U.S. Optimism on Namibia Losing Credibility

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U.S. Optimism on Namibia Losing Credibility Vol. 2, No. 4 Summer 1982 The Black American Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean military build-up inside Namibia ... new airports and military bases are be~ ing constructed and aggression against COMOROS the people of Angola continues daily.'' Mo~o~ While the military activities of South Africa tend to contradict the US state­ ments on Pretoria's intentions, the M(JADAGASfAR stated achievements in the talks them­ ananvo selves have recently come under ques­ tion. Phase I of the negotiations, which addresses the issues of Constitutional Principles to guarantee white minority rights and the electoral system, is still unfinished. Though the Contact Group had the Security Council circulate a document said to represent the agreed upon Con­ Southern A/rica stitutional Principles, it does not accu­ rately reflect the final agreements .._....... reached earlier this year. The docu­ ment omits 3 important provisions re­ SWAPO President Sam Nujoma: ''The occupation forces are still expanding'' lating to the relationship between the three branches of government (which was to be defined by the Constituent U.S. OPTIMISM ON NAMIBIA Assembly); the restructuring of the LOSING CREDIBILITY Public, Police and Defense services; and, the establishment of local councils The State Department continues to write the new nation's constitution. or regional administration only by an speak optimistically about prospects What has held up Namibia's transition act of parliament. for a Namibia settlement despite the to statehood is South Africa's refusal The electoral issue was said to be passage of a mid-August target date to begin the implementation of near resolution when South Africa for concluding an agreement in the 4 UNSCR435. dropped its insistance on a mixed year old talks and ending the 16 year The US has recently argued that system of proportional representation old military struggle against South South Africa is now willing to proceed and single member districts combined. Africa's illegal occupation of the ter­ with the plan for reasons of self­ But they have thus far refused to ritory. interest such as the cost of the war and choose between the two. A rapid completion of the negotia­ the decline in South Africa's economy. On Phase II issues there seems to be tions conducted by the US led Western They also state that South African ob­ more agreement. The size and make up Contact Group between the South jections regarding implementation of the military component of the UN West Africa People's Organization, have been all but resolved leaving only Transitional Assistance Group (UN­ the African Frontline states and South details to be worked out. T AG) is nearly finalized with four of Africa would start the 7 month process The American optimistic assessment the s~ven nations to participate already leading to elections in Namibia as is not, however, shared by SW APO or named, an upper limit of 7500 troops outlined in United Nations Security the Frontline states. In an interview has been confirmed and the UN Secre­ Council Resolution 435 perhaps in with TransAfrica, in Tripoli during the tariat is working out the other details. April of next year. attempted Organization of African SW APO appears to have accepted UN­ The UN plan, accepted in 1978 by all Unity summit, SW APO President Sam T AG monitoring of bases in Angola ' parties, provides the formula for a Nujoma said, "The South African and Zambia and the South African transition from colonial occupation to racist regime has no intention of relin­ posed question of UN impartiality in independence in Namibia. It calls for quishing its colonial domination over its supervisory role has been satisfied internationally supervised elections for Namibia." He added that, "The occu­ through report language to the Security a Constituent Assembly empowered to pation forces are still expanding their (continued on page 8) Guest Editorial NAMIBIA: US DIPLOMACY OR DUPLICITY? By Walter Fauntroy The State Department's 3 month old massive South African invasion of the also mean, among other things, the end optimism that a Namibia settlement is former Portuguese colony of the verge of the Western Contact Group as near at hand will soon be put to the of its independence. Though a reduc­ France, Canada and West Germany final test as the US led Western Con­ tion of their presence has been initiated have all indicated they will not con­ tact Group attempts to resolve the few on several occasions, continual South tinue with the negotiations if imple­ remaining problems in the talks be­ African attacks have caused the mentation is not begun this year. tween SWAPO, the African Frontline Angolans to ask the Cubans to remain. Should this occur it will become neces­ states and South Africa, and gain a UN