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Organization and Training of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (29 June

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Organization and Training of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (29 June 1 Organization and Training of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (29 June 1943–6 June 1944) nitial negotiations concerning an SS Division to be composed of young members of the Hitlerjugend commenced in February 1943 between the representatives of the Waffen-SS and the National Socialist youth organization. On their recommendation Ion 24 June 1943 Adolf Hitler issued an order for the division to be set up in the Beverloo training facility north of Brussels. The officers and NCOs of the new unit were reassigned from its patron division the 1.SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler”1. The enlisted were mainly German young men born in the first half of 1926 who had already received paramilitary training. SS-Panzer Regiment 12 had been in formation since 29 June 1943 in the Mailly-le- Camp training facility northeast of Paris. Approximately 200 soldiers were transferred to the new regiment from the patron division’s SS-Panzer Regiment 1. At the end of 1943 the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 was still far from being operational. The chronology of the organization, training and equipment of the unit in 1944 is as follows:2 1 January 1944 SS-Panzer Regiment 12, which at the time was stationed at the Mailly-le-Camp training facility in France, received an order from the Oberbefehlshaber “West” (Senior Area Commander “West”) to relocate to the training facility near Beverloo in Belgium to join the other units of the division being trained there. 4 January 1944 Distribution of the tactical identification (turret) numbers. The tactical identification number system applied in SS-Panzer Regiment 12 was different from the principles followed by the Army and the armoured units within the Waffen-SS. Turret number 055 was assigned to the tank of the Regimentskommandeur, turret number 054 to the Regimentsadjutant, and turret number 053 to the Regiment Ordonnanz Offizier. Numbers 055–060 were assigned to the tanks of the regimental (Panzer IV) Panzer Aufklärungszug. The commander of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 received the number 155 for his tank, the number 154 was assigned 1 The name of the division was usually abbreviated as “LAH” or “LSSAH”. In wartime as a brigade and later division its standard title was “Leibstandarte,” the lengthier title was more from its SS- Verfügungstruppe period and earlier when a bodyguard unit. 2 Unless indicated otherwise, data has been taken from the activity report of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 between 1 January and 4 June 1944. See Vojenský Historický Archiv, Praha (Military History Archives, Prague), Tätigkeitsbericht des SS-Panzer Regiments 12, 1 Januar–4 Juni 1944. 19 20 WAFFEN-SS ARMOUR IN NORMANDY The first commander of Josef “Sepp” Dietrich commanded the I.SS- the 12.SS-Panzer Division Panzer Korps in Normandy (see Chapter “Hitlerjugend”, Fritz Witt is shown 2 Footnote 23). (Mark C. Yerger) as an Obersturmbannführer in a signed photo (see Chapter 2 Footnote 5). (Mark C. Yerger) to the Abteilungsadjutant and the Nachrichtenoffizierwas given turret number 153. The five (Panther) tanks of the Panzer Aufklärungszug of I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 were given the numbers 156–160. The commander of the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 received turret number 555, number 554 was assigned to his Adjutant and number 553 was handed out to the Nachrichtenoffizier. Turret numbers 556–560 were assigned to the (Panzer IV) Panzer Aufklärungszug of the II./SS- Panzer Regiment 12.3 The 35cm high, 22cm wide numbers with 1cm border had to be painted in black, on the back of the tanks, and on the sides of their turrets, which were painted in camouflage colours. Between the numbers a 4cm wide clear stripe had to be left.4 3 See Appendix III for the original order. The numbering system of the tanks of the Kompanie Chef was as follows: the number of their Kompanie + 05 (for example 105 for the Chef of the 1.Kompanie and 505 for the Chef of the 5.Kompanie), the reserve tank (which at the same time served as the tank of the deputy Kompanie Chef ) received its number according to the Kompanie number + 04 (for example 104 for 1.Kompanie and 504 for 5.Kompanie). Within the platoon the first tank (of the Zugführer) received the number made up from the Kompanie number, that of the platoon, and + 5 (for example the Zugführer of the I./1.Kompanie received turret number 115). Further tanks of the platoon were given the numbers 6, 7, 8 and 9 following the number of their Kompanie and Zug number, for example, the five tanks of the I./1.Kompanie were designated by the numbers 115, 116, 117, 118 and 119. The last tank of the III./8. Kompanie received number 839. See Anlage II/4 zum Tätigkeitsbericht SS-Panzer Regiment 12. 4 See Appendix III for the original order. According to original photographs, some of which can be seen in this book, the numbers were painted with black numbers in a white border on the Panzer IVs, and with red numbers in a white border on the Panthers. The size and system of the numbers remained as described above. ORGaniZation and Training (29 JunE 1943–6 JunE 1944) 21 An excellent close-up of a Panzer IV from II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 on exercises in Belgium, winter 1943/44. