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A New Theory of Fascism?

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A New Theory of Fascism? Michael Mann. Fascists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. x + 428 pp. $79.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-83131-4. Reviewed by Per Bienso Published on H-German (November, 2006) Fascism has always constituted a puzzle for Mann's succinctly defines fascism as "the pur‐ historians and social scientists. Various interpre‐ suit of a transcendent and cleansing nation- tations (among a multitude) have seen fascism as statism through paramilitarism" (p. 13). It is a modernizing strategy, a revolt against moderni‐ meant as a generic and to some extent epochal ty; as the tool of a specific class (usually the capi‐ term, since according to Mann, it can accommo‐ talist or middle class); and as totalitarianism. The date a range of phenomena across Europe in the (alleged) "new consensus" analyzes fascism, interwar period, including Nazism, Italian fas‐ broadly speaking, as an ideology in its own right cism, the Austrian Heimwehr (partially) and Doll‐ based upon transcendent/holistic ultranational‐ fuss's Fatherland Front, the Hungarian Arrow ism.[1] Even though the relevant historiography Cross, the Romanian Iron Guard and the Spanish presents a host of different and often incommen‐ Falange. On the face of it, this juxtaposition of surate images of fascism, the theories can, broad‐ groups raises the obvious problem of reconciling ly speaking, be divided into materialistic and ide‐ paramilitarism and statism within the same con‐ ological categories. Michael Mann claims to offer cept, since normally, one of the central defining a new theory, based upon a synthesis of the mate‐ features of the state is the monopoly of violence. rialist and ideological schools within the histori‐ Not so, says Mann; this characteristic has not al‐ ography of fascism, but with the ambition of un‐ ways defined the state, and we must therefore an‐ derstanding fascists themselves, that is, the fascist alytically separate military and political power re‐ constituency, in its motivations and methods. In lations, even in the modern state (p. 69). Either support of his theory, Mann processes an impres‐ way, Mann's view on fascist paramilitarism is not sive amount of secondary literature on the major one of military power per se, but suggests an al‐ fascist movements in Italy, Germany, Austria, leged popular rising from below that claims for it‐ Hungary, Romania and Spain, with a focus on self the role of elitist vanguard of the nation. which citizens of each country became fascists. Paramilitarism is therefore more than "mere" vio‐ H-Net Reviews lence; it is a key organizational feature of fascism not as sacred as Mann makes it out to be. In my and, at the same time, a symbol of the nation. opinion, the harmonious, organic nation is a more However, this dilemma brings up the ques‐ appropriate concept. The other elements included tion of the nature of fascist statism; if the (fascist) in Mann's definition, however, are less problemat‐ state, whose power Mann says fascists worshiped, ic. did not possess the (external and/or internal) mo‐ To continue, Mann corroborates (or bases?) nopoly of violence, just what kind of state was it? his definition of fascism in his identification of According to Mann, fascists can be characterized three central fascist constituencies: one that fa‐ as seeing the state as their goal in the sense that it vors paramilitarism, a second that favors tran‐ is envisioned as facilitating social, political and scendence and a third that favors nation-statism: moral development; moreover, as the representa‐ To the constituencies that favor paramilitarism tive of the organic nation, the state is intended to belong the generations of young men. According resolve economic and political antagonisms. It is to Mann, fascism in this mood made youth and unclear to me whether this conclusion means that idealism appear especially modern and moral; fascism was totalitarian; Mann acknowledges the these ideals were to be transmitted through sec‐ weak, polycratic states of fascist regimes, but ondary and higher education and encourage no‐ maintains that fascism was totalitarian in its tions of moral progress and militarism. Such fas‐ transformational aims. However, party and cism made its appeal to young men by employing paramilitants undercut these aims (p. 14). Appar‐ bragging, semi-disciplined violence, while in ently, then, such basic fascist institutions were not peacetime encouraging militarism to evolve, or committed to fascism; if they were, then why did mutate, into paramilitarism. Fascism that ap‐ they work against these transformational aims? pealed to constituencies favoring transcendence, Mann suggests that the answer to this question in comparison, drew from no particular class base lies in the contradiction between the movement but did draw upon some economic factors--it ap‐ and the state's bureaucracy (the old elites). pealed to people who worked in sectors outside of Perhaps, however, there is a problem with the front line struggle between capital and labor. making the state a central concept in a definition Members of this constituency saw society from a of fascism. As far as National Socialism is con‐ vantage point that allowed them to view class cerned, the ideal of the state, at least in ideological struggle with distaste and endorse a movement terms, was not as an entity in itself, but as a sym‐ that claimed to transcend that struggle. Finally, bol of the nation.