Issue 56, 1st Quarter 2010 New Journal from NDU Press PRISM JFQ

National Defense University (NDU) is pleased to introduce PRISM, a complex operations journal. PRISM will explore, promote, and debate emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in operations in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, coun- terinsurgency, and irregular warfare. PRISM complements Joint Force Quarterly, introduced by Colin Powell, Chairman of the , 16 years ago to similarly advance joint force integration and understanding. Complexity in PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially those that focus on the nexus of civil-military integration. The journal will be published four times a year both online and in hardcopy. Manuscripts submitted to PRISM should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words in length and sent via email to [email protected]. Strategy

Call for Entries for the

2010 Y L R E T R A U Q E C R O F T N I O J Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition

Are you a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) stu- typically occurs each spring. JPME colleges are free to run their dent? Imagine your winning essay appearing in a future issue own internal competitions to select nominees but must meet of Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, a chance to catch the ear these deadlines: of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an important national security issue, recognition by n April 27, 2010: colleges submit nominated essays to peers, and monetary prizes await the winners. NDU Press for first round of judging.

Who’s Eligible: Students at the JPME colleges, schools, and n May 18–19, 2010: final judging and selection of programs, including Service research fellows and international winners. students. National Defense University Press conducts the What: Research and write an original, unclassified essay in competitions with the generous support of the NDU one or more of the various categories. May be done in conjunc- Foundation. For further information, see your college’s tion with a course writing requirement. Must be selected by essay coordinator or go to: and submitted through your college. www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_SECDEFEC.htm When: Essays may be written any time during the 2009- www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_CSEC.htm 2010 academic year, but students are encouraged to begin the process early and avoid the end-of-academic-year rush that ® ISSUE fifty -SIX, 1 U.S. Special Operations Command st quarter 2010

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Global Insurgency: Point/Counterpoint Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC

Joint Force Quarterly JFQ Dialogue Inside NEW for the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction st Issue 56, 1 Quarter 2010 3 Ambassadors to the World: A New Paradigm for Public Diplomacy and (WMD Center) Strategic Communication By Robert D. Deutsch from NDU Press Public Engagement 101: What Strategic Communication Is, Isn’t, Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) 6 Editor and Should Be By Kristin M. Lord [email protected] Case Study 1 Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 10 “Strategic Communication” Is Vague: Say What You Mean Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz By Christopher Paul President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Biological Weapons Program Open Letter Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 14 Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 15 Letters to the Editor In the first of a new series of case studies, coauthors Jonathan B. Tucker Graphic Design Tara J. Parekh and Erin R. Mahan examine President Nixon’s 1969 decision to re- Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich Forum nounce offensive biological weapons. This renunciation of biological Design Chris Dunham and Jeremy Swanston, and toxin weapons was the first time that a power unilaterally U.S. Government Printing Office 16 Executive Summary abandoned an entire category of armament. The decision opened the way for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, while Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 18 Afghanistan: Context and What’s Next By Volney F. Warner marking the end of three longstanding assumptions regarding U.S. by 25 Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level: A Rejoinder to chemical and biological weapons policy: that chemical and biological Volney F. Warner and “C” By Christopher D. Kolenda weapons were inextricably linked, that an offensive biological capabil- ity was required for deterrence, and that the needed to be NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 32 A Better War in Afghanistan By John A. Nagl prepared to retaliate in kind to a biological weapons attack. cross-component, professional military and academic publishing house. It publishes books, 40 Unified Effort: Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and in Afghanistan By Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, national military strategy, regional security 54 Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan: Creating Unity of Command affairs, and global strategic problems. By Joshua W. Welle Occasional Paper 7 This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department Special Feature of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 60 Interview with Eric T. Olson, USN, Commander, Looking Ahead Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever U.S. Special Operations Command material is quoted from or based on its content. In this general assessment of the 20 years since the United States began U.S. Special Operations: Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare 64 worrying seriously about the risks of regional weapons of mass destruc- By Eric T. Olson COMMUNICATIONS tion (WMD) proliferation, the authors begin by looking back at the Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly Countering Irregular Threats: The Army Special Operations Contribution evolution of the countering-WMD enterprise in the Clinton and Bush online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming 71 issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and By John F. Mulholland, Jr. administrations. Paul Bernstein, John Caves, and W. Seth Carus close access to many other useful NDU Press publications. this section with some observations on why, in fact, America has not Constructive comments and contributions 76 Adapting Across the Spectrum of Conflict: The Role of Naval been attacked with WMD. Turning to the future, they examine such is- are important to us. Please direct editorial Special Warfare By Edward G. Winters communications to the link on the NDU Press Web sues as creeping proliferation, the likelihood of a “proliferation cascade,” site or write to: 80 Mastering the Art of the Possible: The Air Force Special Operations Command other challenges, and initial observations of the Obama administration. By Donald C. Wurster They conclude that although investments and other efforts have to some Editor, Joint Force Quarterly extent prevented our worst WMD fears from being realized, much re- National Defense University Press Forging Marine Special Operators By Mastin M. Robeson 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2505) 85 mains to be done to counter the WMD threat of today and as it is likely Fort Lesley J. McNair to evolve in the future. Washington, DC 20319 Commentary Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations By Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 89 Email: [email protected] The Business of War: The Impact of “PLA, Inc.” on Chinese Officers JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu 94 By Dean Cheng Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at

st ndupress.ndu.edu 1 Quarter, January 2010 Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Infrastructure By Brent J. Talbot ISSN 1070-0692 97

Features 104 An Intelligent Theater By James G. Stavridis 109 The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art By Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan PUBLISHER ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN 117 Can the Army Become a Learning Organization? A Question Reexamined By Anthony J. DiBella President, NDU VADM Ann E. Rondeau, USN Pay for Play: Countering Threat Financing By Michael T. Flynn 123 Advisory Committee and Simone A. Ledeen Col Michael Belcher, USMC Marine Corps War College A Joint Staff to Believe In By G. John David and Paul S. Reinhart Richard K. Betts Columbia University 128 BG Edward C. Cardon, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Global Insurgency: Myth or Reality? Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC The Joint Staff 134 Maj Gen Maurice H. Forsyth, USAF Air War College 135 The Struggle Against Global Insurgency By Daniel G. Cox RADM Garry E. Hall, USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces LtCol Frank G. Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.)Department of the Navy 140 The Dangers of Mistaking Coherence for Capability By Michael W. Mosser Brig Gen Jimmie C. Jackson, Jr., USAF Air Command and Staff College Carnes Lord U.S. Naval War College Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Recall John A. Nagl Center for a New American Security LtGen John M. Paxton, USMC The Joint Staff Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Leadership of the Joint Col David A. Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School 144 ADM James G. Stavridis, USN U.S. European Command Requirements Oversight Council By Richard M. Meinhart Maj Gen Robert P. Steel, USAF Unity of Command in the Pacific During World War II By Phillip S. Meilinger LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) 152 RADM James Wisecup, USN Naval War College

Editorial Board Book Reviews Richard K. Betts Columbia University Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 157 The Human Face of War Reviewed by Clinton J. Ancker III Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College 158 Clausewitz and Contemporary War Reviewed by Thomas Bruscino Mark J. Conversino Air War College Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University 159 To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses Reviewed by Michael Smith Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Funding Extended Conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, and the Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College 160 CAPT John F. Kirby, USN The Joint Staff Reviewed by Richard S. Tracey Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation Joint Doctrine Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College 161 Wargaming the Flu By Margaret M. McCown James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Joint Doctrine Update 163 CONTRIBUTIONS

Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the About the cover United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on Front cover shows soldier standing guard the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University at western observation post used to conduct Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.JFQ is the Chairman’s operations with U.S. Marines and Afghan National Security Forces, flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint October 14, 2009 (U.S. Marine Corps/Artur Shvartsberg). and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. ndupress.ndu.edu DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)

ADM Mullen addresses the Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2009

Joint Force Quarterly is grateful to have received a cascade of correspondence in response to several of

the articles appearing in the last issue. Foremost among them, the essay penned by Admiral Michael Mullen

on the topic of strategic communication produced dozens of letters and nearly a dozen article submissions.

In lieu of the Chairman’s essay in this issue, JFQ is presenting the following three thought-provoking essays

that complement Admiral Mullen’s observations in “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics.”

—Editor

2 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Ambassadors to the World A New Paradigm for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

By R obert D . D eutsch

olitical communication is no come to our current impasse with much of Modern research shows that people different than any other form of the world and move beyond it, we must first reason “emotionally,” often see the world in communication. listen and comprehend the emotional-logic the contradictory terms of paradox, and crave P In Joint Force Quarterly 55 (4th of people’s subjective experience of events. the respect and satisfaction that only comes Quarter 2009), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs In our current situation, we lack the mutual when they feel their identities—more than of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen eloquently sense of connectivity and trust with the their interests—are understood and valued. stated not only a political truth, but also an rest of the world necessary to achieve that. In turn, the power to influence others axiom of any effective communication: “[W]e Instead, a different focus and bold shift in emanates from displaying understanding, need to worry less about how to communicate direction are needed. insightful empathy, and inclusive leader- our actions and more about what our actions To boost our public diplomacy efforts, ship—not a recitation of the merits of one’s communicate.” People have a general sensi- the United States should appoint a dozen or position or reasons why others should be tivity to things inauthentic. so “ambassadors to the world” who would be grateful, which often generates resistance and The fact is, whether the venue is inter- responsible for representing American views resentment. national relations or interpersonal relations, to foreign peoples, not governments. Their Indeed, U.S. public diplomacy must people are now exposed to a great number writ should also run in the opposite direction. develop better ways to understand, listen, of channels and messages, including hearsay They should also be responsible for explain- and talk to “the Other.” This will be difficult and propaganda. All inputs that get through ing the emotional-logic of foreign attitudes because America has never been inclined to the initial gatekeeper of “personal relevancy” to the American public and representing know the Other; it never had to. are put through a Cuisinart-like cognitive these perceptions within the counsels of our process wherein ingredients are modified by government. Knowing the Other the receiver’s preexisting beliefs and current The United States needs not only a new Perhaps the central misguided assump- emotions. Action and talk are given roughly bureaucratic mechanism for making sure the tion in public diplomacy is the notion that equal weight. perceptions of foreign publics are taken into people are rational actors who, if they can just What strategic communication with the account by policymakers, but also a better way be pragmatic, basically think as Americans Muslims of the world requires is talk that is to understand foreign states of mind. do—that the world is a mirror image of us. experienced by the receiver as an action, as a This is a dangerous failure of imagination. behavior. How can this be done? Pay Attention to the Mind People are guided by an emotional-logic The core task for U.S. public diplomacy A large part of the problem is that composed of symbolic associations, images, is not persuasion, but evoking the bond of current models of persuasion—in government narratives, metaphors, and mythologies. identification in the service of people’s sense as well as the corporate world—date from the Despite the fact that logic and rational argu- of self-expansion. People—all people— 1950s. They have not incorporated the latest ments barely influence actual decision- and possess a story about themselves that they insights from modern research about what perception-making processes, they are the tell to themselves, involving aspects of their causes people to embrace ideas. What we need mainstay in the present paradigm of public lives that are latent and not fully constituted. is a new paradigm for U.S. strategic commu- diplomacy. This must change. If we can show that we understand them and nication and public diplomacy that draws on People are not moved by “top of mind” the stories they have about themselves, their the latest discoveries about human nature and rationalistic arguments. Instead, strategic attachment to and regard for us will grow. the nature of the mind. communication campaigns require a more This kind of connection can only be achieved The “push-down” theories of persua- if Americans relate to foreign publics in terms sion—public diplomacy strategies that rely of the paradoxes, existential dilemmas, core on logic and facts, and even the concept of Dr. Robert D. Deutsch is a Cognitive Anthropologist narratives, and self-images that are the most “winning hearts and minds”—are all obsolete and Senior Associate for International important aspects in all our lives. models of communications. People cannot Communications in the Center for the Study of If practitioners of U.S. public diplomacy be persuaded of something that they do not the Presidency and Congress. He is Founder and are ever going to understand how we have instinctively believe. President of the consulting firm Brain Sells. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 3 DIALOGUE | Ambassadors to the World complex approach that must include the fol- the power, through our insights and capabili- and manages the challenges of the inevitable, lowing implicit messages: ties, to help the target audience become more fast-approaching future. authentically itself. Thus, a “war on terror” or To begin to know the Other in his full ■■ I am like you (there is something about human authenticity—paradoxes, ironies, you that is familiar) the United States needs a illogicalities included—is an urgent necessity ■■ I like you (I understand you, you can for U.S. public diplomacy. To achieve this, trust me, you can participate “in” me) better way to understand research on foreign attitudes must go beyond ■■ I am not you, but our differences can foreign states of mind polls and instead utilize in-depth, one-on-one help us expand our selves. interviews and group discussions in which the a “war on al Qaeda” narrative does not com- core narratives and stories of self, of others, First, audiences must be approached in municate to foreign audiences that we under- and of how the world “works” can be heard terms of their familiar, with which they are stand and value them and can help them and explored. People from different tribes, comfortable, utilizing communications that become more authentically themselves. religious affiliations, and levels of activism evoke their core narratives and metaphors Research over the past decade shows must be listened to. about the world and themselves. Novel ideas that audiences from every part of the globe— are offputting; they are dislocating and including the United States—feel that the Knowing Ourselves require too much effort. third millennium is the world of “too”—“too To regain the world’s trust, the United Second, we must communicate that we fast, too complex, and too competitive.” A States must do a better job of understanding understand the target audience. By showing participant in one focus group articulated the blindspots in how it perceives the world we understand them, we make them feel safe. what is perhaps modernization’s core paradox: and creates narratives about it. In response, they will not feel threatened. If “Things are always advancing and getting Writing 57 years ago, Christian theolo- they feel threatened by us, or by our advocacy better—sometimes for the worst.” There is gian Reinhold Niebuhr argued in The Irony of what is novel and unaccustomed, they will great power in being able to demonstrate that of American History that “a weakness of our reject the messages we send. U.S. leaders understand and share this core foreign policy” is that: Third, we must make the audience’s feeling. familiar novel by outlining a grand narra- In addition, U.S. leaders must articulate we move inconsistently from policies which tive in which we offer a way that, working a vision or grand narrative that demonstrates would overcome animosities toward us by the together, both we and the target audience how America can lead the way forward to offer of economic assistance to policies which renew and expand our senses of self. We a world that preserves the best of the past, would destroy resistance by the use of pure must communicate the sense that we have respects and values differences, and embraces military might. We can understand the neat UN (Sophie Paris) UN (Evan Schneider)

Carla Bruni-Sarkozy, first lady of France, addresses UN meeting on HIV/AIDS prevention in New York, Actress Charlize Theron, as UN Messenger of September 2009 Peace, addresses press conference on violence against women

4 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu DEUTSCH

voice to different stories on how people’s identities NEW around the world from NDU Press are being riven by for the White House (Chuck Kennedy) the challenges of Institute for modernization and National Strategic Studies globalization. We should appoint one or more ambassadors to the main group- ings of peoples in the world today, President Obama called for new beginning between the United States and which can be Muslims during speech in , June 2009, declaring cycle of suspicion and imperfectly but discord must end crudely divided into those from logic of either economic reciprocity or the show Europe and countries composed mainly of Strategic Forum 250 of pure power. But we are mystified by the European settlers, such as , Australia, North Korea: Challenges, Interests, and Policy endless complexities of human motives and the and New Zealand; Latin America; sub- Recently North Korea has made conciliatory varied compounds of ethnic loyalties, cultural Saharan Africa; the Middle East; the former gestures to the outside world. As James J. traditions, social hopes, envies and fears which Soviet Union; South Asia; and East Asia. In Przystup points out, in this rapidly changing enter into the policies of nations, and which lie addition to regional ambassadors, we could and complex environment the United States at the foundation of their political cohesion. should not lose sight of the challenges posed by the Kim Jong-il regime: its nuclear weapons The sobering accounts of the missteps missteps in illustrate program and potential instability after a of the occupation authorities in Iraq illustrate dangers when Western transfer of power in Pyongyang. The author reviews three broad alternatives to current the dangers that arise when Western para- paradigms of behavior and U.S strategy: a military strategy, a policy digms of behavior and attitude are presumed attitude are presumed to aimed at regime change, and diplomacy, but to operate in very different cultures. operate in very different outside the Six-Party Talks structure. In the In the wake of the Iraq misadventure, cultures end, he recommends staying the course of the one of the first steps in the way ahead for the current strategy—keeping the door open to United States lies in showing the world that the North’s return to the Six-Party Talks and we are coming to grips with our blindspots as also appoint ambassadors responsible for per- to denuclearization and stabilization of the a culture and that we have a dawning sense of ceptions about important global issues, such Korean Peninsula. the unconscious assumptions that have his- as the environment and nuclear issues. torically led us into blind geopolitical alleys. These ambassadors should stand outside Strategic Forum 249 In short, it is time for us as a nation to face our the normal bilateral, programmatic-oriented Burma in Strategic Perspective: Renewing shortcomings, without succumbing to senti- bureaucratic chain of command in the Discussion of Options mentality or excessive self-flagellation. executive branch. As virtual ambassadors to Lewis M. Stern, George Thomas, and Julia A. Thompson examine the problematic President has dem- peoples, not governments, their main respon- relationship between the United States and the onstrated a superb capability, in Cairo and sibilities should be to report back to Wash- hard-edged ruling junta in Burma. The authors elsewhere, to speak to foreign audiences about ington—and to the rest of the country— out that the exigencies occasioned by their dreams and aspirations and how they the emotional-logic of foreign attitudes, and Cyclone Nargis compelled a limited opening intersect with American values. But the role to represent America to foreign peoples, not in relations, allowing some U.S. humanitarian of a “tribune of the world’s people” is too large governments. aid. Although this was not a watershed event for any one man, no matter how talented. As has been the case throughout history, signaling a major shift by the junta toward This is why we need ambassadors to to know ourselves and to know others is the the West, it did represent instances of change. the world and from the world. Like the court essence of leadership. Being mindful of our- The authors explore several gambits that the jesters of old, their special role would be to selves and others is the urgent task of public United States and the West might take to build speak truth to the powerful—and to everyday diplomacy in today’s world. JFQ on the tentative lines of communication that have been opened. people—and speak in a way that ordinary court denizens or bureaucrats cannot. Unen- cumbered by bureaucracy and the tyranny Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications of everyday programs and projects, the job of at ndupress.ndu.edu these “Perceivers General” would be to give ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 5 Public Engagement 101 What Strategic Communication Is, Isn’t, and Should Be

Secretary of State Clinton speaks to press By K risti n M . L ord about meeting on at UN headquarters

e need to get back to basics.” With these words, Admiral Michael Mullen, W Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for a hard look at U.S. strategic communication in Joint Force Quar- terly 55 (4th Quarter 2009). Admiral Mullen rightly noted that actions speak louder than words, that credibility and trust are key, and that the United States undermines its own power when our government fails to live up to its promises and our nation’s values. He called on Americans to be better listeners and to engage foreign audiences, not to arrogantly fire off messages like so many verbal mis- siles.1 On all these points, Admiral Mullen is correct. His serious consideration of strategic communication is a welcome contribution to an often stale debate. This article builds on the Chairman’s recent articles and speeches, arguing that public engagement is a powerful instrument of statecraft that can advance our country’s broader national security strategy in concert with diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. It can be used to amplify and reinforce the messages sent by our actions. It can also build critical long-term relation- ships, increasing the odds that the messages we intend our actions to send are actually the messages received. Strategic communication can realisti- cally accomplish these objectives. Yet to get back to basics, we must also recognize strate- gic communication’s limits and when failure is a result of the application, not the tool. Like any instrument of policy, strategic communi- cation has not always been used well. This is an indictment of the craftsmen, not the craft.

Dr. Kristin M. Lord is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security. UN (Sophie Paris)

6 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LORD

We need to rethink, not reject, public engage- tragic and unintentional event or yet another strategic public engagement is and should ment as an instrument of national security sign that allied troops value Western life over be for. Strategic communication should not policy. Afghan life? Viewed in the aftermath of a be about gussying up unpopular policies for German bombing that killed many civilians, public consumption, trumpeting the superior- What Strategic Communication Is— many Afghans perceive the latter—and no ity of America or American values, or making and Isn’t amount of additional information may sway the United States more popular in opinion Strategic communication—or as my that view.4 If the United States must indeed polls. It is not about the means—whether colleague and I prefer to call it, overcome what President Barack Obama calls broadcasting or Web sites—but about align- strategic public engagement—is the promotion a “trust deficit” with the Afghan people in ing the means of public engagement to policy of national interests through efforts to inform, order to accomplish its mission there, these ends. Most importantly, it should advance engage, and influence foreign publics.2 Its By K risti n M . L ord importance is growing due to the spread of Voice of America reporter conducts interview with Afghanistan national pluralistic governance, increasing importance of transnational challenges such as transna- tional crime and terrorism that require global cooperation, widespread availability of cheap and instantaneous information and com- munications technologies that devolve power to individuals, and limits of force in theaters where the application of violence actually mobilizes support for our enemies. The use of armed force and traditional diplomacy will always be critical. However, they must be bolstered by a comprehensive effort to engage publics, who hold the ability to confer legiti- macy and tangible support. Increasingly, foreign publics have the power to facilitate or block the achievement of American national security interests. Whether the United States seeks to under- mine support for various groups, convince allies to devote more resources to Afghanistan and , build global

pressure on Iran, or place a new command of America Voice in Africa, public support is crucial. Engaging foreign publics is also essential to counter- perceptions of American intent hold broader strategic ends. The desire for tactical wins has insurgency strategies, whose success hinges consequences. They will influence whether or produced strategic losses all too often, and on popular legitimacy. Not unlike the Cold not Afghans choose to support the counter- in the process it has sullied the reputation of War, ideas and ideologies are central to insurgency campaign roiling their country, strategic communication. Paying Iraqi jour- current security threats. Then, as now, the support that Generals and nalists to plant favorable news stories while ability to win support for a political ideal, Stanley McChrystal view as essential to their at the same time arguing vociferously for attack competing visions, and undermine the success. independent media, for example, undermined people and networks that hold those compet- ing visions is necessary for success. Military armed force and diplomacy must be bolstered by a might remains critical, but engagement, comprehensive effort to engage publics, who confer legitimacy persuasion, and the power of an appealing vision are also essential to achieving national and tangible support security objectives. Actions speak louder than words, but In short, we live in a world where legiti- both America’s strategic credibility and its they are interpreted in a highly contested macy and perceived intent, not just actions broader foreign policy interests in Iraq and marketplace of ideas. As public diplomacy or raw capabilities, matter. As a result, our the Middle East. guru Marc Lynch points out, “Everything is country needs to understand how others subject to spin, framing, and interpretation.”3 view our actions, effectively present our Objectives Even verifiable facts are interpreted differently view of what we are doing and why, build Public engagement can be used to by different audiences. For instance, was the relationships with opinion leaders, and create accomplish five key national security objec- death of an Afghan interpreter during the a climate of trust in which understanding tives.5 First, the United States has a legitimate recent rescue of a New York Times reporter a and cooperation are more likely. This is what need to inform, engage, and shape foreign

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 7 DIALOGUE | What Strategic Communication Is public opinion in support of specific poli- about the United States in proper context. For ment leaders and key counterparts in the cies. A key requirement is simply to provide instance, Muslim societies need to understand nonprofit and private sectors. Military-to- quick and accurate information about what how to weigh the statements by the President military exchanges and young leaders pro- U.S. policies and actions actually are (as versus xenophobic talk show hosts versus grams have been doing this productively for opposed to what our opponents say they are). law enforcement officials versus Hollywood years, but these efforts need to be expanded Though knowing our policies may not lead actors. All of them represent America, but and reconceptualized to meet current and to loving them, it is also the case that pure not all of them represent official U.S. policy future challenges. misstatements of fact about American poli- or even majority opinion. The ability to Fourth, U.S. national interests are well cies abound. It is in our interest to correct understand our vibrant marketplace of ideas, served when foreign publics embrace values them and help foreign audiences see where and the fact that the loudest or most extreme that Americans also share—for instance, and how our interests are aligned with voices are not always the most representative, support for free markets, representative theirs. Highlighting areas where interests adds valuable perspective without distorting governance, environmental protection, and overlap is an equally important element of the truth. the illegitimacy of suicide bombing. We also public engagement. If foreign publics see have a strong moral interest in the promotion how and when their own interests and values the goal is to help foreigners of human rights and opposition to scourges are advanced by cooperation, our public place information about such as human trafficking and slavery. The engagement strategies can facilitate win-win United States has long encouraged the spread outcomes. the United States in proper of these values, whether through official Second, it is in U.S. national interest for context government actions or indirect support for foreign opinion leaders and mass publics to exchanges and visitor programs, private part- understand America, including its institu- Third, the United States needs to create nerships, and grants for capacity-building for tions, values, and people in all its national a climate of mutual understanding, respect, foreign individuals and organizations. complexity. Contrary to common belief, and trust in which cooperation is more Fifth, American national security the goal of such actions is not primarily to feasible. That requires building relationships benefits from the strengthening of dense increase the appeal and attractive power of not only with current and future leaders, networks of personal relationships between America (though that is a nice side benefit) but also between civilians and military current and future societal leaders, which but rather to help foreigners place information leaders, and between military and govern- open channels of communication, create

Marine speaks with residents of Betaka while surveying river for proposed bridge in Helmand Province, Afghanistan U.S. Marine Corps (James A. Burks)

8 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LORD opportunities for collaboration, and be wider. American public diplomacy in The final step in getting back to basics facilitate the achievement of common goals. the Cold War focused at least as much on is to reintegrate strategic public engagement The U.S. relationship with looks pulling allies closer as it did on countering into a broader national security strategy. profoundly different than it did 30 years enemies. That is a lesson worth relearning Presidents from Dwight Eisenhower to John ago thanks to an extensive commitment today. The United States needs the support of Kennedy to Ronald Reagan understood the to build military, educational, scientific, European allies to counter Iran’s pursuit of need to engage foreign publics in concert with governmental, and business relationships. nuclear weapons, pursue pirates off the coast diplomatic, economic, and military means. Though U.S.-China relations are complex of Somalia, and bolster Pakistan against Although these Presidents served in different and hardly free of conflict or contention, extremists. We need our allies in Japan and times, that fundamental philosophy remains our worldviews are undoubtedly far closer South Korea to help us manage the threat sound. The challenge—and opportunity— together than they would have been without posed by North Korea. In all of these cases, today is to engage all of these instruments and this web of relationships and the large cadre the support of publics in allied nations is more. It is to engage partners from around of Chinese leaders who have studied or crucial. the world and from a wide variety of back- spent significant time in the United States. Finally, the United States could be far grounds, along with America’s government Though it is difficult to quantify the number more effective at engaging respected voices and armed forces, to achieve desired goals. As of conflicts averted by these relationships, outside of the government and military. the scholar and newly appointed director of both China scholars and government leaders Whether they are found in universities, policy planning at the Department of State, attest to this fact. If the United States began nongovernmental organizations, private busi- Anne-Marie Slaughter, notes, power in today’s now to build the same fabric of relationships nesses, the scientific community, or diaspora world derives from connectivity.7 The ability with the Arab world that we now have with groups, these voices hold the potential to to engage others, in pursuit of common objec- China, in 30 years perhaps that relationship build new relationships and change minds in tives, is now a potent means to achieve Ameri- would be transformed as well. communities where official U.S. spokespeople can national interests. This connectivity, in never could. pursuit of national objectives, is the ultimate Ways purpose of strategic public engagement. Using Achieving these objectives will be Methods it wisely will require us to get back to basics, far easier if the United States is viewed as a The United States should employ a wide in words as well as deeds. JFQ credible actor on the world stage. To protect variety of means appropriate to the place, America’s moral authority as well as the time, audience, and objective. Social network- trust and even power that authority conveys, ing technologies may be the best means to American policies should be in line with our reach Egypt’s Facebook-loving youth, but highest ideals. They must be constructed to radio may be more appropriate to Afghani- advance U.S. interests, taking into account stan’s less literate, less connected population. N o t es the full range of costs and benefits, including An interview on a Southeast Asian equivalent foreign public opinion and its implications. As of MTV may be the right venue to spark General McChrystal has observed about the dialogue in one instance, but a serious news 1 Michael Mullen, “Strategic Communication: U.S. mission in Afghanistan, “You’re going to interview may be more suitable in another. A Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Force Quarterly 55 th have to convince people, not kill them. Since senior U.S. Government spokesperson may (4 Quarter, October 2009). 2 9/11, I have watched as America tried to first be the most persuasive voice on one occa- Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl, and Seth D. Rosen, Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to put out this fire with a hammer, and it doesn’t sion. On another, a Pakistani scientist may Combat Violent Islamist Extremism (Washington, work.”6 be more effective. A well-timed speech today DC: Center for a New American Security, 2009). To engage foreign publics effectively, it may impact opinion tomorrow, with effects 3 Marc Lynch, “Mullen’s Strategic Communi- is imperative to understand them. Our goal lasting for days or weeks. The relationships cation,” Foreign Policy.com, August 30, 2009. should be to listen and understand foreign and mutual understanding gained through 4 Pamela Constable, “After Rescue, Recrimina- cultures and societies, how people commu- military and educational exchanges take tions,” , September 10, 2009. nicate, which voices they trust, where they longer to bear fruit, but may have more endur- 5 For a discussion, see Kristin M. Lord, Voices get their information, and why. We should ing impact. of America: U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st recognize that others do not see the world as The available tactics are countless, Century (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institu- we do and may interpret our words or actions involving town hall meetings or broadcasts, tion, November 2008). 6 in ways we never intended. We should also flyers or Web sites, dialogues or speeches, or Peter Spiegel, “Commander Maps New Course in Afghan War,” , recognize the diversity of foreign audiences photos or books. Many of these tactics are June 12, 2009. and tailor the means of engagement to the tried and true, long used by the United States 7 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “America’s Edge,” task at hand. in support of national security policies. They Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January-February 2009). Though much of today’s discussion must be adapted to new purposes. But new about strategic communication is focused on methods are also necessary, as the United combating violent extremists and rebuild- States and likeminded partners compete for ing relations with predominantly Muslim attention and legitimacy in the midst of an societies, our strategic aperture should information maelstrom. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 9 “Strategic Communication” Is Vague Say What You Mean

By C hristopher P aul

he Department of Defense Dic- it is generally reflective of prevailing thought strategic communication (or strategic com- tionary of Military and Associ- on strategic communication, it is vague and munications, pluralized as it is often used ated Terms tells us that strategic imprecise. It is not always clear what is and outside DOD). Many individual scholars and communication consists of what is not part of strategic communica- specialists have offered definitions, but these T 2 “[f]ocused United States Government efforts tion. Worse, this definition belongs only to vary considerably. to understand and engage key audiences to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD); the Despite this lack of an agreed definition create, strengthen, or preserve conditions rest of the interagency community does not of the term, there is a vague impression of favorable for the advancement of United subscribe to (nor does it explicitly reject) this consensus that when one of us says “strategic States Government interests, policies, and definition. None of the relevant interagency communication,” we all know what we are objectives through the use of coordinated partners (including the U.S. Department of talking about, and we know that it is impor- programs, plans, themes, messages, and State, National Security Council, Broadcast- tant. This perception of mutual meaning is in products synchronized with the actions of ing Board of Governors, U.S. Agency for some sense correct, but the lack of a precise all instruments of national power.”1 This International Development, and potentially and agreed lexicon is preventing deeper definition causes some problems. Although others) has a formal published definition of shared understanding and making it harder to identify specific problems and solutions in this arena. The solution is simple: when talking about strategic communication, say what you mean. Elsewhere, I have argued for a broad and

U.S. Navy (William Selby) inclusive definition of strategic communica- tion.3 What I offer here is not in contradiction to it. At the enterprise level, I maintain that all of the actions and utterances of represen- tatives of the U.S. Government contribute potential information and influence, and that those activities can be harnessed and synchronized in support of national or theater strategic objectives. Where I am breaking new ground is in identifying discrete elements of the strategic communication enterprise and advocating that those employing the term immediately specify which element or elements they are talking about.

Five Elements I find that the term strategic communi- cation is usually meant to denote one or more of five things:

■■ enterprise level strategic communication ■■ strategic communication planning, integration, and synchronization processes

Dr. Christopher Paul is a Behavioral/Social Scientist GEN Petraeus explains his leadership strategy at National Press Club at the RAND Corporation.

10 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu PAUL

■■ communication strategies and themes theater strategic goals translated into informa- across the joint force, especially to and for ■■ communication, information, and tion and influence goals? How are the poten- communication, information, and influence influence capabilities tials inherent in communication capabilities capabilities. ■■ knowledge of human dynamics and incorporated into campaign plans? How are A focus on this element of strategic analysis or assessment capabilities. agreed communication objectives dissemi- communication leads either up, demanding nated, deconflicted, and synchronized across scrutiny of strategic goals and the com- Enterprise level strategic communication the joint force and the interagency commu- munication objectives they imply, or down, was touched on above and is “capital S, capital nity? A whole host of important questions considering defined objectives and candidate C” Strategic Communication. This is the can be meaningfully asked and answered by themes in specific operational contexts to commonly shared understanding of the term, specifying this element of strategic communi- be coordinated with and communicated by and it embraces a potentially broad range of cation as the topic of discussion. various communication, information, and government activities and encourages their influence assets. coordination toward national or theater stra- These communication, information, and tegic ends. This term is useful only to indicate despite lack of an agreed influence capabilities are the broadcast, dis- what general activity domain a discussion definition, there is a vague semination, and engagement elements of stra- is targeting and to remind everyone that all impression of consensus that tegic communication. Communication, infor- actions and utterances have information and when one of us says “strategic mation, and influence capabilities certainly influence potential—and that this potential communication,” we all know include public affairs, psychological opera- can be harnessed and aligned in support of what we are talking about tions, defense support to public diplomacy, national or theater goals. Any deeper discus- and civil affairs. These capabilities might sion of strategic communication requires a include broader elements of the force, such as more careful specification of what, exactly, we Communication strategies and themes maneuver elements conducting civil-military intend to talk about. are the strategic communication element that operations or military police operating vehicle Current DOD strategic communica- concerns content and involves both the inputs checkpoints abroad. They might include the tion cognoscenti regularly expound that and outputs from the strategic communica- interactions of any element of the force with “strategic communication is a process.”4 tion planning, integration, and synchroniza- foreign populations or the prevalence of lan- The community, however, would be better tion processes. This includes the national or guage and cultural awareness training across served by specifying this as strategic com- munication planning, integration, and synchronization processes and by leaving the broader umbrella term in place and inclusive of other elements. “Strategic communication is a process” recognizes that enterprise level U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force strategic communication is too broad to be meaningfully discussed as a discrete set of activities and responds to that challenge by winnowing what is included in the term to something quite specific. The problem is that others in the interagency community (and in DOD) do not understand this exclusion. They continue to talk about strategic com- munication more broadly (or just differently) and to be confused by this apparently narrow usage by some in DOD. Another problem is that constraining strategic communication to being just a process allows that process (and the term) to be used for any application of that process, whether that application fits within the appropriate bounds of enterprise Secretary Gates meets with Vietnamese minister of defense during Shangri-La Dialogue level strategic communication or not. (This problem is discussed in greater detail below.) As an element of the strategic commu- campaign goals or objectives (inputs) that the force. They might include every action or nication enterprise, strategic communication planning processes will translate into com- utterance of every deployed Servicemember. planning, integration, and synchronization munication goals and themes (outputs) and Wherever we bound this element of strategic processes constitute a discrete set of activities incorporate into plans. Content outputs, such communication, by first specifying that we and require distinct organization, procedures, as communication objectives and themes, are are talking about communication and engage- and personnel. How are general national and the elements integrated and synchronized ment capabilities and then indicating which of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 11 DIALOGUE | Say What You Mean them we wish to discuss, we will have framed audiences specifically and human dynamics Should these five specifying elements the conversation in such a way that everyone generally is critical to identifying themes, not cover the aspect of strategic communica- understands what we are talking about. messages, and engagement approaches that tion we want to talk about, that is okay. Just be Discussions surrounding this strategic will lead to desired outcomes. Data collection sure to be specify what we are talking about communication element focus on the ability and assessment contribute the feedback that more precisely than simply “strategic commu- of various assets to design and disseminate allows two-way communication and engage- nication.” Unless, of course, we really mean messages and engage foreign populations in ment (rather than just broadcast) and that something else. different cultural contexts, as well as the dif- also makes it possible to demonstrate and ferent forms of communication available to report impact or effect from communication Resist Degeneration of the Term the joint force, given that actions speak louder activities. Unfortunately, much gets called than words. What training in language skills, These five specifications connect to each “strategic communication” that should not. cultural awareness, and influence do these other logically. Within the broader strategic When I say that I am an advocate of a broad, force elements have? What doctrine guides communication enterprise, national or cam- inclusive interpretation of strategic com- their employment? What is the broadcast paign level goals and objectives constitute the munication, I mean that I prefer an expansive reach and range of available media? How inputs to the strategic communication plan- view of the things that should be considered rapidly can adversary mis- or disinformation ning, integration, and synchronization pro- communication, information, and influence be countered? Which needed capabilities are cesses. Based on knowledge of human dynam- capabilities, not that I am open to a broad organic to the joint force and which must be ics and analysis or assessment capabilities, interpretation of the types of goals and objec- contracted out? these processes transform and incorporate tives strategic communication can be used to support. While the communication strategies communication, information, and influence capabilities are and themes element does include the goals or objectives to be supported, the goals must the broadcast, dissemination, and engagement elements of always be related to national or theater cam- strategic communication paign goals. While the vague definition from the DOD dictionary is of little help in making this explicit and clear, the host of reports, discussion, and predoctrine on the subject do make the purpose of strategic communication perfectly unambiguous: “to harness informa- tion to protect and promote national interests [emphasis added].”5 Strategic communication is intended to be a whole-of-government approach to challenges faced by the Nation, not a generic term for thoughtful planning and coordination of communication in pursuit of parochial interests. Many in the broader defense com- munity have begun to harness the processes of (and the term) strategic communication in pursuit of their narrow organizational interests. I have now seen several military Service–specific “strategic communication Publicly funded Arabic-language Radio Sawa broadcasts news, information, and entertainment plans” that lay out communication goals throughout Middle East related to informing Servicemembers and Broadcasting Board of Governors Board Broadcasting their families, protecting the reputation of the Service, telling the Service’s “story,” and main- Supporting all of these specified activi- the communication strategies and themes and taining public (and congressional) support ties are knowledge of human dynamics and provide them to commanders who employ the for the Service. Similarly, several subordinate analysis or assessment capabilities. These various available communication, informa- defense organizations and offices now have capabilities include media monitoring, tion, and influence capabilities in pursuit of strategic communication plans that focus on media use pattern research, target audience desired objectives. The planning, integration, communicating effectively with and generat- analysis, and social, historical, cultural, and and synchronization processes and knowl- ing support from other offices and entities in language expertise, along with other relevant edge, analysis, and assessment capabilities DOD. analytic and assessment capabilities. Cultural continue to be useful to force elements as they I reject this misuse of the term strategic knowledge and audience analysis are critical broadcast or disseminate their themes and communication, and I urge everyone to do the for translating broad strategic goals into infor- messages or otherwise engage and appraise same. This is not to say that being thoughtful mation and influence goals. Understanding the impact of these activities. about communication in a broader range of

12 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu PAUL contexts is bad—it is not. Nor is it to say that tives.” This could be narrowly interpreted as tion is communicating inside itself or with the Services and other defense organizations the interests of any part of the U.S. Govern- external stakeholders or publics. This term is should not organize and coordinate commu- ment rather than all of it, thus encompassing completely appropriate for planned and coor- nication efforts in pursuit of their institutional the parochial interests of any government dinated communication activities in pursuit interests—they should. What they should not office or organization. Furthermore, the of the institutional goals of a Service or other do is call that pursuit strategic communica- assertion that “strategic communication is a defense office or organization. One could even tion. Communicating strategically is not the process” does nothing to prevent this degener- have a corporate communication strategy same as strategic communication. ation because it implies that any effort to plan, laying out the goals and planning guidance Part of the problem is that “strategic integrate, and synchronize communication for the organization—only it should not be communication” is sometimes used in this could follow a strategic communication–like called strategic communication. diluted way in the business world, where the process and thus be strategic communication. When in doubt as to whether a set of term strategic is regularly attached to a multi- In industry and in other defense goals might be legitimately conceived as tude of other terms without really adding any establishments around the world, these serving national or theater objectives and meaning. Part of the problem also stems from not-strategic communications are called thus belong under the rubric of strategic com- the vague DOD dictionary definition, which, “corporate communications.” This set of munication, try the following test. If we were while intended to point toward national level activities is sometimes productively divided to try to coordinate or synchronize our com- objectives, simply specifies “United States into internal and external corporate com- munication related to this goal with a partner Government interests, policies, and objec- munication to indicate whether the organiza- outside our organization (in the interagency, say), would they share our goal? If not, the goal is probably below the objective threshold implied by strategic communication. At the end of the day, remember that all communication is not strategic communica- tion. Do not be afraid to assert, “That’s not U.S. Air Force (Dawn M. Price) U.S. Air Force strategic communication that you are talking about!” It may be communication, it may require planning or coordination, and it may be important to an organization. We can still talk about it. Say what you mean, but please don’t call it strategic communication if it isn’t. JFQ

N o t es

1 Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 12, 2001, as amended through March 17, 2009), 524. 2 See the discussion in Christopher Paul, Whither Strategic Communication? A Survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations, OP–250– RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 3 Ibid.; and Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation, MG–607–JFCOM (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). 4 For formal documented examples of this line of thinking, see Charles S. Gramaglia, “Strategic Communication: Distortion and White Noise,” IOSphere (Winter 2008); and Dennis M. Murphy, The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s) (Car- lisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, January 2008). 5 Jeffrey B. Jones, “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States,” Joint Force Quar- terly 39 (4th Quarter 2005), 108. Strategic communication director for Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in Tanga, , speaks at dedication of renovated medical clinic funded by task force and U.S. Africa Command

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 13 Open Letter to JFQ Readers

When Joint Force Quarterly readers see or hear the words National Defense University, they are most likely to think of the Joint Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, or perhaps the National War College. But NDU is much larger and more diversi- fied than most realize. It is comprised of colleges, research centers, and regional centers that cover the waterfront of national defense and international security studies, and each is staffed by some of the most accomplished national security professionals in the world. Perhaps the most important thing that you should know about NDU is that the overarching mission binding its components together is supporting the combatant commands as they address the challenges of the day.

NDU’s five colleges and four research centers have all contributed in some way to the International Security Assistance Force efforts in Afghanistan, as well as to U.S. combat forces throughout the theater. These contributions involve the full spectrum of academic enhancement to theater analysis, from deploying military faculty members to the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, to planning collaboration with interagency counterparts in the National Capital Region, to refining joint profession- al military education. Requests and requirements come in nearly daily, with varying direct and indirect potential for NDU support.

NDU is an enterprise chartered to support the joint warrior. I invite you to tap into the functional and regional skills and resources that you may not have previously realized were at your disposal here at NDU. This is an opportunity for you to access a professional cadre of national security experts who can take your well-framed inquiries to a level of analysis and other assistance that may be unavailable locally. My chief of staff, Mike Cannon, USA, can be reached at [email protected].

Ann E. Rondeau Vice Admiral, USN President

14 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu NEW Open Letter to JFQ Readers LETTERS from NDU Press for the Institute for To the Editor—I can commiserate with the a dedicated member of the profession of National Strategic Studies JFQ editor and staff, having served as editor arms—and gay—I’d want no part of it. My of a professional military journal. We ran service to country would never be about award-winning dialogue vetted out by review “me.” Keep the current law; it supports the panels as well—sometimes to our chagrin. mission, all Servicemembers, and the warrior I received that same sad feeling reading ethos. And it’s working. Colonel Om Prakash’s article on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (“The Efficacy of ‘Don’t Ask, —Colonel James W. Spencer, USAF Don’t Tell,’” JFQ 55, 4th Quarter 2009). His (Ret.) assertion that everyone has just been emo- Past Editor, Airpower Journal (now tional on this and it’s time we just get over Air & Space Power Journal) it is fundamentally flawed. He lists enough references to make an apple pie, but looking closely at his words reveals something we To the Editor—As Colonel Om Prakash’s tried to avoid years ago in the professional article on the efficacy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t journal of the Air Force: agendas. Tell” has been in the news, I would like to He cites inconclusive scientific studies share with your readers some of the conclu- and notional opinion polls to support his “I sions that I drew from my service on the see nothing here against repeal” thesis. Too 1993 Defense Readiness Council on Gays in bad that he won an award for this work and the Military. JFQ had to run it. To suggest the existence of First, despite the colonel’s comparison a “gay gene” in a National Defense University of 10 United States Code §654 with the (NDU) paper is remarkable in itself but fails integration of the Armed Forces in 1948, to include relevant support from the Ameri- racism is not relevant to this issue. Similarly, Strategic Forum 248 can Psychological Association that says there this issue is not about sexual orientation; it is Unity of Effort: Key to Success in is no proven genetic connection. The larger about personal conduct. Afghanistan question is, what relevance is there to any Second, in our discussions on the unsupported assertions in advancing the council, the Air Force was less concerned Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinna- professional military dialogue? than the Army or Marine Corps, whose per- mond ascribe lack of progress in Afghani- I served for nearly 29 years with many sonnel fight for each other in combat units stan more to forces and donors working honorable and brave people who may have as intimate as the squad level. Each Service at cross-purposes than to insufficient been homosexuals. I just didn’t know who has a unique culture, and consequently the resources. Calling for an indirect approach they were. I didn’t have to spend 1 second relative sensitivity to aspects of open homo- that emphasizes working through indig- wondering about whether the people next to sexuality is uneven. enous forces, the authors cite U.S. special me were actually interested in the mission. Third, this issue is complex because, operations forces (SOF) failure to support They were there because they cared about the like abortion, people are divided over the counterinsurgency objectives as an example mission, not themselves. They served with fundamentals of morality and social priori- of military units working at cross-purposes. distinction. The military is supposed to fight ties. We must keep in mind that the military They recommend three ways to improve and win our nation’s wars. They fight as a is a unique culture whose effectiveness is unity of effort: all Operation Enduring team. I don’t want any defender in the heat optimized through discipline and individual Freedom forces (except SOF) should be of battle to question the mission motivation responsibility. Social issues are necessarily merged into one common mission with of his wingman who demands to be self- secondary to good order and discipline, and international forces; decisionmaking author- identified by any individual, personal label. this critical context demands a different per- ity between U.S. military and civilian leaders That detracts from the team. Regardless of spective than one that may be suitable for the should be clarified; and SOF operations your views on homosexuality, “Don’t Ask civilian world. must focus on the indirect approach. Don’t Tell” is not about sexual—but rather is about mission­—orientation. — General Bill Ginn, USAF Call me emotional, but apparently (Ret.) articles advancing the subject of mission Former Commander, Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications orientation are not similarly awarded these U.S. Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force at ndupress.ndu.edu days in the halls of NDU. And if I was truly

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 15 Executive Summary

Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs. This includes a central government located in , which to them is a million miles away from their problems, a million miles away from their security.1

—Major Jim Gant U.S. Army Special Forces

n this issue, Joint Force Quarterly delves majority of respondents (56%) say they have state with an effective central government. into two realms of inquiry that are some level of sympathy with the motivations The article concludes with a menu of strategic mutually dependent upon legitimacy of armed opposition groups. Support for con- options tailored to the authors’ estimate of I for U.S. success. Presented up front sultation with religious leaders in government the situation and admonishes the reader: “It is a wholly unplanned return to the topic of decision-making and to resolve local problems is high time the American people were faced strategic communication precipitated by the continues to rise, with the highest levels of with the reality of what Afghanistan is not large reader (and media) response to Admiral support in the East (82%), and South West and what it will cost.” Mullen’s essay in the October issue. When (72%) of the country. There is little variation During the course of its fact-checking informed of the numerous letters and essays between ethnic groups, but there are signifi- of the first article, U.S. Central Command that JFQ had received, the Chairman con- cant regional differences. Around two-thirds suggested another perspective from the sented to acknowledge these complementary of respondents have some level of sympathy Forum’s second author, Colonel Christopher essays in lieu of his January installment. with such groups in the South East and East, Kolenda, USA. While COL Kolenda agrees Similarly, the October Forum’s examination but this is true for less than half of respon- with elements of General Warner’s essay, he of strategists and strategy led to a cascade of dents in the Central/Kabul and Central/ equates the attendant recommendations with submissions examining the strategic context Hazarajat regions.2 a counterterror (CT) approach that, given of the 32-year Afghan civil war. Continuing the social, economic, and political context, joint professional military education via JFQ Against this backdrop, the Forum is “dangerously misguided.” He laments that benefits immeasurably from the dialectical begins with a unique essay in which General until recently, our approach in Afghanistan method of reader interaction. This journal, Volney Warner explores the fundamental focused primarily on directly targeting enemy more than most, boasts a heavy percentage assumptions underlying military strategy in leadership and building capacity from the of articles from a readership of current prac- Afghanistan with an experienced foreign area top down, when we should have been invest- titioners in the field (literally). Should this officer presently serving there. Presented as ing in the root causes of the insurgency. The issue provoke another unexpected bounty of an interview, the authors begin by disabusing author argues that we must win “the decisive manuscript submissions, the April edition readers of the notion that Afghanistan can be battles for the sentiments and perceptions of shall continue to accommodate unplanned profitably regarded as a nation. They dispute local communities.” He goes on to assert that excursions in readership contributions. the efficacy of employing population-centric most Afghan insurgents operate not from On October 27, 2009, the Asia Founda- counterinsurgency strategies to obtain U.S. Pakistan but within a finite distance of their tion, with funding from the U.S. Agency military objectives in a civil war that has been villages and communities and that placing for International Development, released waged for more than three decades. Empha- U.S. forces along the border would be futile, findings from its fifth public opinion poll sizing that Afghans want nothing so much as ceding population control to the insurgents. in Afghanistan, which covered 6,406 adult to be left alone, the authors advocate a strategy COL Kolenda’s “concept for success” requires Afghans in all 34 provinces. Seventy-one that promotes internal stability and a near- proper resourcing, effective governance, percent of the respondents were found to term redeployment of coalition forces without incorporation of traditional village and dis- support the government’s attempts to address further alienating the Afghan people. Survey- trict shuras, public access to social services, an the security situation through negotiation ing the contextual elements of Pakistan’s end to corruption, and local dispute resolu- and reconciliation with armed antigovern- security concerns with and the strategic tion mechanisms. As COL Kolenda states, ment elements. According to the report: sanctuary of its Federally Administered Tribal “This will not be easy. But difficult is not Areas, the authors review demographic data impossible.” The high level of support for this approach to reinforce their message that Afghanistan is In our third Forum entry, Dr. John Nagl is likely to be influenced by the fact that a a territory that contains people, not a nation- outlines a military strategy for Afghanistan

16 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu that shares many of COL Kolenda’s prescrip- sonance. The authors juxtapose CT special rently under debate are resolved and prior- tions while adding connections to grand operations in Afghanistan and the extent to ity is assigned to either counterinsurgency strategy and policy. He begins with the classic which they support or undermine the popu- or counterterrorism.” strategy fundamental of connecting ends, lation-centric counterinsurgency effort (the The Forum concludes with an article ways, and means to obtain his definition “indirect approach”) championed by General that traces unity of effort to a fundamen- of the U.S. policy objective: “Over the next Stanley McChrystal. Citing a former senior tal principle of war, unity of command. 5 years, we want to create an Afghanistan U.S. military commander who observed that Navy Lieutenant Joshua Welle argues for a from which al Qaeda has been displaced and unity of effort is the most serious problem unified civilian-military structure with clear from which it continues to suffer disruptive in Afghanistan today, the authors add that command and control systems aligned with attacks.” Beginning with the endstate, he there is limited time for unity of effort to be the government of Afghanistan and ISAF. The surveys U.S. policy in Afghanistan over the restored and measurable progress to be dem- author believes that the U.S. Armed Forces are last 8 years and addresses U.S. relations with onstrated. The tension between the two mis- not trained to enhance governance in conflict Pakistan. He opines that “building a rudi- sions is framed as a question of priorities: the zones and to create long-term development mentary state, even a flawed one that is able importance of targeting individual enemies strategies. Accordingly, civilian expertise in to provide a modicum of security and gover- relative to the risk of incurring civilian casual- a counterinsurgency is critical to coalition nance to its people, is the American exit strat- ties and damaging relationships with local success in “armed nationbuilding.” Lieuten- egy from Afghanistan.” Acknowledging an communities; and the importance of working ant Welle identifies three layers within the insufficiency of coalition forces, he advocates with Afghan authorities and forces relative Afghan government and ISAF structures that “oil spot” security, where the most important to the risk that doing so will compromise define command and control: the national, population centers can experience national- efforts to target enemy leaders. Eliminating provincial, and district levels. He observes to-local governmental reconciliation that will the tension between Operation Enduring that separate reporting and coordination spread over time as Afghan forces are trained. Freedom forces targeting enemy leadership mechanisms for national civilian and coali- Dr. Nagl argues for a renewed U.S. commit- and the International Security Assistance tion military efforts are not working because ment to funding grassroots development and Force (ISAF) pursuing stabilization and the counterinsurgency can be won only by governance as trained troop levels increase. population security efforts is the single most joint civilian-military efforts and “through He concludes with the obvious resource ques- important requirement for better unified the sweat, blood, and tears of the Afghan tion of “whether America has the stomach to effort. The second most important require- people, who dream of a country free from do what is necessary to achieve its objectives.” ment is improved civil-military collaboration. tyranny.” The author concludes that integrat- The fourth essay, by Drs. Christopher Special operations forces kill/capture opera- ing these resources into the ISAF structure Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, explores the tions should continue, but only in support of under a single civilian-military command friction between two military mission sets counterinsurgency objectives. As the authors structure is the key to success. in Afghanistan, their combined effect upon point out, “Progress in Afghanistan is not The dilemmas and conundrums resi- unity of effort, and steps to resolve the dis- possible until the strategic objectives cur- dent in these five essays encapsulate the larger issue confronting decisionmakers regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan. National security professionals shall debate the competing “ways” and “means” of military strategy in South Asia on an equal footing until the ques- tion of “ends” is better defined. Those ends and the resources required to attain them need to be placed within a wider strategic Special Forces Group, ODA–316 (Jim Gant) Group, Special Forces d

3 context and national strategy. The answer to this grand strategic question is at once simple and elusive. What better state of peace in South Asia can be delivered at a price that we and our partners are willing to pay? JFQ

—D.H. Gurney

N o t e S

1 Jim Gant, One Tribe at a Time (Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports, Inc., 2009), 8. 2 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul, Afghanistan: The Asia Foundation, 2009), 8, available at .

