics is wrong: rather; it is to state that it is incomplete. The base problem is that tactics has no theory as it lacks a solid definitional basis.31

Etymological roots

Miall wrote ‘[w]e have seen principle strangled by tactics so often.’32 This suggests a tension between alternates. The first is that of principle, a general truth or law, something contextual allowing latitude, while the alternate suggests detail, rigidity and constraint.33 The tension is based in the etymological roots of the word tactics.

The current root word in English dictionaries is the Greek taktika meaning to organise or arrange, that is, something mechanistic or methodical.34 Older English literature, such as that from the 1800s, uses the term tact where today we would use

29 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 124. 30 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 2697. 31 Wylie J.C., 2014, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, Naval Institute Press, p 31. 32 Miall E., 1842, Nonconformist, p 305 sourced via www. Oxfordreference.com.ezp01.library.qut.au/search?q=tactics&searchBtn=Search&isQuickSearch=true 33 Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, p 1003 entry principle. 34 The Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Fifth Edition 2009), Macquarie Dictionary Publishers Pty Ltd, p 1284.

11 tactics.35 Odhams Dictionary of 1936 provides further insight in that it has no entry for tactic: rather, tactic is a sub-heading under the entry Tact – the skill to adapt one’s speech and behaviour to circumstances – a word derived from the Latin tactus and French tangere meaning to touch, a peculiar skill or faculty; a ready power of doing what is required.36 The transition in meaning is illustrated by the translations of Aelian’s work Techne Tactica (circa AD 136) to On the Military Arrangements of the Greeks being later changed to The Tactics of Aelian.37 The Greek techne in the original title is suggestive of techniques, but even more so of procedures, as is the initial translation of ‘military arrangements’. The book itself deals solely with the organisation, frontages, configuration and signals of the phalanx. The problem is not just one of evolution of technology as the phalanx was employed to both defend and attack just as modern military forces defend and attack while using rifles, etc rather than swords, spears and shields. This means that while procedures have application to particular technologies and organisations in time, techniques such as attack, defence and ambush have application over time, and therefore can be seen as universal or enduring. However, it is important to note that the Greek derivation is inadequate as it illuminates procedures and techniques or what and how things are done rather than why they are done. Conversely, the French derivation illuminates context and, by extrapolation, why something is done. Accordingly, there are two main and competing interpretations in the etymological roots of tactics. One interpretation relates to techniques and how something is done and the other relates to context and why something is done.

Therefore, it can be concluded on an etymological basis that two broad definitional models apply: one based on imposed mechanistic order; the other, on context that incorporates variables and principles. The existence of two models is also suggestive of ambiguity and change in understanding of what tactics are over time.

35 An illustration of this usage is shown in a variety of primary source documents dating from the 1820s – 1830s quoted by Henry Reynolds, 1982, The Other Side of the Frontier Aboriginal resistance to the European invasion of Australia, Penguin, pp 104 & 111. 36 Odhams Modern Standard English Dictionary, 1936, Odhams Press Limited, London, p 607, entry tact. 37 Matthew Christopher, 2012, The Tactics of Aelian A New Translation, Pen & Sword, pp xiii–xx.

General English usage of the term tactics

The Strategy & Tactics magazine title illustrates common usage of the term tactics.38 Here, tactics are separate and distinguishable from strategy while inferring a subordinate relationship to strategy. Conversely, a statement such as by Silva that ‘to understand Lusitanian military tactics we must look at the lives of Lusitanian warriors, their ideals and combat techniques, character, armament, influences and contacts’ suggests a differentiation between tactics and techniques as well as hinting that tactics is based on the science of psychology, geography and sociology.39 However, to understand what is implied or specified one must return to definitions of the terms used.

The Macquarie Concise Dictionary defines a tactic as: ‘1. the art or science of disposing military or naval forces for battle and manoeuvring them in battle. 2. the manoeuvres themselves. 3. mode of procedure for gaining advantage or success.’40 The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines tactics as the means or procedure for doing something: ‘in warfare; the art and science of fighting battles on land, on sea, and in the air. It is concerned with the approach to combat; the disposition of troops and other personalities; the use made of various arms, ships or aircraft; and the execution of movements for attack and defense.’41 Webster expands slightly to include ‘[a]ny manoeuvring or adroit management to effect an object as opposed to strategy.”42 These definitions variously state that tactics are a combination of art and science or apply the art as in ‘the manoeuvres themselves’. They all suggest application of method (technique) and detail (procedure).

38 Strategy & Tactics Press (Bakersfield, California) produces a range of magazines (Strategy & Tactics, World at War and Modern War) and war games. (https://www.strategyandtacticspress.com ) 39 Silva Luis, 2013, Viriathus and the Lusitanian Resistance to Rome 155–139 BC, Pen & Sword, p 69. 40 The Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Fifth Edition 2009), Macquarie Dictionary Publishers Pty Ltd, p 1284. Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, Encyclopaedic Edition, 1982, J.G. Ferguson Publishing Company, Chicago, p 1277 entry tactics. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2014. Web. 12 Mar. 2014. 41Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2014. Web. 12 Mar. 2014. 42 Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, p 1277 entry tactics.

The Macquarie Dictionary defines strategy as being: ‘1. generalship; the science or art of combining and using the means of war in planning and directing large military movements and operations. 2. the use, or a particular use, of this science or art. 3. skilful management in getting the better of an adversary or attaining an end. 4. the method of conducting operations, especially by the aid of manoeuvring or stratagem.’43 Here strategy is defined in the same terms as tactics, a science and/or art, the application of a method thus causing little distinction between the two except perhaps on the basis of scale.

The definitions of tactics and strategy amount to being methods (techniques); the only variation being scale and purpose – tactics in battle; strategy in war. Furthermore, they are a blend or a singular application of the art or science that applies. There is no indication of what the basis or theory of that art or science is.

Therefore, it can be concluded that general English usage views tactics as being imposed mechanistic order to gain advantage with little, if anything, to distinguish them from strategy or techniques.

Military usage

In order to define tactics from a military perspective it is best to first state what they are not. Friedman argues that a poor understanding of tactics within the military is epitomised in the use of the acronym TTP (tactics, techniques, procedures) as a word rather than there being an appreciation of the order of seniority, separation and distinction between tactics and techniques and procedures.44(emphasis supplied) This lack of understanding and distinction is reflected by the fact that all armies invariably concentrate on training in techniques and procedures to the detriment of developing tactical acumen.45 The matter is further clouded by recognition of three levels of conflict or even command and control – strategic, operational and tactical.46 These levels may be loosely described as the war overall i.e. in Vietnam – the

43 Macquarie, ibid, p 1156. 44 Friedman, ibid, p x. 45 Friedman, ibid, pp 138, 139. 46 The Australian Army doctrinal publication Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 3 Operations, published as developing doctrine on 19 September 2008, Section 2-2, para 5-10.

14 strategic level; a particular campaign within the war i.e. the Tet Offensive – the operational level; and, a particular battle in the particular campaign; the battle for Hue or the battle of Khe Sanh – both at the tactical level. Hereafter, tactics must be understood to be an entity other than techniques and procedures and not addressing levels of war.

Military doctrine should be both consistent and provide clarity of thought to associated decision making.47 However, the literature review revealed a persistent tension between conceptual and methodical approaches based on particular understandings of tactics over time. The following three examples (1877, 1942 and 1960s) over a 100-year period attest to the point.

In 1877, Calwell observed that guerrilla warfare was “a fine test of skill and a means of teaching tactics that would help overcome the ‘tactical arthritis’” which was “a consequence of a too-long and too-slavish practice of Continental methods.”48

In 1942 Brigadier Porter complained that ‘[o]f late, every manual, text-book and report reeks of the implied doctrine: “the Jap does it this way, so we must.”’49 Those that adopted this emulation approach to tactical success justified it on the basis that the Japanese had ‘cracked the code’ to a unique situation rather than on the basis of the situation being an iteration of something fundamental and unchanging. Porter continued, ‘[t]here can be NO doubt that every campaign has its own local colour, which is blindingly vivid to the participant who knows NO other campaign; and, even to the seasoned campaigner, tends to unbalance the bases which should exist in every tactician’s mind and which have existed in our FSR (Field Service Regulations) for so long.’50 It should be noted that Porter’s comments raise the issue of education and training via the efficacy of presentation and impartation of the doctrine that was in the FSR.

47 Friedman, ibid, p 191. 48 In an address to the RUSI by the then CAPT Charles Calwell to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in 1877 which not only gave the basis of his later book but highlighted the essence and fundamentals underpinning tactics learnt from a variety of so-called small wars involving British forces since 1865. RUSI Journal 2011 156:4 pp 108-121. 49 Porter BRIG S.H.W.C. 30th Bde, Notes on recently expressed concepts of tactics, 11 Oct 1942, AWM54 923/1/6. 50 op cit.

In the 1960s, after having defeated the French, the North Vietnamese Army General Thanh faced a new challenge when confronted by the Americans. In military meetings commanders requested that the COSVN Military Party Committee provide them “with combat formulas.” General Thanh offered a terse reply. “Your combat formulas are out there on the battlefield, he said. “You have to go out there and find them.”51

The USMC Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1–3 Tactics states that “[w]e study examples of successes and failures not to emulate someone else’s scheme, but to increase our own tactical understanding and competence.”52 (emphasis supplied) MCDP 1–3 also implies that tactics pertain to military operations universally, that is, regardless of environment or nature of conflict.

Conversely, a range of authors are suggestive that tactics change dependent on the environment (sea, air, desert, jungle, urban areas) or nature of conflict (counterinsurgency, partisan or conventional warfare) involved.53 These authors are, in effect, suggesting that tactics, not being universally applicable across all situations, are something less than conceptual. The three examples above (1877, 1942, 1960s) across time, address a range of types of war in diverse circumstances involving different technologies with one constant: exhibition of two contrary understandings of tactics. On one hand there is a view that tactics do not change, that they are conceptually/theory based, universal and enduring. On the other hand there is a

51 General Thanh, in Military History Institute of Vietnam, Dai Tuong Nguyen Chi Thanh as quoted by Warren Wilkins, 2011, Grab Their Belts To Fight Them, Naval Institute Press, pp 124. See also pp 192 where Nguyen The Tryunen, Commander 5th Viet Cong Division, on 10 April 1966, encourages the 274th Viet Cong Regiment to fight well and “learn valuable lessons about fighting against American troops that could then be disseminated to the other units of the division and to the local armed forces units fighting on the Ba Ria-Long Khan battlefield.” 52 Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-3 Tactics, 30 July 1997, PCN 142 000002 00, p 10. 53 A review of a selection of books on the sea (Hughes, Capt. Wayne Jr. USN (ret), 2000, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Naval Institute Press), air (Price, Alfred, 1975, World War II Fighter Conflict, Macdonald Illustrated War Studies) and jungle (Cross J.P., 1989, Jungle Warfare, Arms and Armor Press) environments show that while techniques and equipments vary the approach to and conduct of engagements, that is the tactics involved, are fundamentally the same. Equally, a review of books on types of warfare such as counter-insurgency (Galula, David, 1964, Counter-Insurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, Pall Mall Press) and partisan (Heilbrunn, Otto, 1962, Partisan Warfare, George Allen & Unwin Ltd) warfare with so called conventional warfare drives one to the same conclusion. It is noted that this is but a small selection that must be read in concert with the many publications that pertain to the range of conflicts in each category.

16 belief that tactics are a unique, specific method particular to a given set of circumstances.

In 1830 the German military thinker Clausewitz defined tactics as ‘the theory and use of military forces in combat’ thereby invoking a mixture of science (the theory) and art (the use).54 Sloan contends that military doctrine is the vital linkage between theory (thought) and practice.55 Military doctrine achieves this by provision of ‘a shared understanding through a common language across organisations for theoretical concepts.’56 Militaries attempt to codify what they do into doctrinal manuals that describe the execution of techniques and procedures by application of specific weapons, technology and organisational structures.57 Consequently, doctrine only addresses a particular form or type of war at a particular time. It cannot provide context as every situation that arises is unique.58 What it could provide is the basis of why the techniques applied in particular ways will generate certain outcomes. Invariably, doctrine fails to provide this and consequently is used as a rigid rulebook rather than as a scientifically based guide.59 The likelihood of it being used rigidly as a rulebook has been identified as being dependent on the experience of the person responsible for dealing with the incumbent situation, their awareness of military history (vicarious experience) and their understanding of the underpinning science.60 MCDP 1–3 Tactics supports this by stating that “there are no fixed rules and no precise checklists, but there are bounds” which is why “successful leaders study, train, and exercise their minds to improve tactical proficiency.”61 In other words, tactics should not be thought of as an innate, inherited ability but the result of thought and understanding developed through learning and practice. It would seem logical that the understanding and learning involved would be based on science anchored on theory.

54 Clausewitz C von, 1982, On War, ed. A Rapoport, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p 86. 55 Sloan, ibid, p 244. 56 Robertson MAJ Christopher, 2008, Support of US Army Special Forces in Expeditionary Warfare, School of Advanced Military Studies, Kansas, p 4. 57 Friedman, ibid, p 2. 58 op cit. 59 Friedman, ibid, pp. 191-195. 60 Friedman, ibid, pp. 192, 193. 61 Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1-3 Tactics, 30 July 1997, PCN 142 000002 00, p 10.

The sum of the points raised in this section is that tactics are not so well defined in military doctrine as to definitively determine whether they are scientifically based concepts or the application of a particular method. In other words, ambiguity exists as to whether tactics are universal or specific.

Conclusion

Overall, this short review of etymological, common usage and technical military usage of the term tactics recognises a relationship between strategy, tactics and techniques/procedures, and shows that a universal understanding of and, therefore, application of tactics does not exist. By one etymological source tactics are synonymous with art, a method, act or action, and therefore, are a technique. In the alternate, they are something encapsulated in the attainment of a higher-level decision and align with conceptual thought and science. The existence of these two understandings reinforces the existence of a lack of definitional clarity as well as a need to provide redress. An attempt will now be made to redress this uncertainty through a continuance of the literature review regarding the relationships that apply to tactics.

Chapter Three – Literature Review - relationships

The objective of this chapter is to identify the relationships to tactics in order to identify any conceptual basis for an understanding of tactics.

The absence of any theory of tactics noted by Friedman makes the identification of those factors having a relationship to tactics difficult as there is no framework to guide such consideration.62 However, the definitions identified so far give three areas of potential enquiry namely the relationship of tactics to strategy, decision making and science.

Relationships

Relationship to strategy

Various military forces define strategy as being the art and science of employing a nation’s armed forces to secure national policy objectives by the application or threat of force.63 These definitions are somewhat similar to those proffered for tactics with the separation being that of timeframe, space and the level at which it applies or attainment of an immediate advantage whereas strategy may be seen to be the continuous attainment of advantage. Lykke argued that ‘[t]here needs to be a general agreement on a conceptual approach to military strategy: a definition; a description of the basic elements that make up a military strategy; and an analysis of how they are related’ (emphasis supplied).64 Therefore, it is important to explore the strategy– tactics relationship in order to determine its extent and the dynamics and limitations involved to justify attainment or deny alignment of tactics to strategy.

62 Friedman B.A., 2017, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle, Naval Institute Press, pp 1, 3. 63 This definition, with minimal variation in wording, is used by the US, British, Canadian, Australian and NATO defence forces. It should also be noted that Michael Cox, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economic, Lawrence Freedman (2013, Strategy: A History, Oxford University Press) and Hew Strachan (2014, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press) are all agreed that strategy is also a imprecisely defined and articulated concept. See British Army Review 160 Spring/Summer 2014, p132-3, Book Review by Michael Cox on both Strachan and Freedman’s books. For a more complete review see Freedman pp 72-75 which outlines an evolution of tactics into strategy. 64 Lykke, COL Arthur F. ed, 1986, Military Strategy: Theory and Application, US Army War College, pp 1-2 to 1-6.

Gray argues that ‘tactics serve strategy.’65 Speaking of the strategy-tactics relationship in Iraq in 2006, Ricks reinforced that strategy enables tactics through the provision of an overall approach, resources and boundaries in which to act with authority. [s]trategy has a very different and quite simple meaning that flows from just one short set of questions: Who are we, and what are we ultimately trying to do here? How will we do it, and what resources and means will we employ in doing it? The four answers will give rise to one’s strategy. Ideally, one’s tactics will then follow from them – that is, this is who we are, this is the outcome we wish to achieve, this is how we aim to do it, and this is what we will use to do it.66

Stephens aligned strategy and tactics with desired effects by reference to George C. Marshall’s observation that ‘if the objectives (ends) of any intended activity were correctly defined, then even a lieutenant – in other words practically anyone - could write the strategy needed to pursue those ends.’67 He went on to state that: ‘[t]he essence of any strategy, ranging from one conceived on the spur of the moment during a fire-fight between a few infantrymen to one developed for a theatre-level campaign, is the relationship between Ends, Ways, and Means, in which ends is the objective (total victory, conditional victory, stalemate, not losing, etc); ways is the form through which a strategy is pursued (military power, diplomacy, economic sanctions, a combination of same, etc); and means is the resources available (people, weapons, international influence, money, etc). If the ends-ways-means relationship is not logical, practical and clearly established from the outset then the entire action/campaign is likely to be at risk, or at the least flawed.’68

65 Gray, Colin S., 1998, Explorations in Strategy, Praeger, p xiii. 66 Ricks Thomas E., 2006, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, Allen Lane, London, p. 127. 67 Stephens Alan, 2006, Strategy with Style: Effects-Based Planning, (The original draft of this article was published as The End of Strategy: Effects-Based Operations, Working Paper No. 383, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, 2003.) Special Edition, Security Challenges – Effects Based Strategy, Volume 2 Number 1 (2006), p 91- 111. 68 Stephens, ibid, p 91.

Stephens is accepting that strategy and tactics share common ground in that both involve a planning and decision stage prior to implementation through actions as both must identify the desired effect/outcome of any action, regardless of its scale, together with associated ways and means of attainment before that action is initiated.

Stephens is in agreement with Henderson, Liddell Hart and Earle that the attainment of immediate goals must align to the subsequent situation that then arises.69 This then confirms consequent effects and demarcation of authority as tactical considerations.

One does not have to read far into history to see the significant, persistent pervasiveness of demarcation disputes arising from varying understanding of strategy and its relationship to tactics.70 The issue is often that of authority, usually exhibited as an attitude and interference in what is allowed to be done be that through command, control or provision of resources.71 This suggests that if the point of demarcation could be clearly delineated then much friction could be avoided and effectiveness gained. Significantly, it also raises the issue of responsibility for a decision in question. Henderson argued that tactics only applies when one is in independent command.72 As intimated by Clausewitz this usually occurs when intimately engaged in battle as opposed to those concerned with the overall direction of strategy remote from the immediacy of responsibility of the moment.73 Independent command may be considered as being in a position of sole responsibility for an endeavour or undertaking. Henderson’s viewpoint, with the support of Clausewitz, is substantiated in Majdalany’s account of the attempt by the US 36th Division to cross the Rapido River west of Cassino on the night of 20

69 Henderson, p 164; Hart Captain Basil Liddell, 1929, The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy, London, p 151 and Mead Earle Edward, 1943, Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton University Press, p viii. 70 Using Beevoir Antony, 2012, The Second World War, Wiedenfeld & Nicholson as a case study we see Winston Churchill as but one example of this phenomenon. He persisted in this behaviour throughout his political life across a number of conflicts. Within WW2 using Australian forces, commanders and politicians across a variety of theatres and events we have a range of examples in Greece (p 156), Singapore (p220) and Western Desert/Tobruk (p 225) among others. An in-depth coverage of his interactions in the Far East/Pacific regarding the Middle Strategy are addressed by Bell Christopher M, 2013, Churchill & Sea Power, Oxford University Press p 233, map 7 and pp 289–320. 71 Friedman, ibid, pp 113-114. 72 Henderson, ibid, p 168. 73 Clausewitz C von, 1982, On War, ed. A Rapoport, Penguin, Harmondsworth, p 86.

January 1944.74 The crossing was an abject failure. That failure was in large part due to a rigid system of command and control which deprived subordinate commanders of latitude in deciding how to execute and fulfil tasks. More importantly, the failure of this part of the first battle for Cassino had implications that led to the subsequent three battles for Cassino as well as for the outcome and difficulties experienced by the amphibious landings at Anzio.75 The point is that if responsibility for decision- making is removed, overridden or diminished in any way the one being deprived of that authority is reduced to the application of a technique as directed on behalf of the interfering element or elements. Therefore, it is best to think of tactics being developed and enacted with an end state in mind as an objective; for example, a route cleared for safe transit, as a sub-task of a bigger project rather than a prescriptive attainment of a rigidly articulated task, such as, a particular hill captured by a particular time from a particular direction. Therefore, it is concluded that tactics is in a dynamic relationship between strategy and the actions required to achieve an objective rather than being one step in a rigid, one-way downward path from a strategic aim to an action.

Thus far a relationship has been identified between tactics and strategy where tactics are subordinate, but aligned, to strategy where strategy gives context. The key determinant and delineation of that dynamic relationship appears to be the responsibility for attainment of a decision: in the case of tactics, the decision links actions to the attainment of a higher objective, in whole or part. This shared contextual, reactive relationship applies at all levels of conflict.

Relationship to understanding, problem solving and decision making

All references to tactics imply or state the existence of a problem requiring decisions and actions for the attainment of its resolution. The U.S. Army’s Infantry in Battle (1939) couched the concept thus: ‘[i]t is more valuable to be able to analyse one battle situation correctly, recognise its decisive elements and devise a simple, workable solution for it, than to memorise all the erudition ever written of war’.76 This implies that not everyone does as they should by default to application of a drill

74 Madjdalany Fred, 1975, The Battle of Cassino, Mayflower Books, pp 78, 79 75 Ibid, pp 78-83 76 U.S. Army publication Infantry in Battle, 1939, p 137.

22 be it in the form of a procedure, technique or method. Conversely, analysis would be enabled by awareness and familiarity with underpinning science and a theoretical framework by which to interpret and understand the situation and its decisive elements. According to Beck, ‘[n]othing could be more dangerous than to follow sudden inspirations, however intelligent or brilliant they may appear, without pursuing them to the logical conclusions, or to indulge in wishful thinking, however sincere our purposes. We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong enough in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates.’77 Thus, a key attribute of decision makers is an ability to justify their decisions with clear reasoning.78 Beck’s statement, supported by German doctrine that ‘the conduct of war is an art dependent on free, creative activity, scientifically grounded’ is a linkage of logic and reason to science as well as acceptance of individual responsibility for the decision being made.79 Therefore, if tactics is approached according to a particular situation (war – precedent) rather than from war generally (concept – framework – principles) the default will be the application of a method in a very particular, if not rigid, way akin to a drill. This has been both recognized and warned against via the adage to not fight too much with the one enemy lest you teach him all your art of war.80

In order to analyse battle situations correctly, recognise their decisive elements and devise a simple, workable solution the decision maker must be contextually aware. One example of this is Major General Daniel E. Sickles’ actions during the battle for Gettysburg on 2 July 1863. Sickles was a political appointee who had little experience of war or insight and knowledge of military science. Deciding that his appointed position on Cemetery Ridge was unfavourable he moved his Corps forward such that the whole Union line had an insecure right flank. This deficiency was negated given the insight and remedial actions of his commander, General

77 General Ludwig Beck in a speech delivered at the 125th anniversary of the German Kriegsakademie on 10 Oct 1935. 78 Hayden LTCOL H.T. (ed), 1995, Warfighting Maneuver Warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps, Greenhill Books, p 183. 79 Condell Bruce and Zabecki David T. (ed), 2009, On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung German Army Manual for Unit Command in World War II, Stackpole Books, p 17. 80 This is usually attributed to Napoleon however; it will not be found in his Military Maxims or other writings of his on war. The adage has history as it has also been attributed to Plutarch, the ancient Greek however, again, no definite reference can be made. Despite this attribution difficulty the point remains that advantage is linked to variation of method.

Meade.81 The point of this dalliance with Sickles and Meade’s experience is to demonstrate that while Sickles was quite able to deploy a force (an act, the art) he could not do so based on justifiable science or an understanding of context as could Meade. Contextual awareness involves immediate physical factors as well as external sentient and psychological forces. It is the sum of situational awareness (an appreciation that something is happening but not necessarily understanding why it is happening), insight (analysis of that situational awareness and therefore comprehension of what it implies) and foresight (the application of pertinent knowledge and consequent judgement of the insight to anticipate consequent actions).82 Understanding derived from contextual awareness does not guarantee success or advantage; that can only be secured through action; however, it does allow appropriately informed decision making regarding what action to apply, when, how and why. Also, contextual awareness and understanding will invariably be incomplete and require constant updating as events unfold. The real art is to have sufficient understanding within the timeframe for each decision that must be made in order to attain an overall objective. The issue of contextual awareness will be explored further in later chapters.

The relationship of understanding, problem solving and decision making to tactics and the attainment of a satisfactory outcome is very strong, if not central. The relationship may be highlighted thus: application of a technique may be undertaken as a result of direction whereas the assignment of a technique as a task requires understanding, problem solving and decision-making abilities as well as an appreciation of what is being sought through that action. The assignment of techniques as tasks falls within the realm of tactics.

Relationship to advantage

Clausewitz defined the destruction of an enemy as ‘they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight’83 (emphasis supplied). He continued ‘[w]hen we speak of destroying the enemy’s forces we must emphasize

81 Smith Carl, 1998, Gettysburg 1863 High Tide of the Confederacy, Osprey, pp 21, 69-71. 82 Joint Doctrine Publication 04, December 2010, Understanding, U.K. Ministry of Defence, pp 2-1, 2. 83 Clausewitz, ibid, p 90.

24 that nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered.”84 Storr posits that defeat is a psychological state.85 Friedman summarises the preceding to a point that breaking the moral cohesion of the opposing force as an effective entity is therefore the true goal.86 However, many definitions of tactics include a codicil of winning based on ideas of physical defeat and destruction.87 This emphasis on physical destruction detracts attention from the moral/psychological component that underpins decision making and attainment. In so doing much is lost.

But one part that is overlooked is the fact that not all military action is undertaken to win but to generate a situation or effect relative to another associated action or decision for example: the securing of Hill X, an act requiring manoeuvre but not fighting, is undertaken not to win but to provide an effective location for firepower to be emplaced to support or secure offensive or defensive action undertaken elsewhere but within range of Hill X. In this case the act of securing Hill X is terrain and friendly force focussed. Of itself, the securing of Hill X does not impact on the enemy. However, it certainly has the potential to affect the enemy but only if consequent and subsequent associated actions are undertaken within an appropriate timeframe. Therefore, at no time can the securing of Hill X be defined or described as a win. However, possession of Hill X is certainly an advantage to whoever possesses it; not just physically but also psychologically due to the potential or threat it represents.88

To advance one’s own interest tactics must be to one’s betterment or advantage. As conflict generally, and war specifically, is a group activity the advantage in question is not for an individual but for the collective. Furthermore, as a single action, engagement or battle does not win a war, the matter of time and sequence must be addressed. This leads to an important realisation that advantage does not equate to a ‘win’ in its simplistic sense of imposing physical defeat or destruction. Most importantly, the manner in which advantage is attained, assessed or quantified is not

84 Clausewitz, ibid, p 97. 85 Storr Jim, 2009, Human Face of War, Continuum Books, p 15. 86 Friedman, ibid, p 89. 87 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-90 Tactics, 2001, p xiii and p 1-1. ‘Tactics is the art and science of employing all available means to win battles and engagements.’ 88 Friedman, ibid, p 17.

25 detailed. Logically, detail is not provided because the circumstances of each problem vary however, the strategy must give the aim and objectives for all actions. Regardless, the need to attain advantage indicates that there must be an ability to generate or impose that advantage. This, in turn, implies that in seeking advantage one must have the ‘security’ or freedom to generate or impose it.

The relationship to science

Definitions such as that by Clausewitz discussed thus far which described tactics as ‘the theory and use of military forces in combat’ invoke a mixture of science (theory) and art (use/application).89 Using current, common use definitions, art is what is done, a skill, acquired as a result of knowledge and practice, a practical application of any science whereas science is conceptually based and teaches us to know what, when, and how to do, an activity or discipline concerned with theory rather than method, or requiring the systematic application of principles rather than relying on traditional rules, intuition and acquired skill.90 Clausewitz and common use therefore emphasise reliance on theory and science rather than just what is enacted, however well it is done.

However, it would seem that the scientific basis of tactical knowledge, acumen and application has been lost. Jans and Schmidtchen assessed the Australian Army as neither ‘stupid nor curious’ while stating that it was ‘efficient and pragmatic’. They did so to highlight an indifference to learning leading to an over-reliance on common sense and mechanical skills and process and procedure rather than seeing problems in their broader context.91 Friedman makes a similar assessment of US military forces.92 As demonstrated by the tardy development of Australian capability in jungle warfare during WW2, this approach limits opportunities for tactical

89 Clausewitz, ibid, p 86. 90 The Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Fifth Edition 2009), art p 59, science p 1126. Oxford Dictionary, ibid, art p 124 and science, p 2697. 91 Nick Jans and David Schmidtchen, The Real C-Cubed: Culture, Careers and Climate and How they Affect Capability, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 143, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2002, pp 74-5. Consider also articles such as that printed in The Australian on 21 Nov 2006 discussing a speech by The Right Honourable Lindsay Tanner asserting that “Australians are typically anti-intellectual, indifferent to learning and steeped in mediocrity and ignorance.” 92 Friedman, ibid, pp 191-195.

