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“Rede über die Frage: Gehört allzuviel Gü- You are of this world; I am not of this world. te, Leutseeligkeit und grosse Freygebig- — Jesus Christ (John 8:23; 1st century AD) keit im engsten Verstande zur Tugend?” n his praise of the life and death of Je- Socrates as Secular Jesus in Schiller’s sus Christ (“those of a God”) over the First Karlsschule Speech∗ life and death of Socrates (“those of a Isage”) in Emile, ou De l’education, Jean-

Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) provides Jeffrey L. High evidence that by 1762 a moral- Department of Romance, German, Russian philosophical practice of comparing the Languages & Literatures mortal philosopher with the divine prophet California State University Long Beach was common knowledge: “What preju- (USA) dices, what blindness one must have to dare to compare the son of Sophroniscus I am not an Athenian, nor a Greek, to the son of Mary?”2 Citing Rousseau in but a citizen of the world. st 1 Socrates (Plutarch, Of Banishment; 1 century CE) ally read until 1787. The fact that Schiller immedi- ately proceeds to explain that he lost his fatherland, ∗ My most sincere thanks to Sophia Clark, Colleen Württemberg, due to the political response to his Brown (California State University Long Beach), first drama, Die Räuber (The Robbers, 1781), in Lisa Beesley (Vanderbilt University), and Henrik which Karl Moor refers to Plutarch’s Lives of the Sponsel (University of California, Irvine) for their Noble Greeks and Romans in his very first line in the research support and help in preparing this manu- drama (NA 3:20), indicates that his use of the term script. 1 “Weltbürger” (citizen of the world) might also have Moses Mendelssohn calls Socrates “Weltbürger” in been inspired by Plutarch’s characterization of Soc- his “Leben und Charakter des Sokrates” (1767). rates. Moses Mendelssohn, Phädon oder über die Unsterb- 2 Rousseau’s early contribution to the discussion of lichkeit der Seele, ed. David Friedländer, fifth editi- the relative virtues of Christ and Socrates in Emile on (Berlin: Nicolai, 1814) 9. In his “Ankündigung (1762) comprises the praise of the dramaturgical der Rheinischen Thalia” (Announcement of the spectacle of Christ’s life and death over those of Journal Rheinische Thalia) of 11 November 1784, Socrates: “I also admit that the majesty of the Scrip- Schiller declares: “Ich schreibe als Weltbürger, der tures amazes me, and that the holiness of the Gospel keinem Fürsten dient” (I write as a citizen of the speaks to my heart. [...] Can it be that he whose his- world, who serves no prince; NA 22:93). The term tory it presents is only a man himself? Is his the tone “Weltbürger” was by no means uncommon in the of an enthusiast or an ambitious sectarian? [...] second half of the eighteenth century (see NA Where is the man, where is the sage who knows 23:274) and Kant had recently used the phrase how to act, to suffer, and to die without weakness “weltbürgerliche Absicht” in his February 1784 es- and without ostentation? When Plato depicts his say “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in welt- imaginary just man, covered with all the oppro- bürgerlicher Absicht,” which Schiller did not actu- brium of crime and worthy of all the rewards of vir-

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1785, the revolutionary English theologian the philosophies, missions, and deaths, but Joshua Toulmin (1740-1815), the author of the relative advantages and merits of the the book chapter “Christ and Socrates” on mortal Socrates and the divine Christ, the the “respective excellencies” of the two, latter of whom both Toulmin and Priestley wearily concludes that it is time to “drop portray as the unquestioned earthly em- the subject,” for Socrates’ time has passed: bodiment of the only god. These are not “Let Socrates retire at his [Christ’s] com- merely comparisons of parallel philoso- ing, and leave the chair of instruction va- phies, lives, and deaths, but documenta- cant for a greater teacher than himself.”3 tions of a genuine rivalry over primacy of By 1803, Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) feels influence. At stake is the answer to the compelled to write a short book — dedi- question of which of the two is the more cated to Toulmin — in defense of Christ appropriate moral role model for the future entitled Socrates and Christ Compared,4 of humankind. Rousseau, who is foremost which, like Toulmin’s essay, has the dualist concerned with the literary-historical char- heretical distinction of comparing not only acter Christ5; as well as Toulmin and Priestley, who are sincerely invested in de- tue, he depicts Jesus Christ feature for feature. [...] fending the divinity of Christ; bear witness What prejudices, what blindness one must have to to an awareness of — and in the latter two dare to compare the son of Sophroniscus to the son cases discomfort with — the palpable rise of Mary? What a distance from one to the other! of Socrates as Secular Jesus in the second The death of Socrates, philosophizing tranquilly 6 with his friends, is the sweetest one could desire; half of the 18th century. Few thinkers that of Jesus, expiring in torment, insulted, jeered at, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible 5 one could fear. Socrates, taking the poisoned cup, In his open approval of Christ as the preferred blesses the man who gives it to him and who is cry- martyr in Emile and in Fiction ou Morceau allégorique ing. Jesus, in the midst of a frightful torture, prays sur la revelation (1756-1757), Rousseau appears to be for his relentless executioners. Yes, if the life and an exception in 18th century France. See Raymond death of Socrates are those of a wise man, the life Trousson, Socrate devant Voltaire, Diderot et Rous- and death of Jesus are those of a god.” Jean- seau: la conscience en face du mythe (Paris: Lettres Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or On Education, trans. Modernes, Minard, 1967). Alan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979) 306- 6 “Curious as it might seem to partisans of Seneca, 307. Erasmus, or Montaigne, no such myth of Socrates 3 Joshua Toulmin, “Dissertation VIII. Christ and ever existed prior to the eighteenth century. The Socrates,” in Dissertations on the Internal Evidences pagan martyr had, to be sure, enjoyed a goodly and Excellence of Christianity: And on the Character of share of respect and veneration. But it somehow re- Christ, Compared with that of Some Other Celebrated quired the peculiar conjunction of intellectual cur- Founders of Religion and Philosophy (London: J. rents at work in this supposedly iconoclastic era to Johnson, 1785) 169-194. Here 170, 185, and 194. catapult him to the position of sacred relic.” Kather- 4 Joseph Priestley, Socrates and Jesus Compared ine Carson, in her review of Trousson’s book cited (Philadelphia: P. Byrne, 1803). above, “Socrates Observed: Three Eighteenth-

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were as consistent in the promotion of Soc- significant moment in Late Enlightenment rates to this end, and of the idea that it was secularist thought in three regards: in fact Christ’s time that had passed, as Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), beginning in 1) the essay addresses a primary concern 1779 with his first composition on moral of late 18th-century thinkers, namely, the philosophy, “Gehört allzuviel Güte, Leut- common philosophical and political agen- seeligkeit und grosse Freygebigkeit im das of reason free from religion; engsten Verstande zur Tugend?” (Does all too much Kindness, Sociability, and great 2) on a practical level, the essay conspicu- Generosity necessarily Constitute Vir- ously relegates the divine and thus alien tue?).7 martyr Christ to one of many influences in Schiller’s First Virtue Speech — a sec- the history of earthly virtue; and ond followed in 17808 —, in its designation of Socrates (469 BCE-399 BCE) as “den 3) on a theoretical level, the essay marks erhabensten Geist, den je das Altertum ge- the beginning of Schiller’s programmatic bar” (the most sublime spirit ever born to dismissal of the tribal-state religious practice the ancient world; NA 20:3) over the tradi- of disguising moral choice as — and coerc- tional candidate, Christ,9 is emblematic of a ing civic behavior through — divine dictate to the annals of untimely historical necessi- 10 Century Views,” in Diderot Studies 14 (1971) 273- ties. 281. Here 274. 7 Friedrich Schiller, Schillers Werke. Nationalausga- character in James MacPherson’s Ossian (1765). If be. i.A. des Goethe und Schiller-Archivs, des Schil- Cathmor or a text regarding him ever existed previ- ler-Nationalmuseums und der Deutschen Akade- ously, it would have been in medieval Scotland. mie, ed. Julius Petersen et al. (Weimar: Hermann Schiller’s antiheroes in the essay, who serve as Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1943ff). Here volume 25:304. counterexamples to the virtue of Socrates, range in Subsequent references as “Virtue Speech”; subse- time from Absalom (around 1000 BCE) to Julius quent citations appear as “NA” with volume and Caesar (100 BCW-44 BCE), Catiline (108 BCE-62 page number(s). Unless otherwise indicated, all BCE), and Augustus (63 BCE-14 AD); to François translations are mine [J.H.]. Ravaillac (1578-1610); and range in location from 8 “Die Tugend in ihren Folgen betrachtet” (1780; ancient Hebron to early modern Paris. Schiller spe- NA 20:30-36). cifically advises the listener (or reader) to look at 9 Schiller’s use of the term “Alterthum” (ancient pe- the books of the Bible for virtuous role models: riod, approximately 4000 BC-700 AD) should not “Siehe an die heilige Bücher!” (Just look at the holy be understood to indicate that Schiller means to books; NA 20:6). limit the discussion to Greco-Roman antiquity and 10 Note that Schiller pursues this same agenda in his thus exclude Christ from consideration geographi- exposé on Moses as a brilliant politician, but not a cally or culturally. Far from limiting himself to clas- divine messenger, in “Die Sendung Moses” (The sical antiquity, Schiller specifically uses the term Mission of Moses, 1790). See Jeffrey L. High, “Alterthum” in his characterization of Cathmor, a “Clever Priests and the Missions of Moses and

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Schiller’s essay is representative of the posi- zenship, representing the establishment of tions taken by a number of leading Enlight- a sphere of public authority based on self- enment thinkers; including (but by no knowledge through reason that secures means limited to) “the German Socrates” freedom of and from faith and religion in Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), Benjamin civil and public affairs. Franklin (1706-1790), and Thomas Jeffer- son (1743-1826); who not only see Socrates I. Prelude: Moses Mendelssohn’s as a practical moral-political role model for “Leben und Charakter des Sokrates” the pursuit of happiness in the Age of and Phädon Revolution, but consciously feature him in parallel narratives in which not only Socra- mong the texts taught by tes, but Christ himself, appear as a Secular Schiller’s professor Jakob Fried- Jesus, compared to and logically intended to rich Abel (1751-1829) at the displace the miraculous view of Christ, who AKarlsschule was Moses Mendelssohn’s himself had once risen as a Divine Socrates.11 book Phädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit Like the present essay, none of the texts der Seele (Phaedo, or On the Immortality discussed below address in any detail the of the Soul), an adaptation of Plato’s sev- textual accuracy of the 18th century views enth dialogue on the death of Socrates.12 of Socrates and Christ, nor do they ad- The broad resonance of Mendelssohn’s dress the question of Socrates’ religiosity. book is indisputable: by the time Schiller The term “secular” here thus does not re- was sixteen years old (1776), it had ap- fer to a historical Socrates or his beliefs as peared in four editions (1767, 1768, 1769, described in the sources, but to Socrates and 1776). The first some fifty pages of the reception in select 18th-century narratives book comprise Mendelssohn’s essay, “Le- that portray him as a human willing to give ben und Charakter des Sokrates” (The his only life for the earthly, rational con- Life and Character of Socrates), based on cepts of virtue, truth, and happiness. Ergo, “the sources”13 and English poet John Socrates appears here only in his function as a role model for national and global citi- 12 See Laura Anna Macor, Der morastige Zirkel der menschlichen Bestimmung. Friedrich Schillers Weg Schiller: From Monotheism to the Aesthetic Civili- von der Aufklärung zu Kant (Würzburg: Königshau- zation of the Individual,” in Elisabeth Krimmer and sen & Neumann, 2010) 31. Patricia Ann Simpson, eds., German Classicism and 13 In the course of the text, Mendelssohn men- Religion (Rochester: Camden House, 2013) 79-98. tions/cites Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Plato, Aris- 11 According to Trousson, Denis Diderot was the totle, and Aristophenes, though it is evident that the first to suggest a Socrates tragedy written for the radicalism of the Socrates portrayed by Mendels- stage in Traité de la Poésie dramatique in 1758 sohn and then by Schiller, derives from Plato’s por- (Trousson, 47). trayal. See Louis-André Dorion, “The Rise and Fall

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Gilbert Cooper’s (1722-1769) Life of Socra- und insbesondere von dem System unse- tes (1750). Cooper’s book features a spir- rer Rechte und Obliegenheiten” (harmony ited foreword in defense of Socrates and of moral truths, and in particular with the “true religion” (Deism/Naturalism) aimed system of our rights and responsibilities; at Socrates’ detractors (evidently Chris- Mendelssohn, XXXIX). Mendelssohn de- tians), whose characters are informed by fines Socrates’ path from the “finstere either “designing Deceits of the Heart” or Schrecknisse des Aberglaubens” (darkest “the involuntary Errors of a misled Un- horrors of superstition; Mendelssohn, 8) derstanding.”14 Mendelssohn, like Cooper, and “Vorurteil” (prejudice; Mendelssohn, frames Socrates’ study of nature and hu- 26) that inform “Gemüther, die nicht unter manity in modern eudaemonist terms; in- der Herrschaft der Vernunft stehen” (the deed, he more rewrites Plato’s portrayal minds of those who are not ruled by rea- than adapts it for modern tastes,15 noting son; Mendelssohn, 7), through “Tugend that his contribution is concerned with the und Weisheit” (virtue and wisdom; Men- “Harmonie der moralischen Wahrheiten, delssohn, 8, 11), to the end of all human pursuits, “wahre Glückseligkeit” (true of the Socratic Problem,” in The Cambridge Com- happiness; Mendelssohn, 5, 7, 12, 14, 26): panion to Socrates, ed., Donald R. Morrison (New “Die Glückseligkeit des menschlichen York: Cambridge UP, 2011) 1-23, here 3-6. 14 Mendelssohn cites the second edition of 1750 Geschlechts war sein [Sokrates’] einziges (Mendelssohn, XL): John Gilbert Cooper, The Life Studium” (The happiness of the human of Socrates (London: R. Dodsley, 1750) v-vii, x. race was his [Socrates’] only study; Men- 15 Mendelssohn explains, for example: “Seine [Pla- delssohn, 26). Mendelssohn attacks the tos] Beweise für die Immaterialität der Seele schei- sophists as “Priester des Aberglaubens” nen, uns wenigstens, so leicht und grillenhaft, daß sie kaum eine ernsthafte Widerlegung verdienen (priests of superstition, Mendelssohn, 8), […] In dem dritten Gespräch mußte ich völlig zu who exploit religion to their own ends den Neueren [Philosophen] meine Zuflucht neh- (Mendelssohn, 7), a religion that panders men, und meinen Sokrates fast wie einen Weltwei- to “Vorurteil, oder Aberglaube” (prejudice sen aus dem siebzehnten oder achtzehnten Jahrhun- or superstition; Mendelssohn, 26) and leads dert sprechen lassen” (His [Plato’s] arguments for “zur offenbaren Gewalttätigkeit, Krän- the immateriality of the soul appear, at least to us, so weak and quirky, that they scarcely deserve to be kung der menschlichen Rechte, Verderb- refuted […] In the third dialog I had to resort en- niß der Sitten u.s.w.” (to open violence, tirely to modern philosophers and have my Socrates violation of human rights, moral depravity, speak almost like an international sage from the sev- etc.; Mendelssohn, 26) and “heillose enteenth or eighteenth century; Mendelssohn, Ungerechtigkeit” (unholy injustice; Men- XXXVI-XXXVII), and calls his Phädon “Mitteld- ing zwischen einer Uebersetzung und eigenen delssohn, 28). The political consequence is Ausarbeitung” (something between a translation an ignorant, self-enforcing populace, and an original rendition; Mendelssohn, XXXVIII). whose “blinden Eifer” and “pöbelhaften

