Liberal Environmentalism and Global Environmental Governance • Steven Bernstein

Introduction StevenLiberal BernsteinEnvironmentalism and Global Environmental Governance The legacy of the decisions taken at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and the ideas that informed them remain powerfully in place 10 years later. This legacy—which Ilabel the “compromise of liberal environmentalism” 1—can be found in the ideas that undergird many of the most important and far reaching international environmental treaties such as those on climate change and biodiversity. It is also present in the policies and programs of international environment and development organizations ranging from the United Nations En- vironment Programme to the World Bank, as well as throughout the United Na- tions system as a whole, and in the way powerful non-environmental organizations such as the World Trade Organization—which increasingly ªnds itself making decisions with potential environmental consequences—try to respond to the demands to accommodate environmental and development concerns in their decisions and policies. Even many nongovernmental organizations rest their proposals for action on this normative basis, as do many states in their domestic policies. The norms of liberal environmentalism predicate international environmental protection on the promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order. That this is now the accepted basis of much international environmental governance may seem mundane to some who view the triumph of neo-liberal- ism to be nearly so complete as to comprise a global constitutional order.2 Yet, others question whether environmental agreements or concerns can in practice be anything other than a threat or limit to policies such as free trade and unfet- tered corporate freedom. From both environmental and free trade camps, these critics might question the utility or practicality of linking the environment with other values, especially economic growth and liberal markets, and indeed many doubt such a linkage actually exists.

1. For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Bernstein, 2001. Ithank Peter Dauvergne, the edi - tor of GEP, for this opportunity to summarize some of the central claims of the book and the implications of liberal environmentalism for the future of environmental governance. 2. Gill 2000.

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Both positions miss the big picture of what has already occurred in global environmental governance. Whereas the acceptance of neo-liberal economic norms has been one of the major causes of the transformation of global environmental governance, it has not eclipsed it. To the contrary, the shift to liberal environmentalism has enabled environmental concerns to rise to a much more prominent place on the international agenda than would otherwise have been possible, even if the original goals and transformative hopes of global environmentalism have been altered in the process. To critics of these linkages, my argument is simply that a close look at the actual content of international environmental activities reveals that norms of liberal environmentalism have gained wide acceptance as the legitimate underpinning of those policies. To be clear, what follows is not an endorsement of these linkages. Rather, my purpose is to show that the institutions that have developed in response to global environmental problems support particular kinds of values and goals, with important implications for the constraints and opportunities to combat the world’s most serious environmental problems. The argument proceeds in three parts. First, liberal environmental norms are identiªed as the current basis of global environmental governance, which reºect a signiªcant shift from earlier bases of environmental governance. Sec- ond, Ioffer an explanation for that shift that focuses on the interaction of new ideas with underlying sets of institutionalized political and economic norms in the international system. Third, Ioutline the policy implications of both this institutional view of global governance and of liberal environmentalism speci- ªcally. Writing in the midst of a new round of global negotiations to put into practice the promises made at Rio, and given that there is little indication to date that any major party engaged in the upcoming World Summit on Sustain- able Development process is willing to challenge this compromise, a realistic assessment of why environmental governance has evolved in this direction, and the implications of that evolution, seems especially urgent.

Liberal Environmentalism Norms are shared conceptions of appropriate behaviour or action. In the context of global governance, they deªne, regulate, and legitimate state (and other key actors’) identities, interests and behaviour. The importance of norms in policy comes from their institutionalization, which concerns the perceived legitimacy of the norm as embodied in law, institutions or public discourse, even if not all relevant actors follow it.3 As such, norms are central to all governance structures since governance ultimately concerns the steering of actors towards collective or shared goals and values.4 The current dominant set of governing norms evolved out of a series of North-South compromises, but also owing to an ideational shift in how the in-

