Three Faces of Fascism Sheri Berman
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The Populist Backlash Against Europe : Why Only Alternative Economic and Social Policies Can Stop the Rise of Populism in Europe
This is a repository copy of The populist backlash against Europe : why only alternative economic and social policies can stop the rise of populism in Europe. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/142119/ Version: Accepted Version Book Section: Bugaric, B. (2020) The populist backlash against Europe : why only alternative economic and social policies can stop the rise of populism in Europe. In: Bignami, F., (ed.) EU Law in Populist Times : Crises and Prospects. Cambridge University Press , pp. 477-504. ISBN 9781108485081 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108755641 © 2020 Francesca Bignami. This is an author-produced version of a chapter subsequently published in EU Law in Populist Times. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. See: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108755641. Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ The Populist Backlash Against Europe: Why Only Alternative Economic and Social Policies Can Stop the Rise of Populism in Europe Bojan Bugarič1 I. -
SOCS 648: EUROPE SINCE the FRENCH REVOLUTION Summer, 2014 Nathanael Greene [email protected] 860-685-2376
GRADUATE LIBERAL STUDIES PROGRAM SOCS 648: EUROPE SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION Summer, 2014 Nathanael Greene [email protected] 860-685-2376 BOOKS AVAILABLE AT THE BOOKSTORE: John Merriman A History of Modern Europe: VOL. II, From the French Revolution to the Present Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945 JUNE 30: INTRODUCTION AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, NAPOLEON, RESTORATION John Merriman, A History of Modern Europe, Volume II, From the French Revolution to the Present, chapters 13-15 OR, E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, chapters 1, 3, 4, 6, 12 and 13 and 4 • Documents: [on Moodle in your portfolio] • The Marseillaise • Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen • Robespierre’s Last Speech JULY 2: INDUSTRIALIZATION John Merriman, A History of Modern Europe, Volume II, From the French Revolution to the Present, chapters 16 and 20, OR, instead of Merriman’s chapter 16, E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, chapter 2 • Documents: • Taine, “Notes on England” • Ure, “The Philosophy of Manufacturers” • Dickens, Dombey And Son • “The 1834 Poor Law Report” GLSP SOCS 648 Summer, 2014 Page 2 • Coulson, “Child Labor in the Factories” • Chadwick, “The Sanitary Condition of the Laboring Population” • Wilson, “Chartism in Halifax” • Smiles, “Self Help” • Macaulay, “The 1832 Reform Bill” • Cobden, “Repeal of the Corn Laws” JULY 7: REVOLUTION, MASS POLITICS, NATIONAL UNIFICATION John Merriman, A History of Modern Europe, Volume -
Philosophical Statism and the Illusions of Citizenship Reflections on the Neutral State
1 Philosophical Statism and the Illusions of Citizenship Reflections on the Neutral State Frank van Dun ∗ Is the welfare state neutral to personal morality? 1 In today's welfare states one can find numerous life-styles existing side by side. These indicate a wide scope for 'personal mo- ralities' 2, but do not prove that the welfare state is 'neutral' to them. Welfare states interfere in more or less onerous ways with the business of (private) life with police checks, administrative controls and a vast arsenal of regulatory, penal and/or fiscal regimes. Some of the regulations may be more or less reasonable attempts to minimise the risk of one person inflicting irreparable damage on others or their property, but a great many are not. It is not too difficult to see the hand of special (economic, ideological, even sectarian) interests in the bulk of the rules and regulations on the books. 3 The state's non-neutrality is often an unintended outcome, but not always. Officials introduce new regulations with proud declarations of their intention to enforce particular 'moral choices', to treat one thing as a 'merit good' and another as an evil. They also justify intrusive policies with blatantly paternalistic arguments—remember their promise, or was it threat, to take care of us "from the cradle to the grave"—, with self-congratulatory references to an unspecified 'responsibility of the government'. There is no more direct negation of the role of private mo- rality than the claim that one discharges one's own responsibility by depriving others of the opportunity to exercise theirs. -
Reconciling Statism with Freedom: Turkey's Kurdish Opening
Reconciling Statism with Freedom Turkey’s Kurdish Opening Halil M. Karaveli SILK ROAD PAPER October 2010 Reconciling Statism with Freedom Turkey’s Kurdish Opening Halil M. Karaveli © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, Stockholm-Nacka 13130, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org “Reconciling Statism with Freedom: Turkey’s Kurdish Opening” is a Silk Road Paper published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program. The Silk Road Papers Series is the Occasional Paper series of the Joint Center, and ad- dresses topical and timely subjects. The Joint Center is a transatlantic independent and non-profit research and policy center. It has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse commu- nity of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. The Joint Center is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lec- tures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public dis- cussion regarding the region. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this study are those of the authors only, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Joint Center or its sponsors. -
Populism and Fascism
Populism and Fascism An evaluation of their similarities and differences MA Thesis in Philosophy University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Humanities Titus Vreeke Student number: 10171169 Supervisor: Dr. Robin Celikates Date: 04-08-2017 1 Table of Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 3 1. Ideology ............................................................................................................................................. 8 1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Populism and fascism as ideologies ........................................................................................................ 9 1.3 The Dichotomies of Populism and Fascism ........................................................................................... 13 1.4 Culture and Nationalism in Populism and Fascism ............................................................................... 19 1.5 The Form of the State and its Role in Security ...................................................................................... 22 1.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 25 2. Practice ............................................................................................................................................... -