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Wahne” (blind zeal, mob delusion; Men- evil; Mendelssohn, 14).16 To this end, Men- delssohn, 27) is easily manipulated by the delssohn praises a specific advantage of the “Bosheit einiger Mächtigen, die Heuchelei Socratic method, namely, the sequestration der Priester, und die Niederträchtigkeit of the unknowable: “[…] so war ihm er- feiler Redner und Demagogen” (malice of laubt, das nicht zu wissen, was er nicht wis- a powerful few, hypocrisy of the priests, sen konnte, oder durfte” (thus he was free and the despicable behavior of venal ora- not to know what he could not or was not tors and demagogues; Mendelssohn, 27). allowed to know; Mendelssohn, 15); which One of the most notable features of justified Socrates’ refusal to provide an- Mendelssohn’s essay is the nature of the swers to unanswerable questions beyond subtle negation of the significance of “Dieses weiß ich nicht” (This I do not Christ’s death in contrast to that of Socra- know; Mendelssohn, 15), but to pursue tes. In the introductory essay itself, Men- them through further interrogation. delssohn’s interest in Socrates is clearly Not only did Socrates see divine re- stated as morality within the limits of mor- ward and punishment as unknowable, and tality: “[…] das Unendliche im Endlichen thus dishonest and distracting, Melitus’ nachzuahmen, die Seele des Menschen charge that Socrates “habe dem jungen jener ursprünglichen Schönheit und Menschen [Alcibiades] die Verachtung der Vollkommenheit so nahe zu bringen, als es Religion beigebracht” (taught contempt for in diesem Leben möglich ist” (to copy the religion; Mendelssohn, 33), indicates that eternal in the finite and to bring the spirit Socrates’ dismissal of the unknowable itself of the human being as close to that original was a violation of coerced worship of the beauty and perfection as is possible in this Olympian gods and thus posed a danger to life; Mendelssohn, 4). In contrast, Mendels- “die Vorschriften der Religion und der sohn concedes that the superstitious beliefs Politik, gegen welche er die Jugend gleich- of the average ancient Greek facilitated gültig gemacht haben sollte” (the rules of adherence only to the “albernste Religion” religion and politics, toward which he had (silliest religion; Mendelssohn, 8). Mendels- allegedly made the youth indifferent; sohn stresses that Socrates’ strategy against the sophists features an assault on 16 Mendelssohn, 14. The third dialogue of Mendels- “unrichtige Begriffe von der Vorsehung sohn’s Phädon, which chronicles the death of Socra- und Regierung Gottes” (false ideas about tes, includes the greatest number of contradictions providence and the rule of God) specifi- with Christian concepts of the afterlife. On the first cally regarding “die Belohnung des Guten page of the third dialogue, Socrates establishes that there is no evidence in nature for the concept of an und die Bestrafung des Bösen” (the re- eternity in Hell: “Aus der Natur und den Eigen- ward for goodness and the punishment of schaften erschaffener Dinge läßt sich in diesem Falle nicht mit Gewißheit schließen” (Mendelssohn, 168).

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Mendelssohn, 24). Indeed, according to for his unjustified death sentence: “Ich Mendelssohn, Socrates’ refusal to be initi- gehe zum Tode, zu welchem ihr mich ver- ated in the Elysian Mysteries was a strat- urtheilt habet: und sie zur Schmach und egy aimed specifically at reserving the Unehre, zu welcher sie von der Wahrheit right to demystify the coercive myth of di- und Gerechtigkeit verdammt werden” (I vine judgment and frame virtue and vice in go to death, to which you have con- a social context.17 In this sense, Socrates demned me, and you go to disgrace and sentences his accusers to earthly judgment dishonor, to which you are damned by truth and justice; Mendelssohn, 40). If, as 17 Mendelssohn points out his own belief that the Mendelssohn and his portrayal of Socrates Elysian Mysteries were no threat to Soctates’ phi- logically imply, all sentient beings have the losophy, since they comprised nothing other than “die Lehren der wahren natürlichen Religion” (the same experience in the afterlife, then there teachings of the true natural religion; Mendels- is no reason to believe in punishment for sohn, 34), the simple deistic of all creation. This sin or reward for virtue, and there is no view mirrors the thesis presented in Karl Leonhard reason to be thankful for atonement Reinhold’s Ueber die ältesten hebräischen Mysterien through the death of Christ (penal substi- (On the Most Ancient Hebrew Mysteries, 1788), the primary source for Schiller’s “Die Sendung Moses” tution), which promised only a dependent (1790; NA 17, 385). Schiller concludes: “Es scheint series of benefits that the death of other ausser Zweifel gesetzt, daß der Innhalt der al- freedom fighters, such as Socrates, did not: lerältesten Mysterien in Heliopolis und Memphis, forgiveness of sin, and therewith the salva- während ihres unverdorbenen Zustands, Einheit tion of the soul, and a heavenly afterlife. In Gottes und Widerlegung des Paganismus war” (It appears to be beyond any doubt that the content of the specific removal of these speculative the most ancient mysteries in Heliopolis and Mem- and supernatural elements (judgment, phis, during their uncorrupted state, were the unity heaven, and hell) from common Christian of everything in God and the refutation of pagan- eschatology in his portrayal of Socrates, ism; NA 17:385). Mendelssohn’s speculation as to why Socrates refused to be initiated in the Elysian Mendelssohn establishes moral transfor- Mysteries may contain a hint as to why notable free- mation and the sublime model of martyr- thinkers Schiller and Jefferson appear never to dom as an empirical, earthly affair.18 Men- have joined Masonic lodges: “Wenn Socrates sich delssohn’s essay thus glosses over the weigerte, die Einweihung anzunehmen, so main violation of reason committed in Soc- geschah es wahrscheinlich, um die Freiheit zu be- halten, diese Geheimnisse ungestraft ausbreiten zu dürfen, die ihm die Priester durch die Einweihung 18 Mendelssohn’s portrayal of judgment as an earthy zu entziehen suchten” (If Socrates refused to accept concern foreshadows one of Schiller’s most impor- the initiation, then it is likely that this was in order tant lines on the subject in the poem “Resignation” to maintain the freedom to spread the secrets with- (1786), which dismisses the biblical portrayal of out punishment, a freedom the priests sought to re- Judgment Day: “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Welt- voke through the oath of initiation; Mendelssohn, gericht” (World history is Judgment Day; NA 34). 1:168).

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rates’ dying days, namely his rationaliza- of secrecy: “[…] Untersuchungen der Art tion of an afterlife and the reduction of his scheinen in jenen Jahren mit einer gewis- otherwise heroic death to a function of the sen Scheu, fast wie Mysterien bewacht logic of the belief in an afterlife, which is worden zu seyn, so daß sie nur unter ver- addressed in great length in Dialog III of trauten Freunden Statt finden durften” Mendelssohn’s Phädon (Mendelssohn, 189- (Such research projects appear in those 209). As for the details, Socrates responds: years to be guarded with a certain caution, “[…] Alles dieses, mein Freund! Weiss ich almost like religious mysteries, so that they nicht” (All this, my friend! I do not know; could only occur between trusted friends; Mendelssohn, 209). Friedländer, X). Friedländer also cites In the introduction to the 1814 edition Mendelssohn’s letter to Thomas Abbt of Mendelssohn’s Phädon, editor David (1738-1766) of 9 February on the fear of Friedländer captures the spirit of the late earthly persecution as motivation for using 18th century eudaemonist critics of relig- Greek pen names to promote a free discus- ious orthodoxy (as evident in Mendels- sion of “Die Bestimmung des Menschen”19: sohn’s and Schiller’s essays) in a few sum- “Wenn ja orthodoxe Theologen hinter un- mary phrases. Friedländer calls the “Revo- sere Briefe kämen, so liefen wir denn doch lution in dem Gedankenreiche aller den- nur Gefahr, in effigie verbrannt zu wer- kenden Menschen” (revolution in the den” (Friedländer, XIII). For Mendels- realm of thought of all thinking individu- sohn, the direct result of the dangerous als) an unavoidable result of the “Ver- discussion with Abbt on the destiny of hu- knüpfung wachsender Einsicht mit Streben mankind is his Phädon, which begins with nach Glückseligkeit” (combination of the essay “Das Leben und Charakter des growing insight and the pursuit of happi- Sokrates.” As Karl Fink has pointed out, ness; Friedländer, VI). He describes Glück- seligkeit und Fortdauer” (happiness and 19 “the destiny of humankind”; Friedländer, XII. stability; Friedländer, VII) as inextinguish- Both Abbt’s “Zweifel über die Bestimmung des able human longings, and he summarizes Menschen” and Mendelssohn’s “Orakel, die Be- Mendelssohn’s ultimate motivation: “[…] stimmung des Menschen betreffend” were coordina- ted responses to Johann Joachim Spalding’s Betrach- durch seine Schriften Tugend und Wohl- tung über die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748). For a wollen unter den Menschen verbreiten” (to discussion of the origins of the term, the dynamics spread virtue and good will among the between the three texts, and Schiller’s professor Jo- people through his writings; Friedländer, hann Friedrich Abel’s use of the texts in his courses XXIV). Friedländer subtly addresses the at the Karlsschule, see Macor, 25-30, and Wolfgang Riedel, Die Anthropologie des jungen Schiller: Zur dangers of heresy in the 1760s, describing Ideengeschichte der medizinischen Schriften und der discussions of the earthly limits to specula- “Philosophischen Briefe” (Würzburg: Königshausen tion on the destiny of mankind as a work & Neumann, 1985) 156-176.

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citing Mendelssohn’s “The Life and Char- dramatist, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing acter of Socrates” and his Jerusalem, Oder (1729-1781), was prohibited from writing über religiöse Macht und Judentum (Jerusalem, on religious topics in 1778 for his publica- Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 1783), tion of a series of arguments for natural Mendelssohn’s treatment of Socrates is a religion and against orthodox Christianity vehicle toward the promotion of the secu- entitled Fragmente eines Ungenannten lar state: (Fragments of an Unnamed Author; 1774- 1778) by Hermann Samuel Reimarus Mendelssohn had argued that Socrates had dedi- (1694-1768).21 Schiller himself was the sub- cated his life to one of the fundamentals of democ- ject of open charges of polytheism and racy: the pursuit of happiness […] Mendelssohn found Socrates happy in his moment of death. And blasphemy in 1788 for his poem “Die Göt- so Mendelssohn balanced his own capacity for ana- ter Griechenlands” (The Gods of Ancient lytical reasoning with empathetic modes of dis- Greece).22 course, particularly in his view that the separation of church and state (Staat und Religion) is more 21 “Against the Lutheran orthodoxy, whose schol- successfully accomplished as a matter of practical arly writings endeavored to, as it was called, har- rather than theoretical discourse: “This is in politics monize, the four gospels into one narrative in one of the most difficult tasks, which for centuries which inconsistencies were explained away, Re- has been looking for a solution, and only occasion- imarus suggested that these inconsistencies existed ally here and there perhaps with more success because the resurrection and other supernatural 20 pragmatically applied than theoretically resolved. happenings simply never occurred. After Jesus’s death the apostles and gospel writers had to scram- Looking back from 1814, Friedländer’s in- ble to set forth a system of miraculous stories to sup- troduction captures the hostile atmosphere port their claims, just as any system of revealed re- ligion will.” Friederike von Schwerin-High, “Gott- surrounding the reasoned discussion of re- hold Ephraim Lessing’s religious pluralism in Na- ligion toward the end of the separation of than the Weise and The Fragments Controversy,” in church and state during Schiller’s college Enlightenment and Secularism, ed., Christopher years, during which Germany’s premiere Nadon (Atlanta: Mercer University Press, 2013) 273-288. 22 In the August 1788 edition of Deutsches Museum, 20 Karl J. Fink, “Kleist’s Justice Beyond Tears: poet Friedrich Leopold Graf zu Stolberg (1750- Kohlhaasian Manifestos after Kleist,” in: Heinrich 1819) published the most prominent attack on von Kleist: Artistic and Political Legacies, eds., Jef- Schiller and his “Die Götter Griechenlands,” frey L. High and Sophia Clark (Amsterdam: Rodo- “Gedanken ueber Herrn Schillers Gedicht: ‘Die pi, 2013) 23-44. Mendelssohn writes that “dieses ist Götter Griechenlands’” (Thoughts on Mr. in der Politik eine der schwersten Aufgaben, die Schiller’s Poem: ‘The Gods of Ancient Greece). man seit Jahrhunderten schon aufzulösen bemühet See Jeffrey L. High, “Friedrich Schiller, Secular ist, und hie und da vielleicht glücklicher praktisch Virtue, and ‘The Gods of Ancient Greece,’” in En- beygelegt, als theoretisch aufgelöst hat.” (Moses lightenment and Secularism, ed., Christopher Nadon Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, Oder über religiöse Macht (Atlanta: Mercer University Press, 2013) 315-324. und Judentum (Berlin: Maurer, 1783) 3. Subsequent citations as “High, Secular Virtue and

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II. Happiness and the Moral- ness as the destiny of humankind. The Philosophical Function of Socrates’ thesis that good acts are neither those Death in Schiller’s First Virtue which cause mere private happiness, nor Speech those which are outwardly good, but done for ulterior motives, both of which are in- n “Gehört allzuviel Güte, Leutseelig- spired by self interest, is the titular problem keit und grosse Freygebigkeit im eng- of Schiller’s Virtue Speech. Striving to sten Verstande zur Tugend?,” his first counter the concept of the state of nature Iessay on moral philosophy and aesthetics, described by John Locke and David Hob- Schiller quietly lays the philosophical foun- bes by establishing a harmony of public vir- dation for a life-long program to promote tue and private self-interest, Shaftesbury a reasoned, secular alternative to a faith- stressed in Characteristics of Men, Manners, based role model, embarking from and Opinions, Times (1711) that to the harmoni- concluding with the thesis that the destiny ous and whole member of society, not all of humankind is happiness, and the path to pleasure is necessarily good, and not all happiness is virtue. The essay presents the “good” acts necessarily moral.23 Subse- case for virtue in three parts, the first pre- quently, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) senting Socrates as the role model for vir- argued in his Inquiry into the Original of our tue, the second presenting the case against Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) —“In the outward appearance of virtue driven Which the Principles of the late Earl of by ulterior motives, and the third on the Shaftsbury are explain’d and defended”24 importance of inner struggle in the difficult choice of virtue when it is to one’s own 23 “But when Will and Pleasure are synonymous; personal disadvantage. These are followed when everything which pleases us is called pleasure, by a lengthy and unsteady summary in and we never choose or prefer but as we please; ‘tis which Schiller performs a balancing act be- trifling to say ‘Pleasure is our good.’ For this has as tween the appearance of piety and a spirit little meaning as to say, ‘We choose what we think of heresy. The influence of Scottish En- eligible’; and, ‘We are pleased with what delights or lightenment eudaemonism and reconcilia- pleases us.’ The question is, ‘whether we are rightly pleased, and choose as we should do. [...] And as for tion philosophy in Schiller’s thought is no- some low and sordid pleasures of human kind, [...] I where more self evident than in the Virtue should never afford them the name of happiness or Speech, which features the key concepts of good.” Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of disinterested virtue, the role of virtue in Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opin- the perfection of the individual and civil ions, Times, ed., John M. Robertson (Indianapolis: society, and the means and end of happi- Bobbs Merrill, 1964). Here volume II, part II, sec- tion I, pages 29-30. 24 The quote is from the title page of the 1725 edition The Gods of Ancient Greece” with page number(s). of Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Original of our