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 17 Afghanistan Context and What’s Next

n my view, there are situations in the our absence? I have no boots-on-the-ground By V ol n e y F . W ar n er world that the United States cannot experience in either country, do not speak resolve militarily. Vietnam was one of the languages, and, most importantly, do not I them. Iraq is another. Neither war was understand the Arab, Kurdish, and Persian ours to win and both were theirs to lose. We cultures and their nuances, or the relation- always have been very poor at making distinc- ships among the peoples and their tribes. tions between military and political victories However, my boots have been on the and losses, and prone to supporting the losing ground since first enlisting as a Navy Seaman side on civil wars—except for our own. in World War II and subsequently leading Throughout the 2003 campaign to oust infantry combat units in Korea and Vietnam Saddam Hussein and the subsequent insur- and later commanding at division and corps gencies, and even more so with the ongoing with final assignment as commander in chief 2001 Afghanistan campaign, I have worried of U.S. Readiness Command in 1981. We need about whether we choose the right wars, enter to husband the valor and dedication of our them fully understanding why, and prosecute volunteer force and make certain our leaders them in ways that will satisfy our objectives. do not turn to them for quick solutions by Do these wars truly reflect our national inter- applying force to international problems that est? Do the locals support our actions? Do are better left to political resolution—such as we understand the culture of these countries Afghanistan/Pakistan. sufficiently to sense when we have worn out Through a social network comprised of our welcome? Have we considered whether senior-level defense, military, and intelligence our intervention is a long-term positive for the professionals, I was introduced to an individ- United States and for stability in the region in ual with 30 years of in-theater experience and U.S. Army (Tia P. Sokimson) U.S. Army (Tia P.

Soldier provides security from tower at Forward Operating Base Lane, Zabul Province

18 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu WARNER familiarity with the languages and cultures of unwinnable war in a non-nation against a close quickly and in a manner that gives some Afghanistan. He has an extensive background religious confederation that belongs to no hope of future stability without further alien- in the Intelligence Community, Department nation and is very adept at strengthening ating the Afghans. of Defense, and the defense industry. its ranks by playing the anti-Westerner Over these many years, I have come to As one who believes in preemptive peace theme. George Santayana’s observation that care for the Afghan people, their way of life, more than preemptive war, I have over the “those who cannot remember the past are and their compelling desire to be left alone past months peppered him with questions condemned to repeat it” applies to Iraq, but to their form of civilization. I appreciate how that would enable me to better comprehend even more so to Afghanistan and western they settle disagreements and how personal the nuances of the war in Afghanistan. Do we Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal rights and wrongs from many generations ago have a clear understanding of what “winning” Areas [FATA]. The Afghanistan-Pakistan have colored their outlook today. Whether means? What does it mean to the region? region plagues the world like King Tut’s they are termed tribal leaders or “warlords,” What does it mean to the Afghan people? curse—except in this case, it has repeatedly the government they gave is largely the What would be the consequences of negotiat- proven true. government they know and want. This is a ing a political settlement enforceable by the point that those who attempt to judge without region’s interested powers? General Warner: What about the understanding the culture mostly miss. It is With this subject matter expert’s Afghan people? What do they think? You akin to the facile view of too many academics permission, I have transcribed our question- seem to have captured a comprehensive prone to believe that Afghanistan is a conven- and-answer dialogue and agreed to withhold understanding of their culture. tional nation-state. It is not! his name, position, and organizational affilia- Some of us who have lived with the tion. The subject of this interview is presently C: There is a huge difference between Afghans know it only qualifies as a country, active in actions that are politically, militarily, what we think we see through Western eyes defined as a parcel of real estate with people. diplomatically, and operationally sensitive and and the reality of the Afghan culture. Even These are people who have little desire for therefore, for the purpose of this interview, I more today than a mere 2 years ago, I hear social or economic intercourse with strangers refer to him simply as “C.” anti-West cries across Afghanistan and because history has convinced them that such throughout the FATA and northern Pakistan. interchanges only benefit the stranger. Occa- General Warner: You have over the past The Afghans are beginning to liken U.S. sional travelers bemoan the lack of improved 30 years acquired convictions regarding our occupation to that of the Soviets—not in our roads and imagine that a COIN priority is strategic interests in Afghanistan and how the Afghans regard us after almost 8 years of Afghanistan is a country in the sense of real estate, but it is not this latest conflict. Please share some of your a nation and has rarely been one except under a few periods of insights. autocratic rule C: Thanks for this opportunity. I am very appreciative because this Afghan/Paki- practices, but simply in our presence. They are to build them—a thought I have ruminated stan business troubles me deeply, as does the quite willing to accept the Taliban as a politi- over a number of times when in the more burgeoning body of experts who pontificate cal party, despite the strictures of Wahhabi desolate parts of the country. Consider that about Afghanistan without complete appreci- Islamic fundamentalism, if that is the price of there are no roads because the Afghans are a ation for the Afghan culture or even a cursory everyday security. private people and do not want to share land understanding of the highly nuanced Pashto A point that evades the COIN [counter- or be imposed upon to offer Islamic hospital- or Dari languages. insurgency] aficionados and the neophytes in ity to strangers. What would visitors bring Afghanistan is a country in the sense the new U.S. administration is that we do not besides disruption to a lifestyle practiced over of real estate, but it is not a nation and has have an insurgency in Afghanistan; rather, thousands of generations? History confirms rarely been one except under a few periods it is a civil war. The Afghan-Pashto tribes this. This critical point about privacy and the of autocratic rule that extended out of Kabul cannot be separated from those in the FATA, Afghans is one that author Stephen Tanner a few hundred kilometers. With the cultural but the United States continues to believe the continually makes in his excellent history of makeup of families and tribes driving any sense Afghanistan/Pakistan border is inviolate— Afghanistan. of cohesiveness from the bottom up, it is not not militarily, but politically. The posturing likely to ever be a Westphalian nation-state, by the Marine Corps commandant and the General Warner: What are your perhaps contrary to the imaginings of absentee MARSOC [U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special thoughts about the Afghanistan/Pakistan academicians and wishful politicians. Many on Operations Command] commander is remi- relationship? the ground here have come to realize that. niscent of the goat rope that doomed Iranian The last thing that the United States hostage rescue Operation Eagle Claw because C: How do we get the point across to needs is to be sold into continuing an all Services claimed a piece of the action. And the American leadership that the problem is “policy foundations” fan the flames of contin- not so much Afghanistan as it is the fragil- General Volney F. Warner, USA (Ret.), was ued involvement, not for reason of national ity and corruptness of Pakistan and the Commander, U.S. Readiness Command, from 1979 objectives but to perpetuate their COIN cause. failure to clean up the FATA? I see this error to 1981. We need to bring our Afghan enterprise to a multiplying as we ratchet up the resentment ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 19 FORUM | Afghanistan: Context and What’s Next of the Afghans by moving in more troops I will not go into the “why” of Iraq Going into Iraq was a terrible miscalculation; and limiting indigenous control over their beyond saying—as one within the Intel- Iraq is not a national entity, but another Yugo- own destinies. I am comforted to see these ligence Community—I was convinced, and slavia cobbled together as a quick and dirty concerns echoed by members of the U.S.-led remain so, that Saddam’s WMD program, solution by Western interests—and it will alliance. both research and manufacturing, were dead- balkanize after we leave. There are no “maybes” about the Paki- ended within 2 years following Desert Storm. We continuously fail to realize that stanis. The training grounds for what became When the administration again was combating terrorism requires reacting to the Taliban are the madrassas, Pakistani compelled to pay attention to Afghanistan our enemies in terms they can understand schools funded by the Saudis in the 1980s because the Taliban had recaptured much of and fear. Appeasement is the path of least that continue today. In earlier times, com- the territory that we had chased them from, resistance for those with weak minds and base mencing with the 11th century, the madrassas the objective had morphed from defeating the incentives. These behaviors devolve rapidly to taught subjects both religious and secular menaces of militant Islam of the Taliban and the fundamental war equation of win or lose. including law and medicine. This emphasis al Qaeda to a nationbuilding odyssey for the The Soviets had the right solution to terrorism shifted in the 1980s to religion, notably politi- United States. It has escaped and continues when four of their diplomats were kidnapped cal Islam. to escape the idealists and the new COIN in by Hizballah 23 years ago. The Too many in the United States cannot— practitioners who are eager to prove their con- KGB kidnapped six fundamentalists and or do not want to—distinguish between al victions that Afghanistan has only exhibited sliced off a few fingers, sending the severed Qaeda and the Taliban because an enemy, the characteristics of a nation when it was digits to the fundamentalist leadership with any enemy, is good for business and provides under autocratic rule. At all other times, the the message “release our people or you’ll get fodder for Washington advisory organizations tribes lived their own lives; plied their trades; yours back piece-by-piece and more to follow.” who thrive on strategic challenges and joint, swapped foodstuffs, raw materials, and prod- In the early 1970s, when terrorists interagency operations for their continued ucts; and made some AFAs [afghanis, the unit attempted to skyjack a Royal Ethiopian relevance and existence. of currency] off of tourists. This is their way of Airlines flight, they were overcome by the life, even with the Taliban present in some of flight crew and first-class passengers. They General Warner: What are your views the provinces. were moved to tourist class, and the skyjack- on the U.S. and coalition strategy for waging ers were beheaded. The crew radioed Addis the global war on terror in the Middle East General Warner: We seem to be expe- Ababa to call the world press, and upon and South Asia? riencing difficulty in identifying sufficient landing the pilot walked out with the heads Afghan security folks to augment U.S. forces of the terrorists and kicked them down the C: That is too broad a question to now in country. Additional U.S. interagency stair ramp, saying, “This is how we handle cover in summary fashion. I have to go back representatives are sorely needed to “embed” terrorists.” to events after 9/11 to answer, if there is an answer. too many in the United States cannot—or do not want to— In Afghanistan in March-April 2002, we were detoured from the original objective distinguish between al Qaeda and the Taliban because an declared by the President of punishing the enemy, any enemy, is good for business 9/11 terrorists and defusing recurrence by destroying their organization. We exploited governance at the provincial level, if security General Warner: But then why did we the public’s 9/11 outrage and fears to pursue eventually permits. Do you subscribe to the not eliminate the Taliban and pursue bin other political agendas that enveloped coun- COIN population-centric approach in the Laden and company into Pakistan when we terinsurgency, asymmetric warfare, WMD current situation in Afghanistan? had the chance? [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation, and the overthrow of selected dictatorships— C: Let me digress a moment to C: The U.S. Government’s paramils all under the rubric of a “war on terror.” Our welcome you to the wonderful new world of and special ops [special operations] folks, politicians morphed the pursuit of Osama population-centric COIN—the “feed your with the paid assistance of the Northern bin Laden into this war, and we included the enemy and kiss his kids and he’ll be yours for Alliance leaders, nearly cleaned out the Taliban in our definition of enemies. life” strategy. I was in and out of Afghanistan Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, then we In Afghanistan, the impact of this between 1979 and 1984, I have many mujahi- turned the mop-up over to the organized agenda resulted in (1) not augmenting the few deen friends to this day among those who did military, tasking them to build an Afghan troops and paramils [paramilitary forces] that not go to the madrassas and turn Taliban, and National Army [ANA]. But you need a we had in-country to finish off the militant I have spent the lion’s share of time since in nation to have a national army, and this elements of the Taliban and (2) letting Paki- mid- and Southwest Asia—Syria, Iran, Iraq, nation only existed in Kabul and immedi- stan seemingly off the hook by not pursuing Kurdistan, and Afghanistan/Pakistan. I reject ate environs. Nonetheless, BG McChrystal the al Qaeda/bin Laden organization into the COIN as a workable solution over the long [ Stanley McChrystal, northern FATA. According to the President, run unless the United States wants to rent USA] did yeoman’s work until his forces we had other, more important, fish to fry in Arabs and Pashtun for the foreseeable future. were pulled out for Iraq on that ill-conceived Iraq. I say “rent” because we cannot buy them. and unplanned venture. I am a firm believer

20 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu WARNER in counterterrorism warfare up-close, per- C: The tribes were very loosely united percent are 15 to 64; less than 25 percent live sonal, and quietly. in 1747 under Ahmad Shah Durrani and in cities, the rest in scattered tribal settle- One can assign many reasons to why thereafter served as a buffer zone between ments; and fewer than 28 percent of the the Afghan Taliban was not eliminated in British and Russian interests, until the Brits population can read and write. The infant 2002, most of which had to do with American relinquished notional control in 1919. A mili- mortality rate is the third highest in the world politics and shifting of the “strategic threat tary coup in 1973 ended a very brief period of at 152 per 1,000—so high, in fact, that many vision” to Iraq, the line-walking of Pakistani some democracy. The coup was overthrown Afghans do not give names to their children President [Pervez] Musharraf who sheltered by the Soviets in 1979, and they, in turn, were until age 5. Life expectancy is under 45 them in the FATA, and the myopic way we evicted in 1989 by the Afghan mujahideen years old. And beneath Afghan ethnic divi- left in 1992 with no view of, nor concern for, supported by the United States and some sions—42 percent Pashtuns, 27 percent Tajiks, Afghanistan’s future. My personal knowledge 10 percent Hazaras, and minority Uzbeks, begins in 1979 when only CIA [Central Intel- I am a firm believer in Turkmen, Baluchi, and Nuristanis—are ligence Agency], not just surrogates, U.S. counterterrorism warfare up- the loyalty hierarchies commencing with SOF [special operations forces], and USAID family, clan, village, tribe, and, at the bottom [U.S. Agency for International Development] close, personal, and quietly of the list, national identity as citizens of were on the scene. Many of the mujahideen Afghanistan. became fast friends, particularly those of the Pakistan Pashtun. When the United States Northern Alliance. Those who did not attend precipitously withdrew support following General Warner: Why do you contend the madrassas and become Taliban have simi- the departure of the Soviets, many of the Afghanistan is a country but not a nation? larly remained friends over the years. I have mujahideen, now unemployed, unsheltered, mourned the loss of many of these friends. and unfed in a decimated country, attended C: First, because of the social hierarchy In 2001–2002, we warmly welcomed the U.S. camps and schools financed by the Saudi that I have just noted and particularly the special operations forces, wishing that they Wahhabis and operated by the Pakistanis ordering of it with the national identity had been with us during the previous 20 years. under the strictures of the militant Taliban to being least important. We are not dealing obtain shelter and food for their families and with a nation that has—as much as we would General Warner: Can you give us themselves. like to believe—an effective government. a historical context that will let us better Keep these demographics in mind: The Afghan government is in evidence only understand the motivation and loyalties of the the 39 million Afghans have a median age in Kabul, and elsewhere only on police and Afghan people? of under 18; 44 percent are under 15, and 53 military paydays. It is more a license for

Afghan boy watches Marines patrol in Madrassa area of Helmand Province U.S. Marine Corps (Robert Piper)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 21 FORUM | Afghanistan: Context and What’s Next extortion than a functioning central govern- Western puppet. Whatever he embraces, they Waziristan, where they are still working ment. The Morrison-Knudsen [Corporation] will not. the problem. They have moved some troops in the late 1950s and early 1960s built some This is not to say that they cannot think into South Waziristan, but that is primar- dams and buildings with money from the or are too immature to master their own ily a holding action until they create some Asian Development Bank and other interna- future. It is just that—as I have found in living breathing room in the north and can free up tional financing, and it was a peaceful place, with them—they focus on what will happen men and munitions for actions in the south. not part of a nation but peaceful because tonight, what they will eat tomorrow, who is Their claims and media reports notwith- people were left alone to pursue the life they tomorrow’s enemy, and how they can avenge standing, it is still not a full-scale offensive had “since Alexander.” And then the Taliban the wrongs done to their family last month, last in either North or South Waziristan. Part of emerged and saw the profits of poppies that year, or a generation ago. Given their history, the problem was and is that the Pakistani ISI the Soviets and we—believing commerce this is a predictably short and narrow view. [Inter-Services Intelligence] was so involved was more important than simply raising One can fondly remember the “green hills of in supporting the Taliban that the govern- food for local consumption—inspired, and Afghanistan” from the 1970s, but that existed ment has had to sort out what they want to voilà, we have today’s Helmand Province until 1979 because the people wanted to live in do and who is going to do it—a seriously where the Taliban has bogged down U.S. peace and harmony, not because some central muddled situation. The recent aggressive forces. governmental authority mandated it. moves by the Pakistani government reflect a major schism between the Taliban and the ISI, who have been their under-the-table patrons. If the ISI responds, it will help cement the Pakistani government’s response against the militants. It will be interesting to

U.S. Army (David Alvarado) see the effect this has on India and whether it too will rise against the Taliban. To date, the only really successful efforts may continue to be support mounted by our paramils, who are not legal authorities there.

most of the Afghans I speak with barely acknowledge, if at all, President Karzai as other than a Western puppet

General Warner: What are your Afghan minister of foreign affairs listens to injured Afghan thoughts on handling the Taliban problem in soldier talk about suicide attack near International Security the FATA? Assistance Force Headquarters

C: I believe, since the Pakistanis do I am very pessimistic about attempts General Warner: Do you consider not control the FATA, that sooner or later to bring about a unified national entity in Afghanistan as home base for those plotting, someone will have to recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan that most Afghans would place guiding, and directing global terrorism? a political presence. If—a large if—U.S. forces above their village and tribes. The best I can rid most of Afghanistan of the Taliban, can see is a federation of tribes—a kind of C: No, not hardly. While Afghanistan notably in the South around and medieval Poland—where borders, land, and Pakistan are indistinguishable as hosts to in the Helmand Valley, and can block them and water-sharing are clearly spelled out. terrorism, the FATA is the locus of problems. from coming in from Pakistan, our paramils, To make a federation of tribes work, I think I do not believe that anyone in contemporary with increased Pakistani army support, can Pakistan would have to cede some FATA times, short of historians, recognizes in any perhaps winnow down enough of them in land—perhaps Kurram and three of the way the Zero or Durran Line—certainly not the FATA to stabilize most of the area. We Frontier Regions to be administered by UN the Afghans or Pakistanis I have spoken with. might then be able to isolate the Taliban and [United Nations] buffers. And this has to be Perhaps we should leverage Pakistan’s abdica- reduce their numbers. The key is the a priori done by agreement among Muslim states, tion of governing the FATA to bring the FATA conditions the United States could—or even without the United States or other Western issue to the UN Security Council? should—impose on the electoral process. powers in the mix. Most of the Afghans I True, the Pakistani military has been Do not make our Western sense of justice speak with barely acknowledge, if at all, effective finally in the Swat Valley, and with or government a precondition; virtually all President [Hamid] Karzai as other than a those successes they have moved to North Afghans I have spoken with want us out

22 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu WARNER and that means Western influence, not just where we wanted. A recent Wall Street Journal down from their 25,000-feet perch and out of troops. Maybe we could arrange to establish article discussed our successes succinctly and their labs and analysis centers and explain to this under the auspices of non-U.S., largely accurately. We have had the assets to call some a mother why the United States leaves “toys” Muslim-nation UN oversight and remove all strikes across this border that have clobbered to maim her kids. I have held and bandaged U.S. presence except for requested USAID some Taliban training centers and depots, but so many kids and tried to comfort so many projects to rebuild or improve the physical the successes are too few and each one has to mothers that I refuse to distinguish between infrastructure. be argued. We have spotlighted many more their use and the atrocities of murdering mili- As a further complication, Pakistan than we have been able to hit. tant Muslims. And yes, they do look to kids like is not much concerned with the Taliban, except as a threat to the Pakistani govern- ment, and this is increasing because their those satisfied with the status quo of cluster-bombs need focus is on India. Officials of the Pakistani to come down from their 25,000-feet perch and out of government must draw permissions from their labs and explain to a mother why the United States the FATA tribes to enter the area, and these leaves “toys” to maim her kids are only good for a specific agency or fron- tier region. As for most of Western Pakistan, we Marine hands out school supplies in Helmand Province are not much involved except to provide money, materiel, and political words. The Pakistani army is 20 percent Pashtun—the Taliban is mostly Pashtun with some non- Pashtun Afghan conscripts—and 80 percent Punjabi, discounting minor fringe players, and Pashtun and Punjabi have been fighting for years, I think before partition. As I said earlier, the Pakistani ISI is the direct conduit from the Pashtun elements to the Taliban, and these elements increasingly swing toward an alliance with the Taliban.

General Warner: Seizing terrain with the raw courage of soldiers without the appli- cation of supporting firepower is an unpar- donable sin to an old infantry commander who has been permitted “to comb gray hair because of it.” On the other hand, aerially delivered ordnance without the benefit of ground observation too often causes unac- ceptable collateral damage and loss of civilian U.S. Marine Corps (Artur Shvartsberg) lives. How do we reconcile this? Not that UAS and ground-directed MRE [meal, ready-to-eat] packs with candy. C: The surveillance birds are invalu- strikes by covert forces are the total answer to We damage our standing with the Afghans and able—particularly those with high resolution keeping the Taliban in check, but as long as Pashtuns far more with these munitions than by and extended station time. I have to waffle we can subdue them in southern Afghanistan any of the UAS strikes. Believe it. a bit here because of the open forum that we and keep those in the FATA from finding are using. The Predator/Hellfire system is an refuge in Afghanistan, we might achieve some General Warner: I understand your incredibly effective weapon. The Pakistanis level of stability. readings on the Afghans, Taliban, and Paki- seem to be in favor of it so long as they are in I should interject a word of caution stanis. So where do we go next in terms of control of the tasking and the missile releases. regarding some U.S. and other Western tech- strategy? If not, they cry “collateral damage!” For well nology. While we continuously exercise brag- over a year and frequently since, I have fed ging rights over our advanced technology, we C: My suggested options are all worthy you observations on the effectiveness of our cannot seem to build bomblets with timed fuses of objective critique and winnowing to the UAS [unmanned system] hits on the to self-detonate or become inert if they do not balance that are acceptable to the Afghans Taliban in the FATA, how this was counter- impact targets within minutes after delivery. We and Pakistanis, even if only marginally so to ing the Taliban threat and damaging Taliban cannot color-code or mark the bomblets that the U.S. political establishment. The ordering organizations, logistics, and morale, and do not explode on delivery. Those satisfied with of these recommendations does not connote enabling us, in many instances, to corral them the status quo of cluster-bombs need to come any prioritization. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 23 FORUM | Afghanistan: Context and What’s Next

1. Immediately initiate a three- Islamic tradition of Pashtunwalli milmastia, I have omitted COIN from these recom- pronged PSYOP [psychological operation] I am a guest—wishes that we would tangibly mendations, not to dismiss its value as a tool, program using all media—Internet, radio, help, not merely promise, to improve sanita- but because, in Afghanistan or more correctly television, and discussion forums: tion and water facilities, but with a not-so- the total Afghanistan-Pakistan theater, we are a. PSYOP #1: Explain in Islamic terms hidden wish that we would leave as soon as not confronted by the same type of insurgency and context why we are in Afghanistan. The that was done. To them, these are local issues that we saw in Iraq where the revision to FM objective is security for the United States and with no “national” significance. [Field Manual] 3–24, Counterinsurgency, for Afghans and not to reform Afghanistan in 3. Open a private dialogue with Iran, found its genesis. Let’s not continue to blindly a Western image. We must emphasize the U.S. initially working toward NASA [National accept the COIN bumper sticker without real- desire to leave as soon as possible; our desire Aeronautics and Space Administration] part- izing how the acronym needs to be practiced to help the tribes maintain their own security; nership to assist Iran in gaining recognition in the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater. The term and our intention to render infrastructure and respectability in the Middle East. has taken on so many colorations to attract rebuilding and construction where requested, 4. Encourage Iranian and Tajik the broadest possible constituency that it is on a dollar-matching basis with the Pakistanis economic exchanges, even fund them if virtually without value as a prescription for and coalition members. Far from historical necessary, to further fence and contain specific actions. vestiges, tribes are more the focus of security Afghanistan. There is an offensive aspect—covert than police or the much-vaunted ANA, the 5. Encourage cultivation of foodstuffs, COIN—reputed to be used successfully in the deployable size of which is far less than adver- biofuel, and plants for fabrics and industrial FATA that I cannot discuss in any detail in tised by the Afghans or the United States. If uses as alternatives to cocaine poppies and this forum. It has apparently been practiced there is to be a “government” in any form, it drug production. with safeguards and checks against becoming must be of the Afghans’ making. 6. Encourage mutual interests of another Vietnam-era Operation Phoenix and Caution: There is a potential downside Tajikistan, China, and India to diplomatically seems to effectively employ proactive PSYOP to showing the “Afghan face,” and this makes squeeze Pakistan. and “legend building.” it a balancing act. The more the police pres- The primary U.S. objective should be the ence looks Afghan, the more we look like an the primary U.S. objective elimination of terrorists and their networks occupying force, and the Afghans will want us should be the elimination of that present threats: the Taliban and—sepa- out even more urgently. Also, there is a social rate but related—al Qaeda and whatever other as well as civil discipline in policing that, terrorists and their networks decentralized organization networks Osama absent generations of a police legacy, may well that present threats bin Laden has and can create. This should not lead to militia-like abuses—a lesson to learn be conflated with nationbuilding. from Iraq—and demands for baksheesh— 7. Enlist China’s aid to cool off To eliminate these terrorists requires extortion—for protection. I use the term Kashmir and further politically squeeze denying organizations recruits and destroy- “Afghan face” to connote an impression, not a Pakistan. ing those aligned with them. To stifle their nation, as there are many, many Afghan faces. 8. As a political—not military—state- recruiting, we need first to provide the popu- My point addresses the increasing Afghan ment, increase significantly the number lation a measure of security from Taliban view that the United States has become an of armed Predator and Hellfire strikes on threats, and the most effective way to do this occupying power. In my discussions, the local Taliban strongholds and movements in the is to eliminate the militant Taliban elements. administration is bifurcated, anointed by FATA. Do not deploy and definitely forbid Only then does the building of infrastructure Kabul and local tribal leaders, and the latter others the use of Hermes 450, Eitan, or any become relevant or even possible. As Brigadier pay little loyalty to the central government. UAS being used by Israel in the Gaza to avoid [Justin] Kelly [Australian Army, (Ret.)] said in b. PSYOP #2: Counter al Qaeda and adverse propaganda. his recent Quadrant magazine essay, “No one Wahhabism-Koranic spin with teachings 9. Treble the covert action special places their life and the lives of their families by moderate and accepted Arabic scholars operations and paramil forces we have operat- at risk by rejecting Taliban authority merely selected from across Islamic countries—Arab ing in FATA forward and deploy also into because they have, or are promised, more and other. the rear areas of North and South Waziristan electricity or cleaner water.” c. PSYOP #3: State firmly our intent to and Tribal Agencies of Kurram, Khyber, My experiences living with the Afghans decimate al Qaeda and its supporters in the Mohmand, and Bajaur. These operations yield a totally different take than the news FATA to protect noncombatants. should primarily be conducted after dark. media’s pro-Karzai attitude and what we face 2. Appoint Pakistani, Afghan, and 10. Accept no logistic routes offered in “nationbuilding.” It’s high time the Ameri- Iranian ambassadors, businessmen/scholars through or controlled by [Vladimir] Putin can people were faced with the reality of what conversant with the diversity of Islamic and company. Recognize that he remains Afghanistan is not and what it will cost in culture and history. Embassy staffs need to KGB/Federal Security Service with the national resolve, blood, and treasure to realize include persons with backgrounds in this burning ambition to restore the Soviet their politicians’ idealism. Alice’s wonderland and in agriculture, civil engineering, and hegemony. is a closer reality, and I say this knowing and communications. 11. Secure the Afghan eastern “border” loving the Afghan people. JFQ Repeatedly in people’s homes I have in Afghanistan with U.S. combat troops but heard—politely expressed because in the allow no incursions by them into the FATA.

24 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Afghan Border Police wait to receive certificates of completion for training in entry-control points, road blocks, vehicle maintenance, and infantry patrol ISAF Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level A Rejoinder to Volney F. Warner and “C”

By C hristopher D . he editor of Joint Force Quarterly The assessment of the problem and the pre- asked me to respond to the scriptions for the way ahead, however, are K ole n da thought-provoking interview where we differ. T conducted by General Volney F. C characterizes Afghanistan as a country Warner with “C.” I do so as a Soldier serving in the sense of real estate but not as a nation. in Afghanistan. The sentiments here are The confederations of tribes, notions of iden- entirely my own and should not be attributed tity that center on the family, and desires for in any way to the leadership of the Interna- local autonomy make Afghanistan unwork- tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF). able as a state in any modern sense. State- or nationbuilding, therefore, is a futile enterprise. Initial Observations Afghans do not want a government and resist C argues that “we need to bring our any attempt to impose one upon them. Afghan enterprise to a close quickly and in a Counterinsurgency, therefore, is manner that gives some hope of future stabil- the wrong approach—particularly the ity without further alienating the Afghans.” “population-centric” type that C equates with In so doing, we must deny recruits to terrorist organizations and destroy those aligned with Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda, USA, is a Soldier them. I could not agree more, in principle. serving in Afghanistan. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 25 FORUM | Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level

“feed your enemy and kiss his kids and he’ll same really lead to a successful outcome? Can gists and policymakers come to conclusions be yours for life.” The conflict is more civil we truly kill our way out of this? and recommendations that are about right, war than insurgency. U.S. forces are seen as Is government by warlords or tribal and avoid those that are desperately wrong. occupiers, similar to the Soviets. Afghans, he strongmen actually feasible in Afghanistan? This is likely part of the reason General asserts, want us out; but they will take our Afghans roundly reject warlord empowerment. Stanley McChrystal brought so many diverse money to build facilities in their villages. The Taliban, in fact, received tribal support voices to his initial assessment. C recommends a counterterror (CT) against them in the 1990s after years of civil Coming to a reasonable degree of approach, combined with a focus by current war. They do not want to see a return to those understanding of the complexity is critical. U.S. forces on the ground to “secure the times. Community leaders remain alienated To paraphrase Carl von Clausewitz, the most Afghan eastern border” against Taliban inva- from the culture of “commanderism,” repres- important determination that a strategist sion from Pakistan and to provide population sion, and criminality that threatens both their must make is to understand the nature of the security by eliminating militants. A psycho- ways of life and hopes for the future. Thirty war—not mistaking it for or attempting to logical operations campaign should explain years of warfare and social atomization have turn it into something alien to its nature. why we are in Afghanistan, counter Wah- crippled the large traditional structures so The emerging “CT plus tribal warlords habist spin, and state our intent to “decimate” badly that rule by tribal strongmen is no longer equals victory” (or good enough) thesis needs al Qaeda and its supporters. possible. But certainly the governance that to be carefully examined. Analysis of social, The CT approach, coupled with reliance will work in Afghanistan must be one that economic, and political dimensions of the on tribal strongmen, is becoming in vogue enfranchises, builds on, and adapts traditional conflict illustrates that such an argument is among those frustrated with the state of our systems in appropriate ways. dangerously misguided. efforts in Afghanistan, and who look for a less costly solution to securing our interests. according to the International Brief Thoughts on the War These sentiments are entirely appropriate and Republican Institute survey, Afghanistan is beset by five destabiliz- should be debated fully. ing and mutually reinforcing factors: (1) 78 percent of respondents localized violence, struggles for power, and Questions considered themselves social unrest fomented by indigenous mili- A number of problematic assumptions “Afghan” first tants who are exploited by (2) larger insur- and tensions exist within this argument that gent groups whose senior leadership resides deserve exploration. First of all, is Afghani- Is a CT approach feasible without basic in Pakistan, such as the Taliban, Hezb-e- stan truly ungovernable, or must it be gov- law enforcement, governance, and security Islami Gulbuddin, and the Haqqani network erned in an Afghan way? Afghan history from institutions, or is it just another example of that are enabled by (3) al Qaeda and affiliated the 1930s through the early 1970s suggests a playing “whack-a-mole” to no enduring effect? with transnational terrorist networks, all reasonable degree of governance is entirely If we counter Wahhabist “spin,” will that have supported and sustained by (4) narcotraf- possible. any effect in Afghanistan? The Taliban are, in ficking, criminality, smuggling, and inter- Second, does one’s identity as a Suk-dari fact, Deobandi Hanafis—not Wahhabis—as national financiers. These four symptomatic clan, Kom tribe, or Nuristani, for instance, someone with C’s experience should know. factors coexist within an ongoing (5) socio- exclude identity as an Afghan? Or can one And he should also know that Hanafis gener- economic upheaval and political disaffection hold several identities at once? If not, where ally do not enroll in Wahhabi madrassas. that form the root causes of attraction to does the exclusion begin—between clan and Nonetheless, supporting moderate madrassas insurgency. tribe, between tribe and ethnicity, or between inside Afghanistan as alternatives is critically Until recently, our approach in Afghan- ethnicity and national identity? To argue that important. istan focused primarily on directly targeting one’s identity can be the first three and not the enemy leadership and building capacity last is tenuous at best. Afghans I know have Many Afghanistans from the top down, with increasingly mixed little problem holding multiple circles of iden- Like C, I have grown to love the Afghan results. We have not invested as deliberately tities—not unlike most Americans. According people, having spent the better part of the in addressing the root causes of a growing to the International Republican Institute past 2½ years in-country working closely with insurgency. Too often, we have left the arena survey released on June 16, 2009, 78 percent of elders and villagers. That I see things differ- of the people wide open to extremist influ- respondents considered themselves “Afghan” ently than C is not surprising. There are many ence. We have cleared without holding and first.1 While individual surveys should be Afghanistans—the rich tapestry of the society building. Kinetic strikes, although disruptive, used with great caution, identity remains an and culture conveys different meanings to dif- are ably spun by insurgent information net- interesting theme for additional analysis. ferent observers depending on their perspec- works, driving negative feedback that often What evidence do we have that the insur- tives, biases, and agendas. Too often, observ- creates more militants while expanding sanc- gent forces invade from Pakistan rather than ers see the Afghanistan they want to see and tuary. Despite 8 years of individually effec- being resident within Afghanistan itself? If ignore the others that do not conform. This tive tactical actions, levels of violence have protecting the population means that we must complexity is part of what makes Afghanistan increased and the insurgencies have strength- target and destroy Taliban militants, and we so fascinatingly difficult and so potentially ened. We are not winning the decisive battles have been doing just that for the past 8 years, perilous. Afghanistan is one place where the for the sentiments and perceptions of local why is violence rising? Will doing more of the so-called wisdom of crowds can help strate- communities.

26 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu KOLENDA

Root Causes A peaceful middle class cannot develop control of the youth, carefully undermining The socioeconomic dislocation and within the violent social, economic, and polit- the traditional authority figures, and using political disaffection over the past 30 years ical dysfunction. Poor and uneducated boys money and violence to retain popular control. of violence have created conditions ripe for grow up to be young men with little vision The collapse of social cohesion is the Taliban’s insurgent activity. Pashtun society has frag- for building their communities. Those who most powerful enabler. And their operations mented; the fabric of village and tribal life is show promise attend extremist madrassas and and methods are deliberately designed to unraveling. Inter- and intra-tribal conflicts become radicalized, or they escape to larger exacerbate it. abound and are exacerbated by the insurgents. cities for school or work and rarely return. Insurgent leaders play on the lack of Economic deprivation creates vast unemploy- The lack of functional, credible, and economic opportunity, local feuds and griev- ment outside the subsistence farm. Roughly 80 accountable governance adds to the frus- ances, resentment of outsiders (even Afghan percent of the population is illiterate in rural tration. Corrupt officials, protected from officials are deemed to be outsiders), and reli- areas. Many seek social and economic oppor- accountability by political benefactors, exploit gious and warrior narratives to attract young tunities and outlets for addressing political the population and extort aid and develop- men. Extremist madrassas, training camps, grievances by joining insurgent groups; others ment dollars for their own ends while the and group dynamics strengthen identity. are forced to choose. Poverty and disenfran- people see no benefit in return. These socio- Insurgent and terrorist leaders, chisement are guaranteed in the status quo. economic and political upheavals incubate meanwhile, subtly undermine traditional While specifics varied greatly from violent extremism, providing the necessary authority. They are careful not to openly tribe to tribe and clan to clan, in traditional conditions in which insurgent and terror challenge the control of the elders in the stratified Pashtun society powerful families groups can grow and thrive. early stages until they gain a critical mass of

U.S. Soldiers patrol near Forward Operating Base kinetic strikes, although Baylough, Zabul Province disruptive, are ably spun by insurgent information networks, driving negative feedback that often creates more militants while expanding sanctuary formed tribal elites that governed local affairs, much as C suggests. The maliks, mullahs, and malims (tribal elders, religious leaders, and teachers, respectively) controlled the politics, religion, and education of village and tribal life. The poor remained subsistence farmers with little social or economic opportunity. After 30 years of conflict, an economy has developed in which money is exchanged for fighting. Violence has created the most viable path to social and economic mobility Sokimson) U.S. Army (Tia P. and political influence. Those who prove skilled and demonstrate leadership qualities Insurgent Social Strategy popular control. Most elders do not support can advance in the ranks, increase their local The various insurgencies are not held radicalism and retain the belief that they power, and grow wealthy. Many insurgent together by a coherent political ideology or control their people. They often see the leaders are from traditionally poor families compelling theory of social organization government and foreign counterinsurgents who would otherwise have remained outside that attracts broad popular support. Instead, as a greater threat to their power and control the local governing structures. the insurgencies gain coherence through than the local radicals, and will often pas- At the risk of historical anachronism, it “negative integration”—they are defined more sively support insurgent activity against the is fair to say that an element of class warfare by a sense of common enemy rather than government to retain power. Over time, they forms an important subtext to the insurgen- common vision. Their military efforts during grow increasingly incapable of competing cies. The rise of this violent, well-funded the so-called fighting season mask the more with the radicals, but rarely detect the threat warrior middle class has attracted the poor important year-round efforts in governance, until it is too late. The insurgent leaders are while undermining traditional tribal aris- propaganda, and social control. well positioned to intimidate—or elimi- tocracy. As one elder stated, “The big rocks The more subtle—and more power- nate—elders who resist. become little rocks, and the little rocks ful—component of their strategy is the effort As the social strategy comes to frui- become big rocks.” to exacerbate social atomization by gaining tion, charismatic radical leaders use violence ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 27 FORUM | Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level to secure their positions and deny compet- Feedback opportunity, and social anger enable foot ing forms of opportunity. Supported by The power of this strategy becomes soldiers to be replenished easily and provide armed enforcers, these leaders assert their evident as violence escalates despite individu- a cadre ready for upward mobility if leaders authority in decisions affecting everyday ally effective coalition tactical actions. In are killed or captured. village life. They use informal justice too many areas, the government is seen as Violence, and even poorly executed systems, for instance, to rapidly adjudicate an outside and corrupt influence, even an development, therefore, can enable the Tal- land disputes and violations of social norms. actively predatory force that directly threat- iban’s social strategy if the socioeconomic and They control movement and collect taxes ens the authority of the elders and fails to political conditions that make an insurgency through checkpoints. Although it is not serve the people. Perceiving threats to their attractive remain unaddressed. The problem is particularly acute if the actions of the gov- as the social strategy comes to fruition, charismatic radical ernment and coalition are seen as undermin- ing, rather than supporting, the needs and leaders use violence to secure their positions and deny interests of the people. Absent attention to competing forms of opportunity such root causes, our tactics can create rein- forcing feedback that undermines the govern- popular, enough find harsh yet predictable authority from the coalition/government and ment and the elders while increasing the hold justice preferable to the chaotic incompe- the insurgents/local youth, elders naturally of the radicals. tence of untrustworthy government officials assume that they have a better shot at control- and constant, unpredictable violence. The ling their own people. Problematic Thesis poor, moreover, can be attracted to this Kinetic operations inside villages The collapse of social cohesion and system of justice because their rights are confirm to most that the greater threat comes fragmentation of tribal integrity in the upheld against former powerbrokers and from the state and the coalition, not local Pashtun areas make any silver-bullet solution tribal elites. extremists. The grievous affront taken from to govern Afghanistan by tribal strongmen and powerbrokers a dangerous anachro- nism. Many of these individuals have been included in the government in an attempt to gain support among their populations. The fact that their tribal brethren are still involved in the insurgency speaks volumes about the waning power of the so-called strongmen and powerbrokers. Although specific areas experience cross-border insurgent movement and attacks, most Afghan insurgents operate not from Pakistan but within a finite distance from their villages and communities. In a Venn diagram with a large circle depicting the com- munity and a smaller circle the insurgents, most of the smaller circle would fit inside the larger one. The limited portion outside the community represents external leaders, sup- porters, and facilitators. Placing U.S. forces along the border would not only be futile, but it would also further cede population control to the insurgents. Afghan children play in classroom, Wardak Province

U.S. Air Force (RyanU.S. Air Force Crane) The bottom-up approach to social control militates against stability through a The larger insurgent groups work from the violation of a man’s home, damage to his CT-only campaign, or the more conventional the bottom up to gain power and destabilize property, and injury or death of members of approach of protecting the population by the government. They appropriate local his family or tribe inspires more radicaliza- killing militants. The Taliban and other militants and connect them into a larger geo- tion of the youth and more support for the insurgent networks generally do not travel graphic framework to build both sanctuary insurgents. about in large formations that present invit- and control of the population. In Afghanistan, Local developmental projects con- ing targets to coalition firepower and CT they expect ongoing violence will exhaust the tracted to “outsiders,” which are often seen strikes. Most have learned that painful lesson government and counterinsurgents. When to benefit government cronies or wealthy over the past 8 years, so the insurgents have foreign forces leave, the insurgents expect the businessmen, feed into the same underlying adopted a more subtle approach of violent government to collapse. logic. Youth demographics, poor economic intimidation, attraction, and population

28 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu KOLENDA control. Doing so enables them to hide in Afghanistan had a reasonable degree of public Bad governance—the abuse of power for plain sight. administration that met the basic expectations personal interest—is a greater problem in the The social fragmentation and lack of of the people. These expectations are not vast eyes of Afghans. Nearly every conversation I opportunity combined with the large 18- to and can certainly be met once again. have with rural Afghans aligns with myriad 25-year-old demographic makes the attrition The current state of weak and bad surveys and analyses—corruption and abuse strategy that C and others advocate coun- governance is at the heart of political dis- of power are at or near the top of themes cited terproductive. Put simply, we can kill 10 and satisfaction, not the existence of government as major drivers of instability.2 To be sure, the insurgents can recruit 10 more. We can itself. Although several institutions have made if such problems were considered “normal,” kill 100 and the insurgents can recruit 100 significant progress and many national level Afghans would not resent them so much. The more. Attrition simply does not matter when the underlying social, economic, and politi- targeting is most effective when insurgent and terror cal logic makes insurgency more attractive than peaceful existence. When kinetic strikes leaderships are isolated from the local population as a involve civilian casualties or damage to homes complementary effort to the counterinsurgency strategy and property, insurgent recruiting becomes easier. Simple attrition of militants is a losing ministers have proven quite capable, the same levels of popular discontent suggest power- battle. Targeting is most effective when is not true at the subnational levels where the fully that Afghans view them as antithetical to insurgent and terror leaderships are isolated government meets the people. their expectations. from the local population as a complementary Weak governance is the lack of capacity The discontent with the current state effort to the counterinsurgency strategy. to perform the basic competencies of security, of weak and bad governance does not imply For a CT approach to be truly effective, rule of law, and limited services that people that Afghans reflexively reject government the state requires a functional security and expect, such as jobs, education, and health or that Afghanistan is ungovernable. In fact, intelligence apparatus and a basic level of law care. Traditional governance systems, such they suggest the opposite: Afghans expect a enforcement. Absent these prerequisites, CT strikes are at best disruptive, at worst coun- terproductive. A withdrawal of ISAF forces would leave vast swaths of the country under insurgent control. The prospect of sufficient intelligence emanating from such environs to permit precise CT strikes is minimal. Much of the reporting and targeting will almost certainly involve blood feuds and local dis- putes masked as intelligence, which would ultimately heighten rather than diminish insurgent control. The administration of Barack Obama rejected a CT approach to Afghanistan during the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy Review for good reason. The conditions have not changed sufficiently since then to justify the approach as having any strategic merit. Perhaps the person most qualified to understand the capa- bilities and limitations of the CT approach is General McChrystal; if he thought such an approach would work in Afghanistan, he Men prepare meal for shura attended by members of Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and U.S. Marines in Helmand Province

would have advocated it. U.S. Marine Corps (Phillip Elgie)