26 innovation.93 It therefore follows that the greater the emphasis on the art the greater the likelihood of disappearance into obscurity of the science on which the art was originally based. Thereafter, any initiation into that science is a mystery as no-one knows the language or concept in which it was communicated.94

Contrary to acceptance of science based on theory, it is frequently said that the science of war is limited, to technological facts such as weapon ranges and capabilities.95 As all technology is purpose built it is limited by the design parameters applicable to its development. The technology itself is therefore easily countered if its design parameters and capabilities are identified and deconstructed for exploitation and to thereby generate advantage.96 Furthermore, the generation of a technological antidote is achieved with surprising rapidity.97 However, as argued by Cohen and Gooch, the manner of employment and new forms of organisation – the real secret of technological success – is often overlooked and ignored.98 Therefore the science of technology can, at best, form only part of the scientific basis of tactics.

Biddle attempts to explain, using technically complex, mathematically based methods, how material and non-material factors combine to produce combat outcomes. He argues that ‘force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which forces are actually used in combat’ is central to and shapes the use of material factors and can be used to predetermine outcomes.99 He summarises his findings in a chart that addresses the attacker against the defender in a quadrant of outcomes based on comparison of mobility, firepower and protection by depth and complexity of

93 See Threlfall Adrian, 2014, Jungle Warriors From Tobruk to Kokoda and beyond, how the Australian Army became the world’s most deadly jungle fighting force, Allen & Unwin and Dennis Peter & Grey Jeffrey (ed), 2004, The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943–1944, Army History Unit, pp 76 – 85. 94 Hart B.H. Liddell, 1943, Thoughts on War, Faber and Faber, p 274. 95 Lorber A, 2002, Misguided Weapons: Technological Failure and Surprise on the Battlefield, Brassey’s, p 20. 96 Van Creveld Martin, 1989, Technology and War From 2000 B.C. to the Present, The Free Press, p 320. 97 Simpkin, ibid, pp 3 – 8 outlines a fifty-year life cycle for major technologies. 98 Cohen Eliot A. and Gooch John, 1990, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, Free Press, pp 86 – 88. 99 Biddle Stephen, 2004, Military Power Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Princeton University Press, p ix.

27 defence.100 Mobility and firepower assessments are based on technology capability comparison as well as numerical ratio. Biddle’s work supports a view that prediction can align with, but not necessarily guarantee, outcome such as was achieved by Monash at the Battle of Le Hamel on the Western Front on 4 July 1918. Monash predicted that the battle would last 90 minutes. It lasted 93; the battle unfolding almost exactly as it was planned; the areas of ‘failure’ being overcome by redundancy and effective reactions based on prior contingency planning and effective responsive control.101 McRaven uses examples such as the German capture of Eban-Emal in 1940102 to support a view that tactics, as they apply to special operations, is a science, the principles of which can be distilled, formulated and then applied universally across time and situation to engender success as predicted. While limited to special operations, it is surmised that his theory, with modification, could be effectively applied to other battles or campaigns such as that undertaken by the Japanese in Malay in 1941.103

Other authors concentrate on subjects such as geography, physiology and aspects of the social sciences and elements of the military art as they apply to the conduct of war but fail to address them as they pertain to tactics. For example, Burne explains a range of military terms and concepts, Chandler undertakes a study of the eight classical manoeuvres (or techniques) of warfare while Jones develops a theory aligning sustainment of military operations to what strategy, and therefore technique, will be employed to best achieve a desired effect.104 The works and concepts of

100 ibid, p 74. 101 See Nunan, Peter (2000). "Diggers' Fourth of July". Military History 17 (3): 26–32 & 80 and Laffin John, 1999, The Battle of Hamel: The Australians' Finest Victory, Kangaroo Press. 102 McRaven W.H., 1996, Spec OPS Case Studies in Special operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, Presidio Press, pp 29 – 69, Mrazek James E., 1972, The Fall of Eben Emal Prelude to Dunkirk, Hale, and Saunders Tim, 2005, Fort Eben Emal, Pen & Sword and Golla Karl-Heinz, 2012, The German Fallschirmtruppe 1936 – 41 Its Genesis and Employment in the First Campaigns of the Wehrmacht, Helion, pp 121 – 142. 103 Tsuji Masanobu, 1960, Singapore The Japanese Version, Ure Smith, Sydney, p 188; Farrell Brian P., 2006, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940 – 1942, Tempus, pp 119, 120 & 139 – 151; Smith Colin, 2005, Singapore Burning, Penguin, pp 270 – 274; Thompson Peter, 2005, The Battle for Singapore, Portrait, pp 174 – 176. 104Burne Alfred H. LTCOL, DSO, 1947, The Art of War on Land, The Military Service Publishing Company, pp 23-33; Chandler David, 2000, The Art of Warfare on Land, Penguin Books, pp 14 – 20 The eight are: penetration of the centre (of a line), envelopment of a single flank, envelopment of both flanks, attack in oblique order, the feigned withdrawal, attack from a defensive position, the indirect approach and offensive revolutionary/ guerrilla warfare. For an overview see Schematic 12.19 Archer Jones, 2001, The Art of War in the Western World, University of Illinois Press, pp 705, 711. It is an extrapolation of a matrix between persistence and raiding with combat and logistics that all conflict

Burne (definition/explanation of terms and concepts such an interior and exterior lines, lines of communication, flanks, salient, etc) Chandler (forms of manoeuvre), Jones (operational sustainment and alignment with strategy), Biddle (calculation of predictability of outcome), McRaven (operational principles for tactical results), et al, are critical to an understanding of the science behind tactics as they also dictate where, when, duration and indeed the manner in which much of the conflict will be undertaken. Their works gain context and are reinforced by Blainey (reasons for conflict, why conflict starts and ends) and naval authors such as Mahan and Corbett (the importance of lines of communication and the importance of having security and initiative for periods of time or over areas).105 Each of the elements addressed by these and other authors are important as they provide the rationale and context from the strategic level through operational objectives to the tactical arena where the decision in question is to be determined. However, these authors together with those arguing the technology based interpretation of science concentrate on the physical domain and give little, if any, credence to the ‘moral factors’ outlined by Clausewitz for the ‘defeat’ of the enemy.106

Simpkin claims that the science of war is a combination of the disciplines of physics, statistics (based on operational research and analysis) and psychology.107 Specifically he clarifies the physics and mathematics underpinning mass, momentum, relative strength, interior lines, reinforcement, tempo and the like through application of Lanchester equations and the standard laws of physics.108 He also considers intelligence, risk, luck, command and control issues109 as well as career progression110 but without quantification. He then arrives at a conclusion that the ultimate issue is a clash of wills in which opposing commanders attempt to get the other to accept a particular picture of the situation at hand – ‘the creation of a picture of defeat.’ He sees at the root of this ‘the creation and manipulation of will fall within. It builds on an understanding of strategy being based on both aspects of national power and geography pertaining to things such as lines of communication, etc. 105 Mahan A.T., 1988, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783, Classics of Seapower series, Naval Institute Press; Corbett Julian S., 1988, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Classics of Seapower series, Naval Institute Press and Blainey G, 1988, The Causes of War, Macmillan Press. 106 Clausewitz, ibid, pp 90, 97. 107 Simpkin Richard, 1985, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-first Century War, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, pp xix – xx. 108 Simpkin, ibid, pp 79 – 115. 109 Simpkin, ibid, pp 165 – 207. 110 ibid, pp 217 – 221.

29 information, something calling for creative thinking and great subtlety of presentation.’111 Critical to attainment of this picture is willpower which he sees as being of two parts – placement of the commander in order to fully and accurately sense the situation and an ability to implant the picture or plan in the minds and actions of their subordinates.112 This latter aspect requires that the subordinates are ‘tuned’ to receive and correctly apply the picture as given otherwise, Napoleon’s criticism stands that failure is ‘because he did not understand my system.’113 Henderson agrees that tactics, while not stereotypical, ‘deal principally with moral factors; and that their chief end is the concentration of superior force, moral and physical, at the decisive point.’114 Friedman argues that the ‘breaking of the moral cohesion of the opposing force is destruction of that force and the true goal of tactics.’115 He continues that the true target is the enemy’s mind and that it cannot be targeted without understanding the mental state the attacker wishes to achieve and how his physical deployments can facilitate it.116 These latter three authors (Simpkin, Henderson and Friedman) therefore emphasise that physical actions undertaken must be selected and applied so as to achieve moral or psychological effects both amongst one’s own forces, the enemy as a collective and the enemy commander as an individual.

This review of the relationship of science and tactics has demonstrated that the applicable science is of two components – physical and mental –which plays out in a decision – the point where the physical [an act] and mental [the motivation for that act to occur or not] components interact and combine. In this way tactics, while a combination of science and art, is perhaps more correctly described as being scientifically based actions. Therefore, it can be concluded that tactics are the physical manifestation and application of science – they are not just something that is done as an action.

111 ibid, pp 225 – 226. 112 ibid, pp 226. 113 Henderson, ibid, p 7. 114 Henderson, ibid, p 168. 115 Friedman, ibid, p 17. 116 Friedman, ibid, p 140.

Conclusion

The first part of the literature review explored definitions. This review revealed a long-standing tension between conceptual and methodical approaches or understanding of tactics due to two different etymological sources. One etymological source was synonymous with art, a method, act or action, and therefore a technique. The alternate involved attainment of a higher-level decision and alignment with conceptual thought, science and principles. The second part of the literature review, the objective of this chapter, was to identify those factors having a relationship to tactics namely the relationship to strategy, decision making and science.

A strong relationship exists between tactics and strategy where tactics is subordinate, and therefore aligned, to strategy. This relationship was identified as being contextual and reactive regardless of at what level of conflict it is applied. While both strategy and tactics represent attainment of a decision, tactics appears to commence at the point at which a decision became an individual rather than a collective i.e. strategic responsibility.

The strategy-tactical relationship highlighted the centrality and importance of understanding, problem solving and decision making. The relationship may be explained thus: application of a technique may be undertaken as a result of direction whereas assignment of a technique as a task requires understanding, problem solving and decision-making abilities as well as an appreciation of what is being sought through the directed action. The assignment of techniques as tasks falls within the realm of tactics. The key determinant of decision making was identified as being to gain advantage. Inherent in gaining advantage was an ability to generate or impose that advantage and then control and sustain the advantage.

The review of the relationship of science identified two components – physical and mental –which plays out in a decision – the point where the physical [an act] and mental [the motivation for that act to occur or not] components interact and combine. In this way tactics, while a combination of science and art, is perhaps more correctly described as being scientifically based actions. Therefore, it can be concluded that

31 tactics are the physical manifestation and application of science – they are not just something that is done as an action.

In conclusion the relationships review was a continuance of the previously identified tension between conceptual and methodical approaches or understanding of tactics where one’s approach to tactical thinking is determined by the definitional basis used. However, as the review emphasised the centrality and importance of decision making aligned to a higher requirement or strategy it is concluded that what is done must also align to the higher requirements, gain advantage and therefore be selected and undertaken on the basis of reasoned logic rather than be routine, arbitrary or happenstance. The basis of that logic and the science behind it will be explored further in the next chapter.

Chapter Four – The science of decision making

Burne argues that the difficulty in defining the distinction between strategy and tactics is to establish the dividing line between the two.117 He continued that strategy brings the troops to the battlefield: tactics directs their actions thereon.118 By extrapolation the tactical commander is therefore responsible for attaining the desired outcome – a decision.119 Burne continued that ‘[w]ar is an art rather than a science’ as it is ‘waged between human beings and involves the interplay of their respective characters’ and that ‘science does not recognise sentient beings.’120 While Burne recognizes the non-linearity of cause and effect in most human endeavours he also places tactics as an art rather than a science. Burne is not alone in his conclusion.

Kesselring, argues a contrary view in that he constantly describes outcomes in terms of attainment of a decision.121 The basis of his stance is that decisions were to be based on logic, a scientific approach to problem solving.

The literature review identified the point of delineation between strategy and tactics as being responsibility for attainment of a decision. A tactic involved individual responsibility, someone intimately involved rather than one disengaged by distance or layers of intermediate decision making. The review identified two components – physical and mental – which plays out in a decision – the point where the physical [an act] and mental [the motivation for that act to occur or not] components interact and combine. In this way tactics, while a combination of science and art, is perhaps more correctly described as being scientifically based actions. Therefore, it can be concluded that tactics are the physical manifestation and application of science – they are not just something that is done as an action. In this chapter the application of

117 Burne Alfred H. LTCOL, DSO, 1947, The Art of War on Land, The Military Service Publishing Company, p 23. 118 op cit. 119 Oxford Dictionary, ibid, p 619, entry decision – the action of deciding a contest, dispute, etc.: settlement, a final formal judgement or verdict. The coming to a determination or resolution with regard to any point or course of action; a resolution or conclusion arrived at. 120 Burne, ibid, p 3. 121 Kesselring, Field Marshal A., 2007, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, Greenhill Books, pp 92, 123-124, 131, 139-140.

33 science to decision making will be explored further within the context of intimate engagement in conflict.

Overview

Conflict generally, and war specifically, involves individuals in a group setting therefore tactics, to be effectively applied, must first be understood in terms of human reactions. Therefore, it is critical, in order to maintain perspective and context, to not see science as devoid of human factors.122 A veteran lucidly recounted that the ‘frictions of war – chance, bad weather, mistakes and ill fortune – are the only certainties of combat, along with death, injury and destruction. … commanders were men under the severest pressure who had to make on-the-spot decisions with imperfect information. There is no perfect science, only perfect intent that is unlikely to withstand first contact with the prevailing realities on the ground once battle is joined, and where the enemy gets a vote in the outcome. … The frictions of fatigue, weather, miscalculations, friendly fire and pure bad luck also have their place, as do the emotions of loss, fear and excitement mixed with the fortitude and forbearance of the human spirit … the interaction of personal relationships, some good and some bad, as well as the place of comradeship, small unit cohesion and leadership.’123 While his reference to ‘perfect science’ is understood to mean absolute predictability or certainty of outcome his account neatly encapsulates the relationship of science to decision making as well as the involvement of human factor variables.

As already noted human factors encompass a wide range of physiology, psychology, intellectual, motivational and relational factors. This range may be broadly grouped

122 Australian Defence Force publication Volume 1, 2009, Focus on Human Performance in Land Operations, Department of Defence, ISBN 978-0-642-29699-3. Human factors are those physical and behavioural aspects of humanity which limit us in our capacity and capability. But one example of a physical factor is our ability to endure sleeplessness, without medical intervention, for a period not in excess of 72 hours. Other factors are the effects of the diurnal cycle and circadian rhythms on our functioning and thinking. Similarly, our decision making, in terms of type, range and agility, is significantly influenced by a range of nature and nurture influences. 123 Render David with Tootal Stuart, 2016, Tank Action: A Armoured Troop Commander’s War 1944- 45, Weidenfeld &Nicholson, pp xxiii, xxiv.

34 into two categories – physical and mental. Of these two categories the mental is by far the largest in terms of both components and the diversity of impacts on what is formulated and how it is done as an action. If we simplify the discussion to there being a physical [an act] and a mental [the motivation for an act to occur or not] component, the area of immediate interest must lie where the two interact and combine. Marshall links the physical and psychological via the impacts of exertion and stress on mental outlook and subsequent physical action.124 Therefore, this section will attempt to address each of these discrete areas as well as where they overlap.

The physical component

During WW1 the average range of artillery was 10km.125 Troops not in the line were therefore billeted at a distance of 15km or greater from enemy artillery positions. This meant that, on relief of a position, relieving troops faced an approach march of that distance in full kit as did those being relieved on their journey to safety. In order to avoid observation and therefore engagement by artillery the relief took place under the cover of darkness. The shortest night in the year allowed eight hours in which to approach, hand over the position and withdraw those being relieved. To complicate matters all had to be done in order and under control so as to achieve efficiency but also avoid detection through noise and variation of routine. To this must be added variables of inclement weather, enemy action and other such things. Therefore, in order to achieve the task all troops were trained to march 15km within three hours, or maintain a minimum rate of advance of six km/hr, regardless of situation, in order to effect a relief in place within eight hours of darkness. This performance requirement remains today even though there have been changes in such things as artillery range, night observation capability and other surveillance.126 Consideration must also be given to the actual physical state of the troops involved.

124 Marshall, S.L.A., 1947, Men Against Fire, Red River, pp 50 – 52. See also Marshall, S.L.A., 1950, The Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation, The Combat Forces Press, Washington. 125 Griffith P, 1994, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, Yale University Press, pp 24, 31, 34-35, 40- 44, 85 addresses the key facts presented here with respect to ranges, night movement and location of reserves, replacements and reinforcements to the front line. 126 Australian Army doctrinal publication LWP-G 7-7-4 Combat Fitness Handbook, as amended 22 July 2009, p 1.7 outlines the current Australian requirement to march 15km in a period of two hours 45 minutes maintaining a pace of 5.3km/hr while bearing a load of 25kg by day or night. Other armies have similar requirements having a similar historical basis originally founded on applicable science.

If they are tired, sick, hungry or in some other way inclement then their performance will deteriorate. As a generalisation, humans will prevail for approximately 72 hours with insufficient food, hydration or rest; thereafter, performance will degrade significantly.127 It can degrade more quickly in stressful conditions as in the case of the German paratroops fighting around Maleme during the Battle for Crete. In this case the German troops had been awake since approximately 0200 hours on 20 May 1941 before experiencing the adrenaline of either a parachute jump or crash landing at approximately 0700h directly into combat followed by intense fighting that had resulted in what amounted to a massacre of their strength. The fighting had been carried out in high temperatures with little water or shade since their landing. As dusk fell ‘the German attack lost momentum. The Assault Regiment (German) had suffered heavy casualties and the survivors were exhausted. Many fell asleep where they stood and others refused to move any further. … New Zealand soldiers could clearly hear the sound of (German) snoring on the lower slopes. It was this (German) inertia that allowed the surviving elements of C and D companies (New Zealanders) to disengage and slip away without further loss.’128 However, consideration of conflict or warfare from purely a physical basis will avail nothing unless it accepts interaction with the mental/psychological aspects of humanity. The impact of the physical factors illustrated in the above example is often insidious. Personnel do not realise, or will not openly acknowledge, that their performance and the performance of those around them is deteriorating.129 Cumulative strain leads to loss of physical performance as well as lowered judgement and initiative, diminished situational awareness and loss of emotional control. These all impact on and are associated with irrational decision-making, fratricide and operational failure. The cases outlined above substantiate the scientific basis for physical performance requirements and their relationship to the mental component. That science must inform tactics.

The mental component

In 1918 Monash observed that ‘[i]t is because we do not consider psychology enough that we are taking so long to win the war. Personally, I have always found it

127 Australian Army publication, 2002, Fatigue Management During Operations: A Commander’s Guide, Land Warfare Development Centre, pp 22, 69. 128 MacDonald Callum, 1995, The Lost Battle Crete 1941, Papermac, p 202. 129 Fatigue Management During Operations, p 39.

36 pays well to consider closely the psychology not only of the enemy but also of my own troops to study the factors which affect his actions and reactions and how to employ those factors to our advantage, and also to study the methods of keeping up the morale and the fighting spirit of our own soldiers. Indeed, it is psychology all along the line.’130 Fundamentally, Monash was referring to the motivation people have to engage and persist in conflict; both individually and collectively.131 At its most basic, motivation is the issue of whether one will inflict violence on another and, ultimately, kill.

The psychological impact of physical involvement in battle is able to be described in scientific detail.132 The effects are known as suppression and neutralisation.133 Suppression is a limitation of the target to effectively perform its role. This effect may be achieved by the employment of smoke, light, or persistent harassing fire over time. Neutralisation renders the target ineffective or unusable for a temporary period. Neutralisation involves a density and duration of fire that effectively covers the target area such that it prevents actions such as movement, observation or the employment of weapon systems. An Israeli study post the Yom Kippur War makes a definitive link between the perception of the target and the effectiveness of the intended action. This perception is dependent on such factors as personal readiness, combat readiness, perception of how events were to transpire, whether they were surprised and the intensity and duration of the action directed against them.134

130 Lieutenant General Sir John Monash in a letter to Dr Felix Meyer from the Western Front, April 1918 131 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2007, Oxford University Press, p1845, entry motivation, ‘the state or condition of being motivated; the degree to which a person is motivated; enthusiasm, drive.’ BusinessDictionary.com (www.businessdictionary.com/definition/motivation.html) ‘the interaction of both conscious and unconscious factors such as the (1) intensity of desire or need, (2) incentive or reward value of the goal, and (3) expectations of the individual and of his or her peers. These factors are the reasons one has for behaving a certain way.’ Equally it can be ‘a force or influence that causes someone to do something.’ 132 Gal Reuven and Dayan Hava, I992, The Psychological effects of Intense Artillery Bombardment: The Israeli Experience in the Yom-Kippur War (1973), The Israeli Institute for Military Studies, pp 1- 90. 133 ADF Glossary, ibid. 134 Reuven, ibid, pp 69-82.

Inhibitions to violence and killing

It seems that as a default setting, humans have an aversion to killing and deliberately injuring other humans.135 This must be extended to realise that humans also have a default setting to avoid what will hurt them. Ardant du Picq stated that “In modern battle, which is delivered with combatants so far apart, man has come to have a horror of man. He comes to hand-to-hand fighting only to defend his body or if forced to it by some fortuitous encounter.”136 Griffith takes this assertion a step further by arguing that close combat only comes about as a result of a failure on the part of technology to allow one side or another to maintain the separation that allowed a more efficient form of killing at a ‘safe’ range.137 He then concludes that it is the “duty of analysts to discover just where such an advantage may lie, and in this process a judicious understanding of the military past can be no less rewarding than a mastery of the technology and hardware.”138 In simpler terms Griffith is arguing that technology not only allows, but should be further exploited to achieve, a disassociation by means of distance or a filter, from this seemingly universal and normal human response of aversion to violence and death on another human at close range. However, regardless of the degree of separation achieved by technology one is now at a point where a decision is made to engage in conflict and combat or not. It is at this point that motivation comes into play noting that Blainey attests that there is effectively no difference in the factors that send humans into combat from those that cause them to cease combat.139

Motivation

It must be noted that ‘while one motivation may be the preeminent influence on a soldier’s behaviour at the moment of engagement, it is shaped by other, less immediate motivations, and new ones supervene according to the situation.’140 Specifically, the issue is proximity or immediacy to the actual adversarial

135 Grossman, Dave LTCOL, 2009, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, Little, Brown Company, United States. 136 Du Picq, ibid, p 56. 137 Griffith, ibid, p 179. 138 ibid, p 186. 139 Blainey G, 1988, The Causes of War, Macmillan Press, p 162. 140 Kellett Anthony, 1982, Combat Motivation The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle, Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, p 319.

38 situation.141 Given the importance of proximity and associated independence of decision making, it is therefore logical that the best determinant of an appropriate immediate action is the man on the ground – the one confronting the arena in which the decision is being enacted.142 This has implications regarding awareness of context and consequence of actions and therefore stresses the importance of the placement, and thereby awareness, of the decision maker together with their responsiveness to actions and reactions as they unfold. Castillo argues that motivation is aligned to confidence borne of experience and training coupled with determination borne of belief and acceptance of cost.143 Ultimately, he identifies that confidence is critical as it is based on trust.144 Motivation is therefore exhibited by and is the sum of mindset – itself the sum of training and trust, execution and discipline borne of understanding – all critical to attainment of a decision. In attempting to understand motivation one must also address self-interest noting that conflict is not only personal but societal. It involves an adversary, one’s self, the society from which either is drawn, any allies, their issues, and the aspects of the sub-society (e.g.: the army) that each protagonist is drawn from. Self-interest can therefore only be applied if it accords with the ethics underpinning the higher strategic aim or operational objective noting that these two represent the collective not the individual. However, the ethics involved have consequences which limit or expand possible options to attain the decision in question.

Ethics

Carr argues that excess through the application of terror generates further excess.145 History is replete with examples where an action has generated a disadvantageous response far more costly than the initial action would seemingly incur. Three examples illustrate the point. In August 1571 Ottoman forces, in breach of a treaty, flayed alive Marco Bragadin, the Christian Venetian Governor of Cyprus. This led directly to the creation of the Holy League, something heretofore unachievable, and their undertaking of the Battle of Lepanto directly causing the cessation of Ottoman

141 op cit. 142 Evans Michael & Ryan Alan (ed), 2000, The Human Face of Warfare: Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle, Allen & Unwin, pp 50 – 63. 143 Castillo Jasen J., 2014, Endurance and War The National Sources of Military Cohesion, Stanford University Press, pp 230-238. 144 op cit. 145 Carr Caleb, 2003, The Lessons of Terror, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, p 247.

39 expansion and the limiting of its rule.146 The second example is of the punitive expedition mounted by US Army elements against the Sioux nation in 1863-1864.147 The expeditions were conducted on the basis of revenge and dismissive of the fact that the Indians targeted by them were innocent of any involvement in the activities attributed to them. These expeditions then set the conditions for a much longer, wider and destructive war over the next decade. More recently in 1944, the brutal excesses and atrocities of the Gestapo and German auxiliary occupation forces led not only to the Warsaw Uprising but also to its ferocity and longevity which, by all normal yardsticks, should not have lasted 63 days but been over within two weeks.148 These three examples must then be considered against actions that are both humane and pragmatic to engender future opportunities. An example of a humane pragmatic action is the low-level warning flights conducted by Group Captain Cheshire VC over the Gnome-Rhone aero engine factory in Limoges on 8 February 1944.149 The two over flights, while risky in the extreme, gave the 2,000 French female workers sufficient warning to evacuate and flee to shelter prior to the accurate and devastatingly effective bombing raid that followed. Such was the feeling of these female workers about his actions that they sent the Squadron, via the Resistance, a letter of thanks for the consideration shown as well as their appreciation for the accuracy of the raid. However, perhaps more importantly, Cheshire’s actions, and the raid allowed combat validation of a new delivery method as well as a salve to what were severely strained Anglo-French relations. Had Cheshire bombed without warning it is most likely that Churchill would have halted all subsequent raids of this type. Halting these subsequent raids would have then delayed advances in low level marking and bombing techniques that ultimately proved effective in halting the V bombs and other threats through precision bombing.150 Glover, using a different perspective, argues that moderation, and particularly by the victor over the

146 Hopkins T.C.F., 2006, Confrontation at Lepanto, Christendom vs. Islam, Forge Publishing, New York, especially pp 61 & 97–101. Note particularly the explanation and importance of beliefs and identity as outlined on page 100 as well as the obvious tie in of a single act to both strategic aim, consequence and the limitation of options for resolution. 147 Beck Paul N.,2013, Columns of Vengeance: Soldiers, Sioux, and The Punitive Expeditions 1863- 1864, University of Oklahoma Press, pp 5-50. See also Hedren Paul L., 2016, Powder River: Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War, Oklahoma University Press, pp 3,4. 148 Joes Anthony James, 2007, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, The University Press of Kentucky, pp 9-37. 149 Burgess Colin, 2003, Australia’s Dambusters, Australian Military History Publications, p 71. 150 Burgess, ibid, p 72.

40 vanquished, is critical to tactical success.151 Note that the moderation is not so much the military action but the deliverance of the tact portion that applies in surrender negotiations and conditions. Put simply, in all conflict situations it is important to allow dignity to the vanquished in order to salve the basis of the conflict be it identity, beliefs or survival needs. In order to achieve this there must be ‘greater tactical discrimination’ by the troops involved and extreme clarity of the aim of the war, or more precisely, at the lower level where the decision is sought.152

Consideration of ethical issues also strengthens the basis of resolving conflict. In the Battle of Lepanto example an unethical act immediately closed all opportunity and consideration of a range of options for resolution to but one – all-out war. Effective resolution of an issue requires that the issue at stake is crystal clear, only those responsible are targeted, that the agency responsible has the strength to act alone, emphasise continual vigilance, can achieve surprise, employ discriminating operations and are willing to engage with our adversary once their leaders are vanquished.153 It must be noted that this must also to be achieved at an acceptable cost.

Perception and dominance

Keegan, while discussing the creeping barrage of WW1 draws together the physical and mental components through the prisms of perception and dominance. “The basis of the technique is in part mathematical, an application of the science of ballistics, but in part also psychological, requiring judgements about how human beings react to extreme but apparently impersonal threat. Mere ‘searching forward’ does not guarantee the effectiveness of a creeping barrage, since infantry may go to ground while the curtain of fire passes over their heads; ‘searching back’ is essential also, to catch the unwary as they emerge from cover in the belief that the danger is past. A fine judgement about human self-protectiveness in the aggregate therefore distinguishes a good from an indifferent barrage plan.”154

151 Glover Michael, 1982, The Velvet Glove: The Decline and Fall of Moderation in War, Hodder and Stoughton, p 15. 152 Carr, ibid, pp 261-3. 153 Carr, ibid, pp 264 & 273, 281-5. 154 Keegan John, 1982, Six Armies in Normandy From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, Pimlico, p 47.