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— and An Essay on the Nature and Conduct theory of an “imagined state of nature”26 in of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations his An Essay on the History of Civil Society on the Moral Sense (1728) that virtue yields (1767),27 arguing that even the “rudest pleasure because it conforms to the natural state of mankind” distinguished itself “moral sense” of virtue, a feeling faculty through the “desire of perfection.”28 As is separate from reason, while vice yields pain the case with Schiller in a series of subse- because it offends the natural moral sense. quent texts, Ferguson, like Shaftesbury Embarking from the universality of the and Hutcheson before him, equates the moral sense, Hutcheson coined the utilitar- measure of perfection with the happiness ian motto that the altruistic regulative idea achieved.29 Ferguson’s book An Essay on the of ethics is to achieve the “greatest Happi- History of Civil Society contains two sub- ness for the greatest numbers,” resulting in stantial chapters elaborating the philosophy the greatest perfection and the greatest of happiness, entitled “Section VII: Of good, as stated in An Inquiry Concerning Happiness” and “Section VIII: The Same Moral Good and Evil (1725).25 Adam Subject continued,” though the entire Ferguson (1723-1816) criticized Locke’s work is informed by the postulates, “to dif- fuse happiness, is the law of morality” Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; In Two Treatises, re- printed in: Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Har- 26 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil mony, Design, ed., Peter Kivy (The Hague: Mar- Society, reprint of the 4th edition of 1773 (London: tinus Nijhoff, 1973) 3. Subsequently cited as Gregg International Publishers, 1969). Here part I, “Hutcheson 1725” with page number. section I, page 3. Subsequently cited as “Ferguson” 25 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Moral with chapter, section, and page number. Good and Evil, in An Inquiry into the Original of our 27 The German translation of An Essay on the History Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, reprint of the second edi- of Civil Society was published in 1768: Versuch Über tion of 1726 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1971) 109-304. Here section 1, article 1, page 117. In com- die Geschichte der Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Leipzig: Junius, 1768). paring the moral Qualitys of Actions, in order to 28 regulate our Election among various Actions pro- Ferguson, part I, section I, page 13. Kettler sug- pos’d, or to find which of them has the greatest gests that Ferguson considered Locke’s theory “so- moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of cially irresponsible,” which demonstrates a corre- Virtue to judge thus; that in equal Degrees of Hap- spondence between Fergusons work and Jefferson piness, expected to proceed from the Action, the and Schiller’s social programs based on happiness Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to (Kettler, 118, 111). Schiller cited Garve’s translation whom the Happiness shall extend; [...] and in equal of Ferguson’s Institutes of Moral Philosophy in his Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Hap- first dissertation (NA 20:30-36). piness, [...] so that, that Action is best, which pro- 29 Schiller’s second Karlsschule speech, Die Tugend cures the greatest Happiness for the greatest num- in Ihren Folgen betrachtet (1779-80), and his rejected bers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occa- first dissertation, Philosophie der Physiologie (1779), sions Misery.” Hutcheson: Good and Evil, section equate the terms “perfection” (Vollkommenheit) and III, part VIII, page 177. “happiness” (Glueckseligkeit). See NA 20:11, 30.

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(Ferguson, I, VI:62.) and “the happiness of — desto höhere Liebe — desto höhere individuals is the great end of civil society” Tugend” (The more vibrant, more power- (Ferguson, I, IX:95). ful, more urgent the competing inclination, On the first page of the Virtue Speech, the greater reason demonstrated, the Schiller coins a resilient guiding construct higher the love, the greater the virtue; NA for both his future critical thought and ar- 20:3). If the love of greater happiness, tistic production on freedom and happiness which implies selfless conduct even in the when he poses the teleologically informed single most extreme case, guides the indi- question as to what decides between virtue vidual in all choices between the competing and vice. He finds the answer in “die mo- inclinations virtue and vice, then the most ralische Quelle der That” (the moral grave and telling choice is that of a virtu- source of action; NA 20:3), “Liebe zur ous death over an unfree life. A paradig- Glükseeligkeit” (love of happiness; NA matic case, indeed, according to Schiller, 20:3). Thus begins a decades long pursuit the defining moment in the history of of happiness through art intended to reso- moral choice, is Socrates’ decision to nate and effect change in the sphere of choose death before coercion, as a contri- public authority. Here in 1779 as in his later bution to the freedom and happiness of all. writings, “der scharfsehende Verstand” Here, the third paragraph in its entirety: (the sharp insight of reason, [later Form- trieb]; NA 20:3), pitted against “Neigung” Ich sehe den erhabensten Geist, den je das Altertum (impulse and inclination; NA 20:3), guides gebahr, dem nie dämmerte der Offenbarung Gottes ein blasser Wiederstral; — Er hat den Giftbecher in the moral decision-making process. Rea- der Hand — Hier Liebe zum Leben, — das mäch- son tests each choice according to whether tigste Drangsgefül, das je eines Menschen Seele be- it will lead to greater happiness than its al- stürmte; — dort zum Pfade höherer Seligkeit ihm ternative, the deciding factor.30 To this winkend ein zitternder Schein, ein eigner durch moral formula, Schiller adds the measure das Forschen seines Geistes einsam erschaffner Ge- danke — Was wird Sokrates wählen? — Das Wei- of greater and lesser virtue: “Je heller also, seste. — Izt, o Weißheit, leite du seine entsezliche je gewaltiger, je dringender die gegen- Freyheit — Tod — Vergehen — Unsterblichkeit seitige Neigung desto höherer Verstand —Krone des Himmels — Versieglung blutige — große — mächtige Versieglung seiner neuen Lehre! — Leite seine lezte entscheidende Freyheit scharf- 30 “Der Verstand muß jede Neigung prüfen ob sie sehender Verstand — Entschieden — getrunken zur Glückseligkeit leite” (Reason must test whether das Gifft — Tod — Unsterblichkeit — Seine Lehre or not each impulse will lead to happiness; NA mächtig versiegelt! — Höchster Kampf; — höch- 20:3). “Sie, diese Liebe ist es, die zwischen zwey ster Verstand — erhabenste Liebe — erhabenste Gegenneigungen [Tugend und Untugend] den Aus- Tugend! Erhabner nichts unter hohem, bestirntem schlag geben soll” (It is this love that is the decisive Himmel vollbracht! factor between two competing inclinations [virtue I see the most sublime thinker ever born in the an- and vice]; NA 20:3). cient world, who never caught the faintest glimmer

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of divine revelation; — He has the cup of poison in argues, humankind’s “terrible freedom,” his hand — Here the love of life, — the most pow- namely, the requisite autonomy to choose erful drive that ever stormed a human spirit; — there marking the path to higher happiness a flick- personal disadvantage over personal ad- ering light calls to him, an original idea, arrived at vantage as a reconciliation of duty with de- through of the solitary investigation of his mind — sire, the greatest possible freedom from What will Socrates choose? — The wisest. — sensual-physical coercion is evident. But Now, oh wisdom, guide his terrible freedom — Schiller could have found other examples death — passing — immortality — the crown of heaven — bloody seal — great — mighty seal of of such behavior and did so in almost all of his new teachings! — Guide his final, decisive his major works. What qualifies Socrates freedom, sharp-eyed reason — Chosen — the poi- above all others as not only “most sublime son drunk — death — immortality — mightily thinker ever born in the ancient world,” sealed his teachings — greatest struggle — highest but the man who accomplished the most reason — most sublime love — most sublime vir- tue! No more sublime deed done under the great “sublime deed done under the great starry starry heavens! (NA 20:3-4) heavens,” is his rejection of belief in a re- ward in the afterlife, and the assumption According to Schiller’s introductory for- implied in the first line of Schiller’s descrip- mula, Socrates’ “greatest struggle” results tion, that giving one’s only life without in the reconciliation of competing inclina- comfort — as opposed to abandoning a tions of reason (toward “higher happi- dreary prelude to bliss — when one should ness”) and the most basic of natural sen- in the name of the future happiness of oth- sual drives (toward survival). There can be ers, but does not have to, is the most ex- no more terrible form of moral freedom, treme test of virtue. Schiller returns to the nor any more unquestionable demonstra- singularity of this test case in the subse- tion of “highest reason,” than the choice of quent paragraphs and in his later portray- the more virtuous of two inclinations here, als of Socrates. The first segment of the in the face of the most disadvantageous Virtue Essay concludes with his definition personal consequences, the ultimate act of of the essence of virtue as altruism: “Liebe self-determination in the choice of one’s zur Glükseeligkeit, geleitet durch den Ver- own death. Schiller, like Mendelssohn, de- stand — Tugend ist das harmonische clares Socrates’ decision to die the ultimate Band von Liebe und Weißheit!” (Love of proof of his practice of his own teachings.31 happiness, guided through reason — vir- With the choice of virtue over vice, Schiller tue is the harmonious band that unites love and wisdom; NA 20:4). The second part of 31 Note the parallel between Schiller’s description of the definition, the thesis as well as the the death of Socrates and Mendelssohn’s: “sein metaphorical leitmotif of the speech, ap- Bekenntnis mit dem Tode zu versiegeln” (to sign and seal his belief system with his death; Mendels- pears another four times, at least once in sohn, 14).

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each segment of the speech (NA 20:4, 5, 6, vided into two clear categories: the domi- 8). nance of abstract reason unchecked by In the second segment, comprising feeling, and the dominance of sensuality paragraphs 7-11, Schiller, like Shaftesbury unchecked by reason, which break down as and Hutcheson above, strictly differenti- follows: 1) under the dictatorship of rea- ates between the moral inspiration of a son: Ravaillac’s regicide and Catiline’s ar- deed and its reception, between appearance sonist murder represent “verlarvtes Las- and ulterior motives. To illustrate the po- ter” (vice in disguise; NA 20:5); and 2) un- litical application of the end of virtue as der the dictatorship of sensuality: Julius happiness of the whole, Schiller contrasts Caesar’s entertainment of the masses with Socrates’ sublime reconciliation of reason games and gifts as “Herrschsucht” and and sensuality (ennobled reason), as the “Ehrgeiz” (hunger for power and ambi- example for the potential totality of the in- tion; NA 20:5),33 Absolom’s “embracing the dividual with a world history of tyrants lowest citizens” as “thirst for control,” 34 and rebels, at least partially lifted from and Augustus Caesar’s desire to “become Hutcheson and Ferguson.32 The contras- immortal” as “lasciviousness.”35 According tive analysis of their actions demonstrates to Schiller’s argument, ostensibly good acts a lacking totality, which results in moral that appear to contribute to the happiness perversions marked either by a dangerous of the whole, such as rebellion against tyr- one-sided dictatorship sensuality (love) or anny, often prove not to be motivated by theoretical reason (wisdom), and Schiller virtue after all, but by selfish impulses of proceeds to analyze them according to the the mind or the body that actually threaten Socrates criterion, whether or not they ad- the happiness of the whole. Throughout, vanced the goal of humankind — happi- Schiller refers back to his thesis, concluding ness of the whole. The examples are di- of his tyrants and rebels that either, “Hier war die Güte mit Weißheit aber nicht mit 32 Schiller’s discussions of tyrants and rebels address Liebe im bund” (Here kindness was in Julius Caesar, Augustus Caesar, Ravaillac, Catiline (NA, 20:4-6), and the relative merits of Brutus (NA 20:40, 161), Lycurgus (NA 20:33; 22:75, 174), and 33 “Ich sehe den großen Julius das Römische Volk Solon (NA 20:34), a parallel to Ferguson’s frequent mit Spielen belustigen — mit Geschenken und Ga- uses of mostly the same tyrants, rebels, and lawgiv- ben überschwemmen” (NA 20:4). ers to explain moral theses: Julius Caesar (Ferguson 34 “Was war der Grundtrieb […], daß er […] in die I, X:120) Brutus (Ferguson I, VIII:84), and Lycur- Umarmung der niedrigsten Bürger sank? […] der gus and Solon (Ferguson I, IX:98). All Ferguson Durst nach Herrschaft” (NA 20:5). references appear in Adam Ferguson, An Essay on 35 “unsterblich werden mit den Unsterblichen” and the History of Civil Society, reprint of the 4th edition “wollüstiges Gefühl” (NA 20:5). Mendelssohn simi- of 1773 (London 1969), with chapter and page larly describes the motivations of the Sophists as numbers. “Geiz, Ehrfurcht oder Wollust” (Mendelssohn 7-8).

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league with wisdom [reason] but not with troduces the measure of “Kampf der love [feeling]; NA 20:5), or “Hier also war Seele” (inner moral struggle; NA 20:6) as Güte die Larve des in der Tiefe der Seele the measure of virtue: “Die schönste That laurenden Lasters” (Thus here, kindness ohne Kampf begangen hat gar geringen was merely masking vice lurking deep in Werth gegen derjeningen die durch the soul; NA 20:5).36 großen Kampf errungen ist” (The most The third segment, on moral resistance, beautiful deed done without struggle has comprising paragraphs 12-16, represents precious little worth when compared to one of the great masterpieces of Schillerian that achieved through great struggle; NA double-speak, a skill that was evidently as 20:6). A person with all the trappings of valuable at the Karlsschule as it would wealth runs no risk in an act of charity, in- prove to be in Schiller’s dealings with cen- deed, such a person is likely to gain from sors. Indeed, it is baffling why it took until such an act, thus there is no “Gegenge- 1788 for Schiller to be accused of outright wicht” (counterbalance) to the “Neigung blasphemy. Returning to his description of Wohlzuthun” (inclination to do good; NA Socrates’ decision to choose death before 20:7), and the act is merely outwardly coercion as “höchster Kampf,” Schiller in- good, but not virtuous. Following the or- der of considerations in his title, Schiller

36 For Schiller, as evidenced by the moral focus of proceeds to address whether “Leutselig- his earliest and his latest theoretical works, the pur- keit” (sociablity) necessarily constitutes suit of totality and harmony through the reconcilia- virtue. According to the established for- tion of drives was the unsolved problem of human- mula, “jener Große dort der seinen Adel ity and thus the challenge for his drama figures. The seine Hoheit von sich legt” (that particular historical figures Schiller invoked to illustrate this early moral-aesthetic theory mirror the actual later person of importance there, who sets aside characters in his dramas. The story of Absolom, the his nobility, his highness; NA 20:6) and biblical son of King David, who conspired against fraternizes with the common man, does not his father and was killed during his father’s officer demonstrate virtue, because he lacks “das Joab’s coup attempt has most of the elements of Don Gefühl eigener innerer Erhabenheit” (the in- Karlos and Fiesco; Socrates’ sublime composure and ner sense of sublime sacrifice; NA 20:6) autonomy in the face of death parallels that of Mar- quis Posa, Maria Stuart, and Joan of Arc; Ravaillac’s that would serve as a counterbalance to murder of a tyrant mirrors Charlotte Corday, his meaningless sociability; on the contrary, revolutionary hunger for power mirrors Fiesco, and such an encounter is more likely to inflate Catiline mirrors Fiesco’s hunger for power as well his pride: “So ist demnach allzuviel Güte as Karl Moor’s terror campaign. In a further impor- und Leutseligkeit und große Freygebigkeit tant link between the early theoretical works and the early dramas, both Fiesco and Franz Moor are dis- das harmonische Band von Liebe und cussed in Schiller’s second dissertation (NA 20:60) Weißheit nicht; — so hat sie keinen Kampf as psychological case histories already in 1779-80. gekostet; […] Sie ist nicht Tugend!”