Governance as village and community shuras (councils), responsive and accountable government that The notion that Afghans are incapable are too often disenfranchised by subnational meets their basic expectations. of forming a government is as false as it is government officials. The breakdown of social narrow-minded. Afghanistan has always cohesion exacerbates the problem; authori- Concept for Success included elements of a mediated state—some tative councils often do not exist that are “What is of supreme importance in war,” periods more than others. As Clare Lockhart, capable of resolving local disputes or enforc- remarked ancient Chinese military theorist the director of the Institute for State Effec- ing basic social contracts. The official system Sun Tzu, “is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” tiveness, argued in her September 17, 2009, is corrupt and inefficient. The armed justice To defeat their strategy, we must take testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign by local militant leaders is the only function- from the insurgents what they cannot afford Relations, throughout much of the 20th century ing system in these communities. to lose: control of the people. We do so by ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 29 FORUM | Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level addressing the underlying logic that provides and beaten by the Taliban.” The side that most. Afghans know what will happen if we the local conditions necessary for the insur- mobilizes their support will tip the balance. leave before the major insurgent groups no gency to fester, while crushing the militants in Addressing the underlying conditions longer pose a threat. Although they do not every fight. There is nothing more demoral- enables us to earn local support, disaggregate want foreign forces permanently, they also do izing than getting clobbered for a cause that the enemy, and then apply appropriate means not want a return to civil war. While we are people no longer support. to coopt and reintegrate local fighters, while there, they want us to act as good guests. We need to combine direct action isolating and destroying the ideological hard- Partnering with and protecting the against hardcore insurgents and terror net- core in detail. Effective security, governance, population must be the focus of ISAF rather works with an indirect approach that targets and development that enfranchise local than chasing militants. This approach is the sources of their strength. The critical communities are existential threats to the not, as C suggests, feeding the enemy and weakness in the insurgents’ strategy is their insurgency. kissing his kids. It is the product of a thor- reliance on popular disaffection and their First, the mission must be properly ough analysis of the nature of the conflict inability to muster public support (the Taliban resourced in both military and civilian capa- and the requirements to be successful in this consistently polls in the single digits). The bilities. While sufficient numbers alone will culture. Certainly C acts as a good guest with breakdown in social cohesion, particularly in not ensure success, insufficient resourcing his Afghan hosts. Why should ISAF act any Pashtun areas, requires mobilization at com- significantly increases the risk of failure. Just differently? munity rather than tribal levels. as a poorly trained and prepared force with An ISAF force must also be of sufficient The community level will be decisive— sufficient numbers is likely to fail, so will a size to partner with an expanded Afghan and that support is entirely up for grabs. highly trained force with a sound plan that is National Security Force (ANSF). We tried in Communities have been neutral thus far, in improperly resourced. Iraq to stand down our forces while the Iraqi part out of a survival psychology that has The security force must be of sufficient Security Forces stood up. What we found was emerged over the past 30 years. Moreover, size to create contiguous security footprints the Iraqi forces possessed neither the com- the sentiment of many community leaders is for the population in key geographic areas. petence nor the confidence to stand on their that they have not taken a side in this conflict The argument that increasing ISAF presence own at the beginning. Building ANSF is not a because no one has taken their side. As several risks a popular backlash against occupation matter of simply cranking out more recruits. elders have remarked, “We are robbed by our is a well-noted caution, but it is the style of Building combat effectiveness and self- government, bombed by international forces, the footprint rather than the size that matters reliance will require a partnership in which

Soldier speaks with Afghan woman in Khost Province during the sentiment of many community leaders is that they have not taken a side in this conflict because no one has taken their side

our forces live together on the same outposts, train, plan, and execute operations together, and share information and capabilities. There is no better trainer for an Afghan battalion commander and his staff than an ISAF bat- talion commander and his staff. Second, the problems of weak and bad governance must be addressed appropriately, particularly at subnational levels. Effective governance is decisive. We must facilitate the development of governance capacity that serves the interests of people. Until the government is seen as less hostile to those interests, it will never gain trust and respect. Supporting the technical assistance requests by the Afghan Ministry of Finance and increasing the numbers of technical experts at provincial and district levels will help develop basic public administration systems while providing necessary overwatch to ensure accountability. Key sector roadmaps and

U.S. Army (Christopher Nicholas) transparent public finance are necessary com-

30 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu KOLENDA ponents of credibility. The government should ering aid and development funding directly to approach toward governance, security, and champion the interests of the poor as its ethos village and community councils, as programs development to complement renewed and to balance tribal elites and powerbrokers that such as the National Solidarity Program more effective efforts at the national and often remain wedded to benefiting their peers. and the National Area Based Development subnational levels. Third, the concept of official gover- Program do currently, bypasses corrupt Success in Afghanistan does not require nance should be expanded by incorporating officials and ensures all of the money goes the development of a modern European state. traditional structures such as village and directly toward the project. The U.S. Agency A reasonable degree of security in which district shuras to provide an effective check for International Development and Com- insurgents no longer pose an existential threat and balance to district officials. The National mander’s Emergency Response Program proj- to the state, and the country can protect its Solidarity Program Community Development ects should employ a similar methodology. sovereignty, will suffice. Governance needs to Councils, District Development Assemblies, Oversight and accountability structures meet the basic expectations of people in terms and similar representative bodies should must also be emplaced to protect U.S. assets— of political enfranchisement, justice, and be expanded into the fabric of the Afghan our aid and development dollars—from theft economic opportunity. This will not be easy. government. Such efforts to link the central or misappropriation by corrupt officials or But difficult is not impossible. The adminis- government to local communities and provide powerbrokers. That only 10 to 15 percent of tration’s strategy and the ISAF plan provide a local control and responsibility hold the aid and development money has local eco- more plausible range of outcomes that support potential to be a self-organizing alternative to nomic impact, while an estimated 40 percent our national interests than the alternatives. local insurgent governance. The combination goes back to donor countries in the form of Implementing them stands the best chance of of local shuras and councils with a govern- profit and consultant fees, is scandalous.3 attaining C’s well-articulated goal to “bring ment that demonstrates service to all people Finally, effective local dispute resolution our Afghan enterprise to a close quickly and will begin to provide governance attractive to mechanisms must be developed that can out- in a manner that gives some hope of future rural Afghans. match the rough justice meted out by extrem- stability without further alienating the Fourth, increasing access to education, ists. With effective and trusted courts decades Afghans,” while denying recruits to terrorist health care, and economic opportunity pro- away, local shuras and jirgas can provide organizations and destroying those aligned vides powerful and visible asymmetries that legitimate alternatives for conflict resolution, with them. JFQ the government can provide and that insur- provided they serve the poor as well as the gents cannot match. The government must local elites. N o t es outperform the insurgents in the delivery of 1 basic services and the fostering of economic Winston Churchill famously intoned International Republican Institute (IRI), opportunity. that Americans generally find the right strat- Afghanistan Public Opinion Survey, May 3–16, 2009. Forty-six percent of those surveyed were Pashtuns. Local education is critical in keeping egy after they have exhausted the alternatives. Ten percent referred to themselves as Pashtuns first. young men under the control of their families After 8 years, there is a credible strategy for 2 Clare Lockhart, testimony before the U.S. and out of Taliban clutches. Educating girls Afghanistan. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September decreases infant mortality and reduces social Targeting sources of popular disaffec- 17, 2009; Sarah Ladbury, in collaboration with the violence. Young men generally seek permis- tion is an important part of the way forward. Co-operation for Peace and Unity, Drivers of Radi- sion from their mothers prior to going on Doing so alters the socioeconomic and politi- calization, Independent Report for the Department jihad. Educated women tend not to give that cal landscape and provides alternatives to of International Development, August 14, 2009, 7; blessing; young men with viable opportuni- insurgency. Once the population is actively Thomas Ruttig, The Other Side: Dimensions of the ties tend not to seek it in the first place. The supporting the government and resisting Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors, and Approaches persistent attacks on girls’ schools indicate the insurgent influence, the effort reaches a to “Talks,” Afghan Analysts Network, July 2009, threat of women’s education to the Taliban tipping point at which we can transition to 2, 6; Gilles Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Carnegie strategy. Afghan-led counterinsurgency with ISAF Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 12, Concurrently, investing locally in infra- in overwatch. Special operations forces–led, 17–19. In the IRI survey released on June 16, 2009, structure development, security, governance, enemy-centric actions can then finish off 81 percent of respondents cited corruption as a and legitimate economic opportunity will isolated insurgent and terrorist leadership somewhat serious (26 percent) or very serious (55 bolster community councils in the eyes of without negative feedback. The battle is as percent) problem. their people and give them a reason to support much about whom we win over as whom we 3 Matt Waldman, Falling Short: Aid Effective- the government. Although big development go after. We need to focus on winning allies as ness in Afghanistan, Agency Coordinating Body for projects are important, projects controlled well as destroying enemies. Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Advocacy Series (Kabul: and owned by the local population are often The Obama administration’s strategy ACBAR, March 2008), 5, 11. more critical to stability and progress. As the and the implementation approach outlined Afghans say, “If you sweat for it, you protect in General McChrystal’s initial assessment it.” The National Solidarity Program and Greg set the right direction but must be resourced Mortenson’s Central Asia Institute operate on and implemented properly to have the this principle. intended effects. Defeating the Taliban’s Fifth, active measures must be taken to strategy, and preventing the return of al thwart corruption and abuse of power. Deliv- Qaeda to Afghanistan, requires a bottom-up ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 31 A Better War in

By J oh n A . n A G L Afghanistan

uring the 2008 U.S. Presidential tember 11 national consensus on the need to breaks from the previous administration, the campaign, it was common for ensure stability and security in that region. war in Afghanistan has come to be seen as then-Senator Barack Obama to A few short months ago, President “Obama’s War.”4 At the very least, this cam- D portray Afghanistan as a neces- Obama announced a new strategy for paign will be a central part of this adminis- sary war in comparison to the misguided “war Afghanistan and Pakistan, supported by tration’s foreign policy agenda and, perhaps, of choice” in Iraq.1 But what was once con- additional civilian and military resources. its legacy. sidered the “good war” has not been looking The President made the case that the nexus of However, there is no unanimity that the so good lately. Amid increasing violence and al Qaeda and the Taliban in these two coun- administration’s commitment to Afghanistan rising American casualties in Afghanistan, tries presents a serious threat to American is either absolute or correct. Critics point out Americans are expressing more doubt and security and outlined a more integrated and that it is not for nothing that Afghanistan confusion about U.S. objectives in that better resourced political-military approach is known as a “graveyard of empires”; that country and uncertainty about whether those to the conflict.2 Less than 2 months later, he the current U.S. campaign is overly ambi- goals can be achieved at a reasonable cost in authorized the replacement of International tious, excessively costly, and doomed to fail; lives and treasure. An increasingly heated Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Com- and that U.S. interests there could be more debate over U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and mander General David McKiernan with effectively addressed with more limited Pakistan has overshadowed the post–Sep- General Stanley McChrystal.3 With these means.5 Skepticism is undoubtedly on the

Marines and Afghan Border Police patrol in Helmand Province U.S. Marine Corps (Pete Thibodeau)

32 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu NAGL rise: ran a lurid cover proclaiming further destabilizing its neighbors, especially progress is weakening popular support for the Afghanistan as “Obama’s Vietnam” a mere fragile, nuclear-armed Pakistan. mission in many North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 3 weeks following the President’s inaugura- America’s neglect of its relationship with nization (NATO) nations, and even in the tion.6 Public opinion has increasingly soured Afghanistan and Pakistan in the wake of the United States, site of the most vicious attacks on the war effort: a Washington Post/ABC Soviet defeat facilitated the rise of the Taliban launched from Afghan soil by al Qaeda. But News poll released in August 2009 found that and al Qaeda’s subsequent establishment of a the fact that progress has been hampered by 51 percent of Americans “now say the war safe haven there that helped enable its global confused strategy and insufficient resources is not worth fighting,” a 10 percent increase operations, most notably the September 11 is an indictment of the conduct of this war, over March 2009.7 There is decreasing confi- attacks. The efforts of the past 8 years have not its objectives. It does not mean that the dence in the body politic that America has a largely eliminated al Qaeda’s sanctuary in campaign in Afghanistan is fruitless or that strategy in Afghanistan worthy of the name, Afghanistan, and the country should not be America’s interests in this part of the world that the United States can achieve its goals in allowed to lapse into the condition it was in on are unimportant. Afghanistan at a price in proportion to the September 10, 2001. The problem, however, The primary objective of American expected gain, or that it even knows what it is has become even more complex: collusion efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan remains we are trying to achieve there. among al Qaeda, the Taliban, narco-traffick- the elimination of al Qaeda–associated In this light, a more thorough explica- ers, and criminal gangs presents a real and sanctuaries and, if possible, top leaders who tion of ends, ways, and means in Afghanistan growing threat to the region. support transnational terrorist operations. is necessary. Achieving success requires a careful appraisal of what America is trying American policy in Afghanistan over the past 8 years has to accomplish and an appreciation for the resources needed to get there—people, money, suffered from the most fundamental of all strategic errors: and time. Understanding the war in Afghani- insufficient resources to accomplish maximalist goals stan, maintaining domestic and international support for it, and prosecuting it well call for Coalition forces invaded Afghanistan Many in this shadowy alliance, which was three things: a clear articulation of U.S. inter- in the fall of 2001 with the objective of top- originally based in Afghanistan but squeezed ests, a concise definition of what the coalition pling the Taliban government and defeating al by allied military operations, have shifted to seeks to achieve, and a detailed strategy to Qaeda. The Bonn Agreement and subsequent Pakistan’s cities and frontier areas beyond guide the effort. accords expanded Afghan and coalition aims easy reach of the coalition. American efforts far beyond these original objectives. After now focus on Pakistan as a launching pad The Ends8 8 years of strategic drift, coalition efforts for militants fighting in Afghanistan. But the American policy in Afghanistan over have failed to persuade many Afghans that problem runs both ways: a failed Afghanistan the past 8 years has suffered from the most it is wise or safe to commit themselves and would become a base from which Taliban fundamental of all strategic errors: insuf- risk their families’ lives to defy the Taliban.9 and al Qaeda militants could work to further ficient resources to accomplish maximalist Just as ominously, the lack of demonstrable destabilize the surrounding region. Al Qaeda goals. Building a liberal democracy there may or may not be possible, but after 30 years of war, the country simply does not possess the human capital and institutions democracy requires. Creating that human infrastructure would be a noble long-term enterprise for U.S. Army (David Alvarado) the international community, but in the meantime, the United States is focusing on the more pressing challenges to international security: maintaining pressure on al Qaeda on both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, ensuring that transnational terrorists do not regain a sanctuary on Afghan ter- ritory from which to launch attacks on the United States and its allies, and preventing the in Afghanistan from

Dr. John A. Nagl is President of the Center for a New American Security. He retired from the U.S. Army in 2008 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom and GEN McChrystal surveys suicide bomb damage near ISAF Command participating in writing the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Headquarters with Afghan minister of foreign affairs Counterinsurgency Field Manual. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 33 FORUM | A Better War in Afghanistan and the Taliban have served as an inspiration decisions to impose sanctions and ban option has failed to secure U.S. objectives. As for and sometime-ally of violent extremist military-to-military exchanges with Pakistan the Obama administration and the U.S. mili- groups targeting the resource-rich states of over its nuclear weapons programs and tests. tary leadership have recognized, it is well past Central Asia.10 More dangerously, they also Pakistani leaders, military officers, and policy time for a different approach. have ties to the insurgents seeking to over- elites have not forgotten these events, and our throw Pakistan, and the ultimate prize in that actions ensured that U.S. policymakers lost Toward a “Better War” contest would not be another ridge or valley, one of our most significant sources of under- Preventing Afghanistan from again but possibly access to the Pakistani nuclear standing and levers of influence over events in serving as a sanctuary for terrorists with arsenal. An unraveling of Pakistan in the face the region for a generation.13 The improving global reach and keeping it from acting as of the Taliban insurgency, whether gradual or but still fragile relationship of cooperation the catalyst for a broader regional security unexpectedly rapid, could spark a cascading on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency meltdown are the key objectives of the cam- regional meltdown and lead to nuclear arms would be damaged by an American pull- paign. Securing these objectives requires falling into the hands of a terrorist group that back now: the Pakistani leadership would helping the Afghans build a sustainable would use them against the United States or be further convinced that the United States system of governance that can adequately its allies. This is, to be sure, widely considered cannot be relied upon for support and would ensure security for the Afghan people—the a low-probability event, but the security of be encouraged to maintain its ties to Islamist keystone upon which a successful exit strat- Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is hardly clear, militant groups as a strategic hedge—both egy depends. The United States, the Afghan and U.S. visibility into events there is fairly dangerous developments from a U.S. national people, and their coalition partners must low.11 security standpoint. agree on an achievable endstate, determine Because these threats of terrorist sanctu- Preventing the Taliban’s return of the intermediate objectives required to ary and regional instability emanate from control to Afghanistan, maintaining stabil- meet it, and allocate the resources necessary territory shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan, ity in Pakistan, and keeping up the pressure to achieve those objectives. This endstate Pakistan must be encouraged to confront against al Qaeda are objectives worthy of should be something more realistic than terrorism within its borders and curtail its American effort. U.S. policymakers must, a prosperous and modern representative military’s clandestine support for extremist of course, weigh all strategic actions against democracy: it should be a sustainable system factions. Stepping back America’s commit- America’s global interests and possible oppor- of governance that can effectively combat ment to the theater would be a particularly tunity costs. But in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the insurgency, and in doing so prevent a odd choice at the present time, given the low-cost strategies do not have an encourag- reemergence of transnational terrorist safe recent improvement in Pakistani efforts to ing track record since the initial success of havens. conduct counterinsurgency against its own Operation Enduring Freedom. After the fall radical elements and in American-Pakistani of the Taliban regime in 2001, the United in Afghanistan and Pakistan, intelligence-sharing. The course of 2009 saw States sought to limit its own involvement by low-cost strategies do not have dramatic changes in the Pakistani willingness working by, with, and through militia or tribal to wage war against insurgents who increas- commanders to provide security and mop up an encouraging track record ingly threatened the survival of the govern- the remaining al Qaeda presence. But in many ment. In that sense, the alarming advances of cases, this approach empowered these com- To achieve this objective, the coalition Taliban-aligned forces in Pakistan during the manders to act abusively and unaccountably, and its Afghan partners must seek to build a early months of 2009 proved something of a which alienated an Afghan population that state that reconciles some degree of central- blessing in disguise: the militants’ attacks into had been promised a new “Marshall Plan” ized governance with the traditional tribal heartland provinces such as Swat and Buner by the United States and thereby facilitated and religious power structures that hold sway galvanized a previously indifferent Pakistani the Taliban’s reemergence as an insurgency outside Kabul. An internal balance between public and military to stand up to the mili- against the new government and international centralized and traditional power bases—not tants and drive them back.12 The United States presence.14 Drone attacks, which have been central government control everywhere—is should seek to encourage this momentum highly touted for their ability to eliminate a practical basis for assuring the country’s while working to overcome decades of Paki- Taliban and al Qaeda leaders,15 have certainly stability, much as it was in the years prior to stani mistrust of an America that has not been killed numerous terrorists and insurgents. the Soviet invasion. Achieving these minimal perceived as a reliable or supportive partner. But they have not prevented militant forces goals will be hard enough; it will require not Following the Soviet withdrawal from from making threatening advances in both only more military forces, but also a much Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the United Afghanistan and Pakistan, and they rely greater commitment to good governance States curtailed virtually all of its assistance heavily on human intelligence and support and to providing for the needs of the Afghan to Pakistan and was perceived by a generation facilities that may not be available without the people where they live. The coalition will need of Pakistani leaders as having abandoned current ground presence. This is not to say to use its considerable leverage to counter the region. In sharp contrast to the close that drone strikes or alliances of convenience Afghan government corruption at every level. security relationship that prevailed for the with tribal and militia commanders should While an expanded international com- preceding decade, Washington quickly not have a role in the U.S. campaign, but mitment of security and development forces moved to distance itself from engagement neither forms an independent basis for our can assist in the achievement of these goals and support of Pakistan, culminating in strategy going forward. The “light footprint” in the short term, ultimately Afghans must

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ensure stability and security in their own These lessons are well understood, but we deployed in 2009 will not be enough to country. Building a rudimentary state, even a the question remains whether U.S., NATO, secure the whole country, ISAF and Afghan flawed one, that is able to provide a modicum and Afghan forces can execute them. The commanders will have to select the most of security and governance to its people is the paucity of Afghan security forces relative to important population centers, such as Kan- American exit strategy from Afghanistan. U.S. Marines involved in the summer 2009 dahar, to secure first. These “oil spots” of The successful implementation of a better offensive in Helmand Province was trou- security will then spread over time as more resourced effort to build Iraqi security forces, bling and indicative of a security force assis- Afghan forces come on line and gain more after years of floundering, is now enabling tance effort that has not been taken seriously competence. the drawdown of American troops from enough for much of the past 8 years.16 After Of course, all of this is substantially that country as Iraqi forces increasingly take an area is cleared of insurgents, it must be harder than it sounds and requires changes responsibility for their own security. A similar held by Afghan troops supported by Ameri- from how the United States prosecuted this situation will be the definition of success in can advisors and combat multipliers, includ- campaign in years past. First and foremost, Afghanistan some years from now. ing and air support. These opera- U.S. and allied forces must ensure that their The classic “clear, hold, and build” tions are intended to create the conditions uses of force are not counterproductive to the counterinsurgency model was relearned over that facilitate Afghan central government operational necessity of population security several painful years in Iraq, but at present reconciliation with traditional local power and gaining local support against the insur- there are insufficient Afghan soldiers and structures to establish better secured com- gency. As in the early years of the , police to implement that approach by holding munities that “freeze out” future Taliban U.S. troops have sometimes tended toward areas that have been cleared of insurgents. As infiltration. Since the additional troops heavy-handed tactics that have served to a result, American troops have had to clear the same areas repeatedly, paying a price for each operation in both American lives U.S. and allied forces must ensure that their uses of force and the support of the Afghan public, which are not counterproductive to the operational necessity of suffers from Taliban reprisals whenever we population security and gaining local support “clear and leave.” DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)

President Obama’s changes in strategy for war in Afghanistan have led some to call the conflict “Obama’s War”

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 35 FORUM | A Better War in Afghanistan

Afghan men work on road construction project in alienate the Afghan population. One assess- Mahmood Rahqi ment from early 2007 argued that:

the United States is losing the war in Afghani- stan one Pashtun village at a time, bursting into schoolyards filled with children with guns bristling, kicking in village doors, search- ing women, speeding down city streets, and putting out cross-cultural gibberish in totally ineffectual [information operations] and [psychological operations] campaigns—all of which are anathema to the Afghans.17

More recently, U.S. forces have attracted substantial criticism for excessive and insuf- ficiently discriminating use of , which have caused significant loss of civilian life.18 While the new American command in Afghanistan has taken steps to rein in coun- terproductive uses of force, these incidents have left a legacy of Afghan mistrust that will be difficult to overcome. Second, while much of the focus is now on the direct counterinsurgency role of U.S. forces, more attention and resources must be devoted to developing Afghan security forces. More U.S. Soldiers are required now to implement a clear, hold, and build counterin- surgency strategy, but over time responsibility must transition to the Afghans. If the first requirement for success in a counterinsur- gency campaign is the ability to secure the population, the counterinsurgent requires boots on the ground—and plenty of them. The long-term answer is a significantly expanded, and more effective, Afghan secu- rity apparatus. The preexisting numerical targets for the development of Afghan secu- rity forces are not based on the actual security requirements for the country. The current end strength targets for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police are 134,000 and 82,000 men, respectively—not nearly enough to provide adequate security in a war- torn country of over 30 million people with very rough terrain. The Obama administra- tion’s interagency policy review team recom- mended a substantial expansion of the effort to build these forces up to those prescribed end strengths, but that will not be sufficient.19 Some argue that the international community should not develop an Afghan security force larger than what that country’s economy can support. Under peacetime conditions, that concern would be important, but basing our security force assistance efforts on the Afghan economy rather than a realistic estimate of the U.S. Army (Teddy Wade)

36 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu NAGL numbers needed to impose a reasonable level specific issues that cause it to sympathize with insurgents did not turn against the extrem- of security is not the appropriate course of one side or the other. Additionally, insurgencies ists until they were sufficiently alienated by action now. The United States should initiate are rarely monolithic; they comprise numer- AQI’s brutal tactics and disregard for local a greater international effort to expand the ous local factions and individuals fighting for customs.25 The Taliban’s leadership may not Afghan national security forces. If that means personal gain, revenge against real or perceived make the same mistakes. the U.S. Government and international com- slights, tribal loyalties, or other reasons that munity have to help pay for them, that is what may have little to do with the insurgency’s should be done—it will still be far cheaper professed cause. The Afghan insurgency is targeting militant leaders and than maintaining substantial numbers of no different in this regard.22 The Taliban is an foot soldiers and then leaving American and international forces in Afghan- amalgam of local fighters and mercenary and will not solve the problem istan for an even longer period to do the jobs criminal elements around a hard core of com- because local populations that Afghans should do. mitted jihadists. According to Antonio Gius- know the insurgents will just Unfortunately, the advisory mission has tozzi’s detailed study, 40 to 50 percent of the long been treated as a low priority in practice insurgency is made up of “local allies” fighting go underground if not in rhetoric, with advisory teams being for tribal causes or opportunism.23 assembled in an ad hoc fashion and provided Based on such analyses, U.S. com- This experience suggests that empha- with insufficient training and resources before manders are interested in trying to “flip” sizing tribal engagement or flipping less deploying.20 The Obama administration has less ideological factions and promoting the committed insurgents is not a panacea that bolstered the effort with the deployment of development of local self-defense militias to will enable the United States to achieve a 4,000 additional troops to serve as advisors.21 encourage the tribes to defend against Taliban modicum of security on the cheap. Local But it remains unclear whether the U.S. mili- infiltration.24 Exploiting divisions within communities are unlikely to turn in favor of tary—and our government as a whole—have an insurgency paid dividends in Iraq, where ISAF and the Afghan government until these truly cracked the code on effectively develop- the emergence of the Anbar Awakening and entities demonstrate that they are fully willing ing host nation security forces. It is as impor- Sons of Iraq played a major role in crippling al and able to drive out the Taliban and provide tant to address the qualitative problems with the current security force assistance program Soldiers take firing positions on rooftop in reaction as it is to solve the quantitative ones. Combined to mortar attack at Forward Operating Base Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Baylough, Zabul Province must be reviewed to ensure that it has the best organization and sufficient capacity to do its U.S. Army (Tia P. Sokimson) U.S. Army (Tia P. job. The advisory effort must have access to the most talented and experienced personnel avail- able—not just those left over after the regular units have picked first. It must be structured in a way that incorporates best practices for secu- rity force assistance and is most suited to the specific demands of the Afghan operating envi- ronment—not simply assembled in the fashion that is most convenient for America’s existing unit structure. It must focus on developing an Afghan security force that can fulfill the mission of countering the insurgency and pro- viding a sufficient, if imperfect, level of internal security—not on mirror-imaging the force structure of a more advanced Western army dedicated to external defense. And ultimately the entire effort must be judged on the quality of its outputs—professional, competent, reliable Afghan forces—rather than simply how many Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and dramatically reduc- some level of lasting security and competent armed men in uniform come out of its train- ing violence. Again, this is a simple concept (less corrupt) governance. They will not resist ing centers, an approach that clearly produced that is much harder in practice. Thus far, the Taliban or help the security forces as long poor results in the first 4 years of the Iraq War. the insurgency has proven less susceptible to as the insurgency appears to hold the upper The United States and ISAF also need to get cooptation than its fragmented nature might hand and the government remains weak at smarter about the way they engage Afghan suggest, partly because U.S. overtures have best and abusive at worst. communities. Insurgencies can be won or lost been limited and partly because the Taliban Seizing the initiative from the Taliban at the local level because securing the support still holds some legitimacy in certain areas. and reestablishing the political order’s legiti- of the population requires understanding the Even in the case of Iraq, the more secular macy require securing the population and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 37 FORUM | A Better War in Afghanistan developing a sophisticated, nuanced under- while developing anti-Taliban tribal militias execution. Afghans contribute 10 percent of standing of local communities, particularly and coopting nonextremist elements of the project costs through cash, labor, or other the conflicts within them that insurgents can insurgency will be aspects of the new Afghan- means. exploit to their own ends. Simply targeting istan strategy, they cannot be its primary Under this model, the NSP has built militant leaders and foot soldiers and then components. schools for thousands of children, constructed leaving will not solve the problem because Cultivating an Afghan state that is village water pumps that have saved many local populations know the insurgents will legitimate in the eyes of its citizens and works hours of labor, and assembled irrigation just go underground to avoid U.S. strikes and with rather than against local communities is networks that have enabled far higher agri- then reemerge to take vengeance on those therefore a necessary element of the American cultural yields. More than 12,000 village who collaborate with the government once approach. A renewed U.S. commitment to development councils have been elected, more the security forces move on. Security forces funding grassroots development and gover- than 19,000 project plans have been approved, that just pass through on sweeps and patrols nance must accompany the influx of troops. and nearly half of these projects have been will not gain the local knowledge necessary The Afghan government’s National Solidarity completed. The NSP is the only government to understand the particular drivers of the Program (NSP) and programs like it deserve program functioning in all 34 provinces, and insurgency within the community or the much more American support.26 The NSP has it has affected nearly two-thirds of Afghani- ability to identify when that community is become one of the government’s most suc- stan’s rural population. Moreover, women— being infiltrated by outside militants. Mean- cessful rural development projects. Under the whose inclusion is a mandatory component while, attempts to reassert central govern- program, the Afghan Ministry of Rural Reha- of the program—constitute 35 percent of the ment authority without a clear grasp of local bilitation and Development disburses modest elected CDC representatives. power structures and relationships will only grants to village level elected organizations The NSP provides one example of how engender more popular resentment against called Community Development Councils to establish positive links between the Afghan Kabul that plays directly into the hands of the (CDCs), which in turn identify local priori- people and the government in Kabul, and Taliban. ties and implement small-scale development there are undoubtedly other models that In short, until the Afghan govern- projects. A limited number of domestic and might offer success stories of their own. The ment, the United States, and ISAF get their international nongovernmental organizations point is that the insurgency and the interna- approach to local communities right, those then assist the CDCs. Once a CDC agrees on tional security threat it represents will not communities will not decisively turn against a venture, $200 per family (with a ceiling of be defeated simply with armed force, drone the insurgency. That means, of course, that $60,000 per village) is distributed for project strikes, and alliances of convenience with

Community development council member lays commemorative stone during groundbreaking ceremony for health clinic in Kapsi DOD (courtesy of Khalid Shahee)

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certain insurgent factions, although all of whether we are again determined to abandon 10 See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, those things will play a part. It will ultimately an “unimportant” region in the hope that this Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New be defeated when the Afghan people see time, it won’t blow up in our face. JFQ Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); and Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central tangible evidence that a non-Taliban political Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2003). order can offer them a modicum of security The author thanks Brian M. Burton of 11 See David Sanger, “Obama’s Worst Pakistan the Center for a New American Secu- and governance. Nightmare,” New York Times Magazine, January 11, rity for his invaluable assistance with 2009. Learning from Mistakes the preparation of this article. 12 See Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, “Lions The United States played a role in creat- and Jackals: Pakistan’s Emerging Counterinsur- ing the Taliban and al Qaeda: they grew and gency Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (online only), thrived amid the chaos that followed the N o t es July 15, 2009, available at . 13 “the purpose of war is to build a better peace,” Obama: The War We Need to Win,” August 1, 2007, See, for example, Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: available at ; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, after the Soviet withdrawal, and the Taliban “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Response to 2005), 282–299. filled the vacuum that U.S. inaction allowed. the State of the Union,” January 28, 2008, avail- 14 See Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, Afghanistan became the viper’s nest in which able at ; istan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), price for its strategic neglect of the region. “Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: A New Strat- 15–21. After the success of a lightning cam- egy for a New World,” July 15, 2008, available at 15 Greg Miller, “U.S. Missile Strikes Said to paign that overthrew the Taliban and chased . Times, March 22, 2009. 2 16 policy toward the country returned to benign The White House, “Remarks by the President See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “A Fight for Ordi- neglect. Too few soldiers to secure the popula- on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” nary Peace,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2009. March 27, 2009, available at . Afghanistan,” Orbis 51, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 88. Pakistan side of the allowed 3 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, 18 See, for example, Miles Amoore, “U.S. Air the Taliban to regroup, gain strength, and “Commander’s Ouster Is Tied to Shift in Afghan Strikes in Afghanistan ‘Kill Dozens of Women and return to threaten the young Afghan govern- War,” , May 12, 2009; Rajiv Children,’” Telegraph (), May 6, ment that we created but did not adequately Chandrasekaran, “Pentagon Worries Led to 2009; Abdul Waheed Wafa and John F. Burns, “U.S. support, particularly in the development of Command Change,” The Washington Post, August Reported to Hit Afghan Wedding,” The an Afghan army large enough to secure itself 17, 2009. New York Times, November 5, 2008. from its (and our) enemies. Over time, the 4 Milton Bearden, “Obama’s War,” Foreign 19 The White House, “White Paper of the Inter- realization grew that the Taliban had stolen a Affairs (online only), April 9, 2009, available agency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Strategy toward march on us. at . 20 The objectives of American policy See Daniel Helmer, “Twelve Urgent Steps 5 See, most notably, Andrew J. Bacevich, “The for the Advisor Mission in Afghanistan,” Military in Afghanistan are clear, although they War We Can’t Win: Afghanistan and the Limits Review (July-August 2009), 73–81. have not been as well articulated as they of American Power,” Commonweal, August 14, 21 The White House, “Remarks.” should have. Over the next 5 years, we want 2009, available at . See also Steven Wars,” The New York Times, August 16, 2009. Qaeda has been displaced and from which Simon, “Can the Right War Be Won?” Foreign 23 Giustozzi, 42–43. it continues to suffer disruptive attacks. Its Affairs 88, no. 4 (July-August 2009). 24 See Fontini Christia and Michael Semple, government should be able, with minimal 6 John Barry and Evan Thomas, “Obama’s “Flipping the Taliban,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 external help, to secure itself from internal Vietnam,” Newsweek, February 9, 2009. (July-August 2009). 7 25 threats such as the Taliban or the return Jennifer Agiesta and Jon Cohen, “Public See John A. McCary, “The Anbar Awaken- of al Qaeda. It should have the support of Opinion in U.S. Turns Against the War,” The Wash- ing: An Alliance of Incentives,” The Washington ington Post, August 20, 2009. its people, earned through the provision of Quarterly 32, no. 1 (January 2009), 43–59; David 8 This section draws upon Nathaniel C. Fick et Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (New York: a reasonable level of government services al., “Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests Oxford University Press, 2009), 158–176. (particularly security) and reduced cor- in Afghanistan (and Pakistan),” Center for a New 26 This discussion of the National Solidarity ruption, and be determined to never again American Security Policy Brief, January 22, 2009; Program draws upon John A. Nagl, Andrew Exum, provide a safe haven for terror. and John A. Nagl, “Surge in Afghanistan Can and Ahmed A. Humayun, “A Pathway to Success The question now is not how to achieve Work, with Right Resources, Enough Time,” U.S. in Afghanistan: The National Solidarity Program,” our goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan; News & World Report, February 23, 2009. Center for a New American Security Policy Brief, we know the answer to that question. It is 9 Ann Scott Tyson, “In Helmand, Caught March 16, 2009. whether America has the stomach to do between U.S., Taliban; ‘Skittish’ Afghans Wary of what is necessary to achieve its objectives, or Both Sides,” The Washington Post, August 15, 2009. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 39 Unified Effort Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan

By C hristopher J . L amb and M arti n C i n n amo n d

he U.S. Government strategy for inadvertent civilian casualties. The possibility success in Afghanistan unveiled of greater support from Allies and the Afghan by President Barack Obama on government increases the likelihood that the T March 27, 2009, emphasized a strategy can be executed with better unity classic population-centric counterinsurgency of effort. The architects of the new strategy approach. The novelty of this approach can recognize that it puts a premium on better be debated, but clearly the emphasis has collaboration and that they have limited shifted under the Obama administration. time for demonstrating progress. In these Securing the population and reducing civil- circumstances, taking every reasonable step to ian casualties are now the focus of attention. strengthen unity of effort is necessary. This approach should be more popular with The Obama administration already has North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taken important steps to improve unified Allies, who prefer stabilization operations effort among the diverse actors working Secretary Gates and ADM Mullen brief press on to offensive operations against insurgents, to promote stability and defeat the Taliban continuing emphasis to prevent civilian casualties and with the Afghan government, which has insurgency. Even so, more needs to be done. in war zones vocally objected to operations that produce To make the case for this assertion, we first DOD (Robert D. Ward)

40 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB and CINNAMOND review what has been done to improve unity measurable progress needs to be demon- integrating civilian and military strategies of effort. Next, we summarize generally why strated.5 As Secretary Gates noted, “It’s my and capabilities.10 unified effort is so important and yet so dif- view—and, I think, the President’s—that if Thus, absent a major change in strategy, ficult to achieve. We illustrate those points we can show we are making progress, if we’re those executing operations in Afghanistan by examining the case of special operations headed in the right direction, then the Amer- will follow classic counterinsurgency doc- in Afghanistan and the extent to which they ican people and the Congress will sustain this trine, which views the population as the support the indirect approach championed effort. But if in a year or so, it appears that we key center of gravity. The new approach by General Stanley McChrystal, commander are in a stalemate and we’re taking even more emphasizes the need to shape, clear, hold, of U.S. and NATO forces there.1 Because casualties, then patience will wear thin pretty and build: shape the environment through they benefit from an authoritative chain of soon.”6 Secretary Gates’ assessment now intelligence and information operations, clear command and a common culture that values appears optimistic since the administration is areas affected by insurgent presence, hold unity of command, military operations should currently debating whether there is sufficient the areas cleared to ensure that insurgents be easier to execute with unified effort than political support for providing the resources will not reassert their authority, and build more complex politico-military endeavors. required by the strategy. national and local institutions that improve However, the record to date demonstrates that Thus, military commanders now living standards.11 Assuming the strategy is special operations serve conflicting objectives understand that “the trend lines better start reapproved and resources are provided by in Afghanistan. We offer an explanation swinging in our direction or we’re going Congress, the key to success will be getting all for this incongruity to underscore just how to lose the international community and the disparate components of the international difficult unity of effort is to achieve, and to we’re going to lose Washington.”7 With the effort in Afghanistan to work well together establish some baseline requirements for clock ticking, senior leaders such as General in implementing the strategy. This will not remedial action. We then make recommen- David Petraeus, commander of U.S. Central be easy. dations designed to improve unity of effort in Command, emphasize that success in As a former senior U.S. military com- military operations, civil-military coopera- implementing the new strategy will require mander noted in early 2009, unity of effort tion, and among international and Afghan unprecedented unity of effort: “Addressing is the most serious problem in Afghanistan partners. the challenges and threats . . . requires a com- today: “It’s not the Taliban. It’s not gover- prehensive, whole of government approach nance. It’s not security. It’s the utter failure New Strategy and Leadership Team that fully integrates our military and non- in the unity of effort department.”12 Getting The new strategy had to address the military efforts and those of our allies and the multiple international organizations, relative priority of dislodging al Qaeda from partners. This approach puts a premium dozens of nations, numerous development the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region on unity of effort at all levels and with all organizations, myriad U.S. departments and versus pursuing broader counterinsurgency participants.”8 agencies, and even diverse U.S. military units objectives in Afghanistan.2 The tension to pull in the same direction is a monumental between the two objectives was a point of senior leaders emphasize challenge. contention as the strategy was being prepared that success in implementing One common recommendation for and remains one today as the strategy is improving unity of effort is to select compat- being reassessed. Some senior leaders focus the new strategy will require ible personalities for key leadership positions. on attacking al Qaeda, while others favor unprecedented unity of effort Another way is to add command structures defeating the Taliban as a means of denying dedicated to coordination activities. Both al Qaeda its sanctuary over the long term.3 Better unified effort in turn requires these expedients were proposed at the April 3, When President Obama unveiled the strategy, clear strategic guidance, which senior mili- 2009, NATO summit, and were subsequently the stated goal was “to disrupt, dismantle, tary leaders provided when they insisted that approved. Secretary Gates suggested that and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghani- the population-centric counterinsurgency the four-star commander of NATO’s Inter- stan,” as well as “prevent [al Qaeda’s] return approach take precedence over counterter- national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to either country in the future.” The focus on rorism operations. General McChrystal is focus on strategy and high-level “cooperation al Qaeda may be interpreted as giving priority unequivocal on this point: “If we win this between civil and military efforts.” Among to counterterrorism, but the goal of denying effort it will be because we protected the other key issues, the new command could al Qaeda a future sanctuary from which to population. . . . Going after the high-value help improve the disjointed international aid operate justified a wider counterinsurgency enemy targets will just be a supporting effort effort and training of Afghan national secu- effort to defeat the Taliban in both Afghani- to do that.”9 General Petraeus similarly rity forces.13 Secretary Gates proposed, and stan and Pakistan.4 affirms that counterinsurgency is the priority, The commitment to pursue counter- noting that whether Allied forces are involved Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is Acting Director of the insurgency as an indirect means of isolating in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the and weakening al Qaeda was not open ended. “their actions and operations must adhere to National Defense University. Dr. Martin Cinnamond Thus, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ basic counter-insurgency principles.” Ambas- worked in a number of United Nations positions description of Afghanistan in 2008 as “the sador to Afghanistan also in Afghanistan in 2007–2008. He also trained and longest campaign of the long war” gave way stresses that the new strategy “depends upon co-led the Afghan Special Investigation Team to an informal deadline of 1 year in which protecting the Afghan people” and requires investigating assassinations by the Taliban. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 41 FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistan

NATO accepted, a new subordinate three- important positions in , which of operations and the challenge for unified star command to oversee the day-to-day should ensure good communication between effort. Some examples illustrate this point. battle to ensure that all the diverse U.S. (and the field and headquarters in Washington. One strategy objective is to turn over Allied) forces in Afghanistan are in synch. He Secretary Gates gave General military operations to Afghan forces rapidly, introduced NATO leaders to his handpicked McChrystal 60 days to tour Afghanistan, size but if done too quickly, they may not have choices for the new commands: General up the situation, and make a detailed report the capacity to respond effectively to the McChrystal and Lieutenant General David on how best to implement the new strategy insurgency. Conversely, delaying handover for M. Rodriguez, USA, respectively. McChrystal and layered commands. McChrystal’s August too long and relying on international forces and Rodriguez are counterinsurgency experts 30 report emphasized the importance of (meaning all non-Afghan forces in Opera- with close ties to Secretary Gates, and have a unified effort and identified additional ways to tion Enduring Freedom [OEF] and ISAF) risk personal friendship spanning several decades. improve it. To assess whether the urgent, well- alienating a population increasingly critical of General McChrystal, perhaps best known for conceived, and collectively unprecedented those forces. Another difficult implementa- leading the special operations forces14 (SOF) reorganization of command structures and tion issue is promoting good governance, not special mission units that tracked down leadership would ensure unity of effort, it is only in Kabul but also in the provinces. The Saddam Hussein and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi first necessary to understand why collabora- United States wants to strengthen the legiti- in Iraq, more recently led a Pentagon task tion in pursuit of common objectives is such a macy of the central government and reinforce force that reviewed strategy alternatives in challenge in irregular warfare in general and in Afghan national identity by improving the Afghanistan. General Rodriguez was selected Afghanistan specifically. government’s capacity to deliver basic services

the situation-dependent nature of counterinsurgency strategy implementation increases the complexity of operations and the challenge for unified effort

to the population. Yet Kabul’s ability to extend its authority and provide services across the country is weak, and Afghans often attach greater significance to local relationships. Thus, support for the central government must be balanced with support for good local governance without alienating Kabul and the local populace from one another. GEN McChrystal and LTG Rodriguez talk with Deputy Secretary Many other difficult tradeoffs can be of Defense William J. Lynn III at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul

U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison) U.S. Air Force identified: the timing and extent of political reconciliation with insurgents, how boldly by Secretary Gates as his personal military Unity of Effort in Irregular Warfare to attack sanctuaries in Pakistan, how much assistant after Rodriguez’s previous tour in Arguments about the need for a whole- intelligence to share and with whom, which Afghanistan was widely acknowledged as of-government approach to counterinsur- areas of the country should receive the main a model for successful counterinsurgency gency (one form of irregular warfare) are focus with a limited number of troops, and efforts.15 commonplace, yet the need is rarely satisfied so forth. Such strategy implementation issues In another move calculated to improve for several reasons. First, counterinsurgency must be resolved in complex and shifting unity of effort, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is a multidimensional enterprise that requires circumstances—including rapid adaptation of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen invited the integration of diplomatic, informational, by the enemy—that vary greatly from one General McChrystal to handpick his sub- military, economic, and other elements of province to another. With so many issues to ordinates, and McChrystal chose several power. Thus, a nation’s multiple national secu- coordinate, the entire effort can easily lose flag officers from the Pentagon. In addition, rity bureaucracies must work well together coherence. When counterinsurgency ele- McChrystal is having Brigadier General to succeed in counterinsurgency. Second, ments work at cross-purposes, political and Scott Miller, USA (a SOF veteran), assemble counterinsurgency strategy must be imple- moral capital is squandered. The population “a corps of 400 officers and soldiers who will mented flexibly as evolving circumstances is likely to conclude the government and its rotate between the United States and Afghan- dictate rather than be determined a priori by allies are incompetent, untrustworthy, or istan for a minimum of three years” to the strategy. The situation-dependent nature both. Since the center of gravity is the support provide deep expertise and continuity. When of counterinsurgency strategy implementa- of the population, insufficient unity of not serving in Afghanistan, officers will fill tion substantially increases the complexity purpose and effort in a fast-moving situation

42 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB and CINNAMOND is often the critical shortcoming in a counter- the SOF community, units may approach tance of targeting individual enemies relative insurgency campaign. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency to the risk of incurring civilian casualties and The third obstacle to unified effort is missions differently for historical and cultural damaging relationships with local communi- the sheer number and competing objectives reasons. Thus, SOF are in the middle of the ties; and the importance of working with of players and activities involved. Currently, debate over the relative priority of counterter- Afghan authorities and forces relative to the over 40 countries, three major international rorism against al Qaeda and counterinsur- risk that doing so will compromise efforts to organizations (United Nations [UN], Euro- gency against the Taliban. target enemy leaders. Only a clear strategy pean Union, and NATO), and scores of other Theoretically, the two missions can and unified effort can minimize the tension agencies and nongovernmental organizations complement one another. Counterterrorist between these two missions. Hy Rothstein are working in Afghanistan. Moreover, these kill/capture operations can disrupt insurgent provides a compelling account of how the diverse actors are more or less aligned in operations, produce intelligence on the insur- original focus on killing terrorist leaders and support of one of two different missions with gency, and buy time for other population- destroying Taliban forces in 2002 needed to competing priorities that have evolved over centric counterinsurgency efforts to bear shift to counterinsurgency when the Taliban time: NATO’s ISAF mission, and the U.S.-led fruit. Similarly, counterinsurgency efforts OEF mission. ISAF has evolved from a small can generate good intelligence for targeting in practice, counterterrorism security force concentrated in Kabul to a terrorists and alienate them from sympathiz- and counterinsurgency country-wide “stabilization” effort driven ers who otherwise would provide support missions tend to clash by classic population-centric counterinsur- for their activities. In practice, however, gency objectives, including “the extension of government authority across Afghanistan; Afghan National Police indicate possible enemy routes to U.S. Marines the development of the Afghan Government in Helmand Province during counterinsurgency operations structures necessary to maintain security across the country without the assistance of international forces . . . and the promotion by the Afghan Government of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”16 However, a core strategic objective of the OEF mission is the disruption of terror- ist activity by killing or capturing al Qaeda leaders.17 OEF operations have expanded to support counterinsurgency by targeting Taliban insurgent leaders.18 Each mission involves organizations from many nations and the international community, and each mission can be pursued with more or less emphasis on cooperation with the Afghan forces and populace. In addition, the diverse

military forces operating in Afghanistan U.S. Marine Corps (Pete Thibodeau) include General Purpose (or conventional) Forces and special operations forces that do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency mis- adopted insurgent tactics.19 Instead, conven- not always cooperate well. sions tend to clash. With their emphasis on tional forces and headquarters pushed aside For all these reasons, unity of effort is nighttime raids, counterterrorist operations Army Special Forces that had developed close a critical but difficult challenge in irregular can produce inadvertent civilian casualties working relationships with their Afghan warfare, especially in Afghanistan. Using that anger the population and complicate counterparts. Unilateral search operations by special operations as a cardinal example, we attempts by counterinsurgents to win popular conventional forces caused increasing resent- can illustrate that unified effort is difficult to support. Resentment runs even higher when ment, particularly in Pashtun communities. achieve even when all the organizations pur- counterterrorist operations are carried out by Eventually, new U.S. leadership put the effort suing an objective share a common chain of foreign forces that appear insensitive to local back on track: command and consider unified effort a core communities. Counterinsurgents working organizational value. with Afghan authorities and forces may com- Between late 2003 and early 2005, we were promise a counterterrorist operation if the moving on the right path in Afghanistan. Under SOF in Afghanistan Afghan counterparts warn the enemy, or if Ambassador [Zalmay] Khalilzad and Lieuten- Special operations forces typically are those operations are carried out less skillfully ant General , the United States trained specifically for counterterrorism and than would be the case if they were conducted completely overhauled its strategy for Afghani- counterinsurgency and often approach those by international forces. stan. We increased the number of American missions with different tactics than those The tension between the two missions forces in the country, expanded nonmilitary employed by conventional forces. Even within is thus a question of priorities: the impor- assistance to the Afghan government and—most ndupress.ndu.edu issue 55,56, 41thst quarter 20102009 / JFQ 43 FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistan importantly—abandoned a counterterrorism- towards the U.S., towards the Afghan central Insurgents quickly capitalize on the issue based strategy that emphasized seeking out and provincial governments, and regard- of civilian casualties with a more agile and and attacking the enemy, in favor of one that ing Afghanistan’s direction.”23 The Taliban dynamic communications capacity than the emphasized counterinsurgency and the protec- are working hard to exploit this popular international military forces. They sometimes tion of the population. All of this was overseen resentment in order to counter the tactical succeed in pressuring local officials to inflate by an integrated civil-military command advantage that international forces enjoy. estimates of civilian casualties. However, it structure, in which the Ambassador and the coalition commander worked in the same Table 1. Major (>10) Civilian Casualty Incidents, 2006–2009 building, from adjoining offices. The result was Estimated Civilian Date Location Military Forces/Type of Incident that, by late 2004, governance and reconstruc- Fatalities* tion were improving. . . . Entrenched warlords Kirjan District, International forces†/targeted June 14, 2009 NA/13 were being nudged out of power. . . . [N]ational Dai Kundi Province airstrike elections were conducted successfully [and] the Bala Boluk, Farah U.S. special operations forces (SOF)/ May 4, 2009 26/86 Taliban showed signs of internal dissention and Province troops in contact (TIC)** splintering. Rather than building on these gains, Gozara District, Herat February 17, 2009 13/13 U.S. forces†/unspecified airstrike however, we squandered them. Beginning in Province 2005, our integrated civil-military command Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) November 5, Shah Wali Kot District, 37/37 forces† and Afghan National Security structure was disassembled and replaced by a 2008 Kandahar Province balkanized and dysfunctional arrangement. Forces (ANSF)/TIC August 21–22, Shindand District, Herat The integrated counterinsurgency strategy was 33/78–92 U.S. SOF/TIC** 2008 Province replaced by a patchwork of different strategies, Tagub District, Kapisa North Atlantic Treaty Organization depending on the location and on which coun- August 9, 2008 NA/11–12 Province (NATO) airstrike/targeted try’s troops were doing the fighting.20 Dela Bala District, June 6, 2008 NA/47 OEF airstrike† U.S. Government policy statements at District, May 8, 2008 NA/21–80 U.S. SOF/TIC** the time emphasized counterinsurgency and Helmand Province close cooperation with allies. However, the January 23, 2008 Province 11/11 U.S. SOF/TIC** Embassy turned its attention to other matters, Greshk District, June 26–27, 2007 12/45–65 U.S. forces† and ANSF/TIC and General Karl Eikenberry, USA, who suc- Helmand Province ceeded General Barno, returned the military Greshk District, June 22, 2007 NA/25 NATO forces†/TIC emphasis to kill/capture operations. The Helmand Province result was an increasing number of incidents Sangin District, May 8, 2007 NA/21 U.S. SOF/TIC** producing civilian casualties, which led to a Helmand Province 21 steep decline in popular support. Civilian Maruf District, May 1, 2007 NA/13 U.S. forces†/TIC casualties are not the only factor alienating Kandahar Province 22 the Afghan population, but they are the Shindand District, April 29, 2007 NA/42 U.S. SOF/TIC** main one. Herat Province This historical overview suggests that it Jalalabad District, March 4, 2007 16/16 U.S. SOF/road convoy** will not be easy to ensure that operations give Nangarhar Province priority to protecting the population, even November 1, Kandahar Province NA/31 U.S. SOF/TIC** though the new strategy requires it. There 2006 Panjwayi District, are several reasons why this is true. The main October 26, 2006 12/40 NATO forces†/TIC one is the reliance on air support to com- Kandahar Province Greshk District, pensate for the inadequate number of U.S., October 18, 2006 NA/13 NATO forces†/TIC Kandahar Province Allied, and properly trained Afghan forces. Panjwayi District, Airstrikes that result in major civilian casual- May 21, 2006 17/34 U.S. forces†/TIC Kandahar Province ties can occur in support of conventional forces. However, over the past several years, 80 percent of the major civilian casualty inci- Sources: Air Strike Tracker Web site (http://ourbombs.com/striketracker); United Nations Assistance Mission dents where ground forces could be identified to Afghanistan (UNAMA) Mid Year Bulletin on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2009); UNAMA involved U.S. SOF (see table 1). Operating in Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2008); and Human Rights Watch “Troops in small teams, SOF often make contact with Contact” Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (2008), which include details of specific incidents. enemy forces, find themselves outnumbered, and require close air support that occasion- * Casualty figures are often disputed. The first figure is the international military forces estimate; the second ally results in high civilian casualties. figure is either an Afghanistan government or a public media estimate. NA: not available. Most Afghans’ experience with bombing ** Incidents involving SOF troops. is “strongly correlated with negative attitudes † Indicates military forces involved or type of incident is disputed.