Simpkin regarded human reactions to actual or perceived conflict as being more often reflective of perception rather than reality. He stated that ‘the basis for decision is not the physical situation as last reported or observed, but the mental picture of the situation as it will shortly develop. … The outcome turns neither on the seizing and holding of ground nor on the dislocation or disruption of forces and resources, but on the pictures in the opposing commander’s minds.’155 (emphasis added) The actions of B and D Company 2 Para at Goose Green during the 1982 Falklands War illustrate the phenomena via application of manoeuvre.156 The idea of a physical move relative to a point (manoeuvre) is to cause a reorientation of physical disposition. By way of explanation, humans are orientated to face to face engagement. If one is required to face forward and remain so while another person approaches from their flank or rear the person being approached will quickly become uncomfortable to the point of undertaking an almost involuntary reorientation so that face to face contact is regained or maintained. At Goose Green, the movement of B Company onto higher ground towards the south of the Argentinean positions caused them to deflect their attention, in part, from the remainder of 2 Para. This, in turn, resulted in not only a division of Argentinean attention and fire but also stymied any desire by the Argentines to launch counter-attacks. The sum of these events then set the conditions for the subsequent capitulation of the Argentinean garrison as they felt insecure, had lost control of the situation and were therefore doubtful of their ability to persevere for any length of time. Similarly, Caldwell’s observations, drawn from a range of locations and cultures around the world in the late 1800s, demonstrate that this phenomenon is universal to the human race across time, technology, cultures and type of conflict to cause reappraisal and reorientation by an opponent.157

Perhaps the greatest driver of perception is the experience and opinion of the person having the view.158 Often this is a case of perspective influenced by an understanding

155 Simpkin, ibid, pp 224, 225. It should be noted that perception can be at either the individual or collective level noting that the collective level is ultimately represented by one mind, that of the commander. 156 Steed Brian, 2002, Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern War, Ballantine Books, pp 103-121. 157 Callwell Colonel C.E., 1996, Small Wars Their Principles and Practice, Third Edition, University of Nebraska Press, pp 186-7 and 292-299. 158 Kellett Anthony, ibid, pp 308 – 315.

42 of underpinning science linked to education, training or experience.159 Intelligence is the vehicle by which we attempt to address the deficit between what is occurring and what it means overall in terms of a tactical paradigm, framework or principle at play. However, the intelligence effort (data collection) is also driven more from perception than reality in that the data will be limited or misinterpreted according to a particular prior viewpoint; that is you will see what you want or expect to see rather than understand it for what it really is.160 This, in turn, initiates a downward spiral resultant in a failure to attain either the desired strategic or tactical outcomes or, worst case, both. In tactics this translates into the use and effectiveness of shock, audacity and deception to achieve, in effect, entrapment and compliance. More importantly, as the ideal is to only fight when necessary and on your terms, this aspect of human factors and science must be given great emphasis in our concept and execution of tactics.

At the heart of any decision to engage in combat and the motivation for it lies the issue of dominance be that actual or perceived. In keeping with the true object of accomplishing the aim of strategy with the minimal amount of combat necessary this is the point where force must be applied in order to attain compliance.161 If the two opposing forces are equal there is stalemate and therefore, by default, endurance becomes the determinant of success. However, before endurance is accepted as the sole determinant it is better to expend effort in exploring what is required to change an opponent’s mind and convince him that he has lost relative strength, cannot win, and is best served by desisting with his current course of action.

Conclusion

The information in this section leads to a conclusion that tactics are as much a relationship of human factors as they are based on the two components of science – physical (physiological) and mental (psychological) – inherent in those human

159 It was exactly this that Porter was railing against in Chapter Two. 160 For an excellent outline of this see LTGEN Hiam Bar Lev speaking on the subject of surprise and the 1973 Yom Kippur War in Williams Louis (ed), 1975, Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, University Publishing Projects Tel Aviv, p 263 where he states ‘the evaluation is subjective, and is influenced by viewpoint, prejudice, faulty basic assumptions, exaggerated self-confidence, personal ambition, suspicions and fear, and other non-objective influences which tie men to non- realistic misconceptions. Any additional information and phenomena which point to real intentions will be adapted to fit the grid built in accordance with the misperception.’ 161 Liddell Hart B.H., 1954, Strategy, Faber & Faber, p 324.

43 factors. Of the two components it would seem that the mental is both the largest and the most misunderstood or ignored component. The physical and mental components combine and result in an outcome – a decision that can be modified by stress, motivation, ethics and perception. Effective resolution of an issue therefore requires that the issue at stake is crystal clear, only those responsible are targeted, that the agency responsible has the strength to act alone, emphasises continual vigilance, can achieve surprise, employ discriminating operations and are willing to engage with an adversary once their leaders are vanquished as well as achieve a discrete outcome at an acceptable cost.

Chapter Five – Analysis of a decision

Thus far tactics have been shown to involve art and science either alone or in some form of combination.162 It has been concluded that the science inherent in tactics plays out in a decision – the point where the physical [an act] and mental [the motivation for that act to occur or not] components of human factors interact and combine. Also identified were a range of relationships such as those with strategy, advantage and decision making. While these relationships gave a context to what decision was pertinent to a situation, they failed to explain how that decision was attained. This chapter will therefore propose a decisional framework that encapsulates all of the relationships identified thus far. In keeping with Friedman, a theory framework is necessary in order to provide a basis for testing and analysis of definitions of terms, concepts and ideas.163

An outcome or decision may be understood to be attained as either a result of calculation, intuition or chance. Intuition is defined as being the ‘direct perception of truths, facts, etc., independently of any reasoning process.’164 In the military sphere it is regarded as both important and primarily the result of experience.165 However, experience is worthless unless it can be codified and rapidly processed to enable intuition to come to the fore. This, in turn, places great importance on the mindset, intellectual outlook and understanding that underpins the linkages made and employed.166 Also critical is an awareness and application of the science that underpins military effort.167 This suggests that intuition is as much the result of

162 But one assertion of there being an art and a science component is provided by Condell Bruce and Zabecki David T. (ed), 2009, On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung German Army Manual for Unit Command in World War II, Stackpole Books p 17 which states: “1. War is an art, a free and creative activity founded on scientific principles.” 163 Friedman, ibid, p 3. 164 The Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Fifth Edition 2009), p 651. 165 See Riley J, 2005, Instinctive Leadership, Intuitive Decision Making: A command study of General Sir Hugh Stockwell, PhD thesis, Cranfield University, Shrivenham as an example of the general importance placed on intuition by the military. Other general indicators are terms such as ‘to feel the pulse of battle’ (Russian), ‘finger tip feeling’ (German) and ‘the strike of the eye’ (French) in relation to the importance of intuition to military operations. 166 Cohen E.A. and Gooch J, 1990, The Anatomy of Failure in War: Military Misfortunes, Free Press, p 235 167 These scientific elements are subjects of other separate works and will not be addressed in detail here. For an understanding of strategic options (within a quadrant of persisting – raiding/combat – logistics), lines of communication, interior/exterior lines, the eight classical manoeuvres, attainment of decisive ratios, capability matching/negation and human factors see Archer Jones, 2001, The Art of War in the Western World, University of Illinois Press and David Chandler, 2000, The Art of Warfare on Land, Penguin Books in particular.

45 critical thought about both one’s own and others’ experience because, as argued by Booth, decision making is a natural product of thinking.168 That said, codification of experience, regardless of whether it is one’s own or another’s, amounts to distillation of principles from multiple observations and consequent deductions: the basis of science. Therefore, to determine whether calculation, and by extrapolation intuition, or chance applies calculation must be eliminated as an option.

The need and application of critical thought is necessary to gain advantage. Therefore, when enquiring as to the efficacy of a tactic we are really endeavouring to understand how advantage was sought, quantified and achieved. To explain and measure advantage one must enquire as to whether all intended actions, individually and collectively, worked or if they generated effects and opportunities for exploitation. Equally one must explore how the opposition reacted and why. This is an issue regardless of whether the symmetry of equality or the asymmetry of some technology, mass or other capability applies.169

The so called Fetterman Massacre that took place on the western frontier of the USA on 21 December 1866 during a war between the U.S. Army and a federation of the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho nations near Fort Phil Kearney in the then Wyoming Territory illustrates what advantage is and how it is gained.170 In summary, the action was an ambush set by the Indians against previous U.S. Army responses to their encroachments and decoys. The Indians controlled the area outside the

168 Booth LTCOL (Ret’d) Chris, Knowledge Based Intuition, British Army Review 158 Autumn 2013, p 34. 169 For a contemporary application of the issue see an article Restructuring for the future by Daniel Wasserby in Jane’s Defence Weekly Vol 51 Issue 6 of 5 February 2014, pp 26-30. Speaking of an over reliance on a technological asymmetry and therefore a capability deficiency within infantry in Afghanistan General Cone (head of US Army Training and Development Command) states that “If we have to call Apaches in on every little [firefight] on the battlefield then we are going to have a problem.” 170 See Brown Dee, The Fetterman Massacre, 1974, Pan Books; Collins Charles D. Jr., Atlas of the Sioux Wars, Second Edition, October 2006, Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Utley Robert M. and Washburn Wilcomb E., 1985, Indian Wars, Houghton Mifflin Company Boston; Sandoz Mari, 1961, Crazy Horse, Strange Man of the Oglala, University of Nebraska Press; Utley Robert M., 1973, Bluecoats and Redskins The United States Army and the Indian 1866–1891, Cassell; Ambrose Stephen E., 2003, Crazy Horse and Custer The Epic Clash of Two Great Warriors at the Little Bighorn, Pocket Books and Marshall S.L.A., 1972, Crimsoned Prairie The Indian Wars, Da Capo Press

46 immediate influence of the fort allowing them to manoeuvre at will.171 Despite being given an inkling of what was in store via Indian ambushes conducted on 06 and 19 December the U.S. force under the command of Captain (Brevet Lieutenant Colonel) William J. Fetterman reacted in the same way on the same ground when again provoked on 21 December. It should be noted that Fetterman was an experienced soldier with a fine Civil War record but no experience in fighting Indians. He did have a contemptuous attitude toward his Indian foes and those that exercised caution in fighting them.172 In his eagerness to close with the Indians he allowed his cavalry and infantry to become separated. He went outside the limits of support (out of gun range) from the fort and was entirely predictable in his actions resulting in the deaths of all 81 men within his command.173 Most notably, he and his men failed to enact the very techniques that ‘old hands’ used effectively against Indian foes in similar circumstances. Conversely, the Indians enacted a well prepared plan based on accurate intelligence assessments of the various U.S. commanders and their likely reactions/actions that allowed considerable latitude within geographic sectors allocated by tribe.174 All of their actions remained in keeping with the agreed plan and were contributory to the desired outcome, both at the tactical and strategic levels for negligible cost in life for them. It is also noteworthy to consider the timing of the attack in that its proximity to the winter snowfalls prevented the sustainment of the fort by reinforcement and the extension of its erosion by having to be defended by a significantly reduced force. This case study highlights how both position (the ability or security to freely manoeuvre versus being restricted to a feature or facility) and situation (proximity to winter and therefore the relationship to closure of supply/reinforcement due to storms and snow) and predictability of an opponent’s action against a force acting in concert and agreement to a predetermined but flexible plan generate advantage in keeping with a higher objective and aim.

171 Monnett John H. (ed), 2017, Eyewitness to the Fetterman Fight: Indian Views, University of Oklahoma Press, p 35 claims that Fort Phil Kearney, the midpoint on the supply and communication chain along the Bozeman Trail was kept in a virtual state of siege. 172 Fetterman is variously recorded as having made a boast that with either 80 (eg: Brown pp 160 & 163) or 50 men (Sandoz p 196) that he could ride through the entire Sioux nation. This boast, regardless of the number entailed, together with his earlier actions and those on the fateful day all attest to his contemptuous attitude toward his opponents. See also Marshall (p 57) regarding the breadth of that attitude. This issue of attitude will be addressed in more detail later. 173 Monnett, ibid, p 56 records that seven Indians were killed and eight wounded as a result of the fight. 174 Monnett, ibid, p 34.

By addressing the human factors inherent in psychology/intelligence, capability construction/deconstruction, timing and teamwork, outlined in the Fetterman Fight case study above, the Indian leader, Red Cloud, effectively either forced or encouraged, that is shaped, his opponent, Fetterman, into a course of action that limited his options to the one or two that Red Cloud had prepared for. Red Cloud undertook what he did in order to gain advantage, having calculated that it would result in Fetterman’s defeat. Red Cloud attained the decision he sought; Fetterman did not, presumably it would seem, because his actions were more emotionally based than calculated. This case study therefore supports a view that advantage and a decision is attained as a result of calculation, not chance. It is noted that while a decision may be calculated the advantage may be derived from external factors outside the decision makers control. For example, in this case study the impact of weather gave longer term advantage to Red Cloud’s design and disadvantage to the US Army. However, that external factor should have been of equal importance to the calculations regarding actions that impacted on the sustainability of the fort and its operations to both sides. It appears that Fetterman assumed away the negative consequences of the loss of his command to this issue and therefore undertook what was a gamble. Therefore, it can be concluded that the basis of all calculations must be correct otherwise disadvantage and failure remain possible outcomes.

Implied and inherent in advantage is the concept of reaction and consequence. The reaction is not only to the immediate situation but also to higher requirements however imposed, past events, experiences, perceptions, prejudices and training. The battle of the Little Big Horn between Custer’s 7th Cavalry and an alliance of the Sioux and Cheyenne nations is a useful case study of this facet of tactics.175 A study of the tactics of two leaders, Crazy Horse of the Oglala Sioux and Custer himself illustrate that what they did on the day of the battle was in keeping with their respective past experience. Custer had learned from his Civil War actions and the

175 The battle was fought on 25-26 June 1876 as part of the wider Great Sioux War at several locations in the vicinity of an Indian encampment on the Little Bighorn River. For an excellent overview of the battle see Hutton Paul Anthony, Could Custer Have Won? Military History Quarterly Winter 2013, pp 28 – 39. For wider context see Collins, Utley and Washburn, Sandoz, Utley and Marshall as per Footnote 7 and Beck Paul N., 2013, Columns of Vengance Soldiers, Sioux, and the Punitive Expeditions 1863–1864, University of Oklahoma Press. For specific detail see Ambrose Stephen E., 2003, Crazy Horse and Custer The Epic Clash of Two Great Warriors at the Little Bighorn, Pocket Books.

48 battle of Washita against Indians that an audacious assault and the capture of women and children would allow him to sacrifice security to the point of gambling on a successful outcome.176 Custer reacted not only to that experience but also the pressures, real or imagined, regarding the nature of his orders, the security of his command and his tenure within and aspirations post his military career.177 Conversely, Crazy Horse, learnt to put sustained pressure on the cavalry to feed on their fears, expend ammunition and then charge once their rifles overheated and jammed. He knew when to do this by monitoring the rate of fire being delivered against him. This, in turn, required an increasing reliance on the use of effective decoys and a restraining of traditional methods of displays of bravery and a switch to close range ambushing that exploited the Indian supremacy in fieldcraft.178 Crazy Horse had also learnt that the Fetterman Massacre, the culminating event in what was known as Red Cloud’s War, had resulted in eight years of peace – an Indian victory. What he failed to appreciate was the effect of the Civil War on the importance of Indian issues and white transmigration through and exploitation of Indian land in those eight years. So, it is readily seen that the Indian victory against Custer, while resounding and complete, provoked a response from the US Government that could only be described as vengeful and designed for total annihilation of the Indian nations. While this may be debated at length in other forums the point remains that, despite blame for the initiation of the war being the whites alone, the completeness and nature of the Indian victory was the cause for escalation in intensity of the conflict. Conversely, a consequence to the US Government side is the long standing and persistent need to redress their actions over time in the political, legal and economic arenas.179 This case study highlights consequential advantage as well as alignment of attainment of a decision to higher objectives and an overall aim.

The relationship of actions to advantage

How each action undertaken attained advantage must now be explored. Ultimately, the application of force may be required in order to achieve a decisive outcome. The

176 Hutton, ibid, pp 31, 35-37 & Ambrose, ibid, pp 172-173, 259-271, 277-289. 177 Ambrose, ibid, pp112-113, 203, 209-210,253-257,336-338, 343-348, and 400-407. 178 ibid, pp 133-134, 237-239, 293-98, 331-335, 420-423 and 444-446. 179 ibid, pp 482, 483.

49 combination of manoeuvre and mass to achieve a decisive outcome was well demonstrated during the Battle of Isandlwana.180 The battle involved two distinctly different, but capable asymmetric forces, the British and the Zulus. The capability of the British resided in their application of disciplined firepower at extended range. Their principal weapons were the rifle and bayonet. The capability of the Zulus resided in their application of mass in a close quarter melee. Their principal weapon was the assegai or short stabbing spear. In order to negate the British standoff capability at range the Zulus had to close with the British in sufficient numbers to overwhelm them in a close quarter melee. Equally, the British fire had to be of sufficient effectiveness at a distance that precluded sufficient Zulus to eventually advance to within close quarter battle range.181 The Zulus demonstrated confidence in their excellent training, discipline and intelligence (situational awareness) of such things as the terrain, location and capabilities of the British. Conversely, the British were much in the dark of these things as they applied to their foe. The Zulus, as a result of their experience with and against firearms, demonstrated astuteness to develop techniques, such as advances by the use of rushes, which negated British technological superiority in firepower.182 These techniques were then applied or came together with the effects of ground, ammunition expenditure, open formations, weapons jamming and variations of control over the rate and accuracy of fire, to create an eventual diminution of the overall volley effect. 183 Eventually, on closing with the British ranks the Zulus allowed the British to bayonet their shields which they then dragged down thereby trapping the British weapon and allowing another Zulu to spear the British soldier.

The sum of these actions allowed a diminution of overall British capability and established gaps in the British line to allow final destruction by overwhelming mass in a close quarter melee.184 However, this did not all happen in one single frontal assault. The Zulus employed the classical manoeuvre of double envelopment using speed and mass from several directions simultaneously thereby dividing the concentration of British effort. Perhaps most notable is their mastery of deception

180 Snook Lieutenant Colonel Mike, 2005, How Can Man Die Better: The Secrets of Isandlwana Revealed, Greenhill Books 181 ibid, pp 237, 238. 182 ibid, pp 225, 226. 183 ibid, p 213. 184 ibid, pp 243-245.

50 and surprise to initiate the battle when and where they did. Conversely, almost simultaneous with the fight at Isandlwana, was the Zulu attack on Rorke’s Drift some 12 miles distant where these elements were disregarded, contrary to orders, at great cost in life and capability, resulting in resounding defeat.185 At Rorke’s Drift the Zulus attacked a fortified British post that allowed the British concentration of force and thereby firepower against Zulus attacking on a single axis. In other words, the Zulus ceded all advantage to the British as at no time could they effectively close with and overwhelm the British force at close quarters. These case studies from the same era but removed by location and circumstance illustrate that the gaining of advantage is generated by a range of actions that generate effects necessary to attain the conditions required to attain a decision. Inherent also is an understanding of how to generate that advantage through the application of scientific knowledge.

Adaptation

From the Fetterman, Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift case studies it could be construed that tactics are the amalgam of drills; drills being a composite of procedures applied to particular situations, that is: if x happens do z. The German paratroops attacking Americans at the village of Lanzerath on 16 December 1944 applied a drill template by persistence in repeated limited, frontal attacks.186 It was only after the lapse of several hours and failed attempts that the Germans undertook a flanking attack which was immediately successful.187 Up until the final attack the German paratroops exhibited what equates to a fixed mindset, in effect a drill or procedure. Such slavish application of a template overlooks key aspects of why these procedures were developed, how they were orchestrated and controlled as well as the decision making as to when and where they would be applied in time and space against that particular adversary. Equally, operational level examples such as the Russo-Finnish Winter War where the methods employed in the north were different to those in the south illustrate that a method is not universal while the effect desired and the principle behind its employment are.188 Similarly, at the lower tactical level, a study of the

185 For an account of the battle see Knight Ian, 1996, Rorke’s Drift 1879, Osprey 186 Kershaw Alex, 2004, The Longest Winter, Penguin Books, pp 91-114. 187 ibid, pp 115-122. 188 See Trotter William R, 2002, The Winter War The Russo-Finnish War of 1939–40, Aurum Press; Condon Richard, 1972, the winter war Russia against Finland, Pan/Ballantine; Chew Allen F., 1971,

German assault on Fort Eben-Emal, the taking of Pegasus Bridge and the winning of the only VC on D-Day all illustrate that methods are developed for discrete circumstances and do not necessarily have utility past the event or circumstances for which they were developed.189 These observations accord with the arguments of Cohen and Gooch regarding the importance of learning, anticipation and adaptation to avert failure.190 They also put flight to a view that the outcome of any encounter is subject to chance alone noting that chance is perhaps more accurately understood as incorrect calculations.

Advantage

Variations in advantage may be understood more completely by a review of the Third Battle of Gaza in Palestine during WW1.191 Gaza marked the transition from the Sinai Desert into Palestine proper. Key to military operations in this theatre was access to sufficient supplies of potable water. Possession of Gaza guaranteed access to water. However, the Turkish defences pivoted on Gaza (located on the Mediterranean coast) and extended in a great south-eastern arc along the edge of the desert to Beersheba. These defences were sufficiently strong and effective that two prior battles, in March and April 1917 respectively, had been fought to gain possession of Gaza and entry into Palestine.

As a prelude to the Third Battle the Allied force under General Allenby undertook a deception plan designed to convince the Turks that the main effort would again fall on Gaza. At the same time raiding was undertaken to blind the Turks as to what was occurring in the 50 km arc towards Beersheba. A night approach march was then

The White Death The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, Kiwe Publishing and Engle Eloise & Paananen Lauri, 1973, The Winter War, Stackpole Books. 189 See Mrazek James E. 1972, Prelude to Dunkirk The Fall of Eben Emal, Robert Hale London; Saunders Tim, 2005, Fort Eben Emal, Pen & Sword; McRaven W.H., 1996, Spec OPS Case Studies in Special operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, Presidio Press pp29-69; Ambrose Stephen E., 2003, Pegasus Bridge, Pocket Books, p 171 and Morgan Mike, 2004, D-Day Hero CSM Stanley Hollis VC, Sutton Publishing. In all three cases the troops went on to subsequent actions and suffered high losses due to an inability to translate the actions undertaken to later tactical situations without further training in particular methods. 190 Cohen & Gooch, ibid, p 27. 191 Falls Cyril & (maps) Becke AF, 1930, Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from June 1917 to the End of the War, Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence Volume 2 Part I & Part II, HM Stationery Office, pp 37 – 41.

52 undertaken by a separate force to a position outside Beersheba where the main assault was to be made on 31 October 1917.192 The main assault was a charge by the Australian Light Horse Brigade at 4:30pm.193 However, this assault was only made possible by a series of actions that preceded it. The actions (capture and holding of the high ground [Hill 1070] to the west by infantry from the British 60th Division and capture and holding of Tel el Saba by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade) created a situation where the charge could proceed with secure flanks. Had it gone ahead prior to these conditions being met the charge would have been annihilated before it reached the objective, Beersheba itself.194 In sequence it can be seen that the securing of the western and eastern flanks of the charge gave positional advantage while the taking of Beersheba gave situational advantage for the consequential advantage of turning and reducing the Gaza line. This demonstrates that advantage is not an absolute term or state but one of many facets which must be understood and appreciated.

Advantage may also be considered akin to having the initiative, the ability to dictate or influence, but not totally impose, terms. The essence of advantage is that it gives an ability to manoeuvre: that is to move in time, space and relationship so as to generate a dilemma for the opponent ideally provoking or necessitating a reaction from him that is more advantageous to you than his persisting in the ‘current’ behaviour. It also recognizes the importance of adaptability and reactivity based on observation and analysis not just to the immediate situation but also to past events, experiences, perceptions, prejudices and training. Doing the same thing again and again will not always generate the same result as variations in circumstances and conditions must be factored in. This suggests that the actions which precede attainment of a decision are not just those that immediately precede the decision in question but also include a range of thought, study, learning, experience and reflection undertaken well beforehand. In this way tactics may be said to be the sum of thought and action. It is important to note here that the thought referred to is not meant to be understood to be limited to that which immediately precedes initiation of

192 op cit. 193 Gullett Henry S., 1941, The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914–1918,Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 Volume VII (11th ed.), Australian War Memorial, p 394. 194 Massey Graeme, 2007, Beersheba: The Men of the 4th Light Horse Regiment Who Charged on the 31st October 1917, Warracknabeal Secondary College History Department (Victoria), p 10.

53 an action. It encompasses that thought and development which precedes the initiation of any action. Also inherent in this thought is the development of an understanding of what is important to your enemy in terms of how and where their concept of advantage lies. By way of example, an attack undertaken by an enemy at considerable cost such as that by the NVA during the Tet offensive or the Taliban against a range of locations such as Wanat in Afghanistan195 may generate an advantage in their understanding that is somewhat incomprehensible to their opponent’s way of thinking. However, in both cases their (NVA and Taliban) actions established conditions that resulted in the withdrawal (or loss of advantage) of their opponents. Viewing advantage in this way causes consideration of the intentions and realisations of all parties involved. Therefore, advantage may be seen as a relative term that is the sum of thought and action resulting in the attainment of effects, the sum of which set conditions to attain a decision.

Therefore, tactics is the rationale used to generate advantage where advantage transcends an immediate gain to incorporate opportunities generated as second or third order effects. This, in turn, highlights the need for analysis and critical thinking necessary to identify and define the problem, understand its context and relationships and develop sequences of action that deconstruct and undermine those relationships and negate the context. In this way tactics are the sum of key questions such as: What is the opponent attempting to achieve? Why? What reactions by us will negate the attainment of those objectives? What opportunities do these actions generate? How will/did the opponent react? Why? Can this operating methodology be sustained and for how long? Why or why not? How can all identified deficiencies be overcome? From these questions it can be seen that, as each situation is different, each solution must be different. Such creative thinking based on effective analysis automatically renders ineffective any suggestion that tactics are mechanistic, technology panaceas or the application of any other such simplistic method or formula.

195 See US Army Combat Studies Institute report, 2008, Wanat, Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008, Combat Studies Institute Press.

The conditions necessary for attainment of a decision

Essex-Clark opined that “what is important is to define winning tactics, which are needed for developing confidence and leadership quality by any battlefield commander at any level. … Know well your own and your enemy’s fighting habits, idiosyncrasies, and resources, and the affect of terrain and weather on fire-power and manoeuvre. Winning tactics are then a matter of using your resources and knowledge with more cunning, speed, and common sense than the enemy commander opposing you.’196 This articulation of tactics is too simplistic. The issue is not a simple binary win or loss as this invariably gives emphasis to one side, often to the exclusion, in full or in part, of the other. Therefore, to properly assess tactics one must have a framework that allows consideration of the attainment of a decision but also the basis of how the conditions on which the decision was based were intended and realised. Within the case studies the development of three conditions necessary for the attainment of a decision have been identified. For the purpose of this thesis I have named them – security, simplicity and sustainment.

Security

Captain Steve Sainsbury opined that ‘[s]ecurity is the key to survival and coming back alive.’197 Security may be considered the equivalent of certainty in that it allows one the freedom of action necessary to force attainment of a decision. The other side of the security coin is that of intelligence and, by extrapolation, understanding of an opponent’s capability and intentions. This applies to all types of conflict and war. Security is the primary problem to be resolved in a manner that then allows or facilitates progress in other areas such as the political arena during counter- insurgencies.198 It does this by providing a screen of early warning thereby allowing response time to a threat, simultaneously limits enemy awareness of own capability or intentions, enables adaptability through application of sufficient force and

196 Essex-Clark John, 1991, Maverick Soldier–An Infantryman’s Story, Melbourne University Press, pp 71, 72 197 Mackay Gary, 1987, In Good Company One Man’s War in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, p 52. 198 Evans Michael, The shirt of nessus: The rise and fall of Western counterinsurgency, 2004-2014, Quadrant Vol. 59, No. 1/2, Jan/Feb 2015, p 15.

55 response to all threats, and thereby, in the absence of definite information, creates a dilemma of decision to an opponent.

Security is a basic human need. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs articulates a progression of requirements from physiological necessary to sustain life to self- actualization of full potential where progression is tied to fulfilment of the preceding level.199 Second in the progression of requirements is that of safety and security inclusive of protection from harm and emotional security. Another example of this desire encompassing all dimensions is manifested via commitment in a relationship, such as that expressed through the marriage contract. In a more physical sense it is portrayed by the stance that any one human will take in relation to another. Humans are physically suited to direct face to face dealing with each other.200 Should one human move to the flank of another the person so confronted will physically move to maintain that face to face relationship. Put another way humans do not like to be ‘out flanked’ from any angle left or right of the centre line approach to their direct front. The natural human reaction to being flanked or threatened in the rear and from a height is made military by observations from a range of authors and maxims such as that of Napoleon to ‘never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.’201 Here also is some of the science behind tactics to explain the generation of positional advantage.