A Historiography of Fascism
History in the Making Volume 6 Article 5 2013 A Historiography of Fascism Glenn-Iain Steinback CSUSB Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making Part of the Political History Commons Recommended Citation Steinback, Glenn-Iain (2013) "A Historiography of Fascism," History in the Making: Vol. 6 , Article 5. Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/history-in-the-making/vol6/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in History in the Making by an authorized editor of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Articles History Department’s 2013 Faculty Choice Award A Historiography of Fascism By Glenn-Iain Steinback Abstract: A long-standing historical debate revolves around the definition, fundamental nature and historical constraints of the concept of fascism. A wide array of scholarly questions about the political and ideological nature of fascism, the minimum or necessary traits of a fascist movement, arguments over the classification of semi-fascist groups and the concept of generic fascism characterize this debate. The result is a substantial body of scholarly research replete with competing theories for the evolution and origin of fascism as a concept, of individual fascist movements and even over the geographic and temporal application of the term itself within history. This paper is a historiography of fascist studies that illuminates the development of the scholarly narrative and understanding of fascism. Beginning with the historically contemporary Marxist perceptive of fascism, this paper examines competing and complimentary understandings of the phenomenon across the twentieth century, including various theories for the evolution of fascism in Europe, the relationship to and placement of fascism in the broader political spectrum, and the debate over fascism as a form of political religion. -
(January 2002), No. 6 Julian Jackson, France: the Dark Years
H-France Review Volume 2 (2002) Page 19 H-France Review Vol. 2 (January 2002), No. 6 Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. xix+660pp. Notes, maps, abbreviation tables and index. $35.00 ISBN 0-19-820706-9. Review by Robert Zaretsky, University of Houston. Nearly thirty years ago in Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, Robert Paxton revealed a regime driven by jumbled and frequently opposing ideological visions. There were fleeting, ragged projects advocated by corporatists and regionalists, traditionalists and technocrats, anti-Semites and personalists, Maurrasians and pacifists, syndicalists and fascists jostling one another for a space under the umbrella of the so-called Révolution nationale. Paxton made the damning case that Vichy’s leaders-- ranging from Pétain and Laval through Darlan and Flandin--actively pursued a policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany--an ambition as deluded as it was immoral. In addition to subverting the image of France so carefully burnished for more than 30 years by Vichy apologists, Paxton also undermined the claims that these four “dark years” represented a rupture or parenthesis in French history. Instead, he showed the continuities--administrative, ideological, political and social--that made Vichy a bridge between the late Third Republic and the postwar regimes. Since then, a vast amount of original work on Vichy has been done on both sides of the Atlantic. This research has now been brilliantly synthesized by Julian Jackson in France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944. This huge, exhilarating work reveals the undiminished strength of Paxton’s interpretation. -
Reading List for Comprehensive Examination in Political Theory
READING LIST FOR COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN POLITICAL THEORY Department of Political Science Columbia University Requirements Majors should prepare for questions based on reading from the entire reading list. Minors should prepare for questions based on reading from the core list and any one of the satellite lists. CORE LIST Plato, The Republic Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Books I, II, V, VIII, X; Politics Polybius, Rise of the Roman Empire, Book I paragraphs 1-10 (“Introduction”) and Book VI Cicero, The Republic Augustine, City of God, Books I, VIII (ch.s 4-11), XII, XIV, XIX, XXII (ch.s 23-24, 29-30) Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Questions 42, 66, 90-92, 94-97, 105 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince; Discourses (as selected in Selected Political Writings, ed. David Wootton) Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty (ed. Julian Franklin) Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (as selected in Norton Critical Edition, ed. David Johnston) James Harrington, Oceana (Cambridge U. Press, ed. J.G.A. Pocock), pp. 63-70 (from Introduction), pp. 161-87; 413-19 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government; “A Letter Concerning Toleration” David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” “The Independence of Parliament,” “That Politics May Be Reduced to A Science,” “Of the First Principle of Government,” “Of Parties in General” 1 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws (as selected in Selected Political Writings, ed. Melvin Richter) Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part I ("On the propriety of action"); Part II, Section II ("Of justice and beneficence"); Part IV ("On the effect of utility on the sentiment of approbation") Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality; On The Social Contract Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (as selected in World’s Classics Edition, ed. -
The Rise and Fall of Fascism
