THE ROLE of PARTY-LED DISSENT in REDEMOCRATIZATION a Comparative Study

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PARTY POLITICS VOL 7. No.5 pp. 567–580

THE ROLE OF PARTY-LED DISSENT IN REDEMOCRATIZATION A Comparative Study

James C. Franklin

ABSTRACT

A previous study (Franklin, 1999) shows that when competitive regimes are overthrown, political parties often take part in active resistance under the subsequent authoritarian regime. This study examines whether such party-led dissent has an impact on the redemocratization process by comparing the length of time that passed before re-establishment of democracy in 22 countries. The primary ﬁnding is that a relatively early redemocratization only occurred in countries that experienced party-led dissent under authoritarian rule. However, party- led dissent alone is not sufﬁcient for an early return to democracy, as seven of the 17 countries experiencing such dissent took longer to rede- mocratize. Therefore, some consideration is given here to other factors that may combine with the presence of party-led dissent in causing authoritarian leaders to relent and allow a return to democracy. These possible factors include the timing of dissent, the level of instability in the authoritarian government, the level of unity in the opposition, and the international political context.

KEY WORDS democratization dissent protest

Introduction

Political parties are critically important institutions in democratic political systems. With increased attention to the global phenomenon of democratization, scholars have examined the role of political parties in facilitating the democratization process. However, comparative studies have not analyzed in detail the behavior of political parties in resisting authoritarian rule and pressuring for a return to democracy. This is an important omission, since recent research shows that many parties do actively resist authoritarian rule

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(Franklin, 1999), taking part in acts of protest or political violence, which collectively are referred to as dissent. This Article attempts to ascertain the impact that political party-led dissent has on the timing of the democratization process. In particular, I analyze the proposition that countries experiencing political party resistance to authoritarian rule will experience a more rapid return to democracy than countries in which parties remain inactive.

Political Parties and Democratization

Several scholars have discussed the role of political parties in encouraging the installation or the consolidation of democracy. Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) stress the importance of strong parties in facilitating the installation of democratic regimes in South America. Casper and Taylor (1996), in applying their game-theoretical model of democratization, typically identify political parties as the principal challengers to authoritarian regimes during the regime negotiation process. Parties have been key actors in the installation of democracy through pacts, which are agreements between elites that structure the rules governing the next regime (O’Don- nell and Schmitter, 1986; Karl, 1986, 1990; Przeworski, 1991; Stepan, 1986). Furthermore, in regard to the role of political parties in democratic consolidation, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) argue that having an insti- tutionalized party system contributes signiﬁcantly to democratic consolidation. While several scholars have discussed the role of parties as elite actors in negotiating democratic installation and as important political institutions providing a foundation for democratic consolidation, few have compara- tively examined the role of parties in directly resisting authoritarian regimes and pushing for a return to democracy. However, there is reason to believe that direct party resistance may be important in pressuring authoritarian leaders to start the transition process. For instance, although Mainwaring (1992) supports the conventional view of democratization proposed by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski (1991) that sees internal schisms in the authoritarian regime as being a necessary factor in starting the transition process, he argues that opposition, particularly through mass mobilization, also plays an important role. There are theoretical reasons for believing that parties in particular might be important actors in the anti-authoritarian opposition. First, competitive political parties are typically capable of mobilizing substantial proportions of society, and this facilitates opposition in two ways. Mobilizing mass participation in protest serves to legitimize the opposition and delegitimize the government. In addition, parties can serve as mobilizing structures (Tarrow, 1998) that link leaders of pro-democracy movements with rank-and-ﬁle participants. Second, political parties are capable of governing, so they 568 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 569