3. Jepperson et al. 1996, 54, footnote 69; Onuf 1997, 17; and Busumtwi-Sam and Bernstein 1997. 4. Rosenau 1995.

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ternational community framed environmental issues and responses to them over the last 30 years. It is easy to forget that this formulation of the environmental problematique differs substantially from the dominant views held when the ªrst concerted efforts at wide-scale global responses to environmental problems began in the late 1960s and early 1970s. From the perspective of those earlier efforts, which focused on the negative environmental consequences of un- regulated industrial development and were suspicious of economic growth, the shift in environmental governance is a remarkable and a largely unforeseen de- parture. For example, the philosophical statement of planetary concern commissioned for the ªrst global environmental conference—the 1972 United Na- tions Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm—included calls for a “loyalty to the Earth” that recognized planetary interdependence of all life, the adoption of global (as opposed to national) responses to environmental problems, and massive changes in over-consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy. High proªle studies such as The Limits to Growth took an even tougher stand against over-consumption and warned that growth in population and production could not continue on course without leading to the collapse of social and economic systems.5 However, actual international political responses, beginning with the Stockholm Conference, very quickly began to reºect underlying tensions between North and South, and especially highlighted concerns in the South over what was perceived to be lifeboat ethics, and an unwillingness to give up state sovereignty over resources and policy. Table 1, below, summarizes the key norms of environmental governance over the last 30 years, beginning with those expressed in the 26 principles of the Declaration on the Human Environment, the main statement of governing norms from the Stockholm Conference. There, developing countries succeeded in placing concerns about economic growth on the agenda, but ideas to link environment and development had not yet been formulated. As a result, a weak compromise focusing on environmental protection6 prevailed, consistent with the view of Western environmentalists that development and environmental protection are different, often competing tasks. Attempts to further institutionalize environmental governance concen- trated on ways to reconcile competing sets of environment and development norms introduced at Stockholm. “Sustainable development” emerged in the 1980s as that breakthrough idea, becoming the dominant conceptual framework for responses to international environmental problems and capturing the imagination of world opinion. As promoted by the World Commission on En- vironment and Development (WCED),7 the concept aimed to legitimate eco-

5. Meadows et al. 1972. 6. The term admittedly does not capture the uneasy mix of conservation, economic development, sovereignty, and state responsibility norms that characterized Stockholm outcomes, but is consistent with the label most analyses use to capture the orientation toward environmental governance promoted there. 7. WCED 1987.

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nomic growth in the context of environmental protection—a major shift in framing environmental problems since Stockholm. Column 2 of Table 1 high- lights the norms promoted in the WCED or Brundtland report. By Rio, a further shift had occurred along one pathway enabled by the sustainable development concept. Rio institutionalized the view that liberalization in trade and ªnance is consistent with, and even necessary for, international environmental protection, and that both are compatible with the overarching goal of sustained economic growth. Thus, the Earth Summit embraced, and perhaps even catalyzed, the new economic orthodoxy then sweeping through the developing world.8 These norms are embodied most explicitly in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development—“the one ‘product’ of UNCED [the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development] designed precisely to embody rules and principles of a general and universal nature to govern the future conduct and cooperation of States. . . .”9 The main elements of the speciªc compromise institutionalized at Rio include state sovereignty over resources (and environment and development policies) within a particular state’s borders on the political side, the promotion of global free trade and open markets on the economic side, and the polluter pays principle (and its implicit support of market instruments over strict regulatory mechanisms) and the precautionary principle on the management side. For example, according to Principle 12: “States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation.” The polluter pays principle refers to the idea that the polluting ªrm ought to shoulder the costs of pollution or environmental damage by including it in the price of a product. Ideally price signals would reºect the real costs of pollution. This principle thus favors market mechanisms (such as tradable pollution permits or privatization of the commons) since they operate by institutionalizing schemes that incorporate environmental costs into prices. It also promotes an end to market-distorting subsidies and, generally, a smooth operation of the market consistent with environmental protection. The precautionary principle is a norm concerning risk under uncertainty that essentially says that under conditions of risk of serious environmental harm, a precautionary stance is warranted under conditions of uncertainty. Scholars may disagree on the merits of UNCED outcomes, but most acknowl- edge that a new regime or international law of sustainable development became institutionalized.10 Table 1, column three summarizes these norms, with principles in brackets referring to the Rio Declaration. States subsequently re-afªrmed these norms at the 1997 UN General As- sembly Special Session to review the implementation of Agenda 21 (the de-