44 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB and CINNAMOND is also evident that international military Table 2. Major (>5) Civilian Casualty Incidents (House Raids), 2006–2009 estimates of civilian casualties can err. Afghan public resentment is compounded when Date Location Estimated Civilians Killed* Military Forces international military forces resort to blanket Gurbuz District, Khost U.S. special operations forces statements denying or contesting the number April 9, 2009 4/5 Province (SOF)** of civilian casualties without an adequate March 22, 2009 Province NA/5 U.S. forces† investigation. The emergence of video footage Charkh District, Logar showing dead civilians prompted a review of March 13, 2009 NA/5 U.S. and Afghan SOF** Province initial findings that just seven civilians were , Khost U.S. forces†; Afghan forces killed during August 2008 airstrikes in Shin- March 6, 2009 NA/4 Province present† dand District, Herat Province. The investiga- North Atlantic Treaty tion determined that at least 33 civilians were February 12, Uruzgan Province 5/3 Organization Australian 24 2009 killed during the operation. forces† Although they receive less media atten- January 23, 2009 Laghman Province NA/16 U.S. SOF** tion, civilian casualties incurred during house raids—the vast majority conducted by January 19, 2009 Kapisa Province NA/14 U.S. SOF** SOF—also cause resentment among Afghans January 7, 2009 Laghman Province NA/13 U.S. SOF** (see table 2). Many such operations produce September 1, International and Afghan NA/4 benefits never made public for security 2008 forces† reasons. Yet their cumulative political effect April 28, 2007(?) Nangarhar Province 2/5 U.S. forces† may turn tactical successes into a strategic December 12, Mandozai District, Khost 5/5 U.S. SOF** failure, a point repeatedly highlighted by 2006 Province Afghan authorities and increasingly by U.S. military officials as well. For example, in December 2006, in the aftermath of a * In some of these cases, the Department of Defense asserts that combatants and not civilians were SOF operation in Khost Province, the U.S. killed. The first figure is the international military forces estimate; the second figure is either an military claimed four suspected terrorists Afghanistan government or a public media estimate. NA: not available. had been killed. However, then-Governor ** Incidents involving SOF troops. Arsala Jamal, with whom the U.S. military † Indicates military forces involved or type of incident is disputed. had developed a strong working relation- ship, contested the statement, stating that the raid mistakenly targeted a pro-government Royal Marine Commandos participate in stabilization and security operation village. Four of the five brothers living in with Afghan National Security Force the compound worked for the government, and ISAF troops, Helmand Province and Jamal asserted there was “little reason to suspect them of being anti-government elements.”25 In March 2008, in response to two SOF operations that led to the deaths of several Afghan women and children, Jamal complained to Richard Holbrooke that “this undermines everything we are trying to do here.”26 On a subsequent visit to the White House in April 2008, he argued to President George W. Bush that “special operations is the biggest, biggest challenge and [they have a] negative impact on the people’s mind in regard to coalition forces. There is no single bigger issue than that.”27 President and Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak also have called for an end to uncoordinated SOF raids. Karzai has long been extremely critical of airstrikes and house raids. In July 2002, following an American airstrike by a SOF AC–130 that killed scores of people celebrating a wedding, Karzai stressed the importance of procedures to prevent future ISAF ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 45 FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistan tragedies. He has repeatedly called for an civilians.29 General Barno has summarized and ratings of NATO/ISAF forces were just end to airstrikes and to international forces the dilemma posed by SOF operations that as bad. Civilian casualties are a key irritant: entering Afghan homes without permission alienate Afghans: “77% of Afghans call such strikes unaccept- from Afghan authorities, and his rhetoric has able, saying the risk to civilians outweighs the escalated over the years. He has lamented the the tolerance of the Afghan population for value of these raids in fighting the Taliban.” inability to stop “the coalition from killing foreign military forces [can be described Ominously, 25 percent of poll respondents our children” and accused foreign forces as] a bag of capital that has to be spent very now say attacks on U.S. or NATO/ISAF forces of “extreme” and “disproportionate” use of slowly . . . every time we kick down doors in the can be justified—twice the level in 2006.31 force. In September 2008, Karzai protested middle of the night, every time we create some Even though international forces are aware the continued killing of Afghan civilians offense to Afghan cultural sensibilities, we of these trends and want to avoid civilian before the UN General Assembly. Shortly spend that bag of capital—that toleration for casualties, the number of civilian casualties thereafter, he announced: “This is my first foreign forces—more and more quickly. And produced by coalition operations continued demand of the new president of the United we’ve been spending that bag of capital at an to climb throughout 2008, increasing some- States—to put an end to civilian casualties.” extraordinarily fearsome rate, here, in the last where between 39 and 54 percent.32 More recently, Karzai has campaigned on the two years, in part because of civilian casualties Several steps were taken to address the promise of bringing international military and in part because of, simply, the tactics that civilian casualty issue. First, in a memoran- forces under control. we’ve been using.30 dum to Admiral Mullen in October 2008, Karzai’s stridency may be calculated to Secretary Gates directed a change in com- garner popular support, but it also reflects General McChrystal’s recent report on munications posture from “investigate the public mood. An increasing number of the situation in Afghanistan also concluded first, make amends later” to “make amends mass demonstrations against civilian casual- that “civilian casualties and collateral damage first, investigate later.”33 The new approach ties testify to serious public discontent, and to homes and property . . . have severely includes refraining from making initial evidence suggests civilian casualties are one damaged ISAF’s legitimacy in the eyes of the statements contesting casualty estimates, responding more quickly to allegations, Karzai has lamented the inability to stop “the coalition from conducting joint investigations with Afghan authorities, and apologizing publicly where killing our children” and accused foreign forces of “extreme” civilian casualties are confirmed as a result of and “disproportionate” use of force international military operations.34 Second, in late 2008, General David reason some Afghans take up arms against Afghan people.” This contention is supported McKiernan, USA, former commander of U.S. international military forces.28 In Herat Prov- by early 2009 polls, which indicate that the and ISAF forces, directed that all searches ince in April 2007, villagers reportedly took number of Afghans who say the United States and house raids should be led by Afghan up arms against SOF in response to a series has performed well in Afghanistan was cut in security forces except when there was a “clear of raids that resulted in the deaths of several half, from 68 percent in 2005 to 32 percent— and identified danger” coming from a build- ing. McKiernan’s directive did not apply to SOF special mission units, and it is unclear whether it applied to other SOF. Nevertheless, SOF leaders independently suspended special mission unit activities for 2 weeks in February 2009 to review procedures to reduce civilian casualties. The problem did not disappear, however. In June 2009, in a rare departure from diplomatic protocol, Kai Eide, the Nor- wegian head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, publicly declared an “urgent need to review” SOF activities in Afghanistan, asserting the political costs of SOF raids were “disproportionate to the military gains.”35 Shortly thereafter, General McChrystal issued a tactical directive that curtails the use of airstrikes to “very limited situations” where forces are in imminent danger. The directive emphasizes that “Commanders must weigh the gain of using [close air support] against the cost of civilian casualties, which in the Kai Eide, special representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance long run make mission success more difficult Mission in Afghanistan, addresses Security Council on situation in Afghanistan 36 UN (Paulo Filgueiras) and turn the Afghan people against us.” This

46 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB and CINNAMOND approach has not been without criticism, but Soldier assesses security of village General McChrystal has said that he “cannot overstate” his support for operating in ways that limit civilian casualties.37 The directive is also consistent with the approach some NATO military forces already use in Afghani- stan, which bodes well for better unified effort within the Alliance. McChrystal’s directive and his pri- orities reflect the indirect approach to SOF operations historically embraced by Army Special Forces, one that gives priority to working by, through, and with indigenous forces and populations.38 This means the relationship with local forces and population is determined to be more important than the effects that U.S. forces can achieve against targets unilaterally. For example, in 2001 a Special Forces captain routinely deferred to the judgment of the Afghan leader he worked with, who happened to be Hamid Karzai, the current : “Hamid was very careful. If there was any doubt, we wouldn’t bother killing it. I could afford to let a few guys go if I wasn’t sure. Hurting the populace hurt our own cause.”39

McChrystal’s directive gives priority to working by, through, and with indigenous forces and populations

The spirit and challenge of implement- ing the indirect approach was captured recently by an Army Special Forces colonel who answered his own rhetorical ques- tion about which of the many overlapping forces in Afghanistan own any given battle space: “The correct answer is the Afghans own the battle space and we are there in support of them. But [the] mentality that we own the battle space in a sovereign country . . . can cause us to operate in ways that are counterproductive.”40 To reiterate, the new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy requires the indirect approach traditionally championed by Army Special Forces. This means it is necessary to build the capacity of indigenous forces that know the populace better, even for kill/capture operations. However, U.S. forces operating under the OEF mandate have focused for years on the direct approach to special operations, targeting individual enemy leaders unilaterally. This is true not only for SOF special mission units that specialize in U.S. Air Force (Sarah R. Webb) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 47 FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistan direct action, but also increasingly for Army Special mission units conducting direct SOF organizations that embrace unity of Special Forces, who now often accord equal action against terrorists do not report to the command as a core value. Unified effort or higher priority to unilateral kill/capture same chain of command as other SOF units. is even more difficult among U.S. depart- operations than the indirect approach.41 Ironi- From early on in OEF, SOF operated under ments and agencies, and between Allies that cally, whereas in 2002 conventional forces the command of multiple joint task forces. lack common organizational values and such as the 82d Airborne conducted counter- Task Force Sword, comprised of SOF special do not share a single, hierarchical chain of insurgency sweeps that damaged relationships mission units, reported directly to the com- command. Disunity of command within the carefully cultivated by Army Special Forces, batant commander while other SOF such as military, the U.S. Government, and among today the reverse is true. It is now common Task Forces Dagger and K-Bar reported to the United States and its Allies unfortunately for SOF kill/capture operations to disrupt a Combined Joint Special Operations Task is the norm, not the exception. Yet the archi- relationships with local Afghans cultivated by Force (CJSOTF) component commander.44 A tects of the current strategy recognize that it conventional force commanders who, after new SOF headquarters established in Febru- requires “clear unity of effort at all levels and 8 years of learning in multiple theaters, are ary 2009 layers a one-star command on top with all participants.”48 The administration increasingly attentive to counterinsurgency of the CJSOTF command. Ostensibly, the therefore needs to take every possible step to principles. purpose is to enhance coordination between improve unified purpose and effort. SOF units and conventional international Disunity in Command and Control military forces, but many in Army Special Observations and Recommendations There is broad agreement among the Forces worry that the net effect of another News reports suggest the Obama U.S. national security community, the leader- layered headquarters will be less, rather administration is evaluating the option of ship of U.S. Special Operations Command, than more, unity of effort.45 In any case, giving precedence to counterterrorism over and many individual SOF personnel that special mission unit forces remain outside counterinsurgency, and concentrating on the indirect approach to counterinsurgency this command structure, so the potential relatively low-cost “surgical” strikes.49 While should take precedence over kill/capture for working at cross-purposes remains. The this strategy alternative should be evaluated operations. However, the opposite has same point holds for other U.S. organizations in detail, several observations based on the occurred. Understanding why is important if conducting kill/capture operations, such as research offered here are in order. Effective unity of effort is to be improved. One reason the Drug Enforcement Administration. Their kill/capture operations require political for the undue emphasis on direct action is operations targeting individuals linked to support and intelligence from indigenous that resources have been disproportionately drugs and the insurgency are increasing and allocated to targeting insurgent and terrorist need to be coordinated with military opera- leaders rather than to indirect SOF activities tions, so they will not undermine broader making a contribution to in support of counterinsurgency. An explana- counterinsurgency objectives.46 population security is passive, tion for the discrepancy between these opera- The disproportionate emphasis on difficult to measure, often tions and national policy was the overlapping kill/capture operations also can be attrib- ambiguous, and therefore less and ad hoc command and control arrange- uted to organizational culture and reward likely to be rewarded ments extant in Afghanistan to date.42 systems that reinforce the different objectives In OEF, civilian casualties resulting embraced by OEF and ISAF commands. from operations may not be viewed as det- Americans in general, the military in particu- populations, which are more easily obtained rimental to the core mission of destroying lar, and SOF especially are results-oriented. when the population has confidence in the terrorist organizations. However, civilian The capture or elimination of enemy leaders government and its forces. For this reason, casualties are a critical issue for ISAF and its is a measurable, concrete, and energetic General McChrystal’s indirect approach to counterinsurgency mission. Most Afghans activity that is easily rewarded in individual irregular warfare50 is more likely to produce cannot distinguish between OEF and ISAF and unit performance assessment. Making a effective kill/capture operations than attempts forces, and relationships painstakingly devel- contribution to population security is passive, to strike surgically from afar. In addition, a oped by ISAF are adversely affected when difficult to measure, often ambiguous, and strategy shift to give precedence to counterter- OEF kill/capture operations incur civilian therefore less likely to be rewarded. Within rorism would not reduce the irregular warfare casualties. Despite procedures to deconflict the subgroups of SOF, there are different requirement for greater unity of effort, as missions, lack of coordination between SOF cultural propensities toward the indirect kill/capture operations in Iraq demon- and conventional forces is all too common. approach to operations, but in general, the strated.51 Whether the emphasis is on For example, in Nangarhar Province, the military ethos provides all SOF command- counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, the Army brigade commander who ostensibly ers incentives to give priority to kill/capture requirement for improved unity of effort is a controlled the battle space was aware of only operations instead of population security. constant in irregular warfare. 5 of the 30 operations conducted by a SOF This is particularly true now that SOF units If the United States does decide to unit in the area and had no knowledge of the have built up a remarkable capability to stick with its current strategy and provide one in which 17 civilians were killed and 50 conduct such operations frequently and for the additional resources it requires, it can injured.43 sustained periods.47 and should take some more steps to improve The problem is exacerbated by the Unity of effort is difficult in irregular unity of effort, particularly with NATO fragmentation of SOF command and control. warfare, even within the military and within allies. Eliminating the tension between OEF

48 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB and CINNAMOND forces targeting enemy leadership and ISAF have been converging for several years. The where insurgent activity is concentrated. In forces pursuing stabilization and population OEF counterterrorism focus has broadened this environment, the practical distinctions security efforts is the single most important to include disrupting the Taliban insurgency between “security and stabilization” and requirement for better unified effort. Toward by targeting its leadership. More importantly, classic population-centric counterinsurgency this end, almost all of the U.S.-led OEF forces since 2006 the OEF mission has included a missions almost disappear. The terminology should be consolidated under the NATO ISAF nationbuilding component in the form of the remains politically important because NATO mission, to include most SOF forces and all Combined Security Transition Command– does not refer to ISAF’s mission as counter- U.S. training command forces that support Afghanistan, which is charged with training insurgency but rather prefers the euphemism Afghan force development and employment and equipping Afghan National Security “the comprehensive approach” to emphasize programs.52 Only SOF special mission units Forces. General McChrystal’s report the full range of civil-military activities (and their support elements) would continue indicates the OEF training component required to stabilize Afghanistan. Some to operate under the OEF mandate. Taking command will be subsumed under ISAF, a NATO forces will continue to avoid offensive this step would solidify the strategic direction positive step that is consistent with the deci- operations against the Taliban, but the current from General Petraeus and General McChrys- sion announced at the April NATO summit strategy emphasis on population security and tal that nests counterterrorism within a wider to form an Alliance training mission and the indirect approach underscores the need counterinsurgency mission.53 More impor- have it led by a single commander who to have Afghan forces take the lead in such tantly, it would improve the legitimacy of the also would control the U.S.-led Combined operations anyway. Thus, this limitation is not international effort in Afghanistan and rein- Security Transition Command–Afghanistan a severe handicap. force European support for the endeavor. The under OEF.54 NATO ISAF mission is operating under a UN At the same time, the ISAF mission NATO prefers the euphemism Security Council resolution and has a broader has broadened as well. After NATO assumed base for popular support than the U.S.-led command of ISAF in 2003, the UN Security “the comprehensive OEF mission. Finally, the consolidation under Council authorized the extension of the ISAF approach” to emphasize the NATO would be consistent with the adminis- security and stabilization mission to cover the full range of civil-military tration’s focus on multilateral solutions. entire country, an expansion that ISAF com- activities required to stabilize Merging the two missions is more prac- pleted by late 2006. ISAF experienced more Afghanistan ticable than might be assumed. The missions combat when it moved into the south and east U.S. Army (Matthew Freire)

Soldiers secure detainee during joint operation with Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF in Khowst Province

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 49 FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistan

Moreover, past NATO reluctance to con- could be assuaged by the provision that the levels of organization, as the experience with sider merging elements of the two missions commander of ISAF would always be a U.S. the civil-military Provincial Reconstruc- appears to be dissipating. Until 2005, Britain, flag officer, which is entirely reasonable given tion Teams in Afghanistan attests.62 Great France, and all opposed merging that the United States provides the majority of Ambassador–military commander teams ISAF and OEF because they believed the forces and support to the mission. are the rare exceptions that prove the general United States wanted to dump the mission on The second most important require- rule that such leaders typically respond to NATO and concentrate on Iraq, and because ment for better unified effort is improved the demands of their own organizations and they thought the U.S. focus was on fighting civil-military collaboration. Since, as argued cultures, as do their subordinates. As a recent the Taliban and al Qaeda rather than popula- above, successful irregular warfare requires report from the House Armed Services Com- tion security and nationbuilding. Since 2006, rapid resolution of innumerable implementa- mittee (HASC) concluded, “While senior however, some Allies (or particular political tion issues, mechanisms for authoritative leaders should get along in the interest of parties within NATO countries) have recom- civil-military decisionmaking are impera- the mission, history is replete with examples mended merging the missions; Italy explicitly tive. The United States must lead the way where they have not. Rather than depending did so with the rationale that the merger for NATO in this area by ensuring close exclusively on personalities for success, the would reduce civilian casualties by ramping collaboration between General McChrystal right interagency structures and processes down OEF operations.55 Since the ISAF stabi- and Ambassador Eikenberry. In this regard, need to be in place and working.”63 lization mission now includes the full range McChrystal’s plan is insufficient. It calls for The optimum means of ensuring of activities necessary to execute the new parallel chains of command with coordina- unified effort would be a formal decision to U.S. population-centric counterinsurgency tion at every level. Historically, however, the integrate the civilian and military chains strategy, NATO should be more amenable to seeing the ISAF mission absorb the bulk the optimum means of ensuring unified effort would be a of OEF forces and activities if the United formal decision to integrate the civilian and military chains of States emphatically renews its commitment to success in Afghanistan.56 command Many observers would be hesitant to give the lead to ISAF because European coun- way to ensure civil-military cooperation is of command for the purpose of complex tries have demonstrated a marked reluctance to formally integrate the military and civil- contingency operations such as counterin- to use lethal force. But the new U.S. strategy ian chains of command, as occurred when surgency, but this would require changes to deemphasizes the attrition of insurgent General Douglas MacArthur was given laws that mandate a dual civil and military forces, the type of operations Europeans authority over all U.S. activities in Japan chain of command at the country level.64 could not support.57 In addition, NATO and when the Civil Operations and Revolu- The more immediate solution would be an troop-contributing states are relaxing their tionary Development Support Program in informal agreement between Eikenberry and opposition to having their forces involved in Vietnam was instituted. These rare experi- McChrystal to work collaboratively. Such a combat operations when such operations are ments in formally integrated civil-military relationship can be hoped for, but the more an unavoidable byproduct of stabilization chains of command produced good results prudent route would be for the administra- operations.58 The French, for example, now that more than justify their broader use in tion to take steps to ensure a collaborative express frustration with national caveats that complex politico-military contingencies. relationship. limit combat by NATO troops, and recently, a The standard practice, however, has been to General McChrystal and Ambassador European Parliament report made the argu- proclaim the importance of civil-military Eikenberry have developed a joint plan for ment that national caveats are counterproduc- integration while doing nothing to facilitate Afghanistan,65 as should be the norm in tive. On the ground, more nations are finding it, which, typically and not surprisingly, pro- complex civil-military operations. They combat unavoidable and a necessary means duces unsatisfactory results.61 should also exchange key staff members and of pacification.59 Even German forces, with Occasionally, a pair of extraordinary make decisions collaboratively whenever pos- arguably the most restrictive national caveats, personalities will mesh and develop a sible, in keeping with the best practices of our now routinely are involved in combat.60 ISAF noteworthy rapport, as was the case with most accomplished Ambassador-commander forces also can rely more heavily on NATO Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant teams. However, as the HASC recommends, SOF when combat operations are necessary. General Robert Johnston in Somalia (1993), they also should be given some procedural Many Allies have been willing to allow their Ambassador Khalilzad and Lieutenant rules of thumb for collaboration. When diplo- SOF to conduct combat operations with a low General Barno in Afghanistan (2003), and matic and military needs sharply conflict—as profile. General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan they must on occasion in irregular war—who Where fighting is heaviest, U.S. forces Crocker in Iraq (2007). The fact that Ambas- has the final say should be a function of the and likeminded Allies will have to bear the sador Eikenberry is a retired Army lieuten- security situation, which could be determined brunt of the operations until Afghan forces ant general may improve the odds that he on a province-by-province basis. Ambassador are ready. However, that is the case today and and General McChrystal will collaborate, Eikenberry would have the last say for the few not an argument against rolling OEF activi- but it does not guarantee it. Even if they do, contentious issues that could not be resolved ties under ISAF. Any U.S. concerns over the their positive example will not ensure coop- collaboratively in those provinces where future direction of the ISAF NATO mission eration down the line through subordinate security was good enough to allow progress

50 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB and CINNAMOND toward political objectives to take priority— relationships with local Afghans.71 However, General McChrystal will have to per- generally the northern half of the country at this must be done systematically and not be sonally attend to setting SOF special mission the moment. In provinces where the security left to chance. Layering of headquarters that unit priorities within the OEF mandate. environment is so poor that progress toward constrains the latitude SOF traditionally exer- They do not formally report to him, and security objectives must take precedence cise is not the preferred way to achieve this they would continue to operate under dif- before political progress can be realized—gen- objective. Instead, SOF must be subject to the ferent rules of engagement than ISAF forces. erally the southeast and southern half of the culture change on the issue of civilian casual- Historically, special mission units report country—General McChrystal would resolve ties that General McChrystal is advocating.72 directly to combatant commanders. If the the issue at hand.66 Knowing in advance who Several steps already taken or currently under plan to realign all SOF to the commander has the final say will minimize the conflict, way should help ensure the change in perspec- of ISAF does not include special mission tardy decisions, stalemates, and least common tive extends to all SOF. denominator solutions that are frequently the Moving Army Special Forces from OEF special operations forces deleterious results of forcing equal authorities to the ISAF counterinsurgency mission would must be subject to the culture with competing mandates to cooperate. underscore national mission priorities for As for unified effort within the military SOF. Collaboration between SOF and Afghan change on the issue of civilian and SOF community, General McChrystal’s army units working on counterinsurgency casualties that General plan calls for improved SOF command and objectives should be the norm, and it is more McChrystal is advocating control, and it hints that some SOF will be likely to happen if SOF are working under realigned under ISAF, as recommended the ISAF mission mandate. Making ISAF units, General McChrystal’s past experi- here. Improved coordination between OEF the main effort in Afghanistan would also ence should at least allow him to exercise an and ISAF SOF will be provided by enhanced make it easier to eliminate irregularities informal veto over their operations should “SOF operations and planning staff, SOF that complicate unity of effort, such as dif- they threaten counterinsurgency objectives. advisors, and liaison officers to the Regional ferent OEF/ISAF target lists of key enemy If this kind of informal oversight relationship Command Headquarters.”67 McChrystal leaders.73 General McChrystal’s emphatic proves insufficient, SOF special mission units has the credentials to reorient the SOF focus statements about the need to limit civilian could be further constrained to operate in in Afghanistan so that population-centric casualties and the subordinate importance a geographically limited area and by a very strategy objectives take precedence over GEN McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry visit Konar Province to meet with kill/capture operations. He is a veteran of district governors and see U.S.-funded reconstruction projects both Army Special Forces and special mission units who recognizes that decapitation of the enemy leadership will not work, but that a focused effort to keep the insurgency on the defensive is valuable if conducted properly. Offensive operations against insurgents must be informed by the kind of interagency intelligence fusion McChrystal pioneered in Iraq.68 In-depth knowledge of local personali- ties and politics increases the odds that kill/ capture operations will improve security and reduces the likelihood that local informa- tion sources might manipulate international forces for their own objectives.69 To improve intelligence and political awareness, General McChrystal’s new command and control guidance for SOF should pair Army Special Forces with Afghan units that have gradu- ated from basic training and are ready for

employment, and with local irregular forces U.S. Department of State generated through the Afghan Public Protec- tion Force program (if that controversial pilot of targeting enemy leadership effectively precise list of high-value targets and cost- program continues).70 communicate commander’s intent to all SOF benefit procedures. In the past, the frequency SOF kill/capture operations should forces, including the special mission units he of SOF special mission unit operations grew continue, but only in support of counterinsur- knows so well.74 McChrystal’s priorities and without sufficient accountability until they gency objectives. In some cases, conventional plan should also help reinforce the traditional were targeting less important leaders and units integrate SOF kill/capture operations Army Special Forces indirect approach, which with unacceptably higher risks, and the same into their counterinsurgency efforts in a emphasizes the critical importance of the could easily happen in Afghanistan.75 In Iraq, way that strengthens rather than weakens Afghan population and forces. General McChrystal successfully executed ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 51 FORUM | Unified Effort in Afghanistan

17 high-value human target operations in a N o t es “Press Conference with General Tommy manner consistent with counterinsurgency Franks,” available from . 18 Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Shifting Drones’ same can be done in Afghanistan. Once he Assessment,” August 30, 2009, available at ; Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” 2009, 1. informally, the informal coordination rela- 19 The Washington Times, August 20, 2009. Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Trou- tionship with special mission units should 2 Fred Kaplan, “CT or COIN? Obama must bled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, be transferred to General Rodriguez, who is choose this week between two radically different MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006), 7. 20 going to coordinate the day-to-day military Afghanistan policies,” Slate.com, March 24, 2009. John McCain, remarks at the American operations in Afghanistan. Rodriguez could 3 Bill Gertz, “Afghanistan Debate,” The Wash- Enterprise Institute, February 25, 2009, available at emulate McChrystal’s success in Iraq and ington Times, March 26, 2009, B1. . Emphasis added. 21 action are not so laborious as to preclude stan/Pakistan before the House Foreign Relations Pauline Jelinek, “Afghan Civilian Deaths successful kill/capture operations with few Committee, May 5, 2009, available at . 18, 2009. civilian casualties. 22 5 Jim Hoagland, “Foreign Policy by Deadline,” Gilles Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Progress in Afghanistan is not possible The Washington Post, July 19, 2009, 17. 6 Jim Garamone, “Gates Says New Command Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, until the strategic objectives currently under in Afghanistan Will Look to NATO,” American 2009). debate are resolved and priority is assigned 23 Forces Press Service, June 11, 2009; see also Julian Greg Sanders, “How Deleterious is the to either counterinsurgency or counterter- E. Barnes, “Americans won’t accept ‘long slog’ Impact of Airstrikes on Popular Opinion in rorism. Paraphrasing the Cheshire cat’s point in Afghanistan war, Gates says,” The Los Angeles Afghanistan?” Center for Strategic and Interna- in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: “If you Times, July 19, 2009. tional Studies, March 10, 2009, available at . 24 will get you there.” Choosing among compet- Afghanistan Is Fired,” The Washington Post, May “U.S. Probe: Afghan Airstrike Killed at Least ing paths is only relevant in the context of 12, 2009. 33 Civilians,” CNN News, October 8, 2008. 25 clear objectives. But it is equally true that “if 8 David Petraeus, statement before the Senate See Jason Staziuso, “Afghan Mess Up: Crossed signals lead each side to mistake the other you can’t stay on the road you choose, no road Armed Services Committee, April 1, 2009. 9 “New U.S. general looks to shift tack for the enemy,” Associated Press, January 13, 2007. will get you where you want to go.” Choosing 26 in Afghanistan,” June 12, 2009, available at See Richard Holbrooke, “The Longest War,” the best ways to achieve strategic objectives . See “U.S. President Gets an Earful from implement a strategy with unified effort. The 10 Karl W. Eikenberry, testimony before the Afghan Governors,” Agence France Presse, April general U.S. experience with counterinsur- Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 26, 9, 2008. 28 gency illustrates this point well. U.S. military 2009, available at . Studies cites revenge against international forces winning counterinsurgency warfare, but the 11 Anthony H. Cordesman, “More Troops, as a key motivation for joining the insurgency. See organizations implementing the doctrine Fewer Caveats. Let’s Get Serious,” August 10, Hekmat Karzai, “Is the West losing the Pashtuns?” Al Jazeera, January 26, 2009. ignore it with comparable regularity.76 The 2009, available at

52 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB and CINNAMOND

34 See “U.S. Deeply Regrets Civilian Deaths in 49 Peter Baker and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Obama 65 Gertz, “Inside the Ring.” Afghanistan: Clinton,” Agence France Presse, May Considers Strategy Shift in Afghan War,” The New 66 This recommendation is consistent with the 7, 2009. York Times, September 22, 2009. division of labor recommended by General Barno. 35 See Adam B. Ellick, “U.N. Official Calls for 50 McChrystal, 1–2, 1–3, 2–1, 2–10, 2–11. See Barno, testimony. Review of American Raids,” The New York Times, 51 Project for National Security Reform 67 McChrystal, annex B. June 14, 2009. (PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC: 68 Interagency intelligence fusion is difficult 36 See “NATO/ISAF Tactical Directive (Releas- PNSR, 2008). but can be mastered, as British forces in Northern able Portions) 6 July 2009”; David Zucchino and 52 For more arguments on the need to merge Ireland and McChrystal in Iraq demonstrated. Laura King, “U.S. to Limit Airstrikes in Afghani- OEF and ISAF, see Ambassador James Dobbins Peter Spiegel, “Commander Maps New Course In stan to Help Reduce Civilian Deaths,” The Los (Ret.), “Obama’s Af/Pak Strategy,” a draft chapter Afghan War: U.S. Gen. McChrystal Departs From Angeles Times, June 23, 2009. from a forthcoming book. Special-Ops World With Focus on Diplomacy; 37 General Stanley McChrystal, statement 53 Ibid.; McChrystal. ‘Decapitation Strategies Don’t Work,’” The Wall before the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 54 Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Street Journal, June 12, 2009, 6. 2, 2009. Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,” 69 Fisnik Abrashi and Jason Straziuso, 38 The distinction between the direct and indi- Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009. “Afghans say deadly raid was based on misleading rect approach to special operations is controversial 55 “Italy’s D’Alema Advises U.S. to End ‘Endur- tip,” Associated Press, August 28, 2008. and often confused within the special operations ing Freedom’ Mission in Afghanistan,” Agence 70 We are indebted to Colonel David Maxwell community. The authors’ usage is drawn from France Presse, July 25, 2007. for the distinction between remote area operations David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, U.S. 56 Victoria Burnett and Rachel Donadio, with irregular forces and consolidation operations Special Operations Forces (New York: Columbia “Spain is Open to Bolstering Forces in Afghani- with host-nation forces, both conducted in support University Press, 2007). stan,” The New York Times, July 29, 2009. of the Foreign Internal Defense mission. 39 Rothstein, 140. 57 For a European take on population-centric 71 James Dao, “Neighbors by Day, Soldiers 40 Email exchange with Colonel David counterinsurgency operations that is consistent by Night in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, Maxwell, USA, U.S. Army Special Operations with the new U.S. approach, see Colonel Philippe August 5, 2009, available at . 41 Jones, 265; interviews with Special Forces Rebellion,” Doctrine: Revue d’etudes Generales no. 72 Pauline Jelinek and Anne Gearan, “General officers, July 22, 2009, July 27, 2009; interview with 17 (July 2009), Centre de Doctrine, d’Emploi des Seeks New Afghan Approach: He urges ‘cultural 0–6 staff officer, July 20, 2009. For evidence of the Forces, Ministry of Defense, France. shift’ in how troops handle civilians,” The Phila- confusion surrounding the focus of Special Forces, 58 We are indebted to Institute for National delphia Inquirer, August 1, 2009. see Major Darin Blatt and Major Glenn Bollinger Strategic Studies expert Leo Michel for insights 73 Interview with Army Special Forces officer, III, “3d SFG Develops Special Army Forces Combat and an assortment of articles from European press July 27, 2009. Advisers for Afghanistan,” June 24, 2009, available on this topic. 74 Spiegel, 6; McCain. at . Taliban,” Spiegel Online International (Germany), rence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency 42 Institute for National Strategic Studies July 9, 2009. Doctrine, 1960–1970 and 2003–2006, RAND roundtable, Washington, DC, March 3, 2009. 61 Bob Killebrew, “The Left-Hand Side of the Counterinsurgency Study Paper 6 (Santa Monica, 43 Colonel Ian Hope, Unity of Command in Spectrum: Ambassadors and Advisors in Future CA: RAND, 2008). Afghanistan: A Foresaken Principle of War, Carlisle U.S. Strategy,” Center for a New American Secu- Papers in Security Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. rity, 2009. Army War College, November 2008), note 50. 62 David Kobayashi, “Integrating Civilian 44 Denis P. Doty, “Command and Control of and Military Efforts in Provincial Reconstruc- Special Operations Forces for 21st Century Con- tion Teams,” Mini-Case Study for the Project tingency Operations” (Master’s thesis, Naval War on National Security Reform (Washington, DC: College, 2003), available at . in the Kush: The False Hope of ‘Unity of Effort’” 45 Sean Naylor, “New Special Forces HQ (Master’s thesis, The Johns Hopkins School of coming to Afghanistan. Buildup of forces means Advanced International Studies, 2007); Anna need for closer oversight, official says,” The Mili- Husarska, “Trampled by the ‘Civilian Surge,’” The tary Times, January 31, 2009. Washington Post, July 10, 2009. 46 James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan 63 U.S. House of Representatives, House Drug Lords Tied to Taliban,” The New York Times, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on August 10, 2009; Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Oversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report: 2009,” vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn Center for Strategic and International Studies, June from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and 18, 2009. Afghanistan,” April 2008. 47 Interview with David W. Barno, July 31, 64 PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 473ff; see also 2009; interview with Special Forces officer, July Franz-Stefan Gady and Rei Tang, “Afghanistan 22, 2009. Interagency Team Scenario,” Research and Analy- 48 Petraeus. sis Directorate, PNSR, February 2009.

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 53 Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan Creating Unity of Command

By J oshua W . W elle

On the heels of the Afghan presidential elections and General McChrystal’s 60-day mission assessment, changes to civilian- military C2 should be considered. This article argues why and how ISAF should reorganize its C2 structure to ensure true civilian-mili- tary integration.

Complex Environment One of the poorest countries in the world, Afghanistan has a 70 percent illiteracy rate and the world’s third highest infant mortality rate. It has been ravaged by 30 years of war and political instability. Creating opportunities for economic growth is difficult because of weak government institutions, dilapidated or nonexistent infrastructure, and significant environmental degradation from drought. Improving Afghanistan’s ability to Marines and civilian representatives of U.S. organizations talk with self-govern is of the highest priority, so sta- resident in Nawa district of Helmand Province during counterinsurgency bilization efforts are “less about schools and operations with Afghan National Security Forces other infrastructure than about the process U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremy Harris) U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremy by which international donors partner with ast year, Senators John McCain The strategy for success, as directed local governments and institutions.”3 Ultimate and Joe Lieberman argued that by General Stanley McChrystal, USA, and success is achieved through Afghan owner- the way forward in Afghanistan echoed by Washington , is based on ship and execution of enduring development required “a comprehensive civil- population-centric counterinsurgency doc- solutions. Thus, there are no quick wins. L 1 2 military counterinsurgency approach.” The trine. COIN literature, from David Galula to President Barack Obama’s regional U.S. interagency community is answering the David Kilcullen, recognizes good governance strategy labels the Afghanistan mission as a call. By mid-2010, there should be over 700 and sustainable development as the prize, vital national security interest. The objective civilians deployed to complement the increase relegating capture and kill missions to a is to promote a more capable, accountable, of U.S. troops to the North Atlantic Treaty secondary status. The U.S. Armed Forces are and effective government that serves the Organization (NATO) International Security not trained to enhance governance in conflict Afghan people and can eventually function Assistance Force (ISAF); however, the “civil- zones and create long-term development with limited international support.4 Yet in this ian surge” is only a first step toward success in strategies. Accordingly, civilian expertise in a longer term effort, time is of the essence. By a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Next, counterinsurgency is a force multiplier. ISAF mid-2009, a new Ambassador and military the U.S. Government must integrate person- does not do governance and development; it commander were appointed, 17,000 troops nel into a unified civilian-military structure endeavors to enable others to do it by creat- were deployed to the southern region, and with clear command and control (C2) systems ing security space in and opportunities for a clear message from Washington was sent: aligned with the government of Afghani- civilian international and nongovernmental stan and ISAF. Without unity of command organizations (NGOs) to deliver sustainable throughout civilian and military organiza- progress by, with, and through the Afghan Lieutenant Joshua W. Welle, USN, was a Civil- tions, there cannot be the unity of effort people. The strategy is to shape, clear, hold, Military Planner for Regional Command South, needed to support Afghanistan in defeating a and build—through an integrated civilian- International Security Assistance Force, from ruthless insurgency. military strategy from start to finish. November 2008 to August 2009.

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ISAF has 12 to 18 months to show evidence of a postconflict stabilization operation. Gone The National Layer positive momentum to retain support of the are the days when we could separate security Civilian-military synchronization must coalition. efforts from governance and development start at the national or Kabul level. In the activities in a clean phased progression; this highly centralized model that the government First-hand Perspective is armed nationbuilding. The Taliban rarely of Afghanistan espouses, political power is For 10 months, I served in the Regional distinguish between a United Nations (UN) focused here and poorly diffused among the Command (RC) South Civilian-Military governance workshop and a Canadian stabi- provinces. In the effort to keep power and Planning Cell (Civ-Mil Cell) within ISAF lization project. Nor do insurgents separate a resources controlled by Kabul and to ensure at a turning point in U.S. policy. Secretary World Food Program convoy from a British regional warlords are not able to develop of Defense Robert Gates, with buy-in from military patrol. In the eyes of the enemy, those major provincial powerbases, critical deci- partner nations in the South, advocated this supporting the Afghan government or the sions for each province are made in ministries cell to embed civilian expertise needed to coalition are targets. Civilians and military in the capital. National large-scale road design guide regional planning efforts away from actors therefore must closely cooperate, as all and construction are not orchestrated by kinetic operations and toward governance and have similar goals, assume comparable risks, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); road development-led approaches. The cell, estab- and are dependent on one another for success. strategies are part of Afghanistan’s master lished by Brigadier General John Nicholson, But cooperation is not enough. plan and are carried out by the Ministry of USA, led key initiatives that contributed to Dutch commander General Mark De Kruif’s President Obama’s regional strategy labels the Afghanistan vision of a regional, comprehensive integrated strategy. Our team was on the cutting edge of mission as a vital national security interest civilian-military integration. There are distinct layers within Afghan Public Works partnered with international Paradigm Shift government and ISAF structures that define donors. Concerns about Kajaki Dam power The war in Afghanistan is witness to a command and control. The Afghan govern- generation or the privatization of the Afghan paradigm shift in coalition civilian-military ment has a formal presence at the national, utility company, for instance, are best directed doctrine. An excerpt from the ABCA Coali- provincial, and district levels. For security, to Ishmael Khan’s Ministry of Energy and tion Operations Handbook states: the Ministries of Interior and Defense have a Water, not provincial authorities. Power in fourth layer: regional headquarters for Afghan Afghanistan emanates from the center, and In coalition operations, consensus building National Security Forces. ISAF parallels the ISAF should approach the Afghan govern- to ensure compatibility at the political, mili- government but has more robust RCs with no ment with a more informed understanding of tary, and cultural levels between partners is coequal, nonmilitary Afghan counterpart. development strategies. key. A successful coalition must establish at Understanding these four tiers is important. At the present time, each donor- and least unity of effort, if not unity of command. As ISAF commits to full “partnership” with troop-contributing nation retains the right to The success of a coalition operation begins the Afghan government and its security bilaterally engage Afghan ministries on their with the authority to direct operations of all forces, it is through these tiers of formal specific province according to their specific assigned or attached military forces.5 Afghan structures that the coalition can priorities. The Canadian embassy negoti- support lasting, positive change. ates with the Ministry of Education about its Applied to Afghanistan, the last sentence should be rephrased: “The success of a coali- Kandahar PRT members talk to local children about delivering tion counterinsurgency operation begins with donated school supplies the authority to coordinate operations of all assigned or attached civilian and military assets through a common strategy.” If the White House plan for “executing and resourc- ing an integrated civilian-military counter- insurgency strategy” is to succeed, the C2 structure must go beyond the existing plans for civilian-military integration.6 Civilian and military operations are converging every day; civilians are the key enablers of a successful COIN strategy. Whole-of-government, comprehensive, and fully integrated policy concepts are bringing foreign and defense ministries more closely together because stability operations require political, economic, and military cooperation. After 8 years, COIN in Afghanistan is unlike ISAF (Jeffrey Duran) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 55 FORUM | Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan signature projects for Kandahar City. Likewise, its members can be held to a common strat- The EWG, however, was made effective the United States engages the Ministry of the egy. Kabul is home to a wealth of successful because of a talented support secretariat—the Interior regarding Afghan National Police strategy documents but has no decisionmak- Integrated Civilian Military Action Group milestones. Each lead nation establishes rela- ing authority to turn words into coordinated (ICMAG)—whose job it was to staff integra- tionships outside collective synchronization action. To date, national level efforts have tion up and down the U.S. chain of command. mechanisms, without regard to ISAF. This reflected traditional (read ineffective) notions Initially an ad hoc body and predominantly uncoordinated key leader engagement allows of civilian-military cooperation that resemble staffed by personnel from the Department the government to manipulate partner nations herding cats.7 of State Office of the Coordinator for Recon- and weakens the ability of these nations to struction and Stabilization and RC East mili- band together to combat corruption. at the present time, each tary officers, the ICMAG supported the EWG In the face of these competing priorities, lead nation establishes to align stakeholders and created national there has long been recognition that syn- level, regional, and provincial plans in areas chronization is needed. However, in Kabul, relationships outside collective of U.S. priorities. The ICMAG grew to include Afghan government ministries, embassies, synchronization mechanisms, U.S. ISAF and USAID planners with a breadth ISAF, and NGOs have consistently failed at without regard to ISAF of influence and reach into their parent orga- effective synchronization because few agree nizations. The EWG/ICMAG was a success on a single empowered forum for executive The United States went beyond herding because it created a credible and accepted level integration. The Joint Coordination and cats in 2009 by creating an Executive Working forum for decisionmaking, aligned disparate Monitoring Board (JCMB) is the highest level Group (EWG) that synchronized U.S. efforts strategies for the U.S. Government, and had and brings all key stakeholders together in a in Afghanistan. This forum allowed princi- a talented, well-networked staff able to gather forum co-led by the Afghan government and pals from key organizations—Department information from all layers. UN. But this board is more about process of State, U.S. Agency for International Devel- The EWG/ICMAG partnership is a than progress. Issues going to the JCMB are opment (USAID), RC East and RC South model for civilian-military coordination and, if either precooked or watered down to ensure leadership, and Combined Security Transition improved, can be carbon-copied at every layer consensus. Major disputes or differences in Command—to sit in one room once a month of ISAF command, creating effective civilian- approach are often necessarily pasted over. and shape U.S. civilian-military plans and military coordination and making ISAF the Beyond the JCMB, ISAF requires a distinct operations. From EWG meetings in the spring hub (see figure 1). Such a structure would forum in which the coalition can align assets of 2009, it was apparent this collective body be more inclusive of multinational interests and efforts prior to government and UN had far-reaching authority in Afghanistan and outside isolated embassy efforts and allow civil- engagement—where problems can be effec- was formulating a combined civilian-military ian-military planning to be more transparent. tively and openly raised and solved and where voice back to Washington. Establishing a Coalition Executive Working

Figure 1. ISAF Civilian-Military C2 Model

National National ISAF Civilian Lead Government National Coalition EWG Military Co-equal

CIV-MIL Action Cell

Regional Command Civilian Lead Regional Coalition EWG Military Co-equal

CIV-MIL Action Cell

Provincial Civilian Lead Provincial Provincial Coalition EWG Government Military Co-equal

CIV-MIL Action Cell

District District Civilian Lead Government District Coalition EWG Military Co-equal

