sign in sign up
<<
Home , Gabi Ashkenazi, Meir Dagan, Statism, Tamir Pardo

NO. 2 JANUARY 2020 Introduction

The Widening –political Gap in Former Chiefs of Staff Fight for Principles of Statism Yoram Peri

Over the last decade, the gap between the military and political elites in Israel has increased and eventually peaked in 2019, when a group of senior officers who had just retired from the (IDF) formed a new party – led by three former chiefs of staff – and called for the replacement of Prime Minister ’s . This gap has developed because Israel’s previous govern- ments have represented a new kind of polarising, right-wing beyond what is considered a shared national common sense. The military, on the other hand, is striv- ing to maintain the character it has acquired as a “Nation in Arms” by reflecting the entire society of Israel and acting according to its professional ethos and national statist values. The stated goal of the officers entering politics was to defend those values against perceivably partisan and polarising governmental politics. The com- position of a future government is thus both: A competition over principled values of the , but also a determination about the steps regarding the military and political leadership in Israel, as well as the military’s relations with society at large.

Israel is a parliamentary with another model coexists, namely that of free elections and a multiparty system that “political–military partnership”, as the leads to coalition , and the military has been a weighty partner in principle of military subordination to the determining government policies even political echelon has been anchored in the beyond the narrow field of security. Basic Law: The Military (1976). As a result, What has enabled the IDF to maintain the nature of Israel’s military–government its image as a national and non-political relations has been obscured, and most institution is the fact that it views itself observers do not fully appreciate the actual as a professional body acting out of non- weight that the military wields in determin- partisan considerations. Even the perma- ing Israeli policies. nent professional military – and not only Even though Israel practices the “instru- the conscripted units – continues to be a mentalist model”, meaning that the military “citizens’ army” that reflects all shades of executes policies set by the government, civilian society. Thus, the ethos of the IDF

is not one of militaristic professionalism. toppling the regime and achieving Rather, it represents very strongly the a “decisive victory” against Hizbullah. In Israeli idea of “Mamlachtiyut” – a statist other words, advocating a tough militaristic national ethos that combines notions of stance towards Israel’s adversaries was, in belonging to the same community, due recent years, a political strategy by which conduct, inclusivity, and engaging for the the political right hoped to gain votes with- common good of Israel. in -wing electorate. Soldiers and officers come from all walks This created a strong politicisation of of life and represent the broad spectrum of military actions and goals. As a result, it political views prevailing in Israeli society. produced a growing dichotomy between Yet, the leadership of the IDF was always positions the government was taking and a product of the political mainstream and evaluations of the IDF’s general staff. never came from the more extreme margins A series of events that took place in the of society, neither right nor left – embody- last decade illustrates this gap between the ing the very idea of Mamlachtiyut. government and the IDF leadership. Although differences between the mili- One of the latest and most remarkable tary and the political echelons have always events took place a few days before the Sep- occurred, we have seen a new quality of tember elections in 2019, when security lead- discrepancies between the IDF and its civil- ers prevented Netanyahu from declaring ian superiors during the Netanyahu years. the annexation of the West Bank and even This is linked mainly to the fact that the stopped a major military operation in Gaza. policies of the respective Netanyahu gov- Another prominent example is when the ernments in recent years have shifted Israel heads of the defence establishment opposed far to the right, and that the government an attack on proposed by the political disputes positions which have been guiding leaders. In 2010, the heads of the security state policies and institutions for a long time. establishment – Chief of Staff General Gabi This shift created a new political battle- Ashkenazi and chief – field, especially with the “gatekeepers” of literally prevented an attack on Iran’s nu- the principles of statism, such as the , clear facilities as instructed by the prime the judiciary, and especially the Supreme minister and defence minister. These public Court – but also the military. Concerning servants went so far as to claim that such a the IDF, this discrepancy sees two mutually directive – in the absence of the approval reinforcing levels: What is professionally of the entire cabinet – would be unconsti- feasible from a military point of view, and tutional. This situation repeated itself in what is politically feasible with regard to 2011 and 2012 under Chief of Staff Benny what is best for the State of Israel. Gantz and Mossad chief . Another example is the different posi- tioning of prominent ministers and poli- Politicisation of Military Actions ticians within the government and the IDF regarding policies vis-à-vis Hamas in Gaza, One of the central political messages the especially since 2015. In response to Hamas’s right-wing governments tried to establish missile and rocket attacks on Israeli civil- was that, at best, the political left does not ians, Defence Minister , understand security, or in the worst case, supported by other cabinet ministers, de- that they are helping Israel’s enemies. manded a massive military campaign that In addition, there has been a competition was intended to lead to a full takeover of among right-wing groups about who is more the Gaza Strip by the IDF’s field units, the “authentically” right-wing. That has set in surrender of Hamas’s military forces, and motion a dynamic of radicalisation, which the collapse of the Hamas regime. Similarly, led the respective parties to present ever in 2019, Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz more hard-line security positions, such as called for a re-conquering of Gaza to “defeat