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(Therefore, all too much kindness, socia- Schiller cites thirteen lines of the entirely bility, and great generosity does not con- fabricated “Life of Moor. A Tragedy by stitute the harmonious band between love Krake” (NA 20:60), which is nearly word and wisdom — for it cost no struggle […] for word lines 44-56 of act V, scene 1 of Die This is not virtue; NA 20:7). The subver- Räuber (NA 3:117-118). It is highly likely sive irony cannot be lost that Schiller will that Schiller developed his trademark ka- go on to praise both the Duke Carl Eugen leidoscope of metaphors in response to the and his extra-marital partner Franziska police state censorship of the Karlsschule.37 von Hohenheim, neither of whom were In keeping with the practice established in popular with the students, in terms that his earliest poems, in the Virtue Speech parallel his description of Socrates, directly Schiller works on a number of metaphori- after he had disqualified facile good deeds cal registers, including pagan and biblical by the obscenely wealthy and socializing imagery from both the Old and New Tes- with the lower classes for the sake of one’s taments.38 In the fifth of twenty-three own ego from the class of virtuous acts. Schiller closes the speech with a disingenu- 37 For a familiar example of a Schiller poem that em- ous vision of “die Söhne der Zukunft” (fu- ploys a blur of interfaith and deist metaphor, yet re- ture sons) at Carl Eugen’s funeral (re- mains palatable to adherents of the most diverse be- ferred to as a “Fest” or celebration), and liefs, see Schiller’s “An die Freude” (Ode to Joy, yet another future generation searching 1785; NA 1:169-172). See also Jeffrey L. High, — evidently in vain — through the grave “Schiller, Freude Kleist and Rache / On the Ger- man Freedom Ode,” in Dieter Sevin and Christoph markers for those of “Wirtembergs treffli- Zeller, eds., Form - Violence – Meaning: Two Hun- cher Carl” (Württemberg’s worthy Carl) dred Years Heinrich von Kleist (Berlin: Walter de and “Franziska, die Freundin der Men- Gruyter, 2013) 123-145, here 130-131. 38 schen” (Franziska, the friend, [or girl- In the strictly monitored religious confines of the Karlsschule, Schiller established the inscrutable friend] of humanity; NA 20:9). practice of mixing philosophical with mythological It would be unrealistic to expect Schiller and religious metaphors, and expressing modern to express himself entirely freely in writing experience in ancient metaphor. This is evident at an institution where once mere feudal from the earliest poems written at the Karlsschule subjects were sentenced to teenage years — “Der Abend” (At Dusk, 1776), “Der Eroberer” (The Conqueror, 1776) to the last — “Elisium” spent in the total absence of freedom. This (1780 or 1781) and “Gruppe aus dem Tartarus” (A makes it difficult to discern what in the Group from Tartarus; 1780 or 1781), and continues Karlsschule writings Schiller wants to in his mature poetry. Calvin Thomas notes the “free write, and what he is required to write. blending of Christian with pagan conceptions.” On the other hand, there are enough ex- Calvin Thomas, The Life and Works of Friedrich Schiller (New York: Holt, 1906) 67-68. For centu- amples of Schiller’s surprising recklessness ries, critics have confused Schiller’s metaphorical in this regard. In his second dissertation, expression of the inexpressible with a genuine ex-

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paragraphs, an unrecognizable version of großherrlicher Plan” (the creator’s grand God the Creator appears in the equation: design; NA 20:8). All of these references he was inspired by endless love to create a are anchored in seven exhortations to world out of chaos, he was guided by end- worship “Weißheit,” which is a synonym less wisdom to give it order and harmony for “große Unendliche Natur” (great, infi- through immutable laws. Thus love and nite nature; NA 20:8) and “ewiges wisdom comprise God’s relationship to all Uhrwerk” (eternal clockwork; NA 20:8). creation, and virtue, the harmonious band The paragraph ends with a final command between love and wisdom, is the emulation to worship, love, wisdom, and “Tugend” of God (NA 20:4). Three paragraphs later, (virtue; NA 20:8). In the twentieth para- in the seventh paragraph, the highest graph, Schiller appeals to the “Göttin der “Gottheit” (deity; NA 20:5) is Jupiter. In Wohlthätigkeit” (Goddess of Charity; NA the fifteenth paragraph, Schiller addresses 20:8). There are perhaps as many as three an entirely nondescript God of Klopstock’s clear allusions to the New Testament, all of ode, “Für den König” (For the King; NA which, significantly, refer to the Sermon on 20:7, NA21:113). The eighteenth paragraph the Mount,39 where Christ appears more is dedicated to “Liebe” (love; NA 20:7), than elsewhere as a human teaching hu- which is first “die Krone der Tugend” (the mans and admonishing — in terms of crown of virtue; NA 20:7) and then separation of church and state, and in close “Erstgebohrne des Himmels” (heaven’s agreement with Schiller’s thesis regarding first-born; NA 20:7), and features four ex- ulterior motives — that hypocrites worship hortations to bow before this concept of in public displays of piety are at best ques- love, including one to nature, one to the tionable, and personal beliefs are best kept human, one to an angel, and one to all private.40 (NA 20:7-8). In the nineteenth paragraph, The most remarkable comment on vir- “Weißheit! Schönste Gespielin der Liebe” tue and religion comes in the final two (Wisdom! Most beautiful playmate of love) 39 appears as “das meisterwerk Gottes” “der Gottmensch auf dem Tabor” (NA 20:4); “ei- (God’s masterpiece) and “des Schöpffers ner mitleidigen Träne in Hütten geweint” (NA 20:5); and “Nein! Die Armen in den Hütten ruf ich itz auf […] Im Hertzen dieser dieser Unschuldigen pression of religious conviction, though, they pro- wird Franziskens Andenken herrlicher gefeyert, als vide no evidence why anyone might agree with durch die Pracht dieser Versammlung” (NA 20:9). them, aside from the fact that metaphors can be 40 Schiller is not alone in singling out the Sermon on vague. As in the Virtue Essay, Schiller’s more spiri- the Mount: “Deists like Jefferson and Franklin went tual outbursts are routinely accompanied by hereti- so far as to believe that the only thing worth keep- cal or blasphemous ideas. For a sampling of posi- ing of the Christian faith was the Sermon on the tions on Schiller and religion, see High, “Schiller Mount.” Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the and (no) Religion,” 144. American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992) 158.

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paragraphs (15-16) of the third segment former. There is no mention here of the (on moral resistance, paragraphs 12-16). ungodly to be blown away like chaff; on Again returning to “die ächte Tugend des the contrary, it is the heavens that will be Weisen” (the true virtue of the sage; NA blown away like chaff, and left standing 20:7) as a role model, Schiller switches will be the sage, Socrates, in his impenetra- metaphorical registers from the judgment ble virtue. Despite the practical limits of of a powerful Old Testament God — who freedom of speech at the Karlsschule, knows the source of all superficially good where daily prayer and an intensive cur- deeds at their conception and rewards or riculum in religion were mandatory, Christ punishes them before they reach fruition warrants little more than these few veiled (reminiscent of Socrates’ concept of retri- mentions in Schiller’s oeuvre, whereas bution in the here and now) — to the Socrates continues to be an important fig- power of virtue over the ever-changing ure, and Schiller’s introduction to the Vir- demands of gods throughout history and tue Speech implies that Socrates is most thus the ever-changing pseudo-virtue of sublime because of — not in spite of — his religion: “Ihm [dem Weisen] ist sie [die ignorance of Judeo-Christian revelation. Tugend] ein mächtiger Harnisch gegen- Throughout the essay, Christ is never trotzend den Donnern des Himmels ein mentioned by name. Of the positive role gewaltiger Schirm wenn zu Trümmern ge- models mentioned by name, Socrates, Ro- hen die Himmel, wie vor dem Winde Spreu man Emperor and stoic philosopher Marcus hinwegflattert” (For the sage, virtue is a Aurelius (121-180 CE; NA 20:8), who pro- mighty armor, defying the thunder of moted stoicism over Christianity, and heaven, a powerful shield when all the Cathmor, the paragon of virtue in James heavens fall to ruins, blown away like chaff Macpherson’s Ossian (1760; NA 20:8), all in the wind; NA 20:7). Note Schiller’s uses three are pagans. of “Himmel” as both a singular and a plural Schiller’s thesis in the Virtue Speech is noun. “Himmel” is a collective noun that that the realm of moral-political possibility already can mean “the heavens,” thus is polarized into fields of potential acts that Schiller’s unusual use of the plural form constitute virtue and result in moral happi- “die Himmel” would appear to indicate a ness (those of Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, coming age when all non-metaphorical and Cathmor) and those that constitute its concepts of the realm of gods will collapse. many perversions, selfish pursuits of per- To the question of whether the chaff in sonal happiness (those of Ravaillac and question is more inspired by Socrates or Catiline, Julius Caesar, Augustus Caesar, the Bible,41 the logic appears to indicate the

41 Psalms 1:4: “The ungodly are not so: but are like the chaff which the wind driveth away.”

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and Absolom).42 In essence, every day, to an audience. Second, the Virtue Essay is each individual has a fresh opportunity to the first writing by Schiller extant that ar- save or doom the forever-endangered po- ticulates the function of happiness in tential republic. This thesis demonstrates a Schiller’s moral-political theory in philoso- remarkable consistency over the final dec- phical terms. However, the political applica- ades of Schiller’s life, after his study of tion of Schiller’s happiness discourse is al- Kant and long after he famously expressed ready readily evident in his first published his disgust with the French Revolution, poem, “Der Abend” (At Dusk, 1777), in events often said to bring about changes in which Schiller refers to “andre, ach! glük- Schiller’s thought. In particular, the argu- sel’gre Welten” (other, oh! happier worlds; ments in the Virtue Speech and Schiller’s NA 1:3). It is evident from the description portrayal of Socrates as the ideal guaran- of the sun setting in Europe and rising tor of human happiness serve as important across the Atlantic that by “happier components of Schiller’s future moral- worlds” revolutionary North America is aesthetic writings. First, the choice of death intended, and that “happiness” here serves and freedom over life and servitude is the as the distinctive marker of the discourse lynchpin of Schiller’s aesthetic and drama of modern revolution. theory, since in this one extreme choice, In each of Schiller’s subsequent theo- the decision for death and freedom, the retical treatises, the end and the regulative victory of freedom over the slavery to the moral principle of humanity is autonomy desire to live is a universally moving expe- and happiness of the whole through rience and the most obvious and shocking autonomy and happiness of the individual. exercise of freedom that can be portrayed In the first chapter of his rejected first dis- sertation, Philosophie der Physiologie (Phi- 42 In Philosophische Briefe (Philosophical Letters; losophy of Physiology, 1779), Schiller 1786), that is, prior to the criticism of Don Karlos that prompted Schiller’s theoretical defense of Marquis again seeks to establish the destiny of hu- Posa’s inferred moral failure, and before Schiller mankind, and concludes, “Diß ist Glük- had read Kant, Schiller articulated the variations of seeligkeit” (This is happiness; NA 20:10- perversion with a new vocabulary, but with the 11).43 In the second Karlsschule speech, same parameters and results. Here the category “goodness in league with wisdom, but not with 43 love” (NA 20:5) of 1779 appears as “theoretical rea- Schiller also grounded his moral aesthetics in Phi- son” (theoretische Vernunft), an “incomplete en- losophie der Physiologie in Scottish terms closely re- lightenment” (“halbe Aufklärung”), which de- sembling Adam Ferguson’s gravitation analogy: cribes the state of the dangerous ideologue. In a “Was den Menschen jener Bestimmung näher further parallel, theoretical reason reconciled with bringt, es sei nun mittelbar oder unmittelbar, das sensual nature (“höchster Verstand”) is now “er- wird ihn ergözen. Was ihn von ihr entfernt, wird leuchtete Verstand” (enlightened reason; NA ihn schmerzen. Was ihn schmerzt, wird er meiden, 20:107). was ihn ergözt, danach wird er ringen” (That which

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“Die Tugend in ihren Folgen betrachtet” (The Stage Considered as Moral Institu- (The Consequences of Virtue Considered, tion) of 26 June 1784, the education of hu- 1779-80), Schiller asserts likewise in the mankind toward the ultimate goal of hap- first paragraph, that the source and the piness and autonomy via art is best consequences — the means and the ends achieved through the observable presenta- — of virtue are “Vollkommenheit” (per- tion of the stage: “Was wirkt die Bühne? fection) and “Glükseeligkeit” (happiness; Die höchste und lezte Foderung [...] Be- NA, 20:30), the same pair that appear in the förderung allgemeiner Glückseligkeit [...] same context in the fourth of the Ästhe- Menschen- und Volksbildung” (What does tische Briefe (Aesthetic Letters, 1795; NA the stage accomplish? The highest and ul- 20:354) and in Über Naive und Sentimenta- timate challenge […] the promotion of lische Dichtung (On Naive and Sentimental general happiness […] the education of the Poetry, 1795; NA 20:427-428). In Act III, individual and the people; NA 20:88). To Scene II of Die Räuber (The Robbers, this end, Schiller adds, the wise legislator 1781), Schiller’s main character Karl Moor introduces the stage in order to redirect asks the other robbers what is the measure the impulses and drives of the people into of humankind’s quest, and answers his “Quellen von Glückseligkeit” (sources of own question with, “das wunderseltsame happiness; NA 20:90). In Philosophische Wettrennen nach Glueckseligkeit” (the as- Briefe (Philosophical Letters, 1786), the tonishingly strange race toward happiness; path from mere belief to truth achieved NA 3:78). In Schiller’s speech Die through reason is a “Quelle von Glük- Schaubühne als moralische Anstalt betrachtet seligkeit” (source of happiness; NA 20:107). In Ueber die tragische Kunst (On brings the human closer to his destiny, either direct- Tragic Art, 1790-92) and in Ueber Anmuth ly or indirectly, will make him happy. That which und Würde (On Grace and Dignity, 1793), distances him from this goal will cause him pain. it is the “Glückseligkeitstrieb” (drive to That what hurts him, he will avoid, that which de- pursue happiness) that elicits feelings of de- lights him, he will pursue; NA 20:11). “[…] er [der sire and repulsion in the theater audience.44 Mensch] wird ewig wachsen, aber es [das Maas der In Ueber den Grund des Vergnügen an tra- Unendlichkeit] niemals erreichen” (he [the humam being] will always grow, but never achieve [the gischen Gegenständen (On the Reason for measure of infinity]; NA 20:10). Note that Schiller’s the Enjoyment of Tragic Objects, 1792) definition of the regulative idea here is a paraphrase Schiller writes: “Daß der Zweck der Natur of Mendelssohn’s Socrates: “[…] der Weg zu der- mit dem Menschen seine Glückseligkeit selben [Vollkommenheit] ist unendlich, kann in sey, [...] wird wohl niemand bezweifeln” Ewigkeiten nicht ganz zurückgelegt werden” ([…] the path to the same [perfection] is infinite, and can- not entirely be achieved in eternities; Mendelssohn, 44 NA 20:149 and NA 20:282. Cf. Hutcheson: Good 188). and Evil, VI, VII:261.