Morale is important as when all things are equal then the dominance of will expressed as morale will predominate.202 Therefore, if one can threaten the security of an opponent you stand a good chance of destabilising them in that they are invariably mentally and socially discomforted sufficiently to reorientate to the real or perceived threat as it is posed. This creation of doubt is the initial physical

199 Chandler Jackie, 1991, Nursing Care: Theory and Practice, 2nd Ed., Churchill Livingstone, pp 235–238. 200 See Schumacher John A., 1989, Human Posture: The Nature of Inquiry, State University of New York Press, p26. This is a significant area of study that links into topics as wide ranging as direction giving and receipt, recognition and identity of individuals, biometric identification developments and animal/human behavioural interaction and cognition. 201 Described by military authors such as Calwell COL C.E., 1996, Small Wars Their Principles and Practice, University of Nebraska Press, pp 305, 257 & 293 and Skeen GEN Sir Andrew, 2008, Lessons in Imperial Rule Instructions for British Infantrymen on the Indian Frontier, Pen & Sword. Cairnes William E. (Ed.), 2004, Napoleon’s Military Maxims, Dover Publications, p 23 (Maxim XVI). 202 Essame H., 1972, The Battle For Europe, B.T.Batsford, pp 3 & 47. Also, Clausewitz C von, 1976, On War, ed & translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, p 185.

56 manifestation of the accepted adage that an individual is first defeated in their own mind. At a more drastic level the entity whose security is challenged will instinctively submit to the involuntary fight/flight response.203 It is obvious that the greater the shock that can be generated through surprising an opponent (via actions achieving deception as to quantity, speed, direction or time), the audacity of one’s actions or the nature of the threat (such as a bayonet charge) the greater the likelihood to submit to the involuntary fight/flight response. Ideally the default is to the flight part of the response; regardless of whether it is to freeze, submit or run away, rather than the fight portion. By being careful to craft a situation wherein it is more apparent to an opponent to reorientate through flight, and then ideally flee (reorientate) where, when and how you desire it, than fight, you stand a greater chance of gaining domination and a ‘win’. Invariably the crafting of a perception will involve deception; that is the exaggeration or withholding of information to a lesser or greater extent. Ideally, the resultant domination is enduring and effective as this prevents the relative strength status being repetitively challenged. However, what is crafted depends on the strategy that has driven the approach to the problem tactically speaking. For example, a policy or strategy of annihilation requires the opponent to stand and fight and thereby present a more efficient and effective opportunity for his elimination. Thus far however, it can be seen that in order to attain a condition of security one must have established an effect or a series of effects. Among the effects identified so far are audacity, shock and deception. These effects may also be considered as the precursors to a fight rather than the actual fight.

The means by which the fight is conducted is purely physical through application of one or another of the eight classical manoeuvres – that is; single penetration of a line, envelopment of a single flank, envelopment of both flanks, attack in oblique order, the feigned withdrawal, attack from a defensive position, the indirect approach and offensive revolutionary/ guerrilla warfare.204 The duration of the effort is dependent on human factors – strength, endurance, conditioning, health, and the human limitations, primarily of thirst and rest; all of which are tempered by conditioning

203 See Grossman LTCOL Dave, 2007, On Combat, PPCT Research Publications, p 14. 204 Chandler, ibid, see note 141.

57 and training. However, it is important to gain a physical success as early as possible as success breeds confidence, greater effort and thereby, greater success.205

Physical betterment is achieved through balancing firepower, mobility and protection.206 Any emphasis given to one aspect automatically comes at the expense of the others. In order to develop firepower, it is necessary to improve range, accuracy, rate of fire and target effect. To achieve the range, accuracy, etc. it is often important to achieve a better position demanding mobility or protection, either in isolation or combination. To move one must be able to move with alacrity necessitating a lessening of encumbrance – usually at the cost of an ability to engage with firepower or a lessening of protection (albeit movement provides its own protection). Similarly, protection invariably comes with a need to slow or become stationary in position. However, with this comes an ability to improve the accuracy and usually, the rate of firepower. Equally, protection also allows one to absorb a higher level of punishment thus allowing the attacker to wear themselves out making any counter attack launched by the defender more effective. Protection also allows one to buy time regardless of whether this is by trading space or not. The attainment of these three factors is then to be tempered by the creation of a dilemma to the enemy. By way of illustration it may vary as widely as the following two scenarios. If one were to engage an enemy with a weapon (such as airburst artillery) that provoked a response of seeking protected cover that protected cover would then be targeted by direct fire systems capable of their destruction once they were within that shelter. The dilemma then becomes a choice of which means to suffer under or to remove themselves from the situation by either flight or surrender. Similarly, an attacking force divides itself into two groups one moving toward the enemy on a convergent axis with fire delivered by the other group. This forces the enemy to divide the effect of his firepower while the whole of the fire of the two attacking groups is delivered against the one and same target. These examples illustrate how an effective decisive ratio of strength or capability [an effect], and therefore, security [the condition] is generated or negated.

205 Essame, ibid, p 104 – “One of the greatest stimulants to high morale is intelligent training; an even better stimulant is success.” 206 Haight COL David B., Laughlin COL Paul J. and Bergner CPT Kyle F., Armored Forces: Mobility, Protection and Precision Firepower Essential for Future, Armor November-December 2012 pp 5–8. This article is an example of the general military understanding of the relationship of these three factors to physical betterment in conflict.

It should also be noted that each of the effects generated comes at the cost of relative weight and risk. A high risk usually indicates a high pay off should it succeed. For example the provision of security through guards and other defence measures may come at a cost of available effort to attack; audacity may come at some considerable risk of vulnerability to oneself while engaging in the audacious act; focussed or concentrated effort may only be achievable through decentralised, disparate actions, and so on.207 As the matter under consideration is conflict, security must also be considered giving any and all opponents (inclusive of those of your own side who limit your actions or capabilities in any way), actual or potential, a vote. To do this security must be considered on the basis of what the essence of the conflict means to each party involved. Invariably this involves consideration of their relative strengths and weaknesses and what gives that strength or weakness. It also involves consideration of what worth or cost attainment of the decision is. These considerations need to be made in detail prior to the initiation of the action in which they apply.

The material within this section highlights the importance of an ability ‘to call the shots’; that is the having and retaining of initiative throughout the time taken to attain a decision. This then, is the fifth and final effect necessary to attain the condition of security. The five effects that together combine to generate the condition of security are shown below in Figure 5-1.

207 For a fuller discussion on these aspects see Luttwak Edward N., 2001, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press and Leonhard Robert R., 1994, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War, Praeger.

in order to EFFECTS CONDITIONS set

Audacity

Shock

Security Deception generates freedom of action to force a decision

Initiative

Decisive Ratio

Figure 5-1: Effects required to generate the condition of Security

Actions required to achieve the effects necessary for the condition of security

Any attempt to establish a completely exhaustive list of actions required to generate an effect will ultimately devolve into detail and context. To do so is beyond the scope of this research. As a default for this research project it is necessary only to establish a more generic grouping of actions that can then be fleshed out and applied more specifically to particular case studies as required. The actions for each effect necessary for the condition of security that now follows will be more specifically applied to the case study undertaken in a later chapter.

Audacity Audacity is defined as being bold, daring, spirited or adventurous.208 In a military sense it then suggests an undertaking that generates a sense of awe, bewilderment or surprise, decisiveness and inevitability in those observing it unfold or actually subject to the audacity. This, in turn, demands actions inclusive of decisiveness and leadership; preparation as embodied in thought, training, rehearsal; experience – vicarious or actual; situational awareness, as well as recognition and exploitation of a time window or opportunity.

Audacity is demonstrated by the fighting for the Belgian fortress Eben Emal in early May 1940.209 The fortress, which dominated the crossing of the Albert Canal, a 130 km long artificial waterway linking Liege and Antwerp, was assaulted by a glider borne force, the first glider landing at 0425h on 10 May 1940.210 The German force numbered 69 men as opposed to the approximately 1,000 Belgians manning the fort.211 Within the space of 20 minutes, 40 minutes less than that allocated to them to complete the task, the Germans had completed all assigned tasks and destroyed the main guns covering the bridges at Kanne, Vroenhoven and Veldwezelt.212 The basis of their success lay in the detailed planning and rehearsals leading up to the attack as well as the decisive leadership and determined commitment demonstrated throughout.213 The audacity of the assault generated through its speed, efficiency and method resulted in not only the fall of the fortress and its associated bridges but was also an immense psychological shock to the Allies who had counted on it holding up any German advance for at least five days.214

208 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 64. 209 The action is recounted in a range of references. Among them are Mrazek James E., 1972, The Fall of Eben Emal, Robert Hale London; Saunders Tim, 2005 Fort Eben Emal, Pen & Sword Military; McNab Chris, 2013, The Fall of Eben Emal Belgium 1940, Osprey; McRaven William H., 1996, Spec OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, Presidio; ; Kurowski Franz, 2010, Jump Into Hell German Paratroopers in World War II, Stackpole and Golla Karl-Heinz, 2012, The German Fallschirmtruppe 1936-41 It Genesis and Employment in the First Campaigns of the Wehrmacht, Helion. 210 McRaven, ibid, p 66. 211 It is difficult to determine the exact numbers involved. The German force assigned to the task numbered 86 men however two gliders were delayed for the initial assault, thus the 69 listed even though the full force was eventually involved. The Belgian numbers are harder to ascertain however the fort’s compliment on 9 May was listed as 1,198. Varying accounts suggest that several of this number was variously on leave, not able to be recalled into the fort on the sounding of the alert, etc. regardless, the fact remains that the German force negated a Belgian force more than ten times its number. 212 McRaven, ibid, p 66. 213 ibid, pp 39 – 45, 67 – 69. 214 Saunders, ibid, p 16,

Shock Shock is defined as a sudden and violent upset or fright, a physiological effect, a sudden collapse of the nervous mechanism caused by physical injury or strong emotional upset, to strike with intense surprise, to come into violent contact.215 In a military sense it suggests actions undertaken with such speed and violence as to convey the impression of inescapable, imminent doom or actually generate that result. German WW1 ‘combat experience had shown that sudden surprise fire, rather than prolonged engagements, best defeated attacks.’216 This observation led to an emphasis on forward areas being more lightly held and then, if taken by the enemy, subjected to immediate, violent counter attack. Invariably this resulted in the re-taking of the lost territory with minimal losses of men and materiel. The reason for this success rate was that the enemy attacking force was being hit when it was at the point of over-extension, when adrenaline was lower and their resources such as ammunition were diminished. This then meant that the shock of the counter attack was magnified, especially as it was of some significant mass, at short range, violent, noisy and at a time, place and speed from a direction that was likely unexpected.

A review of two counter attacks at Galatas during the Battle for Crete suffices to explain the effects of shock action on both sides. The events took place on the western edge of Galatas on the 25th and 27th of May 1941 respectively, after heavy fighting since 20 May when the Germans had originally attacked Crete.217 On 25 May, at around 8pm after being under a strong German attack since 4:30 pm, the New Zealand 18th Battalion launched a counter attack by two companies supported by two tanks. One of the leaders, Lieutenant Thomas recalled that the counter attack began as ‘the whole line seemed to break spontaneously into the most bloodcurdling of shouts and battle-cries. … the effect was terrific – one felt one’s blood rising swiftly above fear and uncertainty until only an inexplicable exhilaration quite

215 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 962. 216 English, ibid, p 85. 217 The action is recounted in a range of references. Among them are MacDonald Callum, 1995, The Lost Battle Crete1941, Papermac; Beevor Antony, 1992, Crete The Battle and the Resistance, Penguin; Long Gavin, 1962, Greece, Crete and Syria Official History Australia in the War of 1939- 1945 Series I Vol. II, Australian War Memorial; Simpson Tony, 1981, Operation Mercury The Battle for Crete, 1941, Hodder and Stoughton; Kurowski Franz, 2010, Jump Into Hell German Paratroopers in World War II, Stackpole and Golla Karl-Heinz, 2012, The German Fallschirmtruppe 1936-41 It Genesis and Employment in the First Campaigns of the Wehrmacht, Helion.

62 beyond description surpassed all else.’218 Forty years later another participant, Arthur Helm, recalled that ‘[t]hey put the fear of God into us as well as the Germans.’219 Thomas went on to recall that the Germans, as the New Zealanders advanced, ‘seemed to be in full flight. From doors, windows and roofs they swarmed wildly, falling over one another to clear our relentless line.’220 Later, on 27 May about 11 am, some 400 Germans were observed advancing astride the Suda Bay Road. On arrival at a depot the Germans became distracted through looting. At this point at least three companies, a mixture of the Australian 2/7th and New Zealand 28th (Maori) Battalions, rose from their positions and charged the Germans with the bayonet. The Germans ‘were taken by surprise, and, after a few minutes firing, broke and ran. …The advance continued for more than a mile.’221 It was estimated that some 280 Germans were killed and three taken prisoner while 52 Australians and New Zealanders became casualties, at least 10 of whom were killed. ‘The advancing Germans had received a severe shock, and made no further attack that day.’222

Deception Latimer, using the legend of the Trojan wooden horse and the account of Gideon and his band of 300 against the Midianite horde, shows the longevity and pervasiveness of deception in warfare.223 Deception is defined as the action of misleading by a false appearance or statement.224 Militarily, this suggests presentation of a force or capability contrary to what is actually available. The misleading presentation may assume one or more of several forms; that is, in timing, source, size or capability. The deception may be active; that is, one deliberately sets out to mislead: or passive; that is, one allows the opponent to see what they think they should be seeing; or, as Davies describes it – conceal, create, confuse.225

Deception may be achieved through diversion of an enemies’ attention, by the use of decoys and dummies, to demonstrate, disguise, substitute, control the release of

218 Simpson, ibid, pp 253, 254. 219 op cit. 220 op cit. 221 Long, ibid, pp 251 – 253. 222 op cit. 223 Latimer Jon, 2001, Deception in War, John Murray, p 6. For a detailed account of Gideon see the Holy Bible Judges Chapter 7. 224 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 269. 225 Davies Martin, 2009, ‘Conceal, Create, Confuse’ Deception as a British Battlefield Tactic in the First World War, Spellmount.

63 information and through counter-surveillance methods to deny observation. Examples of modern large scale deception operations involving all of these methods are Operation Bertram which preceded the Battle of El Alamein and Operation Fortitude which masked D-Day preparations.226 Regardless of which one or how many of these methods are employed it must be recognised that their use, if what they have to ‘sell’ is accepted by the enemy will result in an advantage that must then be exploited by initiative in the application of force noting that in recognising the value of deception one must also recognise the science that underpins its attainment and importance.

Initiative Initiative is defined as the ability or readiness to introduce or initiate action.227 In a military sense it then suggests both a desire and an ability to engage in physical conflict. Individually and collectively, desire and ability imply both confidence and situational awareness. Understanding and training underpins and enables both. Militarily, situational awareness is obtained through the provision of a range of early warning such as sentries, scouts and guards to the front, flanks and rear of forces as well as an insistence on particular routines in order to readily identify anomalies. Confidence is developed by rehearsals and the development and practice of contingency plans. As indicated all of this must be understood and practiced to a point of familiarity and precision inherent in instinctive behaviour and response. The net result of this is both an ability and willingness to initiate actions against an opponent.

Decisive ratio A ratio is defined as the relation between two similar magnitudes in respect to the number of times the first contains the second.228 Decisive is defined as the power or ability to attain a decision and end controversy.229 In a military sense it then suggests the amount of force that one opponent can bring to bear against another at the point of decision so as to attain a desired outcome. As discussed under the heading of initiative there must first be a willingness to engage in an action. That willingness is easier to garner if there is a capability to support it. For this reason

226 For Operation Bertram see Thomas Graham, 2014, Deception in the Desert – Operation BERTRAM, The British Army Review 162, pp94 – 105. For Operation Fortitude see Barbier Mary Kathryn, 2007, D-Day Deception Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion, Stackpole. 227 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 541. 228 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 867. 229 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 270.

64 morale, leadership/decisiveness together with training and fitness are precursors to attainment of a decisive ratio. It must also be noted that each and every one of these factors are born of understanding and training. Thereafter, this may then be applied through the generation of the numbers, capabilities in appropriate formations at the point of decision and the point of suppression in order to enable manoeuvre using an effective speed and type of movement. Invariably, determination of these requirements will be based on adequate intelligence and understanding of the situation.

Recognition of the value of the effects of audacity, shock, deception, initiative and decisive ratios must also include appreciation of the science that underpins their attainment. As stated previously, the actions required to generate the five effects necessary to set the condition of security will vary according to context and situation.

Simplicity

Human conflict inevitably draws in more than two protagonists. Henderson argues that once conflict becomes organised it is deemed to be war as it is no longer ‘a blind struggle between mobs of individuals, without guidance or coherence, but a conflict of well-organised masses, moving with a view to intelligent co-operation, acting under the impulse of a single will, and directed against a definite objective.’230 Organization requires command (authority), coordination and control as these enable regulation of the tempo of actions as well as the exploitation of opportunities and curtailment of threats inherent in effective reactions. Underpinning and enabling command, control and co-ordination is communication. However, communication is not just a physical means by which information is passed between individuals. It must be accepted that the complexity of communication is dependent on the nature of the relationships involved. Of primary importance in any relationship is the issue of trust, an ability to liaise candidly as well as the ability to communicate abstract and complex thoughts.

The level of trust has a significant impact on the latitude of action granted and therefore degree of control imposed and, consequently, the condition of simplicity.

230 Henderson, ibid, p 1.

The relationship is demonstrated by a review of the strategic–tactical level interaction impacting on the German Navy’s Pacific Squadron during WW1.231 Admiral von Spee, commander of the German Pacific Squadron, was initially given latitude to carry out ‘cruiser warfare’ to damage British trade and, if conditions were favourable, to strike enemy forces and establish maritime supremacy in that region unless ordered otherwise.232 However, after his success at the Battle of Coronel he was then restricted by orders from Berlin. The subsequent delay this imposed in getting further orders then set him at a disadvantage for the battle resulting in his eventual defeat near the Falkland Islands.233 Equally, a review of Hitler’s involvement in the operations on the Eastern Front of WW2 in Russia highlight the same situation on land at a different time involving different technologies. Competing political and economic objectives highlighting an incoherent strategic aim, together with an obsession about the security of his southern flank, left Hitler in a decisional dilemma. That translated into him demanding a shift in resources from a thrust against Moscow (political objective) to one against the Ukraine (economic objective) that generated a delay which exacerbated the effect of the impending winter. Ultimately, while attaining a massive victory in the Ukraine, he never attained Moscow, having to eventually retreat back to Germany and accept defeat. The conflict, and consequent control and sustainment issues, that these changes in effort generated for his subordinate commanders is both well documented and evident in their subsequent behaviours – all of which multiplied complexity.234

Another example of the importance of simplicity as a condition necessary to attain a decision is the battle for Palembang in Sumatra during WW2.235 The Japanese invasion plan depended on the seizure of two objectives: the airfield by paratroops and their link up with river-borne infantry to seize the town of Palembang and its associated oil and mineral wealth before continuance of an advance south to Java. While the river-borne assault was nearly annihilated the airfield fell after what can only be described as a debacle complicated by the presence of different nationalities, branches of service (army, navy and air force), civil authorities and confusion as to

231 McNally Michael, 2012, Coronel and Falklands 1914, Osprey. 232 ibid, p 12. 233 ibid, p 36. 234 Carrell Paul, 1971, Hitler’s War on Russia Vol. 1 Hitler Moves East, Corgi Books, pp 30-31, 125- 129. 235 See Kelly Terrence, 1985, Battle for Palembang, Robert Hale, London.

66 responsibilities, roles, authorities and integration of effort. The net outcome of the resultant confusion was dissolution of any ability to react appropriately to enemy action, control events or generate any tempo at all.

Perhaps more importantly, these case studies highlight that any assessment of effectiveness cannot be one sided; that is, it must be a comparative assessment of all parties involved. Inherent in this approach is an awareness of the philosophical approach on which each participant has based their efforts. This issue of effectiveness is often addressed via discussion on the relative superiority of a particular side in a particular conflict such as that of German or British/Allied arms in both World Wars.236 In the case of German/British/Allied military effectiveness the discussion is frequently distilled down to one side or the other having an approach founded on a belief that war is chaotic while the other saw it as being structured. This, in turn, is exemplified in the command system that either side then employed. The two options are essentially restrictive, centralised control or directive control which allows decentralised exploitation of initiative by subordinates.

However, both approaches can produce internal frictions that aid the enemy rather than generating unified action against that enemy. The missing element that minimises the possibility of friction is how situations are understood, terms defined and intentions communicated. These give simplicity of communication through provision and use of a mutually accepted and understood language, method of operation and division of responsibility. Calwell strongly argued for ‘balanced forces capable of independent action’ (emphasis supplied) whose leaders were to be capable of understanding “how to depart from the plan of operations on their own responsibility, if the general situation appears to have altered.’237 Inherent in this is realisation of the fact that men whose ideas are accepted will feel a higher sense of participation in the achievements of an organisation of which they are members.238

236 A small sample of works addressing this question is Van Creveld Martin, 1982, Fighting Power German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, Greenwood Press; Dupuy T.N., 1995, A Genius for War The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, Hero Books and Mosier John, 2002, The Myth of The Great War, Perennial. 237 Calwell, ibid, p 142. 238 This is covered in some detail in a range of leadership and management texts. For the purpose of this research but one example is provided by Australian Army publication Land Warfare Doctrine 0.0 Command, Leadership and Management which cite that a distinctive feature of the Australian

According to Samuels, the ability to generate such leaders is entirely dependent on the philosophy of the organisation from which they are drawn.239 That philosophy will invariably be based on a concept of how conflict is to be ‘managed’. These, in turn, are based on concepts of rhythm, tempo, the fleeting nature of opportunities and ability to quickly and appropriately respond to them and trust.240 Excellent examples of battle ‘management’ are provided by consideration of the attack on the Dujaila Redoubt during the advance to relieve the Turkish siege of Kut-al-Amara on 8 March 1916 and, in particular of the difference between the early and latter stages, within essentially a 24 hour period, of the battle for Goose Green during the 1982 Falkland Islands War.241 The orders for the attack on the Dujaila Redoubt were assessed as having ‘had a paralysing effect’ on the subordinate commanders involved.242 The battle for Goose Green involved two different commanders; the first being LTCOL H. Jones up until the time of his death and, subsequently, MAJ C. Keeble, as the second in command, taking control from that point. Under Jones the focus was on controlling the battle in accordance with a predetermined set of phases, timings, etc; under Keeble, generating advantage through reaction to where progress was being made and Argentinean actions indicating a mental state of doubt, uncertainty and reticence.243

The material within this section highlights the importance of an ability to enable and regulate the execution of the decision in as simple and straightforward, uncomplicated way as possible. The effects that provide the condition of simplicity approach is to emphasis the role of individual initiative (p1-5), partly through recognition of individual efforts (p1-9). 239 Samuels Martin, 1995, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888 – 1918, Frank Cass, pp 282-285. 240 This is best understood in terms of comments by Zabecki in his introduction to (but on especially p9 & 10) Truppenfuhrung, the German Army manual for unit command in WW2 that it was not a “‘cookbook’ on how to win battles, but rather was it was designed to give them a set of intellectual tools to be applied to complex and ever-unique warfighting situations.” Quoting American officers CAPT Hartness and Wedemeyer respectively, he continues that “[t]he decision, the reaching of a workable solution is the objective.” and; “[b]etter a faulty plan or decision permeated with boldness, daring, and decisiveness, than a perfect plan enmeshed with uncertainty.” This must be aligned with the summary sentence of the original Introduction (p 19) which is emphasised and states that “[t]he first criterion in war remains decisive action.” 241 For Kut-al-Amara see Gardner Nikolas, 2014, The Seige of Kut-al-Amara At War in Mesopotamia 1915 – 1916, Indiana University Press, p 129. For Goose Green see Fitz-Gibbon Spencer, 1995, Not Mentioned in Despatches: The History and Mythology of the Battle of Goose Green, The Lutterworth Press, Cambridge, pp 17-21, 49-50 and 134-184. Also see Adkin Mark, 1992, Goose Green: A Battle is Fought to be Won, BCA, London which is quoted in part by Fitz-Gibbon. 242 Gardner, ibid, p 129. 243 Fitz-Gibbon, ibid, p 11.

68 are fourfold – the ability to independently command, to maintain control, regulation of tempo and an ability to react effectively. In turn, these effects are generated by a range of actions. The four key effects necessary to regulate the execution of a decision generate the condition of simplicity are shown below in Figure 5-2.

in order to EFFECTS CONDITIONS set

Command

Control

Simplicity provides the means to Tempo generate and execute the decision

Reaction

Figure 5-2: Effects required to generate the condition of Simplicity

Actions required to achieve the effects necessary for the condition of simplicity

Command Command is defined as having the authority to direct actions or others in a particular domain, function or activity.244 Command then is the allocation of authority for a span of tasking, granting latitude of action and allocation of resources as well as a structure to exercise that command. Henderson argues that a sound system of command must be based on three facts: a force ‘cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from a headquarters’; ‘that the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation’ and; ‘that intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience.’245 This then is based on three requirements: that the

244 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 208. 245 Henderson, ibid, p 4.

69 difference between orders and intentions were understood and applied – the difference being that orders were only ever issued by the commander on the spot everything else was to be an instruction conveying intent; that all officers were trained to act independently within this system and; that ‘any spirit of rash and selfish enterprise was discouraged to the utmost.’246

Control Control is defined as an ability to exert restraint or direction over someone or an activity.247 Inherent in this is an ability to communicate ideas, concepts, intentions and requirements. In a military sense this demands the dictation of coordination measures such as the setting of boundaries of responsibility, allocation of routes and the accord of priorities for their use, etc. It also requires the allocation of objectives, tasks and phases. All of these measures should simplify and clarify the situation for subordinates and enable effective ‘management’ of operations. The more difficult or complex they are, the greater the degree of difficulty to communicate them and therefore the greater the risk of confusion in their formulation, transmission, comprehension or enactment. In order to limit that risk of confusion these ideas, concepts, intentions and requirements, while remaining complex, must be able to be communicated simply in a common, mutually defined and agreed language.

Tempo Tempo is defined as a particular rate, rhythm or pattern of activity.248 In keeping with Henderson’s opinion that ‘[u]nder modern conditions the inexperienced commander will not be granted time in which to correct his deficiencies and give himself and his troops needful practice’ a commander must prepare in advance by thought, training and rehearsal for what is demanded or likely in the future.249 Attainment of tempo demands that all actions be correctly sequenced or synchronised within an overall timeframe to achieve the desired effect.

A review of the battle of Midway suffices to highlight not only the difficulties inherent in achieving tempo via sequence and synchronisation but also the

246 ibid, p 6. 247 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 228. 248 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 1071. 249 Henderson, ibid, p 2.

70 interactions between them together with their benefits when attained.250 It is of interest that the Japanese war games prior to the commencement of the operation highlighted all the issues that arose during the battle – however, they were ignored.251

Reaction Reaction is defined as an action in response to a stimulus, influence or other event.252 In a military sense any reaction to either opportunities or threats must be timely and effective. To be timely and effective there must be an ability to identify changes in enemy posture or action and then be able to understand what those changes mean. Such foresight not only presupposes observation and deduction, in essence intelligence, but also reinforces that the observer has an understanding of military science and an operational framework on which to base those observations and consequent assessment. Thereafter, this gives an ability to retain calm control and buy time provided that sufficient reserves to implement the changes required to conduct or complete an effective reaction are at hand. As illustrated at Midway, an ability to react has strong linkages to an effective command and control capability as well as an understanding and ability to dictate tempo.

Sustainment

There is an old adage to the effect that any fool can get into a fight but that it takes some thought, effort and skill to stay in it longer than your opponent. Put simply this is sustainment. Critical to attainment of the condition of sustainment is an ability to not only match an opponent’s ability in this area but either counteract or surpass it. Therefore, sustainment can be developed in three ways: through the provision of requisite materiel and support, through an ability to apply pressure or an ability to bear the costs incurred. In turn, these effects are generated by a range of actions requiring quality planning and pre-emptive thought to ensure the flow of resources to the decisive point in time and appropriate quantities.

250 A small selection of source material on the battle is: Sakai Saburo, 1966, Samurai, Four Square War; Fuchida Mitsuo & Okumiya Masatake, 2002, Midway The Japanese Story, Cassell; Stille Mark, 2007, USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers The Pacific 1942, Osprey; Chandler David G. (ed), 2009, Midway 1942 Turning-point in the Pacific, Osprey and Parshall Jonathan and Tully Anthony, 2007, Shattered Sword The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, Potomac Books. 251 Fuchida & Okumiya, ibid, pp 123 – 128. 252 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 870.

