B•• KS Sheri Berman is a visiting associate professor of at Barnard College, , and the author of The Primacy of : Social and the Ideological Dynamics of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Three Faces of Sheri Berman

Fascists Michael Mann New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004

The Anatomy of Fascism Robert O. Paxton New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004 The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism Richard Wolin Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004

In recent decades, the term “fascism” has terpretations of fascism’s nature and histori- basically been stripped of all substantive cal significance, and their impressive books content. People on the left often apply the should interest academics and general read- “fascist” tag to describe any right-wing thug ers alike. Together they provide an excellent they don’t like, and their opposite numbers opportunity to assess what is and is not have reciprocated with coinages such as known about fascism, as well as the rele- “feminazi” and “econazi.” Academics have vance of the topic for contemporary political been less glib, but even they have fought life. In particular, we will see that while passionately over how to characterize and old-style fascism is defunct in its original even analyze the phenomenon. Almost 85 home—Europe—its spirit lives on in years since fascism’s appearance and almost another part of the world in the guise of 60 years since its demise, reams of books radical Islam. about it still appear regularly, their authors Robert Paxton’s The Anatomy of Fascism often disagreeing sharply with one another is the most comprehensive of the three. over fundamental issues of definition, scope, With a long and distinguished career as a and causality. historian of European politics and particu- This year has seen a particularly bounti- larly French fascism behind him, Paxton ful crop, with three major new studies by, writes that this book represents the “culmi- respectively, the political historian Robert nation of a lifetime of study,” and it shows, Paxton, the sociologist Michael Mann, and embodying the best of what historical schol- the intellectual historian Richard Wolin. arship has to offer. He concentrates on the All three authors draw extensively on pre- particular political contexts within which vious scholarship while offering original in- fascist movements arose and took

Three Faces of Fascism 95 power, while still being careful to point out poorly. Moderate socialists’ unwillingness how “long-term shifts in fundamental polit- to break decisively with their communist ical, social and economic structures” inter- brethren and fully embrace a truly social acted with the choices and actions of indi- democratic strategy, even though they had vidual political actors to explain fascism’s long ago given up any real hope or even de- development and fate. The most important sire for revolution, rendered them politically of these structural factors, his analysis sug- impotent. Just as important was the failure gests, were the rise of mass politics, the fail- of . Having never fully adjusted to ure of fascism’s political competitors, and the rough and tumble of democratic poli- the power of . tics, liberal parties generally withered dur- Europe’s democratic age really began ing the interwar years, leaving their natural only in the late nineteenth and early twenti- middle-class constituency ripe for the pick- eth centuries, and although political partici- ing. But liberalism’s inadequacies went pation increased across the continent many deeper than the missteps of the parties that of the habits, norms, and institutions that bore its name, as the itself proved we now view as necessary to support a well- to have little to offer mass publics suffering functioning democratic polity lagged be- from economic crisis, social dislocation, and hind. For example, political parties, particu- cultural destabilization. larly of the liberal and conservative varieties, The backlash against the spread of capi- remained weak, leaving their natural mid- talism, and modernity more generally, that dle-class, peasant, and rural constituencies had been brewing across Europe around the feeling that they lacked a voice in the new turn of the century led intellectuals and ac- democratic regimes. As a result, the emer- tivists to grope for ways of reintegrating gent were often weak, ineffi- their societies and restoring a sense of mean- cient, and corrupt, doing little to inspire ing to the amoral and “disenchanted” bour- popular confidence or loyalty. Because mass geois world. The nationalist movements participation in politics was there to stay, that resulted tended to grow increasingly however, traditional of the radical over time, and eventually fed on the elitist, antidemocratic variety and other disappointment and frustrated idealism of forms of were not workable veterans from the First World War, the hu- alternatives to democracy in many cases. miliation of the defeated belligerents, and Enter fascism, which offered a withering the resentment of certain countries, like critique of democracy that was designed to Italy, over not having gotten their “just appeal to a broad constituency. Fascism’s desserts” at the end of that war. goal of not merely capturing power but All these trends provided fertile ground transforming society completely was per- for fascism’s rise. Structural factors, however, fectly suited to the times, since it sought can take you only so far. As Paxton puts it: not to exclude people from politics but “Having assembled a catalogue...of longer- rather to involve them in a mass revolu- term structural preconditions we might be tionary project. tempted to believe we can foresee exactly Fascism was able to maneuver so suc- where fascism is likely to appear, grow, and cessfully on the political stage, meanwhile, take power. But that would mean falling in- partly because other actors kept tripping up to a determinist trap. There remains the ele- and flubbing their lines. The radical rheto- ment of human choice. It was by no means ric of European communists in the years be- guaranteed that a nation fitted with all the tween the two world wars sent people flee- preconditions would become fascist.” So, af- ing into the fascists’ arms, for example, and ter describing the broader historical context, mainstream socialists performed almost as he moves on to discuss how the machina-

