Inforj\Aation Issued by the Association of Jewish Refugees in Great Britain

$Inforj\Aation Issued by the Association of Jewish Refugees in Great Britain$ îS;;^ IH ^^^^Hg^^g^^^^^^^^â Vol. XV No. 4 April, 1960 INFORJ\AATION ISSUED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF JEWISH REFUGEES IN GREAT BRITAIN 8 FAIRFAX MANSIONS, Office and Consulting Hours : FINCHLEY ROAO (Corner Fairfax Road), LONDON, N.W.3 Monday to Thursday 10 a.m.— } p.m. 3—6 p.m. Telephone: MAIda Vale 9096^7 {General Office) Friday 10 a.m.—l p.m. MAIda Vale 4449 (Employnnent Agency and Social Services Dept.) Then Eden fought—and won—against Mr. LOOKING BACK AT SCEZ Dulles's " brinkmanship " with similar motivation as Dulles later adduced against Suez. Can he ti i"*^ '^^ '^'^ Four Summit approaching, poli- can deny that Nasser's diplomatic position is really have been misled by Dulles's ambiguity and 'cai anjj ffiilitary worries of the first magnitude today stronger, in spite of his military defeat in moralising phrases without taking into account gitate the Western world and are the subjects 1956 and in spite of Eden's disputable waming the basic line of American policy ? That is the f intense diplomatic activity. But for a time. that he is a second Hitler who should be removed main riddle in the book. ^' least, in this country, attention has been as long as there is still time. On the contrary, And that is, so it seems, where the Jewish ocused on the smouldering and unsolved Middle some regard him today as a stronghold of peace aspect may provide a clue. It is at least possible 5^^' problems, partly because of the tensions on and order and as a bastion against Communism. that Eden miscalculated the relevance of the ^°^ Israel-U.A.R. border, but primarily owing to Since Suez the attitude to neutralism, once Jewish factor. Perhaps he believed fhat an /}? publication of Sir Anthonv Eden's memoirs regarded as veiled pro-Communism, has funda Amerfcan administrafion would not, a week before Th^"' London). mentally changed, perhaps also under the impact the presidential election, affront the Jews by tak thus a book of historical character has become of the breakdown of the once praised Bandung ing an unequivocal stand against Israel. It has j political issue. In spite of its many other co-existence programme. often been suggested that the timing of the action important chapte.rs, the main interest bears upon As to Israel, the book makes it transparent may have had something to do with the American ne Suez affair of 1956, which up to this day is that Eden used Israel as a pretext for his long elections. This suspicion also infuriated Presi "^digested history. The Middle East became the prepared vendetta against Nasser. After the dent Eisenhower. In I960, also an election year, JÛcial factor in the events which led to Eden's Canal crisis set the ball rolling, Eden showed the issue has been touched upon when Eisenhower, ^«ipse, and the fact that Israel also played a much understanding for Israel's suffering under at his Press Conference some weeks ago, made prominent part in these events, gives them a parti- constant provocation by Nasser's threats .and by a statement which he afterwards corrected, about t^. Jewish interest. That does not mean that the fedayeen. His intimation that Britain could a warning which he had allegedly given the the crisis of 1956 must necessarily be viewed from not tolerate aggression against Jordan, but that Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Abba Eban, in mid- ^.Partisan angle, although that may often happen, military action against Egypt would fall under October, 1956, to the effect that America would "Hilar to the controversy going on among a completely different category, could only be not be influenced by electoral considerations and fitish public opinion, there may also be differe taken as an encouragement to attack, and Eden's would firmly oppose any Israeli aggression. In nces among Jews as to what the right Jewish subsequent formula that the Israel-Egypt con- our context it is unimportant whether this warn r Israeli policy in this affair was or should have Hagration must be stopped, and that this would ing really occurred in this form or another; in rsv\ ^" ^"y "^^" '"°'' Jewish readers will provide a convenient reason also to solve the any case, the statement recalls the stafe of mind eiish the former Prime Minister's complimentary problem of the Canal by returning it to inter at that time, and it may explain that Eden also ^rnark on Israel and his understanding for Israel's national ownership, let the cat out of the bag. cherished some considerations of fhis sort. It Point of view, induced him to assume that America, even if she bv c ^^^ other hand, the great debate evoked The American Attitude disapproved the Anglo-French-Israeli action, y Eden's book