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The Compatibility Or Incompatibility of Islam and Democracy: Implications for Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Algeria, 1980-2009

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The Compatibility Or Incompatibility of Islam and Democracy: Implications for Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Algeria, 1980-2009 The Compatibility or Incompatibility of Islam and Democracy: Implications for Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Algeria, 1980-2009 Majid Takht Ravanchi Doctoral Thesis, Doctor rerum socialium The Faculty of the Business, Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Bern has on 16.12.2010 accepted the Thesis Proposed by First Expert: Prof. Dr. Wolf Linder Second Expert: Prof. Dr. Adrian Vatter February 2010 Bern Originaldokument gespeichert auf dem Webserver der Universitätsbibliothek Bern Dieses Werk ist unter einem Creative Commons Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Keine Bearbeitung 2.5 Schweiz Lizenzvertrag lizenziert. Um die Lizenz anzusehen, gehen Sie bitte zu http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/ oder schicken Sie einen Brief an Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California 94105, USA. 1 Urheberrechtlicher Hinweis Dieses Dokument steht unter einer Lizenz der Creative Commons Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Keine Bearbeitung 2.5 Schweiz. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/ Sie dürfen: dies es Werk vervielfältigen, verbreiten und öffentlich zugänglich machen Zu den folgenden Bedingungen: Namensnennung. Sie müssen den Namen des Autors/Rechteinhabers in der von ihm festgelegten Weise nennen (wodurch aber nicht der Eindruck entstehen darf, Sie oder die Nutzung des Werkes durch Sie würden entlohnt). Keine kommerzielle Nutzung. Dieses Werk darf nicht für kommerzielle Zwecke verwendet werden. Keine Bearbeitung. Dieses Werk darf nicht bearbeitet oder in anderer Weise verändert werden. Im Falle einer Verbreitung müssen Sie anderen die Lizenzbedingungen, unter welche dieses Werk fällt, mitteilen. Jede der vorgenannten Bedingungen kann aufgehoben werden, sofern Sie die Einwilligung des Rechteinhabers dazu erhalten. Diese Lizenz lässt die Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechte nach Schweizer Recht unberührt. Eine ausführliche Fassung des Lizenzvertrags befindet sich unter http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/legalcode.de 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the support provided by the Department of Political Science of the University of Bern for the completion of this thesis. I also wish to express my appreciations to Professor Wolf Linder for his encouragement, inputs and guidance throughout the entire work on this thesis. His timely suggestions and corrections have undoubtedly improved the text. Special thanks go to Monika Spinatsch for her assistance in arranging communications, in person or through emails, with Professor Linder. Last but not least, I want to express gratitude to my wife and my two sons for their patience and support throughout days and nights spent on this thesis, without which this work could not have been completed. Tehran, February 2010 Majid Takht Ravanchi 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………...........12 1.1 Purpose and Objective………………………………………………….......... 14 1.2 Literature Review………………………………………………………......... 15 1.3 Research method………………………………………………………...........16 1.4 Principal Question……………………………………………………….........18 1.5 Important Questions……………………………………………………..........18 1.6 Hypothesis……………………………………………………………….........21 2 BASIC DEFINITIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM………………........24 2.1 Democracy………………………………………………………………........24 2.2 Islam……………………………………………………………………..........25 2.3 Different Readings of Islam……………………………………………..........29 2.4 Ideological Tendencies within Islam…………………………………............31 2.5 Islam and Constitutionalism…………………………………………..............32 2.6 Islamic Democracy……………………………………………………............33 2.7 Question of Compatibility of Islam and Democracy.........................................34 2.8 Question of Incompatibility of Islam and Democracy......................................36 3 SECULARISM……………………………………………………………............39 3.1 Democracy and Secularism……………………………………………...........39 3.1.1 Definition of Secularism…………………………………………...........39 3.1.2 Origin of Secularism……………………………………………….........40 3.1.3 Separation of Religion from Politics……………………………….........41 3.1.4 Reasons for Separation……………………………………………..........42 3.1.5 Problems with Secularism………………………………………….........42 3.2 Islam and Secularism……………………………………………………........43 3.2.1 Religious Democracy………………………………………………........44 3.2.2 Islam's Objectives…………………………………………………..........45 3.2.3 Islam's characteristics………………………………………………........45 3.2.4 Need for an Islamic Government……………………………..................46 3.3 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….........48 4 HUMAN RIGHTS…………………………………………………………...........53 4.1 