The Rise and Fall of Fascism Michael Mann, Professor of Sociology, University of California at Los Angeles. E-mail: [email protected] Fascism was probably the most important political ideology created during the 20th century. In th e inter -war period it dominated half of Europe and threatened to overwhelm the other half. It also influenced many countries across the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and South Africa. In Asia, for example, its influence was probably strongest on the Chinese Kuomintang, Japanese militarists and Hindu nationalists. My book Fascists (Cambridge University Press, 2004) is based on research on fascists where they were strongest, in six European countries -- Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Spain. In the book I ask the question, why did fascism rise to such prominence? And I answer it looking at the men and women who became fascists: who were they, what did they believe in, and how did they act? There are two main schools of interpretation among scholars as to the rise of fascism. An idealist school has focused on fascists' beliefs and doctrines, emphasizing their nationalist values. Most recently, some of these scholars have termed fascism a form of “political religion”. 1 A more materialist school has focused on fascism’s supposed lower -middle class or middle class (petit bourgeois or bourgeois) base and the supposed way in which fascism was used to save capitalism when it was in difficulties. The debates between them constitute yet another replay of ongoing polemics between idealism and materialism in the social sciences. Both nationalism and class were important in fascism. -
1993 Spring – Koshar – “History and Memory”
History 866 seminar in European Social History: History and Memory R . Koshar Semester II , 1992-93 Tues day, 4- 6 This is a graduate seminar on the history of social memory in the twentieth-century Euro-American world. The course has two goals: to acqu aint s tude nts with recent scholarsh ip on how and why staL.es and social groups have consL.rucL.ed "public 11 memories in contemporary history ; and to have students write a paper of 25-30 t yped, double-spaced paqes explorinq social memory in a s p ecific historical context. After considering the concept of social memory , the course focuses on two important :rsi tes" of memory, c i~ e ma / L. elev i s ion a nd monuments, and then on the memory of two events, the Holocaust and Vichy France . For most of t he semester, we will d iscuss required and recommended readings. Each week several students will be responsible for circulating discussion questions pertaining to the required reading. The last four sessions are devoted to student presenL. a t ions of papers . *indicates required reading 1. Introduction (January 19) 2. Memory as a Historical Concept (January 26, February 2, 9) Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memorv (trans.) David Carr, Time, Narrative, and History, 153-185 Michel Foucault, Languaae, Counter -Memorv, Practice (trans.), 113-196 Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions: Europe 1870-1914," The Invention of Tradition, eds. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 263-307 Reinhard Koselleck, "On the Disposability of History," in Futures Past: On the Sema ntics of Historical Time (trans.), 198-212 *David Lowenthal, The Past is £ Foreian Country, xv-xxvii, 3- 259 *Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire," Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 7-25. -
The Immoral Equivalent of War
1 The Immoral Equivalent of War Deirdre Nansen McCloskey We are in a war, say all the presidents, the thoughtful and quasi-liberal presidents such as Emmanuel Macron in France and Moon Jae-in in Korea, as well as the thoughtless and quasi- fascist ones such as Donald Trump in the US and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. A terrible war. But the worst part is not the war itself against the disease and, as collateral damage, the crushing of the economy, wretched though they are. The worst part is the post-War likelihood of a triumphant statism, and then the fascism to which triumphant statism regularly gives rise. The disease is for 2020. The fascism is forever. The young historian Eliah Bures wrote six months ago a collective review in Foreign Affairs of books from left and right, books that all used prominently what he calls “the other F- word,” fascism. He notes that the word can be used foolishly, to mean “politics I don’t like.” Thus the “Anti-Fa,” that is, “Anti-Fascist,” movement of the loony left in the US. Bures is correct. But slipping into extremes of nationalism, socialism, racism, and the rest of the quicksand of the 1930s is not impossible. The 1930s, after all, happened. In the 1930s. Late in Bures’ essay, by way of a comforting conclusion from the apparent safety of November 2019, he pens a sentence that has acquired a terrifying salience: “Barring a crisis of capitalism and democratic representation on the scale of the 1920s and ’30s, there is no reason to expect today’s populism to revert to fascism.” Uh oh. -
H-Diplo Essay 242- Robert O. Paxton on Learning the Scholar's
H-Diplo H-Diplo Essay 242- Robert O. Paxton on Learning the Scholar’s Craft: Reflections of Historians and International Relations Scholars Discussion published by George Fujii on Tuesday, June 9, 2020 H-Diplo Essay 242 Essay Series on Learning the Scholar’s Craft: Reflections of Historians and International Relations Scholars 9 June 2020 A Mid-Atlantic Identity[1] https://hdiplo.org/to/E242 Series Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii Essay by Robert O. Paxton, Columbia University, Emeritus A smallish town in the Virginia Appalachians might seem impossibly remote from France. Even so, France was actively present in my home town in the 1930s and 1940s. Lexington is a college town. Two professors of French were frequent dinner guests of my parents. My piano teacher and church choir director, another frequent dinner guest, had studied in Nadia Boulanger’s famous summer course at Fontainebleau. A Catalan painter, Pierre Daura, had met a Virginia girl at the École des Beaux Arts in Paris and married her. Exiled from Franco’s Spain, the Dauras made their home at St.- Cirque-la Popie in the département of the Lot. When war broke out in 1939, they resettled in the countryside near Lexington. My father, a lawyer, helped Pierre Daura with his citizenship papers. The Dauras were joined for a while by their brother-in-law, the better-known French painter Jean Hélion. I still have the copy of Hélion’s memoirs that he inscribed to my mother. The isolated local intelligentsia of my parents’ generation in American small towns valued France as an indispensable link to the cultivated outside world.