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-297-1722-27, photo: Kurth) Panzer IV from 6.Kompanie II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, Belgium, winter 1943/44. This image gives a good impression of the application of the tactical numbers to the tanks. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-297-1725-09, photo: Kurth) 22 WAFFEN-SS ARMOUR IN NORMANDY A frontal view of the same Panzer IV. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-297-1725-11, photo: Kurth) Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt observing exercises conducted by SS- Panzer Regiment 12, March 1944. From left to right: von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber West), Standartenführer Kurt Meyer (commander SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25, later commander 12.SS-Panzer Division), Brigadeführer Fritz Witt (commander, 12.SS-Panzer Division), Obergruppenführer Joseph Dietrich (commander, I.SS- Panzer Korps). (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-297-1739-16A, photo: Kurth) ORGaniZation and Training (29 JunE 1943–6 JunE 1944) 23 Panzer IV tanks from 5.Kompanie, II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 parade before Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, March 1944. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-297-1740-19A, photo: Kurth) 7 January 1944 Arrival of a new Panther tank for the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12. 10 January 1944 Beginning of the train loading in Mailly-le-Camp. 16 January 1944 SS-Panzer Regiment 12 arrived at the training facility near Beverloo. 29 January 1944 Regrouping of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and the regimental units to Hasselt and the northern region. 31 January 1944 The training of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 in January proceeded as ordered, although the shortage of fuel and training ammunition hindered the work. One NCO and three enlisted men were killed this month. 6 February 1944 Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, General Inspector for the Panzertruppen, inspected the drill of the 3./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 with the theme, “attack in motion against enemy in the air”. During the first week of February 16 Panther tanks arrived for the I./SS- Panzer Regiment 12. 15 February 1944 Command drill of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 with the theme: “attack of a Panzer Abteilung with limited goals”. The regimental Flak Zug (one officer, five NCOs and 64 enlisted men), with Zugführer Untersturmführer Walter Schaffert were directed to Schwetzingen, in order to receive training with Panzer-Ausbildungs-und Ersatz Abteilung 204. 24 WAFFEN-SS ARMOUR IN NORMANDY Max Wünsche as a Sturmbannführer with the “Leibstandarte” wearing his Knight’s Cross, later the first commander of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (see Appendix II and main text). (Mark C. Yerger) Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche in his Panther command tank (Pz Bef Wg Panther) during an exercise with SS-Panzer Regiment 12 in Belgium, March 1944. The additional antennae for the command equipment are clearly visible. (National Archives) ORGaniZation and Training (29 JunE 1943–6 JunE 1944) 25 A close-up view of Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche, Belgium, March 1944. Note the zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste on the tank. (National Archives) Panthers from 2.Kompanie, I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 on exercise in Belgium, March 1944. (National Archives) 26 WAFFEN-SS ARMOUR IN NORMANDY A Panther from I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, Belgium, March 1944. (National Archives) A rear view of Wünsche’s command Panther, Belgium, March 1944. (National Archives) ORGaniZation and Training (29 JunE 1943–6 JunE 1944) 27 An iconic view of Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche, commander of SS- Panzer Regiment 12 during the fighting in Normandy. (National Archives) 17 February 1944 The regimental Panzer-Pionier-Kompanie was created from the Ausbildungskompanie of SS-Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 12 (Kompanie Chef: Oberleutnant Müller5) near Zonhoven. 29 February 1944 Command drill for the Zugführer und Kompanie Chef at the Stab of the 12.SS-Panzer Division in Turnhout. Theme: “Panzer group combat against panzer group”. During the month, four enlisted men were killed, and one NCO was shot in accordance with the death-sentence of the field court martial. 3 March 1944 Participation of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 in battle-group training with the armoured personnel vehicles of the III./SS-Panzer-Grenadier- Regiment 26 and the Wespe and Hummel self-propelled howitzers of the I./SS-Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 12. Themes covered: “attack of armoured Kampfgruppe with limited goals” and “cooperation of subordinated units and armament”. 12 March 1944 Drill of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 at full strength. Theme: Kampfgruppe“ against Kampfgruppe”. 5 Because of the shortage of trained officers, approximately 50 officers were reassigned from the German Army to the 12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”.
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