8. Biersteker 1992. 9. Pallemaerts 1994, 1. 10. Spector et al. 1994; Sand 1993; and Pallemaerts 1996.

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Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/152638002320310509 by guest on 01 October 2021 6 • Liberal Environmentalism and Global Environmental Governance UNCED 1992 4. Transfers left primarily to market mechanisms, except for least developed countries. 5. Same as WCED plus humantered cen- development. (Principles 1, 7, and 27). 6. Market mechanisms favored. PPP and precautionary principle. (Princi- ples 16 and 15). WCED 1987 4. Unchanged plus speciªc proposals such as a tax on usecommons. of the global 6. Mix of command-and-control and market mechanisms. Polluter pays principle (PPP) endorsed. 5. Multilateral cooperation for global economic growth as necessary for other goals. Stockholm 1972 6. Command-and-control methods of regulation favored over market al- location in national and international planning. (Principles 13 and 14). Environmental Protection Managed Sustainable Growth Liberal Environmentalism 5. States should cooperate to con- serve and enhance global resource base. (Principles 1–7 and 24). 4. Environmental protection requires substantial transfers of technology and resources to developing countries. (Principles 9 and 20). (continued) orm-Complex Environmental Management N Table 1 Source: Reproduced from Bernstein 001, 109.

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tailed blueprint for action on environment and development adopted in 1992 at Rio). Some examples since the late 1980s of practices or institutions that incorporate these norms, or the general orientation to global environmental policy they legitimize, are the following: Agenda 21, especially chapter 8 which promotes market instruments and the integration of environment and development in decision making related action programs; a wide range of declaratory international law and customary international law (most notably, the norm of sovereignty over resources);11 the trend toward certiªcation and labeling of forest products as a way to internalize environmental costs and create market signals to consumers (where international regulatory solutions to forest protection have failed); widespread support for an end to environmentally unfriendly subsidies in a variety of UN programs and international agreements; World Bank policies and programs that emphasize the “win-win” opportunities of linking efªcient economic growth to environmental protection and the importance of assigning private property rights to ensure environmental protection;12 the ex- plosion of research on incentive-based instruments for environmental protection in a number of countries and internationally under sponsor-ship of organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and speciªc developments in international environmental agreements such as trading of CFC quotas under the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion.13 In addition, although still a major arena of contestation, discussions on trade and environment in the WTO and OECD have stressed the compatibility of trade liberalization and environmental protection, explicitly referring to Rio Principle 12 as a basis for legitimacy. Solutions to reconcile trade and environment again stress internalization of environmental costs, reduction of subsidies, and clarify- ing of intellectual and other property rights, and emphasize that unilateral measures or protectionism should be resisted.14 The argument is not that these norms are easily put into practice. Indeed, the tension between environment and trade/economic concerns remains present in many forums. Rather, the argument is that the framing and understanding of appropriate behavior on environmental issues in global environmental governance forums stems from these norms. Moreover, to the degree that practi- cal measures stray from these norms, agreement or ability to implement practi- cal responses will be difªcult and conºict-laden.

11. State sovereignty over resources is widely considered the foundational norm of international environmental law, existing in various forms in legal decisions and documents such as the UN charter, but stated explicitly beginning with UN General Assembly Resolution 1803/62 (1962) on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and later Principle 21 of the Stockholm Dec- laration on the Human Environment and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, which expanded it to include a sovereign right to exploit resources pursuant to a state’s own environment and development policies. See, for example, Sands et al. 1994, 7. 12. World Bank 1992. 13. See OECD 1998. Also see Bernstein 2001, chapter 3, for a detailed discussion of these trends. 14. For example, Reiterer 1997.