shows that on the whole these would not openly oppose it, at least not until fhe ncnioifj have done little to convert anybody. But the most surprising part of the book is elections were over. In fhis respect he erred. fitics and reviewers are sticking to the views that referring fo America and especially to Mr. Perhaps the suspicion of such reasoning added Dulles. Sir Anthony complains bitterly about the vehemence to America's opposition. To Eden's Dl M- '^^y '^^'^ ^' ^^^ '"""^ °^ action. The British American attitude, but for an ordinary reader it despair, America took the initiative of branding public is as split on the issue as it was before. is difficult to understand why the British Prime Israel as an aggressor in the Security Council, v/W ^°°^ ^^^ not brought to light any new facts Minister had assumed that the United States and Israel was saved only by the British and nich could have altered the picture. Whatever would support Britain's Middle East position. Is French veto. Neither did Israel provide a shield 'ê its merits, in this respect it has been a dis- not the whole post-war record of the United against American fury for Britain and France. PPointment that has been widely expressed. Not States an almost continuous story of antagonism nor did the American Jews play fhe role which nly did Sir Anthony not add new material, he against Britain in the Middle East, beginning had perhaps been allotted fo them also in Israel's vaded some obvious questions to which one with Palestine in 1947, continuing with Persia, own considerations. ould have expected an answer, and it puzzles Saudia. Egypt, and wherever the situation arose ? jje reader why the leading statesman of that The United States has made it abundantly clear 'nie should have re-written the story if he had that she does not regard the alliance as binding A Realistic Lesson , °t the intention to reveal or to explain what was for the Middle East. Eden himself tells all these This is a point of extraordinary Jewish interest ""herto hidden. stories, he also describes the anti-British activity which throws some light on the often discussed Eden's Personal Tragedy of Mr. Jefferson Caffery, the U.S.A. Ambassador but never clarified question of fhe relationship in Cairo, but he did not draw the conclusions between fhe Diaspora and fhe State of Israel. ^. The most moving impression that the book pro- from his own experience. Mr. Dulles's treatment In a decisive moment, when Israel as always 'les derives from the personal tragedy of a of the Suez question after July, 1956. should have took general Jewish backing for granted, impor (t'^'Lwho occupied such a dominant position on convinced him that America was not fundamentally tant parts of fhe Diaspora and in fhe first place ne European scene during thirty years. The mea- interested in the Canal and would not expose her American Jewry, refused fo be treated as a (j/*l of his defeat can be assessed by an appraisal self in favour of the English and French share satellite which had to support Israel uncondition I the success of his chief opponent in this drama. holders, also that she will not risk being identified ally though not having been consulted. True, ru°' °"'^ ^^^ Eden's prediction of the imminent with " colonial" interests. Why did he believe as a matter of routine, and where no " American " g,"' of the Suez Canal been disproved, but that, faced with a fait accompli, Dulles would problem was involved, American Jewish public Plenty of both Western and Eastern capital has yield ? opinion had always supported Israel. Suez 1956 eently been heaped upon Nasser for works such Could the Prime Minister have completely was the first case of world-wide implications, tin Considerable extension of the Canal and Brec ignored the main factor in all politics, namely, where fhe American administration had ifs own on of the Aswan Dam. Nobody doubts today power ? In a new world constellation and in the view and firm line. Here if became evident that Q^t the Egyptians are capable of managing the midst of the cold war, Britain and France could .American Jewry. Zionists included, would not. ref '' î*"^ the only objection, namely, their not afford major military ventures without for Israel's sake, oppose their own Government lusal to let Israeli ships pass, is not seriously American approval. Only the two super-powers on an issue of principle. They did not wish to maintained although the Western Powers pay lip- have a certain limited scope of freedom of action. appear as a group which could be accused of jj^'ce to the principle of free navigation also for In Hungary, Russia could carry out what she " un-American " inclinations. Eisenhower fought j^ tael. Anyhow, Nasser's curious contention that did in 1956, nof because before the U.N.

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