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represent ‘viable regime alternatives’ to authoritarian rule (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986). This is critical because, as Przeworski (1986) argues, a ‘regime does not collapse unless and until some alternative is organized in such a way as to present a real choice for isolated individuals’ (p. 52). Finally, political parties that thrived earlier in a competitive environment have an interest in seeing that competitive party politics is re-established. Thus, the establishment of democracy does not depend solely on altruism, but also on the self-interest of party leaders who seek to regain their positions of inﬂuence. Because of these factors, the participation in dissent by formerly competitive political parties should present a formidable challenge to authoritarian regimes and may contribute to their collapse and replace- ment with democracy. In addition to these theoretical expectations, an examination of the activities of political parties under non-competitive regimes shows that many parties do directly resist authoritarian rule (Franklin, 1999). Of 51 political parties examined in 24 countries facing the overthrow of competitive politics and the imposition of an authoritarian regime, 32 parties actively resisted, taking part in dissent. In the following section, I examine the activities of political parties under authoritarian rule to determine the effect of party-led dissent on the timing of redemocratization.1 Most of the countries examined below eventually returned to democracy, but a critical distinction is the span of time that elapsed before redemocratization occurred. Thus, a distinction is made in the analysis between countries that experienced a relatively rapid return to democracy and those that experienced a longer authoritarian interlude.

Analysis of Party Resistance and Redemocratization

The impact of party-led dissent on redemocratization will be examined with a broad analysis of 22 countries that experienced the overthrow of a competitive regime and the imposition of non-competitive rule. This focus allows an examination of how formerly competitive political parties respond to the overthrow of competitive politics, and permits us to determine whether this response had any impact on the timing of redemocratization. There are several different ways to analyze the causes of redemocratization. One common method is to examine the period leading up to it in particular cases and determine what factors were present or absent that may have contributed to the transition. In this case, we might look at the year or two preceding redemocratization to determine the level of party-led dissent and the presence of other factors, such as governmental instability. However, this approach ignores an important cross-national difference: how long it took a country to return to democracy. For instance, Argentina and Chile both had harsh military regimes in the 1970s and both later experienced a return to democracy. An important difference, though, is that the 569 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 570

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military regime in Chile lasted around 16 years, whereas the Argentine military regime only lasted seven years. An analysis that merely looks at the factors just preceding the transitions ignores the question of why pro- democratic forces in Chile failed for so long to bring about democratization. Therefore, in this investigation I take a different approach. Instead of examining the factors that were present or absent just prior to democratization, I use a cut-off point to compare countries that democratized relatively quickly with those that took longer. Thus, in contrast to most studies focusing solely on the democratic transitions themselves, using such a cut- off allows comparison of relatively rapid cases of re-democratization with cases in which the authoritarian regime is more ﬁrmly entrenched. Following the logic discussed in the last section, political party participation in dissent should present a signiﬁcant challenge to the authoritarian regime in power. While this may not lead the authoritarian leaders to immediately hand over power, it has the potential to pressure authoritarian leaders to step down sooner and with fewer prerogatives than they would have preferred. Thus, the principal proposition that will be tested is that countries that experience party-led dissent will return to democracy more rapidly than countries that do not experience party-led dissent.

Sample First, the sampling process is briefly reviewed. (For a more detailed dis- cussion, see Franklin [1999]). The histories of most countries for the post- 1945 period were examined to find cases in which regimes that allowed open party competition were replaced by non-competitive regimes.2 In competitive regimes, governments and legislatures are chosen through elections that allow relatively free and fair interparty competition. In non-competitive regimes, no interparty competition is allowed, or there is at least one con- tinuous year of extreme and/or unconstitutional interference in rightfully elected political parties’ exercise of power. While the focus here was on competitive versus non-competitive regimes, this is equivalent to definitions of democratic versus authoritarian regimes used by many scholars in the democratization literature. For example, Huntington defines a regime as democratic if its ‘most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote’ (1991: 7). This is similar to my definition of a competitive regime. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also subscribe to this ‘minimal definition’ approach. Others use a minimalist definition to identify the democratic installation and then expect further improvement with consolidation (Diamond, 1996; Valenzuela, 1992). Thus, from here on, I equate ‘competitive’ with ‘democratic’ and ‘non-competitive’ with ‘authoritarian.’ If the scenario of an authoritarian regime replacing a democracy was judged to apply to a particular country, the years in which it applied were 570 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 571

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then determined. As mentioned above, the analysis requires choosing a cut- off to be used to distinguish countries that experienced a relatively early redemocratization from those that failed to do so. This cut-off is 10 years following the imposition of authoritarian rule. The choice is unavoidably somewhat arbitrary, as any choice would be. This choice has the desirable qualities, though, of dividing the sample into two roughly equivalent groups (10 countries in the sample democratized in less than 10 years, 12 took longer) and of being close to the median duration of authoritarian regimes for the countries in this sample.3 Political parties were then identiﬁed for the sample countries. This process resulted in a sample of 48 political parties ﬁtting the above criteria in all 22 countries that experienced a breakdown of democracy. This study examines these 22 authoritarian regimes, which are listed in Table 1.4