[2]. Statism is thus probably a constituencies that favored nation-statism tended more useful term in the Italian case. However, in to be of heterogeneous background, including practical terms, to fascists, the state was an obvi‐ people with military experience and those with ous and (not least) an available instrument for high educations, those who worked in the public achieving their cleansing and transcendent goals. or service sectors as well as individuals who came When they needed to, however, they were willing from particular regional and religious back‐ to compromise with other agencies. An obvious grounds. But one principle unified them: all mem‐ example of this tendency is the agreement Mus‐ bers of this constituency worked at the heart of solini's regime made with the Catholic Church in the state. They were typically soldiers, veterans, 1929, ceding a degree of control over the Italian civil servants, teachers and public sector manual educational system. Granted, the regime was driv‐ workers (p. 28). The evidence brought to bear in en more by opportunism than ideology, but such support of this division unquestionably provides activity does suggest that to fascists, the state was the most rewarding section of the book; in areas where controversy exists, Mann generally ex‐ 2 H-Net Reviews hibits sound judgment. Despite differences be‐ oped earlier in The Sources of Social Power tween the different fascist movements, Mann (1986). finds that no specific classes decidedly dominated Mann does not subscribe to the classic eco‐ them. Instead, they were dominated by the above‐ nomic explanation of fascism: namely, that capi‐ mentioned sectors in society. Mann largely man‐ talists felt their profit threatened by the rising ages to document this taxonomy, even though a proletariat. He does argue that propertied classes great deal of overlap can be found between the felt a threat to their property and thus turned to constituencies, as well as significant differences authoritarian and repressive solutions of one between the different movements. kind or another. However, class theory cannot ex‐ This is Mann's definition; his book then ap‐ plain fascism's most salient features, namely its plies this theory to a historical narrative. Mann populism and radicalism. The economic piece of considers fascism a phenomenon of modernity; it Mann's puzzle is thus the claim that relative eco‐ was a product (although not a necessary conse‐ nomic backwardness favored authoritarianism. quence) of the rise of the strong nation-state, Since backwardness restricts mass mobilization, specifically in its "organic" permutation. Until however, it cannot explain fascism. Thus, in World War I, however, state power was limited; it Mann's view, it is instead late industrialization was not seen as a tool to achieve many social ob‐ that caused rapid development, leading to wide‐ jectives. World War I changed perceptions of the spread dislocation. Such disruption, read against state, since total war militarized the nation-state the background of the integrated global economy, and provided a model of how state intervention made extreme nation-statism a tempting solution. and planning could be used to achieve economic The problem with this explanation, as Mann rec‐ development. Consequently, a state with a strong ognizes, is that Germany was not a late developer, infrastructure emerged. At the end of the war it while the Nordic countries, which remained seemed the future belonged to the liberal demo‐ democracies, were. Another problem Mann fails cratic nation-state. However, this vision soon gave to address is Czechoslovakia, which--even though way to a wave of authoritarian (including fascist) it was subject to much of the same economic dis‐ regimes that divided Europe into liberal-demo‐ location--remained democratic. Generally speak‐ cratic north-west and authoritarian central-east- ing, even though Mann's analysis of the economic south blocs. Despite the appearance of the author‐ crisis partly enables him to explain the authori‐ itarian part of Europe as a solid unit, important tarian surge, it offers comparatively fewer clues differences persisted in space as well as time. Its to an explanation of fascism. The Great Depres‐ authoritarian states ranged on a spectrum from sion cannot be seen as an independent explanato‐ mildly authoritarian to semi-reactionary authori‐ ry factor, since it afected all of Europe, while only tarian and corporatist regimes to fascist ones. half of the continent took the authoritarian or fas‐ However, fascism was not simply authoritarian‐ cist roads.
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