Actions required to achieve the effects necessary for the condition of sustainment

Support Those directly involved in conflict cannot be responsible for their own sustainment, and even if so in part, they cannot be responsible for its entirety. Support is defined as the provision of those things necessary for existence, to give help, strength and courage.253 George Orwell is attributed with having stated that the essential act of war is destruction, not necessarily of human lives, but of the products of human labour.254 Henderson understood war as first a matter of movement, second, as a matter of supply and third, as a matter of destruction.255 In a military sense this means that support is the provision of that which enables and sustains combat capability throughout an operation inclusive of an ability to rapidly reorganise, reconstitute and reconfigure for what is to immediately follow thereafter.

Support then is the key effect that must be generated to ensure sustainability in any conflict. Consideration must be given to what is necessary to sustain one’s own forces (food, fuel, ammunition, medical, maintenance, delivery media, etc) for as long as is required given all potential adverse factors (terrain, weather and other ‘uninvolved’ players such as contractors, suppliers, one’s own populace and politicians). Equally, the support provided must address the entire span of the action or battle which it supports. Invariably this will require consideration and an ability to forecast and fulfil demands for reinforcement of men and materiel as well as the evacuation, treatment and reconstitution of casualties, again, of both men and materiel. It will also include the provision of reserves of combat capability together with the effective committal of them into the fray as, where and when required via methods such as a counter-attack.

All aspects of this support must then be provided with protection in order that it can fulfil the support role. At times this protection may be provided by them being physically located far from harm. This then produces a requirement to transport the means of support forward to and rearward safely from the fight.

253 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 1048. 254 No specific source identified. 255 Henderson, ibid, p 1.

Inherent in support are the human factors that result in the maintenance of morale. Among them are relationships with allies, home country political and popular support, inclusive of the media by which that support is generated and maintained, as well as the provision of adequate rest, hydration and sustenance for the individual soldiers involved.

Pressure Pressure is defined as the application of force by one opponent against another.256 Here, pressure must be understood in two mutually supportive planes; the physical and mental. In a military sense this suggests an ability to not only apply force but to persevere in its application as well as an ability to absorb that force which is applied against it by an opponent. Just as our sustainment is generated and maintained so too can the opponents’ sustainment be targeted through the application of sustained pressure. This application or absorption of pressure may be broadly summed up as the relative attrition of resources or persistence in effort such that own force physical and mental are preserved while those of the enemy are eroded.

Physically pressure can be achieved through an overmatch of numbers or capability or through a process of attrition. Psychologically, it can be generated through a variety of alternatives being applied in concert, either in sequence or simultaneously. Equally it can be generated through persistent, relentless effort that denies the enemy respite, recovery or realignment while simultaneously allowing our own forces respite, recovery and realignment.

Ultimately, pressure via persistence in effort is a result of determination. Determination draws on levels of confidence. Confidence, in turn, is due to a range of actions tied to personality, experience, training, past success, motivation and the perceived or actual attainment of dominance as well access to resources. Accounts such as that of the German efforts to breakthrough Soviet defences across the Perekop Isthmus and the subsequent reduction of the Sevastopol fortress demonstrate that greater pressure will be exerted when the degree of confidence is greater.257

256 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p 825. 257 See Sweeting C.G., 2004, Blood and Iron The German Conquest of Sevastopol, Brassey’s Inc. pp 33-83; Forczyk Robert, 2008, Sevastopol 1942 Von Manstein’s Triumph, Osprey; McTaggart Patrick,

Cost Tied to both sustainment and the persistence of pressure is the issue of cost, both local and total. Cost is defined as the price paid to get, make, do or maintain something.258 In a military sense it then suggests a quantification of effort expended in manpower and materiel relative to the benefit derived from that expenditure in a ratio to similar calculations for the opposing force. This invariably involves consideration of what residual resources and thereafter, capability, are left to continue on to the next decision and ultimately to attainment of higher operational objectives and the strategic aim. Equally important and inherent in this is the resultant motivation to persist with combat and conflict. Perhaps the most immediate consideration is whether or not the actual decision in question has been achieved. Finally, as already alluded, has the outcome cost, or conversely, gained something in terms of a second or third order effect.

Cost is well illustrated in many case studies involving airborne forces at Crete, Arnhem and Dien Bien Phu. Each of these battles consumed significant resources, principally aerial firepower and transport, to achieve success at the point of decision. However, all came undone as the action continued. The reasons for this varied. In Crete it was due to losses of transport airframes through enemy action and separation of successive waves due to refuelling difficulties and closure of airfields because of the dust clouds generated on sub-standard strips in Greece and an inability to reinforce by sea passage.259 In Arnhem it was due to a combination of weather, German anti-aircraft defences and Allied decisions regarding firepower support. 260

2005, Siege! Six Epic Eastern Front Assaults of World War II, J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.; Manstein Field Marshal Erich von, 2004, Lost Victories, Zenith Press pp 204-259 and Melvin Mungo, 2011, Manstein Hitler’s Greatest General, Phoenix, pp 227-273. 258 Macquarie Pocket Dictionary, Third edition, 1998, Jacaranda, p237. 259 Golla, pp 403 – 536 See also Hetherington John, 1971, Airborne Invasion The story of the Battle of Crete, Sphere Books; Thomas David, 1999, Crete 1941 the battle at sea, Efstathiadis Group; Comeau M.G., 1961, Operation Mercury An airman in the Battle of Crete, Kimber Pocket Editions; Clark Allan, 2000, The Fall of Crete, Efstathiadis Group; MacDonald Callum, 1993, The Lost Battle Crete 1941, Papermac; Simpson Tony, 1981, Operation Mercury The Battle for Crete 1941, Hodder and Stoughton; 260 Robert J. Kershaw, 2007, ‘It never snows in September.’ The German view of MARKET-GARDEN and The Battle of Arnhem, September 1944, Ian Allan Publishing, pp 303-314; Buckingham William F., 2004, Arnhem 1944, Tempus, pp 227-235; McManus John C., 2013, September Hope The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, NAL Caliber, pp 436-437; Powell Geoffrey, 1984, The Devil’s Birthday The Bridges to Arnhem 1944, Buchan and Enright; and Bennett David, 2008, A Magnificent Disaster The Failure of Market Garden The Arnhem Operation September 1944, Casemate, pp 191- 202

In Dien Bien Phu it was a similar situation.261 However, in all three cases it may be summarised as being an inability to win the reinforcement race at the point of decision. Ultimately, none of the situations in these case studies resulted in a sustainable activity in the immediate or longer term senses. However, the cost was not felt just at the local level. It extended more widely to the extent of causing the discontinuance of employment of airborne assaults and limiting what could be achieved in subsequent campaigns (Crete) and in the case of Dien Bien Phu, the outcome of the war. Overall, these operations only served to dissipate strength and tactical skill.

As the saying goes “there is a little of the whore in all of us” – the principle is established but the price must be fixed and agreed. Here the price is a clear picture of what defines success which must be established before initiation of the first move, be that an action or reaction. Nobody entering into a fight should be placed in a position at its conclusion to say something similar to that uttered by Hezbollah Leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah. In an interview with Lebanon’s NTV Television Station regarding the 34-day War between Israel and Hezbollah in July and August 2006 he stated ‘We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 … that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.’

Another facet of cost that must be considered is that of linkage to operational and strategic issues. But one example of a tactical action undermining the attainment of subsequent operational objectives is that of Carlson’s raid on Maikin Island in 1942. This action highlighted the security risk of the Japanese island outposts to Allied capabilities resulting in the development of substantial defences on each that had to then be reduced by costly direct amphibious assaults over the next two years. Interestingly, the raid was seen as a ‘test exercise’, the raiding force involved was considered expendable and the risk of the loss of a submarine, the delivery means for the raiding force, was rated as moderate compared with the diversion it would create to the Guadalcanal landings.262 Other examples include the German persistence with

261 Windrow Martin, 2004, The Last Valley Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam, Da Capo Press, pp 538-544. 262 Rottman Gordon L., 2014, Carlson’s Marine Raiders Maikin Island 1942, Osprey p 26.

75 air sustainment of surrounded forces in Russia such as at Cholm, Demyansk, and eventually, Stalingrad.263 Ultimately, these efforts resulted in the erosion of their air transport capability specifically and their airpower generally. In all cases an earlier decision to cease these efforts based on a better cost appreciation would have resulted in a more effective response later in the war.

Cost also involves examples where soldiers have given, indeed sacrificed, themselves in order that these other higher objectives can be attained. But two examples are the Spartans at Thermopylae and the German 6th Army at Stalingrad.264 Another, more recent, example of this two or three tiered sacrifice is that of MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randy Shugart in their efforts to assist the crew of the downed Blackhawk Super Six-Four when it was shot down over Mogadishu, Somalia on 03 October 1993.265 It is important to note that the costs incurred must address sustainment of psychological and motivational factors, ethics, capability and cohesiveness.

Equally, cost must be factored against the attainment of the factors of security and simplicity. The sinking of the British battleships Repulse and Prince of Wales off Malaya (10 Dec 1941) together with that of the Japanese Yamanto by the Americans off Okinawa (7 Apr 1945) during WW2 illustrates the point. The Japanese attacked the two British ships with a total of 88 planes; 32 of which were either lost (4 – 4.5% of the total force) or damaged (28) [a total 36.3% cost]. Conversely the Americans attacked with 200 planes of which ten were lost [a total 5% cost].266 The differential in ratio can be explained due to the range at which the battles occurred as well as the time available to coordinate the assaults. In both examples the psychological gain achieved by the destruction of the battleships was immense; the Yamanto being exponentially greater due to the small loss ratio sustained by the Americans while

263 See Mark Jason D., 2011, Besieged The Epic Battle for Cholm, Leaping Horseman Books; Forczyk Robert, 2012, Demyansk 1942-43 The frozen fortress, Osprey and Hayward Joel S.A., 1998, Stopped at Stalingrad The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-43, University of Kansas Press 264 Here the meaning intended is that of the surrender or destruction of something highly prized or desirable for the sake of something considered as having a higher or more pressing claim. a surrender of or permit injury or disadvantage to for the sake of something more desirable or of preventing some evil; Macquarie Concise Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 2009, Macquarie Publishing, p1109, entry sacrifice. 265 Durant Michael J., In The Company of Heroes, 2003, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 266 Strategy and Tactics Number 292, May–Jun 2015, p 62.

76 the effect of the loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales was magnified by there being no wider knowledge at the time of the Japanese losses. In both cases a decisive ratio was achieved however, in the case of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, the Japanese sacrificed the effects of audacity, shock and deception in order to apply pressure and gain a higher-level outcome of greater value (local sea control and an illusion of invincibility in the eyes of their opponents) at what ultimately was an acceptable cost at that time of the war.

These examples also highlight the importance of the issue of time. Invariably it appears the more prolonged an issue to achieve resolution the greater the cost incurred. However, while some techniques such as ambushing and raiding lend themselves to short term engagements the strategy in which they are nested such as that of the ancient Roman Fabian against the Carthaginian Hannibal in the Second Punic War (218-202 BC) to hold in contact but denial of decisive engagement are beneficial only while the capital of strength remains.267 In the case of Fabian, he maintained an ability to sustain (preserve) and secure his force while that of Hannibal diminished steadily over time. However, ultimately, anticipated costs as well as those actually incurred must be sustainable and effective in gaining the desired outcome even if it is only time.

In summary, the effects necessary to set the condition of sustainment are represented in Figure 5-3 below.

267 This is the so-called Fabian strategy.

required to in order to ACTIONS EFFECTS CONDITION generate set

Support

Sustainability

Pressure those resources necessary to enable and sustain the forcing of a decision

Cost

Figure 5-3: Effects required to generate the condition of Sustainment

Chapter Six – Theory proposal

Every case study has indicated that military action, regardless of type, intensity, scale or duration, is undertaken in order to achieve an outcome (attain a decision) – be that to seize an objective, destroy capability, impose delay or provoke a particular response.268 The highest order, the strategic aim, dictates what is desired and why. The outcomes (decisions to be attained) are never in isolation or absolute; they have precursors, consequences and implications. These precursors, consequences and implications relate to objectives derived from the strategic aim.269 An objective, the immediate higher order to an outcome, provides the focus on what allows, inhibits or prevents attainment (generally either a capability, terrain, weather, or information) of what is desired and thereby gives the effect (find, fix, guard, grow, modify or eliminate) which must be achieved. It then follows that effective lower order actions which attain the outcome (decision) in question must retain alignment or interact with pertinent intermediate objectives and the highest-level strategic aim throughout as anything else amounts to nugatory, wasteful effort. Therefore, attainment of a decision is seen to be the sum of two lower order aspects together with their relationship to higher objectives as shown in Figure 6-1 below.

268 In On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, Clausewitz notes that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” 269 As discussed in Chapter Two see Bell Christopher M., 2013, Churchill & Sea Power, Oxford University Press, pp 288–302 for an overview of the impact of a strategy (the Middle and Modified Middle Strategies of WW2 in Asia and the SW Pacific) on the operational objectives and subsequently, the tasks and techniques required. Another good example is Simpson Emile, 2013, War From the Ground Up Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics, Scribe.

Actions E ffects C onditions required Decision Objectives to in order in order to necessary to inherent in generate to set achieve attain Strategic AIM

What is desir ed and why BASED ON Beliefs Identity The focus of a decision tha t tar gets Survival what allows, inhi bits needs or pr events attainment of what i s desir ed and the under lying effec t to be achieved

Figure 6-1: Decision Model

The first lower order aspect involves those actions which generate the effects (something generated by a range of actions undertaken in concert) that, in turn, set the conditions necessary to achieve the decision as shown in the solid isosceles [red] triangles.

The second lower order aspect is the sum of three conditions – the freedom of action to attain the decision, an ability to generate, control and execute attainment of the decision and having the resources necessary to enable the forcing of the decision and then maintain sufficient capacity for as long as is required thereafter (depicted in the dotted [green] equilateral triangle).

The first consequence of this theory proposal is that tactics cannot be reduced to competency in a particular skill, drill, technique, procedure or manoeuvre. Rather it dictates that the sum of actions creates effects and conditions that contribute to the final outcome while recognising a direct relationship to higher order objectives and an overall aim. The linkage between the two: the sum of actions and the higher order is a desired outcome; a particular decision being sought. Given the plethora of linkages involved tactics cannot be the result of a simple lineal, mechanical process.

Rather, tactics must be the result of relationships that are best understood within a framework involving reaction to a range of inputs.

As attainment of a decision involves everything from actions to attainment of the decision this should be understood as being the realm of tactics. Therefore, strategy encompasses everything from the strategic aim down to the point of decision but not inclusive of its attainment.

Case studies – Decision Model

The utility of the decision model and attainment of the three conditions of security, simplicity and sustainment is reinforced by several authors. Trinquier, recounting the Algerian War, wrote ‘[i]n the unprotected regions that comprise the major portion of the national territory, particularly the vast area of inhabited countryside where police forces are small or non-existent, terrorist action encounters no opposition at the beginning of a conflict and is most effective. Isolated raids first reveal the existence of a partially organized movement. These attract attention and promote caution amongst the populace. Then, selective terrorism begins to eliminate lesser persons of influence, petty bureaucrats and various police officials who did not understand the first warnings or were slow to react to them. Administrative cadres are restrained or eliminated. The silence and collusion of the unprotected civilians have been won. Agents of the enemy have free hand to organise and manipulate the population at will.’270 In this case the insurgents have the security to impose and then consolidate control. The consolidation of control translates into sustainability of the insurgency through compliance. The matter is confirmed by the comments of a German officer operating against partisans in Greece in 1943 who reported that ‘only after German troops posted armed guards, thus establishing security, could the population be influenced against the guerrillas.’271 He went on to reinforce that the security provided had to be ongoing in order to maintain (sustain) their influence. As demonstrated by Kalyvas a similar conclusion is derived from multiple case studies of insurgency and civil wars ranging across the globe throughout the last two

270 Trinquier Roger, 1964, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, Praeger, pp 18, 19. 271 Kalyvas Stathis N., 2006, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Cambridge University Press, p 262.

81 centuries.272 Kalyvas concludes that the level of violence in these conflicts is directly related to the level of control which in turn is related to the level of security which, in turn, is related to the allocation of resources to attain and maintain that security.273 Put simply, regardless of the nature of the conflict, attainment of a decision is dependent upon the simultaneous setting of the three conditions of security, simplicity and sustainment. What remains open to conjecture is to what extent or how fully these conditions are achieved by the effects and actions that underpin them.

The relationship of actions, effects, conditions, their attainment and success

Overall, the sum of attainment of each of the scientifically based conditions of security, simplicity and sustainment will result in a decision being enacted; that is evident via an action or inaction (i.e.: a decision to delay the implementation of a particular action) noting that the actual detail of the action will vary according to the opponent, terrain, timings, technologies, training (experience) and other pertinent factors that prevail at that point in time. This objective and quantifiable analysis would therefore identify the likelihood of success as well as be used as the basis of any relative assessment of efficiency. Therefore, if any given plan to attain a decision is reviewed, either pre- or post the event, the ‘winner’ will have more consistently and objectively attained the sum of each of the three conditions of security, simplicity and sustainment than their opponent. This cannot be undertaken as a lockstep, mechanical process but must reflect consideration and weighting of the matter at hand. Such consideration must address what actions are required to be enacted in order to generate those effects that will achieve the desired conditions in the context in question. Included in that consideration are questions as to why a particular effect is to be generated in a particular priority or weighted against others and why that weighting or priority is necessary. Invariably the answers to the last two questions address key matters of what resources (money, manpower, time, technologies, etc.) are available, the risks that are acceptable as well as the strategic stake (belief, identity, survival) and relative worth involved. These will now be tested via consideration of a comprehensive case study in the next chapter.

272 ibid, pp 213 – 245. 273 ibid, pp 217-218.

Chapter Seven – Theory Test Case Study – The Battle for Gona

Introduction

This case study reviews a battle at the end of the Kokoda Campaign in Papua New Guinea during WW2. It involved the reduction of one of the three separate but linked Japanese defensive positions based on Gona, Buna and Sanananda, all of which are on the coast of Oro Bay in the Solomon Sea. The Battle for the Beachheads (Gona, Buna and Sanananda) lasted from 16 November 1942 until 22 January 1943. In what was a simultaneous three-pronged assault, the Australian 25th Brigade was tasked to reduce the Gona position while Sanananda and Buna were to be simultaneously reduced by joint US and Australian forces. The Battle for Gona involved essentially symmetric forces of the Australian and Japanese armies.

Application of the Decision Model and Relationship Matrix to the Case Study

This case study seeks to assess the utility of the decisional and relationship framework as a means to understand a conflict situation and describe tactics. It addresses the actions, effects and conditions involved in attainment of the tactical objective while remaining mindful of the strategic aim and campaign/operational objectives involved. In order to demonstrate this thesis’ theory of relationships, this case study must show that individual actions nest within a construct of the decision model and the relationship matrix. Specifically, the commanders under consideration must demonstrate that they had identified the essence of the problem confronting them – that is they identified the key decision sought at both the strategic and tactical levels and that their consequent actions simultaneously achieved alignment as well as advantage at both levels. This should translate into achieving the security, simplicity and sustainment conditions necessary for the attainment of the relevant decisions. Attainment of decisions should also confirm the scientific foundation of tactics as well as demonstrating that while tactical execution is best generated from the ground up rather than dictated down from above the parameters of that execution are established within the strategic aim and operational objectives.

Environment

The area of the Battle for the Beachheads was some 38 square km along approximately 19 km of coastline.274 Gona is located on the western flank of this area.

The area, on a flat low-lying coastal plain, is characterized by a mixture of swamp, scrub, jungle, kunai grass patches and coconut groves, some of which around Buna were plantations.275 The coconut groves extended some 100 metres inland. Dispersed among the coconuts were banyan and other trees having dense foliage and protruding buttress roots. The swamps, usually tidal, varied in size and depth, were bordered by sago and mangroves and constituted an obstacle to movement. The jungle and scrub was of sufficient height and density to obscure observation from both the ground and the air. The kunai (grass) patches were thick, rose some two metres high and, due to their sharp edges, were both stifling and an obstacle to easy passage.

The battle was fought during the tropical monsoonal wet season across the months of November, December and January. This resulted in high temperatures, high humidity, high daily rainfall, especially around 4pm and a constant smell of rotting vegetation. The area was rife with environmentally linked diseases such as scrub typhus, dengue fever, malaria and fungal infections of several kinds.

Gona was centered on an Anglican Mission station located near the mouth and some 90 metres east of Gona Creek. Gona Creek is sufficiently wide and deep at this point to constitute a military obstacle. The area around the Mission was dominated by two areas of jungle and scrub to the south and south-east. The area to its west was more open being covered by coconuts, banyans and patches of kunai. The area also incorporated at least two significant swamps. The mission, located some 100 metres inland from the coast, consisted of a church, hospital, school, other buildings and native huts.276 The coast in the area is shallow limiting close inshore navigation to small craft. Running due south of the Mission is the Gona-Jumbora Track which leads eventually to Soputa and Popondetta. The nearest airfield of any capability is at

274 Brune Peter, 1994, Gona’s Gone! The Battle for the Beach-head 1942, Allen & Unwin, p 21. 275 ibid, pp 21-22. 276 ibid, pp 22, 23.

Popondetta some 20 km inland.277 Between it and Gona lay the Allied force’s main administrative area and headquarters, some 10 km inland at Soputa.278

Since 22 June 1942, the Japanese had built hundreds of well-camouflaged, reinforced bunkers in mutually supporting positions blocking all available approaches.279 Approximately 900 men were entrenched at Gona around the Mission in a compact box approximately 400 metres square with their backs to the sea, their right flank resting on Gona Creek some 90 metres to the west and with most of their defensive works and bunkers facing to the south and east.280 The Japanese defences were ‘a masterly combination of the use of the military potential of the ground and the allocation of the available defenders.’281 Their fire plan concentrated on three key areas. The first area consisted of numerous machine gun posts in a giant L stretching for approximately 100 metres along the eastern bank of Gona Creek to its mouth and from there along the coast to Small Creek, some 1200 metres to the west. Each of these posts was, in turn, reinforced by slit trenches that supporting infantry would occupy as and when needed. Closer to the Mission these individual positions were incorporated and connected via a double trench system.282 The second position, of similar construction, formed a semi-circle around the south-east to eastern sides of the Mission. The third position was located at the southern edge of the smaller patch of scrub between Gona Creek and the Gona-Jumbora Track. All of these posts and positions were mutually supportive being capable of bringing fire to bear in support of their neighbours. The Japanese had cleared patches of kunai to provide view onto designated killing grounds. All the positions were well camouflaged and well protected such that only a direct hit from an aerial bomb or artillery round would destroy them.283 Complementing these defences was the extensive use of snipers positioned in trees. The net result was a strong defensive system at least three layers deep, mutually supported and reinforced by the use of interior lines of

277 Bradley Phillip, 2012, Hell’s Battlefield The Australians in New Guinea in World War II, Allen & Unwin, p 108. 278 ibid, p 109. 279 McCarthy Dudley, 1962, South-West Pacific Area First Year Kokoda to Wau, Australian War Memorial, p 122. 280 ibid, p 421 and Brune, ibid, p 24. 281 Brune, ibid, p 22. 282 ibid, p 23. 283 ibid, p 24.

85 communication, the details of which could only be identified and established at close range by careful observation.

The battle – an overview

The Battle for Gona took place in the period 19 November – 9 December 1942. The battle was fought between Australian attackers from the 25th, 21st and 30th Brigades and Japanese defenders comprised of elements of the 41st and 144th Regiments plus base personnel. The overall 27 days of battle involved 11 separate attacks together with intervening periods of bombardment and associated activity such as patrols. The battle may be categorised as a siege and reduction of a fortified area.

The strategic situation

In order to understand the issues that pertain to the Battle for Gona one must understand the broader strategic context. Due to the nature of the geography and infrastructure in the greater south-west Pacific area troops, equipment and supplies required to be transported over vast distances to where they were required. Given the archipelagic nature of the area the only forms of suitable transport were via sea or air. In war these sea and air lines of communication were either the subject of attack or required to be protected. Given the proven strength of air operations so far in WW2, operations within the Pacific Theatre may be distilled to a military contest, in the first instance, to obtain and secure airfields (inclusive of aircraft carriers) in order to then attack or defend areas relative to the airfield in question.

One must also understand that the strategy of the two major forces involved played a part. On both the Japanese and Allied sides there was contention between two schools of thought as how to proceed. That contention eventually impacted on events at Gona.

On the Japanese side the contention was between the army and navy.284 By early 1942 Japan had control of an area stretching from Burma to New Guinea and the

284 The material for this paragraph is drawn from the Japanese Official History of WW2 the Senshi Sosho, as quoted by Boog Horst, et al, 2006, Germany and the Second World War Vol III The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944/5, Clarendon Press, pp 706–720; Shindo Hiroyuki, 2013, The Japanese Army’s ‘Unplanned’ South Pacific Campaign, Australia 1942 In the Shadow of War, Cambridge University Press, pp 103-123 and Bullard Steven,

Bismarck Archipelago. However, it had not yet defeated the US navy and therefore could not command the area at will. Conversely, given its then current relative disparity of naval and military strength the US would not gamble an engagement that might determine outright final victory or defeat in the Pacific War. Japan did not foresee any Allied ability to undertake a counter-offensive until early 1943. Therefore, as a contingency, Japan undertook defensive measures to consolidate and exploit its gains while maintaining pressure on its enemies to weaken them and provoke a decisive engagement. The army was therefore against any further territorial gains in the south-west Pacific. The navy, however, saw the threat that Australia posed as a logistic base for potential Allied advances toward Japan. It therefore sought offensive actions against the lines of communication between the US and Australia. The naval issue was reinforced as a result of the US air strikes against the Japanese home islands launched from carriers on 18 April 1942. This led to a compromise strategy that sought to isolate Australia rather than invading it. In order to isolate Australia, it was decided to capture Port Moresby and use it as a forward base to threaten Australia. Port Moresby was selected because it not only gave an advantage in terms of increased range of coverage but also negated the adverse weather effects that the Owen Stanley Range imposed on air operations mounted from further north in New Guinea. After their failure to achieve capture of Port Moresby through naval action at the Battle for the Coral Sea in the period 4-8 May 1942 the Japanese sought to attempt it via Milne Bay (25 August–7 September 1942) and an overland advance across the Owen Stanley Range (22 July–18 November 1942). Both these initiatives were defeated. Thereafter, later in May 1942 the Japanese navy sought to occupy the Solomon Islands and establish air bases (Guadalcanal and Tulagi) there. On 27 May a naval fleet departed Japan for the Midway Islands. The consequent destruction of this force in the period 3-7 June 1942 now made the holding of forward air bases on Pacific Islands such as New Guinea and the Solomon Islands critical to the consolidation and retention of territory gained thus far.285

On 7-8 August 1942 US forces invaded Guadalcanal. As a result of this invasion together with the withdrawal of their forces from along the Kokoda Trail back to the

Japanese Strategy and Intentions Towards Australia, Australia 1942 In the Shadow of War, Cambridge University Press, pp 124-139. 285 McCarthy, ibid, pp 113, 114.

New Guinea Beachheads (Buna – Gona – Sanananda), Japan now faced a direct land threat to airfields on its outer limits of influence. The follow up of Allied forces in New Guinea directly challenged Japanese aspirations of development and use of the airfields at Popondetta and Buna in proximity of the Beachheads.

On the Allied side contention as to how to proceed also raged. In a manner similar to the Japanese, this was essentially between naval and army proposals based on availability of resources. As a result of deliberations at the Casablanca Conference the Allied leaders informed the Australian government on 29 January 1942 that the Pacific War was fifth on the list of priorities.286 That priority determined the allocation of resources to the theatre. The US Navy, via Admiral Nimitz, sought an offensive through the central Pacific directly toward Japan. General Macarthur (Army), Allied Commander in Chief of the South-West Pacific Area, sought an advance through the south-west Pacific. Much of the disagreement centred on the use of air power and the risk inherent with the use of Nimitz’s carriers within reach of Japanese land based aircraft as well as command responsibilities.287 This issue extended to all naval operations as Vice Admiral Carpenter, Macarthur’s naval commander, was unwilling to risk and failed to provide naval forces for operations in support of the Battle of the Beachheads.288 In the meantime General Kenny, Macarthur’s air commander, was vociferously championing the effectiveness of air power to achieve the desired victory.289 The reality was that air support was small and limited in effectiveness. That effectiveness was further limited by weather, aircraft capability, serviceability and organisational issues.290 The consequent lack of sea and air control then resulted in an inability by the Allies to close off the battle area to Japanese resupply and reinforcement.291 Simultaneously it created an Allied logistic issue of great magnitude as supplies of all types was curtailed to the point that ‘[t]he troops went in on a shoestring, and the shoestring was mildewy rotten.’292 To complicate matters the boundary between the central and south-west Pacific areas of command ran such that the Solomon Islands fell within the Central Pacific

286 Horner David, 2003, Strategy and Generalship: Strategic and Operational Planning for the 1943 Offensives, The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943-1944, Army History Unit, p 27. 287 Boog, ibid, p 713. 288 Dean, ibid, p 227. 289 op cit. 290 op cit. 291 op cit. 292 Dean, ibid, pp 228-229.