Results In order to test the proposition discussed above, we must examine the relationship between political party-led dissent and the timing of redemocratization. To measure the timing of redemocratization, countries that returned to democracy within the ﬁrst 10 years after authoritarian rule was

Table 1. Countries in sample Year authoritarian Redemocratization Country regime was established within 10 years? Argentina 1976 yes Bangladesh 1982 yes Bolivia 1964 no Brazil 1964 no Burkina Faso 1980 no Chile 1973 no Colombia 1949 yes Dominican Republic 1963 yes Ghana 1981 no Greece 1967 yes Honduras 1972 yes India 1975 yes Kenya 1969 no Korea 1972 yes Nepal 1960 no Nigeria 1983 no Peru 1968 no Philippines 1972 no Turkey 1980 yes Uruguay 1973 no Venezuela 1948 yes Zambia 1972 no

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established are coded as ‘1’ and countries that remained authoritarian through the 10-year maximum time limit of the study are coded as ‘0’. The central explanatory variable of this paper is party participation in dissent. Dissent here refers to collective and public displays of disagreement with the government, its leaders, its policies, or the regime itself that are made outside of conventional political channels. It encompasses both protest and political violence. While there are a number of different aspects of dissent, this initial analysis will focus upon what is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of dissent – participation in dissent – which refers to whether any political parties in a country took part in any acts of dissent or not. While I will also give consideration to other aspects of dissent, a comprehensive analysis of these must await future research. The relationship between these variables was ascertained using a cross- tabulation of party participation in dissent with the timing of redemocratization. The results listed in Table 2 show that all countries experiencing redemocratization within the 10-year time period studied also experienced party-led dissent activities. The chi-square test reveals that the relationship is statistically significant. While we must be cautious about interpreting sta- tistics based on 22 cases, the fact that early redemocratization was absent in countries without party-led dissent suggests that party participation in dissent was necessary for a rapid redemocratization. It was not sufficient for redemocratization, though, as seven out of 17 countries that experienced party-led dissent did not democratize during the period studied. Therefore, there is evidence that party-led dissent is an important factor contributing to a relatively rapid redemocratization. Before accepting these findings, though, there are two important issues that must be considered. First, we must consider whether party-led dissent is causing redemocratization or whether the relationship is merely incidental. Second, it is important to consider why party-led dissent leads to an early democratization in some cases but not in others.

What Kind of Relationship? We often interpret an empirical relationship between two or more variables as implying some sort of causality. We cannot prove that one variable causes

Table 2. Cross-tabulation of participation in dissent and democratization No political party Political party Democratization participation in participation in Total within 10 years dissent dissent countries No 5 7 12 Yes 0 10 10 Total countries 5 17 22 Chi-square = 5.39, signiﬁcant at p < 0.01 level, one-tailed. 572 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 573