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(No one will doubt that [...] nature’s in- tivation) and “Verhandlungsart” (act it- tended end for humankind is its happiness; self), as well as “Inhalt” (motivation) and NA 20:133). It takes Schiller an entire two “Folgen” (consequences) of rebellion, and and a half sentences to get to the regula- employs the now sixteen-year-old “band tive idea of the Ästhetische Briefe, which is that unites wisdom and love” again in the “happiness.”45 context of rebellion, specifically the French Not only the end of all human pursuits Revolution, which demonstrates the dicta- is the same, but the path to happiness has torship of reason in its leaders, and the dic- proven surprisingly stable. When one tatorship of sensuality in its followers: compares the First Virtue Speech to the “Wenn die Kultur ausartet, so geht sie in later theoretical treatises, one finds the ar- eine weit bösartigere Verderbniß über, als guments from the former restated in new die Barbarey je erfahren kann. Der sinnli- contexts. In Ueber Anmuth und Würde che Mensch kann nicht tiefer als zum Thier (1793), Schiller articulates three possible herabsturzen” (When civilization degener- states of development; 1) dictatorship of ates, it falls into a much more malicious reason (Formtrieb) over sensuality state of decay than barbarism ever can. (Stofftrieb); 2) dictatorship of sensuality The sensual human being can’t fall any over reason; and 3) harmonious reconcilia- deeper than an animal state).46 The abstract tion of sensuality and reason and of duty theoretical human being, Schiller con- and inclination, which after some fourteen cludes, is capable of rationalizing diabolical years remains Schiller’s prerequisite for disregard for humanity. In the third of the virtue. In both the letters to Augustenburg Ästhetische Briefe, Schiller promotes the cul- and the Ästhetische Briefe, Schiller provides tivation of “den dritten Charakter” (the a direct comparison of the same two cate- third character), the medium between sen- gories of perversion. In his letter to sual and rational nature. In a political con- Augustenburg of 13 July 1793 and in the text, the harmonic third character recon- Ästhetische Briefe, Schiller describes the ciles the sensual “Herrschaft bloßer paradoxical gulf between the “Inhalt” (mo- Kräfte” (rule of mere might) of the “Not- staat” or “Naturstaat” (state of nature)

45 “Glückseligkeit” is no less than the stated end to with the rational “Herrschaft der Gesetze” be pursued in the first paragraph of the Ästhetische (rule of law) of the “Vernunftstaat” (state Briefe (1795). Indeed, it is the thirteenth word of the first sentence of content after the dedication: “Ich werde von einem Gegenstande sprechen, der mit 46 NA 26:263. Presumably in the summer of 1793, dem beßten Theil unsrer Glückseligkeit in einer Schiller wrote the undated note entitled Methode, in unmittelbaren, und mit dem moralischen Adel der which he wrote: “Der Mensch ist mächtig, gewalt- menschlichen Natur in keiner sehr entfernten Ver- sam, er ist listig und kann geistreich seyn lang eh er bindung steht” (NA 20: 309). vernünftig wird” (NA 21:90).

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of reason; NA 20:315). In the fourth of the Schiller formulates in the fourth of the Äs- Ästhetische Briefe, Schiller concludes that thetische Briefe: “Totalität des Charakters the lack of the third character made the muß also bey dem Volke gefunden wer- terror of the French Revolution not only den, welches fähig und würdig seyn soll, possible but fairly unavoidable: “Soviel ist den Staat der Noth mit dem Staat der gewiß: nur das Uebergewicht eines solchen Freyheit zu vertauschen” (Totality of [dritten] Charakters bey einem Volk kann character must be found in the people who eine Staatsverwandlung nach moralischen would be capable and worthy of exchang- Principien unschädlich machen, und auch ing the state of necessity with the state of nur ein solcher Charakter kann ihre Dauer freedom; NA 20:318). Indeed, in each of verbürgen” (So much is certain: only the Schiller’s treatises from 1779-1795, the end preponderance of such a third character in and the regulative moral principle of hu- a people can render a change of govern- manity is autonomy and happiness of the ment harmless, and also only such a char- whole through autonomy and happiness of acter can guarantee its endurance.”47 Also the individual. Socrates appears as an ex- in the fourth letter, Schiller again returns ample in four of them. to the triadic model of totality and perver- sion of 1779: “Der Mensch kann sich aber III. Socrates in Schiller’s auf eine doppelte Weise entgegen gesetzt Subsequent Works sein: entweder als Wilder, wenn seine Ge- fühle über seine Grundsätze herrschen; iven the consistency of Schiller’s oder als Barbar, wenn seine Grundsätze theory of the autonomy required seine Gefühle zerstören” (The human be- for self-governing, proceeding ing can work against himself in a twofold Gfrom the dedication to “happiness” to sense: either as a savage, when his feelings “wisdom in league with love” and “totality rule over his principles; or as a barbarian, of character” embodied foremost in Socra- when his principles destroy his feelings; tes, it is hardly surprising to find Socrates NA 20:318). The reconciliation of these as the paradigmatic sublime hero of wis- two inclinations is “Totalität des Charak- dom in the poem “Rousseau” (1782) and ters” (totality of character; NA 20:318), the four further aesthetic treatises: Brief eines ennobled state of reason, which is the pre- reisenden Dänen (Letter of a Traveling requisite for a political state of freedom, as Dane, 1785), Über die tragische Kunst (On Tragic Art, 1791), the Ästhetische Briefe 47 NA 20:315. See the discussion of the Ästhetische (Aesthetic Letters, 1795), and Über Naive Briefe by Nicholas Martin, who compares these ex- und Sentimentalische Dichtung (On Naive cerpts. Nicholas Martin, Schiller and Nietzsche. Un- timely Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) and Sentimental Poetry, 1795). In 1782, 72. Schiller produces a blasphemous compari-

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son of Socrates, Christ, and Rousseau in speculation from Christianity in Emile, his early poem, “Rousseau.”48 Regarding much as Jefferson would do later in the Rousseau’s persecution by his own coun- Jefferson Bible, addressed in the next unit. trymen, Schiller draws a remarkable paral- In the sixth stanza of Schiller’s poem, horns lel between Socrates’ death at the hands of signal Judgment Day and the resurrection the sophists and, according to Schiller’s of the dead Rousseau, and in the tenth portrayal, Rousseau’s death at the hands stanza, Schiller makes a sarcastic reference of Christians, as two cases of collusion of to the eighteen centuries to pass without politics and religious orthodoxy: “Wann improvement since Christ’s birth, for, as wird doch die alte Wunde narben? / Einst revealed with bitter irony in the final war’s finster — und die Weisen starben! / stanza, Rousseau, like Socrates, was one in Nun ist’s lichter, — und der Weise stirbt. / a series of Christ-like martyrs: “Rousseau Sokrates ging unter durch Sophisten, / doch du warst ein Christ,” a play on the Roußeau leidet — Roußeau fällt durch German word “Christ,” which can mean Christen, / Rousseau — der aus Christen here either “Rousseau, you, too, were a Menschen wirbt” (When will ancient Christian,” or “Rousseau, you, too, were a wounds be healed? / Once was dark — Christ” (NA 1:63). Given the context and and the wise men died! / Now is lighter, — the earlier comparison to Socrates, the text and the wise man dies. / Socrates was makes entirely more sense with the latter. brought down by sophists,/ Rousseau suf- Schiller features Socrates’ wisdom and fers — falls at the hands of Christians, / his willingness to die for his principles in Rousseau — who sought to make Chris- four further works on aesthetics and mo- tians humans!; NA 1:62). Rousseau was rality between 1786 and 1795. In “Brief specifically persecuted for removing divine eines reisenden Dänen,” Socrates appears again as a role model for freedom. Socra- 48 Calvin Thomas notes: “Schiller seems to have got tes, who “für seine Weißheit starb” (died his idea of Rousseau chiefly from H. P. [Helfrich for his wisdom; NA 20:106), is not only a Peter] Sturz’s Denkwürdigkeiten von Johann Jakob reminder of a better Greece, but “eine Rousseau (1779),” from which Thomas cites Rous- Ausfoderung dieses Volks an alle Völker seau’s recollection of his persecution for his criti- cism of the papacy and of religious orthodoxy first der Erde” (a challenge by the Greeks to all by the Parisian parliament, then by the city council peoples of the earth; NA 20:106). The key of Geneva, the Protestant minister of a village, and to the achievements of ancient Greece lie finally in Bern (Thomas 67-68). See also Helfrich not in the artworks themselves, but in the Peter Sturz, “Denkwürdigkeiten von Johann Jakob philosophy that informed them, a philoso- Rousseau” in Schriften von Helfrich Peter Sturz (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1779) 129-179, here 150-168. phy that accepted that the human being Sturz compares Rousseau to Socrates on page 179 of could strive to be “mehr als er selbst war” his essay (NA 2IIA:63). (more than he was; NA 20:105), and al-

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lowed the thinker “jede Spekulation über den schrecklichen Glückswechsel eines die Fortdauer der Seele ersparen” (to Darius zu Thränen hingerissen zu werden” spare himself any speculation about the af- (Conversely, one needs only to be a hu- terlife of the soul; NA 20: 105). Without man being to be moved to the great emo- the moral distraction of the Christian con- tion by the heroic sacrifice of a Leonidas, cept of the afterlife — an incentive to be- by the quiet humility of an Aristides, by the have virtuously for selfish reasons, “ein voluntary death of a Socrates; or to be Surrogat der wahren Tugend” (a surro- moved to tears by the terrible turn of for- gate for true virtue; NA 26:330-31) — the tune of a Darius; NA 20:161). In the Ästhe- Greeks were more free to focus on actual tische Briefe, Socrates, along with the last virtue: “Die Griechen philosophierten honest politician Phocion (402-318 BCE), trostlos, glaubten noch trostloser, und represents one of two isolated exceptions handelten — gewiß nicht minder edel als to a Greek culture civilized and alienated wir” (The Greeks philosophized without from nature to the point of near universal comfort, held even less comforting beliefs, superficiality and dishonesty (NA 20:338- and acted — certainly no less noble than 339): “Als unter dem Perikles und Alexan- we do; NA 20:105). In Über die tragische der das golden Alter der Künste herbey- Kunst (On Tragic Art, 1791), Schiller ex- kam, und die Herrschaft des Geschmacks plains the importance of universality in the sich allgemeiner verbreitete, findet man choice of tragic subjects for the theater, Griechenlands Kraft und Freyheit nicht addressing grades of truth from subjective mehr, die Beredtsamkeit verfälschte die to objective, and arguing of the subjective Wahrheit, die Weisheit beleidigte in dem class that in order to understand a Ro- Mund eines Sokrates, und die Tugend in man’s response to the judgment of Brutus dem Leben eines Phocion” (When under or the suicide of Cato, one would have to Pericles and Alexander the golden age of be a Roman. Thus the portrayal of an arts arrived, and refined taste expanded its event of subjective significance that re- reign more generally, one no longer finds quires insider knowledge is likely to have the strength and freedom of Greece; elo- “einen engeren Wirkungskreis” (a more quence made falsehood truth, and the wis- select sphere of influence; NA 20:161). Of dom that came from the lips of a Socrates, the objectively tragic, Schiller writes: the virtue displayed in the life of a Pho- “Hingegen braucht man bloß Mensch cion, became merely offensive; NA 20:339). überhaupt zu seyn, um durch die helden- In Über Naive und Sentimentalische Dichtung müthige Aufopferung eines Leonidas, (On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, 1795), durch die ruhige Ergebung eines Aristid, Schiller argues that even in the satirical durch den freywilligen Tod eines Sokrates portrayals of Socrates by Aristophanes in eine hohe Rührung versetzt, um durch (448-380 BCE) and Lucian of Samosata

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(125-180 CE), the attack on the reason of IV. A Survey of Schiller’s Contem- Socrates says more about his critics than poraries on the Secularist Function about him: “Selbst durch den boshaften of Socrates Scherz, womit sowohl Lucian als Aristo- phanes den Sokrates mißhandeln, blickt enjamin Franklin’s list of 13 main eine ernste Vernunft hervor, welche die virtues, the thirteenth of which re- Wahrheit an dem Sophisten rächt, und für gards Humility, features a common ein Ideal streitet, das sie nur nicht immer pairB of Late Enlightenment role models: ausspricht” (Even amid the mean-spirited “13. Humility: Imitate Jesus and Socrates” parody, to which Lucien and Aristophanes (Franklin, 38). As Franklin himself docu- subject Socrates, serious reason peaks mented, he was not a Christian, but a deist. through, the truth of which betrays the In his letter to Ezra Stiles of 9 March 1790, sophist and fights for an ideal not even Franklin outlines his attitude towards necessarily addressed; NA 20:447). In The Christ and Christianity, stressing that he Clouds (423 BCE), Aristophanes caricatures admires Christ the moral philosopher, Socrates as a clownish sophist, which Plato while indicating that he has no interest in mentions in The Apology as a contributing “his Religion”: factor in the atmosphere that led to Socra- tes’ trial and suicide.49 As to Jesus of Nazareth, my opinion of whom you particularly desire, I think his system of morals and his religion, as he left them to us, the best the world ever saw or is like to see; but I apprehend it has re-

49 ceived various corrupting changes, and I have, Lucian not only satirizes Socrates in The Passing of with most of the present dissenters in England, Peregrinus (165 CE), in which Peregrinus appears as some doubts as to his divinity; though it is a ques- the new Socrates, but also dismisses Christ and tion I do not dogmatize upon, having never studied Christianity in terms that parallel those of late En- it, and think it needless to busy myself with it now, lightenment critics: “The poor wretches have con- when I expect soon an opportunity of knowing the vinced themselves, first and foremost, that they are truth with less trouble. I see no harm, however, in going to be immortal and live for all time, in conse- its being believed, if that belief has the good conse- quence of which they despise death and even will- quence, as probably it has, of making his doctrines ingly give themselves into custody, most of them. more respected and more observed; especially as I Furthermore, their first lawgiver persuaded them that do not perceive that the Supreme takes it amiss, by they are all brothers of one another after they have distinguishing the unbelievers, in his government transgressed once for all by denying the Greek gods of the world, with any peculiar marks of his dis- and by worshipping that crucified sophist himself and pleasure.50 living under his laws.” A. M. Harmon, Lucian, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1936) 15. See Robert E. Van Voorst, Jesus Outside the New Testament: An In- 50 John Bigelow, ed., The Complete Works of Ben- troduction to the Ancient Evidence (Grand Rapids, MI: jamin Franklin (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000) 59. 1888) vol. 10, 192-195. Here 194.

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Franklin’s brief response to Stiles’ question destructive at the macro-level on two constitutes substantially more than a polite fronts, both deriving from Christ’s divin- expression of distance toward Christianity. ity, namely, the perpetuation of an un- First, Franklin writes that he considers founded belief in the supernatural, and the Christ’s moral philosophy and “his Relig- coercive relationship between a god of re- ion” to be without equal. It is, however, ward and punishment and its worshippers. impossible to reconcile the common usage This rule of superstition and fear is com- of the term “religion,” as opposed to phi- pounded by Christian intrusion in political losophy, with the sentiments that Franklin affairs and the personal lives of others, a delivers next. Franklin questions the divin- development Georg Wilhelm Friedrich ity of Christ without interest in researching Hegel (1770-1831) calls the “failure” of the matter, and, in agreement with Socra- Christ, which he specifically contrasts with tes, he does not believe that a supreme be- the success of Socrates. In the Berner Frag- ing would take any interest in whether an mente (1793-1794), Hegel emphasizes the individual believes in any religion, much importance of the written word for the less in a specific religion. Both of these po- spread of a folk religion (Volksreligion) and sitions stand in stark contrast to Christian- blames Christ’s followers for misunder- ity as articulated in quotes attributed to standing Christ’s mission as a symbolic and Christ in the Bible, the only canonical hegemonic campaign of formal conversion source. Franklin summarily offers the con- to adherence (Sittenlehre), rather than a ditional proposition that he would see no pedagogical and missionary program of harm in Christianity, if its consequences practical morality. As Joshua D. Goldstein were good, that is, if its adherents ob- summarizes, “The educational success of served the teachings of Christ specifically, Socrates, and the failure of Christ” results but not necessary those of the apostles or in a “new sectarianism and estrangement Church leaders. Franklin never mentions from others.”51 Of Hegel’s Berner Fragmente the Christian churches in the letter. Most and “Die Positivität der christlichen Relig- significantly, Franklin’s approval of ion” (The Positivity of the Christian Relig- Christ’s moral philosophy without his di- ion; 1795/1796), Frederick C. Beiser writes vinity, the sine qua non of his promise of an that morality is not possible without afterlife, reduces Christ himself to a Secu- autonomy, which is why Hegel considers lar Jesus (like Socrates). A number of Socrates the better moral teacher: “While Franklin’s younger contemporaries fo- cused less on the possibility that Christian- 51 Joshua D. Goldstein, Hegel’s Idea of the Good Life: ity could still have a civilizing effect at the From Virtue to Freedom. Early Writings and Mature micro-level, and more on the belief that Political Philosophy (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Christianity as a belief system had proven Springer, 2006) 51.