Command while Bougainville and the northern parts of the Solomon chain fell within the South-West Pacific Command.293 The attack on Guadalcanal by forces under Nimitz’s command caused the Japanese to withdraw forces from New Guinea to reinforce the fighting there.294 Compounding these issues was intelligence of Japanese activity on the western flank of South-West Pacific Command – Darwin and north-western Australia was being bombed, airfields were being constructed in Timor and islands occupied – Japanese strength was evident, active and threat of reinforcement in Papua was apparent.295

However, while US success at Guadalcanal was beneficial to Macarthur’s efforts in New Guinea it could also potentially give priority to Nimitz’s strategy and detract from his own.296 The sum of the strategic situation, fuelled by Macarthur’s insecurities regarding being sacked, placed a time imperative on success in New Guinea relative to that in the Solomon Islands.297

Strategic Aim

The Allied (McArthur’s) strategy, issued on 14 November 1942, was to pursue the immediate total annihilation of remaining Japanese forces in Papua rather than to settle for the less costly (in lives) strategy of starving them out.298 MacArthur’s demands became more strident with the passage of time and with a lack of progress. By 20 November, with reference to the reduction of Buna, he ordered that: “All columns will be driven through to objectives regardless of losses.” On 21 November, he ordered the American commander at Buna, General Harding, to: “Take Buna today at all costs. MacArthur.”299

The Japanese strategy was to thwart Allied ambitions. General Hyakutake, in Rabaul, issued an order on 16 November 1942 insisting that Buna be held ‘at all costs’ and that the enemy (Allied) airbase at Dobodura (south of the beachheads) be destroyed.

293 Dean, ibid, p xxiv. 294 Shindo, ibid, pp 116-117. 295 Dean, ibid, pp 224-225. 296 Dean, ibid, p 225. 297 Horner, op cit. 298 Ham, Paul, Kokoda, 2005, HarperCollins Publishers, p 414. 299 Horner, Davis, 1998, Blamey: Commander-in-Chief, Allen & Unwin, p 360.

Operational Situation

The strategic situation and issues all had a consequential effect on the operational situation. Generally, the Allies were not in a position to engage the Japanese invaders within the South-West Pacific theatre in a battle of attrition as they were weaker in air, sea and land power.300

At the operational level the Allied battle for Gona, and indeed all the beachheads, amounted to an elimination of the Japanese lodgement in order to establish a forward airfield from which to provide security to Port Moresby and from which to base further operations. Conversely, the Japanese defensive efforts were designed to counter the Allied threat and enable their own security and further operations.301

On the Japanese side the threat posed by US operations on Guadalcanal had been increased by their defeat at the hands of the Australians at Milne Bay. In order to reinforce their position on Guadalcanal the Japanese conducted an economy of force defence and withdrew its forces from along the Kokoda Track in New Guinea to the beachheads. That withdrawal exposed the proximal airfields at Dobodura and Popondetta to Allied use. However, the Beachhead battlefields remained under the cover of Japanese aircraft operating from other New Guinea bases further north and west. Equally, given the reluctance of Allied naval forces to operate along the northern shores of New Guinea, Japanese naval forces continued to operate in support of the Beachhead positions but usually only at night when Allied air power was absent.302 This meant that the Japanese continued to be able to support, sustain and reinforce their forces within the beachhead positions. Of pertinence to the Battle for Gona the Japanese garrison there was reinforced by at least a company (approximately 200 men) from the 1st Battalion of the Japanese 41st Infantry Regiment on 18 October 1942.303 What is significant regarding this reinforcement is not only the nature of its conduct and strength but the fact that these men were all fit

300 McCarthy, ibid, p 336. 301 McCarthy, ibid, p 337 and Brune, ibid, pp 18, 21. 302 McCarthy, ibid, pp 354, 355 & 336. 303 McAuley Lex, 1993, To The Bitter End: The Japanese Defeat at Buna and Gona 1942-43, Arrow, pp 24-28. The account describes an offshore transfer of some 1500 men from a destroyer to landing craft that then ferried the troops to Gona from where they subsequently marched overland to reinforce other positions at Sanananda and Buna. The destroyer, on this occasion, was attacked by American aircraft.

90 and healthy and would therefore be free from the effects of local medical threats for at least the next one to two weeks.304 However, perhaps the greatest strength of the Japanese defensive effort lay in their individual soldiers based on their unique national politico-religious code of behaviour. The Japanese soldier was frequently described as being fanatical due to them exhibiting an uncompromising and ruthless ‘resolve to fight on and die in circumstances that the Australian soldier could not have contemplated, let alone endured.’305 Any fanaticism was then encouraged by their orders from Colonel Yokoyama which stated “It is not permissible to retreat even a step from each unit’s original defensive position. I demand that each man fight until the last.” His orders added that “Those without firearms or sabres must be prepared to fight with sharp weapons such as knives or bayonets tied to stick, or with clubs.”306

Opposing the Japanese at Gona was the Australian 7th Division under the command of General Vasey.307 The 7th Division was an experienced formation having previously served in the Middle East, Greece, Crete and Syria. The 7th Division was composed of three subordinate brigades; the 16th, 21st and 25th. Each of these brigades was, in turn, composed of subordinate battalions. Of these only the 21st and 25th Brigades were to fight at Gona. The 21st Brigade was composed of the 2/14th, 2/16th and 2/27th AIF Battalions. The 25th Brigade was composed of the 2/25th, 2/31st and 2/33rd AIF Infantry Battalions as well as the 3rd Australian Infantry Battalion, a militia (AMF) unit.308 Vasey, an experienced soldier, had replaced the previous commander General Allen after he had been sacked by General Blamey, the Australian Allied Land Force Commander, for failing to maintain an adequate rate of advance during the fighting for the Kokoda Track.309 The 7th Division came to the battle for Gona as a result of following up in pursuit of the Japanese forces withdrawing from the Kokoda Trail. The 25th Brigade was following up a trail that led to Gona while the 16th Brigade followed up another that led to Sanananda. The 3rd AMF Battalion was sent further west of the 25th Brigade following up a 400-man

304 ibid, p 25. 305 Brune, ibid, pp 24, 25 and McAulay, ibid, p 4. 306 ATIS Bulletin #47 (Yokoyama Force Orders) 307 McAuley, ibid, p 14. 308 op cit. 309 ibid, p 15.

Japanese force that had withdrawn along the Kumusi River whose mouth was west of Gona.310

It would be a fallacy to claim that the units and formations within 7th Division were an accurate representation of their strength. The Kokoda Campaign had generated some 15,575 cases of sickness among Australian troops of which 9,249 were malarial.311 An observer at the time ‘was appalled to see the condition of our troops arriving from the Owen Stanleys (Kokoda). They all seemed to be riddled with malaria, and suffering from malnutrition.’312 As indicated by this observer the health and fitness of the troops was not improved by the quantity, quality or regularity of rations that they received throughout the fighting. This was due to not only the difficulties of supply that the Allies had to contend with but also a direct result of the conditions under which the fighting was conducted. One of the more significant impacts of the conditions was the effect it had on obtaining effective rest disturbed as it was by a combination of tasks, enemy action, terrain and the effects of weather.313 Coupled with this was the extremely high likelihood of becoming a fatality with the usual ratio of four wounded to every fatality being reversed.314 As a result of these factors the effective fighting strength of the 25th Brigade at the commencement of the battle for Gona was the equivalent of what a battalion should be.315

Compounding the weakened personnel strength was a lack of supporting arms. Within the infantry battalions, mortar and machine gun crews were given very limited ammunition, often of the wrong type, and ordered to ration it.316 The 7th Division lacked heavier fire power normally provided by armour, artillery, naval and air support. Allied divisions were normally assigned a complement of thirty-six field (105 mm) and twelve medium (155 mm) artillery pieces.317 Eventually four 25 pounder field guns (105mm equivalent) were to support the attacks on Gona. It had taken a total of 34 planeloads to move these guns and some 600 rounds of

310 op cit. 311 Dean, ibid, p 218. 312 ibid, pp 23, 123. 313 McAulay, ibid, p 39. 314 McAulay, ibid, p 113. 315 Dean, ibid, p 220. This figure would increase by a further 180 men (to 1,030) once the 3rd Battalion rejoined the rest of the Brigade at Gona. By way of comparison the 16th Brigade start figure was 1,869 men. (McCarthy, ibid, p 394.) 316 McAulay, ibid, pp 59, 364 and Brune, ibid, p 60. 317 Dean, ibid, pp 228,229.

92 ammunition to the battlefield.318 Further, in an attempt to generate support for air power, General George Kenney—Commander of the Allied air forces in the Southwest Pacific Area—argued that artillery support was unnecessary. Despite having no knowledge of jungle warfare, he also told MacArthur that tanks had no role in ground action in the jungle.319 While USAAF and RAAF ground attack and bomber aircraft represented a significant and ever-increasing advantage for the Allies, a combination of thick jungle overhead, poor maps and inaccuracy of bombing methods meant that bombs were dropped on their own units more than once.320 Added to this issue of accuracy was the fact that offensive air support was unreliable due to the effect of weather, distance from bases and a lack of effective communication and coordination between the aircraft and the ground troops they were supporting. This led to air support dictating the timing of attacks on the ground if air support was employed.321

Allied intelligence in the lead-up to the battle was deficient as "Allied staffs told frontline commanders that they faced no more than 1,500 to 2,000 enemy and could expect the Japanese to surrender about 1 December."322 Other intelligence described the Japanese defenders as "sick and malnourished" when in fact some 5,500 fit and healthy enemy held the beachhead. Worse, they were reassured that there was "little indication of an attempt to make a strong stand against the Allied advance." Based on what little they knew about the area, Allied intelligence believed that widespread swampland would render the construction of strong points in the Buna-Gona area impossible. Initially they were described as hasty field entrenchments. Later, it was identified that every contour of the terrain was exploited and the driest stretches of land were carefully chosen to be occupied and fortified, making it impossible for any lateral movements without becoming mired in swamp.323 All of this information led MacArthur to believe that the Japanese defences could be taken with relative ease causing him to put unrealistic expectations on subordinates.324

318 op cit. 319 McAulay, ibid, p 15. 320 McCarthy, ibid, pp 360, 362, 398 and Brune, ibid, pp 41-43, 72. 321 McCarthy, ibid, p 368. 322 ibid, p 352. 323 Milner Samuel, 1957, Victory in Papua, U.S. Army in World War II – The War in the Pacific, Center of Military History United States Army, pp 137 – 143. 324 Milner, ibid, p 10.

Compounding these issues, the Allies had very poor maps and limited reconnaissance photos of the area, which made it extremely difficult to accurately position and target artillery or air support.325 Indeed, air photographs were not received until 18 December after the battle for Gona had concluded and then only in inadequate numbers. Captain Harry Katekar, Adjutant of the 2/27th Battalion within 25th Brigade at Gona summed up the situation thus: “We were thrown in with scant information about the enemy, no aerial photographs, nothing to go on. I don’t recall ever seeing a proper plan of the area showing where the 25th Brigade was at that time when we were supposed to go in or, in fact, what the 2/14th were doing on our right. The whole thing was rushed and therefore one can expect there to be what actually transpired – a slaughter of good men! The correct way to get information is to send in recce patrols. That’s always the way you do it, because you get the enemy to disclose where he is. You don’t go in with a full company rushing in against something you know nothing about.”326

The final operational level factor that impacted on the Australian efforts at Gona was that of morale and motivation. MacArthur (American–Supreme Allied commander) and Blamey (Australian–Allied Land Forces commander) both felt pressure to produce a quick victory, but for different reasons. MacArthur’s concerns, as already discussed, were at the strategic/political and international levels complicated by US inter-Service rivalry and personal ambitions. Furthermore, Buna was MacArthur's first offensive campaign involving American troops against the Japanese. He did not like Blamey, frequently being at loggerheads with him and showing him disrespect.327 In return, Blamey was therefore keen to have one-up-manship on Macarthur and pushed his subordinates hard to achieve it.328 As a result neither commander was reluctant to sack subordinate commanders that they thought were not performing.329 Similarly, there was no shortage of interference in operations regardless of the situation.330

325 Milner, ibid, p 55. 326 Brune, ibid, p 229. 327 McCarthy, ibid, pp 174-175, 510; Dean, ibid, pp 25, 200 and McAulay, ibid, pp 4-8. 328 McAulay, ibid, pp 4 – 7, 33 & Bradley, ibid, p 91-93. 329 McAulay, ibid, pp 6, 14, 31. 330 McAulay, ibid, pp 33, 49, 53, 60 & Bradley, ibid, p 111.

Further, Blamey had also addressed Australian troops of the 21st Brigade at Koitaki in a way that the troops took as a slur on their competence and capability and generated deep and lasting resentment.331 The significant friction between the Australian and American commanders played out in a particular way to the disadvantage of the troops involved.332 When MacArthur offered the 41st American Division as reinforcements for the advance on Gona, Blamey declined.333 This was later seen as payback for earlier statements by MacArthur about the fighting ability of Australian troops. Blamey stated he would rely on his depleted 21st Brigade as he "knew they would fight".334 As (Australian) General Berryman said to (US) General Eichelberger “The jokes of the American officers in Australia, making fun of the Australian Army were told all over Australia. Therefore, when we've got the least thing on the American troops fighting in the Buna sector, our high command has gone to General MacArthur and rubbed salt into his wounds.”335 Despite getting back at the Americans there remained a persistent trend of removing commanders who were perceived to be progressing too slowly. Three Australian local commanders were removed from command during the battle for Gona – Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, Major Hearman and Lieutenant Colonel Caro.336 At the local command level this resulted in a denial of a commander’s ‘liberty of action’ through an implied or specified slur on their competence and character despite all of them being experienced and capable.337 At a lower level this resulted in an attitude amongst the Australian soldiers at Gona that they were determined to show that they had the necessary mettle and would redeem themselves and their units by their actions. Many, it was to be alleged, took unnecessary risks so that their honour could no longer be impinged or questioned.338

Operational Objective

The Australian operational objective was to isolate, reduce and capture Gona (in concert with similar operations against Buna and Sanananda) in order to secure the

331 Brune, ibid, pp 16-17. 332 Bradley, ibid, pp 101-102. 333 McAulay,ibid, pp 39 – 40. 334 op cit. 335 Dean, ibid, pp 211-213. 336 Brune, ibid, p 93. 337 ibid, p 92 and Dean, ibid, p 188. 338 ibid, pp 94-96.

95 north Papuan airfields (Dobodura, Popondetta and Buna) and thereby enable further attacks on Rabaul and recover Australian national territory.

The 21st Brigade (39th, 49th and 55/53rd Battalions) was specifically chosen by Blamey to deploy forward on 30 November as follow up on his "knew they would fight" jibe to MacArthur. That he chose a battered and demoralised Australian unit against a solely Australian objective revealed the seriousness of the American problem.339

The Japanese objective was to thwart the Australian attack by defending their stronghold ‘at all costs’ in order to set the conditions for a counterattack that would allow establishment of a defensive perimeter from Gona through south of Giruwa to the navy airfield at Buna.

The Battle

As stated previously the overall 27 days of battle for Gona from 19 November – 9 December 1942 involved 11 separate attacks together with intervening periods of bombardment and associated activity such as patrols. The Battle for Gona will now be described and studied by consideration of each day with emphasis on the attacks. 340

Thursday 19 November 1942 The first contact at Gona was made by a 60-man patrol drawn from all companies of the 2/33rd Battalion. This patrol was composed of the fitter individuals in order to allow the weakened, hungry and exhausted remainder of the Battalion to catch up. At approximately 1100h a ten-man scouting element from this 60-man patrol encountered three Japanese sentries, killing one and putting the other two to flight some 1500 metres south of the coast along the Jumbora-Gona track. This then drew fire from a position further north. Despite not suffering any casualties it took this element an hour to extricate themselves from the situation. The 2/31st, which was leading the 25th Brigade, now arrived and

339 Ham, ibid, p 451. 340 This section is a synopsis of Brune’s various works but especially Gona’s Gone and A Bastard of a Place pp 437-488. It also draws from Pratten Garth, 2009, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, Cambridge, pp 188-192, 195; Austin Victor,1988, To Kokoda and Beyond The Story of the 39th Battalion 1941-1943, Melbourne University Press; Australian Official War Histories and unit diaries at http://www.awm.gov.au/ ; and Bradley, ibid, pp 107-126.

96 immediately attacked. They were met with a blast of well controlled heavy machine gun and rifle fire inclusive of sniping from the trees a further 100 metres north. This attack resulted in 32 Australian casualties. The Australians withdrew under cover of a thunderstorm. This withdrawal took all night to effect as the Japanese maintained an intense fire across and over what was a well-prepared killing ground. Australian snipers claimed 12 Japanese killed. Another patrol clash further east cost the 2/33rd Battalion another three casualties. A further two Australians were lost – one killed and another missing (captured) due to Japanese action. The Australians claimed 30 Japanese killed. This indicates that the Japanese had an active defence with a patrol screen operating forward of their main defensive position.

Friday 20 and Saturday 21 November 1942 25th Brigade was unable to continue having by now exhausted its supplies. It therefore had to wait for an air drop resupply. Heavy rain prevented the drop on the 20th although some food was received. A significant air drop arrived on 21 November. The 3rd Battalion AMF, 179 all ranks strong, arrived and was set to work for the next few days on further development work on Popondetta airstrip. General Macarthur ‘directed’ that an attack was to be made at 0800h on 21 November and that it was to be pressed home ‘regardless of casualties’. 2/33rd Battalion sent patrols to either flank of Gona which returned at 0400h on 22 November after having reached the beach on both flanks; that is, west of Gona Creek and some 1500 metres east of Gona.

Sunday 22 November 1942 A company (45 members strong) from 2/16th Battalion was attached to the 2/33rd Battalion and promptly tasked to occupy a position west of Gona Creek and act as a blocking force on that flank. At 0600h the 2/33rd Battalion moved forward to attack astride the Gona-Jumbora Track from the south while the 2/31st Battalion moved to the beach following the previous patrols route to attack west toward Gona along the beachfront. The 2/33rd attack began at around 1300h and lasted about two hours. This attack failed being stopped again by intense MG and rifle fire at close range. The attack gained only about 50 metres of ground. During the attack a group of US C47 transport aircraft circled overhead and proceeded to conduct an indiscriminate air drop of supplies along the Gona-Jumbora Track. As it was done without warning or mutual arrangement during fighting only 5% of the cargo was recovered. A Japanese counterattack was directed against the 2/33rd at

97 dusk. The 2/31st attack began at approximately 1800h but was beaten by concentrated, close range mortar and MG fire. The Australian casualties for the day were 129 killed and wounded, among them six company commanders. Again, the night was spent attempting to recover the wounded from the battlefield, this time with the 2/33rd being assisted by the 2/25th Battalion. Due to the dwindling numbers (61 in total) A and D Companies 2/33rd Battalion were combined under the command of a Lieutenant.

Monday 23 November 1942 At 0430h the 2/25th attacked along the coast supported by fire from the 2/31st. Despite gaining a little ground they lost 64 men and had to withdraw in order to resist a counterattack. By now the combined fighting strength of the three battalions comprising the 25th Brigade was 736 all ranks – an under- strength battalion. Allied air strafing and bombing carried out. That night, due to this reduction in strength, Brigadier Eather withdrew the 2/31st back to a position south of Gona and brought forward the 3rd Militia Battalion. On the Japanese side diary notes indicated ‘considerable casualties’ due to bombardment as well as reinforcement by an 80-man infantry unit which was immediately deployed to the south of the mission.

Tuesday 24 November 1942 The day was devoted to patrolling and a six-hour aerial bombardment and strafing of the enemy beginning at 0800h. The aerial attack, comprising 16 sorties, started with strafing attacks by fighters until about 1130h and then was followed by bombers between 1300h and 1400h. The bombardment was supported by MG and mortar fire from the battalions. The patrolling was necessary as the troops had to be withdrawn from proximity to the Japanese positions some 600-1,000 metres for safety reasons. The patrols ensured the early detection and harassment of any Japanese forays forward of their positions. These efforts kept the Japanese at bay and gave the Australians a substantial physical respite.

Wednesday 25 November 1942 At 1600h the 3rd Battalion attacked Gona from the south-west supported by MG and mortar fire from the 2/25th and 2/33rd Battalions. This fourth major assault was also supported by 60 rounds of fire from the newly arrived four 25 pounder field artillery pieces. Despite a gain of some 50 metres at one point they withdrew at 1740h having suffered light casualties. Japanese reports recovered after the battle indicate that the attacks caused many casualties amongst a

98 group of reinforcements as well as others in different areas. It must be noted that other Australian positions such as that on the west of Gona Creek applied continual pressure on the Japanese through harassing fire, principally MG and mortars, and sniping. Given the continued effectiveness of the Japanese defence and the dire personnel state it was now apparent that the 25th Brigade was in desperate need of reinforcement or replacement. Macarthur offered the American 41st Division. Blamey spurned the offer on the basis that he preferred Australians ‘as they would fight.’ That afternoon, Brigadier Dougherty, commander of the 21st Brigade arrived.

Thursday 26 November 1942 Due to the strength of his Brigade Eather could now only hope to contain, but not attack. As a result, the day passed relatively quietly until 1700h when the Japanese launched a counterattack against the 2/33rd Battalion. This was successfully beaten off but caused a further withdrawal of the Australians of 400 metres in order to develop better defensive positions while leaving standing patrols in their former positions as a means of creating depth and security from surprise attacks.

Friday 27–Sunday 29 November 1942 Throughout this period the 25th Brigade was relieved by the 1,100 strong 21st Brigade. The 21st Brigade, in the process of recovering from the Kokoda Campaign, was the last available battle experienced formation available in New Guinea. Its strength represented little more than a battalion. Given their manning its constituent battalions had amalgamated companies to make viable sub-units. The Brigade was that in name only. While Dougherty wanted to attack on 30 November, he was directed to attack on the 29th as per an original forecast that gave no recognition to the fact that the 2/16th would not arrive until the afternoon of the 29th. On 28 November troops from 2/14th moved to a position east of Gona near Small Creek in preparation for both taking over from the 2/25th Battalion and for a subsequent attack. However, this movement was conducted in the open kunai rather than in the scrub and concealed from view. Thus, the Japanese were forewarned of what was happening and acted accordingly. This resulted in 46 casualties, some 10% of the overall Battalion strength. Among them was a high proportion of NCO and officers. By 0200h 29 November they had withdrawn to a point further east of Small Creek. Due to these circumstances the planned attack for 29 November was now changed. The 2/14th was to secure the

99 eastern flank and had all available mortars firing in support of its efforts. Meanwhile the 2/27th was to attack west toward Gona at 1100h after a preliminary air strike that had commenced at 0930h. The 2/27th attack was to be conducted in two phases after passing through the remaining 25th Brigade held positions. Artillery support, to be coordinated by an artillery observer yet to meet up with the Battalion, was available but only to be called for on an opportunity basis after the air strike. All of this required effective prior coordination. It did not occur. The 70 bombs dropped were widely dispersed due to inadequate identification of the target area. The Battalion was not in position by the time the aircraft cleared the area and, as a consequence, the Japanese were alert and ready for the ensuing attack. By 1300h the Battalion had taken 55 casualties which were eventually extracted in another all-night recovery effort. The Battalion withdrew to its original start point. Behind the start point and further east the 2/14th had taken ground and established a significant block to any communication between the Japanese positions at Sanananda and Gona. While this meant that Gona was invested it also cost 38 casualties. In the meantime, the 2/33rd, 3rd Militia and a company from the 2/25th persisted with attacks from the south along the Gona-Jumbora Track. This resulted in a further 12 casualties to the 3rd Battalion while the 2/25th company killed 12 Japanese and took one prisoner for 12 casualties to themselves. This summary of the day’s action shows a number of uncoordinated, ill supported efforts conducted simultaneously around the Gona perimeter at a time of uncertainty inherent in any handover between two agencies. Most tellingly, these attacks were effectively not planned by those conducting them, were hasty and conducted over unfamiliar terrain into unknown defensive areas.

Monday 30 November 1942 Early on the night of 29 November Brigadier Dougherty received approval for another attack on 30 November. This attack, again by the 2/27th and supported by a company from the 2/16th went in at 0615h against the same position as the preceding day with artillery and mortar support. It very quickly came to halt some 100 metres short of the Japanese position in the face of intense fire. The day settled down to a continuous exchange of fire. This attack cost another 56 casualties. As a result, the 2/27th and 2/16th Battalions were now amalgamated into the one unit. Meanwhile the 2/14th continued their efforts to secure the eastern flank. This was done via a strong patrolling program to identify and harass Japanese positions prior to then attacking them systematically that afternoon

100 when artillery (40 rounds) and mortar support became available. This was successfully completed at the cost of two casualties, both wounded.

Tuesday 01 December 1942 The 21st Brigade again attacked with the composite 2/16th–2/27th and 3rd Militia Battalions. However, despite the allocation of 150 rounds of supporting fire from the 25 pounders, this attack which commenced at 0600h, also failed. The attack was to have been a cooperative effort by the two battalions however, the 3rd Militia Battalion failed to act in concert with the 27th– 2/16th. Varying reasons have been put forward as to why this disconnect happened however none are germane to the discussion except to acknowledge that effective liaison and coordination was not allowed to or did occur. However, this attack gave rise to two interesting points. The first is that men from two platoons from the 2/27th–2/16th made it through the defences into Gona village. Of these six, ten (accounts vary) made it right through the Japanese position and across Gona Creek. The second point is that the 3rd Militia Battalion area gave little effective resistance. Their attack was the first that differed from the two obvious axes that had been constantly used so far. In an attempt to maintain pressure another attack was made at 1030h by 17 men supported by 90 rounds of 3” mortar fire. This attack seized its objective but, despite casualties, was forced to withdraw in the face of a Japanese counterattack. That night saw the last attempt by the Japanese to reinforce the garrison directly from the ocean, when 200 troops on barges got to within 500 metres of Gona before being driven off by MG fire. The day had cost another 59 Australian casualties.

Wednesday 02–Saturday 05 December 1942 The Australians attempted to maintain the pressure. Wednesday morning a 20-man platoon again attacked the post last attacked at 1030h the preceding day. The attack again failed at a cost of another nine casualties. The 21st Brigade had now lost 430 casualties in five days of fighting. These, together with those borne by the 25th Brigade, amounted to a crisis for General Vasey. He had to make a decision as to whether to persist at Gona or reinforce the efforts of the 16th Brigade at Sanananda. The bottom line was that more reinforcements were needed. These came in the form of the 39th Battalion drawn from the 30th Brigade. The crisis also caused a further command consolidation and reorganisation. The composite 2/27th–2/16th Battalion was transferred from the 21st

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Brigade to the 25th Brigade. The 39th Battalion was to go from the 30th Brigade to the 21st Brigade. While the 39th had fought in the Kokoda Campaign it had its losses replaced by some 430 raw reinforcements. Thankfully it had retained a reasonable portion of experienced leaders. By early on the afternoon of 3 December the plan had unravelled for a number of reasons. Vasey changed his mind and directed that the 21st Brigade was now to comprise its original three battalions plus the 39th. The 25th Brigade was to be relieved by the 21st Brigade and withdrawn from the fight. The 30th Brigade, less the 39th Battalion, was to reinforce the 16th Brigade at Sanananda. This change was in effect by 1630 on the 4th of December. The 2/14th and the 2/27th–2/16th were to the east of Gona while the 39th was astride the Gona- Jumbora Track south of Gona. As of the night 4 December the Australians commenced patrolling on the most easterly Japanese positions. This yielded useful information noting that the Japanese were now remaining in their positions, were no longer patrolling and did not post external sentries. They were ceding the night and elements of their security to the Australians. Furthermore, the evidence suggested that Japanese losses were mounting. Saturday 5 December was spent in adjustment and consolidation of their positions.

Sunday 06 December 1942 On the basis of concerns about further Japanese reinforcement and a belief that only 150 defenders remained, orders were issued on 5 December for a dawn attack on the 6th. This attack was to be a repeat of the attack on 1 December. The composite 2/27th–2/16th Battalion was to attack along the beach from the east while the 39th Battalion attacked astride the Gona-Jumbora Track from the south. The attack commenced at 0530h following a 60 round mortar barrage. Both these attacks failed; the 39th Battalion gained 50 yards at a cost of 12 killed and 46 wounded in its D Company alone while the composite battalion had another 10 casualties. On a positive note a Corporal and his section on the right flank of the 39th attack had made a successful penetration into a weakly held area before withdrawing. Of even more concern, the blocking position on the west of Gona Creek was attacked that night by strong Japanese forces attempting to reinforce Gona from the west.

Monday 07 December 1942 As a result of the mounting threat on the west flank a 50-man patrol was dispatched to the area to further secure it. This patrol encountered

102 a strong Japanese force around midday and attacked it. Fighting continued throughout the remainder of the day. Despite inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese, the patrol commander was forced to withdraw 500 metres and seek reinforcements. In response to his request a further 40 men, the only elements available, were dispatched to his aid. This force was then able to withhold further Japanese advances.