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another, but we can consider plausible reasons that would prevent this relationship from being a causal one. Particularly, if a third variable causes both party-led dissent and redemocratization, then the relationship between the latter two variables would be spurious and hence would not imply causality. One potentially spurious relationship that seems particularly likely in this case involves governmental instability. Several scholars see governmental instability as being an important factor in the democratization process (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1991; Mainwaring, 1992). In addition, such instability may provide important opportunities that encour- age parties to resist (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, 1996). Therefore, both party- led dissent and redemocratization could be caused by governmental instability, making the relationship between the former two variables spurious. A second factor that is often seen as being an important precondition of democratization is socio-economic development. In particular, I focus on one particular aspect of socio-economic development: the increase in edu- cation and literacy. Lipset (1959) and Dahl (1971) both assert that edu- cation is a critical component of the relationship between socio-economic development and democracy, and Liu (1993) finds that literacy has the strongest individual impact on democratization. Furthermore, Ionescu and Madariaga (1972), Wallerstein (1957) and Clapham (1997) suggest that opposition parties have a much stronger potential basis in more highly socio-economically developed countries. Thus, more developed societies, and particularly societies with higher literacy rates, might be more likely to have strong political parties willing to resist authoritarian rule, and such societies might be more likely to experience a rapid return to democracy. In this case, the relationship between dissent and redemocratization would be spurious. A third possibility that would lead us to suspect that the relationship between party-led dissent and the timing of redemocratization is spurious was suggested by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986). They argue that parties play little or no role in mass mobilizations that challenge the authoritarian regime and instead move into active opposition only in the period just prior to the elections that mark the end of the authoritarian regime. In this case, party-led dissent would occur only after the authoritarian leaders had already decided upon the transition to democracy. Furthermore, if this argument is correct, other organizations, such as unions or human rights organizations, should play the leading role in anti-authoritarian activities. While there are not enough cases to conduct a multivariate analysis with statistical controls, we can examine the possibility of the first two types of spuriousness by observing whether instability and literacy have bivariate relationships with redemocratization. The third possibility cannot be tested in this manner and is discussed separately. Governmental instability is measured from events compiled in Keesing’s and Facts on File. These events include significant turnovers in the top personnel of government, open 573 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 574

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Table 3. Coding scheme for elite instability Code Description 1 (a) There is significant turnover within government, but chief executive position does not change hands. A significant turnover denotes one that reportedly demonstrates some underlying conflict in the government (e.g. civilian versus military personnel, followers of different leaders). And/or, (b) there are other reports of conflict in ruling coalition. 2 (a) There is turnover in the chief executive position. And/or (b) there are competing factions claiming control of government And/or (c) there is an attempted coup.

conflict between top government personnel, or coup attempts. Each event was coded according to the scheme discussed in Table 3, then all the event- codes are summed for each country. Finally, the total score for each country was divided by the number of years analyzed. The second variable analyzed is the literacy rate as close as possible to the mid-point of the period under study for each country. Difference of means tests were used to assess the relationship between governmental instability and literacy, on the one hand, and redemocratization, on the other. The t-scores corresponding with these differences, given in Table 4, indicate that there is no significant relationship between either of these alternative explanatory variables and redemocratization. The low t-scores could partially be explained by the small number of cases, but they are so low that the only plausible interpretation is that there is no reliable relationship between these variables and democratization. Thus, there is no indication that the relationship between participation in dissent and redemocratization is actually caused by the influence of either of these variables. The third possibility of spuriousness – in which party-led dissent only occurs in the period just prior to elections – can be analyzed, in part, by simply observing whether dissent tends to occur in the period after the calling of elections. The calling of elections was coded from Keesing’s and Facts on File news archives, and the results show that 14 of the 17 countries in the sample experienced party-led dissent before the calling of elections.

Table 4. Difference of means results for democratization Mean of Mean of variable for variable for lingering early Explanatory variable authoritarians redemocratizers t-score Average governmental elite instability 1.39 1.74 0.63 Literacy rate 58.63 65.64 0.69 Number of countries 12 10

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Therefore, parties did not simply wait to resist until the transition to democracy was already assured. A second aspect of this question is whether parties play an important role in the anti-authoritarian movement, or whether other types of groups, such as unions or human rights organizations play the predominant role. Cer- tainly we must not assume that parties act alone, but in many of the cases studied here it is clear that parties played an important role in the anti- authoritarian opposition. Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1986) emphasize the importance of parties in the opposition to authoritarian rule in Chile. Baxter (1991) and Bertocci (1985) emphasize the importance of political parties in the opposition in Bangladesh. While the unions and human rights groups played an important role opposing military rule in Argentina, one cannot ignore the role of political parties (Munck, 1998). Furthermore, political parties played important roles in uprisings in the Dominican Republic (Gleijeses, 1978), Venezuela (Alexander, 1982) and Nepal (Shaha, 1978). Therefore, we can reject the possibility that political party-led dissent had no inﬂuence on the redemocratization process.