96 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • FALL 2004 tions and miscalculations of elites in various of uncovering who the fascists actually were countries provided the final, necessary factor and what drove them. enabling certain fascist movements to gain power. “Resacralizing” Modern Society Like much of his earlier analysis, this Mann’s first crucial finding is that fascists material too is familiar, but Paxton does were chiefly young males with certain com- a good job of summarizing the sorry tale. mon characteristics. Many had participated Conservatives in countries such as Germany in the First World War, emerging radical- and Italy, he explains, were so obsessed with ized, trained to fight, and inured to vio- thwarting the Left while maintaining their lence. They often returned home to societies own prerogatives that they fooled them- uninterested in their needs and incapable of selves into believing they could use fascists providing them with gainful employment, for their own purposes, and provided them and thus became dry tinder waiting to be with political resources, openings, and legit- ignited. Many were also idealists desperate imacy. Once in power, the fascists repaid for a cause to believe in. Fascism promised a the debt by eliminating their erstwhile pa- transformation of society, a trons along with the rest of the old order. cleansing of the body politic, and a return And of course, one must not forget the role to national grandeur, and so supplied a secu- played by political geniuses like Mussolini lar religion ideal for latching onto. As Mann and Hitler. Acutely attuned to the needs, puts it, fascists “claimed a higher moral fears, and passions of the people, fascism’s purpose, transcendent of class conflict, capa- leaders played a key role in attracting the ble of ‘resacralizing’ a modern society grown masses to the cause and in building and materialistic and decadent. They identified a consolidating powerful political movements. ‘civilizational crisis’ encompassing govern- Yet as critical as such were, it ment, morality, science, social science, the is important not to overestimate their role arts, and ‘style.’” or take it out of context, as many previous Beyond their youth, gender, and mind- historical analyses have done. Both Musso- set, however, Mann notes that fascists were lini and Hitler, for example, peddled their socially heterogeneous. This distinctive fea- wares in relative obscurity for years before ture of the movement has not always been they managed to actually take power. This fully appreciated by other scholars, with seems to indicate that without the “right” Marxists, for example, viewing fascism as conditions both men might very well have dominated by elites or the bourgeoisie while remained the historical footnotes many modernization and mass society theorists of their contemporaries expected them generally see it as a product of the middle or to be. rural classes. We now know, however, that Paxton is thus correct in seeing fascism fascism drew support from almost all social primarily as a political phenomenon, the na- sectors, and that farmers, businessmen, pro- ture and fate of which can best be explained fessionals and managers, craftsmen, and even by carefully reconstructing the structural workers were all well represented among its and contingent factors that helped bring a adherents. Since almost all other contempo- group of related political movements to rary political parties remained unable to prominence and, in some places, to power. move beyond narrow, class-based support, As might be expected, Michael Mann takes fascism’s broad social base gave it a dy- a very different approach, arguing that to namism and strength that its competitors understand fascism one needs to examine its could not match. social base. He thus provides a “sociology of But Mann goes on to make a larger fascist movements,” doing an excellent job point, namely that the very attempt to un-