SWP Comment 2 January 2020

2 Hamas”. The military objected to those ideas, organise politically and to participate in the not only because it would result in many cas- April 2019 elections. Therefore, a substan- ualties – both to the IDF and to the civilian tial number of retired, very high-ranking Palestinian population – but also because officers joined ranks in order to defeat the there was no permanent military solution government of Prime Minister Netanyahu. for Gaza, as it had stressed time and again. No wonder that the newly formed party There are many more examples in recent Kahol Lavan (“Blue and White”) – with years where – while right-wing politicians , , and Moshe have called for a show of force – the army Ya’alon, three former IDF chiefs of staff – has called for moderation, emphasised the was called “the party of the generals”. importance of diplomacy to restrain Palestin- As these officers had already left the army ian violence, and, most recently at the be- and became civilians, their involvement in ginning of 2020, called for work permits in the political game was legitimate; however, order establish calm between Gaza and Israel. they reflected and represented the positions of their former colleagues in uniform. Senior retired officers have participated Growing Distance between the in the highest ranks of government since Army and the Government the early days of the State of Israel. They benefit from the high public esteem for the The government’s policies in the security military, with a current trust rate among field have led to harsh responses by mili- Jewish Israelis of about 90 per cent, where- tary leaders. The latter fear losing the two as the level of trust in political parties has pillars that have earned them a special fallen to 14 per cent. In the public percep- status: Their strong position in dialogues tion, politicians are perceived as acting out with the government could be undermined, of narrow personal motives and in the ser- and they could also lose the confidence of vice of particular interest groups, whereas large segments of the public, who might military officers are valued patriots who are fear that the military will cease to be a non- acting for the sake of the nation, willing to political citizens’ army. What has support- risk their lives. ed these perceptions is that the national Yet, the country has never seen three for- religious movement (the engine behind the mer chiefs of staff in one party. They entered settlements project) has managed to infil- politics not only to work on the political– trate the centres of power in Israeli society military relationship, but, as they continue – including the military – to a degree that to stress, to preserve the statist principles far exceeds their relative representation by which the state is governed. Thus, politi- within the population at large. cal–military relations are a core issue, but The IDF leadership is very concerned the party is presenting – or at least claims about the widening gap between the mili- to present – their understanding of IDF tary and civilian society, so much so that, in values as a political guideline per se. Their the past decade, a number of chiefs of staff core demands are to uphold the rule of have declared that this rift poses a serious law, end corruption, strengthen republican danger to the IDF, even more than the mili- values, end partisan governments, create tary threats of terror organisations or from a national-unity coalition, and uphold prin- Iran. ciples of good . They contrast it with the politics of Netan- yahu’s governments, which they deem sec- Officers Parachute into Politics tarian, partisan, and focussed on religious and ethno-nationalist principles, rather The feeling that government officials and than being orientated towards the pro- the military top brass do not broadcast on fessional and common good. Kahol Lavan the same wavelength has led the latter to Benny Gantz described that