CIV-MIL Action Cell

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Group (CEWG) and a Civilian Military Action has members from most southern partners enabled (the United States lags in this capacity Cell (CMAC) at ISAF headquarters and lower (Australia, Canada, , the Nether- compared to coalition PRTs and must recruit, levels will deliver positive results. lands, the United Kingdom, and the United train, and deploy enough civilians to support States) and ought to be the direct support this structure). PRTs with civilian leadership The Regional Layer staff to the dual-command team and action are better at building Afghan capacity, deliv- Though there is no parallel Afghan secretariat to the PCB. Beyond planning, the ering basic services, and improving rule of law regional governance structure, RCs enable Civ-Mil Cell is the lone interlocutor within because civilians are resourced in numbers military planning and have logistical ISAF that can seamlessly access donor and and engaged in the military planning process. assets to support fast-paced operations in diplomatic networks. The cell identifies key In fact, in the more successful PRTs, some the provinces. Regional designations suit problems, is an advocate for the region in senior civilians coapprove operations with Afghanistan’s geographical, ethnic, and socio- Kabul, and can organize stakeholders to the military commander. Making the PRTs economic divisions; a regional focus allows enable a southern strategy. civilian-led is not enough; PRT planning must resources to be applied better in a complex The CEWG/CMAC must still respect be accountable in some way to ISAF. Pres- coalition theater. coalition requirements and interests: country- ently, ISAF tries to obtain basic atmospherics Each region—North, East, South, West, specific caveats will apply (RCs should not through standard reporting and only receives and Capital—has a coalition two-star general spend nationally driven dollars). However, we 20 percent of required data because there is no leading the security mission. However, the can no longer afford RCs imploring civilian incentive for PRTs to report. PRT–ISAF links success of the regional model to date begins development actors to provide information on are too informal, which weakens mission to break down when confronted with the project milestones, future planning initiatives, effectiveness. integrated planning needed for the next level and donor strategies relevant to long-term of COIN operations. ISAF RCs have been military planning. historically ineffective at planning COIN the Civ-Mil Cell is the lone operations because development strategies The Provincial Layer interlocutor within ISAF that are handed down from Kabul or created at Success at the provincial level is para- can seamlessly access donor the PRT without input from the military RC mount because ministries, although lacking and diplomatic networks headquarters. To overcome this situation, RCs Afghan human capacity, do exist and can require an ISAF civilian leader and a coordi- connect the population to the government. nating structure identical to the national level There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan; 26 Provincial level elements (coordinated CEWG/CMAC model. have PRTs, and 13 of these are U.S.-led. by PRTs) also require an EWG with key pro- A CEWG already exists in RC South. Provincial development strategies are vincial stakeholders that can align plans and The Partner’s Coordination Board (PCB) has drafted and executed in relative isolation create true civilian-military effect. The British been effective in creating a regional under- from ISAF (surprisingly, American military PRT, located in Lashkar Gah, has a Joint standing through voluntary participation of officers detailed to ISAF headquarters lack Coordination Board (JCB) chaired by a senior each province’s senior civilian and manda- an understanding of U.S. PRT priorities civilian, with British and U.S. senior military tory attendance by task force commanders. because most information is close-hold participation, and Danish senior civilian However, the PCB has not been able to or not transmitted over NATO computer input. This team also works closely with the establish far-reaching authority because PRTs systems). In many parts of the country, PRTs provincial governor to help shape operations. and their sponsor countries are reluctant to are supported by ISAF but not all their ele- The summer 2009 clear-hold efforts in Babiji, cede the influence of their capitals to a higher ments are under control because of a “lead Khanishin, and Nawa were possible only military coordinating body. In 2009, General nation” policy. The lead nation methodol- through civilian-military planning with Gov- de Kruif partnered with the UN Assistance ogy is not working. As a result, in several ernor Gulab Mangal, supported by the British Mission in Afghanistan to put a “civilian provinces, strategies are often disjointed and U.S. troop commanders. face” on the PCB but saw limited success; from ISAF; PRT proprietary attitudes over There should also be a CMAC to carry having an actual coalition-approved civilian relationships with Afghan ministries reduce out executive policy by aligning donor plans regional commander would create needed coalition effectiveness; and some PRTs have with security priorities to create synergy unity of command over coalition PRTs. The a cavalier attitude that their methods alone between the international provincial elements PCB would be empowered by the contribut- will win the war. Changes to the PRT C2 and provincial line ministries. A dedicated ing nations, endorsed as the lead regional structure would be—by far—the most dif- civilian-military staff working for the JCB, coordination board, and become the driver of ficult to implement; however, creating PRT reporting to the ISAF chain of command, cross-provincial, civilian-military planning in unity of command up to ISAF, and unity would ensure continuity across provinces and the South. of effort with the wider provincial team of set achievable benchmarks measurable at the RC South also benefits from having actors (special operations forces, embedded regional and national levels. a well-established Civ-Mil Cell that strives and police mentor teams, and intelligence While the concept has been an essential to create the regional comprehensive vision agencies), is critical. tool for unity of effort, integrated command needed to support planning for governance, Like the British in Helmand, Dutch in teams, which enable coordination between development, and reconstruction, similar to Uruzgan, and Canadians in Kandahar, all international civilian and military leader- the U.S. Embassy’s ICMAG. The Civ-Mil Cell PRTs should be civilian-led and military- ship in a province, often miss the mark and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 57 FORUM | Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan become overly reliant on personality, consen- basic stability operations complex; it is all fog. district level stakeholders. Presently, there are sus, and trust to get the job done.8 ISAF ought Subprovincial efforts must adapt to unfamil- one or two nonmilitary advisors supporting to endorse and train toward a structure in iar Afghan tribal structures, the influence battalions and companies when there should which civilians lead PRTs, the military sup- of the narcotics power brokers, and a void of be a 10-person CMAC linked into a larger ports civilian directors, and all reporting and Afghan district ministries. Counterinsur- ISAF civilian-military structure. assessments go through joint civilian-military gency experts rightly argue that “district level Resources for better district develop- RC teams up to ISAF headquarters and the governance, social justice, and security define ment are coming online through the U.S. broader CEWG in one coherent system. As the key terrain of the insurgency, and control civilian surge, but civilian-military C2 is U.S. troop deployments homogenize coali- at the local district level is vital.”9 still very much unaligned, particularly in tion battlespace, particularly in the South, In the interconnected and localized web the southern coalition environment. The the lead for all governance and development of Afghanistan’s districts, a finely tuned plan United States authorized the creation of a must remain nested in a single location—the that draws on the strengths of all our elements Senior Civilian Representative in RC East PRT. As 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade in the field is essential. As these areas move and RC South and the designation of “lead commander Brigadier General Larry Nich- through shape-clear-hold-build, ISAF and its civilian” among the U.S. civilian agencies at olson said in a June 2009 PCB, “If you are civilian partners must be able to move delib- each level. Presence was then extended to the not working with the [British] PRT, you are erately and seamlessly from military to civil- district level through the creation of a District irrelevant to the governance and develop- ian leads. In practice, the military leads on Support Team (DST) concept, which is similar ment mission.” Canada and the United States security regardless of the stage of the shape, to the British Military Stabilization Support recently completed a Kandahar Action Plan, clear, hold, and build framework. But to be Team. A DST will have two to three U.S. without ISAF input; again, ISAF was cut out successful, more civilian input is required. civilians with delegated authority to conduct of the planning process because of oversensi- During Operation Kaley, the Canadian mili- tive bilateral concerns. Progress will continue tary’s “village approach” was dominated by battalion commanders should to be nominal until development and military uniformed planners, and when it came time make all resources accessible efforts are coordinated under one ISAF chain to hold-build, there were not enough stabil- of command. ity advisors to support operations. Battalion to a civilian lead commanders should make all resources acces- The District Layer sible to a civilian lead and allow governances/ stabilization activities, such as implementing District level integration is less challeng- development to lead kinetic planning. Civil- cash-for-work programs (providing an alter- ing than provincial because there are fewer ians in the field, conducting shuras or serving native to the insurgency), issuing vouchers to cats to herd. However, the paucity of Afghans as political advisors, also need a small civil- entice poppy farmers to grow wheat instead and the untenable security environment make ian-military staff to integrate planning across (facilitating a licit agro-based economy), and building governance capacity that leverages Figure 2. Seamless Multinational Civilian-Military Integration existing tribal structures (persuading Afghans away from the Taliban toward the Afghan Civilian-military cooperation within a single nation is not enough in a mission with 42 participating government). countries. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ought to create structures that allow While the concept has been floated, for seamless multinational civilian-military integration. DSTs have not yet been given the authority to align stakeholders at the district level. DSTs Dual-Command: All operations, at all levels, must be guided by a North Atlantic Treaty are American constructs that are not fully Organization–approved senior civilian, partnered with an ISAF military commander who is a co-equal with primacy over security operations. This two-person command team nested into coalition PRTs or ISAF. DSTs should speak with one voice down to subordinate commands and civilian development should have one civilian-lead actor, teamed actors, across to Afghan ministries, United Nations partners, and the nongovernmental with a military battalion commander and organization community, and up to national capitals. reporting through the civilian-led PRTs up to the ISAF region and then national head- Coalition Executive Working Group: The dual-command team must chair an approved quarters. DSTs must be empowered to lead Coalition Executive Working Group (CEWG) that includes all key stakeholders on that planning that is aligned with Afghan district layer and below. This body can unify efforts along all lines of operation, aggregate planning level priorities. and resource challenges, and communicate with the Afghan government in a unified manner. Making Civilian-Military C2 Real 2 Civilian-Military Action Cell: The CEWG must be supported by a Civilian-Military Action Without a drastic C shift toward full Cell staffed by first-rate personnel from each lead coalition partner at that layer. This cell, civilian-military integration, unity of effort serving as a secretariat and plans/policy node, reports directly to the civilian-military is unlikely. The civilian-military C2 struc- command team. ture outlined must be politically approved by NATO and installed in each of the four Effective stability planning incorporates all key stakeholders at that layer and is civilian-led. This proposed ISAF structure does not eliminate other forums for integration; however, it does define a layers. In a perfect world, it can work. The hierarchy of platforms that, if properly mandated, can fuse planning and execution efforts. greatest obstacle will be getting embassies to align civilian governance and development

58 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu WELLE programming into a broader, coalition- on winning the war in the field, [but] is a dys- old news. But the U.S. commitment to ISAF coordinated strategy. functional, wasteful mess focused on Kabul and Afghanistan is now redoubled, with After this structure becomes reality and crippled by bureaucratic divisions.”10 hundreds of civilians with expertise in gov- (see figure 2), ISAF should fuse the civilian- Others concur, claiming Afghanistan “devel- ernance and development, billions of dollars military structure. Succinctly, each layer opment activities have not been integrated for socioeconomic growth, and thousands of should have: into counterinsurgency planning.”11 Embrac- troops supported by robust combat enablers ing the recommendations of this article being sent. Integrating these resources into ■■ a civilian and military co-lead brings the international community and ISAF the ISAF structure under a single civilian-mil- ■■ an endorsed and inclusive multina- closer to unity of effort by creating unity of itary command structure is the key to success. tional CEWG command, without undermining national Counterinsurgency progress is symbiotic ■■ a robust CMAC with national repre- sovereignty. The RC South PCB/Civ-Mil Cell for civilians and the military; operations sentation of all key stakeholders on that level is evidence that coalition civilian-military cannot be conducted in isolation. In or out ■■ direct communication through planning is possible, but nationalizing this of uniform, those serving in Afghanistan are dynamic staffing policies at all four layers. model requires greater support from NATO part of one team. JFQ partners at a political level. Moreover, ISAF, Allowing CMAC personnel freedom to with a much greater civilian presence through N o t es rotate up and down within the layers to work its CMAC and other multinational civilian 1 with national embassies strengthens unity of links to development agencies, must be the John McCain and Joe Lieberman, “Our effort. Not until this author traveled to each recognized forum for civilian-military plan- Must-Win War: The ‘Minimalist’ Path Is Wrong for Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, March 19, southern PRT, up to Kabul and ISAF head- ning and coordination. (Making this system 2009. quarters, and to other partner embassies did work will require faster civilian training and 2 General Stanley A. McChrystal, “July 2009 this maze of stakeholders become apparent. deployment processes from coalition coun- Tactical Directive,” available at . The ties between the U.S. Embassy ICMAG tries, putting qualified personnel throughout 3 Andrew Exum et al., Triage: The Next Twelve and RC South Civ-Mil Cell proved that ISAF—a process that is under way.) Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Washington, interlayer coordination strengthens the link Having separate reporting and coor- DC: Center for a New American Security, June between national and regional priorities. dination mechanisms for national civilian 2009), 17. Coalition partners should retain civilian and coalition military efforts is not working 4 The White House, “White Paper of the Inter- control (call it lead nation if necessary) over because the counterinsurgency can be won agency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward governance programs and infrastructure only by joint civilian-military efforts. A Afghanistan and Pakistan,” available at . 5 ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook, April to link all projects into a wider national ISAF recently stated, “Civilians like working with 2005, x, available at . Emphasis added. of maneuver. Reporting must then funnel up the military.” If this sentiment is widely held, 6 The White House. to ISAF headquarters in Kabul to properly civilians should colead ISAF at all levels and 7 See John Howard Eisenhour and Edward measure effects. Presently, much of the staff be supported by experienced military com- Marks, “Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in at coalition PRTs mock ISAF reporting and manders who understand counterinsurgency Civil-Military Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 22 place national requirements first. strategy. (Summer 1999), 86–90. Cultural divides over how to conduct Heeding this advice will not win the war 8 The ISAF PRT Handbook suggests that an development do exist, but both Ambassa- in Afghanistan; victory can only be achieved integrated command group, composed of senior dors and generals agree that COIN is a long through the sweat, blood, and tears of the military and civilian officials, should be collocated and slow fight requiring strategic patience. Afghan people, who dream of a country free and have a highly consensual and considered approach to decisionmaking. The command group Military officers recognize the importance from tyranny. However, the recommendations is responsible for taking ISAF top-level direction of governance and development objectives herein can improve how the international and, in combination with national priorities, but lack the development advisor’s long view. community and coalition support the Afghan determining PRT strategy to include approach, Development experts realize that schools and government. The present ISAF structure is objectives, planned activities, and monitoring and wells without teachers and water management ineffective because ISAF continues to take evaluation systems. PRTs rarely respond to ISAF are not effective but seldom appreciate the on governance and development planning guidance. enabling benefits of the military. Having the without civilian governance and development 9 Exum et al., 24. finest civilians and military officers collo- expertise. Civilian leadership, partnered with 10 Al Pessin, “More US Troops May Be Needed cated and working in unison under the ISAF a military commander, is required at all levels, in Afghanistan,” Voice of America, July 29, 2009, umbrella to support Afghanistan’s govern- and the CEWG/CMAC model will be the available at

JFQ: We understand that you are focus- ADM Olson ing on the creation of a U.S. Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] Capstone doctrine: USSOCOM [Publication] 1. How do you see this relating to other joint doctrine (such as [Joint Publication 3–05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations]) and Service doctrines about Special Forces?

ADM Olson: Doctrine over the past several years has been very dynamic. Freez- ing it at any point for publication would have been inappropriate. We relied instead on an active program to collect and disseminate best practices as they were proving successful. We are now working to revise USSOCOM Pub 1, a foundational document scheduled for completion on January 1, 2010. We have coordinated with the Joint Staff to delay our rewrite of JP 3–05 until January 15, 2010, because much of USSOCOM Pub 1 will be used in the new JP 3–05. The Joint Staff has granted us “fast track” authority of the next iteration of JP 3–05, which will shorten the publication cycle to just under 12 months. USSOCOM is actually surging to origi- nate more SOF [special operations forces] doctrine, as this is an area in which we have largely deferred to the Services. Our intent is to be able to meet our legislated responsibility for SOF doctrine development within a year.

JFQ: How do you envision exercising your responsibilities as the joint proponent for security force assistance [SFA]? How do SFA and foreign internal defense [FID] compare? Are they not redundant?

Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, is Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed Admiral Olson at his Pentagon liaison office.

U.S. Navy

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ADM Olson: SFA and FID are not you give us your views on UW in general and Afghanistan. Please give us your views on the redundant, but many of their activities who conducts it and under what authorities? COIN versus CT [counterterrorism] debate overlap. In my view, SFA is an expansion of (I do not want to get into sensitivities here, as you have forces that are intimately involved FID; the common purpose is to contribute but most JFQ readers do not realize that with both activities. to the development of other nations’ security a Presidential finding is required for most forces. As the Department of Defense [DOD] operations, and we want to touch on this as an ADM Olson: COIN without CT, or CT joint proponent for SFA, USSOCOM will educational point.) without COIN, is a flawed strategy. And in serve mostly as an extension of the Joint Afghanistan, the situation is complicated by Staff in a synchronization role. We will be ADM Olson: The concept of UW has the reality that the elected government com- the machine that receives, reviews, and pri- not changed. It remains, roughly, a set of petes with Taliban shadow governments for oritizes SFA requirements, and then makes activities intended to stimulate and support control of the tribal communities. This brings recommendations to the Joint Staff about indigenous organizations that are challeng- UW into the equation. COIN, CT, and UW force preparation and allocation. I expect that ing an illegitimate and hostile government. are all core SOF missions, so, in any case or most SFA missions will comprise a mixture Such activities include but are not limited to combination, SOF are key to implementation of SOF and General Purpose Forces, with guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, and of the selected strategy. other agencies of government participating intelligence activities. The initial stages of the whenever appropriate. This construct nests Afghanistan campaign are a great example JFQ: An excellent example of the nicely within the processes already developed of UW. Fewer than 600 SOF enabled indig- application of the FID concept of remote area at USSOCOM to synchronize DOD planning enous Afghan forces to suppress and evict operations can be found in Major Jim Gant’s against terrorist networks. For more than a the Taliban government. UW is essentially One Tribe at a Time [Nine Sisters Imports, year, SFA has been a working group at the the flip side of counterinsurgency [COIN], 2009]. Why have Special Forces not been used USSOCOM-hosted, semiannual Global Syn- which encompasses those activities intended more along these lines in Afghanistan? chronization Conference. to support a legitimate government against challenge by insurgent forces. ADM Olson: The employment of special JFQ: We are interested in the new operations forces as described by Major Gant unconventional warfare [UW] definition and JFQ: This issue of JFQ features four plays to SOF strengths by translating tactical how that will support national security. Could authors who evaluate potential strategies in actions and microregional presence into stra-

Special Forces Soldier detonates explosive to simulate enemy attack during foreign internal defense training at Camp Diwaniyah, Iraq U.S. Air Force (Eric Harris) U.S. Air Force

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 61 SPECIAL FEATURE | Interview tegic effects. This is SOF at its roots and at its JFQ: We would like to ask about the ADM Olson: The budget provided to core. Allocation and employment of deployed CJSOTFs in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are USSOCOM is intended to meet requirements SOF is the purview of the operational com- manned mostly by 3d and 7th SFG [Special peculiar to SOF. All other requirements manders, and so we are doing what we can Forces Group] in Afghanistan and 5th and should be met by the Services. At this point to suggest innovative and bold utilization of 10th SFG in Iraq. You have directed that 3d in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi SOF in the manner described by Major Gant. SFG take over sole responsibility for Afghani- Freedom, the ability of the Services to meet At USSOCOM, we say that “presence without stan and Pakistan and that the 5th take over SOF needs is stretched thin. Still, we are value is perceived as occupation.” In Afghani- Iraq entirely with both groups augmented receiving good support. The main issue is stan, our value to the tribes isn’t necessarily by other SFGs. However, there are rumors related to the “enabling” forces that are in measured by our traditional standards. that USSOCOM is going to put non–Special such short supply. SOF truly depend on them Forces (SEALS, Marine Corps Forces Special and cannot perform their missions without JFQ: Do you envision that SOF Operations Command, and Air Force Special them. might take the lead in some operations in Operations Command) officers in command an IW [irregular warfare] environment of the CJSOTFs. Whom do you envision com- JFQ: We would like an update on around the world, such as Combined Joint manding CJSOTFs in the future when the USSOCOM reorganization. Based on a recent Special Operations Task Force–Philippines dominant elements are all Army special opera- Booz Allen Hamilton study done on SOF orga- [CJSOTF-Philippines]? tions (Special Forces, Civil Affairs, psychologi- nization, you directed on October 1, 2009, that cal operations, Special Operations Aviation, USSOCOM revert from the “centers” concept ADM Olson: SOF have the lead in logistics support)? that General [Peter] Schoomaker [USA, (Ret.)] CJSOTF-Philippines, as that task force has established in the 1990s back to the traditional been commanded by Special Forces colonels ADM Olson: We are a joint force that J-staff organization. Please expand upon your for years. Although every situation is differ- is not hung up on the Service affiliation of rationale and how you think this will improve ent, CJSOTF-Philippines is a great example any individual leaders. Realistically, though, SOF support. of what SOF can accomplish in remote and the CJSOTFs in Iraq and Afghanistan will challenging environments. It is the imple- be commanded by Army SF colonels for the ADM Olson: USSOCOM is a unified mentation of a SOF campaign plan that was foreseeable future. combatant command with many of the developed to support the Armed Forces of the responsibilities of a military department. Philippines in their actions against common JFQ: The next question centers on A primary factor in the adjustments to our threats that were manifested in local terrorist the 5th SOF truth: “Most special operations headquarters organization was the recogni- groups with linkages to al Qaeda. In this case, require non-SOF support.” How do you feel tion that having a three-star SOF officer General Purpose Forces were assigned in about the support you are getting from the assigned to the Pentagon to represent the direct support of the SOF commander. Services? command’s requirements and positions is essential. I was also determined to empower both the deputy commander and chief of staff with the authorities expected of their positions. Since the centers had done what General Schoomaker created them to do, it

U.S. Navy (William Ramsey) was time to declare success and move on to a structure that is more in line with our coun- terpart organizations. I expect that we will improve our user-friendliness while we gain many efficiencies.

JFQ: As the first Navy SEAL ever appointed to the grades of three and four stars, as well as the first naval officer to be USSOCOM’s commander, you bring a unique perspective to your duties. As you approach 2½ years into your tour as USSOCOM’s 8th com- mander, what are the one or two most impor- tant things that joint military professionals should know about today’s USSOCOM?

ADM Olson: First of all, I don’t think the fact that I’m the Navy’s first three- or Woman injured during sinking of ferry near Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines, is helped aboard Navy vessel four-star or the first naval commander of by members of U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines USSOCOM is really all that important. I grew

62 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu OLSON up in a joint-SOF environment, and I just sort So that’s the two levels. I think it’s ments in which we are ever more likely to of worked my way up through the system the important to make a distinction between find ourselves. same way all previous commanders have. what the headquarters does and what the What I think is important to know force does because what we’re really doing JFQ: As the joint proponent for SFA, about United States Special Operations is providing the wherewithal for the force to should USSOCOM take the lead in training Command is really at two levels. One is the develop and operate. indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan? command itself, meaning the headquarters, Lieutenant General [William] Caldwell and that is to understand that we are a JFQ: Do you envision an “Indirect [USA] is a very capable officer and slated strategic level headquarters. We fill in what Operations” Command advocated by Robert to take over Combined Security Transition I would call a sort of strategic, almost intel- Martinage in his congressional testimony last Command–Afghanistan [CSTC–A]. Wouldn’t lectual battlespace regarding special opera- spring? (Mr. Martinage is now working for a SOF three-star be an ideal choice for that tions: how they ought to be developed, how the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special position? they ought to be used. We serve in many ways as an extension of the Joint Staff, in U.S. Soldiers from ISAF during night mission in Wardak Province, Afghanistan some ways as an extension of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; we have authorities that are of a unified combatant command, that are in some regards similar to military departments and defense agencies, that we serve as a microcosm of a sort of the depart- ment, with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and joint commands, on the next level of command. And that’s without real operational authority once the force leaves the United States, where the busi- ness is influencing how they’re employed, not directing how they’re employed from our headquarters in Tampa. So that’s the command. An entirely different discussion is the force itself. What you want to know about is United States Special Operations Forces, not United States Special Operations Command, and I think the message there is that it really is a broadly capable, career oriented force that fills in many of the niche requirements that this nation has. Our core activity is listed within the legislation that created us, some of it added since then—that’s the menu from which we derive the capabilities that U.S. Army (Matthew Friberg) we invest in, and it’s a wide range of capa- bilities. I think that there’s a general sense Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Inter- ADM Olson: I have a great respect that we are troops who have gone through dependent Capabilities, and he wrote about for LTG Caldwell and am glad to see him in more schools and been issued different types this issue in his SOF report for the Center for command of CSTC–A, while I also acknowl- of equipment, but my cliché response to Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.) edge that a SOF three-star would likely be that would be, we’re more a mindset than a good fit in that position. But in this area, a toolset for the department. And in many ADM Olson: SOF are effective across the strength of SOF is not in raising basic ways, I think that because we have the ability the spectrum of conflict, and I think it is armies or police forces; it is in developing and to operate together more over the course of important to avoid the temptation to catego- mentoring the special forces, commandos, a career, and we operate in generally smaller rize units or capabilities as either “direct” paramilitary, and surrogate forces of other units, we have some agility that larger orga- or “indirect.” The reality is that most of our nations, which we are doing in both Iraq and nizations don’t have. We also serve as a kind units can be conducting direct actions one Afghanistan. JFQ of control group for experimentation within day and indirect actions the next. I do believe the department. We are a place to bring new that we will need to develop a deployable equipment online, do tests, and experiment senior-level SOF headquarters that can take with new tactics, techniques, and technolo- command of a complex direct-indirect force gies along the way. structure in the ambiguous conflict environ- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 63 Army Special Operations Command troops prepare to fast rope from CH–47D Chinook U.S. Army Special Operations Command U.S. Special Operations: Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare

By Eric T. Ols o n rregular warfare (IW) is a concept Defense (DOD) operational planning for highlighted in contemporary military global operations against violent extremist thinking, but it encompasses a per- organizations, and it is prepared to employ I spective that has long been the core of SOF worldwide when directed by the President America’s special operations forces (SOF). or Secretary of Defense. Put simply, in fighting The United States Special Operations our nation’s wars, USSOCOM decides how Command (USSOCOM), created by Congress SOF should be prepared and recommends over 22 years ago, implemented its original where, when, and how to use SOF and other charter and Title 10 authorities primarily as a forces in support of U.S. defense policy. resourcing headquarters, providing ready and The operational commitments of the relevant SOF for episodic engagements against American military have led to an increase in threats to the Nation and its vital interests. demand for SOF. America’s SOF are popularly Since the attacks of 9/11 and during 8 years prescribed as the “pinch hitters” of national of protracted war, USSOCOM has become security, called upon to succeed where others a proactive, global, and strategically focused would fail, to solve crises by working through headquarters encompassing a two-fold purpose and with others rather than by unilaterally and mission. As a functional command, committing American lives. Although there USSOCOM serves as proponent for U.S. SOF are elements of truth in this perception, it is and for the development of equivalent unit flawed for two reasons. First, by their very and headquarters functions among allied and nature, SOF are limited in size and scope and partner nations. As a combatant command, inherently cannot form the mainstay of our USSOCOM synchronizes Department of large-scale military commitments abroad.

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Second, while the ability to work with part- described these trends as a “flattening” of the sensus must be favored over coercion, and the ners and allies, be they other nations’ fielded world, in which traditional hierarchies are ability to do so proactively requires a holistic forces or militias of local tribesmen, may be a being superseded by globalizing effects that approach to warfare aimed at both eliminat- core SOF capability, today’s conflicts require connect us in ways for which state-centric ing adversaries and eroding the conditions other elements of our military to embrace institutions are poorly postured.2 that foment and foster their behavior. such capabilities. In that context, this article This new realm of sovereignty is defined DOD defines irregular warfare as a outlines what makes SOF “special” in the not by geographic boundaries but by popula- “violent struggle among state and non-state operational environment, and explains how tion trends. Crime, migration, extremism, actors for legitimacy and influence over the USSOCOM and SOF fit into the integrated and competition for resources drive popula- relevant population(s).”4 IW is then inherently whole of military forces tasked to defend U.S. tions and foment conflict. As a result of this both political in purpose and local in charac- and partner interests. environment and the changing practical ter. The focus is on populations and effective definition of what it means to be sovereign, governance rather than on territories and The Contemporary Context war also does not mean what it used to. material dominance. This has distinct impli- Civil war, religious conflict, and compe- Traditionally defined forms of warfare such cations for how irregular wars must be fought tition between peoples rather than states have as counterinsurgency and unconventional and for the forces that fight them. dominated human history. Despite the recent warfare are being lumped under umbrella popularity of the term irregular warfare, such terms such as irregular warfare or hybrid U.S. Special Operations warfare is “irregular” only in comparison to warfare in attempts to better describe mili- USSOCOM was activated on April 16, the preceding century or so of state-on-state tary actions in this “new” environment. The 1987, at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. opposition. Two world wars and four decades concept of war itself often means something DOD created the new unified command of Cold War conflict overshadowed what has else when translated into other, especially in response to congressional action in the historically been the defined norm in warfare: non-Western, languages. It is a common and Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense population-centric conflict based on compet- perhaps naïve misconception to believe that Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Nunn- ing social identities and comparatively scarce peace is a norm from which wars deviate, or Cohen Amendment to the National Defense resources. Examining the contemporary that war itself is a temporary problem with a Authorization Act of 1987. Congress man- environment serves first to illustrate why SOF presupposed military solution. In many parts dated that a new four-star command be acti- are increasingly in demand, and then intro- of the world, that is simply not so. Secretary vated to prepare SOF to carry out assigned duces implications for how our overall defense of Defense Robert Gates captured this notion missions and, if so directed, to plan for and posture must be oriented and resourced to well when he wrote: “What is dubbed the war conduct special operations. In addition to defend U.S. national security. on terrorism, in grim reality, is a prolonged, the military department–like authorities Defining the current operating environ- worldwide, irregular campaign—a struggle of developing training and monitoring ment requires an appreciation of the complex between the forces of violent extremism and readiness, Congress gave USSOCOM its own world in which we live. The current popula- those of moderation.”3 budgetary authorities and responsibilities tion of 307 million Americans is less than 5 percent of the world total, which by almost although territorial sovereignty can be defined and defended, any statistical metric would indicate that events will generally occur whether or not this cultural, economic, and informational sovereignty cannot nation wants them to. Furthermore, terms such as uni- or multipolar are inherently Regardless of how wars are defined, through a specific Major Force Program in misleading in that they overly rely on states’ one constant remains: current and potential the DOD budget. Additionally, USSOCOM territorial sovereignty as a definition of social antagonists are unlikely to directly oppose was granted its own acquisition authorities, identity or a measure of power in the global America’s conventionally postured military enabling it to develop and procure equip- system. Sovereignty is simply not what it used forces. This means that the United States is ment, supplies, or services peculiar to special to be, and even a cursory review of the past most likely to get hit, as occurred on 9/11, operations. 1,000 years of civilized history suggests that in ways for which the preponderance of its USSOCOM now has approximately “patria rarely designated the polity.”1 military is least prepared. No longer can a 54,000 Active-duty, Reserve, and National Although territorial sovereignty can be massed military presence be relied upon to Guard Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, defined and defended, cultural, economic, secure solutions to what are inherently politi- and civilians assigned to its headquarters, and informational sovereignty cannot. cal conflicts, as physical presence without four Service components, and one subunified Globalization creates stresses on developing popular value will ultimately be perceived command. USSOCOM’s components are and underdeveloped nations and societies, as occupation. Proactively engaging in these U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which in turn create regional instability and conflicts requires a lengthy commitment Naval Special Warfare Command, Air Force political tensions. Thomas Friedman similarly before the fighting even starts. As proud as Special Operations Command, and Marine America may be of its ability to run quickly Corps Forces Special Operations Command. to the sound of the guns, the surest means The Joint Special Operations Command is a Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, is Commander, U.S. of winning against an irregular enemy is to USSOCOM subunified command. Headquar- Special Operations Command. defeat him before the shooting starts. Con- ters, USSOCOM, through its component and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 65 SPECIAL FEATURE | U.S. Special Operations subunified commands, prepares and fields ■■ Information operations: achieving employing military capabilities for which SOF to conduct the core activities listed below. information superiority by adversely affecting there is no broad conventional force require- enemy information and systems while protect- ment.” Furthermore, special operations ■■ Direct action: seizing, destroying, cap- ing U.S. information and systems “are applicable across the range of military turing, or recovering through short-duration ■■ Counterproliferation of weapons of operations” and “differ from conventional strikes and other small-scale offensive actions mass destruction: either locating, seizing, operations in degree of physical and political in denied areas destroying, or capturing, recovering, and ren- risk, operational techniques, mode of employ- ■■ Special reconnaissance: acquiring dering such weapons safe ment, independence from friendly support, information concerning the capabilities, inten- ■■ Security force assistance: sustaining and dependence on detailed operational intel- tions, and activities of an enemy and assisting host nation or regional security ligence and indigenous assets.”5 While the ■■ Unconventional warfare: conducting forces in support of a legitimate authority definition effectively (if not succinctly) out- operations through and with surrogate forces through the unified action of the joint, inter- lines the manner in which special operations that are organized, trained, equipped, sup- agency, intergovernmental, and multinational and SOF differ from conventional forces and ported, and directed by external forces communities missions, it offers little regarding their opera- tional integration within an overall campaign plan and IW context.

the varied range of special operations presents challenges to the very definition of what comprises a special operation and to what must characterize the forces that undertake these missions

America’s SOF are organized, equipped, trained, and deployed by USSOCOM to meet the unique demands of regional combatant commanders around the world. The first part of the command’s mission is to “provide fully capable Special Operations Forces to defend the United States and its interests.” USSOCOM is a force provider in a large sense, much like a military Service. The second part of the USSOCOM mission is to U.S. Navy (Byron C. Linder) U.S. Navy (Byron “synchronize planning for global operations 353d Special Operations Group and U.S. Marines unload relief supplies from CH–53E for remote areas of against terrorist networks.” This defines a west Sumatra, Indonesia, following two earthquakes combatant command authority codified in the Unified Command Plan, which states that ■■ Foreign internal defense: providing ■■ Counterinsurgency operations: defeat- the USSOCOM commander “is responsible training and other assistance to foreign gov- ing insurgency through military, paramilitary, for synchronizing planning for global opera- ernments and their militaries to enable the political, economic, psychological, and civic tions against terrorist networks, and will do foreign government to provide for its national actions so in coordination with other commands, the security ■■ Other activities specified by the Presi- services, and, as directed, U.S. government ■■ Civil Affairs operations: establishing, dent or Secretary of Defense. agencies.”6 USSOCOM synchronizes the maintaining, or influencing relations between prescribed plans for operations, then reviews, U.S. forces and foreign civil authorities and The varied range of special operations, coordinates, and prioritizes them, to make civilian populations to facilitate U.S. military both as historically executed and conceptu- recommendations to the Joint Staff and Sec- operations ally outlined above, presents challenges to the retary of Defense on how resources should be ■■ Counterterrorism: preventing, deter- very definition of what comprises a special allocated to match the ever-present demands ring, and responding to terrorism operation and to what must characterize the of global operations. ■■ Psychological operations: providing forces that undertake these missions. Accord- The most comprehensive element of truthful information to foreign audiences that ing to joint doctrine, special operations are USSOCOM’s synchronization effort is the influences behavior in support of U.S. military conducted to “achieve military, diplomatic, global collaborative planning process. This operations informational, and/or economic objectives effort draws on other combatant command

66 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu OLSON capabilities and expertise to develop the DOD how best to engage it. That product is then that compose the whole of an IW campaign; war on terror campaign plan, which, coupled provided to combatant commands to apply conventional and special operations must be with the combatant commands’ regional war operationally, while USSOCOM retains a coordinated rather than simply deconflicted. on terror campaign plans, is dynamic and mutually reinforcing relationship with each This inherently requires the development under continuous review. USSOCOM and Theater Special Operations Command as of appropriate mechanisms to mesh IW the DOD Global Synchronization Commu- the crucial tie between force provision and activities within DOD, with the diplomatic nity have developed structured processes to operational application. This then broadly and development efforts of our interagency evaluate and prioritize the many capabilities, encompasses USSOCOM’s role within the partners, and in accordance with mutually operations, activities, resources, and forces national security strategy: to decide how SOF supporting interests of the United States and required for DOD efforts to deter, disrupt, should be prepared and to help decide where partner nations. and defeat terrorism. The primary forum and when to use them. That role can then be These priorities underscore the is the semiannual Global Synchronization further expanded into SOF’s roles in irregular USSOCOM mission to ensure that SOF Conference, an event that brings stakeholders warfare. are highly trained, properly equipped, and into a single cooperative venue that sets the deployed to the right places at the right times stage for much of the collaboration to occur Irregular Capabilities and Capacities for the right missions. SOF personnel must be in the following 6 months. This synchroniza- In employing indirect operations to gain capable of planning and leading a wide range tion is intertwined with USSOCOM’s role as a asymmetric advantage over adversaries, irreg- of lethal and nonlethal special operations mis- resource provider. ular warfare is not a new mission area for SOF. sions in complex, ambiguous environments. It is a common misperception that Unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, USSOCOM plans and executes opera- counterinsurgency, Civil Affairs, psychologi- tions globally. Except for rare occasions, cal operations, and foreign internal defense too often, special operations USSOCOM does not synchronize or are all traditional IW activities and core are thought of as unilateral, command specific operations; that is the activities for SOF. With the IW emergence as high-risk, one-shot deals role of the operational commanders who a focus area for broader participation across maintain the authority to position and utilize their allocated SOF. Connecting operational ADM Olson testifies on U.S. policy toward Pakistan and Afghanistan before Senate Armed Services authority to proper utilization is of the utmost Committee, April 2009 importance in correctly employing SOF assets that are by definition in limited supply. For example, establishing continuity among dis- parate efforts is a distinct concern in Afghani- stan, where the dynamic nature of tribal structures, physical terrain, and civil-military activities combines to challenge traditional military hierarchies. The creation of Combined Forces Special Operations Component–Afghanistan in early 2009 was instrumental in extending SOF reach from the tribal level to the national level while remaining integrated within the overall military campaign and with continu- ing efforts to transition Afghan forces from a military to a civil security enforcement role. That transition itself is critical to executing a comprehensive civilian-military plan that will integrate the security, governance, develop-

ment, and strategic communications dimen- DOD (Bradley A. Lail) sions of supporting the Afghan government, ongoing interagency efforts, and international DOD, it increasingly describes activities that Too often, special operations are thought of partners. both SOF and General Purpose Forces will as unilateral, high-risk, one-shot deals. There Taken in sum, USSOCOM builds SOF employ in their operational approaches. These are of course times when that is the case, but and then reviews the manner and recom- approaches must reflect a certain focus, where what is truly special about special operations mends the places in which those forces will the “new high ground for operational forces is the ability to work through and with others be used. USSOCOM prioritizes both material will be to capture the perceptions of popula- in pursuit of mutually beneficial outcomes resources, in terms of what equipment SOF tions, not to seize terrain.”7 Furthermore, par- to unusually complex situations. Put simply, needs and how to get it, and operational ticipation by U.S. operational forces in total a “special operation is above all a powerful resources, in terms of where the threat is and should imply an integrated set of activities exercise of mind; muscle and even disciplined ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 67 SPECIAL FEATURE | U.S. Special Operations response are essential but secondary.”8 Gain­ embraces the multifaceted cultural heritage of The enabling capabilities that must be ing the right perspective is paramount—only this country by allowing for the quick inclu- provided in greater number by the Services then can the right processes follow. It is sion of ethnic diversity into the military force include mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, important to be able to accurately predict the over the long term. While it is a new program, remote logistics, engineering planners, con- effects of our decisions and actions within the MAVNI is not without precedent. The Lodge- struction, intelligence, regional specialists, specific operational context of a microregion. Philbin Act of June 30, 1950, allowed for interpreters/translators, communications, dog The complexity of the present strategic recruiting foreign nationals into the U.S. mili- teams, close air support specialists, security environment requires that SOF operators tary, and provided members to the U.S. Army forces, and others that permit SOF operators maintain not only the highest levels of war­ Special Forces. MAVNI fulfills a similar criti- to focus more directly on their missions. fighting expertise but also cultural knowledge cal need today, and overall educational quality Assigned at the unit or detachment level to and diplomacy skills. These “3D operators” is phenomenally higher than non-MAVNI support joint SOF commanders away from are members of a multidimensional force recruits: 87 percent of recruits are enrolled main bases, the effects of such a combined prepared to lay the groundwork in the myriad in college or have a college degree, and 29 force will remain integrated within an overall diplomatic, development, and defense activi- percent hold Master’s or higher degrees. By campaign effort while having immediate ties that contribute to the U.S. Government’s comparison, the top recruiting battalion in impact in the local conditions where they are pursuit of vital national interests. Funda- the Nation enlisted 13.7 percent with college employed. mental to this effort is the recognition that degrees.9 The goal is a two-fold balance: first, to humans are more important than hardware To meet more immediate tactical needs, have sufficient organic SOF-peculiar enablers and that quality is more important than quan- USSOCOM has initiated steps to dedicate to permit rapid response to operational crises; tity. Investments in weapons platforms and in-Service translators and interpreters to its and second, to have enabling capabilities technologies are incomplete without the right Army component for joint use. Individual assigned in direct support of SOF for longer people to employ those systems. development aimed at correctly aligning term sustainment and expansion of the The focus is to first select and nurture language testing, career management, and operation. SOF are and will remain dependent the extraordinary operators and then to incentives remains important to the overall on the Services for key force enablers. The provide them the most operationally relevant capability, requiring strengthened insti- nonavailability of these force enablers has equipment. Language skills and regional tutional programs at the Army, Navy, Air become the most vexing issue in the current knowledge continue to be key to establishing Force, and Marine component levels. We are operational environment, especially in view effective relations with the foreign forces, already behind, and there is a long way to go, of the responsible General Purpose Forces organizations, and individuals with which in recognizing and incentivizing such exper- drawdown in Iraq. SOF cannot fully provide SOF will interact. tise before it becomes possible to develop and for their own needs over the long term, and The 1st Special Forces Group language sustain real experts in specific key regions the provision of such support is a mandate training program was recognized by the around the world. of the General Purpose Forces: “Services Army and DOD as the best of its kind in 2007, but, even though language training programs to meet immediate tactical needs, USSOCOM has initiated steps have been enhanced in recent years, SOF to dedicate in-Service translators and interpreters to its Army remain underqualified in many key languages and dialects. USSOCOM will continue to component for joint use expand these programs, stressing the need for a few individuals to be thoroughly steeped in Resourcing IW and/or executive agents should be prepared select languages and cultures. We have termed SOF cannot grow more than 3 to 5 to support special operations as soon as pos- these programs Project Lawrence, intended percent per year in those key units and capa- sible but not later than 15 days after SOF are to produce individual regional expertise in bilities that must be developed within the employed.”10 support of a persistent presence approach. Yet SOF organizational structures and training In addition to an appropriate baseline unlike the career path of their namesake, T.E. pipelines. This growth rate will not meet the budget, SOF readiness requires investment in Lawrence of Arabia, these initiatives include already obvious appetite for the effects of the rapid fielding of both existing solutions an exploration of innovative options to permit SOF in forward operating areas. The solution, and cutting edge technologies, even when specialization without sacrificing promotion beyond the necessary continued steady and relatively small purchase quantities do not opportunities, for which the proactive support disciplined growth of specific special opera- optimize production costs. Here the authority of the Services is required. tions capabilities, is to mitigate the demand on to direct funds is actually more important One of USSOCOM’s priority initiatives SOF by developing and sustaining support- than the amount of funding itself; policy and is the increase of regional expertise through ing capabilities within the Services that are planning decisions must objectively project recruitment of native heritage speakers. As of beyond their organic needs, and can therefore future needs and anticipate any new or August 2009, approximately 350 legal nonper- be used in direct support of special operations expanded authorities required to meet those manent residents with special language skills commanders. This will enhance the impact of needs.11 USSOCOM’s aggressive use of its and abilities joined the Army under a pilot forward-deployed SOF without placing unfea- acquisition authority is a key factor in provid- program. Called Military Accessions Vital to sible additional demand on SOF’s own limited ing wide-ranging, time-sensitive capabilities the National Interest (MAVNI), the program enabling units. to widely dispersed and often isolated forces.

68 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu OLSON

Because this budget authority is limited to of nation-states to deal with increasingly by intimidating and sometimes brutalizing SOF-peculiar equipment and modifications, complex challenges or to meet the needs and them into submission. When governments USSOCOM also depends heavily on Service expectations of their populations. These chal- fail to address the needs of the population, acquisition programs that develop and lenges are exacerbated by the growing number they become irrelevant and people will make procure Service-common mobility platforms, of nonstate actors who have strategic effects choices shaped by their own immediate needs weapons, ammunition, and other equipment in a networked and interconnected world. In for survival. that is then modified to meet SOF’s mission the vacuum created by weak or failed govern- In the best case scenario, people will needs. ments, nonstate actors have achieved greater turn to a benevolent nonstate actor such While Federal acquisition regulations influence over benign populations by address- as a nongovernmental organization, a uniformly apply to DOD, USSOCOM strives ing their basic needs and grievances, and moderate and tolerant religious group, or to take advantage of flexibilities inherent d in these guidelines to expeditiously provide 2 Marine Special Operations Battalion conducts parachute training at Reno/Stead materiel solutions for the SOF operator. This is accomplished in cooperation with the three military departments, as these departments fund, develop, acquire, and provide the basic Service-common vehicles, aircraft, boats, weapons, ammunition, and other equipment to USSOCOM, which is then modified to SOF-specific platforms, systems, and equip- ment. When a SOF requirement cannot be met using a Service-common solution, USSOCOM uses its authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment or modify the Service-common equipment to meet SOF needs. In those instances, the USSOCOM acquisition culture stresses assertive risk man- agement and process efficiencies to steward a system that is arguably more tailorable, responsive, and agile than elsewhere in DOD. While some capabilities are truly SOF- peculiar and reside within USSOCOM’s processes, most special operations capabilities are based on Service-provided systems. It is therefore important that DOD collectively transitions from a platform-based acquisi- tion cycle to one that is capabilities-based, wherein capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection suites or specific weapons packages can be modularly employed on a variety of ground, maritime, and air platforms to increase their tactical and operational reach. Doing so would allow USSOCOM to buy, try, and modify capabilities without being constrained by Service platform considerations and also allow USSOCOM to upgrade modular capabilities at the pace of technology advance- ment. In return, the rapid development of SOF-peculiar and modular systems is likely to expand a catalogue of systems through which to appropriately fit and equip portions of the conventional force for the IW fight.

Commitment to Success The problems SOF and DOD must be prepared to address include the inability U.S. Marine Corps (Stephen C. Benson) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 69 SPECIAL FEATURE | U.S. Special Operations a local ethnic or traditional institution. This is specialized excellence within a our assistance in resolving their crises. There However, populations also turn to extrem- full spectrum capabilities set. Many of the really is nothing special or irregular about it, ist or criminal organizations, many of enabling capabilities previously listed are not but it does require wisdom and persistence. which are sponsored by rogue nation-states. exclusively military in nature, nor are they Such an approach has historically been a Nonstate groups such as al Qaeda, the restricted to government services. Some are core part of U.S. special operations, and it Taliban, Hamas, Hizballah, Movement for commercial entities that have been construct- must remain a mainstay capability of our the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Jamal ing things in adverse places for decades. future military. Tomorrow’s victories will be Islamiyah, and MS–13 are growing in influ- Academic specialties such as anthropology are defined by the successes of others, and their ence and shaping the choices of populations also included on this list of essential enablers defeats will be our failures. The commitment, as nation-states fail to adequately address that must exist within a balanced joint force in either case, remains ours, and we must their needs and grievances. Responding to above and beyond the organic needs of the embrace it now. JFQ these challenges requires an approach that Services. Only with such an “excess,” as mis- is integrated with the long-term work of leading as that word may be, can we ensure N ot e s civilian agencies, especially the Department that the resident expertise is available to adapt 1 of State and U.S. Agency for International to any emergent security scenario that may Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: Development, to foster the credibility and face us in the coming years. These impera- From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 42. influence of legitimate authorities among tives apply to both SOF and to the larger U.S. 2 Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat: A relevant populations. defense establishment, which has been tasked Brief History of the 21st Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). Joint Tactical Air Controller coordinates with aircraft to provide close air 3 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” support for Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January-February 2009). See also Eric T. Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, no. 16 (Spring 2009), 3. 4 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 12, 2001, as amended through March 17, 2009), 282. 5 Ibid., 511–512. 6 Department of Defense (DOD), Unified Command Plan (Washington, DC: DOD, 2009). The Unified Command Plan in its entirety is a clas- sified document, though the guidance presented here is not. 7 Robert H. Scales, The Past and Present as Prologue: Future Warfare through the Lens of Con- temporary Conflicts, The Future of the U.S. Military Series (Washington, DC: Center for a New Ameri- can Security, 2009), 4. U.S. Army (Corey Dennis) U.S. Army (Corey 8 Derek Leebaert, To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, Beyond these required changes must to provide “a portfolio of military capabilities from Achilles to Al Qaeda (New York: Little Brown, also come a change in how the U.S. military with maximum versatility across the widest 2006), 586. 12 organizes and trains units. Everyone must possible spectrum of conflict.” 9 U.S. Special Operations Command, invest in IW capabilities and incentiv- The conflicts we are engaged in are “MAVNI Recruiting Update” (Tampa, FL: J1, ize the best and brightest to pursue these bigger than DOD, and they will require a August 7, 2009). See also Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., career fields. Such an investment must be global effort. The United States will need to go U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washing- formalized in policy that incentivizes these even beyond a whole-of-government approach ton, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982). disciplines as core skills, and institutionalizes to what can be called a whole-of-nations 10 JP 4–0, Joint Logistics (Washington, DC: The operator career progression that rewards spe- approach: an ability to work through and with Joint Staff, July 18, 2008), V–9. 11 cialized rather than generalized performance. others in pursuit of mutually beneficial out- Richard M. Miller, Funding Extended Conflicts: Korea, Vietnam, and the War on Terror This investment is already long overdue. If we comes to unusually complex situations. Doing (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, do not commit a significant portion of our so requires more than setting an “American” 2007), 121. personnel to living abroad in other cultures example for others to follow, as neither words 12 Robert M. Gates, remarks delivered to the for extended periods and to specializing nor deeds are sufficient to justify our pres- Economic Club of Chicago, Chicago, IL, July 16, rather than generalizing our skill sets, then ence abroad over the long term. Our military 2009. we will fail to gain the trust, credibility, and forces must be able to live as locals do, and faith of those nations and partners we claim understand and respond to indigenous con- to be fighting alongside. cerns, if we are ever to expect others to accept

70 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Army Civil Affairs Team 621 member provides security near medical clinic in Iraq U.S. Air Force (Mike Meares) U.S. Air Force

Countering Irregular Threats The Army Special Operations

Contribution By J o h n F . M u l h o l l a n d , J r .

he joint Services and interagency missions in support of combatant command- communities predict a future ers and chiefs of mission. of persistent conflict consisting ARSOF, which is composed of Civil T of irregular or hybrid threats Affairs, Rangers, Special Forces, Psychologi- within an irregular warfare (IW) environ- cal Operations, Special Operations Aviation, ment requiring forces to operate across and Sustainment, has long been involved in the spectrum of military operations. The countering irregular threats across the full U.S. Army Special Operations Command spectrum of operations. These forces rou- (USASOC) embraces the joint, U.S. Special tinely operate in small elements throughout Operations Command (USSOCOM), and complex, uncertain environments and are Army vision of this future threat and, as the uniquely suited for conducting operations designated Army component to USSOCOM, within the IW environment. Four of the five is responsible for recruiting, educating, mission areas defining IW in the Depart- Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland, Jr., USA, organizing, training, manning, equipping, ment of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular is Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations and deploying Army special operations forces Warfare,” are designated by USSOCOM Command. (ARSOF) to accomplish special operations (and Title 10) as special operations core ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 71 SPECIAL FEATURE | Army Special Operations activities: foreign internal defense (FID),1 The relevance of these three lines of IW capabilities and lines of action as part of unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, action spans the full spectrum of operations their contribution to full-spectrum operations and counterinsurgency.2 The fifth IW activ- as each action is complementary and con- and whole-of-government/-nation solutions to ity, stability operations, requires extensive tributes to education and training the force, complex political-military problems in the era support of two primary core SOF capabilities, information-gathering, analysis of current or of 21st-century persistent conflict. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, probable security challenges, and the ability which are the proponent responsibility of the to seize the initiative. The focus of the Army Investment U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare special operations lines of action is to support The ARSOF contribution within the Center and School.3 To continue to improve a whole-of-government approach to current investment line of action is designed to the Army’s ability to conduct operations in an and emerging security challenges. In effect, provide focused, full-time military expertise IW environment against irregular and hybrid what is common across these three actions is in assessment, planning, coordination, and threats, USASOC has established three lines that ARSOF provides a strategic “bridging” advice and assistance on behalf of combat- of action aimed at preparing for, preventing, force of specially assessed and selected, highly ant commanders at the request of Ambas- and countering these likely future threats that trained, intelligent Soldiers possessing high sadors. The foundation of the investment will persist in the 21st century. initiative and creativity who, by natural incli- line of action lies in the USASOC Title 10 The three ARSOF lines of action, which nation, seek solutions to complex problems. can overlap in execution, are investment, This bridging force consistently looks to link persistent engagement, and operations. Army or bridge other U.S. Government capabilities, the focus of the Army special special operations roles in these lines of action often seemingly disparate ones, inherent in operations lines of action include preparatory activities to inform deci- the joint Services and interagency community is to support a whole-of- sionmakers and build relationships with key while working to develop or enable indig- government approach to indigenous and U.S. mission leaders abroad enous security solutions. current and emerging security and organizations through the conduct of per- However, challenges confronting Army challenges sistent presence. They are preventive in nature special operations within these lines of action by contributing to capability- and capacity- construct are twofold. First, personnel policies building and development efforts through inhibit supporting long-term investment in responsibilities to educate and train ARSOF enduring engagement with friends, partners, overseas locations. Secondly, the necessary to develop Soldiers with regional expertise and allies, and they are initiatives-based to enabler, sustainment, and support (ESS) capa- capable of providing information to U.S. civil- deter, disrupt, and defeat discrete threats bilities and capacity are not entirely resident ian decisionmakers. Global ARSOF presence and hostile forces in the application of direct within ARSOF. is a key supporting effort to the Department operations, which can include the full range of Ultimately, the purpose of this article is of State and combatant commanders’ strate- special operations core activities. to advance an understanding of the ARSOF gies in semipermissive and unstable areas of the world. The ARSOF investment line of Figure 1. The ARSOF Lines of Action action is primarily realized by small teams of Army Special Operations Civil Affairs, Special Forces, and Psychologi- Strategic Effects Through Tactical and Operational Excellence; Inherently Joint, Interagency, and Combined; Superb Problem Solvers cal Operations personnel studying, living, ARSOF provides our nation with unique, sophisticated, and tailored capabilities to operate in ambiguous, high-risk environments around the world and working for extended periods of time

TO COMM PPORT ANDER’ in overseas locations to gain understanding, SU D CAM S ATION AN PAIGN D RECI ESIG APP N acquire expertise, and develop relationships. LAR, AND REGU HYBR These ARSOF elements provide a comple- , IR ID EX TH PL RE M AT mentary capability in further developing CO S U.S. interagency efforts to increase available INVESTMENT: PERSISTENT PEOPLE WITH PURPOSE PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT human and technical information in select PASSION foreign countries against irregular threats.