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Socrates respects the freedom of the indi- some extent fatal foray into eudemonism.54 vidual, his right to find the truth for him- In March 1799, Kleist, a political liberal and self, Jesus preaches a prescribed path to- then still a Christian-oriented free thinker, ward salvation. […] Socrates knows that articulated the tragically flawed philosophy he is no better than anyone else; but Christ expressed in “Aufsatz, den sichern Weg regards himself as a savior.” In short, the des Glücks zu finden und ungestört – auch Catholic replacement of virtue with compli- unter den größten Drangsälen des Lebens ance means that expiatory sacrifice and — ihn zu genießen!” (Essay on the Most undeserved eternal life necessarily com- Certain Way to find Happiness, And — prise a dual insult to the republican free- Even Amidst Life’s Greatest Hardships – dom of the virtuous human being, while How to Appreciate the Journey Unde- for Christian sinners of competing de- terred, 1799) as well as in a lengthy letter nominations, there is either hell to fear or to his former tutor, Christian Ernst Mar- no reason at all to see Christianity as a phi- tini, of 18 (and 19) March 1799. Kleist’s “life losophy of virtue, but rather one of mere plan”55 is supported by two pillars that obedience.52 Consequently, by the 1790s, in would prove to be fundamentally incom- accordance with Mendelssohn’s description patible, the (deist/agnostic/atheist) En- of “mob delusion” and political collusion lightenment concept of political happiness- (Mendelssohn 27), even a secularized ver- sion of Christ is established as a problem- 54 The following paragraph on Kleist is based on the atic solution for a political Age of Reason. arguments in Jeffrey L. High, “Schiller, Freude As Germany’s most prominent propo- Kleist and Rache / On the German Freedom Ode,” nent of the Scottish Enlightenment’s hap- in Dieter Sevin and Christoph Zeller, eds., Heinrich piness discourses53 and one of Heinrich von von Kleist – Style and Concept: Explorations in Liter- ary Dissonance (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2013 Kleist’s (1777-1810) most frequent sources, forthcoming) 123-145. Schiller appears to be the most likely inspi- 55 In May 1799, Kleist wrote the related “Lebens- ration for Kleist’s brief and certainly to plan” letter to his step-sister Ulrike, in which the quest for truth through reason (“Gründe der Vernunft”; Kleist II:489) will lead to virtue, and virtue in turn will lead to happiness. The project is still informed by a belief in life after death: “Denn 52 Frederick C. Beiser, Hegel (New York and Lon- schon die Bibel sagt, willst du das Himmelreich don: Routledge, 2005) 129-130. erwerben, so lege selbst Hand an” (For, as the Bible 53 See Jeffrey L. High, “Schillers Unabhängigkeits- says, if you want to enter the kingdom of heaven, erklärungen: die niederländische Plakkaat van Ver- begin working to that end). Heinrich von Kleist, latinge, der ‘amerikanische Krieg’ und die unzeit- Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, 2 vols., ed. Helmut gemäße Rhetorik des Marquis Posa,” in Jahrbuch Sembdner (Munich: Hanser, 1984), volume II, page der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft (Göttingen: Wall- 489. Subsequent citations as “Kleist” with volume stein Verlag, 2010) 80-108. and page number(s).

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through-reason and Christian faith. In struct remarkably similar to Schiller’s in- basing the pursuit of happiness on the re- troduction of Socrates: “[…] blicken Sie wards of virtue, in aesthetic education einmal zweitausend Jahre in die Vergan- through observing “moral beauty” (Kleist genheit zurück, auf jenen besten und II:305), in his prison and chain metaphors edelsten der Menschen, […] auf Christus” (Kleist II:305), transplanted flora metaphor (Look back into History 2000 years, to that (Kleist II:311); in his quotes from Schiller’s best and most noble human being […] to “Briefe über Don Karlos” (1787, Letters on Christ; Kleist II:306).58 In the final three Don Karlos) and “Die Schaubühne als pages of his essay, Kleist returns to role Moralische Anstalt;” in the “virtue un- models for virtue, twice invoking Christ tested” turn from Schiller’s “Der Verbre- and Socrates in the same passage (Kleist cher aus verlorener Ehre” (The Criminal II:314). Kleist’s evident intent is to inject of Lost Honor; Kleist II:312), in allusions religion into a philosophy of happiness to “Der Ring des Polykrates” and “Die (through virtue governed by reason), Götter Griechenlands,” for which latter from which it had only recently been re- Schiller was accused of blasphemy in 1788,56 moved, due to its self-evident incompatibil- Kleist runs an almost unadulterated ity with, if not hostility toward, reason and Schillerian program of happiness, with one the happiness of Others (in both the remarkable, and not entirely coincidental, Hegelian and Lacanian senses of the term). exception. In the two introductory para- Kleist’s attempt to erect twin towers of vir- graphs of the First Virtue Speech, Schiller tue in Socrates and Christ stands in stark articulates the thesis that the means, disin- contrast to Schiller’s definitive statements terested virtue (“Tugend,” mentioned five on conflating reason with religion, among times), results in the end, happiness many others, those in Philosophische Briefe,59 (“Glückseligkeit,” three times), before in- a work that clearly did inform Kleist’s es- troducing his historical role model, Socra- tes (NA 20:3). Although it is very unlikely 58 Ironically, Kleist concludes his contribution to the that Kleist had read Schiller’s First Virtue dueling martyrs debate with a Schiller quote regard- Speech, Kleist supports the thesis of his ing yet another secular Socrates/Christ typology, Schiller’s Marquis Posa in the drama Don Karlos own happiness essay — the end happiness (1787): “Unrecht leiden schmeichelt große Seelen” is achieved through the means, disinter- (Suffering is flattering to great souls; Kleist II:305). ested virtue57 — with an alternative con- 59 See for example, Julius to Raphael: “Du hast mir den Glauben gestohlen, der mir Frieden gab. […] 56 See High, “Friedrich Schiller, Secular Virtue, Tausend Dinge waren mir so ehrwürdig, ehe deine and ‘The Gods of Ancient Greece.’” traurige Weisheit sie mir entleideten” (You stole 57 Kleist II:302-303. In the letter to Martini, the my faith, that gave me peace […] A thousand things phrase is “die Tugend allein um der Tugend willen” were so venerable to me, before your dreary wis- (virtue for virtue’s sake; Kleist II:475). dom exposed them to me; NA 20:110).

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say. By 1801, Kleist testifies that he had scheint. Ist das letzte, so ist die Wahrheit, discovered the fault line between reason die wir hier sammeln, nach dem Tode nicht and religion and concludes, based on his mehr — und alles Bestreben, ein Eigentum understanding of Kant’s view of subjectiv- sich zu erwerben, das uns auch in das Grab ity, that the impossibility of knowledge of folgt, ist vergeblich —” (We cannot decide the afterlife has reduced the Lebensplan and whether that, which we call truth is truly the certain path to happiness to rubble: truth, or whether if it only seems so to us. “Seit diese Überzeugung, nämlich, daß If it is the latter, then the truth that we hienieden keine Wahrheit zu finden ist, gather here is nothing after death — and […] war der einzige Gedanke, den meine all our striving to acquire anything we can Seele in diesem äußeren Tumulte mit take to the grave, is in vain —” (Kleist glühender Angst bearbeitete, immer nur II:634). dieser: dein einziges, dein höchstes Ziel ist Joseph Priestley’s (1733-1804) Socrates gesunken” (Since this conviction — that and Jesus Compared (1803)62 is an early ex- no truth is discoverable here on earth — ample of the new dualist heresy of compar- […] in all this outer tumult the one ing the relative merits of the mortal Socra- thought working and burning in my anx- tes with those of the unquestioned son of ious soul was this: your highest and only god. Priestley’s book is dedicated to his goal in life has sunk.”60 As a result, Kleist friend Joshua Toulmin, himself the author arrives at a new position, namely that the of a book chapter on the “respective excel- subjectivity of “Wahrheit und Bildung” lencies” of “Christ and Socrates” (1785),63 (truth and education; Kleist II:633) cannot in which Socrates is ultimately declared be uncritically fused with an even less reli- lacking in the categories of polytheism able Christian vision of heavenly reward (Toulmin, 192), “divine commission,” and then recast as a coherent personal re- prophecies, and miracles (Toulmin, 193): ligion (“eine eigene Religion”; Kleist “Here the character of the philosopher, is II:633). Ergo all speculation about the af- eclipsed by the superior greatness of the terlife, which had been the goal of Kleist’s Son of God, and the Saviour of the World” exercise of earthly virtue to begin with,61 is (Toulmin, 193). Citing Rousseau’s Emile, fruitless: “Wir können nicht entscheiden, ob das, was wir Wahrheit nennen, wahr- 62 Joseph Priestley, Socrates and Jesus Compared haft Wahrheit ist, oder ob es uns nur so (Philadelphia: P. Byrne, 1803). 63 “Dissertation VIII. Christ and Socrates,” in Dis- 60 Kleist’s letter to Wilhelmine von Zenge of 22 sertations on the Internal Evidences and Excellence of March 1801 (Kleist II:634). Christianity: And on the Character of Christ, Compared 61 See Kleist’s letter to Wilhelmine von Zenge of 22 with that of Some Other Celebrated Founders of Relig- March 1801 on his concept of the afterlife (Kleist ion and Philosophy (London: J. Johnson, 1785) 169- II:633). 194. Here 170.

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Toulmin concludes that Socrates’ time has bringing and college. Priestley marvels passed: “Let Socrates retire at his [Christ’s] over Christ’s literacy and rhetorical confi- coming, and leave the chair of instruction dence, as if these were not to be expected vacant for a greater teacher than himself” from one who can claim, “All power is (185). Socrates’ retirement, however, was given unto me in heaven and in earth” evidently premature. Given its proximity (Priestley, 38), while he belittles the “ex- to Toulmin’s attempt, Priestley’s apology ceedingly trifling” (Priestley, 41) dis- for “important Christian truth” (Dedica- courses of the heathen, mocking Socrates’ tion) appears redundant and superfluous relatively comfortable patrician death, in on its face. Yet Priestley’s vehemence contrast to Christ’s more sublime readiness demonstrates how much ground Socrates to suffer a death both “painful and igno- had gained on Christ in the second half of minious” (Priestley, 42). the eighteenth century. In fact, Priestley Upon completion of his book, Priestley makes some curious concessions, in which immediately sent a copy to the President of Socrates actually measures up to Christ: the United States, Thomas Jefferson, who “Both of them were friends of virtue, and had clearly already given the subject some laboured to promote it […] Both the dis- thought, and would continue to do so over courses and the general manner of life of the next two decades. Jefferson’s ideas on Socrates and Jesus have an obvious re- Christ, religion, and the creator are wide- semblance, as they both went about gratui- ranging, erudite, and articulated at some tously doing good […] with respect to length, thus, the following will be limited to natural capacity, he [Socrates] was proba- a brief summary of his secularist work and bly equal to Jesus” (Priestley, 36). Ulti- his comparisons of Socrates and Christ. It mately, however, while ostensibly compar- was Jefferson who had provided “The ing Socrates and Christ on an even playing Declaration of Independence” with its deist field, Priestley repeatedly points out that register and blurred its two references to a the son of god is more impressive than the supreme being to “the Creator” and “na- “heathen,” “polytheist,” “idolater” (Priest- ture’s God,” terms distinct from those of ley, 4-5) philosopher. Priestley praises the Christian orthodoxy. It was also Jefferson “miracles” (Priestley, 38), “extraordinary who wrote the “Virginia Statute on Relig- authority” (Priestley, 40), and “the great ious Freedom” of 1779, which provided the superiority of the system of religious language for the First Amendment to the truth” Christ enjoys in monotheism, while US Constitution (1791), in which the bemoaning the comparative advantage of “separation of Church and State” is implied Socrates’ upbringing and education to and de facto codified. In Paris in 1787, Jef- those of the son of god, who, one would ferson had marveled at the unveiling of think, could do without a middle class up- Jacques Louis David’s “Death of Socrates”

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(La Morte de Socrates, 1787), one in a se- thagoras, Socrates, Epicurus, Cicero, ries of significant Socrates paintings from Epictetus, Seneca, Antoninus” (Jefferson, the eighteenth century.64 One of the earli- 381). In contrast to those of Priestley, Jef- est mentions of Priestley’s book is in Jef- ferson’s remarks on Christ’s poverty and ferson’s letter to Benjamin Rush of 21 April lack of formal education make perfect 1803, in which Jefferson declares his alle- sense, since he is clear that he is talking giance to a secularized Christ: “I am a about a man, and not the son of God: “The Christian, in the only sense in which he question of his being a member of the [Christ] wished any one to be; sincerely at- Godhead, or in direct communication with tached to his doctrines, in preference to all it, claimed for him by some of his followers, others; ascribing to himself every human and denied by others, is foreign to the pre- excellence; and believing he never claimed sent view, which is merely an estimate of any other.”65 Thus the condition of Jeffer- the intrinsic merits of his doctrines.” Jeffer- son’s attraction to Christ is Christ’s hu- son’s letter to Priestley of 9 April 1803 manity, and his interest purely philosophi- marks the first of his three significant re- cal. Attached to the letter is a brief outline sponses. Aside from his first response, his entitled “Syllabus of an Estimate of the vague praise of Priestley’s work, Jefferson Merit of the Doctrines of Jesus, compared writes at length in his second response, his with those of others,” which regards the own goal to fulfill the idea of the syllabus following philosophers: “particularly Py- mentioned above, including one point of contrast with Priestley’s book: “This view 64 Giambettino Cignaroli (1706-1770), also known would purposely omit the question of his for his portrayal of another Enlightenment hero divinity, and even his inspiration” (Jeffer- from antiquity in his “Death of Cato” of 1759, painted his “Death of Socrates” in the same year;64 son, 375). and Jacques-Philip-Joseph de Saint-Quentin (1738- During the same period, Jefferson be- ?) won the Grand Prix de l’Académie Royale with gan work on the third response, the phi- his “The Death of Socrates” in 1762, the first year in losophical experiment that he would com- which antique rather than biblical entries were solic- plete in 1819 or 1820, The Life and Morals of ited. Evidently George Washington disagreed with Jesus of Nazareth, commonly known as Schiller’s assessment of the limited appeal of the death of Roman Senator Marcus Porcius Cato (95- “The Jefferson Bible”: “It is a paradigma of 46 BCE), perhaps a reaction to Gottsched’s tragedy, his doctrines, made by cutting the texts out Der sterbende Cato (1731/1732); Washington orga- of the book and arranging them on the nized a performance of Addisson’s Cato (1713) for pages of a blank book.” The project is un- the Continental Army at Valley Forge in 1778. dertaken in the spirit of his letter to Wil- 65 Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Library Edi- liam Short of 4 August 1820, in which he tion (Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson describes the challenge of removing from Memorial Association, 1903) 380. the New Testament “the follies, the false-