Democracy and Human Rights…………………………………………..........53 4.1.1 Definition of Human Rights………………………………………..........53 4.1.2 Western Philosophers and human Rights..................................................54 4.1.2.1 Aristotle.............................................................................................54 4.1.2.2 Aquinas………………………………………….............................54 4.1.2.3 Hobbes………………………..........................................................55 4.1.2.3 Locke………………………….........................................................57 4 4.1.2.4 Rousseau…………………………...................................................59 4.1.2.5 Kant…………………………...........................................................60 4.1.3 Contemporary Human Rights Instruments……………………...............61 4.1.4 Link……………………………………………………………...............62 4.2 Islam and Human Rights…………………………………………………......63 4.2.1 Purpose of Human Creation……………………………………….........63 4.2.2 Human Categories…………………………………………………........64 4.2.3 Dignity……………………………………………………………..........64 4.2.4 Sanctity of Rights……………………………………………………......65 4.2.5. Role of Society…………………………………………………….........66 4.2.6 Equality…………………………………………………………….........66 4.2.7 No Compulsion in Religion…………………………………………......67 4.2.8 Freedom……………………………………………………………........68 4.2.9 Slavery………………………………………………………………......71 4.2.10 Justice……………………………………………………………… ....71 4.2.11 Right to Life………………………………………………………........72 4.2.12 Right to Property…………………………………………………... .....72 4.2.13 Privacy……………………………………………………………... ....73 4.3 Conclusion………………………………………………………………... ....73 5 WOMEN………………………………………………………………………......79 5.1 Democracy and Women………………………………………………….. ....79 5.1.1 Western Philosophers and Women………………………………….. ....79 5.1.2 Problems with Exclusion……………………………………………. ....80 5.1.3 Feminism……………………………………………………………. ....81 5.1.4 United Nations Activities…………………………………………… ....82 5.2 Islam and Women……………………………………………………….........83 5.2.1 Message of Islam……………………………………………………......83 5.2.2 Koran and Women…………………………………………………........83 5.2.3 Complimentarity…………………………………………………….......85 5.2.4 Differences between Man and Woman…………………………….........85 5.2.5 Equality…………………………………………………………….........87 5.2.6 Misperceptions………………………………………………………......87 5.2.6.1 Guardianship………………………………………………….........87 5.2.6.2 Evidence………………………………………………………........89 5.2.6.3 Divorce………………………………………………………..........89 5.2.6.4 Polygamy……………………………………………………….......90 5.2.6.5 Inheritance…………………………………………………….........90 5.3 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….........91 6 PARLIAMENT……………………………………………………………….......95 6.1 Democracy and Parliament……………………………………………….......95 6.1.1 History of Assemblies……………………………………………….......95 6.1.2 Problems of Assemblies……………………………………………........96 6.1.3 United Kingdom Parliament……………………………………….........97 6.1.4 Representative Democracy………………………………………….......98 6.1.5 Representative or Direct Democracy………………………………........100 6.2 Islam and Shura………………………………………………………….......101 6.2.1 Meaning of Shura……………………………………………………....101 6.2.2 Characteristics of Shura……………………………………………......102 6.2.3 History of Shura…………………………………………………..........102 6.2.4 Shura and Elections………………………………………………….....103 5 6.2.5 Is Shura Obligatory?...............................................................................104 6.2.6 Who is Consulted and How?..................................................................104 6.2.7 Shura's Tasks……………………………………………………...........105 6.2.8 Shura and Democracy……………………………………………….....107 6.3 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….......108 7 TURKEY………………………………………………………………………...113 7.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………....113 7.2 Modern Turkey………………………………………………………...........114 7.3 Turkish Military………………………………………………………..........115 7.4 Secularism……………………………………………………………….......115 7.5 Human Rights………………………………………………………….........119 7.5.1 Religious Minorities………………………………………………........120 7.5.2 Islamists…………………………………………………………….......121 7.5.3 Kurds……………………………………………………………….......122 7.5.4 Reforms…………………………………………………………….......122 7.6 Women……………………………………………………………………....124 7.6.1 Individualism………………………………………………………......125 7.6.2 Equality………………………………………………………………...126 7.6.3 Domestic Violence…………………………………………………......126 7.6.4 Women and Secularism…………………………………………….......127 7.6.5 Legal Status of Women…………………………………………….......128 7.6.6 Road Ahead…………………………………………………………....129 7.7 Parliament………………………………………………………………......129 7.8 Islamist Parties……………………………………………………………...131 7.9 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….....134 8 SAUDI ARABIA………………………………………………………………...142 8.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………….....142 8.2 Wahhabism………………………………………………………………......143 8.3 Religious Legitimacy……………………………………………………......145 8.4 Secularism…………………………………………………………………...147 8.5 Royal Family………………………………………………………………...149 8.6 Opposition…………………………………………………………………...151 8.6.1 Sunni Opposition…………………………………………………….....151 8.6.2 Shi'ite
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