GOVERNMENT Strategic Options REASON Additionally, the investment line of action for Ambassadors

S and allows for the development and sustainment U S

COCOMs E P

C P

R O R O of long-term relationships with indigenous F T

T A CHANCE I O /

J MILITARY T personnel and enables/allows for a cadre of O N I I N O T J

/ O I language-capable and culturally relevant A T F T O R R O C P E P Soldiers who provide Ambassadors, combat- S U S C ONV ATS ENTIONAL THRE ant commanders, and follow-on forces with critical capabilities should emergencies arise or contingencies develop. OPERATIONS ARSOF has had a long history of invest- ing in personnel to develop the necessary regional expertise, and USASOC continues to Key: IA = Interagency; COCOM = Combatant Commander be committed to this approach by currently

72 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MULHOLLAND providing more than 180 highly trained, porting combatant commanders’ partner Highlighting the importance that the experienced Soldiers to over 30 Embassies nations’ security-building capacity efforts special operations community places on per- ranging from the Republic of the Philippines through enduring engagement. In support sistent engagement, despite the predominant to Pakistan. Historical ARSOF personnel of combatant commanders’ Theater Security commitment to Operations Iraqi Freedom and investment overseas is best represented by, but Cooperation Programs, ARSOF employs a Enduring Freedom, in 2009 ARSOF conducted not limited to, such organizations as Special range of FID capabilities focused on training more than 100 partner nation capacity- Forces Detachment A in Berlin, Special Forces and population-based infrastructure pro- building training and program events in more Detachment K in Korea, and 46th Special grams designed to improve foreign security than 50 countries. In many instances, gaining Forces Company in Thailand, as well as long- forces’ capacity and capability to deter or access in unstable and politically sensitive term presence in Central and South America defeat irregular threats through the conduct locations requires a small footprint in the working for chiefs of mission. The advantages of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. conduct of operations. Coordinating capacity- of an investment line of action in IW are the Training and programs include, but are not building efforts is complemented in these opportunity to develop cultural and environ- limited to, Special Forces imparting coun- sensitive locations by the planning and rela- mental skills as well as to build and sustain terterrorism or counterinsurgency skills to tionships developed through ARSOF persis- relationships and access and mutual under- selected partner nation military units or Civil tent presence activities. ARSOF components’ standing of challenges in the region. Affairs and Psychological Operations assisting From its inception, ARSOF has focused partner nations to deter irregular threats from on developing regional, cultural, and language gaining sanctuary and countering extremist in many instances, gaining skills through consistent regional alignment ideologies. access in unstable and of USASOC components. However, in line politically sensitive locations with the USSOCOM commander’s vision for U.S. Army Rangers participate in mass tactical requires a small footprint in increasing language and cultural expertise, airborne operation, Fort Benning, Georgia the conduct of operations it is recognized that select ARSOF Soldiers have what the USSOCOM commander labels the “T.E. Lawrence” aptitude and desire to become regional experts. This requires a career-long assignment methodology to acquire the necessary expertise. For ARSOF, investment is envisioned as maturing to a career-long commitment of specially selected members maintaining the proficiency neces- sary to optimally contribute to our country’s foreign policy, specifically in the areas of selected partner nation–specific and regional strategies. USSOCOM and the Army have authorized the establishment of dedicated Regional Support Detachments in each Special Forces Group in order to develop these capabilities. Finally, ARSOF investment in personnel capital alongside a partner nation’s military leadership assists in the development of the combatant commander’s strategy for the U.S. military engagement plan in a partner nation.

Persistent Engagement Persistent engagement can be character- ized as a line of action by using all elements of national power and defense, development, and diplomacy to prevent conflicts and enable friends, partners, and allies to defend their sovereignty and eliminate ungoverned and undergoverned spaces where irregular threats can find sanctuary. Characterized by FID (activities that ARSOF has been part of for more than 50 years), one of ARSOF’s primary contributions in the IW environment is sup- U.S. Army (Jason B. Baker) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 73 SPECIAL FEATURE | Army Special Operations regional orientation, cultural understanding national interests. The operations line of continue to require ARSOF to maintain skills and agility, foreign military relationships, and action can be unilateral U.S. direct action as enabled and honed through premier training language capability are instrumental to the well as combined operations with ARSOF and technology. successful conduct of FID missions. working through and with indigenous forces. ARSOF provides unique capabilities that The operations line of action also can be force multipliers in all forms of combat Operations includes Special Forces conducting unconven- and enablers for other operations and activi- ARSOF operations are characterized by tional warfare operations alongside friendly ties in an IW environment against irregular small, mature, politically astute, and lethal Afghan resistance forces in the early stages of and hybrid threats. The ability of ARSOF to forces that capitalize on access and enhanced the war in Afghanistan. FID operations cur- provide situational understanding, conduct aviation mobility to quickly and decisively rently ongoing by special operations in support development and information activities, train neutralize high-value targets. Whether of Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, as well the forces of friends, partners, and allies, and Rangers, Special Forces, special operations as select partner nations in each of the overseas support the operations of U.S. combat forces aviation, or the ground component of the combatant commands, are also representative provides a strategic bridging capability that National Mission Force, ARSOF will continue of operations. The contribution of ARSOF assists in preventing, preparing for, and, when to provide a strategic direct approach option conducting investment and persistent engage- necessary, conducting operations to meet U.S. for our nation, underscoring a high-end ment lines of action can result in the develop- national objectives. capability in support of operations in an IW ment of information networks and personal environment against irregular threats and relationships, which ultimately supports the Challenges in major combat operations. An important find-and-fix phases of the operational target- The significant challenges faced by distinction is that the operations line of action ing cycle. The finish phase of the operational ARSOF in executing these lines of action is not synonymous with direct action, but is targeting cycle can be conducted by ARSOF include adapting personnel policies to allow defined by the application of the full range operating unilaterally or by ARSOF-enabled development of expertise by broadening the of special operations missions undertaken indigenous forces. Countering irregular threats traditional paths for career advancement and in named operations to defeat threats to U.S. globally across nation-state boundaries will satisfying the requirements for ARSOF ESS capabilities and capacity. USSOCOM, the Figure 2. The ARSOF Construct Department of the Army, and USASOC are committed to addressing these challenges. Analysis and development of recommended 4th PSYOP Group USASFC courses of action to address the ESS concerns 95th CAB were included in the DOD Program Objective 160th SOAR TO COMM Memorandum (POM) for Fiscal Years 2012– S PPORT ANDER’ E SU D CAM S C ATION AN PAIGN D N RECI ESIG th E APP N 75 Ranger 2017; and the Quadrennial Defense Review R W Regiment A P (QDR) personnel policy review and analysis L LAR AND E REGU HYBR R E , IR ID T S S EX H IS are addressing the challenge of growing T.E. O L RE th : P A T T P OM TS E 528 SB N R C N E U T Lawrences to develop the microregional P M E T H N SUSTAIN T S I G expertise in support of persistent presence, E A V W G N E PEOPLE while not threatening an individual’s career I E L U.S. M P O PASSION E Army goals or advancement opportunities.

E N

P T JFK GOVERNMENT Personnel Policies. The ARSOF invest- REASONStrategic Options for Special BUILD Ambassadors Warfare ment line of action requires continued analy- S

S U and

E

P COCOMs C Center P R O sis and review of current Army personnel O R F and T A T I

O / policies to support the development of T.E. School

J CHANCE T O N I I MILITARY N O Lawrences. A T.E. Lawrence special opera- J T

/ Train and O IA T T educate for F tions Soldier is one who is linguistically fluent O R DEVELOP O R P operations C P E U S S across the and retains a deep cultural understanding REGIONAL, spectrum of C CULTURAL, ON ATS conflict enabling development of long-term relation- VENTIONAL THRE LANGUAGE ships with indigenous people in a select EXPERTISE AND IW LONG TERM OP NS country. A Soldier attains this level through RELATIONSHIPS ERATIO Center continuing assignments in a country at some CA, PO, SF Proponency expense of established professional develop- SOATC RASP 1 and 2 ment requirements. Career progression of ARSOF officers, warrant officers, and non- commissioned officers (NCOs) currently dic- Key: 4th PSYOP Group = 4th Psychological Operations Group; 95th CAB = 95th Civil Affairs Brigade; 160th SOAR = tates assignment and education requirements, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; 528th SB = 528th Sustainment Brigade; CA = Civil Affairs; COCOM = Combatant Commander; IA = Interagency; IW Center = Irregular Warfare Center; PO = Psychological Operations; which sometimes conflict with the develop- RASP = Ranger Assessment and Selection Program; SF = Special Forces; SOATC = Special Operations Aviation Training ment of cultural, language, and regional apti- Company; USASFC = Special Forces Command tude required to support human capital devel-

74 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MULHOLLAND

opment to sustain an investment approach. the global IW environment. Army special of strategic options for our Ambassadors and Consideration should be given to supplement- operations logistics competency resides with combatant commanders, thus serving our ing mandatory attendance at Department of the 528th Sustainment Brigade. The brigade is nation as a strategic bridging and enabling the Army NCO courses, officer Intermediate knowledgeable in all aspects of land, sea, and force. ARSOF will remain a critical IW Level Education (ILE), and warrant officer air logistics and is experienced at leveraging contributor within the Army and the joint advanced courses with expanded educational theater sustainment capacity in support of force and will continue to adapt and evolve opportunities, both in military and more ARSOF operational requirements. The 528th capabilities to meet the demands of an era of likely civilian schools, in foreign countries. provides ARSOF-unique communications persistent conflict. JFQ Although many partner nation military and medical capabilities, to include a recently education programs do not offer similar acquired Trauma Level II medical transport N ot e s NCO and warrant officer opportunities, capability. This capability provides lifesav- 1 select ARSOF Soldiers should be considered ing medical care for Soldiers operating in Joint Publication 1–02, Department of for attendance at corresponding officer ILE remote locations. However, in previous years, Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April programs. An additional dilemma in develop- programmed ARSOF operational capability 12, 2001, as amended through August 19, 2009), ing ARSOF T.E. Lawrences in support of the growth increased without a correspond- defines foreign internal defense as the “participation investment line of action is the traditional ing increase in ESS capacity. Resolving the by civilian and military agencies of a government in requirement for Soldiers to change assigned current ESS capacity and capability gap any of the action programs taken by another gov- locations every 2 to 3 years; development of includes both a SOF organic and nonorganic ernment or other designated organization to free enabler solution set. and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 3d Special Forces Group trains with AT–4 antitank The commander of USSOCOM recently and insurgency.” rocket launcher before rotation to Afghanistan directed the reintroduction of the long-omit- 2 Field Manual 3–0, Operations (Washing- ted fifth “ARSOF truth,” which states, “Most ton, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, special operations require non-SOF assis- February 2008), specifies: “Special operations tance.”4 Special operations must operate as forces conduct most irregular warfare operations. Sometimes conventional forces support them; other part of the Total Force, and there are few oper- times special warfare operations forces operate ations that can be conducted without assis- alone. However, if special operations forces and tance from joint and interagency partners. host-nation forces cannot defeat unconventional Army special operations ESS requirements and irregular threats, conventional Army forces to conduct operations in an IW environment may assume a lead role. The joint operations were identified during the POM and QDR grouped under irregular warfare include the fol- processes. Army and USSOCOM analysis to lowing: foreign internal defense, support to insur- resolve current ARSOF ESS shortfalls propose gency, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, resolution through two methodologies. The and unconventional warfare.” 3 first is organic growth of SOF-unique ESS In its proponent role for the Army and requirements in the areas of logistics, intel- executed by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, USASOC is respon- ligence, and medical support to Special Forces sible for the doctrine and education foundation group and battalion formations. The second is for unconventional warfare and, as designated by a concept of direct- and general-support rela- USSOCOM, is the lead component for the ground

U.S. Army (Corey T. Dennis) T. U.S. Army (Corey tionships for non–SOF-unique ESS require- aspect of foreign internal defense. ments involving the collaboration between 4 Commander, U.S. Special Operations cultural and language expertise and necessary combatant commanders and Services through Command, “O” Flake, Number 09–13, June 19, human relationships is contradictory to the the Global Force Management process to 2009, Subject: Fifth SOF Truth. The “O” Flake states current change of station mandate faced by ensure programmed, dedicated ESS assets in that “the operational effectiveness of our deployed ARSOF Soldiers. Solutions that focus on the support of global ARSOF missions. forces cannot be achieved without being enabled requirement to retain Soldiers committed to a by our Service Partners.” For this reason, the com- select country—while not threatening career Army special operations origins are mander of USSOCOM directed the addition of a fifth SOF truth: most special operations require progression—are being explored by USASOC rooted in IW operations and possess a tre- non-SOF assistance. The other four SOF truths are: and the Army. Fundamentally, operations in mendous IW capability, capacity, experience, humans are more important than hardware, quality an IW environment demand corresponding and history. USASOC will seek to maintain its is better than quantity, special operations forces irregular personnel management in order to operationally balanced force, while increasing cannot be mass produced, and competent special develop the type of Soldier needed to enhance its IW capability and capacity in support of operations forces cannot be created after emergen- those strategic capabilities that combatant joint, interagency, and multinational efforts. cies occur. commanders and Ambassadors require. To contribute to countering irregular threats ESS Requirements. The challenges by a whole-of-government/-nation approach, surrounding the persistent engagement and ARSOF investment, persistent engagement, operation lines of action lie in ESS require- and operations lines of action bring unique, ments necessary to conduct operations in complementary capabilities providing a range

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 75 Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL students wade ashore during over-the-beach exercise U.S. Navy (Kyle D. Gahlau)

Adapting Across the Spectrum of Conflict The Role of Naval Special Warfare

B y E d w a r d G . W i n te r s ince the 9/11 attacks on the more precisely against this new enemy. There United States, the Nation has are no longer operations and intelligence; realized a new enemy, one that instead, we face “intelligence-operations” S has no borders, hides among the or “operations-intelligence.” Additionally, innocent, moves quickly, and is tied to no there is no single organization that can defeat law of war—or to any law, for that matter. this enemy; it requires joint intelligence Because of this, the enemy is hard to predict operations at a level that surpasses anything and is difficult to find. The window of oppor- we have done previously. It requires the tunity to strike him is small and comes with interagency community working side by side little warning. He is hard to engage with our developing and executing common strategies conventional weapons because he surrounds and synchronizing all efforts. It requires the himself with innocents. He is smart, calculat- application of many elements of national and ing, has planned for the long war, yet adapts coalition power against the enemy. quickly to counter any success we have. Any Speed of action was an immediate response to this new enemy must be quick, requirement and remains an enduring quest. nimble, adaptive, and precise. It must also In the 8 years since 9/11, NSW has done what be persistent. We must engage not only the it does best: more successful combat missions enemy but also the environment and human have been conducted, across a broader range terrain in which the enemy takes refuge. of operational environments, than at any The U.S. Naval Special Warfare (NSW) time in its storied history. We have achieved Command of the U.S. Special Operations this success because we have remained true Command has changed to move faster and to our core. This article provides the story of

76 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu WINTERS continuous and agile adaptation by sea-air- its inception. Training Iraqi SOF, police, islands of the Sulu Archipelago, training land teams (SEALs), Special Warfare Com- and tribal security forces, NSW has helped and advising Philippine marines and SEALs. batant-craft Crewmen (SWCC), and highly develop and maintain security within the Living a Spartan existence in these isolated trained, special operations forces (SOF)–tai- Western Euphrates River Valley of Anbar outposts and teaching combat casualty care, lored Navy technicians. It is a chronicle of an Province. In 2006, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had complex mission planning, and intelligence organization focused on learning, anticipat- a stranglehold on Anbar and was conduct- operations, as well as providing medical ing, and adapting to more effectively execute ing devastating attacks on coalition forces as evacuation and intelligence, surveillance, across the spectrum of indirect and direct well as the local population. NSW played a lines of operation. critical role in enabling the “Awakening,” a movement of Sunni tribes to reject and fight in 2008, a single overwatch Not Just Direct Action AQI and to ally themselves with the coalition. element eliminated nearly An NSW squadron—composed of a NSW helped train and equip those tribes’ 50 enemy personnel over a SEAL team, organic and attached combat security forces and their sheiks’ bodyguards 2-day period and put an end support (CS) and combat service support to resist the brutal counterattack by AQI. to enemy attacks on coalition (CSS), Individual Augmentees, and mobilized NSW also helped transition many of those forces within their sector Reservists—has been assigned as Special tribal security forces into the Iraqi police Operations Task Force–West (SOTF–W) in and continued to provide training on tactics, Anbar Province, Iraq, since 2005. Over the evidentiary documentation and control, and reconnaissance support, NSW has past 4 years, SOTF–W lines of operations have targeting and intelligence, and command and enabled partner nation forces to take the remained constant and include: control. While SEAL direct action operations fight to the enemy. helped put the enemy on its heels, Iraqi civil Around the globe, in Africa in support ■■ conducting combined lethal opera- and tribal leaders and security forces, trained of Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans tions (direct action) and mentored in part by NSW, won the fight Sahara, in South America, and in Asia, ■■ conducting foreign internal defense against AQI. NSW Active-duty and Reserve personnel are (FID)/security force assistance (SFA) ■■ developing networks of influence ■■ targeting enemy networks.

Conducting Combined Lethal U.S. Navy (Tim Turner) Operations. NSW direct actions have been exclamation points within the Iraq coun- terinsurgency rather than the focal point of effort. These include Fallujah (2004), Ramadi (2006), (2008), and Mosul (2009). In these four major battles, small NSW elements provided direct support to U.S. Marine Corps and Army maneuver elements. SEAL snipers and Tactical Air Controllers rained devastation upon enemy forces and helped shift the tide of these battles. In 2008, for example, a single over- watch element eliminated nearly 50 enemy personnel over a 2-day period and put an end to enemy attacks on coalition forces within their sector (Baghdad, Sadr City). SEAL provides team cover while advancing on suspected al Qaeda and Taliban forces, NSW provided Marine Corps, Army, and Operation Enduring Freedom Iraqi Security Forces freedom of maneuver and operational space as these General Purpose Forces heroically and success- Half a world away in the Philippines, distributed in small teams as liaison elements, fully fought to provide security to the Iraqi NSW Task Unit–Archipelago (NSWTU- joint planning and advisory teams, and coor- population. Arch) has conducted a 7-year FID/SFA cam- dination elements. These warriors are engaged Conducting FID/SFA. SOTF–W has paign with its Filipino counterparts enabling in the current fight through FID. Not widely been successfully engaged in FID/SFA from the harassment and capture of insurgent, ter- known throughout Department of Defense rorist, and criminal elements. NSWTU-Arch circles, in February of 2008 rebels from Sudan leads small, distributed teams called Liaison pushed all the way into Ndjamena, the capital Rear Admiral Edward G. Winters, USN, is Coordination Elements (LCEs). These two- of Chad. The battalions of Chadians trained Commander, U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command. to seven-man LCEs are scattered across the by SEALS had only one combat loss and were ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 77 SPECIAL FEATURE | Naval Special Warfare instrumental in keeping Chad from falling Developing Networks of Influence. to better prosecute irregular warfare (IW). into the hands of the Sudanese rebels. Through combat operations, FID, and SFA, Support activities are excellent examples of Special Warfare Combatant-craft Naval Special Warfare Command builds and how NSW has adapted to meet the fight more Crewmen, NSW’s master mariners and career maintains relationships that constitute local effectively. In 2006, NSW established intel- special operations professionals, have also and regional networks of influence. These ligence operations commands with new and molded themselves to the current fight. The networks must be fostered and developed advanced collection and analytical capabili- world’s premier combat craft operator, the through constant contact. Over a recent ties. The support activities—two Echelon IV SWCC traditional role is waterborne insertion 4-month period, nearly 1,000 meetings O–5 commands—have become the NSW of SOF and clandestine delivery of special were conducted by SOTF–W with tribal targeting engine. Support activities and their operators in the littorals and river deltas. Yet and civil leaders and Iraqi citizens. These subordinate units are led by SEALs, who bring for the last 8 years, SWCC have been globally meetings provide atmospherics and insights with them the warrior ethos that is the core dispersed in small teams conducting FID and that are crucial to counterinsurgency. Tribal of NSW; these leaders provide the operational SFA. A maritime NSW task unit in Manda engagement in Anbar Province provides an grounding crucial to successful advanced Bay, , composed primarily of SWCC example of the deep and broad networks of intelligence operations. However, career SOF operators, has led a 6-year FID/SFA campaign influence that NSW builds and maintains. personnel—SEAL and SWCC—compose less focused on maritime security. Initially train- For instance, Sheik Sattar abu Risha led the than 20 percent of support activities; over 80 ing Kenyan naval personnel, they expanded Anbari tribes in the Awakening. SEALs and percent are Navy technical specialists, highly their focus to an all-of-government approach NSW combat support personnel were fre- trained and SOF-tailored combat support and trained the Kenyan Wildlife Service, quent guests in his home. They provided a assigned to NSW for 2 to 5 years. These cross- coast guard, and maritime police in an effort sounding board as he planned and executed functional or multidiscipline intelligence

support activities and their subordinate units are led by SEALs, who bring with them the warrior ethos that is the core of naval special warfare

teams are integrated into an assault force—the SEAL troops—creating a seamless and con- tinuous intelligence operations cycle. The comprehensive assimilation of intelligence disciplines into a single targeting element and its complete integration under tactical assault forces create a powerful synergy unachievable through traditional stovepiped intelligence silos.

Adaptation NSW Combatant-craft Crewmen (seen here driving Naval Special Warfare is learning from special operations craft–riverine) are USSOCOM the current conflict and anticipating the maritime mobility experts

U.S. Navy (Kathryn Whittenberger) future fight. NSW is adapting to an environ- ment where smaller, tailored-to-task forces to increase and maintain security and control the Awakening. When Sheik Sattar was will be widely distributed and conducting maritime lines of communication in this vola- killed in an improvised explosive device operations and activities by, with, and tile area of the Horn of Africa. attack in 2008, select members of NSW, through partners. This IW fight will con- SEALs and SWCC, as well as NSW’s considered friends of the family and of the tinue for the foreseeable future. Long-term organic CS and CSS personnel, conduct tribe, attended his funeral. Within days presence, knowledge, and relationships will combat FID in Iraq and Afghanistan and of his death, NSW intelligence operations be among our most important weapons. The FID/SFA around the world. This has been identified his killers and facilitated their Nation will require mature, joint, combined, the largest contribution of NSW in terms capture. These deep relationships are repli- interagency warrior-diplomats. Educating of man-hours and focus since 9/11. The cated around the world with tribal, civil, and subject matter experts within the NSW force relationships that they build during these military partners. on insurgency, tribal politics, culture, law, activities are the foundations for networks Targeting Enemy Networks. Since 9/11, finances, and Civil Affairs, and on the use of of influence essential to counterinsurgency NSW has been relentless in pursuing innova- information to counter jihadist propaganda, and the current fight. tion in organization, tactics, and capabilities will soon be a primary training require-

78 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu WINTERS ment. This is vital to build a force more fully nation partners; no single NSW organization and senior enlisted personnel to meet capable of waging counterinsurgency and owns or trains to the problem set. Focus and demand worldwide. This growth is not only IW campaigns rather than simply execut- implementation plans shift with each new SEAL growth; it is also CS and CSS growth. ing episodic training exercises, raids, and rotation, and personnel lack focused prepara- That additional operator force will require reconnaissance. A growing portion of Naval tion for these unique and challenging assign- those additional support elements. This is Special Warfare will be dedicated to creat- ments. Anchor Teams are designed to foster difficult as our requirement for CS and CSS ing opportunities for the United States and continuity, cultural expertise, connectedness, from the Navy comes at a time when it is its allies and facilitating the execution of and long-term commitment—the “4 Cs” of being directed to downsize. For some time, complex military and civil operations by others. This will require close coordination Anchor Teams are designed to foster continuity, cultural with the interagency community and U.S. expertise, connectedness, and long-term commitment Country Teams, as well as mastery of FID, SFA, and advanced intelligence operations. NSW is adapting to better conduct IW and to find and fix terrorists and their infra- structure. Developing language, regional expertise, and cultural (LREC) specialists is one area where the Navy and NSW are U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien) applying resources in fiscal year 2010. The Navy will recruit 30 Sailors through the Military Accessions Vital to National Inter- est (MAVNI) program for assignment to Naval Special Warfare as military linguists. MAVNI is focused on legal immigrants who possess unique, high-demand/low-density LREC skill sets. The support activities will develop education and training to tailor these unique assets into vital IW enablers. These cultural engagement specialists will support NSW squadrons and conduct tactical questioning, provide translation in support of FID and SFA, and act as cultural advisors. Additionally, they will serve as human terrain sensors, providing opera- Secretary of the Navy meets with LTG David Rodriguez tional commanders with ground truth and and GEN Stanley McChrystal at ISAF headquarters insight into social, tribal, and cultural atmo- spherics gained from deeper interaction with counterinsurgency. This construct will be we expect that we will continue to do more NSW’s networks of influence. transparent to operational commanders except with less; however, the quality, strength, and Another innovative organizational struc- for the fact that TSOCs will receive more dedication of our people will allow us to ture under development within Naval Special focused and better prepared NSW elements to continue to succeed. Warfare is the Anchor Team concept: small execute their strategies and plans in key loca- teams of SEALs and SWCC who focus on a tions where they currently maintain persistent Naval Special Warfare is known for particular country over a minimum 4-year presence. and characterized by high-intensity direct assignment. Anchor Teams will resource NSW will continue to adapt to accom- action. Lesser known is NSW’s capacity for Theater Special Operations Command plish the needs of the Nation alongside joint, and accomplishments conducting foreign (TSOC) requirements for persistent pres- combined, and interagency partners. We internal defense/security force assistance, ence and focus on advise/assist, FID, SFA, will continue to grow into better, stronger building networks of influence, and using and liaison duties; their time horizon will partners—and we will also grow in size. We its robust ability to target terrorist networks. not be just a single 6-month deployment but believe that we can grow at a rate of about 3 Since 9/11, NSW has displayed unique agility rather an entire tour of duty. NSW has had to 5 percent annually, but there is a delicate by rapidly adapting and transforming to persistent presence (365-days boots-on-the- balance between growing fast enough to meet meet new and evolving theater requirements ground) in over a dozen high-priority and demand and growing so fast that the experi- and by swiftly transitioning across the spec- priority countries. However, this presence by ence of the platoon becomes dangerously trum of conflict—conducting tribal engage- necessity is resourced by a constant flow of diluted, resulting in mistakes that cost lives. ment and FID in small distributed elements personnel from multiple commands. Each In addition to the SEAL and SWCC and then aggregating into larger elements to effort lacks continuity and connectedness to operators, it will take years before NSW conduct high-intensity urban combat. JFQ operational issues and interagency and host reaches the quantity of quality senior officer ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 79 Mastering the Art of the Possible The Air Force Special Operations Command

By D o n a l d C . W u r s te r

In November 2008, a flight of four CV–22 relief operations. While in Mali, Malian and Ospreys, along with corresponding mainte- U.S. military personnel conducted Medical nance/logistics support, deployed to Bamako, Civic Action Programs and Veterinary Civic Mali, in Africa to participate in Flintlock—the Action Programs aimed at providing select premier exercise to support future training and medical and veterinary services to rural com- engagement in the Trans-Saharan region. Not munities in Mali.1 only was this exercise significant in the fact This story provides only one example that it was the first time U.S. Air Force Special of how AFSOC continues expanding our Operations Command (AFSOC) CV–22 air- capabilities to provide the combatant com- craft had deployed across Ocean to mander with the full spectrum of specialized support special operations forces (SOF), but its airpower. Providing airlift for access to rural importance lay in the achievement of combat- populations represents a paradigm shift in ant commander objectives: assisting partner thinking about how SOF airpower is applied nations in establishing and developing military to meet the commander’s objectives. The interoperability and strengthening regional context of irregular warfare is expanding per- relationships in support of future combined ceptions of the term the art of the possible. humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster Lieutenant General Donald C. Wurster, USAF, is Commander, U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command. U.S. Air Force

Malian and Senegalese forces train on 8th Special Operations Squadron CV–22 Osprey

80 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu WURSTER

U.S. Air Force Special Operations threats tends to exist where there are common problem: access to the hinterlands in order Command, the air component of U.S. Special elements that can form the basis for grievance to extend the rule of law. In the IW context, Operations Command (USSOCOM), is against a government’s legitimacy: poverty, the mobility provided by airlift is key to engaged in operations around the world. perceived social injustice, corruption, lack building legitimacy, yet hinterland access Many of these operations support engage- of infrastructure, inability to project the rule has proven a challenge in the past. However, ment strategies aimed at building relation- of law throughout a nation’s sovereign lands, with the addition of light and medium ships that will prevent future conflict within an appealing alternate vision of governance, mobility aircraft, AFSOC has anticipated a region. We employ a dedicated force that competing ideologies, and historic ethnic and and answered the need for austere mobility. executes the mission areas of SOF mobility; tribal conflict. Along with these causes for The leased and purchased airframes chosen shaping and stability operations; battlefield grievance or greed that invite instability, other to meet the specific needs of theater require- air operations; intelligence, surveillance, and conditions typically exist that foster the growth ments and supported SOF forces are based reconnaissance (ISR); precision strike; agile of insurgent groups, such as sanctuary, outside on commercial, off-the-shelf models and, combat support; command and control; and funding sources, and access to ungoverned or by virtue of their ubiquity in the civilian information operations. At the same time, we undergoverned spaces. market, can offer a great range of nation are pushing the innovation and technology This list describes conditions typically access options. envelope to develop responsive, relevant, and found in states that could be described as Three new squadrons have been sustainable capabilities to achieve combatant occupying the “bottom strata” of interna- assigned this mission. Within 2 months of commander goals within the context of a tional economic development standards for activation of the first of these tailored theater dynamic security environment. gross national product, unemployment, high mobility squadrons in 2008, aircraft arrived As an adaptive learning organization, mortality rates, and low individual income. in the Pacific for use by joint task force AFSOC’s understanding of the nature of this Because insurgent groups formed under such commanders in U.S. Pacific Command. By dynamic environment has been the catalyst to circumstances tend to tap into extremely June 2009, additional medium-lift aircraft modify our approach to warfighting. In short, complex social and cultural conditions, they were flying near-daily missions in support we have evolved our organization and its capa- are inherently complex adaptive systems. of U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa bilities to remain a step ahead in an environ- This interactive complexity inherent in Command requirements, providing airlift for ment where the only real constant is change. human groups fundamentally differs from up to 25 passengers or 9,000 pounds of cargo. structurally complicated systems, such as an With their short takeoff and landing capabili- Nature of the Environment enemy Integrated Air and Missile Defense ties suitable for small, remote airfields, these Since the terror attacks of 9/11 and our System, and requires a different approach.4 aircraft provide the combatant commander a subsequent experiences in Operations Endur- What was once airpower’s forte—defeating SOF presence in areas previously inaccessible. ing Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, our nation has witnessed forms of warfare that are the the nature of subnational threats is an extension of the places portent of future conflict. The concept that the central threat for the foreseeable future and conditions that generate them will be of an irregular nature has been recog- nized by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in structurally complicated systems such as This new capability in the combatant com- the 2008 National Military Strategy and has enemy air defense systems—remains a criti- mander’s toolkit extends reach and influence subsequently been embraced by AFSOC and cal capability even though it is now a problem beyond the airfield limitations of larger, more the Services at large.2 that we are seemingly less likely to face in the traditional airlift. Irregular warfare’s (IW’s) expected near future. Instead, a new requirement has In addition to expanding the austere prominence has sparked a paradigm shift in emerged: addressing and adapting to chal- mobility capability, AFSOC is placing high how AFSOC regards the threat environment. lenges of the human condition. Today, along emphasis on recapitalization of the MC–130 Previous thinking about the employment of with our kinetic ability to deliver “hard” fleet. All MC–130 variants continue as the SOF tended to focus efforts within a context military power, AFSOC has internalized the workhorses for SOF movement of troops of nation-state conflict, counterproliferation, concepts of soft power by honing skills for and resupply. This recapitalization effort and counterterrorism. Tomorrow’s security both coopting and coercing. This is our new will modernize both our Active-duty and challenge will likely have less focus on nation- security challenge: how can we as Airmen air Reserve airlift fleets, improve sustain- state peer competitor conflict, and more of an help to prevent or deter future conflict, and ability, and expand AFSOC aerial refueling emphasis on irregular challenges and issues at what capabilities can we develop and use to capabilities. the subnational level. operate in the austere challenging environ- Future SOF mobility concepts to address The nature of these subnational threats ments our mission requires with our available high-end threats will continue to expand is an extension of the places and conditions total force partners? global accessibility for the warfighter. The that generate them. Irregular threats, which next-generation mobility platform needs to can become regional threats impinging on SOF Mobility provide the capability to execute long-range U.S. national interests, develop within an The first part of the answer has to deal clandestine infiltration, exfiltration, and environment that facilitates their growth.3 with environments where instability and resupply missions to conduct the full range of Fertile ground for the development of these conflict are most likely to share a common special operations. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 81 SPECIAL FEATURE | Air Force Special Operations

Shaping and Stability Operations and aid, which help reduce the likelihood of the squadron size in just the past 3 years, A dangerous combination that can instability. with the potential to double again in the near threaten regional stability is a partner nation Beyond partner nation engagement, future. that has violent extremists in its midst (or AvFID personnel help build the compat- conditions exist for them to thrive), has the ibility necessary for coalition air operations Battlefield Air Operations will to suppress or defeat them, yet lacks the at the intrastate level. To execute the mission One of the greatest challenges facing capacity to do so. Culturally astute, language- of building partnership capacity, 6th SOS an air component engaged in an irregular trained combat aviation advisors from the 6th personnel, who represent over 30 different war is one of integration with ground forces. Special Operations Squadron (SOS) execute Our Battlefield Airmen of the 720th Special the aviation foreign internal defense (AvFID) the next-generation mobility Tactics Group provide the critical link between mission, providing unique capabilities to SOF ground forces and the decisive effects develop and maintain relationships, shape platform needs to provide the airpower can provide. The Battlefield Airmen the environment, promote regional stability, capability to execute long- career fields in AFSOC are combat controllers, and build partner nation capacity. Habitual range clandestine infiltration, pararescuemen, special operations weather- training relationships fostered by the 6th SOS exfiltration, and resupply men, and the latest addition: the terminal allow access, presence, persistence, and influ- missions attack control party. AFSOC’s newest unit ence in regions that might otherwise fall prey of Battlefield Airmen, the 17th Air Support to insurgent groups. A unique quality that the Operations Squadron, provides dedicated Joint AvFID unit possesses is the ability to operate career fields, train on a variety of domestic Terminal Attack Controller support to the U.S. with a reduced signature, thus mitigating and international airframes while providing Army Rangers and Special Forces units. Our concerns by some partner nations about training expertise that ranges from aircraft Battlefield Airmen, Active duty and assigned the perceptions within their populace when maintenance to security, pilot training, sur- Air National Guardsmen, are heavily deployed ground troops from an outside nation are vival, and life support. The AvFID mission is to meet the insatiable need for their unique present. AFSOC’s “signature management” is in high demand. The increased requirement skills—whether controlling aircraft, conducting an enabling capability in retaining America’s from combatant commanders has sparked a personnel recovery, or forecasting environmen- access to partner nations—allowing influence period of unprecedented growth, doubling tal impacts to the mission.

Air Force Special Operations Command vice commander speaks with Peruvian armed forces chief of staff about weapons systems aboard AC–130U “Spooky” gunship

U.S. Air Force (Jason Epley )

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All Battlefield Airmen are trained to Precision Engagement precision fires to SOF in the field as well as seamlessly integrate with any U.S. or coalition Keeping collateral damage to a bare close air support for troops in contact. AFSOC SOF team, and to this end, they are taught minimum is a strategy that must be unfail- is currently pursuing outfitting its MC–130Ws “joint” from day one. Not everyone is suited ingly pursued in most irregular contexts. An with the PSP as an interim measure to rapidly for such an arduous lifestyle, and the Air errant munition’s impact can go far beyond increase its precision strike capacity until new Force Special Operations Training Center, collateral damage or civilian casualties; the precision strike aircraft are fielded. composed of both Active-duty and Reserve strategic communications impact can be Components, has placed a needed emphasis devastating as well. Precision munitions then Agile Combat Support on recruiting the right people for grooming become essential for a successful campaign. By their very nature, IW campaigns into Battlefield Airmen and Air Commandos. AFSOC assets provide combatant com- require that the joint force establish long- At the completion of the individual career manders with the option of precision fires term presence in multiple countries to build field training, instruction culminates in the with long loiter times—a combination often the necessary partner nation capability and operational readiness phase of Special Tactics needed when dealing with subjects who capacity, which extends U.S. operational Training Squadron. Airmen learn the tactics, attempt to hide among the civilian populace. reach, is a force multiplier, and increases techniques, and procedures of operating on The AC–130 gunship remains the weapon of options for defeating mutual adversaries.6 the ground inside enemy territory, while choice for SOF troops in close contact with With this in mind, our forces need a robust, honing the skills that enable airpower’s success and ultimate achievement of the joint in an irregular context, intelligence, surveillance, and force commander’s objectives. reconnaissance must be used to fill in an additional dimension: ISR context and meaning The irregular warfare conditions SOF will face in the future require a different 23d Special Tactics Squadron combat mindset and the hardware to match the needs controller in Afghanistan of the environment. Conventional ISR activi- ties typically provided the commander with raw data about enemy forces—size, number, location. In an irregular context, ISR must be used to fill in an additional dimension: context and meaning.5 Often, killing and destroying are not the right ways to do busi- ness in irregular warfare (although those, too, are sometimes required). AFSOC has moved ahead full force with the creation of new squadrons equipped with the latest unmanned ISR technology to help gain understanding of the enemy, while maintain- ing the ability to find, fix, and finish a target should the mission warrant it. Not only will AFSOC continue to provide USSOCOM with the MQ–1 Preda- tors, but also, as of July 31, 2009, with the U.S. Air Force standup of the 33d SOS at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, the advanced the enemy. When going into an engagement, agile combat support (ACS) capability to MQ–9 Reaper joined the inventory. With its every special operator wants a gunship over- sustain the myriad new and legacy AFSOC improved performance and firepower, the head. Their proven lethality and accuracy weapons systems deployed worldwide. Reaper will provide unparalleled ISR and have made them the most feared aircraft in Whether employing direct combat support close air support to the warfighter and com- the fight. To improve this critical capabil- activities such as maintenance and logistics or batant commanders. These platforms, along ity, AFSOC is pursuing several initiatives to other functional areas such as security forces, with the tireless dedication of the Air Com- recapitalize its aging AC–130 fleet. communications, health services, or opera- mandos of the 11th Intelligence Squadron, are The core of the recapitalization initia- tions training, ACS plays a significant role able to develop “pattern of life” intelligence tive’s offensive capability is the Precision in the successful accomplishment of AFSOC on persons of interest—with the processing, Strike Package (PSP), consisting of a modular missions and is vital to the overall develop- exploitation, and dissemination necessary set of sensors, fire control systems, and ment and defense posture of a partner nation. to turn data into information. Actionable weapons that can be installed on a number Sometimes nonkinetic engagement intelligence is the sine qua non of today’s IW of different aircraft types. This system is goes further in securing the peace. AFSOC fight. designed to provide armed overwatch and deployable medical and surgical teams go to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 83 SPECIAL FEATURE | Air Force Special Operations

NEW villages to help treat people who may not have tions are executed. In the IW context, any from NDU Press seen a doctor for years. This type of commit- action, even down to the individual Airman, ment can help change local perceptions of the can have strategic level impact. In this sense, for the United States and its military. IW is largely a “battle of the narrative,” each Center for Technology and While medical teams are significant side working to have the more effective stra- National Security Policy contributors, in the end ACS will often involve tegic communication effort to capture the aircraft with unique capabilities. None of the support of the people. In AFSOC, IO dissemi- manned or unmanned machines or the crews nation is one of the missions of the Pennsylva- that operate them can benefit a combatant nia National Guard’s 193d Special Operations commander without the support personnel Wing. The importance of this mission is and maintainers who keep them operational. reflected on their ramp: the 193d is the first AFSOC is home to world-class maintenance AFSOC unit to be equipped with the new professionals, many of whom require special- “J-model” C–130s, upgrading their previous ized skills that take longer to hone than the EC–130E aircraft into the EC–130J, extend- time it takes to train the aircrew flying the ing range, altitude, and capability to reach a aircraft. Their level of dedication and spirit of broader audience. The 193d is in high demand teamwork are exactly what America has come and remains one of the most deployed units in to expect from its special operations “quiet AFSOC, and the most deployed air unit in the professionals.” National Guard.

Command and Control Adaptability Is Key to Airpower Expanding the global footprint of the When Colonel John Boyd devised force to meet rising theater demands necessi- his Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop to tated a revised AFSOC approach to command describe how to get “inside” of an adversary’s and control (C2), ensuring alignment with decision cycle, he was thinking about con- emerging national military strategy priorities ventional combat against like opponents, not of IW and building partnership capability. asymmetric and irregular threats that are Sourcing and sustaining a professionalized complex adaptive systems. Today, “acting C2 force for each Theater Special Operations quicker” is simply not enough. We must not Commander (TSOC) must strike the right only be more flexible in our thinking about operational balance of keeping pace with the future threat, but we must also adapt programmed platform, aircrew, and operating faster than the enemy does. As worldwide Defense Horizons 68 locations, while still remaining light, lean, security threats evolve, the capabilities within Cyberspace and the “First Battle” in 21st- agile, and relevant to the SOF involved. As AFSOC’s missions have rapidly adapted as century War such, the AFSOC Air and Space Operations well—and will continue to do so for the fore- Center (AOC) is partnering with AFSOC seeable future. JFQ According to authors Robert A. Miller Wings/Groups and all the ground control 2 and Daniel T. Kuehl, the “first battle” in centers to place small professionalized C N ot e s the 21st century may well be in cyberspace. nodes forward, each tailored to specific TSOC 1 They remind us that we have already seen mission needs. We refer to this construct U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, hints of cyberwar in and Georgia. as Global SOF Air C2, not only because it is “Government of Mali Hosts Military Exercise in Bamako, Mali,” available at . shape the larger battlespace may become ported by 24/7 reachback, but also because it 2 The National Military Strategy of the United the key feature of the next major war. is scalable to handle contingencies within, or Given the increasing dependence of States of America (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, across, theaters. To further sustain this capa- the U.S. military and society on critical June 2008), 7, 8. bility during periods of surge, a ready reserve 3 infrastructures, this cyber-based first battle The National Defense Strategy of the United is one that we cannot afford to lose. force is additionally being integrated into the States of America (Washington, DC: Office of the AOC. The combined effect of these initiatives Secretary of Defense, June 2008), 2, 3. is SOF air, communications, and C2 for the 4 See Paul K. Van Riper, “EBO: There Was No 21st century. Baby in the Bathwater,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 83. 5 Information Operations James S. Corum, “Getting Doctrine Right,” Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2d Quarter 2008), 95. In a globalized world where individuals 6 Department of Defense (DOD), Irregular with cell phone cameras and a computer con- Warfare Joint Operating Concept Version 1.0 (Wash- VisitVisit the the NDU NDU Press Press Web Web site site nection can sway the opinion of a population, forfor more more information information on on publications publications ington, DC: DOD, September 11, 2007), 1, 11. at atndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu information operations (IO) become a battle- field dynamic under which all military opera-

84 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Forging Marine Special Operators

By M a s t i n M . r O b e s o n

stablished on February 24, 2006, and headquartered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is the Marine Corps component of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). E MARSOC is making great advances in its quest to build and operate in order to con- tribute directly to the Nation’s overseas contingency operations. Now at about 80 percent of its full mission capability, MARSOC is in the process of reorganizing and right-sizing to continue to meet its current operational commitments and posturing the force for its future roles.

Major General Mastin M. Robeson, USMC, is Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command.

MajGen Robeson addresses graduates of first MARSOC Individual Training Course U.S. Marine Corps (Richard Blumenstein) U.S. Marine Corps (Richard

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Since our activation almost 4 years ago, training commitments are also indicative of top priority for us is the preparation, deploy- MARSOC’s pace of operations has increased the steady increase in our operational demand ment, and redeployment of our forces to steadily. As an additional capability is intro- as our capabilities grow. This has facilitated and from combat, specifically in support of duced or capacity increased, it is employed our ability to take on more of the load histori- Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan. against a global threat. MARSOC provides cally shouldered by other special operations This includes developing the special opera- to USSOCOM the following additive and forces (SOF) units. During fiscal year 2006, tions task force and preparing for its employ- complementary capabilities: we conducted 4 missions; in fiscal year 2007, ment as well as maintaining the two-company we completed 15 missions; in fiscal year 2008, presence. We are also focused on building ■■ company- and team-sized units we completed 32 missions; and we completed partnerships with other partner nations’ with the capability to conduct distributed operations ■■ littoral and counterinsurgency Marine Special Operations Advisor Group members expertise train in advanced urban warfare tactics ■■ special reconnaissance ■■ operational command and control to field a special operations task force or a combined-joint special operations task force ■■ interoperable conduit between USSOCOM and the Marine Corps (for example, Marine Expeditionary Unit [Special Operations Capable] integration into USSOCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plans).