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hoods and the charlatanisms” of Christ’s a special superintending providence.66 biographers, and their “groundwork of vulgar ignorance, of things impossible, of On the contrary, in the same letter to Wil- superstitions, fanaticisms and fabrications,” liam Short cited above, Jefferson provides including Christ’s divinity, and leaving insight into his materialist understanding only about fifty full book pages of the of (his) Socrates by entirely disqualifying “sublime ideas of the Supreme Being, Plato for an inconsistent and implausible 67 aphorisms and precepts of the purest mo- spiritual portrayal of Socrates. Jefferson’s rality and benevolence, sanctioned by a life de-spritualization of Socrates bears strong of humility, innocence and simplicity of similarities to his dogged dedication to sys- manners, neglect of riches, absence of tematically cutting away the divinity of worldly ambition and honors, with an elo- Christ. In the same vein, and again, in a quence and persuasiveness which have not comparison of Socrates and Christ, Jeffer- been surpassed” (Jefferson, 1436). son dismisses the very divine foundations In 1813, Jefferson refers to both the of Christianity in defense of his Secular Je- “Syllabus” and the “Jefferson Bible” in a sus: letter to John Adams, in which Jefferson again demonstrates his practice of ignoring That Jesus did not mean to impose himself on man- kind as the son of God, physically speaking, I have the commentary of intermediaries, even been convinced by the writings of men more when they are the only sources. Thus, learned than myself in that lore. But that he might Plato’s depiction of Socrates’ religiosity in conscientiously believe himself inspired from The Apology and Xenophon’s depiction of above, is very possible. The whole religion of the the same in Memorabilia merit no consid- Jews, inculcated on him from his infancy, was founded in the belief of divine inspiration. The eration in Jefferson’s dismissal of the pos- sibility that Socrates believed in a spiritual 66 The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Corre- realm: spondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, Lester J. Cappon, ed., (Chapel Hill and An expression in your letter of Sep. 14 that “the hu- London: University of North Carolina Press, 1987) man understanding is a revelation from it’s maker” 385. gives the best solution, that I believe can be given, 67 “So again, the superlative wisdom of Socrates is of the question, What did Socrates mean by his testified by all antiquity, and placed on ground not Daemon? He was too wise to believe, and too hon- to be questioned. When, therefore, Plato puts into est to pretend that he had real and familiar converse his mouth such paralogisms, such quibbles on with a superior and invisible being. He probably words, and sophisms, as a school boy would be considered the suggestions of his conscience, or ashamed of, we conclude they were the whimsies of reason, as revelations, or inspirations from the Su- Plato’s own foggy brain, and acquit Socrates of pu- preme mind, bestowed, on important occasions, by erilities so unlike his character.” Merrill D. Peter- son, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: Li- brary of America, 1994) 1435.

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fumes of the most disordered imaginations were re- small minority of which find comparable corded in their religious code, as special communi- merit in Socrates. In 1821, Percy Bysche cations of the Deity […] Elevated by the enthusi- asm of a warm and pure heart, conscious of the high Shelly (1792-1822), the author of “The strains of an eloquence which had not been taught Necessity of Atheism” (1811), published his him, he might readily mistake the coruscations of similarly heretical “Epipsychidion: Pas- his own fine genius for inspirations of an higher or- sages Of The Poem, Or Connected der. This belief carried, therefore, no more personal Therewith,” citing Socrates and Christ as imputation, than the belief of Socrates, that himself was under the care and admonitions of a guardian his authorities on the morality of free love: Dæmon. And how many of our wisest men still be- “And Socrates, the Jesus Christ of Greece, lieve in the reality of these inspirations, while per- / And Jesus Christ Himself, did never fectly sane on all other subjects. (Jefferson, 1436) cease / To urge all living things to love each other, / And to forgive their mutual In other words, Jefferson, who is a serious faults, and smother / The Devil of disun- devotee of the moral philosophy of Christ, ion in their souls.” writes that it is insane to believe in the di- In 1854, theologian and philosopher vinity of Christ. As M. Andrew Holowchak Robert William Mackay (1803-1882) cap- concludes: “Christ is, to Jefferson, an his- tures more the essence of the cases made torical figure, and he and his teachings are by Schiller and his contemporaries: matters for historians and ethicians, not 68 opportunistic theologians.” The Christian movement was, in many respects, The nineteenth and early twentieth analogous to the philosophic movement begun with centuries witnessed a deluge of compari- Socrates. […] The one effected practically what the sons of Socrates and Christ,69 only the other sought theoretically. The initial Christian re-

68 M. Andrew Holowchak, “Jefferson and Jesus,” in (October 15, 1925) 1269-1270; William Riley Van Dutiful Correspondent: Philosophical Essays on Tho- Buskirk, William Riley, Saviors of Mankind: Lao- mas Jefferson (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Litle- Tze, Confucius, Gautama, Zoroaster, Aakhnaton, field Publishers, 2013) 93-110, here 102. Moses, Isaiah of Babylon, Socrates, Jesus of Naz- 69 See for example Gladys M. Wauchope, “Socrates areth, Saul of Tarsus, and Mahomet (New York: and Jesus: their trials and deaths,” in London Quar- Macmillan, 1929); Adelaide P. Bostick, “A com- terly Review (London, England: 1862) 157, (April parison of the portrait of Jesus in the Gospels with 1932) 171-181; Paul Carus, “Socrates: A Forerun- the portrait of Socrates in the writings of Plato and ner of Christianity,” in The Open Court, vol. 21 Xenophon,” in Journal Of The National Association (September 1907) 523-527; William Ellery Leonard, Of Biblical Instructors, Vol. 3, no. 2 (January 1, Socrates: Master of Life (Chicago: Open Court Pub- 1935) 94-101; Michael Tierney, “Socrates and His lishing, 1915); R. Goldwin Smith, “Christ and Soc- Message,” in Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. rates,” in Canadian Magazine 45 (October 1915) 477- 33, No. 132 (December, 1944) 487-497; George M. 484; William F. Bostick, “Jesus and Socrates,” A. Hanfmann, “Socrates and Christ,” in Harvard in The Biblical World, Vol. 47, No. 4 (April, 1916) Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 60 (1951) 205- 248-252; “Socrates or Jesus?” in Christian Century 42 233.

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quirement, repentance (μετάνοια), the establish- sons of Socrates and Christ marks a return ment of a condition of mind and feeling “fit for the to pre-Enlightenment religious-intellectual kingdom of heaven,” was the necessary practical orthodoxy. In 1889, R. M. Wenley prefaces result of the self-examination and self-knowledge insisted on by Socrates, and of the ethical direction his Socrates and Christ: A Study in the Phi- given by him to the earliest systematic inquiry after losophy of Religion with a series of quotes in- truth. Ideal righteousness, the search for divine tended to bolster the argument of his perfection, the endeavor to be “as good and wise as work, that Christ is superior to Socrates possible,” these were the true and only means of ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν because Christ gave life where Socrates “escape,” ( ) or salvation con- 71 templated both by Socrates and Jesus. To the truths could not. already uttered in the Athenian prison, Christianity The first quote is from Elisabeth Barrett added little or nothing, except a few symbols, Browning’s verse novel Aurora Leigh which, though perhaps well calculated for popular (1856): “Subsists no law of Life outside of acceptance, are more likely to perplex than to in- struct, and offer the best opportunity for priestly Life […] The Christ himself had been no mystification.70 Lawgiver, unless he had given the life, too, with the Law.” In the utter lack of evi- As Mackay points out, however, the moral dence for her declaration, its circular form, philosophy of Socrates was then and re- and its general incoherence, Leigh’s posi- mained at a distinct disadvantage when pit- tion on eternal life lends ironic support to ted against the complete idola theatri pro- those of Mendelssohn, Schiller, Franklin, gram of Christianity for the hearts and and Jefferson, who are more willing to be- minds of a broader audience: lieve a law-giver than an eternal life-giver. If the quote is intended to indicate that the But philosophy belongs to the few; the common promise of the afterlife sealed Christ’s mind, when sufficiently awakened to become con- moral teachings, then, in aspiring to eternal scious of disparity and disunion, pines under the life as a reward for adhering to the law, the impression of a corrupt and ‘fallen’ nature, and es- idea violates the key measure of virtue in capes from the haunting self-conviction only when, accepting as a faith what reason repudiates, it an- Schiller’s Virtue Speech, namely that true 72 ticipates the conclusion, and grasps the absolute virtue seeks no reward. If, by giving life, unity of the human and the divine as a given indu- bitable fact. (Mackey 20) 71 The present essay takes no position on the appro- priateness of the mottos for Wenley’s book. R. M. Mackey and the Shelleys, however, belong Wenley, Socrates and Christ: A Study in the Philoso- to an increasingly silent minority. The phy of Religion (Edinburgh and London: Black- clear trend in post-Enlightenment compari- wood, 1889). All three quotes appear in the front matter on page ii. 72 In 1786, Schiller is particularly clear on the impor- 70 Robert William Mackay, The Rise and Progress of tance of earthly life as opposed to the insignificance Christianity (London: John Chapman, 1854) 19-20. of speculation about an afterlife, which Schiller de-

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Leigh’s fragment is intended to mean revelation of eternity] […] [It is this which gives to] Christ giving his own, then he accom- this little period of life [, so contemptible when weighed against eternity, a significance it never plished less than Socrates by pretending to had without it.] [It] … is [thus] an infinite arena, be divine and promoting a false belief in an where infinite issues are played out [. Not an action afterlife. of man but will have its truth realized and will go on Wenley’s second quote is from Joseph for ever.] … This truth [, whatever may be the opin- Henry Shorthouse’s historical novel John ions we hold on Christian doctrine, or whether we hold upon them a sacred silence or not,] we must Inglesant (1881): “[…] it was expedient that recognise in Christianity and its belief independent a nobler than Socrates should die for the of all theories. people, — nobler, that is, in that he did what Socrates failed in doing, and carried The hostility toward theory and the ex- the lowest of the people with him to the pression of faith in an afterlife explain both ethereal gates.” The quote, however, is Carlyle’s inattention to Socrates’ over- precisely the argument turned on its head whelming emphasis on life and Carlyle’s by the logic of the introduction to Men- disdain for life and embrace of death. In- delssohn’s work, which served as Schiller’s deed, Schiller’s Socrates is the undisputed model in the Virtue Speech. If Christ had “master of life,”73 and “this little period of died to absolve sinners, then, according to life” on earth and its quality are the fore- the logic of Mendelssohn’s essay, he would most topics addressed in Plato’s Phädon have accomplished very much less than and subsequently in Mendelssohn’s Phädon Socrates and died for nothing. and Schiller’s Virtue Speech: it is precisely The third quote is a compilation of the finality of death that makes life pre- fragments of Lectures from Thomas cious, and life’s preciousness that makes Carlyle, ironically, the author of The Life of self-sacrifice sublime. Although Wenley Friedrich Schiller (1872), who contrasts sets out in his preface to “eliminate doc- Christ’s offer of eternal life with the focus trinal considerations” (Wenley, vi), the en- on noble death in the Socrates narrative. tire work is informed by its predictable All square brackets indicate my attempts to conclusion: “The supremacy of Christ is reconstruct Carlyle’s original: further enhanced by the strange circum- stance that His revelation is not, like Soc- There is no word of life in Socrates. [In another rates, Luther, or of Carlyle, representative point of view we may regard it (Christianity) as the only of a specific stage in the world’s de- velopment” (Wenley, 256). scribes as “Ein Lügenbild lebendiger Gestalten” In his 1927 essay, “Why I am not a (the false promise of living figures) and “Verwe- sung” (decay) “in den kalten Behausungen des Grabes” (in the cold dwelling of the grave; NA 73 William Ellery Leonard, Socrates: Master of Life 1:168). (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1915).

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Christian,” Bertrand Russell contrasts characters as role models for individuals Christ’s belief in a punishment in hell with seeking a personal and political constitu- Socrates’ sublime tolerance of those who tion based on morality achieved at through disagreed with him and his belief in earthly reason. Scott’s book ends on a note so un- judgment, concluding: “I cannot feel that scholarly that it would have been merciful either in the matter of wisdom or in the of him to confess this in a preface: matter of virtue Christ stands quite as high as some other people known to history. I My great teacher, Professor Gildersleeve, said that “Socrates reached an arm’s length toward Christ, should put Buddha and Socrates above — it was only an arm’s length, but it was toward 74 him in those respects.” But even among Christ.” It is just this fact, that the greatest man academics, the parallel truths offered by [Socrates] of the most intellectual city and at its most Socrates and Christ are not necessarily exalted period saw but dimly and partially that evidence of a moral truth beyond Christian which Jesus saw so clearly and so completely and with such assurance, which has strengthened my revelation. Like Priestley’s work and a faith that the carpenter of Nazareth and the compan- host of others since, John Scott’s Socrates ion of simple men of lowly Galilee must have been and Christ (1929) is of interest only in that it something more than a man. (Scott, 52) sincerely attempts to compare the relative significance of Socrates and Christ as V. Conclusion: Schiller and guides for modern morality.75 Predictably, the Virtue of Socrates Scott dismisses Socrates with pseudo- arguments based on the evidence of bible n an October 2012 article entitled citations: “[…] there is no parallel in Socra- “Tsunami of Secularism,” a US- tes to the following: ‘For God so loved the American minister compares the world that he gave his only begotten Son Ideaths of Socrates and Christ, in the proc- that whosoever believeth in Him should ess rejecting centuries of moral-philo- not perish but have everlasting life’” sophical progress. Having dismissed Rous- (Scott, 51). Most such efforts, informative seau’s secular tendencies as a problem as they may be, embark from the premise rather than a solution, then vaguely imply- that Christ was the son of god. As a result, ing that the founders of the United States few in the end strive to achieve a serious were not in favor of removing religion comparison of the suitability of the two from the sphere of public authority, the author delivers a penultimate ironic rhe- 74 Bertrand Russell, Why I am not a Christian and torical turn — equating secularism with other Essays (London: George Allen & Unwin, sophistry — the formal reverse of 1957) 19. Schiller’s parallel of sophistry with Christi- 75 John Adams Scott, Socrates and Christ. A Lecture Given at Northwestern University (Evanston, Illinois: anity in his comparison of Socrates and Northwestern University, 1929). Rousseau (and of Mendelssohn’s portrayal

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of the sophists as priests of superstition). merely human and did not promise eternal He concludes: “As Christians we will be life. This conclusion, too, fails the serious held to a higher accountability than even measure of Schiller’s Virtue Essay. Socrates was held to. How do we know Franklin, among many others, offers a this? Because Jesus tells us so: ‘To whom compromise between the demands of rea- much has been given, much will be re- son and the benefits of a pseudo- quired’ (Lk 12:48).” The second-hand tes- civilization based on revelation, namely, timony of Christ is scant enough evidence, that regardless of the truth of the Biblical but there is no evidence for the article’s narrative, the world would probably be a dramatic closing argument against secular- slightly better place if Christ’s doctrines ism: “Hell exists and it is eternal.”76 That were more respected and better observed hell exists, and that Christians will be held (Franklin, 194). Franklin’s language makes to a higher standard than Socrates, is bad it quite clear that the group most in need of news indeed, since a great deal of evidence such virtue guidelines were those Lessing indicates that even most Christian intellec- characterized as “der christliche Pöbel” tuals believe that the one human who ri- (the Christan rabble)77 and whose God vals Christ in virtue is Socrates, perhaps Schiller described as “das wohlthaetige the most deserving citizen of the heavenly Traumbild des grossen Haufens” (the be- republic, who, according to Schiller, “never nevolent dream vision of the great masses; caught the faintest glimmer of divine reve- NA 25:167). To Schiller, however, as indi- lation” (NA 20:3). The logic in this relative cated by his description of Socrates as his- clause in Schiller’s Virtue Essay is razor tory’s greatest example of the triumph of sharp: the belief in the reward of an after- virtue, the happiness of humankind is a life for earthly “kindness, sociability, and zero sum game, and thus no “Surrogat der great generosity” is a violation of the con- wahren Tugend” (surrogate of true virtue; cept of virtue itself. On the other hand, NA 26:339-331) will suffice to advance this there is no rational sense to be made of the end. On the contrary, surrogate virtue and metaphysical presuppositions that serve as the anti-intellectualism that drive it were arguments for the Christ-apologists and remain the greatest threat to the rule against the relative merits of Socrates as a of reason and the happiness of the individ- philosopher and martyr for humankind. ual, a threat that the comparison of Socra- These conclude without fail that Christ su- persedes Socrates because Socrates was 77 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, “Fragmente einer Vorrede” to Nathan der Weise of 1778/1779, in Gott- 76 At: http://yearoffaith2013.com/2012/10/27/a- hold Ephraim Lessing, Werke und Briefe, Klaus Boh- tsunami-of-secularism-by-rev-benjamin-p- nen and Arno Schilson, eds. (Frankfurt am Main: bradshaw/. Accessed on 2 January 2013. Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1993) 665.