SWP Comment 2 January 2020

3 difference with the catch phrase that he policy against the Palestinians, of nurturing would stand for a “Memshala Mamlachtit” defeatist tendencies, and of being infected (statist government), whereas Netanyahu with “leftism”. would head a “Memshala Malchutit”, meaning Not a few representatives of this right- Netanyahu would govern Israel like a king- wing political circle have publicly recom- dom. mended that a new nationalist government In those formulations, the shift that should initiate an overhaul of the IDF com- Israel has taken over the last years becomes mand, remove the upper echelon, and pro- visible. Whereas the principles of statism mote a young cadre of commanders. These were previously widely shared among would certainly be primarily composed of © Stiftung Wissenschaft politicians, they have now become a bone dedicated religious officers who were edu- und Politik, 2020 of contention: As the Israeli Democracy cated in the religious pre-military colleges All reserved Index in 2018 has shown, questions sur- and the national religious schools. rounding the principles of statism, the rule Such blatant identification between the This Comment reflects of law, and the state of Israel’s democracy IDF and one wing of the political map – the author’s views. became, for the first time in its history, a together with the explicit call for political The online version of major dividing line between left and right cleansing of the military leadership – was this publication contains – and thus formed a new (and currently previously unheard of in Israel. Despite functioning links to other dominant) political cleavage in Israel. This sharp differences between left and right, SWP texts and other relevant is emphasised by the strong showing of the until now, all parties have always been sources. “party of the generals”, Kahol Lavan, in the careful to keep the military out of the po- SWP Comments are subject two elections of 2019. With 35 and 33 seats litical fray. In the second decade of the 21st to internal peer review, fact- (out of 120), respectively, they headed the century, the IDF has found itself at the cen- checking and copy-editing. strongest or second-strongest faction in the tre of a national debate. For further information on . In both elections, the newly If the current trend of dominance of our quality control pro- formed party was clearly identified as the ethno-nationalist and religious politics cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- major competitor to Netanyahu’s Likud, continues, it is likely that we will see ever- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ thus indicating a shift in the political growing criticism of the government against quality-management-for- landscape of Israel. the IDF elite, as long as they do not comply swp-publications/ with the government’s view on security- related matters. It needs to be seen to what SWP extent they can withstand the pressure. In Stiftung Wissenschaft und Scenarios for Future Political– Politik military Relations any case, the likelihood of the preference for German Institute for military solutions over political approaches International and The heightened involvement of retired in conflict scenarios will certainly rise. Security Affairs officers in electoral politics in 2019 has On the other hand, a government that is already had a negative effect on political– not made up of purely right-wing parties Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin military relations. Representatives of the will probably break these dynamics of self- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 right wing have attacked not only the radicalisation of the right wing’s political Fax +49 30 880 07-100 retired-officers-turned-politicians, but also demands. Especially if Kahol Lavan, the www.swp-berlin.org the military establishment itself. The IDF “party of the generals”, were to be in a gov- [email protected] has been accused of being fearful of enter- erning coalition, the gap between the mili-

ISSN 1861-1761 ing into battle, of not believing in the like- tary and political leadership will be signifi- doi: 10.18449/2020C02 lihood of reaching a victory in the battle cantly smaller. Thus, much depends on the with Hamas or Hizbullah, of refraining composition of the next government. from carrying out a vigorous and aggressive

Yoram Peri, PhD, is Jack Kay Professor of Israel Studies and Director at the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies. He was a Visiting Fellow in the project “Israel in a Conflicting Regional and Global Environment: Internal Developments, Security Policy and External Relations”, which is part of the SWP Middle East and Africa Division and is funded by the Federal Foreign Office.

SWP Comment 2 January 2020

4