In January 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed MARSOC to deploy two Marine special operations companies into Afghanistan. Subsequently, USSOCOM tasked us to deploy a special operations task force headquarters to Afghanistan to provide command and control over all special opera- tions assets and missions and to coordinate

we agree that the Phase Zero engagements in key areas of Southeast Asia and Africa are a cornerstone of our nation’s long-term strategy their operational functions within a specified region. Both of these firsts for MARSOC are the result of our development of broad force capabilities. When we were first established

under USSOCOM, we were used as an imme- U.S. Marine Corps (Steven King) diate solution to operational gaps. USSOCOM now has a focused vision as to how and where over 40 missions last fiscal year. We are forces to include South Asia and the littorals to best employ our capabilities, demonstrating rapidly growing in capability and capacity, of Southeast Asia and Africa. We very much its increased confidence in our abilities. Addi- providing the forces and expertise needed to agree that the Phase Zero engagements in key tionally, it gives the Marine Corps a greater contribute to global, sustained engagements areas of Southeast Asia and Africa are a cor- understanding of what value MARSOC pro- by U.S. SOF. nerstone of our nation’s long-term strategy. vides to the current fight, to the Nation, and Like our joint USSOCOM counterparts, to Corps history. our mission sets typically fall under the fol- Internal Reorganization Our expanded footprint in Afghanistan lowing core activities: foreign internal defense, Due to the increased need for the and an increase in the number of joint-com- security force assistance, counterinsurgency, employment of MARSOC forces and the bined exchange training and counternarcotics special reconnaissance, and direct action. A accelerated maturation of our capabilities and

86 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu ROBESON other force initiatives, we are in the process of pational specialties, provided they meet the The next step for a newly assigned reorganizing or right-sizing our structure. This proper requirements. Marine is ITC, an intensive 7-month train- is a top priority. The past year has validated the One of our more significant milestones ing package broken into four phases. The tremendous success that we can achieve when to date has been the graduation of our first framework of the program of instruction we properly task-organize our Marine special Individual Training Course (ITC), which emphasizes the indirect approach, irregular operations companies and teams. represents a major achievement in having a warfare, counterinsurgency, and amphibi- In April 2009, we redesignated the SOF-qualified program that takes a basically ous reconnaissance. Phase One is the basic Marine Special Operations Advisor Group as trained Marine and produces a competent skills phase where Marines are introduced to Marine Special Operations Regiment. This special operator—the last piece to complete USSOCOM and MARSOC, tactical combat established a structure of 1 regiment, 3 special the MARSOF pipeline. casualty care (advanced medical training), operations battalions, 12 special operations The process for a Marine to become basic communications, Survival Evasion Resis- companies, and 48 special operations teams. a part of MARSOC begins when we recruit tance Escape, weapons skills, and fire support. Each battalion has the same mission but and screen potential candidates. These Phase Two is the shaping phase where Marines focuses on different geographic areas. The Marines then attend Assessment and Selec- are taught mission planning and preparation, key to our success is the ability to grow our tion (A&S) that determines if they have the introduction to special reconnaissance skills, combat support and combat service support attributes required to complete training and advanced combat marksmanship, amphibious capabilities (signals intelligence, human intel- ligence, communications, intelligence analy- sis, explosive ordnance disposal, and military the Advanced Linguistic Course is intended to prepare Marines working dogs) to support the above structure and the requisite maintainers. to excel in cross-cultural relationship-building activities Once the reorganization is complete, we will have three colonel-commanded units: Marine Special Operations Regiment with conduct special operations missions. The reconnaissance, advanced light infantry and three Marine Special Operations Battalions assessment includes physical, team, and small unit operations, and basic demolitions. (1st MSOB at Camp Pendleton, California, problemsolving events providing an overall Phase Three is the refining phase where and 2d and 3d MSOBs at Camp Lejeune, North pattern of performance designed to identify Marines sharpen their skills in advanced com- Carolina), Marine Special Operations Support those Marines who are most comfortable munications, urban close quarters combat, Group (which will include a support bat- working in austere and isolated areas, or and advanced special reconnaissance. Phase talion and an intelligence battalion at Camp in small teams, while employing an indi- Four is the culmination phase where histori- Lejeune), and the Marine Special Operations rect approach. At the completion of A&S, cal irregular warfare and counterinsurgency School. Marines receive orders to MARSOC. operations case studies are used to reinforce

Building the MARSOF Marine MARSOC members learn Dari In our ongoing efforts to build a language skills and cultural command with long-term relevancy that nuances before deployment USSOCOM can employ across the spectrum to Afghanistan of SOF engagement methods, it is crucial to select and train Marines capable of conducting missions as directed. We believe that Marines are who we are and special operations are what we do. As such, forging Marines into Marine Special Operations Forces (MARSOF) opera- tors is another top priority. We believe there is no better pool from which to recruit special operators than the Marine Corps. Marines have a history and background in small wars and expedition- ary operations that make them comfortable working with emerging regional nations and in austere, isolated locations. At the outset, we focused solely on recruiting Marines from the combat arms community, but we have recently cast a wider net across the entire Corps for potential candidates. This includes updating some of the selection criteria and opening up availability to all military occu- U.S. Marine Corps (Stephen C. Benson) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 87 SPECIAL FEATURE | Marine Special Operators the principles they have learned and will New MARSOC Facilities Center that will incorporate all aspects of employ during the final exercise. We have developed and are executing physical fitness, therapy, rehabilitation, After graduating, select Marines a long-term military construction plan to nutrition, and education specifically meant transition to the Advanced Languages provide MARSOC with extensive, multifac- to develop and sustain the MARSOC human Courses, which encompass 9 to 12 months of eted, and functional compounds at Camp asset to its maximum potential in order to concentrated language instruction designed Lejeune and Camp Pendleton. Facilities provide the highest level of operational readi- to provide each deploying team with a valued at $370 million are currently under ness while preserving the force. near-fluent speaker for the language in construction, and future projects totaling Our future projects include facilities which each team will operate. This is a new over $300 million have been validated by on both coasts to support subordinate unit program called the Advanced Linguistic USSOCOM to round out and support the headquarters, company, and team facilities Course and is intended to prepare Marines emerging MARSOC organization. needs, as well as additional projects to support to excel in the cross-cultural relationship- Since our activation, we have occupied a expanded mission requirements for academic building activities that are essential to growing inventory of geographically dispersed instruction, training venues, billeting, and working effectively with other nations. The interim facilities on both coasts. We are cur- associated personnel and equipment mission majority of the graduates will move directly rently transitioning from over 112 facilities support activities. to an operational team in one of the MSOBs. into a newly constructed compound at Camp The goal is to establish 48 Marine special Lejeune’s Stone Bay, and we anticipate our Future of the Force operations teams with at least one member west coast compound at Camp Pendleton’s MARSOC continues to meet the chal- lenge of concurrently building the force and deploying the force. The lessons learned from ongoing operations have enabled us to adapt our structure, training, and operational cycle to improve force capabilities and to meet requirements. We are still in the process of growing our force to its authorized structure.

U.S. Marine Corps (Stephen C. Benson) We are currently at 82 percent of our Marine build, 94 percent of our Navy build, and 75 percent of our civilian build. With continued terrific support from Headquarters Marine Corps, we hope to achieve our manpower goals to become fully mission capable during fiscal year 2012. As we continue to mature our capabili- ties and grow our capacity, we are reminded of the many magnificent Marines who have served exceptionally in special operations throughout our Corps’ history. First Lieuten- ant Presley O’Bannon’s daring exploits against the Barbary pirates in 1805 began a special operations history that has continued through the Spanish-American War, Nicaragua, Haiti, Marine Special Operations Regiment members relay enemy target details during fire support and combined Dominican Republic, World War II, Vietnam, arms training Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and dozens of other small wars and engagements. As who is near fluent in the language and Las Flores Area to be ready for occupancy the newest member of an incredibly capable culture of the county that he will operate in in the summer of 2010. The Stone Bay com- joint special operations community, we look (the remaining members receive survival pound initially opened with a new component forward to providing the Nation with capa- language training). headquarters and operations/intelligence bilities that will truly contribute to irregular After assignment to their units, Marines building, and will be followed by facilities warfare successes globally. We Marines are are sent to follow-on advanced courses offered to support bachelor enlisted housing, health proud to serve alongside our fellow special by our Marine Special Operations School. services, equipment operations/maintenance, operators. We remain Marines first, who Additional Service, joint, and SOF courses supply and weapons storage, academic train- are always faithful, always forward, silent are also available to them. At the end of the ing, both entry level and advance academic warriors. JFQ pipeline, the amount of schooling the Marines instruction, special operations training range, potentially receive will make them a premier and fitness requirements. special operator for current and future We are also establishing a state-of-the- USSOCOM missions. art Warfighter Rehabilitation Performance

88 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations

By Alfred H. P a d d o c k , J r .

nce again, we hear discus- I believe this would be a mistake. sion within the U.S. Army on First, I want to place the issue in its his- whether the name psychological torical context. Essentially, three terms have operations (PSYOP) should be been used since World War I to describe the USACAPOC (Sharilyn Wells) (Sharilyn USACAPOC O changed—an issue that has arisen periodically Army’s employment of persuasive commu- for years. The term, defined broadly as the nications to influence the behavior of enemy, planned use of communications to influence friendly, and neutral audiences: propaganda, human attitudes and behavior of foreign psychological warfare, and psychological audiences, is characterized by some as “toxic,” operations. “disinformation,” “unsavory,” and with other The term propaganda was first widely pejorative words. This criticism inhibits the used by the Army in World War I. Its origins, ability of PSYOP units to support U.S. mili- however, go much farther back. In 1622, Pope tary forces and to interact with other execu- Gregory XV created a papal department tive branch agencies—or so goes the criticism. named the Sacra Congregation de Propaganda Thus, some argue, the term must be replaced. Fide, or the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. Although the department was aimed largely at Martin Luther’s call for refor- mation of the Church, the term at the heart of its name has remained part of our vocabulary. MG David A. Morris, USA, commander, U.S. In his Munitions of the Mind: A History Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Command (Airborne), speaks at Independence Day Present Day, British historian Philip Taylor celebration states that propaganda is a neutral term, an organized process of persuasion, a means to an end, and that “[w]e need to redirect any moral criticism away from propaganda itself in the direction of the goals and intentions of those conducting it.” This is a key point, which I will revisit later. In any event, the key organization for Army propaganda during World War I was the Propaganda Subsection in the G2 (Intel- ligence) of General John Pershing’s Allied Expeditionary Force. Leaflets distributed by

U.S. Air Force balloons and airplanes emphasized surrender Above: U.S. Air Force B–36 crew members arm themes to German soldiers: promises of good leaflet-dropping bomb for psychological warfare mission over North Korea Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., was on Active duty in the U.S. Left: U.S. Naval officer loads 25-pound shell with propaganda leaflets prepared by Psychological Army from 1957 to 1988 and served three combat Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters, which tours in Laos and Vietnam with Special Forces. He integrated U.S. and British military and civilian also was Director for Psychological Operations in

propaganda efforts during World War II the Office of the Secretary of Defense. PsyWar.org

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food and humane care, privileges under invasion of France and prosecution of the for overt and covert propaganda remains international law, opportunity to return to war in mainland Europe. As indicated in its today. families, and so forth. history of operations in the Western European In Europe, PWD made radio broadcasts Some leaflets related progress of the Campaign, 1944–1945, PWD/SHAEF defined from Office of War Information transmitters Allied forces on various fronts, with maps psychological warfare as “the dissemination and over the British Broadcasting Corpora- showing the territory gained by the Allies, of propaganda designed to undermine the tion (indeed, the venerable BBC was often particulars of German losses, and the rapid enemy’s will to resist, demoralize his followers, used to disseminate propaganda), conducted increase of the U.S. Army in the theater. The and sustain the morale of our supporters.” loudspeaker broadcasts on the frontlines, and Army emphasized factual accuracy with its Psychological warfare thus became the employed large-scale leaflet operations using “combat propaganda,” thereby enhancing its overall umbrella term—the process—and pro- specially designated aircraft squadrons. PWD credibility. paganda was the product (themes, dissemi- even provided leaflets to be dispersed by the A new term—psychological warfare— nation). This term succinctly encompassed emerged in World War II, but propaganda the divisive (undermine the enemy’s will to psychological warfare became remained as a key element. “Psywar” gained resist, demoralize his followers) and cohesive the overall umbrella term—the recognition early in the war when a group (sustain the morale of our supporters) pur- of Americans translated German docu- poses. In actual practice, the two terms were process—and propaganda was ments indicating that psychology should be often used interchangeably. the product employed in all phases of combat. Propaganda directed against the enemy Most of the Army’s operational work in was divided into three classes: “white,” whose then-novel method of artillery shells designed psywar took place at the theater level, where source is clearly indicated; “black,” in which a specifically for that purpose. the responsible organization was normally false source is given; and “grey,” in which the The basic Army field operating unit for designated a psychological warfare branch source is not revealed. White was often char- psywar was the Mobile Radio Broadcasting (PWB). The largest of these organizations was acterized as overt propaganda, grey and black (MRB) Company, whose personnel could the PWB at Allied Forces Headquarters, acti- as covert propaganda. Military psywar units operate loudspeakers and radios, employ vated in North Africa in November 1942. Its concentrated primarily on overt propaganda mobile printing presses, and prepare leaflet head was Brigadier General Robert McClure, for maximum credibility of their messages. bombs. The doctrinal and organizational who was to play a key role in this field during The Office of Strategic Services—forerunner concepts embodied by the MRB reappeared in both World War II and Korea. of the Central Intelligence Agency—employed the psychological warfare units formed during In February 1944, McClure, under covert actions. This division of responsibility the . General Dwight Eisenhower’s command, established the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (PWD/SHAEF), for the

U.S. Army History

Above: 8th PSYOP battalion member and Montagnard loudspeaker team broadcast propaganda in Vietnam

Left: MG Robert A. McClure, USA, is called the “Forgotten Father of U.S. Army Special Warfare” U.S. Army U.S.

90 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu PADDOCK

During 1945–1946, Army psychologi- vinced the Army that psychological warfare operated a 50,000-watt radio station and high- cal warfare staffs and units dissipated with and Special Forces units required such a speed heavy printing presses, published a the general demobilization of the military facility and home base. The center consisted magazine for Vietnamese employees working establishment. A prototype detachment of of a Psychological Warfare School for psywar for the U.S. Government and civilian agen- 2 officers and 20 enlisted men at , and Special Forces instruction, the 6th RB&L cies, and possessed a capability for developing , was the only operational psycho- Group, the 10th Special Forces Group, and propaganda. logical warfare troop unit in the Army when a psywar board to test materiel, doctrine, PSYOP battalions employed light the North Koreans attacked South Korea techniques, and tactics for psywar and Special printing presses, a research and propaganda in June 1950. Reorganized as the 1st Loud- Forces. development capability, and personnel to speaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, it was This home base, the name of which was work with American Air Force Special Opera- sent to Korea in the fall of 1950 and served changed to the Special Warfare Center in tions units for aerial leaflet and loudspeaker as the Eighth Army’s tactical propaganda 1956, formed the nucleus for expansion into missions. Their loudspeaker and audiovisual unit throughout the conflict. Tactical pro- the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center teams operated with American divisions and paganda, sometimes called combat propa- and School after the death of President John brigades or with province advisory teams. The ganda, was directed at specific audiences in F. Kennedy—and eventually, for establish- 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa provided valu- the forward battle areas. Mobile loudspeak- ment of the U.S. Army Special Operations able backup support for printing and high- ers mounted on vehicles and aircraft became Command (USASOC) headquarters at Fort altitude leaflet dissemination. a primary means of conducting tactical Bragg. (In 2001, the USASOC headquarters Four target audiences formed the basis propaganda in Korea. building was named in honor of General of the 4th PSYOP Group’s overall program To conduct full-scale strategic opera- McClure, “The Father of U.S. Army Special in support of the counterinsurgency effort. tions, General McClure—now chief of psycho- Warfare.”) First was the civilian population of South logical warfare on the Department of Army Nevertheless, interest in special warfare Vietnam—in essence, “selling” the govern- Staff—directed the 1st Radio Broadcasting and began to dissipate after the Korean War, ment of South Vietnam to its people. Next Leaflet (RB&L) Group to deploy to Korea in and the Army’s psychological operations came the Viet Cong guerrillas in the South, July 1951. It conducted propaganda intended capability had eroded by the early 1960s. In followed by the North Vietnamese regular to further long-term strategic aims. The group addition, an important change in terminology army, and finally the North Vietnamese civil- had the equipment and capability to produce occurred: psychological operations replaced ian population. and leaflets, and to augment or psychological warfare as the umbrella term. The 4th and its battalions employed replace other means of broadcasting radio Psychological operations, or PSYOP, encom- the same media used in World War II and propaganda. It supervised a radio station passed psychological warfare, but the latter Korea—radio, loudspeakers, and leaflets— network known as the Voice of the United Nations and often produced more than 200 interest in special warfare began to dissipate after the Korean million leaflets a week, disseminated by aircraft or artillery shells. Some leaflets, for War, and the Army’s psychological operations capability had example, offered inducements for enemy eroded by the early 1960s soldiers to surrender, while others bolstered the morale of Korean civilians by proclaiming indicated propaganda directed only against with the leaflets taking up 95 percent of its United Nations support. enemy forces and populations for divisive effort. The group disseminated propaganda Although the 1st RB&L Group was purposes. The new and broader term could via television directed primarily at the civil- a concept accelerated to meet the require- also be used to describe propaganda employed ians of South Vietnam. It also air-dropped ments of the Korean conflict, it and the 1st toward friendly and neutral audiences for thousands of small transistor radios—pre- L&L Company performed functions similar cohesive purposes. tuned to its 50,000-watt radio station—over to those used in psychological warfare in As was the case after World War II, enemy troop locations. World War II. It bore a direct linkage to the the Army severely reduced its psychological In targeting the enemy, one of the mobile radio broadcasting companies formed operations capability after Korea. Conse- most effective efforts to which the 4th Group under PWD/SHAEF to conduct operations quently, an insufficient base of PSYOP-trained provided support was the Chieu Hoi, or Open in North Africa and the European theater. officers was available when the 6th Psycho- Arms Program. Over the years, approxi- Both the strategic concept embodied in the logical Operations Battalion was activated in mately 200,000 mostly lower level Viet Cong RB&L group and the tactical propaganda idea Vietnam in 1965. By 1967, the Army’s PSYOP defected, or “rallied,” to the South Vietnamese expressed by the L&L Company would appear forces in Vietnam had been expanded to a government. Some of these ralliers agreed in the capability formed as part of the new group (the 4th) with four battalions, one in to participate in propaganda campaigns by Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, each of the four corps tactical zones. having their photos taken and composing a North Carolina, in mid-1952. Indeed, they In addition to providing support to tac- simple surrender appeal disseminated by leaf- th th U.S. Army History were forerunners to the activation of the 4 tical field force commanders, the 4 PSYOP lets among their former units. Psychological Operations Group in Vietnam. Group assisted the South Vietnamese govern- The 4th Psychological Operations This Psychological Warfare Center was ment in its communication effort down to Group returned to Fort Bragg in October the brainchild of General McClure, who con- the hamlet level. The group headquarters 1971 as part of the withdrawal of U.S. forces

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 91 COMMENTARY | Legitimizing Army PSYOP from Vietnam. Although officially a combat population against the Jews, and the employ- agency to identify itself as the source of pre- support organization, the 4th lost 13 of its ment of propaganda to support U.S. forces in packaged news misleads the viewing public by members to enemy action during the war, and actions that result in the surrender of enemy encouraging the audience to believe that the several others were decorated for valor. troops, thus saving their lives and possibly the broadcasting news organization developed the From World War I to Vietnam, the lives of our own Soldiers. The purposes are information. The prepackaged news stories terms propaganda, psychological warfare, and completely different. As Taylor states, “We need are purposely designed to be indistinguishable psychological operations were employed in to redirect any moral criticism away from pro- from news broadcasts to the public. . . . The total war, limited war, and counterinsurgency, paganda itself in the direction of the goals and essential fact of attribution is missing.” respectively. They would continue to be used intentions of those conducting it.” No matter. This is a classic illustration of black until near the end of the Cold War in the late The term that had been a central part of our propaganda. This and milder forms of pro- 1980s when propaganda and psychological doctrine from World War I to the end of the paganda (white or grey) have been a regular warfare were relegated to the glossaries of Cold War disappeared. It was not to be trusted. feature of American political life since the PSYOP doctrine. Indeed, when I commanded Totalitarian states used it. It represented lies. founding of the Nation. Nevertheless, military a PSYOP battalion in the mid-1970s and a General McClure often told his psycho- psychological operations terms continue to be group in the early 1980s, the Propaganda logical warfare staff and units to “[s]tick to deemed by some as too sensitive for interac- Development Center was the focal point of the truth, but don’t be ashamed to use those tion with commanders, other countries, and our operations. Under the new regime, that truths which are of most value to you.” In some governmental agencies. entity became the Product Development other words, employ “selective truth,” much With regard to the latter, my favorite Center, but the “products” were, in fact, still like the political propaganda employed by anecdote is a discussion I had with a senior propaganda. Nevertheless, the erosion of our candidates for office in the United States. United States Information Agency official terminology had begun. A revelatory article that makes this while serving as the director for PSYOP in the Above, I quoted Philip Taylor’s state- point was Michael Dobbs’ December 2007 late 1980s. He was an old hand in the business, ment that propaganda is a neutral term, an piece in the Washington Post on December 30, having been a member of the Joint U.S. Public organized process of persuasion, and a means 2007, “The Fact Checker: Sorting Truth from Affairs Office in Vietnam, which, incidentally, to an end. The Department of Defense Diction- Campaign Fiction.” Citing specific statements provided policy direction for military PSYOP ary of Military and Associated Terms (March of Presidential candidates, Democrat and in the country. We had a candid relationship. 2009) defines the word as “[a]ny form of com- Republican, Dobbs states many claims were When I told him that his agency in reality munication in support of national objectives “demonstrably false.” He argues that “the art conducted propaganda and psychological designed to influence the opinions, emotions, of embellishment and downright fibbing is operations abroad, he immediately responded, attitudes, or behavior of any alive and well in American “You’re right, Al, but we can’t call it that.” For politics.” In fact, much of this military PSYOP, we should call it that. twisting of the facts is often U.S. Army U.S. poor propaganda. In the age of the Internet, as Dobbs notes, those who criticize the term the accuracy of a candidate’s propaganda allude to its being statements can be checked. used only by our adversaries Nevertheless, “electoral for evil means rewards from stretching the truth or distorting a rival’s record just as frequently It is truly ironic that a capability used to outweigh the fleeting political assist military commanders in accomplish- costs.” ing national security objectives abroad can Another example of be considered un-American, when the same propaganda used by our gov- techniques of propaganda are used by our ernment appeared in Robert government and political parties for domestic Pear’s front-page article in purposes. In a fruitless search for legitimacy, PSYOP helicopter equipped with loudspeakers, circa 1964 the October 1, 2005, New a steady stream of euphemisms is trotted out, York Times, “Buying of News usually with the word information attached— by Bush’s Aides is Ruled Illegal: Covert Pro- an amorphous term that can mean anything group in order to benefit the sponsor, either paganda Seen.” Essentially, the Bush admin- to anybody. directly or indirectly.” istration commissioned writers to prepare In May 1994, in a letter to the Assistant That is about as neutral a definition as stories praising the Department of Education’s Secretary of Defense for Special Operations one could ask for. Yet those who criticize the programs and passed them to newspapers that and Low Intensity Conflict, I wrote that term propaganda allude to its being used only printed the stories without telling readers the “[a]nother difficulty with the term ‘informa- by our adversaries for evil means. But surely, origin of the material. Of this affair, the Gov- tion’ is its ever-widening definitional bound- for example, there is a difference between ernment Accountability Office stated in its aries. In all of its permutations . . . it is becom- Nazi Germany’s use of propaganda to turn its September 30, 2005, report: “The failure of an ing a morass which will cause even more

92 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu PADDOCK confusion if [the Department of Defense] uses not heard any calls for renaming the Special recommended the creation of an interagency it to describe what it does in PSYOP. More Forces branch. public diplomacy committee to support coun- profitable for the long run, in my view, would Calling PSYOP or propaganda some- terterrorism efforts and a PSYOP working be continued efforts to legitimize existing thing else will not deceive anyone. It certainly group as part of the committee. These recom- terms rather than apologizing for them or won’t fool our adversaries or the media. As an mendations were implemented. attempting to disguise them.” example of the latter, Pulitzer Prize winner During my tour as the Director for That was 15 years ago. Alas, the con- Tom Ricks wrote a front-page article in the Psychological Operations in the Office of the cerns I expressed have come to pass. A case Washington Post on April 10, 2006, the lead Secretary of Defense, one of my top priorities, in point is when the U.S. Special Operations sentence of which read: “The U.S. Military approved by the Under Secretary of Defense Command renamed its Joint Psychologi- is conducting a propaganda campaign to for Policy, was institutionalizing PSYOP. To cal Operations Support Element the Joint magnify the role of al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Just do so, I continued briefing senior officials Military Information Support Command in changing the name is not going to camou- throughout the Department of Defense, and November 2007. Despite this new name, the flage what psychological operations does: for 2 years I lectured at the Service war col- mission of the organization—psychological persuasive communications to influence leges. When the Secretary of Defense recom- operations—remains unchanged. attitudes and behavior of foreign target audi- mended to the National Security Council that Now some want to eliminate altogether ences in ways that support U.S. objectives. As an interagency PSYOP committee be formed, the name psychological operations—despite Richard Crossman, a brilliant propagandist we insisted that “psychological operations” be the fact that psychological warfare and PSYOP who worked for McClure in World War II, included in its title. It was. organizations served honorably in World War stated, “The art of propaganda is not telling A final personal anecdote. A few years I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and in a lies, but rather selecting the truths you require ago, I was invited to participate in a National variety of roles, to include conflicts, until the and giving it mixed up with some truths Public Radio panel to discuss psychologi- present—and despite the fact that our country the audience wants to hear.” The “truth” is cal operations. As it turned out, the panel is now engaged in another ideological Cold that psychological operations are based on comprised three —and me. The War, the very essence of which is psychologi- manipulation of facts. Using euphemisms will moderator was also a . At the begin- cal in nature. The question must be asked: If only draw attention to our efforts to disguise ning, I sensed that they were all just waiting propaganda, psychological warfare, and psy- the real purpose of PSYOP. to pounce. So I began my comments with chological operations were appropriate terms for these earlier threats to our national secu- little instruction on psychological operations historically has rity, why are they politically incorrect now? Related to this is the heritage issue. I been included in the curricula of the Army’s professional wonder, for example, how 4th PSYOP Group military education for officers veterans who served in Vietnam—and who lost 13 troops—would feel about changing the Let me address the argument that a frank explanation of the military’s use of name of their unit. And now we have a PSYOP changing the name would make it easier for PSYOP and propaganda. I also compared it to Regiment comprised of one Active-duty and PSYOP to be accepted by supported com- the hypocrisy of U.S. domestic political propa- two Reserve Component groups. All have per- manders. Historically, the biggest challenge ganda, and cited a couple of examples. When sonnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The for PSYOP personnel has been convincing I finished, it was as if all of the air had been regiment has as its purpose the development commanders how PSYOP can help them let out of their collective balloons, and the of pride in the heritage of a unit. Changing the accomplish their mission. The PSYOP name discussion proceeded on a much less adver- PSYOP name will detract from that purpose. rarely plays a part in this equation. Part of that sarial basis. After the session, the moderator One can only imagine the hue and cry difficulty stems from the fact that measures thanked me for my candor. that would arise if a proposal were made to for effectiveness of PSYOP are often difficult What I have described are examples change the name of the infantry, the artillery, to demonstrate. Another factor has been that of aggressive institutionalizing that can or armor. These are combat arms units that little instruction on psychological operations and should be done by all PSYOP individu- use lethal means to accomplish their missions. historically has been included in the curricula als (Active-duty, Reserve Component, and Thus, it is particularly ironic that some would of the Army’s professional military education retired) to prevent a loss of identity for their change the name of PSYOP units that employ for officers. Thus, PSYOP personnel continu- craft. PSYOP personnel should take pride in nonlethal means to support these combat ally have to reorient commanders and staff on their discipline and avoid apologizing for its arms. Apparently, undermining the morale of their capabilities. name. The use of euphemisms in an attempt the enemy is more politically incorrect than As for selling PSYOP at “higher levels,” to disguise PSYOP should cease. And senior killing them. I should like to provide some personal experi- Army officials must take into account the Then there are practical considerations. ence. While serving as the military member rich legacy of this specialty, plus the practical A name change would require significant of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning limitations of changing its name. In sum, they retooling of Service and joint doctrine. Addi- Staff with a portfolio that included public should resist political correctness and legiti- tionally, the development of a PSYOP branch diplomacy, PSYOP, and terrorism, I arranged mize military psychological operations. JFQ for officers in the Army was a further impor- for the 4th PSYOP Group to brief senior State tant step toward legitimizing the name. I have Department officials on its activities. I also ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 93 The Business of War The Impact of “PLA, Inc.” on Chinese Officers

By D e a n c H e n g n 1979, as the Chinese People’s Libera- Three decades later, the PLA is a much tion Army (PLA) fought its last major more professional force. Gone are the days of war, it was a military still recovering focusing on “rifles and millet” and the belief Ifrom the ravages of the Great Prole- that overwhelming numbers would suffice tarian Cultural Revolution, when military against technologically sophisticated oppo- professionalism had been derided in favor nents. Instead, even as it is incorporating a of “People’s War,” “human wave attacks,” variety of sophisticated weapons, ranging and the thoughts of Chairman Mao Zedong. from Kilo-class submarines to Su-27 and Moreover, it was a military that had been Su-30 fighter aircraft, the PLA is revitalizing repeatedly politicized, as it was often the sole its thinking and organization. To this end, it institution that could maintain order while is promulgating new joint doctrines and reg- Dean Cheng is a Research Fellow at the Heritage Mao “unleashed” the Red Guards against the ulations that suggest it is grappling with the Foundation. Chinese Communist Party (CCP). difficulties of operating not only in the land,

ADM Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, tours bridge of Luyang 2 in Quingdao, China, during 60th anniversary of founding of PLA Navy U.S. Navy (Tiffini M. Jones)

94 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu CHENG sea, and air environments, but also in outer space and cyberspace. It is also in the process of constructing a long-service noncommis- sioned officer corps to supplement both its conscripts and its officer corps. Much of the success of this transition rests upon that officer corps. Of special importance will be the current cohort of midlevel officers, those at the rank of senior colonel (U.S. O–7 equivalent) and below, who will have to sustain ongoing reforms after the current military leadership retires. For these officers, the PLA foray into business in the 1980s and 1990s, often termed “PLA, Inc.,” by Western analysts, was an essential part of their early careers in the military. The experiences they derived from managing commercial entities will likely define their worldview.

PLA, Inc. After the passing of Mao, his succes- sor, Deng Xiaoping, sought to reform the Chinese economy. Deng shifted China from a Soviet-style centralized, planned economy that emphasized military production to one oriented toward consumer and light industrial demand. In the wake of the Sino- in 1979, he also slashed the PLA’s budget by nearly 25 percent.1 To make these reforms more palatable, in the early 1980s the PLA was allowed to commercialize. This comprised two elements:

■■ converting the Chinese military indus- units appear to have refocused on military trial complex to production of commercial training and preparedness and left the com- within a few years, many PLA goods for the consumer and export markets mercial world behind. units had established their ■■ allowing various Chinese military units to use their resources to embark on money- Impact on Officers own companies, factories, making ventures.2 There is a widespread view that the farms, and other commercial period of intense commercial focus on the enterprises Within a few years of this decision, many part of the PLA was detrimental to officer PLA units had established their own compa- development, if only because of the tension nies, factories, farms, and other commercial between commercialization and professional- tion with the broader Chinese society and enterprises. ism.3 Yet there were also potential benefits economy, themselves undergoing the reform By 1999, however, many units were whose impact is less clear. Three are discussed and opening processes, and with the world spending more and more time on their profit- below. at large. making ventures and neglecting their training Promoting More Flexible Thinking. This increased interaction with a duties. Moreover, corruption had become an The PLA that fought the Sino-Vietnam range of new counterparts likely exposed endemic issue within the PLA, threatening war had been deprived of contact with officers to a variety of new ideas. The focus not only discipline within the military, but most foreigners for nearly 20 years, since on profit-making introduced a new set of also CCP-army relations. In light of these the Sino-Soviet split. This insulation from metrics for measuring success, as studying problems, Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, larger military and technological develop- bottom lines eclipsed studying Mao’s “Little ordered the military to divest itself of most of ments was symptomatic of the self-imposed Red Book.” It also likely reminded officers of its businesses (one prominent exception being isolation that Mao inflicted upon China the importance of flexible thinking as a path the PLA’s stake in the Chinese telecommuni- as a whole. For the PLA, then, entry into to success, as well as the benefits of being cations industry). Ten years later, most PLA the commercial sector promoted interac- open to alternative approaches to achieving a ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 95 COMMENTARY | The Business of War particular set of goals. All these lessons have of the promotion criteria, since they benefit under Informationalized (or Informatized) applicability in military as well as business military functions as well. Conditions. contexts. Exposing Officers to Foreign Tech- This suggests that the PLA is no longer Retooling Political Officers. The nologies and Experiences. For many PLA afflicted with an antitechnology attitude; General Political Department (GPD) is one officers, the creation of businesses opened more importantly, it also indicates that the of the four general departments that manage the door to joint ventures with foreign firms. PLA may not be operating under a “not the Chinese PLA. While it is responsible Along with exposing officers to new ideas, invented here” bias. The combination of for overseeing the political orthodoxy of these interactions led to initial contact with domestic technological weakness and lack of the PLA, this did not prevent the GPD from the various information and sensor tech- combat experience has potentially made the managing its own business empire as part nologies that were just beginning to affect Chinese military more open to incorporating of PLA, Inc. More to the point, as the GPD both civilian and military capabilities in the foreign technology as well as to learning from plays an essential role in the training and early 1980s. The disparity between Chinese foreign experience. promotion processes, this meant that both and foreign technology levels was sub- officers and their underlings in the era of stantial and made clear how much ground Today’s PLA officers suffer from lack PLA, Inc., were being assessed according to China had lost through its enforced autarky. of combat experience. They also labor under their ability to generate revenue and profits. Coupled with the impact of the 1991 Gulf relative technological inferiority compared This would suggest that officer selection and War, the importance of high technology was with their American counterparts. Yet their promotion by the GPD was based, at least underscored by how the PLA characterizes experiences as entrepreneurs and business in part, on the qualities of a good business- future wars: Local Wars under High-Tech managers may have made them more flexible man—and those qualities may still be part Conditions now evolved into Local Wars and open to learning from foreign experi- ence. This suggests not only that the PLA is likely to sustain its current set of reforms, but also that it may be a more flexible and agile adversary than might be expected for a military steeped in Marxist-Leninist ideology

DOD (Jerry Morrison) that has not engaged in direct combat for three decades. JFQ

N o t e s

1 James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 2001), 53. 2 Testimony of Andrew D. Marble to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commis- sion, Washington, DC, December 7, 2001. 3 See, for example, David Shambaugh, Mod- ernizing China’s Military (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 196–204; and Andrew Scobell, Going Out of Business: Divesting the Com- mercial Interests of Asia’s Socialist Soldiers, East- West Center Occasional Paper, no. 3 (: East-West Center, January 2000).

Secretary Gates greets PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff during Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore

96 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu AP Images (Dan Balilty) Israeli air force F–15I lands at Hatzerim military base in southern Israel Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Infrastructure

By B r e n t J . t A l b o t

n a recent Wall Street Journal article, Barack Obama has taken up the reins of Iran’s nuclear program by that length of time John Bolton asked, “What if Israel U.S. leadership and has renewed efforts to outweigh the costs to Israel in terms of imme- strikes Iran?”1 Certainly there has been jump-start the Arab-Israeli peace process, the diate, elevated threats to or within its borders. I a great deal of media attention on this question of the Iranian nuclear threat to Israel Moreover, President Bush would have had subject, particularly since Israel launched remains unresolved. U.S. interests in mind when denying Israel over 100 aircraft in a June 2008 aerial exercise Most defense experts agree that a strike a green light to bomb nuclear sites in Iran, believed to simulate an attack on Iran.2 It on Iranian nuclear infrastructure would and Bush chose not to launch such an attack was also rumored that during former Prime only delay, and not prevent, Iran’s efforts to himself despite speculation to the contrary Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to Washington acquire nuclear weapons. Even the current and a greater capability to do so. U.S. forces in May of that year, he asked President George Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff, in the region would be vulnerable to Iranian W. Bush for permission to overfly Iraq in Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi, has retaliation, and Iran certainly has the poten- order to strike targets in Iran, which Bush admitted his belief that an aerial attack would tial to disrupt ongoing U.S. peace-building denied.3 If true, the denial likely delayed only set back Iran’s nuclear program 2 or efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In other an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear targets 3 years.4 With Iran’s ability to attack Israel that might have otherwise occurred before through its proxies Hamas and Hizballah, it Brent J. Talbot is a Professor of Military Strategic President Bush left office. Now that President seems unlikely that the benefits of delaying Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 97 COMMENTARY | Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Infrastructure words, such an attack appears unfeasible and on the American homeland, but to punish helm than any other concern.5 Professor unlikely for both Israeli and U.S. forces now enemies on their own territory. Compared to Yoram Peri confirms this view: “The central- or in the foreseeable future. the Israeli populace, living in range of missiles ity of security, the extensive human capital Still, history reveals numerous military from enemies both near and far, the American and social capital invested in the military, and actions that appeared unfeasible and unlikely homeland is enemy-free. the country’s institutional interests created in at the time, such as the Japanese attack on Israel is a state born of the Holocaust Israel a social structure different from that of Pearl Harbor, or combined Arab actions from which European Jewry fled, having democracies living in peace. . . . Israel exists as against Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973. To no other place to go. Additionally, another a nation in arms and, therefore, lacks integral understand the real threat perception and 800,000 Jews migrated from Arab and boundaries between its military and society.”6 likelihood of an attack by Israel, one must Persian homelands to join them in Israel, Moreover, there is a lack of distinction look into a security culture that has developed some fleeing potential genocides of their between civil and military leadership since along far different lines than that which own. The Jewish people have fought almost so many former generals serve as politicians, has evolved in America. The U.S. security continuous wars against their Arab neighbors enabling a security-focused decisionmaking culture, developed in a land separated from since the founding of the Jewish state, clash- process at the highest levels of government. its enemies by two great oceans with friendly ing in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and 2006. Recent policies, such as the construction of neighbors on its northern and southern They have also dealt with two major intifadas the security barrier or “fence,” have been borders, had no need to focus on security. initiated by the Palestinians—as well as spo- aimed at ending Palestinian suicide bomber While security became a major concern in radic violence in the interim—since the 1967 infiltrations into Israel at the expense of world the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and again after occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (in opinion concerning Israel’s treatment of events of 9/11, Americans have generally 1987 and 2000). Palestinians. And because of its effectiveness been more focused on the economy or their Israeli civil society is best described as at ending the most recent intifada, Israelis personal lives than the survival of the United a “national security culture,” focused on the applaud the barrier. Survival of the state is States. Moreover, there is a clearly established survival of a state ever involved in war or foremost in the minds of Israel’s politicians chain of civilian control of the military in gearing up for war. Security has always taken and citizenry, even at the expense of world U.S. politics, and the decision to use military priority over economics, personal concerns, or acceptance. force is made by civilian leadership and only other governmental matters. Feelings of inse- Still, the Western perception would as a last resort in most cases. Finally, the U.S. curity among the Israeli electorate are more counter that Israel must feel more secure military is not designed to prevent attacks likely to change the leadership at the political now than at any time in its history. It has

Sign reading “Atomic Power Plant” points toward nuclear facility in Bushehr, Iran

AP Images (Hasan Sarbakhshian)

98 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu TALBOT signed peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. With this state of affairs in mind, I as it is likely to impact operations in Iraq, The Golan front has remained quiet since recently interviewed Israel’s Director of Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. 1973, even after Israel’s September 2007 Military Intelligence, Major General Amos attack on a suspected nuclear complex in Yadlin. He confirmed that Iranian nuclear Why Israel Might Attack Syria, which drew no retaliation. Iraq—its efforts are Israel’s number one security In 1981, Israel destroyed the Iraqi onetime principal threat—is no longer a concern at present and that Iran is considered nuclear complex at Osirak. World opinion concern with Saddam Hussein removed a much greater threat than Hizballah or condemned the attack, as did the United from power. Lebanon’s powerful Hizbal- Hamas, both of whom have recently been States. Yet Israel suffered no real political lah organization has not reattacked with dealt with, and both of whom Israel feels consequences, and the destruction of the have been deterred from further attacks in reactor is widely believed to have prevented the near term. He believes Israel is capable of Saddam from acquiring nuclear weapons in Israeli civil society is best dealing with these border threats even if Iran the 1980s. Some would even say the United described as a “national should increase its arms supplies and encour- States has Israel to thank for the fact that it did security culture,” focused on agement to harm Israel.7 Though he made not face a nuclear Iraq during the in the survival of a state ever no mention of any plans to attack Iran, one 1991. In September 2007, Israel again attacked involved in war or gearing up must consider that Iran is the only remain- a suspected nuclear complex, this time in ing existential threat to the state of Israel, neighboring Syria—a country that is number for war that reelected Iranian President Mahmoud two on the Director of Military Intelligence Ahmadinejad has called upon Muslim leaders threat list—and again it suffered no conse- missile volleys since 2006, even though the to wipe Israel off the map,8 and that Israel, a quences. The event got little publicity, in part recent so-called Gaza War (December 2008– state always focused on its security first and because the Syrians themselves were slow to January 2009) left Hamas clamoring for foremost, has planned and trained for mis- admit that any attack had occurred, perhaps help from its symbolic ally to the north. The sions requiring the scale and distance to suc- embarrassed by their ineptitude in detecting Gaza operation itself has stopped Hamas cessfully attack nuclear sites in Iran. Bearing or countering it and the potential exposure of support for rocket attacks on Israel, at least this in mind, one must consider that such an undisclosed nuclear program, in violation temporarily, and the fence has ended suicide an attack could be forthcoming, and if so, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Considering attacks. The Israeli military has proven itself the United States and its coalition partners that in both of these instances Israel’s regional the most capable in the region. should immediately plan for the aftermath nuclear-pursuing neighbors were thwarted in

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meets President George W. Bush at White House, June 2008

AP Images (Evan Vucci) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 99 COMMENTARY | Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Infrastructure their desires, that Israel suffered no real con- as would be required by any peace treaty deter any attack.”14 Even more remarkable, sequences from either engagement, and that favored by President Obama, whose recent intelligence uncovered by the Times Iran is now the third country in the region efforts to reinvigorate the peace process during August 2009 claims that Iran has attempting to go nuclear, Israel’s track record could increase pressure on the Israeli govern- openly stated that it completed its research seems to indicate that an attack on Iran will ment to renew negotiations with the Pales- program to weaponize uranium and could occur sooner or later. Supporting this view is tinians. Noted expert John Duke Anthony feasibly make a bomb within 1 year of a the comment made by Shaul Mofaz, former believes that by attacking Iran, IDF forces decision by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali IDF chief of staff and then deputy prime min- would transfer attention from Israel’s terri- Khamenei. It would take 6 months to enrich ister, who told an Israeli , “If Iran tories far to the east as the United States and enough uranium and another 6 months to continues to develop nuclear weapons, we will assemble a warhead that could be carried attack it.”9 the likelihood of a decision to aboard the Shehab-3 missile.15 Referring Though Mofaz no longer holds a launch a preemptive strike has back to the Osirak case, Israel struck just cabinet office, the new government led by days before the reactor was to become opera- Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu achieved arguably increased with the tional; so if Israeli intelligence sources agree victory over a Kadima-led coalition primar- accession of Netanyahu to similar assessments regarding the Iranian ily due to increased security concerns from nuclear timetable, an IDF strike could be the electorate. Had Kadima’s disengagement international community became increas- expected soon.16 plan been successful in achieving a more ingly concerned about potential repercus- A major argument against an IDF air- peaceful environment after Israel’s 2005 sions in the oil-rich gulf.11 In other words, an strike on the Iranian nuclear infrastructure withdrawal from Gaza, the electorate would attack on Iran might actually reduce pressure is that it is too dispersed and hardened to be have left it in power. But with the Hamas from the Obama administration on Netan- targeted with any high probability of success. takeover of Gaza and increased violence yahu’s government to make peace with the But Efraim Inbar, director of Israel’s Begin- that resulted in the need for the IDF to enter Palestinians. Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, claims Gaza during December-January 2009 (just At the same time the Israeli govern- that Natanz is the key facility. Without prior to elections), the electorate favored the ment has changed hands, U.S. intelligence uranium enrichment, the Iranian program conservative parties, and Likud was able to sources are claiming that the “earliest possi- cannot go forward. Inbar concludes that “all engineer the current governing coalition.10 ble date Iran would be technically capable of the eggs are in one basket at Natanz.”17 Thus, Thus, a more conservative, security-con- producing enough highly enriched uranium one target is within Israel’s capabilities, as scious government is in place. Ehud Barak, for a weapon is late 2009,” though the more was the case in Iraq and Syria. Israel Defense Forces Israel Defense Forces

Israeli Chief of the General Staff speaks at Tactical Command and Staff College in Israeli Homefront Command search and rescue unit conducts training to Galilee rescue people trapped under collapsed building another former IDF chief, remained as probable timeframe is 2010–2015.12 Iran also Natanz the Target? defense minister, and he is also an advocate has demonstrated the capability to deliver Interestingly, while still in its nascent of action against Iran. Thus, the likelihood an atomic weapon, having put a satellite into stage, enrichment operations at Natanz were of a decision to launch a preemptive strike orbit during February 2009.13 An Economist suspended in November 2003 after Iran has arguably increased with the accession of assessment stated in July 2008 that the signed an agreement with France, Germany, Netanyahu. “window for military action against Iran and the United Kingdom (known as the Another crucial issue concerning could close within a year, because by then E3). However, with Ahmadinejad’s first the elections is Netanyahu’s opposition to Iran might already have developed a bomb, election in 2005, Iran violated the enrich- further withdrawal from the West Bank, or improved its air defenses sufficiently to ment agreement and resumed research and

100 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu TALBOT development efforts at Natanz against E3 well before all centrifuges are delivered to Israeli aircraft or at least prevent refueling and International Atomic Energy Agency Natanz.22 operations over their territory. is also (IAEA) wishes.18 In 2006, the IAEA referred Nuclear experts also state that there an ally of sorts and was likely complicit in the matter to the United Nations Security are two more critical nodes in the nuclear the 2007 attack on Syria—detachable wing Council, and since that time Iran has played infrastructure: uranium conversion facilities tanks from an Israeli fighter were found a cat-and-mouse game of cooperation and at Isfahan, and the heavy water plant and plu- on the Turkish side of the Syrian-Turkish noncooperation with the IAEA on the matter tonium reactors under construction at Arak.23 border during that operation—and some of uranium enrichment. During July 2008, The experts’ target analysis indicates that even speculated that the Syrian raid was a President Ahmadinejad boasted that 6,000 50 Israeli fighters (F–15s and F–16s), armed dress rehearsal for an Iranian attack.26 Such centrifuges were installed at Natanz.19 This complicity indicates that Turkey might figure is double U.S. intelligence estimates, the Israeli intelligence estimate welcome overflight of its territory as in the though data indicate that the facility is 2007 attack. But it also leaves the option for designed to house nearly 50,000 centrifuges may necessitate an attack plausible denial in the largely unmonitored when complete, and analysts believe that well before all centrifuges are airspace of eastern Turkey, and this route all the centrifuge cascades—with newer delivered to Natanz would mitigate the need to get a green light and more efficient models coming in later from the United States for the attack. The U.S. installments—could be fitted in 2 years and with appropriate global positioning system– Navy–controlled Persian Gulf and U.S. Air operational by 2012.20 or laser-guided penetrating bunker buster Force–controlled Iraqi airspace would be cir- Massachusetts Institute of Technol- weapons, would achieve a high probability cumnavigated. Turkey certainly shares Israeli ogy nuclear experts agree that Natanz is of success against these targets of concern: concerns about a nuclear Iran. Turkish Prime the most important target in the Iranian Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak.24 Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has stated nuclear infrastructure, though they recom- Three possible routes of attack have that he cannot support Iran’s nuclear program mend waiting until all centrifuges are in been analyzed.25 The most likely route is if it seeks development of weapons of mass place to maximize attack effectiveness.21 across Turkey, as it allows refueling over the destruction.27 Still other estimates state that 4,000 to 5,000 Mediterranean during the mission for all Israel’s June 2008 exercise provides centrifuges would be enough to generate fighters departing for and returning from empirical evidence that Israel is capable of “one weapon’s worth of uranium every eight target(s) in Iran. More importantly, this route conducting a major attack on Iran. More months or so,” meaning the Israeli intel- mitigates the need to overfly potentially than 100 F–15 and F–16 fighters flew over ligence estimate may necessitate an attack hostile Arab countries that may engage 900 miles from their bases in Israel out over

Iranian President Ahmadinejad visits new facility producing uranium fuel for planned heavy water nuclear reactor near Isfahan AP Images (Vahid Salemi) AP Images (Vahid

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 101 COMMENTARY | Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Infrastructure

Israeli Minister of Defense Shaul already tested both weapons in combat: the Mofaz at Pentagon, 2002 GBU–28 against Hizballah (2006) and the GBU–39 against Hamas (2009).30

What about Reprisal? The biggest argument against an Israeli attack is the expected reprisal by Iran. With influence over both Hamas and Hizballah, Iran would likely use its proxies to launch retribution attacks. A second option would be a missile barrage aimed at Israel. More worri- some for the United States would be an attack on oil shipping or an effort to close the Strait of Hormuz. While these reprisals seem more than Israel would be willing to bargain for, it has already dealt with Hamas and Hizballah, especially during the last 3 years; and both parties have been worn down by Israeli efforts to reestablish deterrence. Israel can handle terror threats from these groups, and neither is an existential threat like a nuclear-armed

Israel has already dealt with Hamas and Hizballah, and neither is an existential threat like a nuclear-armed Iran

Iran. Furthermore, Israel’s missile defense system could handle an Iranian missile volley. Finally, the oil threat is more of a U.S. problem, and closing the strait would be as much a problem for Iran—in need of hard currency through oil sales—as for anyone else, particularly the Chinese, who buy over half a million barrels of Iranian oil each day.31

Israel is likely to launch a preemptive strike in the near future against the Iranian nuclear infrastructure to prevent, or at least delay, Iran reaching the nuclear threshold. DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) This argument goes against the typical the Mediterranean, refueled, and returned to or perhaps more of the well-dispersed Iranian Western security mindset as mentioned simulate a mission that could reach Iranian nuclear infrastructure. above. But the goal is to provide evidence that targets given straight line routes from bases Some might argue that even though Israel is a security-driven society. For Israelis, in Israel.28 Though the actual distance is 1,380 Israel has sufficient aircraft, it would be “The world does not function according to miles per an assessment using the Turkish unable to penetrate Natanz. The Iranians principles of justice and morality, but serves as route to their farthest aim point in Isfahan, learned the lesson of Osirak and thus built a battlefield for the disputes of actors, namely with the added ability to refuel on the return a hardened and dispersed facility at Natanz, the different states. . . . Reality is shaped by the route, there is no reason Israeli fighters would where two separate halls containing the use of force.”32 Diplomats like to believe that be limited by the distance to the target. More- centrifuge cascades are buried 8 to 23 meters persuasion and appeasement are alternative over, the fact that Israel was able to conduct underground and protected by multiple layers tools in relations between states, but a secu- a mass exercise, using twice the calculated of concrete.29 But recent sales by the United rity-driven society focuses on military solu- numbers of fighters, indicates that it not States of GBU–39 bunker buster bombs, along tions to threats, especially those that are exis- only could destroy the three key targets, but with earlier sales of the more capable GBU–28 tential. Israel perceives its adversary as a target also the excess capacity would be available to the Israeli air force, means that Israel has needing preemption rather than a persuadable against other targets, including air defenses, the weapons to do the job. Finally, Israel has entity. It sees Iran’s nuclear ambitions as

102 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu TALBOT aimed at its small territory, which lacks the Times, August 3, 2009, available at . from NDU Press 16 The cost-benefit analysis of a state living in Ehud Barak met with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen in the shadow of another holocaust perceives for the December 2007 and briefed him on the Israeli only military solutions. The United States and Center for Technology and belief that Iran could have a by its coalition partners should prepare for the 2009, though 2010–2011 was more likely. See National Security Policy inevitable aftermath. JFQ Steven Erlanger, “Israelis Brief Top US Official on Iran,” The New York Times, December 11, 2007, available at . 17 Author interview of Efraim Inbar, 1 John R. Bolton, “What If Israel Strikes Springs, CO, February 10, 2009. Iran?” The Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2009, A13. 18 Paul K. Kerr, Iran’s Nuclear Program: 2 , “Israel Military Sends Message Status (Washington, DC: Congressional Research to Iran, World,” , National Service, November 20, 2008), 5. Public Radio, June 21, 2008, available at . Expansion,” July 26, 2008, available at

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 103 Brig Gen David A. Cotton, USAF, director of Command, U.S. Air Force (Joshua L. DeMotts) Control, Communications, and Warfighting Integration, U.S. European Command, confers with participants in exercise Combined Endeavor 2009

An Intelligent

Theater By J a m e s G . S t a v r i d i s

perationally, the U.S. mili- highest gross domestic product among the commanders against their demands to enable tary is essentially organized half-dozen combatant commands. operational forces puts our defense intel- geographically. The world is We are, of course, enormous consumers ligence enterprise on the horns of a dilemma: divided into six combatant of intelligence. Our dedicated intelligence where and how should it create analytic agility O and at the same time maintain functional commands with wide-ranging responsibility apparatus runs above 1,800 people, all focused for Department of Defense (DOD) activity on our particular theater of operations. Yet I alignment over the long haul? across a defined theater. often ask myself the question, and no pun is The key is agility: we should apply some At U.S. European Command, for intended: Is this the most intelligent way to of the principles of special operations to our example, our area of focus is the 51 countries organize ourselves in the area of intelligence? theater intelligence approach. that make up the European continent, stretch- I think we can save resources, operate ing from the Bay of Biscay in the Atlantic more efficiently, and provide commanders at Is What We Have Still Relevant? Ocean to the far Pacific shores of Russia. Our the theater level and below better intelligence As we look at the intelligence structure area runs from the Mediterranean to the by organizing ourselves better. of the Department of Defense after 9 years North Pole, and includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, As we look into the next decade, Georgia, and Israel outside of Europe. It is an expending the time and energy to rethink the Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, is Supreme Allied area with close to 800 million people, more shape of theater intelligence structures and Commander, Europe, and Commander, U.S. European than 10,000 nuclear weapons, and the most organizations is an investment worth making. Command. He was formerly Commander, U.S. powerful collection of armed forces and the Balancing analytic agility needed to support Southern Command.