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Ideas, Institutions and the Selection of Environmental Norms Elsewhere Ihave detailed why norms associated with liberal environmentalism became institutionalized while other norms fell by the wayside.15 While space limitations prevent a full defense of that argument here, its central proposition is that new ideas must ªnd some “ªtness” with the existing international social structure—or broader sets of institutionalized norms already accepted as legitimate bases of governance in the international system. Thus ideas and agency are important in the formulation of creative proposals to address global problems, but these ideas interact with broader social structures in which they must ªnd a legitimate basis, or ªtness, in order to be acceptable to relevant communities. I call this a “socio-evolutionary” explanation for the selection of norms, owing to its emphasis on the ªtness of proposals for new norms with underlying shifts in the broader normative environment.16 Notably, alternative positions to liberal environmentalism have abounded (and continue to be proposed), including even proposals for an end to private property, community rights to enforce standards, or ideas that support a “green” international political economy.17 The latter, for example, proposes that the world political economy ought to resemble a neo-medieval structure wherein self-regulating local communities run their own economies, regulated by decen- tralized institutional arrangements, and a global civil society controls the worst global environmental problems. Why then, did liberal environmentalism pre- vail? In this case, policy entrepreneurs, working through the OECD and Brundtland Commission, succeeded best at moving a concern for the environment into the mainstream of international politics when they nested environmental norms into the broader international social structure, even as that structure evolved to reºect a new consensus on a liberal economic order. The OECD in Paris, acting in this case as a research organization and policy entrepreneur, not simply as a club of economic powers, played a pivotal role in reframing the problem of environment and development.18 Its development of the polluter pays principle between 1972–1974 created an intellectual basis on which to build future policies.19 The key event that brought these ideas into the mainstream of public policy came in 1984 when Environment Director Jim MacNeill organized the “Environment and Economics” conference. The conference em-

15. Bernstein 2000. 16. The idea of “social” ªtness builds most directly on Weber 1994, Florini 1996, and March and Olsen 1998, and is inºuenced more broadly by sociological institutionalism and constructiv- ism in International Relations, which have emphasized the importance of institutional environ- ments as providing or constituting legitimate or appropriate bases of action. 17. Caponera 1972; and Helleiner 1996. 18. The following analysis is based in part on interviews with Jim MacNeill, OECD environment director 1978–1984 and secretary-general of the Brundtland Commission, and Maurice Strong, a commissioner and secretary-general of the Stockholm and Rio conferences, conducted in 1995 and 1996, respectively. 19. OECD 1975.

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phasized the desirability of strengthening the reciprocal positive linkages between environmental protection policies and economic growth, and the role of economic instruments, which it found were more efªcient and more appropriate for preventative policies.20 Attendees included ministerial-level representa- tives from member governments, business and environmental leaders, and aca- demics, whom it tried to sway in the direction of the OECD environment committee’s vision. Gro Harlem Brundtland chose MacNeill as secretary general of her commission (after serving as Norway’s representative to the OECD committee), ensuring that the OECD’s conclusions on sustainable development would be a major inºuence on the outcome. Compared to earlier formulations of the sustainable development concept, the Brundtland report, Our Common Future, begins with the imperative of economic growth, and then moves to the question about how to make it sustainable. In the late 1980s, a hospitable normative environment for the Brundtland Commission’s ideas that formed the basis of liberal environmentalism took hold, manifest in the new near-universal consensus on the emerging liberal economic order, most apparent in the IMF and World Bank programs to combat developing country debt. Developing country identities in many cases were sim- ilarly undergoing a shift from identiªcation with a program for a New Interna- tional Economic Order to identities more consistent with participation in a liberal international political economy. Whether by will or submission, the general trend toward the retreat of the state from the economy, opening ªnancial markets, promoting free trade, and acceptance of market forces as the main engine of economic growth gained wide (if sometimes grudging) acceptance in North and South alike, even in many formerly socialist economies.21 Meanwhile, deeper norms of state identity and sovereignty deªned in terms of non-intervention and anti-colonialism22 militated against institutionalizing ideas or governance proposals that challenged state sovereignty from above. These included global management schemes that appeared to grant ex- tensive authority to transnational institutions for science, a centralization of international decision-making authority, or, alternatively, support for a more general social movement to increase democratization and common culture at the global level. Various strands of environmental thought had long endorsed such changes, viewing states as inappropriate sites for (or sources of) environmental management, and supporting the creation of a more cosmopolitan world order, possibly “pushing the nation-state system...somewhat from the center of world political order.”23 Instead, actual responses have been mostly consistent with sovereign authority and in opposition to global management (except by sovereign states), even if entering into agreements by deªnition relinquishes