Three Faces of Fascism 97 derstand fascism by reference to class dy- that would place cohesion above conflict and namics is misleading. Sociologists know protect traditional values and communities. that “there are other social structures besides Particularly after the First World War, classes and markets,” he jibes, and argues Wolin notes, such ideas spread widely and that what united fascists was less their eco- chipped away at liberal democracy’s support nomic background than their shared com- and . They were also seized on mitment to a set of values or goals he calls and radicalized by nationalists, who made “transcendent paramilitary nation-statism.” them prominent features of fascism’s appeal. With this inelegant term he tries to get at All three books are outstanding, even as a variety of things: First, that fascists fer- they differ greatly in their approach to the vently believed in the reality of the nation, subject as well as their understanding of which for them was an entity with a special what fascism really was. Each provides an mission and soul that had to be nurtured essential part of the picture, but it is only and protected at all costs (from both inter- by putting all three perspectives—the po- nal and external enemies). Second, that fas- litical, social, and ideological—together that cists saw the as both the embodiment one can grasp what made fascism arguably of the nation and the instrument that would (says Paxton) the “major political innovation help it achieve its goals, the bearer of a of the twentieth century,” a force capable of “moral project” whose interests transcended destroying liberal democracies across Europe those of particular individuals or social and triggering the most destructive conflict groups. And third, that violence lay at the the world has ever known. very center of fascism’s appeal and project, Fascists did indeed build powerful po- with participation in paramilitary groups litical movements that took advantage of giving supporters a powerful shared experi- the weaknesses of the reigning liberal demo- ence that helped bond them together and cratic political order, the failures of political train them for future political and competitors, the discontent and alienation endeavors. of the masses, and the machinations of local Richard Wolin, finally, takes yet another elites. But fascism was also a powerful social tack, concentrating on fascism as an intel- force that infiltrated all corners of civil soci- lectual phenomenon. Wolin takes ideas seri- ety and gathered an extremely diverse and ously and focuses on those that paved the dynamic constituency. And it did feature a way for fascism’s emergence and comprised comprehensive ideology that incorporated its distinctive worldview. This leads him to many long-standing criticisms of liberal emphasize a group of actors that both Pax- capitalist society and offered what seemed a ton and Mann pass over much more quickly, promising alternative. It was its simultane- namely intellectuals. ous success in all three arenas that differen- As the title of his book indicates, Wolin tiated fascism from other political alterna- sees the central feature of fascism as an op- tives of the time like , conser- position to reason, faith in progress, ration- vatism, and for the most part social democ- ality, and cosmopolitanism. During the late racy, and made it a force of world-historical nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a significance. backlash against the Enlightenment, liberal- ism, and modernity began brewing among A Modern Analogue European intellectuals, many of whom be- Recognizing fascism’s tripartite nature is gan to glorify emotion and will instead of crucial for assessing not only its historical rationality and a faith in science, and group significance but also its continuing rele- identity instead of and cos- vance. Many observers have used the term to mopolitanism. They called for a new order describe right-wing parties that have arisen