Why does Party-Led Dissent Sometimes Fail to Lead to Redemocratization? The primary finding above is that party-led dissent was necessary but not sufficient for redemocratization for the sample of countries analyzed. An important question remains, though – what distinguishes those cases in which party-led dissent contributed to an early democratization from those in which dissent failed to lead to early democratization? In other words, what factors combine with party-led dissent to lead to a rapid redemocratization, and which factors prevent a rapid redemocratization despite the presence of party-led dissent? While a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this project, I will consider some possible explanations. First the amount of party-led dissent may explain this variation. Coun- tries that experienced a high level of party-led dissent may have experienced an earlier redemocratization than countries that experienced a lower level of dissent. This possibility can be tested by observing the number of acts of dissent (the incidence of dissent) per year for two groups of countries – the early redemocratizers and the lingering authoritarians.5 The average incidence of dissent per year for the early redemocratizers was 3.22, compared to 3.90 acts of dissent per year for the lingering authoritarians.6 Clearly, this explanation is not supported by the data. A second possibility is that it is not just the amount of dissent but when this dissent occurs that influences the timing of redemocratization. Perhaps an early challenge, before an authoritarian regime can consolidate, is more likely to force a rapid return to democracy. The data for this sample support this possibility. Over the first three years of authoritarian rule, the early redemocratizers experienced an average of 7.8 acts of party-led dissent, 575 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 576

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whereas the lingering authoritarians experienced a mean of 3.13 acts of dissent. Thus, challenging an authoritarian regime soon after it is established may make a relatively quick return to democracy more likely. Third, political party participation in dissent may interact with the level of governmental instability to cause a relatively rapid return to democracy. Thus, a united authoritarian government may be able to withstand a great deal of dissent, but when an authoritarian government faces internal instability combined with party-sponsored pressure from below, it may be forced to step down. The early redemocratizers in this sample had a slightly higher average level of governmental instability, with an average governmental instability score of 1.74, compared to 1.44 for the lingering authoritarians. While the early democratizers have the predicted higher level, this difference is rather small.7 Still, in certain cases, the level of governmental instability did seem to have a substantial impact on whether party-led dissent was able to force a return to democracy. A comparison of Chile and Argentina illustrates this. Both countries had harsh military regimes established in the 1970s. Several Chilean parties, organized into centrist and leftist coalitions, sponsored a large-scale campaign of demonstrations in 1983–4. However, President Pinochet refused to give in to demands for a political opening (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991). In Argentina, following four years of military rule, the Radicals, Peronists and smaller parties organized a coalition known as the Multipartidaria, which staged massive protests in 1982 and 1983 (Munck, 1998). The dis- astrous confrontation with Britain over the Falklands/Malvinas islands, resulting in military defeat for Argentina, clearly played a significant role in the collapse of the military regime. However, Munck (1998) argues that the societal opposition (including the Multipartidaria) played an important role in pressuring the military leaders into taking the risky move of confronting Britain. Parties were not the only opposition actors, but they were an important actor in pressuring the military, rejecting military proposals and steering the transition process on a more democratic course. Thus, party- led protest played a significant role in leading to a return to democracy in Argentina, but in the period examined for Chile, a campaign of party-led dissent was unable to press for a return to democracy. Relative levels of instability in the governing coalition provide a plausible explanation for these different results of party-led dissent. Argentina’s military experienced increasingly sharp divisions between moderates and hard- liners which were reflected in alternation of presidents. Furthermore, interservice rivalry intensified after defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war (Munck, 1998). In Chile, Pinochet, utilizing a variety of Machiavellian tech- niques, was capable of neutralizing all potential rivals within the military, putting himself in a very secure position of authority (Constable and Valen- zuela, 1991). Thus, Pinochet could withstand the protests organized by political parties. Overall, these cases lend credence to Mainwaring’s (1992) argument that it is a combination of divisions in the authoritarian coalition 576 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 577

