The Public's Influence on Ronald Reagan's Strategic Relationship with South Africa
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Georgia Southern University Digital Commons@Georgia Southern Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of Spring 2021 Cannot Afford to Publicly Surrender: The Public's Influence on Ronald Reagan's Strategic Relationship with South Africa Jessica P. Forsee Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd Part of the African History Commons, American Politics Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Forsee, Jessica P., "Cannot Afford to Publicly Surrender: The Public's Influence on Ronald Reagan's Strategic Relationship with South Africa" (2021). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2226. https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/2226 This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CANNOT AFFORD TO PUBLICLY SURRENDER: THE PUBLIC’S INFLUENCE ON RONALD REAGAN’S STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA by JESSICA PATTON FORSEE (Under the Direction of Julie de Chantal) ABSTRACT Reagan’s administration used the policy of constructive engagement to bring gradual reform to the apartheid system and build peace in the southern African region. The coordination of anti- apartheid activist organizations and members advocating for harsher economic pressure on South Africa successfully raised US public awareness and shifted public opinion against constructive engagement’s gradualist policies. As a result, leading Reagan staffers like Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker recalibrated constructive engagement’s focus to quicken regional peacebuilding maintain stability and control of US foreign policy in the public eye. This thesis analyzes the early influences on constructive engagement and Reagan’s efforts to maintain economic gradualism while emphasizing the role of US anti-apartheid activists as active agents of change in Reagan’s policies towards South Africa. “Cannot Afford to Publicly Surrender” focuses on how Reagan staffers and anti-apartheid activists used public mediums as stages for their respective agendas on US foreign policy. INDEX WORDS: Ronald Reagan, Chester Crocker, Constructive engagement, US Foreign Policy, Public perception, Apartheid South Africa, Anti-apartheid activism, Foreign policy influences, 1980s CANNOT AFFORD TO PUBLICLY SURRENDER: THE PUBLIC’S INFLUENCE ON RONALD REAGAN’S STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA by JESSICA PATTON FORSEE B.A, Georgia Southern University, 2019 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS COLLEGE OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES © 2021 JESSICA PATTON FORSEE All Rights Reserved 1 CANNOT AFFORD TO PUBLICLY SURRENDER: THE PUBLIC’S INFLUENCE ON RONALD REAGAN’S STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA by JESSICA PATTON FORSEE Major Professor: Julie de Chantal Committee: Cathy Skidmore-Hess Mao Lin Electronic Version Approved: May 2021 2 DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my family and friends, who patiently helped me through the writing process in phone calls and message check-ins. In all honesty, without the following individuals, words would have never made it on these pages: Jacob, Alyssa, and Craig. My fiancé Jacob Turner’s encouragement reminds me every day that good scholarship is not done in isolation and to celebrate those little moments of life. Alyssa Windsor is a research partner unlike any other and whose company I will always cherish in the research rooms and at the dinner table. I am eternally thankful for the early support to “go nuclear!” and pursue this research by the brightest light in Georgia Southern’s History Department, Dr. Craig Roell. It is true one can be a historian and hopeful at the same time and Dr. Roell was the epitome of hope. His lessons are something I will carry with me throughout my career and life; and for that, I dedicate this thesis as case study of hope to Craig. It is my intention that this work provides a historical example on how a shared vision of hope for a new South Africa successfully revised a formerly unmoving US foreign policy, with little credit to those who envisioned it. Ubuntu, friends. 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Within the many footnotes in these pages, one can never fully acknowledge the village it took to bring this thesis into existence. The attempt to do so begins with the people and institutions listed. I want to first recognize the Georgia Southern University History Department for the support I received from the time my application to the completion of this thesis. Each of my professors shaped my training as a historian for the better. I am grateful for the members of my committee, Drs. Julie de Chantal, Cathy Skidmore-Hess, and Mao Lin. They patiently read long-winded sentences, picked my brain for the better, and pushed me in my professional and personal development. The Graduate Student Professional Development Fund, through the Georgia Southern University Graduate Student Organization, financially aided my travel and transportation to the Reagan Presidential Library to conduct this research in January 2020 prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The archival staff of the Reagan Presidential Library, including Kelly Barton, were helpful to this research project from my first email to the end. The countless digital collections and librarians I reached out to are owed another critical by-line to this research done during uncertain times. The community I found in the anti-apartheid movement was unparalleled and for that reason, I am indebted to Elizabeth Schmidt, Prexy Nesbitt, and William Minter for taking the time to introduce me to it and will carry our conversations with me for life. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...................................................................................................................3 ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................................................5 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................6 Historiographical Context.....................................................................................................9 Sources………………….....................................................................................................15 Statement of Thesis……......................................................................................................17 Organization…….................................................................................................................18 2 CULTIVATING CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT ...........................................................21 Introduction...........................................................................................................................21 1980 Campaign Influences: Anti-Communist and Anti-Carter............................................23 Opposition during the 1980 Election: Divestment Discontent.............................................27 Reagan Elected and Crocker’s Initial Influence...................................................................31 Pretoria’s Gradual Reforms and Nuclear Power Matches Reagan’s Early Rhetoric............33 US Policy to South Africa Policy Formulation Period.........................................................37 Conservative Schisms Emerging During Policy Formulation..............................................42 South African Officials Attempt to Influence Policy Formation..........................................44 South African Undeterred Aggression..................................................................................50 3 THE ECONOMIC DISCORD OVER CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT...........................54 Introduction...........................................................................................................................54 Congressional and Executive Strategic Resource and Policy Concerns...............................55 Anti-Apartheid Activists Use of the Strategic Resources.....................................................61 Regional Peace Attempts and Setbacks.................................................................................65 4 THE DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGN AND 1984 ELECTION IMPACT..........................72 Introduction............................................................................................................................72 Divestment Efforts.................................................................................................................74 The 1984 Election..................................................................................................................75 Domestic Struggle for Good Publicity...................................................................................80 The ‘New Manifesto’ and Public Management of Anti-Apartheid Sentiment............87 Reactions to Executive Order 12532......................................................................................93 5 DELIBERATE REFRAMING OF US POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA.........................98 Introduction............................................................................................................................98