98 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • FALL 2004 in Europe and the former Soviet Union in societies. Like other forms of vio- recent years, and their opponents have lence and instability, it is most tarred right-wing demagogues like Jean- likely to occur in societies which Marie Le Pen in France and Jörg Haider in have experienced some social and Austria with the fascist label. But such us- economic development and where age is clearly inappropriate. It is true that the processes of political moderni- some of these parties and political leaders zation and political development draw on nationalism, racism, and anti-Semi- have lagged behind the processes tism, and that they face weak and corrupt of social and economic change. political systems, collapsing , and desperate and discontent populations. But This is precisely the condition, it is worth none of them boast the kind of political, so- noting, that much of the Muslim world cial, and intellectual mix that made fascism finds itself in today. There, as in Europe in so powerful and dangerous. Similarly, al- the early twentieth century, development though Wolin makes a good case that to- has proceeded far enough to offer citizens a day’s postmodern left favors a distinctly fas- glimpse of what modernity has to offer, but cist intellectual approach, the thinkers he not far enough to deliver it. States are under criticizes clearly lack the kind of political significant pressure to perform a growing power and broad social support that made range of functions and satisfy ever-increas- their interwar counterparts so worrisome. ing demands, yet lack the strength and ad- In fact, the only place one currently sees ministrative capacity to follow through. the sort of triple threat that truly consti- Traditional institutions and norms have tutes a modern analogue to fascism is in the eroded, but modern ones have not yet arisen Muslim world, which unfortunately none of to take their place. the three authors discuss at any length. A Moreover, the Muslim world, with the number of commentators have linked radical existing authoritarian regimes clearly unsat- to fascism recently, but they have isfactory, premodern forms of tended to do so either as simple name-call- obsolete, and recent movements such as so- ing or as a reference to supposed direct in- cialism and pan-Arabism discredited, is also tellectual borrowing between the two move- notable for its lack of attractive political ments. The Paxton, Mann, and Wolin alternatives. Muslim countries are home to books, however, allow us to see just how ac- very large numbers of young males, many of curate and deep-rooted the parallels actually whom are angered by unemployment, cor- are, whether or not there are pictures of ruption, and military defeat, and some of Mussolini or Hitler hanging on the walls of whom have received military training in the caves near Tora Bora. anti-Soviet crusade in Afghanistan and other Properly understood, after all, fascism is jihadist endeavors. And, of course, in places a developmental disease, a political illness like Afghanistan and Iraq the lack of or- that strikes only certain types of victims at der—and the prevalence of warlords and certain times. What the political scientist armed militias—generates its own danger- Samuel Huntington has said of revolution in ous dynamic, creating desperate populations his book Political Order in Changing Societies and large numbers of young males who are applies here as well: radicalized, trained to fight, and inured to violence. It will not occur in highly tradi- Enter radical Islamism, a socially hetero- tional societies with very low levels geneous movement offering a powerful cri- of social and economic complexity. tique of the current order, a romantic and Nor will it occur in highly modern communitarian revolutionary alternative to

Three Faces of Fascism 99 it, and a clear set of internal and external tion for this effort is something of a seman- enemies against whom violence is encour- tic game; the point is that the die-hard radi- aged. Add local conservative elites (whether cals must probably, in the end, die hard. in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or even Israel) who At the same time, however, there must fool themselves into thinking they can use also be a parallel campaign to co-opt the the newcomers for their own purposes, and movement’s less extreme followers, one that one ends up reaping the whirlwind. offers the mass publics of Muslim countries What lessons can be drawn from the a healthy political alternative that addresses European fascist experience for handling the their very real and pressing concerns. Here Middle Eastern one? In the West, the fascist the Bush administration’s support for politi- wave was ultimately beaten back by two cal reform and liberalization throughout the things: military intervention to topple fas- greater Middle East makes excellent sense cist regimes and the spread of healthy po- (however much one may question its imple- litical alternatives that addressed the prob- mentation), since the corrupt, inefficient, lems and eliminated the conditions that had and illegitimate regimes that govern much motivated most of fascism’s rank-and-file of the region today are a major cause of pop- supporters. It took not only the Second ular discontent and a major barrier to any World War, in other words, but also the progress. Yet the true challenge will be not postwar settlement—the emergence of well- merely to eliminate authoritarianism, but to functioning liberal democratic regimes with foster the emergence of well-functioning po- generous welfare states—to ensure that the litical parties and states capable of and de- menace was disposed of, never to return. voted to helping people cope successfully The implications of this for the present with modern life. Until those come into be- would seem to be clear. First, there must in- ing, the roots of this latter-day fascism will deed be direct action to combat the Islamist remain lurking beneath the soil, no matter organizations and cadres so devoted to vio- how many of its branches are lopped off lence that they cannot exist without it. above.• Whether the “war on terror” is an apt locu-

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