Meanwhile back at the actual perimeter another frontal attack was ordered for 1230 h by the 39th. This attack was to be preceded by an aerial attack. The eight RAAF Wirraways arrived on time and bombed – behind and over the 39th Battalion, not on the Japanese! The strafing caused five casualties to the 39th Battalion. Given the fact that the Japanese were now fully alerted to the imminence of an attack, that the fire support was non-effective and a deep concern that the attack was to be over the same ground and likely to end with even more casualties and no forward gain, Honner, the Commanding Officer of the 39th Battalion called off the attack. It must be noted that Honner’s action to cancel the attack was, in effect, a disobedience of orders and a cause for dismissal from command. In presenting his fait accompli to Dougherty, the Brigade commander, he argued for another attempt the next day after better preparation by artillery and excluding air support. Dougherty concurred with both his cancellation and request for another, different attempt. Doubtless part of Dougherty’s acquiescence was due to his manning, now at 792 – a nominal four battalions reduced to a strength of less than one full strength battalion. Furthermore, his strongest battalion, the 39th, was slated for possible redeployment against Sanananda. Therefore, there was only one more chance to attack Gona while there were sufficient numbers remaining in 21st Brigade. Thereafter, 21st Brigade would barely be capable of containing the remaining Japanese at Gona while as much force as was available denied any reinforcement from the west. In the meantime, the 39th spent the rest of the day patrolling, registering targets or resting. Simultaneously there was another changeover of commanding officers of the composite 2/27th–2/16th Battalion on the basis that the Brigade commander had ‘lost confidence’ in the outgoing incumbent’s abilities and determination. This was the fourth change of command for these units since the start of the battle.

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On the Japanese side, best estimates now place their strength at between 2-300 men. However, even this much reduced number placed the Australians at a disadvantage to the 3:1 ratio usually employed by an attacking force to overcome a defending force.

Tuesday 08 December 1942 The details of this attack were left to the two commanding officers (CO) involved. While the 39th Battalion was responsible for the main attack the CO of the composite 2/27th–2/16th Battalion was allowed the discretion to attack in support as and when he saw fit as opportunity presented. The attack overall was of three parts–a holding/diversionary attack by C Company 39th on the left of the Gona-Jumbora Track, the actual attack by the remainder of the 39th through the scrub on the south-east toward the Mission and an attack by the composite 2/27th–2/16th along the beach from the east.

This attack had several variations from what was by now the normal pattern of activity. The first variation was the timing. The attack commenced at 12:30 pm with a 15-minute artillery bombardment with the ground assault beginning at 12:45 pm. These timings, entering into the circadian afternoon lull, were much later than the usual earlier morning assaults. The delay also had the effect of heightening the level of tension amongst the Japanese as they knew that, as a result of the last air attack, that another major assault was looming. Finally, the later start had allowed the assault troops the greatest amount of rest that they had had since their arrival at Gona.

Another significant variation was that the C 39th attack was an attack by fire rather than a physical closing with the Japanese defences. It should also be noted that the direction of Honner’s main attack was directed at a known weak area of the overall Japanese defensive layout as well as being the first time that any Australian attack had come from this direction. Drawing on his own battle experience with the effects of artillery, Honner required that the supporting fire use delayed fuses so that the rounds would penetrate into the earth before detonation. This created a greater destructive and shock effect than the proximity or contact fused rounds used previously. The fact that ranging had been conducted on identified targets the preceding day enhanced both the accuracy and effectiveness of the artillery fired in support of his attack. Furthermore, due to the cooperation he undertook with his

104 artillery and mortar officers Honner had complete control over his combined supporting fire. The number of rounds, both artillery and mortars, allocated to this attack was the greatest so far. The key benefit was that this gave a rate, duration and intensity of fire support that had previously been unattainable. To maximise the fire support and allow his troops to close with and overwhelm the defences Honner directed that his assault force was to start their advance against the Japanese positions two minutes before the artillery ceased fire. Even then he attained a degree of deception while minimising risk by stopping the less accurate mortar fire at that time while continuing the more accurate artillery fire. Predictably, the 2/27th–2/16th attack was quickly stopped after a minimal advance with 30 casualties. Equally predictably C 39th provided a weight of fire that pinned the Japanese defenders and prevented them moving to reinforce the defences under threat from the main attack. Due to C 39th firing from the protection of their pits they suffered no casualties while providing effective support and a diversion.

Within the assault force the two leading platoon commanders, again with previous battle experience, had undertaken to maximise the advantage of the artillery and mortar fire support by, on their own collective initiative, to start their advance ‘early’ while the fire support was still coming in. This, together with Honner’s two minutes, now meant that the assault force would actually be on the Japanese position simultaneous with the lifting of the fire support. This meant that the Japanese would have no reaction time between the suppressive effect of the fire support and dealing with an assault force. To compound the Japanese defenders confusion the assault force threw grenades before they entered the Japanese positions. This had the effect of giving the impression that the bombardment was still continuing. The net result was that the assault force entered the Japanese position and had eliminated at least six posts killing in excess of 46 Japanese before any effective Japanese response began. That response, when it did come, was from the right flank where there was no support such as there was on the left flank of the assault force. Having made the breech, Honner now set about exploiting it by thrusting his D and C Companies through that breech into the depth of the Japanese position. By nightfall half the perimeter and the centre of the defended area was in 39th Battalion possession. The fighting continued throughout the night as the Japanese sought to break out and escape. By early next morning 39th Battalion was endeavouring to link up with the

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Composite Battalion which was now advancing west along the coast using successive leapfrogging envelopments from the south-east. At 1615h 9 December the CO 39th Battalion, LTCOL Ralph Honner, sent the laconic message “Gona’s gone.”

That message did not halt the fighting required of the troops involved. Those remaining were required to then conduct further operations against threatened Japanese reinforcements and the threat they posed to the western flank and thereby to the airfields. Ultimately, they were successful in the destruction of this threat and securing the overall Allied western flank.

The Japanese lost at least 638 dead during the defence of Gona Mission. However, more than another 200 bodies were recovered from the beaches outside the Mission defended area. The Australians lost 750 men dead, wounded and missing. Gona had been eliminated but at the cost of 21st and 25th Brigades effectiveness. Both took considerable time to rest, reconstitute and train before again becoming battle ready. By way of example: eroded from its original 800 who landed in New Guinea in August 1942 the 2/27th Battalion started the battle with 374 officers and men: at its end only 92 were left; 66 were dead, 136 wounded and 87 evacuated sick. The 39th Battalion, the first into action in the campaign, fighting throughout, was finally flown to Port Moresby on 25 January 1943 with just 32 men remaining. The Battalion had lost 65% of its strength in two weeks of fighting – 107 casualties (31 dead, 74 wounded, two missing) of its original 350. The remainder were hospitalised sick. The Battalion was disbanded and never reformed.

The battle for Gona – operational objectives

The battle for Gona has been considered in overview and some detail elsewhere however, not from the perspective of this thesis. A summary of the detail and relationship of the strategic aim, operational objectives and decisions for attainment that apply to the three battles for Gona is depicted in Figure 7-1 below.

Cursory analysis indicates that there was significant variation in attainment of the six operational/campaign objectives that applied. Time analysis shows that the final Australian attack was in effect the only deliberate attack. The remainder were hasty.

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The immediate consequence of the speed, and therefore deliberation, of an attack is the degree to which certainty can be generated through proper identification of enemy location, strength and capability (Objective 1: Find/ID enemy defences). The answers to these give rise to determination of enemy intentions and probable courses of action. As a result, one’s own forces can then be positioned and employed to fix the enemy (Objective 2: Fix enemy forces), guard one’s own and threaten the enemies’ lines of communication (Objective 3: Guard LOC and enemy approaches). This, in turn limits an enemy ability to physically move and manoeuvre (Objective 4: Ability to grow force capability). This then impacts on the thought, morale and actions of each side. The modification of physical and mental capacity and capability combined cause a diminution of enemy capability relative to a growth of one’s own capability (Objective 5: Modify opponents thought/action). All of this then culminates in the integrity of the defence noting that there are two decisions pertaining to the determination of that integrity (Objective 6: eliminate or maintain the integrity of defences).

in order to Operational Strategic supporting achieve Objectives AIM

1. Find/ID enemy defences 2. Fix enemy forces Beliefs – superiority 3. Guard LOC and enemy Identity – approaches Allied/Axis/national 4. Grow force capability Survival – airfields 5. Modify opponents thought/ action 6. Eliminate/maintain integrity of defences Australian Attack: Capture Gona ASAP in order to secure airfields & secure Australian national territory Decision/s supporting Japanese 1. Maintain/penetrate Defence: Retain Gona in perimeter order to disrupt enemy 2. Maintain depth of capability and operations defence/exploit penetration

Figure 7-1: Relationship of strategic aim to operational objectives and consequent decisions to the capture of Gona

While the integrity of the defence was tested in every one of the nine attacks within the overall battle it was the precursors (operational objectives) to that test where the

107 real issues lay. The importance in this statement lies in the fact that the attainment of each operational objective is a decision in its own right. They also, individually and collectively, represent an aspect of the three conditions of security, simplicity and sustainability. If each objective is a decision then they, by adherence to the basis of this thesis, becomes a tactic in isolation or a part of a tactic for an overall higher decision: in this case; to destroy the integrity of the defence. Regardless of their designation it can be seen that attainment of each of the operational objectives was necessary to the final outcome. If strategy provides the resources for the application of a tactic then the operational objectives remain firmly within the strategic realm as the commander at the point of decision (in this case attacking Gona) had insufficient capability to simultaneously address the operational objectives. Therefore, by extrapolation, the outcome of the battle should be able to be determined by the degree to which the campaign objectives were attained. These are summarised below in Table 7-1. In every attack it will be seen which opponent attained the operational objective (where A = Australian and J = Japanese) in question (listed down the left- hand side) more completely (denoted by Y for success) or less completely (denoted by the N for fail). A designation of P indicates a judgement of partial attainment. The judgement of the overall outcome is then given as a success (S) or failure (F) rating.

Table 7-1: Attainment of Operational Objectives for the battle for Gona

19 22 23 25 29 30 1 6 8 Nov Nov Nov Nov Nov Nov Dec Dec Dec Operational A J A J A J A J A J A J A J A J A J Objective Find/ID enemy N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y P P P P Y N Fix enemy N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y P Y P N P N Y N forces Guard LOC & approaches N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N Grow force capability N Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y P Y N N N N N Modify enemy thought/action N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y P N P N P N Y N Integrity of N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y P P P P Y N defences Outcome F S F S F S F S F S F S S F S F S F

Assessment – The Battle for Gona

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Underpinning military science

The first element of military science is to review the strategies at play. At the strategic level the Australian attackers encountered the primacy of defence. The Australian attacks were undertaken as part of a persisting strategy involving the conquering of territory in exchange for a political goal – the destruction of Japanese power in Papua that could be used to support operations that would continue loss of Australian national territory. The Japanese strategy was one of persisting defensive combat. The circumstances of being located on the coast precluded them from employing retreat and evasion so they had to resist the inevitable frontal attack. Given their having a high ratio of force to space within the area they held they had to be either contained and left to wither (note that if their LOC were cut then this would occur more quickly than if they were able to maintain their sustainment) or elimated by destruction. In either case it could be said that the Australians had to besiege their fortress in order to eliminate them. It is here that any choice was removed from operational level commanders as strategically they were directed to destroy the Japanese force. Given the availability of resources at the time this had to be done by direct ground assault rather than through massed firepower or other options. To attack, the Australians had best concentrate force against weakness using assault troops to achieve a penetration of the Japanese defences. Ideally, a penetration required that the attacker must achieve concentration against a particular, ideally weak, point and then exploitation through that point to reduce the depth and sustainability of the defence. The identification of such a point requires an ability to gain and interpret information or; conversely, deny that. This first element of military science identified the type of engagements required and that therefore would likely be encountered.

The second element of military science determined the likely locations where engagements would occur. The above strategies meant that initial interactions between attackers and defenders would likely take place along the lines of communication and in areas that allowed direct and easy access to, or domination over, and therefore, possession of the ground in dispute. This meant that any attack would develop initially along roads and tracks. In priority order these would be from the direction from which the enemy advanced and thereafter to the flanks of that

109 initial advance. In the first attack the Australians advanced from the south along the Gona-Jumbora Track – they then persisted in attacks from the south to the very end of the battle. Thereafter their attacks were from the east to the west along the coast. Other native tracks ran along the coast east and west from the Gona Mission however, as indicated earlier, the Gona Creek to the western side of the Mission constituted an obstacle hence why no attack developed from that direction although eventually, the Australians lodged a force further west to cut the Japanese lines of communication to the west. The final attack came from the south-east, a direction that was devoid of tracks or roads and, as a consequence, was less well defended.

The third element of military science, the classical manoeuvre applicable in this situation was penetration of a line. Due to the defences being in a semicircle the advantages of interior lines, and therefore concentration of effort, lay with the defenders – the fourth element of military science. Conversely, any attacker had to invest or surround the fortress to prevent egress for the purpose of a counter attack against his forces and to prevent any reinforcement of the besieged garrison. That done the attacker then had to concentrate his force against a particular sector in order to attain a decisive ratio.

The fifth element of military science, capability matching, would then determine options for the attainment of a decisive ratio. The two key capabilities at play throughout this battle were that of mobile and less mobile/static forces. This is best understood from the scientific perspective of kinetic energy: that is, the result of mass times its velocity or, in practical terms a projectile such as a bullet. A larger mass bullet travelling fast will cause more significant damage on impact than will one of the same size travelling more slowly. A smaller bullet travelling even faster may be equally damaging but present that damage in a different way. Regardless of the size of the bullet or its speed its terminal effect may be dissipated by an impenetrable barrier (steel, concrete, etc), a less dense barrier placed on an angle so as to deflect the impact and cause a ricochet or use of a softer, but more dense material of greater thickness that absorbs the impact (sandbags, etc) or a combination of these measures (spaced materials, etc). The key aspects in this case study are defence (the barrier) and firepower (the bullet). The defenders must have both protection and simultaneously be able to maintain an effective rate of fire at the same

110 time. Mobility is not an issue except where a counter involving movement or manoeuvre relative to the point of attack is required. The protection referred to is delivered in two ways – by standoff such that closure and employment of the attackers weapons and the shock of a physical collision is minimised or eliminated well forward of their position or by presentation of a solid deep mass such that any penetration can be absorbed, isolated or constricted and thus destroyed. This translates, in this case study, to a defence in depth where the attacking force can be isolated while maximum firepower is concentrated against it at all times during its assault. In this case study the success of the defence was dependent on being able to stop the attack at some distance forward of the front line of the Japanese defensive positions. In every attack except for the last one the Japanese were able to achieve this. Thereafter, once penetration has occurred, the side that can sustain the attack or defence the longer will decide the outcome. This element of military science, together with the relative composition of the forces involved, determined how engagements would be best understood, undertaken, and most likely, fought between the two types of forces involved.

The final aspect of military science would then lie within the human factors influencing the respective protagonists. As a generic overview it could be asserted that both the Japanese and Australians were equally committed to an outcome in their favour. As a consequence, the outcome would be determined by attritional destruction. What is very evident on the Australian side is the impact on this aspect from external time pressure, limitations on command authority and confidence, soldiers’ motivation, illness and other deprivations affecting performance, training and adherence to that training, education and experience. Ultimately, these issues resulted in the fact that of all the attacks on Gona only the final one was a tactical action on the part of the commander of the assaulting force. While all of the initial attacks could be graded as helpful to the final overall attritional result they were, of themselves, failures as none of them established a lasting lodgement within the defensive perimeter – the decision sought through their undertaking. It is instructive to note that the last attack was the only successful attack in the entire month of battle. Primarily, as demonstrated in Table 6-1, this was because the operational objectives necessary for attainment of a successful decision were now met. Equally, while much has been said about the tenacity of the Japanese defence it is instructive

111 to note that as a result of the last attack, they, being human, ceded to that humanity and attempted to breakout and flee from what they saw as impending annihilation. In doing this they reinforced the primacy of the psychological impact of actions in human factors.

Overall, consideration of underpinning military science gives no justification for acceptance of an outcome determined by chance. Rather, the outcome of engagements was based on probabilities generated by time, location, accuracy of pertinent information and resources inclusive of capability and support.

Conditions for decision attainment

The evidence confirms that the actual engagements between Australian and Japanese forces was as a result of respective strategy and aligned with operational objectives. There is significant evidence to suggest that the thought and action of the Japanese commanders involved was theirs alone; and therefore, tactical. There is however, significant evidence to support a view that the decisions of Australian participants for all attacks except the last one were taken, in whole or in part, by external parties which reduced most attacks to application of a method – in this case an attack limited by external direction in terms of time, place, direction, method and resources.

As proposed earlier, the Decision Model depicts the confluence of discrete actions to achieve effects that generate three conditions – security, simplicity and sustainment – necessary to achieve a decision in support of higher-level objectives within a strategic aim. An assessment of whether the actions undertaken by each participant actually achieved the requisite effects and condition that underpin attainment of a decision will now be examined in detail.

Security

Security encompasses that which generates freedom of action to force attainment of a decision. In order to generate the requisite freedom of action it was postulated that five effects were required. Those five effects – audacity, shock, deception, initiative and a decisive ratio – were, in turn, generated by a range of associated actions. In

112 this case study we see that the winners in each battle involved, by a range of actions, were better able to generate the effects necessary to adhere to the condition of security. The condition of security as it applies to this case study is shown below in Figure 6-2.

Audacity: Audacity is defined as being bold, daring, spirited or adventurous. In a military sense this suggests an undertaking that generates a sense of awe, bewilderment or surprise, indecisiveness and inevitability in those observing it unfold or actually subject to the audacity. This, in turn, demands actions inclusive of decisiveness and leadership; preparation as embodied in thought, training, rehearsal; experience – vicarious or actual; situational awareness, as well as recognition and exploitation of a time window or opportunity.

As all the Australian attacks in this battle were expected none of them achieved audacity by occurrence. Most were predictable through signalling of intention or deduction of likely avenue of approach, timing and method. However, the manner of their execution had the potential to generate this aspect. All but the final attack failed to generate this effect completely. Those deficiencies were compounded by the attackers having an almost total lack of situational awareness of what they were up against.

As static defenders the Japanese were somewhat limited in their ability to generate audacity however, they did achieve it in the earlier stages through the design and preparedness of their defences and the conduct of their defence. In this area they were somewhat assisted by an Allied ‘own goal’ which had led their troops to believe that they would not have to deal with the level of opposition they initially encountered.

Shock: Shock is defined as a sudden and violent upset or fright, a physiological effect, a sudden collapse of the nervous mechanism caused by physical injury or strong emotional upset, to strike with intense surprise, to come into violent contact. In a military sense this suggests actions undertaken with such speed and violence as to convey the impression of inescapable, imminent doom or actually generate that result. Therefore, actions that apply mass and momentum, especially at a time and

113 location where they are least expected, will generate shock. That effect will be exacerbated by either the proximity or length of range at which the effect is generated. The volume and intensity of noise associated with these actions will also increase the effect. The actions undertaken should both exacerbate or produce a dilemma in the opponent’s mind in either making a decision or initiating an action.

In assessing shock, the presence of a physical response, or more likely, lack of a physical response, is what is sought. In all accounts, Japanese and Australian, there is no evidence of shock from any action other than the final assault. However, a gradual build to a point where a change in Japanese thought occurs is noted in the assessment of operational objectives. The only action that generated shock in terms of what is sought is the final Australian attack. The delay it generated in terms of a Japanese response allowed not only penetration of the perimeter but also exploitation directly resulting in the complete elimination of the Japanese defence. That obliteration was only possible given the initial shock achieved during the penetration of the perimeter being continued as subsequent positions were isolated and destroyed.

Deception: Deception is defined as the action of misleading by a false appearance or statement. In a military sense this suggests a presentation of force or capability contrary to what is actually available or; in other words, it seeks to conceal, create or confuse. This misleading presentation takes on one or more of several forms; that is, in timing, source, size or capability. It is also important to recognise that deception may be active; that is, one deliberately sets out to mislead: or passive; that is, one allows the opponent to see what they think they should be seeing.

The key components of deception are to limit an opponent’s awareness of the timing, source and size of an intended action. Often this is done by masking capability. In the final successful attack, the direction, location, timing and method of the attack were masked. Conversely, had the Japanese defence adopted a more aggressive denial of information through active, longer range patrolling in the lead up to the battle they would likely have achieved a more prolonged resistance. It is instructive to note that once the Japanese remained in their positions neglecting to post external

114 sentries and completely ceased patrolling as of 5 December several operational objectives turned significantly against them.

Initiative: Initiative is defined as the ability or readiness to introduce or initiate action. In a military sense this suggests both a desire and an ability to engage in physical conflict. Normally, the initiative is therefore deemed to lie with the attacker. That desire and ability to engage is conveyed by the provision and degree of alertness of measures such as guards to flanks, the rear and in advance of movement, sentries/scouts and lookouts, routine, contingency plans, reconnaissance and rehearsals. These measures then generate situational awareness and tempo in reaction. In this way the initiative usually resides with the side having the better awareness and therefore the ability to orientate and act more quickly and appropriately. Initially, the initiative lay with the Japanese even though they had adopted a more passive type of static defence. This assessment is based on accounts which reflect that the initial Australian attacks were very much application of a drill more akin to open country operations rather than what was required in closer country. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the Japanese defence, while static, was very effective due to their use of internal lines, relocation of weapon systems, such as machine-guns, sentries and albeit limited patrolling and counterattacks; all of which combined to make the defence more active and difficult to reduce. Had the Australians being more patient and developed a clearer picture of the Japanese defences earlier it is almost without question that they could have successfully attacked in greater strength much earlier.341

In turning to the other aspects of initiative, namely routine, contingency plans and rehearsals, minimal evidence is given in available accounts although there is some suggestion that this existed on both sides, as would be expected. Other than the initiative displayed by Honner, evidence supports initiative by individuals such as the Corporal who initially discovered the flaw in the Japanese defences on the south- east and recognised it for what it was. Another example is that of the two platoon commanders who lead the final assault in under the artillery barrage.

341 Interestingly, this was the expressed opinion of Honner and others when posed with this question after the event. See Threfall, ibid, pp149-152, 155-156 & Brune, Gona’s Gone, pp 86-96.

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Decisive ratio: A ratio is defined as the relation between two similar magnitudes in respect to the number of times the first contains the second. Decisive is defined as the power or ability to attain a decision and end controversy. In a military sense this suggests the amount of force, principally firepower, that one opponent can bring to bear against another at the point of decision so as to attain a desired outcome. The actions required to achieve a decisive ratio are assessed as being morale, leadership/decisiveness, training and fitness, a favourable force ratio at the point of decision achieved through numbers and appropriate formations, a favourable force ratio at the point of suppression, intelligence, an ability to manoeuvre together with a suitable speed and type of movement. At the point of joining battle the issue of attainment of a decisive ratio becomes critical.

The actual force ratio between the two forces throughout the battle invariably lay in favour of the defence due to the accepted ratio of attackers to overcome defenders being 3:1. However, the result of persistent piecemeal attacks and the incremental losses sustained, particularly by the Australians, resulted in an erosion of their capability and consequent inability to regain a decisive ratio based on manpower. As the Australians were increasingly able to bring more firepower to bear, not just in terms of weapon systems (machine guns, mortars, artillery, airpower) but also in ammunition types and quantities, this changed the scales in their favour as the duration of the battle lengthened.

The evidence suggests that it was only in the final attack that the Australian effort was more effectively coordinated and supportive against a specific point in considerable strength. The earlier attacks all appeared to have been across broader frontages, less well coordinated and supported. These deficiencies were made more apparent in terms of casualties due to the ability of the Japanese defenders, especially in the earlier attacks, to concentrate their defences at the threatened point through use of interior lines and mutually supporting posts.

The sum of the effects achieved by the respective opponents in the attacks comprising the battle shows that the victors of each attack more effectively achieved all the effects of audacity, shock, deception, initiative and a decisive ratio than did the losers. On the basis of simple mathematics, the losers failed to achieve security and therefore made the attainment of decisions throughout these battles more

116 difficult. Conversely their opponents achieved all five effects, even if by default, and therefore attained security, or, more completely, therefore had the freedom of action to force a favourable outcome to the decisions at hand.

Actions which appear to have applied to gain the five effects necessary for attainment of the condition of security in the case study are depicted below in Figure 7-2. in order required to EFFECTS to CONDITIONS ACTIONS generate set

Leadership/ decisiveness Preparation (thought, training, rehearsal)

Experience Audacity Situational awareness Time window/ opportunity

Mass Momenteum Range (prox-max) Noise Dilemma of decision Shock Dilemma of action Timing Location/ direction Speed/ tempo

Timing Source Security

Size Deception Capability generates freedom of action to force a

decision Flank guards Rear/advance guards Sentries/scouts Routine Initiative Contingency plans Reconnaissance Rehearsals

Morale Leadership/decisiveness Training/ Fitness Force ratio at point of Decisive decision (no/fmn) Ratio Force ratio at point of suppression Ability to manoeuvre Speed/type of movement

Figure 7-2: Relationship of action to effects and the attainment of security

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Simplicity

Simplicity encompasses that which provides the means to generate and execute the decision in question. In order to generate and execute the requisite decision it was postulated that four effects were required. Those four effects – command, control, tempo and reaction – were, in turn, generated by a range of associated actions. In this case study we see that the losers of each battle, by a range of actions, failed to adequately generate and then execute the effects necessary to adhere to the condition of simplicity. Conversely, the victors better maintained aspects of simplicity throughout. The condition of simplicity as it applies to this case study is shown below in Figure 7-3.

Command and Control: Command is defined as having the authority to direct actions or others in a particular domain, function or activity. In a military sense this suggests, in addition to the authority, a structure and means to impart and communicate those directions. Command then is the allocation of authority for a span of tasking, granting latitude of action and allocation of resources as well as a structure to exercise that command. Control is defined as an ability to exert restraint or direction over someone or an activity. In a military sense this demands the dictation of co-ordination measures such as the setting of boundaries of responsibility, allocation of routes and the accord of priorities for their use, etc. It also requires the allocation of objectives, tasks and phases.

There is significant evidence of limitations being placed on the Australian commanders’ application of command or control in the immediate lead up to or during their respective attacks. The most significant impost was that of time constraint and method, especially use of airpower. The imposition of higher interference, most usually, removed the subordinate commanders’ actions and undertakings from alignment with operational objectives and strategic goals. There is significant evidence that the various commanders and decision makers were operating under a range of other varying limitations such as availability of resources.

This case study illustrates the importance of the fact that options always exist – there is never only ever one option. There is however, real skill, literally at a glance, in

118 identifying what those available options are. How one acquires the ability to identify possible options at a seeming glance then becomes a key issue. Three obvious sources would be from direction, instruction or experience. A less likely answer is an understanding of the context and what that allows or offers. Direction implies an effective method of control and communication. Instruction, experience and an understanding of the context imply prior consideration and preparation. The evidence suggests that various higher Australian and Allied leaders, by virtue of their actions, did not have a clear appreciation of timing, opportunities or the realities of the situation at Gona. Again, had patience been applied and a thorough preparation occurred the outcome they sought was more likely to have been achieved much earlier and at a lesser overall cost. Conversely, evidence from the Japanese side indicates that higher level coordination of both the overall defensive effort across the entire beachhead was absent. Had the overall Japanese defence been more effectively managed then the fall of Gona would have been further delayed and possibly denied. It is to the credit of local Japanese commanders that the actual defence of Gona was pursued as vigorously as it was.

Tempo: Tempo is defined as a particular rate, rhythm or pattern of activity. In keeping with Henderson’s opinion that ‘the inexperienced commander will not be granted time in which to correct his deficiencies and give himself and his troops needful practice’ a commander must prepare in advance by thought, training and rehearsal for what is demanded in the future.342 The veracity of his argument is best exemplified by Honner in this case study wherein he was able to exploit his earlier training and experience to make an effective decision in a timely manner and prescient manner. Attainment of tempo also demands that all actions be correctly sequenced or synchronised within an overall timeframe to achieve the desired effect.

Despite their experience the evidence suggests that none of the Australian, or indeed Allied commanders in the period of first eight attacks capitalised on their experience very effectively. Similarly, none of the first eight attacks generated any tempo, primarily because of the lack of effective synchronisation and coordination both within and between the attacks. On the Japanese side it could be argued that tempo

342 Henderson, ibid, p 2.

119 was generated in at least the first half of the overall battle however, this dissipated thereafter, especially after the Australians had cut Japanese communications between Gona and Sanananda.

Reaction: Reaction is defined as an action in response to a stimulus, influence or other event. In a military sense any reaction to either opportunities or threats must be timely and effective. To be timely and effective there must be an ability to identify changes in enemy posture or action and then be able to understand what those changes mean. Such foresight not only presupposes observation and deduction, in essence intelligence, but also reinforces that the observer has an understanding of military science and an operational framework on which to base those observations and consequent assessment. Thereafter, this gives an ability to retain calm and control and buy time provided that there are sufficient reserves to implement the changes required to conduct or complete an effective reaction.