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tes and Christ is uniquely situated to ex- phy, not the promise of heaven] in the cit- pose. Wenley’s insidious formula of 1889 ies of men and bring her also into their threatens to turn the clock back to a pre- homes and compel her to ask questions Socratic concept of the responsibility of about life and morality and things good humankind for its own fate: “Judaism saw and evil.”79 Cicero’s statement, like heaven from earth, Hellenism imagined Schiller’s declaration that “Die Welt- earth as heaven, […] Christianity brought geschichte ist das Weltgericht” (World his- heaven to earth” (Wenley, 261). Evi- tory is Judgment Day; NA 1:168), is a dec- dently, however, it did not; it merely laration of secular independence from brought the promise of heaven and the judgment by holy barbarians. On a theo- threat of hell to those who would believe it, retical level the First Virtue Essay marks and much worse still to those who would the beginning of Schiller’s programmatic instrumentalize it, priests and politicians. dismissal of the tribal-state religious prac- For Schiller and many of his contemporar- tice of disguising moral choice as — and ies, the belief in heaven as a reward for coercing civic behavior through — divine earthy virtue and the threat of a punish- dictate to the annals of untimely historical ment in hell stood counter to the very idea necessities.80 of virtue. According to the Christian nar- Schiller, who called religion “die Lüg- rative as Wenley portrays it here, Christ in nerin, gedungen von Despoten” (the hired end effect removed the responsibility for liar in the service of despots; NA 1:168) in philosophy from human individuals and the poem “Resignation” in 1786, shared relocated it in the promise of a heaven in- Jefferson’s and Mackey’s conviction that conveniently located just beyond their the irrational nature of Christianity served reach for the duration of their lives. It is to secure the “opportunity for priestly little wonder the secularist thinkers of the mystification” (Mackey, 20) of the masses. eighteenth century sought support in the non-Christian thinkers of ancient Greece. Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge: In a remarkable preemptive counter-strike Cambridge UP, 1994) 42. 79 to such disempowering nineteenth-century Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, trans. by J. E. King (London: Loeb Classical Library, 1927) 434-435. formulas as Wenley’s, Cicero described 80 Note that Schiller pursues this same agenda in his Socrates as the first to “call philosophy exposé on Moses as a brilliant politician, but not a down from the heavens,” by which he divine messenger, in “Die Sendung Moses” (The meant the cosmos,78 “and set her [philoso- Mission of Moses, 1790). See Jeffrey L. High, “Clever Priests and the Missions of Moses and Schiller: From Monotheism to the Aesthetic Civili- zation of the Individual,” in Elisabeth Krimmer and 78 See Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture Patricia Ann Simpson, eds., German Classicism and of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Religion (Rochester: Camden House, 2013) 79-98.

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Schiller singled out the presence of relig- Kindervernunft anzuknüpfen und gleich- ious authority as facile tool of political co- sam zu popularisieren, [...] hat Kant dann ercion in Abfall der Vereinigten Niederlande weiter nichts gethan, als das morsche Ge- von der Spanischen Regierung (The Revolt of bäude der Dummheit geflickt” (to connect the Netherlands against Spanish Rule, the conclusions of philosophical thought to 1788): “Das gemeinschaftliche Ziel des the reason of children and thus popularize Despotismus und des Priestertums ist Ein- philosophy, […] Kant has done nothing förmigkeit, und Einförmigkeit ist ein not- more than patched the rotting house of wendiges Hülfsmittel der menschlichen stupidity; NA 26:219).82 In the logic of Armut und Beschränkung” (The common Schiller’s Virtue Essay, Kant’s benevolent aim of despotism and of priestcraft is uni- gesture is just another chapter in the his- formity, and uniformity is a necessary ex- tory of surrogate virtue and pseudo- pedient of human poverty and imperfec- civilization. tion).81 The structure of Schiller’s argu- Like Socrates relocating philosophy ment in the Virtue Essay, in its focus on from a metaphorical mystery to the homes human reason, wisdom, love and happi- of humans, Schiller’s dramatic recasting of ness, and its uncompromising requirement Socrates as the most virtuous character in that virtue be unconditional, dictates that history is compelling, and the motivations the exercise of reason be free from relig- are self-evident in the context of the Virtue ious dogma and defiant in the face of the Speech: if the immortal son of God, who collusion of religion and the state. agrees to his own execution, is impressive Schiller’s enduring commitment to the because he descends to the level of hu- removal of religion from moral philosophy mans, who, unlike immortals, are wont to is nowhere more evident than in his re- cling to earthly existence, then the mortal sponse to Kant’s Religion innerhalb der Gren- freedom philosopher who agrees to his zen der bloßen Vernunft (Religion within the own execution is entirely more impressive Confines of Reason Alone; 1793-1794), in because he transcends his human nature. which Kant sought to popularize moral phi- Ironically, if one removes the divine aspect losophy by demonstrating where it over- from the Jesus story, as Thomas Jefferson laps with Christian principles. Here Schiller did in The Jefferson Bible, the moral-political dismissively summarized that in his disin- story gains endlessly. As it stands with genuous attempt, “die Resultate des phi- Christ and Socrates, one, according to the losophischen Denkens dadurch an die sources, ostensibly did not really die so that sinners might not go to hell, a place or

81 NA 17:55. Friedrich Schiller, History of the Revolt of the Netherlands, translated by A. J. W. Morrison 82 See Schiller’s letter to Gottfried Johann Körner of (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1855) 54-55. 28 February and 1 March 1793 (NA 26:219).

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state for which there is no evidence; and ingly dignified illusionist as our “magician- one died for the principle — “most sublime Socrates” (Rousseau, 175), and Mendels- love” — so that innocent individuals might sohn’s biography of Socrates stresses the not spend their brief mortal existences liv- unusual on a biblical scale, sparing no detail ing in one of the many forms of hell on in an otherwise sober portrayal of Socra- earth made possible by ignorance. Christ’s tes’ divine immunity to misfortune and divine act of death violates the first meas- suffering. In battle, Socrates was the great- ure of Schiller’s thesis: not only was it not est Athenian warrior, carrying a man on an exercise of disinterested virtue, it was in his back, walking miles in his bare feet on fact a divine mission that brought with it a ice, and surviving as the only soldier in an series of coercive conditions. Conversely, entire army who did not contract the Socrates’ death — “most sublime virtue!” plague. As a poor teacher, he lived under a — was a selfless and unconditional gift in ban on teaching rhetoric passed against the name of humankind’s progress toward him by Charicles, with an additional per- happiness, which is the condition of virtue. sonal restraining order against consorting On a practical level, in the context of with the youth. As a public figure, he suf- Schiller’s oeuvre, the Virtue Essay con- fered humiliation by Aristophanes in The spicuously relegates the divine and thus Clouds and by Ameipsias in Connus (both alien martyr Christ to one of many influ- 423 BC). During his political persecutions, ences in the history of earthly virtue. he raised a large enough following of dis- Christ appears in a league with the pagans ciples to survive his silent betrayal by Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, and the fictional Critias, then suffered renewed persecution Cathmor in his moral resistance to perse- by sophists and priests in charges of impi- cution on a story level, but, due to his ety and corrupting the youth of Athens function as a divine messenger, not in the under the restored democracy. As a pris- ultimate measure of disinterested and hu- oner, he refused to participate in Criton’s man virtue.83 Not that the story of Socrates escape plan, forgave of the foreman the constitutes significantly less than a Christ- jury, bathed himself to spare the slaves the like capacity for the fantastic. In Emile, task of washing his dead body, and dem- Rousseau playfully refers to his surpris- onstrated his ultimate dedication to the so- cial contract, the rule of law, and the repub- 83 Unlike Socrates, Christ is not mentioned by name, lic through his martyrdom in the name of but as the “Gottmensch auf dem Tabor” (God-man truth, freedom, and the love of the happi- on Mount Tabor) as one in a list of teachers of vir- ness of humankind. Finally, he chose his tue: “So spricht der Gesezgeber aus den Donnern von Sina! So der Gottmensch auf dem Tabor! — So own death over injustice and demon- Religion — Sittenlehre — Philosophie — und aller strated sublime composure at an unjust Weisen einstimmiger Mund!” (NA 20:4). end. And he was just a man.

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But this is exactly the point of the Secu- qualification. Only a human — a citizen of lar Jesus movement. Happiness and free- the world — will do. dom from coercion are human — not di- As a result of his upbringing in Würt- vine — pursuits, and in a contest of duel- temberg, resistance in the face of coercion ing martyrs to be decided by moral resis- was Schiller’s primary concern, and in the tance, virtue derived from reason, and the eighteenth-century church states, freedom goal of human happiness, it is not only ad- from religion was the only hope of free- vantageous to be human rather than di- dom of thought. As an artist and a theorist, vine, it is a requirement. According to Schiller was forever on the lookout for an Schiller’s “Die Götter Griechenlands” historical human willing to die for principle, (The Gods of Ancient Greece) in 1788, the rather than merely be murdered, looking alien nature of Christ’s divinity is precisely for a Secular Jesus who fulfilled the very what disqualifies him, the Christian God, real promise of humankind without any ul- and the entire Trinitarian blur, as appropri- terior motives or conditions, and thus ate guides for humans.84 When Christ (and without making any further promises: “Mir or the Christian God) arrives in the poem deucht, ein gewisser Hyginus, ein Grieche, to displace the Greek gods, he appears as a sammelte einmal eine Anzahl tragischer judgmental, punishing, joyless, sexless, and Fabeln entweder aus oder für den Gebra- comparatively very alien immortal usurper uch der Poeten. Solch einen Freund kön- — “ein heiliger Barbar” (a divine barbar- nte ich brauchen” (I believe that a certain ian; NA 1:193) — displacing the mild Hyginus, a Greek, collected a number of Greek judge, “der Enkel einer Sterblichen” tragic plots either from or for the use of (the grandson of a mortal), who along poets. I could use such a friend).85 Not that with the furies, had been human enough to Schiller had a difficult time finding such feel compassion for humans, “zarte Wesen, characters; Wilhelm Tell is his only main die ein Weib gebar” (tender beings, born character in a completed drama who sur- to women; NA 20:193). Thus, Christ’s fa- vives long after the curtain falls, and mous admission, “I am not of this world,” Schiller’s Tell had more than demonstrated is not a selling point, but a point of dis- the likelihood of his willingness to die for the right cause, freedom from coercion. Schiller’s Marquis Posa, like his Mary 84 There is evidence enough in Schiller’s works, in Stuart and Joan of Arc, is a Christian particular in “Die Götter Griechenlands,” to be- (Catholic), but a conspicuously Socratic lieve that Schiller’s position was not far from that of Christian, involved in what his enemies be- his choir of demons in the poem fragment of 1776, “Triumphgesang der Hölle” (Hell’s Song of Tri- umph): “Pfui! heilige Dreifaltigkeit” (Boo! holy 85 See Schiller’s letter to Goethe of 15 December trinity; NA 1:14). 1797 (NA 29:169).

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lieve is a conspiracy to introduce the sepa- “Über das Erhabene” (variously dated ration of church and state to Spain. In his from 1796-1801), Schiller’s Lessingian the- audience with Philipp II, Posa demon- sis, “Kein Mensch muss müssen” (No hu- strates the great paradox of religious coer- man being must have to do anything; NA cion with his confession — “Ihr Glaube, 21:38) is tested against the human capacity Sire, ist auch / der meinige” (Your faith, for moral resistance — “greatest struggle” Sire, is my faith; NA 6:184) — and his de- — against the most extreme demand of mand — “Geben Sie / Gedankenfreiheit” sensual nature, the desire to live in the face (Grant freedom of thought; NA 6:191). In of death, against the highest demand of unraveling the puzzle of the coercion of a ennobled reason, to be free from coercion. believer, Schiller’s comparison of Socrates The history of the trial and death of Socra- and Rousseau (in the poem “Rousseau”) is tes, with its ancient, and importantly pre- telling. Although Schiller and his contem- Christian emphasis on virtue, ethics, epis- poraries either ignore reports of Socrates’ temology, and logic, in an act of defiance belief in the supernatural or, in Jefferson’s toward a coercive state — all in the de- case, are eager to dismiss them, there is no fense and service of human freedom and way to deny Rousseaus’ repeated attempts happiness — is singularly suited to the to belong to a church, nor much justifica- moral philosophy that informs Schiller’s tion to compare the virtue of Rousseau theory of tragedy, which is rooted in the with that of Socrates. It is likely that all the sacrificial defiance of coercion. According eighteenth-century thinkers require from to Socrates, “Science says ‘We must live,’ Socrates is his resistance against the relig- and seeks the means of prolonging, in- ious state and his insistence on the practice creasing, facilitating and amplifying life, of of reason in the sphere of public authority, making it tolerable and acceptable, wisdom regardless of personal belief. Likewise, all says ‘We must die,’ and seeks how to make other similarities notwithstanding, resis- us die well.” According to Schiller, the in- tance against religious persecution is all dividual is free to transform even death that is required of Rousseau to make him into a defiant act of free will. And the Socrates-like. meaning of life, according to Schiller’s Soc- In the Virtue Essay, Schiller goes to rates, is not to make it tolerable and ac- great lengths to establish that disinterested ceptable, but to make it meaningful by con- virtue is only then most evident in the tributing to the freedom and the happiness most disadvantageous of moral choices — of the whole through virtue. Dying well, “terrible freedom” — that of the virtuous according to both, means dying of one’s death (of a human) over an unfree life, a own volition after a life of virtue — and thesis that informs his entire career as a freedom is never more evident than in a dramatist and an aesthetic theorist. In final act of defiant virtue, the hallmark of

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Schiller’s tragedies in the decades after the Virtue Speech. Accordingly, for Schiller, the notion of immortality Socrates repre- sents in the First Virtue Speech is not metaphysical, but moral, political, and aes- thetic. Mortal and dead as he was, the justi- fication for Socrates’ immortality — “No more sublime deed done under the great starry heavens!” — had never been more self-evident than in the Age of Secularist Revolution. For the empiricist Schiller in 1779, Socrates’ time had only just begun.

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