20. OECD 1985. 21. Biersteker 1992; Busumtwi-Sam 1995; and Rodrik 1994. 22. What Robert Jackson (1990) characterizes as “negative” sovereignty. 23. Deudney 1993, 301, who sees in “green culture” some “of the major ingredients lacking in pre- vious cosmopolitan alternatives to nationalism.” Also Ward and Dubos 1972.

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state autonomy to varying degrees. In addition, most of the institution-building in response to global environmental concerns has occurred within the conªnes of traditional sovereign-state diplomacy.24 In addition to ªnding synergies with a growing consensus about proper economic conduct among major states in the North and South, sustainable development ideas found support within other UN institutions previously reluc- tant to incorporate environmental concerns, such as the World Bank, which could now formulate environmental policies that it viewed as consistent with its broader goals of promoting economic growth and liberalization.

Implications and Prospects for Global Environmental Governance If the above analysis is correct, the same logic that led to the institutionalization of liberal environmentalism has implications for the development of responses to particular environmental problems. On one hand, the evolution of possible management regimes for global environmental problems should be expected to occur within the opportunities and constraints of liberal environmentalism. On the other hand, in cases where solutions to international environmental problems that ªt within liberal environmentalism are evasive, international cooperation is likely to remain difªcult. Two prominent examples illustrate these effects. Perhaps no better example of the effects of liberal environmentalism exists than the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The compromise behind the Protocol links quantitative reductions or limits in greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries to three main market mechanisms that involve transferring “credits” for emissions to help countries meet their targets: emission trading among developed countries; joint implementation (JI) among developed countries, where emission reductions ªnanced by foreign investments would be credited to the source country; and a clean development mechanism (CDM) to ªnance projects in developing countries, where the investor, from a developed country, would receive “certiªed emissions credits” for emission reductions produced by the project in the developing country. The Kyoto mechanisms all work on the same basic principle: that assigning property rights to emissions and creating a market that allows them to be transferred will enable emission reductions to be achieved where it is most efªcient, or cheapest, to do so. They can be considered “market” or “incentive-based” mechanisms because they rely on the establishment of a market for emission credits to create price signals, and thus incentives, for buyers, sell- ers and investors, as long as abatement costs vary across countries. Recent con- cessions on carbon sequestration or “sinks,” agreed to in Bonn (in July, 2001) in order to pave the way toward ratiªcation (minus the United States) work under a similar logic, in that they generate credits toward reduction targets and will be eligible under the CDM. Indeed, the FCCC as a whole, as explicitly stated in Ar-