They do so only at the wish of the sary for the international community Security Council implementing resolu­ Angolan government and it is therefore to seek another strategy to achieve tion to set the transition plan in mo­ solely a bilateral matter between two Namibian independence and com­ tion. For lack of a clear indication of sovereign nations. prehensive sanctions under chapter South Africa's willingness to end its il­ The issue of the Cuban presence in seven of the UN Charter appears to be legal occupation of Namibia, the State Angola has never been a part of the the only alternative. The US has tradi­ Department's optimism is shared by negotiations for Namibia's indepen- ' tionally vetoed all such resolutions but few other parties to the negotiations. dence, it is nowhere mentioned in the another veto following a failure to gain In fact, for the Africans involved there UN settlement plan (Security Council South Africa's withdrawal from Nami­ is a strong sense of Deja vu. Unlike the Resolution 435) adopted by all parties, bia would be particularly invidious and Reagan administration, they have been including South Africa, in 1978 and unjustifiable. to the point of imminent settlement none of the other 4 members of the While the armed struggle to liberate before only to see the South Africans Western Contact Group had ever rais­ Namibia is bound to escalate if South back down and increase their military ed the issue to be considered as a part Africa's occupation continues, the US presence in Namibia and their destabi­ of the Namibia talks. can either support the call for sanctions lization efforts against their neighbors It is unforgiveable that the US would or be responsible for a protracted war instead. provide South Africa a stalling tactic costing thousands their lives and for Yet we are hopeful, if not optimistic, by trying to introduce this issue, which continuing to deny one million black that a speedy conclusion to the talks is essentially an internal matter for people their right to self-determina­ can be achieved allowing the people of Angola, into the negotiations, thereby tion. Namibia to gain their right to self­ subordinating the US commitment to The basis for the Reagan administra­ determination that they have struggled the Namibian people's independence to tion's "constructive engagement" for against colonial oppression for some backward strategic objective. It is policy toward South Africa is its per­ nearly l 00 years and which for the past even worse that the South African's ception of "shared strategic concerns" 16 years they have waged a costly have said that their newfound flexibili­ in the region and the secondary argu­ armed struggle. Namibia's independ­ ty in the talks is based on a US ment that it is easier to influence na­ ence would also provide us diplomacy assurance that the Cuban question will tions that we have good relations with. with some credibility in Africa, which be resolved if Namibia is to be indepen­ South Africa has used this policy to it is sorely lacking at present. It would dent. That the administration would (continued on page 8) equally allow us, and the international offer such an assurance is very disturb­ community generally, to focus our at­ ing particularly in the absence of any tention and resources on working for US/Angolan agreement on this issue majority rule in apartheid South Africa and while ongoing talks between the itself. two countries have thus far produced The principal doubt about South no progress on the issue. Africa's commitment to begin imple­ This style of diplomacy has led a mentation of the 4 year old UN settle­ number of observers to argue that the ment plan derives from Pretoria's in­ US is being duplicitous and that the op­ sistance on a withdrawal of the Cuban timism and near completion of the , troo·ps in Angola as a part of any m;gotiations will eventually be ex­ agreement. Here they have seized upon plained away by blaming Angola for a position taken by the Reagan ad­ any failure to reach a settlement. Such ministration, albeit incorrect and self­ a characterization should be rejected defeating, that the principal threat to by the informed American public as it stability and development in southern will most certainly be rejected by the Africa is the presence of Cuban troops international community. For if the - and the bogeyman of "communist ex­ current talks do fail it will be because pansion." of the same South African intran­ The Cubans arrived in Angola in sigence that has undermined all settle­ 1975 at the invitation of the late Presi­ ment attempts in the past. FAUNTROY: "For the Africans dent Augostino Neto to help defeat a A failure to reach an agreement will there's a sense of Deja vu." 2 TRANSAFRICA NEWS • SUMMER 1982 Country Profile GUYANA: GIVING SOCIALISM A BAD NAME "In Guyana, there is today a fundamental crisis ..
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