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and opposition, including mass mobilization, that opens the democratization process. However, the small differences in average governmental instability between the early redemocratizers and the lingering authoritarians indicates that other factors affect the impact of party-led dissent on redemocratization for some of these cases. Another important factor affecting the impact of party-led dissent on redemocratization may be the extent to which the opposition is uniﬁed. As mentioned above, Argentina’s two largest parties, the Peronists and Radicals, joined forces in the Multipartidaria (Munck, 1998). The two largest parties in Bangladesh, the Awami League and the BNP, were each able to organize most of the smaller parties into separate coalitions, and at the period leading up to the protest movement of 1990 these two coalitions were able to unite (Baxter, 1991). Likewise, the leading political parties in Venezuela formed the Junta Patriotica in 1957 to coordinate resistance to the dictatorship of Perez Jimenez (Alexander, 1982). The political parties in these countries were able to present a united opposition that contributed to isolating authoritarian leaders and pressing them to accept a return to democracy. The Chilean parties also organized coalitions, but a critical sticking point was disagreement between the Communist Party and the Christian Democratic Party over the proper oppositional tactics (Constable and Valenzuela, 1991). The Com- munists favored all forms of actions, including violence, while the Christian Democrats rejected violence. This prevented a coalition between the primary centrist party in Chile and one of the two major leftist parties. Finally, the international political context can have important conse- quences on the effectiveness of party-led dissent in pressuring for redemocratization. Nepal serves as an excellent example of this. The Nepali Congress Party formed Nepal’s ﬁrst democratically elected government in 1959. It lasted just over a year, before being overthrown by King Mahen- dra in 1960. Prime Minister Nehru of India strongly disapproved of this action and the Indian government allowed the Nepali Congress Party to use Indian soil as a base from which to launch attacks against the new authoritarian government in Nepal. So, with India’s permission, the Nepali Con- gress Party organized a massive campaign of violent raids into Nepal in 1961 and 1962. Nepal responded by establishing closer relations with China. After a Chinese military attack on India in 1962, India pushed for an end to the attacks into Nepal. Thus, international support greatly facili- tated resistance by the Nepali Congress Party, but diplomatic maneuvers by the governments of Nepal, India and China, forced an end to the movement for restoration of democracy (Shaha, 1978).

Conclusions

Scholars have long argued that political parties play important roles in the development and functioning of a democratic system. This research considers 577 03 Franklin (JB/D) 30/8/01 2:10 pm Page 578

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another role of political parties – helping to re-establish democracy through direct action. An examination of 22 countries that experienced the breakdown of democracy and establishment of an authoritarian regime shows that an early redemocratization did not occur in countries in which party-led dissent was absent. However, political party-led dissent does not always lead to redemocratization, nor should we conclude that the presence of party-led dissent alone leads to redemocratization. Some consideration is given here to other factors that may combine with the presence of party-led dissent in causing authoritarian leaders to relent and allow a return to democracy. These possible factors include the timing of dissent, the level of instability in the authoritarian government, the level of unity in the opposition, and the international political context. More research focusing on particular cases is necessary to ascertain the nature of the impact of party-led dissent on redemocratization. Finally, an important future task is to examine the role of social movement organizations as well as parties in pressuring for a return to democracy.

Notes

The author would like to thank Robert Harmel for his helpful comments and Whitney Franklin for her skillful editing.

1 The focus here is on redemocratization, because countries that have not previously experienced democracy are less likely to have opposition parties resisting authoritarian rule. The analysis of redemocratization is important for understanding democratization, because 20 of the 35 countries that Huntington (1991) identi- fies as part of the most recent third wave of democratization had previously experienced democracy. 2 The following three groups of countries were omitted: countries with a population of less than one million, those that gained independence after 1985, and advanced, industrialized democracies. The last-mentioned group was identified as the 21 long-term democracies listed by Lijphart (1984). 3 The median duration of authoritarian regimes in the sample is 12 years. The rounded-off value of 10 years was more desirable, though, because the distri- bution has a more natural cut-off at 10 years. 4 The original sample had 24 countries; Sudan and Myanmar were omitted because their authoritarian regimes were established too recently to allow observation of 10 consecutive years. 5 The early redemocratizers comprise Argentina, Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Greece, India, Korea, Turkey and Venezuela. The lingering authoritarians comprise Bolivia, Chile, Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, Uruguay and Zambia. 6 These figures aggregate the total incidence of party-led dissent across all parties analyzed in each country. 7 The difference of 0.3 between these means is far smaller than the standard deviation of 1.26 for governmental instability.

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JAMES FRANKLIN is Assistant Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan University. He has published an article on political repression in Compara- tive Political Studies. He continues to engage in research on political parties, contentious politics and democratization. ADDRESS: Department of Politics and Government, EL 201, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH 43015 [email: [email protected]]

Paper submitted 20 December 1999; accepted for publication 16 March 2000.

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