24. Litªn 1993; and Conca 1993.

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ticle 4(2) (a and b) rests on the link between developed countries “modifying” greenhouse gas emissions while recognizing inter alia “the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth.”25 It is still too early to know if the enabling conditions of liberal environmentalism have sufªciently shaped state interests in conformity with these norms or can overcome a variety of competing domestic constraints playing out in ratiªcation debates in many countries. The argument here is only that these normative conditions provided, and continue to provide, an opportunity for agreement on climate change that would have been more difªcult if liberal environmentalism had not prevailed. The irony may be that the kind of agreement enabled, as many critics maintain, may be vastly inadequate to signiªcantly forestall, let alone stop or reverse, current trends in greenhouse gas emissions that lead to climate change, especially if they enable only voluntary or incentive- based mechanisms domestically. No claim has been made that liberal environmentalism is the optimum solution for effective responses to climate change, only that any cooperative solution on the problem is most likely to be accepted if it ªts within this set of legitimated norms. The example of the lack of progress on a global convention on forest protection and use illustrates equally well the constraints liberal environmentalism produces. As the prospects for a global forest convention have dimmed, the trend toward certiªcation and labeling of forest products, as a way to internalize environmental costs in the absence of regulatory solutions to forest protection, has increased in legitimacy and viability. Such schemes operate in the market- place, sometimes with government involvement, although usually, as in the case of the most prominent transnational scheme—the NGO-led Forest Stewardship Council—without. Notably, much of the difªculty in reaching agreement on a global forest convention is precisely because states have been unable to formulate policies that do not conºict with key liberal environmental norms. For example, certiªcation is advantaged over multilateral diplomacy in the forestry case because it is a market-driven mechanism consistent with environmental cost internalization and the polluter pays principle. The logic of certiªcation is that ªrms internalize the costs of sustainable forest management through the requirements to gain a label, and the market operates to reward sustainable forest practices. Such a mechanism avoids politically charged debates in which developing countries in particular fear that the North will impose standards and unfair trade restrictions on developing countries, and challenge their sovereignty.26 By creating a normative environment conducive to viewing certiªcation and labelling schemes as legitimate means to addressing environmental prob-

25. For a fuller discussion of how the climate change regime is an attempt to implement liberal environmentalism, see Bernstein 2002. 26. Lipschutz 2001; and Humphreys 1999.

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lems, especially as compared to traditional forms of regulation of the command-and-control variety, liberal environmentalism makes it more difªcult for market players or states opposed to the schemes owing to short term interests, to make the case that others should not accept them.27 There are ironies and contradictions within liberal environmentalism as well. Whereas it opens up opportunities for new forms of management, and perhaps for democratic participation as well, it also reinforces the role of the market. Perhaps nowhere is this contradiction greatest than in the precautionary principle. On one hand, this norm ªts easily with the polluter pays principle and the logic of internalizing costs and market norms, since it encourages pollution prevention by incorporating costs up front rather than by means of end-of- pipe regulation.28 However, in practice, the precautionary principle politicizes decisions about risk under uncertainty, potentially empowering government regulation over powerful global institutions such as the WTO or some regional trade agreements. Such institutions currently put the onus on governments, under a high burden of scientiªc proof, to override liberal trade norms. The precautionary principle would reverse, or at least modify, the burden of proof from governments who want precaution to guide decisions on allowing products with potentially harmful effects into their markets, to exporters or producers to show their products are safe for human health and the environment. The 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety of the Convention on Bio- diversity is a prime example of how this tension has become manifest in practice. On one hand, it endorses a precautionary approach, stating that a lack of scientiªc certainty due to insufªcient information of the potential adverse effects on biodiversity shall not prevent a Party from taking a decision on living modiªed organisms (LMOs) under the Protocol. On the other hand, the protocol is to be mutually supportive with international trade agreements and it rec- ognizes WTO norms such as non-discrimination. Meanwhile, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement) of the WTO requires “sufªcient scientiªc evidence” to restrict trade for health reasons. Under these circumstances, the precautionary principle and liberal trade norms will uneasily co- exist in practice and conºicts over speciªc LMOs are likely.29 Whereas a prediction of how these tensions will play out is premature, the institutionalization of liberal environmentalism and unwillingness within organizations such as the WTO to admit that there are contradictions with norms such as the precautionary principle suggests that unilateral government regulation over and above agreed international standards will remain difªcult in the

27. Even with a normative context broadly conducive to the acceptance of such schemes, however, they must be designed to avoid running afoul of relevant international law, especially with highly institutionalized bodies of rules embodied in multilateral institutions. For a detailed discussion of the relationship of such schemes to multilateral institutions in trade and environment, see Bernstein and Cashore forthcoming. 28. See, for example, Costanza and Cornwell 1992. 29. IISD 2000.