At the strategic level much latitude for effective reaction was lost by the inordinate emphasis of attainment of a particular result, immediately by MacArthur. This was then compounded by the acquiescence of Blamey and, thereafter, by a range of operational level subordinate Australian commanders. A similar situation existed on the Japanese side but for different reasons and with a different result where local commanders were essentially left to their own devices. At the lower level of the battle, the evidence attests to a greater degree of adaptability, in both mind and action, by the victors in each attack than by the losers. However, it must be accepted that all of the rigidity demonstrated throughout this battle on both sides was self- imposed. Again, Honner is deemed to have demonstrated the greatest latitude of thought as is seen by the range of interactions, responses and variation of methods he employed to match changes in context and situation despite the task remaining unchanged.

Each of the effects in question can be distilled down to attainment of a range of actions. Actions which appear to have applied to gain the five effects necessary for attainment of the condition of simplicity in the case study are depicted below in Figure 7-3.

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required in order to ACTIONS to EFFECTS CONDITIONS set generate

Leadership Span of command Latitude of action Command Command structure

Co-ord/control measures Single aim

Clear, limited objectives Control Phases - reconfigurations

Preparation (thought, training, rehearsal) Simplicity Sequencing/synchronisation/

overlap time frames Tempo provides the means to Comms compatibility (habitual generate and execute the relationships, SOP, liaison, decision comms type)

ability to ID change/threats ability to retain/ remain calm ability to buy time Reaction ability to implement change ability to apply fundamentals

Figure 7-3: Relationship of action to effects and the attainment of simplicity

Sustainment

Sustainment encompasses that which provides those resources necessary to enable and sustain the forcing of a decision. In order to generate and execute the requisite decision it was postulated that three effects were required. Those three effects – support, pressure and cost – are, in turn, generated by a range of associated actions. The condition of sustainment as it applies to this case study is shown below in Figure 7-4.

Support: Support is defined as the provision of those things necessary for existence, to give help, strength and courage. In a military sense this means that support is the provision of that which enables and sustains combat capability throughout an operation inclusive of an ability to rapidly reorganise, reconstitute and reconfigure for what is to immediately follow thereafter.

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Within the effect of support the first action is that there is adequate preparation. Preparation is paramount to support as it normally drives the efficacy of the remaining component actions such as counter penetration/attack, supporting fire, protection measures, allocation and use of transport, casualty treatment and evacuation, etc. This applies more particularly to the Australians in this case study. While the location of Gona meant long lines of communication the difficulty this posed was not insurmountable for any participant especially if consideration is limited to use of available resources once battle was joined. Despite having the initiative due to being the attacker, the Australians ceded it by persisting in attacks while being inadequately prepared for them. In so doing they actually eroded their own support. Similarly, the commanders of the Japanese defence ceded initiative by a lack of more complete preparation for a protracted defence coordinated across all three of the beachhead sites of Gona – Sanananda – Buna. However, at the lower level of the battle the Japanese were, initially, the more prepared of the two opponents.

Pressure: Pressure is defined as the application of force by one opponent against another. In a military sense this suggests an ability to not only apply force but to persevere in its application as well as an ability to absorb that force which is applied against it by an opponent. Just as one’s own sustainment is generated and maintained so too can the opponents’ sustainment be targeted through the application of sustained pressure. Equally, any protagonist must be capable of absorption of a degree of pressure from an opponent. This application or absorption of pressure may be broadly summed up as the relative attrition of resources or persistence in effort. Pressure by attrition can be achieved through an overmatch of numbers or capability. Equally, it can be generated through a variety of alternatives being applied, either in sequence or simultaneously, but in concert. Ultimately, pressure via persistence in effort is a result of determination, due primarily to levels of confidence. Confidence, in turn, is due to a range of actions tied to personality, experience, training, past success, motivation and the perceived or actual attainment of dominance as well access to resources. Pressure applied in these battles, essentially due to external factors, was of limited duration and, to be effective, had to be overwhelming, which it was not. Both sides approached the overall decision on an attritional basis while simultaneously ignoring the base requirement of attrition – resource superiority,

122 regardless of whether that was personnel, materiel, firepower or anything else. As a consequence, pressure at the strategic and operational levels on both sides amounted to increasingly unrealistic demands on the tactical level – the actual battle. This certainly achieved attrition, mostly on their own side rather than more directly on their opponents. However, ultimately, due primarily to the Allies negating the effectiveness of Japanese resupply (support) and dogged perseverance of Australian assaults the finite Japanese resource was consumed. The real question was the cost acceptable; or, put differently, could the outcome have been achieved more effectively?

Cost: Tied to both continuance of support and persistence of pressure is the issue of cost, both local and total. Cost is defined as the price paid to get, make, do or maintain something. In a military sense this suggests a quantification of effort expended in manpower and materiel relative to the benefit derived from that expenditure in a ratio to similar calculations for the opposing force. This invariably involves consideration of what residual resources and thereafter, capability, are left to continue on to the next decision and ultimately to attainment of higher operational objectives and the strategic aim. Equally important and inherent in this is the resultant motivation to persist with combat and conflict. However, the most immediate consideration is whether or not the actual decision in question has been achieved. Ultimately, has the outcome cost, or conversely, gained something in terms of a second or third order effect.

The basis of local cost is usually a default to either attainment of the decision in question or the casualty ratio. In this case study the efficacy of the tactics employed is well demonstrated on the basis of relative cost alone. At Gona it cost the victorious Australians far more than it cost the defeated Japanese.343 On the basis of local cost the final Australian attack was the most cost effective. Therefore, on a basis of net cost it is assessed that the Japanese were more tactically proficient for the greater portion of the battle. Despite that determination they were defeated.

343 Mayo Lida, 1975, Bloody Buna, Doubleday, p 180. It is interesting to compare the costs of Guadalcanal against that of the Beachheads. The 60,000 US troops on Guadalcanal suffered 6,000 casualties while the 40,000 US and Australian troops at the Beachheads suffered 8,500. This says as much about the allocation of resources and effectiveness of support as it does about tactics overall.

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Operationally, the win at Gona did little to further Allied efforts against the other beachheads at Sanananda and Buna except to demonstrate that the Japanese could be defeated and as a spur to Allied efforts in each of those localities. What the win at Gona did achieve operationally was to ensure that all overland lines of communication for the Japanese was now denied to them and further limited their ability to support either of the other two localities by sea or air. This, in turn, contributed to the attainment of operational objectives for the other two locations and thereby, the eventual defeat of the Japanese beachheads. The overall defeat of the Japanese beachheads ensured local Allied air and sea control as well as liberation of occupied Australian territory, both being significant political and militarily strategic gains.

This cost analysis and rating of tactical effectiveness aside it is instructive to consider, particularly in light of the final attack, what the Australians could have achieved, not only at the tactical level against Gona, or indeed the Allied efforts at Buna and Sanananda, but, at the operational and strategic levels across the beachheads had they demonstrated patience and built up their situational awareness and resources while attaining the operational objectives before attacking.

Each of the effects in question can be distilled down to attainment of a range of actions. Actions which appear to have applied to gain the five effects necessary for attainment of the condition of sustainment in the case study are depicted below in Figure 7-4.

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required in order to ACTIONS to EFFECTS CONDITIONS set generate

Overmatch Redundancy Pressure Alternatives Determination

residual resources to

continue motivation to persist residual capability to continue Cost desired outcome achieved 2nd/3rd order effects acceptable

Figure 7-4: Relationship of action to effects and the attainment of sustainment

Judgement of effectiveness – Gona

It may be summed up that a man is first defeated in his own mind. If so, then the psychological domain has emphasis over the physical. Ultimately, the psychological dimension, while critical, is never enough to achieve a resolution alone. It must come with the physical means to make it so. At Gona the Australians failed to efficiently and effectively inform, resource and set the conditions for attainment for themselves

125 in order to apply the physical actions to attain the mental outcome they sought from their opponents – to (immediately) cede and desist. As a result, they had to apply greater physical force and effort while consuming a greater amount of resources for a longer duration. This culminated in the final attack where the Japanese changed their mind and attempted to break out and flee from Gona. This last point cannot be over- emphasised, that is, the seemingly fanatical Japanese forsook that fanaticism, were human, changed their mind and desisted by attempting to flee. Could they have been made to change their mind sooner? More effectively?

The second major factor to consider is that of the degree of situational awareness enjoyed by each side throughout the battle. Given that the Japanese were operating from positions that had been established over time they enjoyed an in-depth awareness of the nature of the likely approaches, ranges, degree of cover and when to best initiate engagements. Due to Australian predictability by constantly attacking the same place the same way and a failure to mask intentions by covered movement, etc. each encounter was, for the Japanese, a deliberate action with few uncertain factors. Conversely, given the time that the Japanese had to camouflage and prepare their positions and the rushed nature of most Australian assaults the Australians were reduced to, at best, the limited situational awareness of a meeting engagement against an unidentified target. This, in turn was compounded by the Australians ‘changing’ troops for each assault with no effective handover of information between each assault. It was not uncommon for many Australians to have fought at Gona for some time without seeing a live Japanese soldier. Throughout the battle the Australians were at a disadvantage in having to attack from the lower, open or swampy ground into the higher, more covered, vegetated terrain held by the Japanese. The Japanese compounded their advantages of observation and fields of fire by utilising the elevation dimension through placement of sharpshooters, observers and snipers in the trees within their positions. This placement meant that the Australians were exposed not only by the terrain disadvantages of height and cover but also by virtue of the fact that they were almost never adequately protected by entrenchments or other artificial means of cover, whereas the Japanese enjoyed the relative security of well-prepared positions that gave them protection while moving between and when fighting from within their positions.

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The third Australian failure lay in their use of weapons, techniques and capabilities to deconstruct an opponent’s capability. The relative superiority of Japanese weaponry and effectiveness lay in the ranges at which all engagements were fought (well within the maximum range of all weapon types), the fact that the Japanese were fighting from well sited, integrated and planned positions against attacks that played to those defensive strengths and that the Australians were largely flailing wildly in the dark in terms of being unable to adequately identify individual targets or generate sufficient weight of fire to destroy either individual or area targets once identified. This resulted in the capability that the Australian weapons represented or were being used to generate being ineffectual in that they failed to achieve a decisive ratio, a relative superiority, at the point of decision. Thereafter, regardless of their individual effort they, as a whole, could only fail if faced with committed physical opposition but especially if the defenders efforts were combined and integrated as they were. Conversely, in the final attack, the effective tiered use of fire support from artillery, mortars and grenades kept the Japanese defenders suppressed thereby allowing the infantry assault to close with and enter the Japanese defences unimpeded.

The fourth issue was use of techniques and timing to properly generate the speed, situation and circumstances that, in turn, would create gaps in the defences and the opportunities to exploit them or, conversely, defeat an attack. The creation of gaps enables the ability to better manoeuvre and therefore apply firepower. Inherent in this is the use of surprise, deception and targeting of the opponents command, control and sustainment capabilities. By a failure to address this in the initial attacks the Australians were entirely predictable. In the final attack a combination of change of direction, holding attacks, exploitation of safety margins and timings of the fire support plus the use of delay fuses generated a dilemma for the Japanese.

The fifth issue lay in sustainment. Once Gona was completely isolated the matter of its reduction was then time dependent based on the amount of supplies available within it. From this point, due to the Australians cutting of their resupply lines of communication, the Japanese were doomed to eventual failure however, conversely, the Australians were then forced into a situation that was time dependent, the very commodity they did not have. This meant that the sustainment of their effort became

127 critical both in terms of quantity, quality and relative priority of commodities in demand. This was never totally satisfactorily resolved throughout this battle.

Ultimately, the Australians won at Gona as they regained control of when to attack, generated an ability to manoeuvre enhanced by approaching from an unexpected direction (thereby attaining deception and shock and thereby overall security) and then synchronize and orchestrate their efforts (simplicity) to achieve a decisive ratio at the point of penetration in an overall line to eliminate a finite Japanese force unable to be reinforced (sustainability). The Australian break-in then exacerbated the Japanese position as not only were their lines of communication gone but also their advantage of interior lines and thereby any ability to achieve a decisive ratio at points of decision by relocation under cover. Given the proximity of the fighting the Japanese had by now also lost all means of capability overmatch. Conversely, in the final assault Honner and his men applied audacity, shock, deception and the initiative to adhere to the principle of security. Similarly, by controlling the tempo of the situation as well as having appropriate reactions their command and control was simple and effective, devolved down to achieve independence within intention rather than rigid centralised command imposing delay in response. Finally, they were able to exploit their experience to generate confidence, maximise their support, maintain effective pressure and keep the costs down to achieve sustainment as their own lines of communication were assured. While acknowledging the imperative for a quick victory for a number of reasons at a range of levels, not least being the race to prevent further Japanese reinforcement, had the matter been conducted on 19 November as it was on 08 December it is likely that the Battle for Gona would have been completed within a week; much more in keeping with the strategic aim, operational objectives and cost. Overall, Honner achieved tactical success as he correctly applied the underpinning science to achieve the three conditions at an effective cost in both time and resources to attain a higher objective in keeping with the strategic aim.

This case study allows the drawing of a conclusion that deliberate actions are more likely to achieve success than are hasty or, more correctly, ill-considered ones. Similarly, the evidence clearly indicates that the offensive and defensive techniques applied in every attack was the same. Therefore, the application of a technique, in

128 itself is insufficient for success. The secret lies in its contextual application. Equally, success seems to be the domain of leaders with an ability to translate knowledge into action, not through drive or charisma, but through an ability to correctly identify and react appropriately to a situation either before it unfolds or as it unfolds. Put differently, they seem to have an ability to control events rather than be controlled by them. In many cases this includes an ability to control or orchestrate their own forces more effectively than those of their opponents not in the execution of a task but to generate a particular effect at the right moment and place in time to achieve that effect. Certainly, success is not in the hands of those with the greater numbers or having particular advantages in equipment or technology. It does lie in appropriate mental and physical preparation. That preparation is invariably dependent on time but more so on attitude or approach, all of which reinforces a view that success is equated with an ability to prevail over time against an adversary where that time is expended first in generating the conditions (read operational objectives) that enable success. This case study also reinforces a view that actions must be conducted in alignment with the science of war to generate the effects inherent in setting the three conditions which underpin the attainment of a decision.

On the basis of this case study it can be deduced that tactics is not as much about imposed, sequential, mechanical thinking and rigid application of organisation, techniques and procedure as it is about proactive, reactive adaptability relative to resources available, the strategic aim, operational objectives and then innovation within the prevailing context. However, anything said about adaptability and innovation is trite unless it is tied to a scientific understanding of the context of the situation and achievement of the conditions of security, simplicity and sustainment. It is particularly interesting to note that the tactical effectiveness of the forces involved improved proportionate to the level they were given authority to act independently yet within strategic guidance.

Overall, this case study reinforces a view that actions that fail to generate the full range of effects necessary to set the conditions for the attainment of a decision, while possibly ultimately achieving the desired outcome, will only do so at greater cost. That cost will be further increased where those decisions are not nested into or complementary to higher objectives. The case study also demonstrates that the

129 science of war is applicable as a means to determine likelihood of engagement and outcome. Ultimately, the case study reinforces the primacy of the psychological aspect to attainment of a desired outcome or decision - despite the tenacity of the Japanese defence it is instructive to again note, as a result of the last attack alone, that they ceded to their humanity and attempted to breakout and flee from what they saw as impending annihilation. In doing this they reinforced the psychological impact of actions creating conditions favourable to the attainment of a decision.

Case study – findings

This case study reinforces the existence of enduring consistencies across time and circumstance. First, there is definite relationship between the application of the science of war inherent in human factors, lines of communication, employment of classical manoeuvres, interior/exterior lines, etc throughout from actions to attainment of a strategic aim based on sustainability of effort over time, simplicity in execution and an ability to gain and maintain advantage in imposing the decision outcome sought.

The second relationship is the employment of a discrete range of actions rather than one in isolation to generate required effects and thereby attain the three conditions of security, simplicity and sustainment necessary to achieve a decision. The attainment of these three conditions (security, simplicity and sustainment) is dependent on the generation of a combination of a range of effects underpinning each of them. It must be stressed that the proportions of the combination will vary the degree of overall attainment of the condition in question. For example; an ability to achieve a decisive ratio at a given point in place and time is generated by actions ranging from the speed and type of movement involved through to the training and fitness as well as the leadership of those involved. However, attainment of a decisive ratio in isolation is insufficient to attain security as attainment of a decisive ratio will invariably be dependent on concurrent attainment of audacity, shock and deception necessary to attain the initiative, which, in turn, allows the movement necessary to generate the decisive ratio. Consequently, it is the breadth and depth of the base of actions that lays the foundation of ultimate success. It must be noted that while not all actions and effects need be included or are necessary for a tactic there must be simultaneous

130 attainment of the three conditions in order to attain success. The effectiveness of the attainment of the decision is then measured against operational objectives necessary to attain the strategic aim.

Third, tactics are response behaviours noting that there are two levels of response. The first part of response is as a result of one’s own experience. The second part of response lies in analysis of what the opposition is doing or is trying to do noting that, as explained earlier, this opposition may also come from one’s own side. The case study also highlights that for a grand or large-scale design to be implemented a sequence of events must occur or be executed. The method of each event, the technique, procedure and technology employed, is important and reactive to the end result. Even more important are the sequence, synchronisation and emphasis applied to those events. Without these latter three there would be; as a consequence of the completion of all the events, a result; usually negative, however; if positive, the result of chance or the local flexibility borne of persistence or determination.

Overall, this case study has reinforced the benefit (acceptable cost in time) of considered analysis giving rise to contextual decision making resulting in short term advantage aligned to longer term or higher objectives. It also supports a view that tactics, while conceptual, to be effective, must be scientifically based and executed in keeping with the bounds of that science. The composition of a tactic, together with its component elements and their relationship to the decision in question and its nesting within higher objectives and strategic aim in a military setting can therefore be represented diagrammatically.

Assessment of the decision model, the relationships matrix and tactics definition

This case study has affirmed the utility of the decisional framework as a means by which to understand a conflict situation as depicted in Figures 7-1 and 7-5 together with Table 7-1. It has achieved this by demonstration that an array of individual actions led to the generation of a series of effects that then set the three conditions necessary to attain a decision. Simultaneously it has set the attainment of a decision within a particular strategic and operational context which consequently allows an objective, effective appraisal of the effort undertaken against the outcome.

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Furthermore, this case study has shown that each and every physical action must be directed toward attainment of a mental outcome; that is, the decision by an opponent to cede and desist.

The application of the decisional framework and relationship matrix has also confirmed the scientific foundation of tactics as well as demonstrate that while tactical execution is best generated from the ground up rather than dictated down from above the parameters of that execution are established within the strategic aim and operational objectives. It reinforces a view that strategy is derived from national capability where that capability is expressed in a force design which then dictates the tactics to be employed. This then supports the strategy – tactics relationship.

These points confirm the key element of the proposed definition that tactics are the sum of scientifically based thought and action to generate advantage in order to attain an immediate decision within a higher objective. That confirmation is achieved by denial of an understanding that tactics are limited to the mechanistic ordered arrangement of units. The sum of these relationships as they pertain to the battle for Gona can be depicted as in Figure 7-5. Should it be desirable to make a quantifiable assessment of the degree to which each side attained each action, effect and condition then additional columns for each side may be included and a numerical value assigned accordingly.

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Operational required to in order to in order to & Strategic ACTIONS EFFECTS CONDITIONS supporting generate set achieve Campaign AIM Objectives

Morale The focus of a decision that Leadership/decisiveness targets what allows, inhibits Training/ Fitness or prevents attainment of what is desired and the Force ratio at point of decision underlying effect to be (no/fmn) Decisive Ratio achieved Force ratio at point of suppression Ability to manoeuvre Speed/type of movement What is Beliefs superiority Leadership desired and Identity Allied/Axis/national why Span of command Survival airfields Latitude of action Command Attack : Defence: Command structure Capture Gona ASAP in Retain Gona in order to secure and order to disrupt Co-ord/control measures shorten lines of enemy capability Single aim communication and and operations Clear, limited objectives Control decision supporting 1. Maintain/penetrate defence perimter Phases - reconfigurations 2. Maintain depth of defence/ exploit penetration

Preparation (thought, training, rehearsal) Simplicity Sequencing/synchronisation/ provides the means to generate and execute overlap time frames Tempo the decision Comms compatibility (habitual relationships, SOP, liaison, comms type) ability to ID change/threats ability to retain/ remain calm ability to buy time Reaction ability to implement change ability to apply fundamentals

Span of supported action (security in initiation, preparation requirements/ limitations, size, duration, extraction) Reinforcement (rate/no) Casualty treatment Casualty evacuation Supplies (rate, quantity, means of transport) Counter penetration/attack Support Physical protection Supporting fire Sustainability Tenacity in leadership those resources Lines of communication (length, necessary to enable and key terrain) sustain the forcing of a decision Transport means, assets Security requirement Allies & other support Human factors - 72 hr, etc Moral, legal, political support Information mngt/ media Overmatch Redundancy Pressure Alternatives Determination residual resources to continue motivation to persist residual capability to continue Cost desired outcome achieved 2nd/3rd order effects acceptable

Figure 7-5: Relationships inherent in tactics applicable to the battle for Gona

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Chapter Eight

Conclusion

This research was based on a conclusion arising from a literature review that the term tactics, as used commonly in the English language and within the military, is of profoundly ambiguous understanding, full of latent meaning and contradiction. Accepted statements that tactics is both an art and a science and that the outcome of any encounter is conjectural, dependent on chance reinforced that conclusion.

A review of military history confirmed that linkages of tactics to conflict overall, context, resources, experience, risk, strategy, ultimate goals, the science of war and decision making, are all but forgotten, ignored or unintelligible. Put simply, the notion of tactics has become quite misunderstood as it is an ill-defined and vague notion rather than something of tangible substance and description (definition).

The aim of this thesis was therefore, to provide the basis of an overarching and comprehensive definition of tactics, specifically within the military sphere, to counter the demonstrated piecemeal, disjointed, inconsistent and incomplete understanding of tactics.

Using Thomas’ case study typology, the overall object of this research is tactics. The subject is composed of the many and varied historical examples of military conflict that were considered. Throughout the research the object is framed by the pertinent research question to build or test the basis of a theory. The questions which informed the research were:

What is the relationship between strategy and tactics?

What is tactical success?

What conditions are required for tactical success?

What factors and elements support the conditions for tactical success?

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Tactics – its relationship to strategy Inherent in tactics is an understanding and acceptance of the hierarchy of decision-making relationships between higher objectives sought and lower level actions to attain them in part, usually over time and as resources allow. Therefore, tactics, which incorporate analysis and decision making at a lower level must remain subordinate to strategy which sets or determines the higher objectives to be sought. Inherent in this subordination is the recognition of the interrelatedness of the two – neither can function in isolation to the other. Equally, the two are on a sliding scale of application regardless of the scale or size of the overall endeavour to which they apply. The key determinant for a tactic is that it involves attainment of a subordinate decision for which the individual involved is alone responsible for. If the subordinate is not responsible for the attainment of a decision (outcome) then, by default, they are responsible for the fulfilment of a particular task, usually by the application of a particular method or technique.

Tactics – its factors and elements Analysis arising from the literature review and a wide range of military history case studies clearly indicates that tactics are something done and therefore is an art. However, what is done is within a relationship where responsibility for attainment of a decision is assigned. This then places emphasis on attainment of a decision which, in turn, is composed of both a mental and physical aspect. Therefore, any action undertaken should be done on the basis of subverting the opponent’s psychology to one’s own will. Therefore, tactics, to be effective, are very much an art based on science. What is not evident in the literature and the case studies is the identification and articulation of the relationship of the science to the application of the art.

Having determined that tactics are an art subordinate to strategy a theory to enable description and assessment of tactics was proposed. The basis of the theory was established via continued review of military history case studies to identify common factors and elements to a wide range of situations across time and circumstance that led to either success or failure. Subsequently, it was confirmed that actions, to be effective, were undertaken in order to generate an effect that, in turn, set conditions necessary to achieve a decision that supports attainment of a higher order objective. The theory itself was based on consideration of what was entailed in a decision from a conceptual point of view. It was proposed that three conditions – an ability or

135 freedom to act so as to attain a decision, the ease of control and coordination of the actions to do so and the ability to sustain the effort required to achieve that decision – had to exist for success or attainment of the decision in question. The attainment, both in degree and entirety, of the three conditions provided the means of assessment of its effectiveness. The theory was then tested by addressing all relationships simultaneously rather than looking at each factor or element in isolation or lineal sequence.

Overall, the case studies demonstrated that tactics are not the execution of a task, despite that being involved, but the attainment of a decision. The attainment of a decision involves convincing an opponent to do something, ideally the thing that you want them to do. This places a heavy emphasis on human factors, principally those of the mind rather than performance of an action. However, the performance of an action should be done primarily to achieve an effect of thinking in an enemy’s mind. That change of mind will only occur if the opponent realises that they no longer have the freedom to do as they wish, that they no longer control the manner and sequence of what is happening or that they no longer can sustain their efforts. On realisation of these three things an opponent will cede the struggle. The attainment of these three conditions is therefore necessary to enact or enforce a decision. Therefore, tactics are more about thought than action or, put differently, thought and the attainment of a certain mindset in an opponent must have both priority and emphasis in tactics.

Tactics defined

The research effort was then used to establish a matrix (Figure 8-1 below) that depicts the relationships inherent in tactics and thereby gives an indication of the outcome to a conflict encounter.

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Operational required to in order to in order to & Strategic ACTIONS EFFECTS CONDITIONS supporting generate set achieve Campaign AIM Objectives

Leadership/ decisiveness Preparation (thought, training, rehearsal) Experience Audacity Situational awareness Time window/ opportunity Mass Momenteum Range (prox-max) Noise Dilemma of decision Shock Dilemma of action Timing Location/ direction Speed/ tempo Timing Source Security Size Deception generates freedom of Capability action to force a decision Flank guards Campaign A Rear/advance guards 1. Find Sentries/scouts 2. Fix Routine Initiative 3. Guard Contingency plans 4. Grow Reconnaissance 5. Modify Rehearsals 6. Eliminate Morale The focus of a decision that Leadership/decisiveness targets what allows, inhibits or Training/ Fitness prevents attainment of what is Force ratio at point of decision desired and the underlying effect (no/fmn) Decisive Ratio to be achieved Force ratio at point of suppression Campaign B Ability to manoeuvre Speed/type of movement 1. Find 2. Fix Beliefs Leadership 3. Guard Identity Span of command 4. Grow Survival Latitude of action Command 5. Modify What is desired Command structure 6. Eliminate and why Co-ord/control measures Single aim Clear, limited objectives Control decision supporting Phases - reconfigurations Campaign C Preparation (thought, training, 1. Find rehearsal) Simplicity 2. Fix Sequencing/synchronisation/ provides the means to 3. Guard generate and execute the overlap time frames Tempo 4. Grow decision Comms compatibility (habitual 5. Modify relationships, SOP, liaison, 6. Eliminate comms type) ability to ID change/threats ability to retain/ remain calm ability to buy time Reaction ability to implement change ability to apply fundamentals

Span of supported action (security in initiation, preparation requirements/ limitations, size, duration, extraction) Reinforcement (rate/no) Casualty treatment Casualty evacuation Supplies (rate, quantity, means of transport) Counter penetration/attack Support Physical protection Supporting fire Sustainability Tenacity in leadership those resources necessary Lines of communication (length, to enable and sustain the key terrain) forcing of a decision Transport means, assets Security requirement Allies & other support Human factors - 72 hr, etc Moral, legal, political support Information mngt/ media Overmatch Redundancy Pressure Alternatives Determination residual resources to continue motivation to persist residual capability to continue Cost desired outcome achieved 2nd/3rd order effects acceptable Figure 8-1: Relationships and requirements inherent in tactics

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This matrix thereby contributes to a definition of tactics as follows.

Tactics, simply described, is the sum of reactive thought and actions taken to generate advantage in order to attain an immediate decision and enable transition within a higher objective in a particular context.

Tactics, more completely, is the sum of thought and actions taken to enable and allow, control and sustain the attainment of an immediate decision which is the responsibility of the decision maker alone, in a particular context aligned to attainment of a higher objective. Tactics are reactive, the result of analysis, experience and deduction, based on science and considerate of pertinent factors to make the most effective and ethical employment of all available resources to achieve an advantageous outcome. This is achieved through synchronisation in time of effect to create opportunities for second and third order effects. The effectiveness of a tactic is measured by its cost relative to attainment of the pertinent higher objective or strategic aim noting that a tactic must not only seek to gain success and avoid destruction but enable transition to the next decision.

Ultimately, unless one understands tactics as a concept they will never rise above the application of methods and techniques as their decision making will be devoid of a philosophical framework that allows their ideas to be communicated and understood across time and circumstance. Furthermore, one must consider issues on an informed basis within context of both circumstance and relationships to external factors so that their resultant actions will involve lesser risk and complexity in order to achieve higher objectives at an acceptable and sustainable cost.

Most importantly, what this conceptual model highlights is that a paradigm shift in thinking on warfare specifically and conflict generally and therefore the consequential adjustment of the military is required. Inherent in this is a parallel adaptation of all of our institutional patterns of thought and logic on warfare and conflict. At the basis of this is a need to see conflict not as a discrete event but as a collection of interrelated decisions that effects a transition within an overall ongoing saga involving more than two protagonists in direct confrontation.

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