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short term. Given the difªculty of changing current institutions and structures, nongovernmental groups and entrepreneurial leaders are turning to new institutions such as private regimes or voluntary schemes such as the Global Com- pact—a UN Secretariat-sponsored scheme that identiªes a set of human rights, labor and environmental norms based on existing UN agreements that corpora- tions can sign on to voluntarily.30 While this strategy may make some headway within liberal environmentalism, it is also subject to the limits of corporate self- regulation since the UN has no mandate to independently regulate private cor- porations. At the same time, some civil society groups, frustrated with the lim- ited ability of international institutions to address environmental concerns under the current governing arrangements, have begun to launch more radical forms of opposition to challenge the legitimacy of existing institutions. The wave of anti-neoliberal globalization protests have attempted to take advantage of contradictions within current norm-complexes, including liberal environmentalism, that promise the compatibility of liberal markets and goals such as environmental protection. Given that liberal environmentalism and international social structure more broadly has legitimated institutions such as the WTO, the argument here suggests that little normative leverage exists to counter the linkage of liberalization and environmental concerns, although to the degree that institutions in practice appear to produce consequences that belie this understanding, new ideas are likely to arise that may yet reveal and take advantage of contradictions in order to push for change.

Conclusions The focus on the normative basis of environmental governance, and global governance more broadly, opens the door to an exploration of what values institutions promote. Too much recent work on institutions in the rationalist tradition truncates these discussions by focusing exclusively on issues of design, which most often take the goals institutions pursue and the values they promote as given or unexplained. As Alexander Wendt has recently pointed out in a friendly critique of a volume devoted to institutional design in the rationalist tradition, it treats as exogenously settled many of the most important questions about international institutional design, namely about the constitution of its ends ...itishard not to feel that by the time this volume’s rational designers begin their deliberations much of the politics is over. 31 The focus on the normative underpinning of institutions asks this prior political question. Rather than assuming a well-designed institution is “good” because it facilitates cooperation, the focus on norms and institutionalization is a ªrst and necessary step to assess what kind of changes institutions are actually

30. Kell and Ruggie 1999; and Ruggie 2001. 31. Wendt 2001.

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promoting and their potential impacts on particular policies and outcomes. For example, it allows analysis of what a particular institution means for issues of equity (between generations, rich and poor states, societal groups, and so on), environmental quality, or cost-effectiveness. The rational institutionalist litera- ture, while it may address important questions concerning the requirements for cooperation or institutional stability, truncates debate on these fundamental issues at the heart of designing institutions to address global environmental problems. Ihave also tried to highlight that this view of institutions and institutional change is not simply normative, but can also explain the channeling of environmental governance toward liberal environmentalism. New ideas and the agents that carry them operate within a broader set of institutional constraints: social structure is seen to powerfully select certain ideas so that change, especially at deeper levels, generally occurs in a slow and evolutionary fashion. In this case, the consequence is that liberal environmentalism has resulted in enabling certain kinds of responses to global environmental problems consistent with it, such as possibilities for the privatization of environmental governance in some areas or the increasing use of market mechanisms. But at the same time it has made trade offs much more difªcult because it denies that they may be necessary among values of efªciency, economic growth, corporate freedom, and environmental protection. Liberal environmentalism risks justifying inaction if tough regulatory choices, which imply trade-offs with market values, are necessary to get the desired ecological effects. The broader picture of what Idescribe as liberal environmentalism suggests also that institutions that reºect this set of norms are not without contradictions. Creative actors might draw upon these contradictions or normative resources to push for change, but must do so within a broader normative environment. Given that environment, it is not surprising that agreement on the tough choices required for implementation of Agenda 21 is proving difªcult in the lead up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development, since it may be difªcult in practice to formulate speciªc responses to global environmental problems consistent with liberal environmentalism. Of course, action consistent with these norms may also prove disappointing, which may put further pressure on the compromise itself.

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