104 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Stavridis

of war, preceded by an additional decade of With the advent of joint training and Defining the Unknown intense operations approaching war (Somalia, education programs since the 1990s that Commanders work in the realm of strategic Haiti, the Balkans, Operations Northern Watch emphasized joint integration, functional del- ambiguity. We are expected to pursue national and Southern Watch in Iraq, Colombia, and egation, and technology-enabled horizontal security objectives through a host of means, often hostage rescue and disaster relief missions), it and vertical collaboration, the need for large, without a clear picture of all the competing inter- seems that we are finally coming to grips with theater intelligence centers of any name is ests. That is fine and is what we are paid to do. the intelligence demands of high-fidelity, high- diminishing. Add in the examples of Iraq and Of the three primary Unified Command tempo tactical operations. That is the good Afghanistan, with their exceptionally robust Plan responsibilities commanders hold—to news. However, we still could do better on what and capable intelligence structures forward develop plans for contingencies, direct operations, type and size intelligence organization we need and immediately available to the operational and perform other activities to shape the envi- to support the combatant commanders. commander, and the continued support of ronment—the third consumes the bulk of their Much of what currently exists at these large, theater-level organizations “in the rear” energies. The simply stated task of “shaping” has vital headquarters in Hawaii, Tampa, Miami, is even more suspect. such broad-ranging implications that we can no Colorado Springs, and Stuttgart, Germany The question, then, is: What intelligence longer afford to look just at the traditional aspects (where U.S. European and U.S. Africa Com- support does the 21st-century theater strategic of military intelligence. We will engage across a mands are collocated), is grounded on a commander really need? Clearly, we need to host of political, sociological, cultural, informa- 1990–1991 model in which General Norman exercise our Title 10 and Title 50 authorities and tional, and military issues with leaders of all types Schwarzkopf deployed forward to Saudi operational responsibilities in the context of throughout the assigned region. Arabia and essentially turned his combatant national security and national military strate- These engagements are our part of a command forward headquarters into a joint gies. We need to determine if the current theater “whole-of-government” approach to national task force (JTF). Arguably, we have been intelligence structure template—fundamentally security. They demand that theater intelligence trying to replicate all combatant command unchanged for nearly 20 years—is still relevant integrates a broad, strategic depth to supporting and JTF intelligence functions at the theater to supporting commanders. Are they the best analysis in addition to the traditional order of level since. Our most recent iteration of trans- we can do to provide the appropriate level and battle and indications and warning (I&W) that forming these organizations is the Joint Intel- type of intelligence to commanders in the 21st have been the bread and butter of intelligence ligence and Operations Center. century? Are they efficient and cost-effective? centers for more than a decade (see figure 1).1

Figure 1. Rethinking Theater Intelligence: Nature of the Commander’s Challenge

Continuum of Tension and Influence

CONSIDERATIONS ECHELON of Ambiguity • Core functions of the combatant commander DECISION/INFLUENCE the• Inclusion need of broader for large, Intelligence theater By J a m e s G . S t a v r i d i s Community; Title 50 authorities intelligence centers of any Global Transition reference from Strategic • Functionsname of componentsis diminishing and joint task levels of war to continuum forces National of tension and influence on Strategic the vertical that spans • Roles of supporting agencies multiple temporal horizons on the horizontal axis. Theater Combatant Command • Authority to act versus role to influence Strategic Intelligence Needs

• Deploying and employing versus directing Operational forces

• Defining the nature of problems to frame Tactical ambiguity and find opportunity

• Developing certainty to enable actions TIME Certainty Temporal • Capitalizing on existing processes in Actual Relevant Relative Resourcing Assessment Horizons operational context Traditional Indications Strategic Indications and Warning and Warning • Reinvestment of current resources Focused on known events, actors, Focused on potentials, unknowns, capabilities, relative certainties, and risk management and risk mitigation

MUST DEFINE THE NATURE OF REGIONAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS, DEFINE STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY AND RISK, AND PROVIDE CONTEXT FOR OPERATIONAL AWARENESS AND ASSESSMENT

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 105 FEATURES | An Intelligent Theater

Our responsibility for preparing contin- and develop order of battle updates that The last piece is interagency coopera- gency and deliberate plans implies that we are determine enemy capabilities and subse- tion. With the broadening aperture we use also responsible for implementing those plans in quently force capabilities that need to be to see and understand our regions, we need accordance with DOD established procedures developed—a primary Title 10 responsibility to rethink and fully empower the concept of and processes. Two supporting intelligence of the Service departments and chiefs. But the reachback. The concept of reaching out and tasks need to be supported: all-source analysis theater commander’s intelligence organiza- leveraging resources external to DOD needs that contributes to planning as formalized in tion does not need to focus on detailed force to become inherent and institutionalized for the DOD Directive for Intelligence Planning,2 tracking and order of battle functions. theater intelligence. Whatever our theater and an operational linkage to and alignment Instead, the theater commander’s inter- intelligence organization evolves into, it has between the defense I&W process and the crisis est lies in understanding the strategic reasons to be agile, integrate into the Nation’s Intel- and operational planning processes based on why forces are employed relative to U.S. ligence Community, provide our people the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) national security interests. This understand- best professional opportunities for growth, planning and contingency tasking. ing provides the rationale for commanders to and have the capacity to expand and contract It is notable that while theater com- develop plans and propose force and capabil- quickly to meet demands within a theater or manders typically direct operations, we ity requirements. in support of others. generally do not conduct operations. The Theater targeting is another function that intent is for operations to be conducted by needs to be scrutinized for potential restructur- the concept of reaching out either the theater Service components or ing/realignment. We must think in terms of joint forces apportioned to us under a JTF theater versus operational targeting, then again and leveraging resources commander. This has a significant impact on in terms of national strategic versus theater external to DOD needs functional alignment of intelligence skills. strategic targeting, to determine the best place to become inherent and We need to put our skills and functions to apply intelligence human resources. We institutionalized for theater where they align operationally. need a clear relationship between targeting intelligence We also need to look at time differently skills and the level of command that is actually at the theater level (see figure 2). Tactical going to find, fix, and affect the target. Thus, commanders can work in real time and may we at a theater command may find minimal Defining What We Need project themselves into future time to forecast need for targeteers; instead, we should work to Conflict in the 21st century will demand their next engagement with an enemy force. create a resource to meet a significant need at more intelligence capabilities at lower ech- The tactical world is one of high certainty with commands such as U.S. Strategic Command elons of command than ever before. Pervasive tangible, physical actions and results. Theater and U.S. Special Operations Command, or at intelligence support across the force is critical commanders’ realms are not as certain, as they theater functional and component commands and places intensive strain on our capacities. work with time horizons that are much farther and JTFs. The voracious consumption and production out and impact a much broader set of factors. Exploitation is another area we should of tactical and operational intelligence are They and their staffs are working to affect rethink. The National Cryptologic Representa- unprecedented. Sustaining the manpower events, people, and situations across a time tive (NCR) model is generally working well. With that represents realized intelligence capabili- continuum that may stretch for a decade. a few embedded leaders, the NCR can garner the ties forward at all levels is a must. It is clearly important for the com- support of thousands for our employed forces Manpower capacity must be adequate ponent commanders to know where every forward. Are we willing to apply the model to to support what is needed on a “normal” basis enemy submarine, tank, and airplane is other disciplines and functions? and programmed for expansion in crisis. Investing in the information technology and Figure 2. Temporal Horizons (Thinking about Time) physical infrastructure for crisis operations is critical to that planning. However, the luxury of maintaining any additional crisis man- Actual Resourcing power on hand is no longer feasible. Operations being conducted now Timing and tempo of cyclical activities I&W processes are critical to effectively (actual time) that influence, garner, or create capabilities; Program Objective forecasting when to transition from a steady- Relevant Memorandum and Guidance for state to a crisis posture. The I&W process Perceiving future actions or Employment of the Force cycles must be effectively operationalized. This will engagements in time relevant to an only work with education and full integra- adversary or other to achieve effects Assessment Forecasting horizons related to integration tion of I&W and operational processes—not Relative and participation in national and the absorption of one by the other, but full Perception of friendly actions in international policy and strategy integration. sequence and synchronization with development efforts Critical intelligence functions are more each other to create synergy effective when they are focused on supporting units that will conduct operations or affect an action. Planning groups that consist of com- TIME TRANSFORMS FROM LINEAR TO A SERIES OF COMPETING/COMPLEMENTARY CYCLES ponents, designated JTF staffs, and supporting

106 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Stavridis

theater level; however, that does not neces- sarily mean they have to stay where they are within the theater command. For instance, there is still a requirement for a viable, robust I&W mechanism to monitor the theater and forecast decision and transition points, as well as opportunities. However, the mechanism can be an integrated element of the command center/theater monitoring/crisis action plan- ning function. Integrated strategic analysts from across the government bring the skills needed at the theater level. Our national security is not just about military threats, but also competitors GEN Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, who employ the full set of national instru- commander in chief, U.S. Central ments. Energy, transportation, commerce, Command, visits troops who took part and agriculture are some of the areas we need

in Operation Desert Storm, 1992 DOD (Dean Wagner) to reach out to. Intelligence campaign planning and agencies can bring in the expertise to build to balance current demands against future programmatic integration and oversight are joint targeting/effects lists. This allows our requirements adequately to allow forecasted, critical at the theater level. We have to make theater staffs to concentrate on development managed, and timely expansion and contrac- sure that we translate our understanding of targeting guidance and policy. Accordingly, tion of organizations at all levels. of why things are happening into realistic planning skills will be more valuable than We can continue onward essentially “as targeting skills at the theater level. This implies is,” with periodic shuffling of the work force that theater components and combat support between commanders and agencies based on Figure 3. Getting Rid of the agencies (CSAs) will provide targeting exper- the best argument layered on current priori- “Spare Tire” tise to our planning groups as they work. ties. This weights main efforts but keeps large Clear and Relevant Policy and The current analytic skill set does not portions of the overall Intelligence Commu- National Strategy encompass all the requirements we have based nity capacity locked into current fights and on National Security Strategy objectives. The creates risk to the theater’s future shaping and DNI, IA, and CSAs transnational nature of 21st-century threats, engagement efforts. Service Center such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons We can reshape based on “getting rid of NGIC of mass destruction, pandemic disease, and the spare tire” (see figure 3). This option keeps DNI human and narco-trafficking, demands that specific theater I&W, collection management, NASIC our intelligence professionals and organiza- and enhanced analytic skills at the theater MCIA tions be networked to garner a broader set command level. Combat support agencies of skills and competencies. Reaching out is would still provide embedded expertise to not optional, and integrating the Director of draw products forward into the combatant COCOM National Intelligence (DNI) representative to command analytic shops as required, much support the theater intelligence effort is pivotal. like the National Cryptologic Representative Theater intelligence infrastructure model currently employed by our theater development and maintenance, partner commander’s staffs. Service nation capacity-building, and sensitive Targeting, order of battle, battle track- Components intelligence activities will continue. As we ing, and other selected functional skills would rethink our theaters, the DNI and Intel- be pushed to Service centers, theater Service Deployed Forces ligence Community as a whole will welcome and functional components, JTFs, and combat some of the opportunities we present. We support agencies. This provides components Decisive Execution at the have to make sure our skills and capabilities with additional manpower to support troop Point of Implementation are articulated in clear and relevant terms to rotation units and gives combat support agen- the rest of the community. cies the capacity to support sustained opera- DNI = Director of National Intelligence; IA = tional theater rotational force requirements. Intelligence agencies; CSA = Combat Support Options Agency; NGIC = National Ground Intelligence There are options we can pursue as we Nonnegotiable Center; NASIC = National Air and Space Intelligence Center; MCIA = Marine Corps rethink theater intelligence. Although any There are a few nonnegotiable areas as Intelligence Activity; COCOM = Combatant viable option will get the job done, some will we go about this rethinking. Certain intel- Commander incur more risk than others. The key will be ligence functions have to be retained at the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 107 FEATURES | An Intelligent Theater

Figure 4. Rethinking Theater Intelligence: Reinvesting Resources

Current COCOM DNI and the Interagency Intel Functions COCOM Functions National collection capabilities National collection management Indications and Warning (I&W) I&W TIME Policy studies and assessments Collections Collections management (JRC) Government-wide capability integration Planning Term analysis Resource management Strategy development ECHELOONN Combat Support Agencies and Term analysis Program development and oversight Order of battle Interagency capability integration Joint Staff National collection capabilities Force tracking AUTHORITHOORIITY Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Theater Service National collection management Ops Components Single-source exploitation Counterintelligence (CI) Ops Battle/force tracking Strategic studies and policy assessments investigations SPACE Tactical analysis Sustainment capacity Resource management Targeting Program development and oversight Program development Resource allocation Government-wide capability integration Guidance for Employment Theater program execution of the Force Executive agency for CI/HUMINT/ Service Centers Exploitation Air/Maritime Collection and Ops (DNI, MCIA, NGIC, NASIC) Targeting Order of battle Capability studies KEY: COCOM = Combatant Commander; DNI = Director of National Intelligence; MCIA = Sustainment capacity Marine Corps Intelligence Activity; NGIC = National Ground Intelligence Center; NASIC = Service program development and oversight National Air and Space Intelligence Center; IA = Intelligence agencies; CSA = Combat Support Agency requirements that can shape the future force ments will evolve. In particular, the command from one organization to another. Care must and drive adjustments to our strategic posture. and control/supporting-supported relation- be taken. Consequences of failure are high. ships will need to be redefined. Weighing the Options ■■ Authority to act versus role to influ- Where We Might Go Looking at essentially a corporate restruc- ence is always a consideration and will drive What might this look like? A likely ture, we have to consider the benefits and risks: the type and scope of intelligence production. scenario is small, agile, adaptive intelligence Experience and education will be key aspects organizations led by innovative thinkers ■■ Core functions retained at the theater for defining the skill requirements needed who exercise the authorities to focus on and command level must be relevant to managing define strategic problem sets—think of them the challenges at the theater strategic level, as intelligence “special operators” attached in identifying opportunities to adroitly engage authority to act versus role small groups directly to theater commanders at the national strategic level, and providing to influence will drive (see figure 4). They then reach back as needed direction to the operational level efforts. intelligence production to pull product to the commander’s level. ■■ Inclusion of the broader Intelligence This will also require highly disciplined Community is critical to understanding how processes and procedures to fully exploit national resources and capabilities can be at the theater: planners and general military all theater staff capabilities and capacities leveraged, both in our favor and against us. intelligence, interagency, and intelligence, sur- found in our headquarters, as well as among The issues of energy, economics, health, agri- veillance, and reconnaissance managers will be our components and assigned forces, and culture, and commerce increasingly are being the four cornerstones. This will be augmented clearly defined support relationships of the used as the national instruments of choice by with the right level of process management department’s CSAs and DNI support. Hard competitors. and oversight. thinking and analysis will be crucial, but the ■■ With continued seasoning of the ■■ Deploying and employing versus potential payoff in efficiency and quality of force, our components and JTFs are becoming conducting operations defines where critical support is high. JFQ exceptionally skilled at using capabilities that operational and tactical intelligence skills such only existed at theater level or in the special as time-sensitive targeting support and exploi- N o t e s operations forces 10 years ago. They are tation are needed. 1 equally experience- and technology-enabled, Scott Corrigan, “Setting Conditions through and we should empower them with the capa- Risk has to be managed. As our people Intelligence Operations,” briefing slides with scripted commentary, Pinnacle: “Joint Operations bilities that shorten their operational and tacti- learn new approaches to their jobs, and Module,” Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, VA, cal sensor–actor linkage while unencumbering our organizations redefine their roles and August 4, 2009. our theater effort. functional boundaries, there is potential for 2 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memo- ■■ The roles of our supporting agencies processes to develop holes, or for functions randum 3314.01, “Intelligence Planning,” Washing- as they relate to responding to theater require- to “fall off the moving cart” as they transfer ton, DC, February 28, 2008.

108 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Stryker brigade provides security as part of “surge” of troops into Baghdad, May 2007 U.S. Army (Antonieta Rico) The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art

By Justin Kelly and M ichael J. Brennan

ars are fought to achieve a distribution of political power that is satisfactory War and politics, campaign and statecraft, are Siamese twins, W to the victor. Political power rests on the acquiescence of a popula- inseparable and interdependent; and to talk of military tion—however that is attained. Therefore, the fundamental challenge in war is to assemble a operations without the direction and interference of an sequence of actions that seems likely to change the minds of a (hostile) population. Some administrator is as absurd as to plan a campaign without stratagems, tactics, or weapons may be, or recruits, pay or rations.1 become, inimical to that shift in the popular consensus and be counterproductive. Some may have mixed impacts, influencing differ- ent parts of the target community in different ways. Actions to overcome armed resistance may alienate sectors of the population, while Brigadier Justin Kelly, Australian Army (Ret.), was Director General of Future Land Warfare in Army failing to do so may be a path to defeat. Shifts Headquarters and Commander of the Land Warfare Development Centre. Dr. Michael J. Brennan is Director of in the circumstances on the ground, in the General Simulation in the Australian Department of Defence. domestic politics of the belligerents, or in the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 109 FEATURES | The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art

concept of the nation-in-arms and the impact by Georg Bleibtreu The Battle of Koniggratz of the Industrial Revolution. The nation-in- arms provided huge armies, while the Indus- trial Revolution provided the means to equip, deploy, command, and sustain them. The result was that whereas in the wars of the 18th century, armies in the field seldom exceeded 150,000, Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 with 600,000 men, and the Prussians invaded France in 1870 with 1,200,000. As a result of this increase, the size of the battlefield grew from a few kilometers wide in Frederick the Great’s time to several hundred kilometers in

Wikipedia.org France in 1871. The use of seemingly inexhaustible mass wider international community may validate, it was clear that to be understood and properly armies supported by the full economic power invalidate, or alter the strategic objectives directed, war needed to be seen in the round. of increasingly well-organized states moved sought, the campaign plan pursued, or the As Gerhard von Scharnhorst asserted, “One war, at least in Europe, from limited conflicts tactics employed. Although these complexities must habitually consider the whole of war of dynastic maneuvering to unlimited and are not new, they are becoming increasingly before its components.”3 Michael Handel stupendously violent confrontations seeking salient in the contemporary setting. expands on this proposition, arguing that war the complete subjugation of the enemy. This The aphorism “strategy proposes but needs to be viewed as a gestalt, or complex raised the stakes of war for the belligerents at tactics disposes” is important here. Unless whole comprising concrete and abstract ele- the same time that the increased scope and strategy includes a tactical view, it may seek ments, and explaining that “because of its dispersion of action reduced the ability to objectives that are practically unachievable, infinite complexity and non-linear nature, maintain tight control. Therefore, whereas it or it may miscalculate the costs and benefits war can only be understood as an organic remained a common practice for European likely to emerge from a conflict. These costs whole not as a mere compendium of various monarchs to accompany their armies into are not limited to the direct economic and separate elements.”4 the field until well into the 19th century, this social impacts of war on the belligerents but Nowadays, political leaders are not no longer ensured that the means committed extend to international public opinion and prepared from birth to be students of war, to tactical engagements remained yoked to international politics. The consequences of and war has expanded beyond a localized strategic objectives. tactical actions can, more than ever, decide cluster of tactical actions. In the face of today’s G.S. Isserson describes a typical Napo- not only who wins the war but also the shape complexity, the understanding and manag- leonic campaign as “a great, long approach, of the peace that follows it. ing of war as a whole are shared across a which engendered a long operational line, Equally, tactics need to serve strategy, bureaucracy. The military’s interaction with and a short final engagement in a single area, and tactical action without strategic purpose that bureaucracy is colored—if not quite regu- which, with respect to the long operational is merely senseless violence. The strategic lated—by its doctrine. This article argues that line is a single point in space and a single direction of a war needs to be intimately the existing understanding of the meaning moment in time.”5 Echoing Carl von connected to the details of the warfare being and role of operational art is based on poor Clausewitz—“The field of battle in the face of conducted to ensure both that it is making strategy is no more than a point; in precisely realistic demands and that the warfare in the face of today’s the same way the duration of battle reduces to remains appropriate to the wider conduct a single moment in time”—Isserson describes of the war. Moreover, tactics need to be complexity, the understanding Napoleonic war as the era of single-point constantly seeking to contribute to the ends and managing of war as a strategy since “the entire mission of a military laid down by strategy with economy and whole are shared across a leader was reduced to concentrating all his efficiency, and with nuance shaped by an bureaucracy forces at one point and throwing them into awareness of the wider conduct of the war. battle as a one act tactical phenomenon.”6 A two-way conversation between strategy In this context, the closely contem- and tactics is fundamental to the successful theoretical foundations, is implicated in a poraneous Austro-Prussian (1866) and prosecution of any war. pattern of U.S. failures of strategy, and is not Franco-Prussian (1870–1871) wars marked a Sound theory attempts to deal with able to accommodate the evolution of warfare watershed. The war of 1866 demonstrated the this reality. The German school of military as it is currently anticipated. strategy of a single point—Koniggratz—but, theorists that emerged around the end of by 1870, the larger armies and more expansive the 18th century, for example, saw war as a From Strategies of a Single Point to theater of operations created new needs. In “giant demonic force, a huge spiritual entity, Modern Campaigns 1870–1871, there were many battles that influ- surcharged with brutal energy.”2 For those The need for operations was a product enced each other and that extended through responsible for the management of this beast, of changes brought about by the Napoleonic time and across space. War had outgrown the

110 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Kelly and Brennan

U.S. Soldier on patrol outside Forward Operating Base Salie, Baghdad

U.S. Army (Albino Mendoza III) strategy of a single point. Whereas in 1866 all to dissolve into an uncoordinated brawl. A a common leading thought, and not arbitrarily the Prussian armies moved toward Konig- framework to direct it was required and, at or accidentally strung together, is a matter of gratz, in 1870 the Germans’ frontage was 100 the latest, by 1895 one had emerged and is course, and does not remove the distinction. kilometers in their assembly areas, immedi- described by Colmar von der Goltz: Again, among certain operations a more ately increasing to 150 kilometers as the force intimate relationship will generally be brought advanced. The defeat of France required four In the course of military events there will about by the fact that they are conducted under discrete combat links: Spicheren-Werth, Metz, always be separate groups of affairs springing similar circumstance, at the same time of year, Sedan, and Paris, each of which represented into prominence, the parts of which are more against the same hostile army and are sepa- a cluster of lesser battles of varying scale. intimately connected with each other than the rated from the rest of the operations through This meant that battle, instead of occurring preceding or subsequent occurrences. Military conditions of time or space, change of oppo- in a single place with the mass of forces of activity then tends with livelier interest towards nents or alteration in the method of conducting both sides engaged, became distributed into a a special object and leaves all others to one the war. Such an association of operations is number of subordinate battles across a some- side, or subordinates them, until the former is called a “campaign,” which forms a definite times expanding front. As a result, “[Helmuth attained. After that, a certain abatement, or portion of the war.9 von] Moltke was faced with a completely perhaps a brief pause for recuperation, may be new problem of coordinating and directing observed until a more rapid course of action is Therefore, by the end of the 19th combat efforts, tactically dissociated and dis- again adopted, and, in a manner, a new idea, a century, there was an understanding that persed in space to achieve the overall aim of second objective, becomes visible. the evolution of warfare, increasing size of defeating the enemy.”7

As a consequence of this realization, th toward the end of the 19th century, German by the end of the 19 century, there was an understanding that thinking included awareness “that the battle- conditions had led to the need to group tactical actions into field had grown larger and deadlier. Battles operations and to group operations into campaigns and engagements had lost their distinctiveness and would blend into an all-encompassing Every such group of actions will be armies, improvements in firepower, com- ‘Gesamtschlact’ [overall battle] that might composed of marches, the assumption of munications, and logistics, and consequent extend across the entire width and depth of positions, and combats, and is called an expansion of theaters of operations had the theatre of war.”8 Of course, without some “operation.” . . . That the different groups of created new conditions. These conditions unification, the Gesamtschlact would threaten occurrences . . . must be connected by the bond of had led to the need to group tactical actions ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 111 FEATURES | The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art into operations and to group operations Giving the New Kid a Name form of engagement in the armies of the past, into campaigns. As a result, strategy was It was the Soviets who gave us the term which fought on shorter fronts.12 faced with problems of a complexity that operational art. Although the term operation were new to it. Rather than war planning in its special meaning of a sequenced group Tukhachevsky and his colleagues saw involving the design of a single campaign of tactical actions had been around since the maneuver as having physical rather than focused on creating the opportunity for second half of the 19th century, the identifica- moral objectives—the Soviets wanted to a single decisive battle, it now involved a tion and codification of operational art had annihilate the enemy. As a result, Tukh- need to plan possibly several campaigns, to await the arrival of the socialist state. The achevsky was quite clear that “an operation is each of which was itself a cluster of dis- Soviets, guided by dialectical materialism, the organized struggle of each of the armies crete, and largely foreseen, operations found it necessary to distill “science” out of for the destruction of the men and material intended to achieve intermediate objec- the universal experience of war and as a result of the other. Not the destruction of some tives, the summation of which represented produced a comprehensive and multipartite hypothetical, abstract nervous system of the the objective of the campaign as a whole. taxonomy of its components.10 In Soviet army, but destruction of the real organism— The summation of the objectives of each usage, military science was understood as a the troops and real nervous system of the of the campaigns, in turn, represented the system of knowledge facilitating the under- opponent, the army’s communications, must objectives of the war. standing of practical experience. Military be the operational goal.”13 At the same time, the need to coordi- art, as a subset of military science, involved This statement encapsulates the two nate multiple blows distributed across time the application of this system of knowledge dominant streams in Russian operational art: and space but supporting a single unifying in practical situations.11 Operational art, a successive operations (the infliction of a series idea broadened the understanding of the subset of military art, combined tactics and of damaging blows) with deep operations (the campaign (adding a geographic meaning to logistics to assemble a series of tactical prob- linking of these blows to achieve penetrations its previous temporal one) and created the lems intended to achieve an intermediate aim of increasing depth until the enemy defensive special meaning of operation that we retain within a campaign. zone, including deep reserves, had been today. Within the campaign, clusters of tac- By 1923, Mikhail Tukhachevsky had tical actions, grouped in time or location, begun to articulate the broad shape of Soviet and pursuing their own unifying idea—but operational art: because single decisive battles one subordinate to that of the campaign— were no longer expected, the formed individual operations. The arrange- Since it is impossible, with the extended fronts path to the annihilation of the ment of these tactical actions and the reten- of modern times, to destroy the enemy’s army enemy needed to be broken tion of their focus on the campaign intent at a single blow, we are obligated to try to do into a series of operations formed the entirety of the new, and as yet this gradually by operations which will be nameless, kid on the block—operational more costly to the enemy than to ourselves. . . . art. Whereas in 1866, the congruence of the In short, a series of destructive operations pierced and the conditions for mobile warfare war, the campaign, and the Battle of Konig- conducted on logical principles and linked thereby reestablished). This would create the gratz made operational art unnecessary, by together by an uninterrupted pursuit may take conditions for the encirclement and subse- 1870–1871, it had become essential. the place of the decisive battle that was the quent annihilation of large enemy groups. These two ideas were eventually combined in Soviet deep operations theory, in which a deep attack was understood as simultaneously destroying, suppressing, and pinning down President Obama meets with security team on Pakistan, not only those defending forces designated to October 2009 repel an attack from the front, but also those located well behind the front. The evolution of the theory of the deep attack took place in conjunction with a refine- ment in Soviet understanding of operations and operational art. Because single decisive battles were no longer expected, the path to the achievement of the annihilation of the enemy needed to be broken into a series of operations. Operations were understood as a sequence of tactical actions that were:

directed towards the achievement of a certain intermediate goal in a certain theatre of mili- tary operations. . . . On the basis of the goal

White House (Pete Souza) of an operation, Operational Art sets forth a

112 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Kelly and Brennan whole series of tactical missions . . . [and] dic- sequence of simultaneous and sequential (courses of action), and means (instruments tates the basic line of conduct of an operation, battles connected by a unifying idea and by which some end can be achieved).18 If we depending on the material available, the time intended to defeat an enemy force. This accept this, we can conclude that strategy which may be allotted for the handling of dif- original error was further developed in the necessarily requires the simultaneous con- ferent tactical missions, the forces which may 1986 version of FM 100–5 when the term sideration of ends, ways, and means. In the be deployed . . . and finally the nature of the operational art was introduced to the Ameri- case of a specific conflict, the choice of ways operation itself.14 can lexicon and defined as “the employment includes campaign design: the decisions on of military forces to attain strategic goals in a whom, where, and how to fight. Campaign In this, there is a clear hierarchy of respon- theater through the design [emphasis added], design would also include a clear view on sibilities: strategy frames the campaign; that organization and conduct of campaigns and the scheme of maneuver, the operations that is, it defines the theater, sets objectives, and major operations.”17 This new and heretical seem likely to be necessary, and therefore the allocates resources while the campaign com- understanding of operations and operational resources required. Failure to complete this mander, working within this framework, art spread through the Anglophone world like examination, or errors in its completion, risks decides on the successive operations necessary a virus, and, with minor variations in spell- seeking to achieve too much with too little to achieve his campaign objectives.15 ing, the same definitions appeared in British, or, conversely, incurring opportunity costs Canadian, and Australian military doctrine that might detract from the prosecution of The Heresy Emerges by the early 1990s and remain relatively the wider conflict. Equally, each individual In 1982, the U.S. Army published a unchanged to this day. campaign needs to be examined in the revised version of Field Manual (FM) 100–5, There is nothing wrong with ascribing wider strategic context to ensure that the Operations, which described how the Army new meanings to existing terms, and therefore ends-ways-means rationale for it internally intended to fight. The 1982 version formed a the FM 100–5 definition is not necessarily is in accordance with the higher direction of key component in the post-Vietnam renais- wrong. However, in this case it has the perni- national strategy and is politically sustainable sance that was sweeping through the Army cious effect of perverting the original purpose through its planned duration. In this context, at the time. The advent of the all-volunteer of operational art—facilitating the two-way operations—as a sequence of tactical actions force brought with it a renewal of military conversation between tactics and strategy— and tactics, actual battles, and engagements— professionalism in the widest sense, and and instead, in association with a discrete clearly come under the category of means. this flowed into approaches to training and and influential level of command, actually Pleasingly, this analysis seems to lead to education as well as how the Army as an works to weaken this connection. The mis- a model broadly in accordance with Scharn- institution viewed war and preparation for it. understanding of the role of operational art horst’s and Clausewitz’s direction that we con- Most importantly for our purposes, however, proselytized in FM 100–5 and the creation of sider war as a whole. Furthermore, it appar- it introduced to the U.S. Army the idea of the the notion of an “operational level of war” has ently encapsulates the idea of war as a gestalt operational level of war. led it to assume a level of independence that and offers opportunities for the multiple It is not clear how the German view of has usurped the role of strategy and thereby loops and connections that recognize war as a war as a whole or the Soviet recognition of resisted the role that politics should play in complex, adaptive system. This model, shown operational art became translated, in Ameri- campaign planning. in figure 1, is broadly in accordance with can usage, into a discrete level of war existing Art Lykke, in an influential article in theory and is entirely consonant with German somewhere between strategy and tactics, but 1989, described strategy as consisting of ends and Soviet approaches to operational art. In therein lies the source of much subsequent (objectives toward which one strives), ways contrast, however, if we conduct a similar confusion. This confusion is demonstrated in the single paragraph that introduced this new species to the military menagerie: Figure 1. Ends, Ways, and Means in War as a Whole

The Operational Level of War involves plan- ning and conducting campaigns. Campaigns ENDS are sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy force in a specified place and time WAYS with simultaneous and sequential battles. The disposition of forces, selection of objectives and Operations actions to weaken or outmaneuver the enemy Strategy MEANS and all set the terms for the next battle and exploit Tactics tactical gains. They are all part of the opera- tional level of war.16

Here, FM 100–5 removes from strategy its traditional role of planning campaigns and conflates the term campaign with what the Soviets would recognize as an operation—a ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 113 FEATURES | The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art

Figure 2. The Continuum of War Despite tactical successes, the failure to adequately involve the strategic level in campaign planning is manifest in America’s National Security Strategy recent wars. The 1990–1991 Gulf War is an STRATEGIC ENDS National Military Strategy example. In this single campaign, there were Theater Strategy two successful examples of operational art: Operation Instant Thunder, the air opera- tion to shape the environment, and Desert Storm, the ground operation to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Despite the clear success OPERATIONAL WAYS Operational of both operations, the 1991 campaign was not sufficient to end the war with Iraq—for that, a succession of additional campaigns was required, and it apparently is only now coming to a conclusion. TACTICAL MEANS Tactical The Iraq War that began in 2003 is another instructive example of the problems of the existing doctrinal approach. In 2003, who was responsible for anticipating that analysis with a discrete level of war and its sional jurisdiction. In this context, operational the campaign to remove Saddam would associated level of command, a hierarchical art, as defined in the 1985 version of the pam- necessarily be followed by one to establish a model emerges such as that in figure 2. phlet, represents the pinnacle of the profession successor regime? To simply answer “Bush” This, the “continuum of war” model, is in of arms. It was therefore both a product of or “Rumsfeld” is to hide what has become a accordance with most extant Western doctrine the self-perception of the U.S. military and a doctrinal void. Political leaders are no longer and reflects what Eliot Cohen has referred to necessary input to it. This arguably is the true routinely students of war. Therefore, there is a as the “Huntingtonian” or “normal” theory reason for the unchallenged theoretical sole- need that they be supported to prevent them of civil-military relations.19 In this model, it cism that appeared in FM 100–5 in 1982. from demanding the unachievable. Equally, is the “duty of the statesman to formulate a Unfortunately, the hierarchical separa- though, they need to be made fully aware of ‘clear, concise and unambiguous declaration of tion of levels of war on which the continuum the costs and risks attendant on the choices national policy’ to guide the military.”20 Once of war is based is not reflected in practice. being offered to them. These costs and risks this declaration is provided, the politicians Strategy is free to expand, contract, or alter span fields as diverse as minor tactics and should simply get out of the way and let the its objectives as circumstances create new international economics, and they are not military get on with its job. As the Command opportunities or foreclose others, or as amenable to consideration at the provincial and General Staff School wrote in 1936: the costs-and-benefits calculus alters. The headquarters of a combatant commander or connection between war and politics gives even in the office of a Secretary of Defense. politics and strategy are radically and funda- strategy functionality, and therefore war is Binding the conduct of a campaign to that mentally things apart. Strategy begins where necessarily vested with the same volatility of a war and ensuring the war contributes to politics ends. All that soldiers ask is that once as politics. Any attempt in theory to insulate the state’s role in the march of history are the the policy is settled, strategy and command the practical conduct of war from this volatil- embodiment of the idea that war is an exten- shall be regarded as something in a sphere ity is erroneous. This means there is not an sion of politics. apart from politics. . . . The line of demarca- overlap between strategy, operational art, and The 2007 “surge” was conducted when tion must be drawn between politics and strat- tactics; they are completely fused. Tactical President George W. Bush, substantially alone, egy, supply and operations. Having found this actions necessarily carry strategic implica- balanced the economic, diplomatic, strategic, line, all sides must abstain from trespassing.21 tions, and strategy conceptualizes, creates, political, and military costs and benefits of the and applies tactical forces, as well as shaping alternatives available to him and chose to fight Although this is admittedly an extreme their diplomatic, economic, demographic, on. This was a return to “classic” campaigning view which was written in 1936, it continues and operational environments. An American in which the head of state, rather than merely to echo today, and “a simplified Hunting- soldier on a street corner in Baghdad personi- acceding to the advice proffered, laid out the tonian concept remains the dominant view fies not only a strategic decision to invade objectives and constraints of the campaign within the American defence establishment,” Iraq, but also the entire political, social, diplo- and chose the general who would be respon- with the Caspar Weinberger and Colin Powell matic, cultural, and economic evolution of the sible. It is almost unique in recent U.S. history. doctrines reflecting its continuing authority.22 United States from its colonial origins. The The more familiar disjunctions among The existence of an independent level of actions of this strategic private carry military, politics, strategy, campaign planning, and the war, served by its own level of command and Iraqi domestic political, U.S. domestic politi- conduct of operations were also demonstrated operating free from unwelcome interference cal, and international political implications. in Somalia (1992) and Kosovo (1998). from strategy, represents the foundation on Any attempt to conceptually separate tactics What allowed the conduct of a war and which the U.S. military defines its profes- from strategy denies this connection. strategy to become so disjointed? Strategic

114 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Kelly and Brennan failure cannot be sheeted home to any one that perpetuates the failing identified by as described in FM 100–5, operational art idea or problem but rather tends, like most many. By conflating two very different ideas, became the principal focus for a “level of accidents, to be the result of a confluence of the United States (and the Anglophone world war” and assumed the responsibility for otherwise unconnected errors. The aim of in lockstep) has reinforced the difficulty of the campaign planning. In time, the vigor of this military doctrine, planning, and organiza- strategic management of wars and exposed an conception reduced political leadership to tion is to reduce the number of errors being Achilles’ heel. At the same time, by expanding the role of “strategic sponsors” and quite spe- made in order to reduce the frequency of the meaning of operational art to be nearly cifically intervened to widen the gap between these accidents. Not everything is within the all-encompassing, the detailed examination politics and strategy. The result has been control of military leadership, but doctrine of its necessary evolution is prejudiced. When a well-demonstrated ability to win battles largely is. Current U.S. doctrine creates a gap the United States finds itself fighting Serbia, that have not always contributed to strategic success: “a way of battle rather than a way of war.” The creation of an operational level not everything is within the control of military leadership, but of war undid a lot of good work—to connect doctrine largely is politics and tactics—that had been done by theorists since Clausewitz. between politics and war, whereas “good” Somali warlords, or failed and failing second- This pernicious solecism has confused our doctrine should acknowledge both the need and third-rank states, these weaknesses may response to the continuing evolution of warfare. to fully engage political leadership and the be apparent but their consequences manage- At a time when the connections between national bureaucracy in campaign planning able. If, at some time in the future, the United tactics and politics are being continuously and the challenges of doing so. Good doctrine States finds itself at war with a great power, strengthened and exploited by actual and does not guarantee success but at least offers a these theoretical obfuscations may prove to be putative enemies, we have stretched the promising start. more damaging. meaning of operational art until it has become The U.S. military’s decision to extend Rather than meeting its original a near synonym for the entirety of warfare. In the meaning of operational art to encompass purpose of contributing to the attainment of combination with its role as a defining com- campaign planning is a theoretical dead end campaign objectives laid down by strategy, ponent of the jurisdiction of the profession of

Iraqi residents survey damage from a truck bomb explosion in Tal Afar U.S. Army (Robert C. Brogan)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 115 FEATURES | The Leavenworth Heresy and the Perversion of Operational Art arms, it has prevented us from beginning to ­resultant self-imposed strategic surprise that 8 Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: make the institutional adaptations necessary needs to be dealt with as the war progresses. German Military Thinkers Before the Great War to cope with the increasing connectedness of The result has been characterized as (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 212. 9 This is the first mention that the authors the more-military and less-military aspects of “compression” of the operational level of can find of the use of the term operation with its contemporary warfare. war, in which the strategic level is charged special meaning. See Colmar von der Goltz, The If operational art is the entirety of with being guilty of intrusion into the realms Conduct of War (1895), section 8, “The Operations,” warfare, from campaign design down to of operations and tactics. Rather than the a photocopy of which (produced by the U.S. Army battalion level—and if it is principally the operational level being compressed, strategy War College Art of War colloquium in February purview of the military—then the type is reasserting its role and attempting to meet 1983) is in possession of the authors. of “national campaigns” envisaged in the its responsibilities, but in the face of the dual 10 The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, xiii– joint operating environment, seeking the resistances presented by the enemy and a dys- xviii, describes this taxonomy in detail. coherent and direct application of all of functional military doctrine. 11 A.A. Svechin, “Strategy and Operational the elements of national power, are beyond Art,” in The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 7. 12 our reach. Perhaps we should use the term The term operational art can, in the James J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet strategic art to encompass the bureaucratic end, mean anything we want it to mean, but Warfare State (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), effort required to deal with the types of it cannot usefully mean everything we pres- 178. diffuse, nuanced, and complex problems ently think it does. It is not at all clear that 13 M. Tukhachevsky, “Voyna Klopov,” Revo- envisioned in the joint operating environ- interagency operational art is practical or that lutsiya i voyna, no. 22 (1923), quoted in Jacob Kipp, ment. At present, operational art has filled a logical line of operation seeking to establish “Two Views of Warsaw: The Russian Civil War that space—as it surreptitiously threatens to the rule of law can truly be said to contain and Soviet Operational Art, 1920–1932,” in B.J. fill the space occupied by tactics and even opportunities for operational art. Arguably, McKerchner and M.C. Hennessy, eds., The Opera- minor tactics. If battalion commanders are we are here confusing operational art and tional Art: Developments in the Theory of War operational artists, then surely the strategic purposeful action. To be useful, trainable, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 53. Tukhachevsky also needs to be one. and applicable, operational art needs to have wrote the preface to the Russian version of Fuller’s Despite the doctrine that is presently meaningful boundaries. Reformation of War, in which he challenges much published by the world’s militaries, there is It is time we returned operational of what Fuller had to say. The foreword in its entirety is reproduced in Richard E. Simpkin, Deep no evidence that politicians are content to art to its enclosure. Operational art is not Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevsky set concrete objectives and then sit back and the entirety of warfare. It is not the design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and passively watch the conduct of a war for which and conduct of campaigns. It is not an General Staff College, 1991), 125–134. they are responsible to both their domestic interagency problem. Operational art is the 14 Svechin, quoted in Schneider, 175. and international audiences now and for the thoughtful sequencing of tactical action to 15 Vladimir Triandafillov, “The Nature of rest of history. The U.S. theory of an opera- achieve a subordinate objective within a cam- Operations of Modern Armies,” in Schneider, 191. tional level of war charged with campaign paign. Good operational art, demonstrated as 16 Field Manual 100–5, Operations planning and working in conjunction with often as necessary to support the achievement (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the of campaign objectives, ensures that tactical Army, 1982), 2–3. 17 actions contribute to the attainment of the Australia defines the operational level of an operational level of war purpose of a war. JFQ war as “the planning and conduct of campaigns charged with campaign and major operations in order to achieve strategic objectives.” See Australian Defence Force Doctrine N o t e s planning and working Publication–D, Foundations of Australian Military in conjunction with the Doctrine (2002), paragraph 3–9. British Defence 1 From John G. Nicolay and John M. Hay, Doctrine (JDPO–01 2008, paragraph 231) describes post–Goldwater-Nichols Lincoln, quoted in Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme the operational level of war as “the level at which hierarchy threatens effective Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002), 51. campaign planning within a theatre or area of operations.” 2 Herbert Rosinski, “Scharnhorst to Schlief- 18 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an fen: The Rise and Decline of German Military Understanding of Military Strategy,” in U.S. Army the existing post–Goldwater-Nichols hierar- Thought,” Naval War College Review 29 (Summer War College Guide to Strategy, ed. Joseph R. Cerami chy threatens effective campaign planning. 1976), 85. and James F. Holcolm, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Specifically, it threatens to resist close engage- 3 Ibid., 103. U.S. Army War College, 2001), 179–185. ment with the political and bureaucratic 4 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical 19 Cohen, appendix. leadership until either strategic pressures Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 345. 20 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the 5 G.S. Isserson, “The Evolution of Operational become intolerable, at which time the “10,000- State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela- Art,” in The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art: mile screwdriver” pierces the carapace of tions (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 307–308. 1927–1991—The Documentary Basis, ed. H.S. Oren- the operational commander—often to his 21 Ibid.; Cohen, 228. stein (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 55. chagrin—or, more usually, it means that a 22 Cohen, 229. 6 Ibid. campaign is undertaken without the strategic 7 Ibid., 59. level being fully engaged in examination of the ends-ways-means interaction, with

116 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Soldiers graduate from Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Advanced Individual Training

U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Public Affairs

Can the Army Become a Learning Organization? A Question Reexamined

By A n t h o n y J . D i B e l l a n 1994, after serving as an organizational consultant for General Gordon Sullivan, then–U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Margaret Wheat- ley wrote an article about the U.S. Army becoming a learning I organization. Wheatley, a new-age social scientist and author of Leadership and the New Science, had been solicited by Sullivan to see how the Army could benefit from the buzz about learning organizations that was then sweeping corporate America. It has been 15 years since that writing, during which time there has been a great deal of research on learning organizations. This article revisits the title of Wheatley’s essay in light of recent research and military experience.1 In doing so, it lays out an integrated approach for building learning capability in any organiza- tional setting, large or small, military or otherwise. Over the years, the U.S. military has won more wars than it has lost, but has had to do so with changing tactics in the context of chang- Dr. Anthony J. DiBella is a Faculty Member in the ing circumstances, be they political, economic, or social-cultural. For National Security and Decisionmaking Department at some time, it has been recognized that the Army is apt to face a growing the Naval War College. diversity and number of missions, and it was that sense of urgency in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 117 FEATURES | Can the Army Become a Learning Organization? the 1990s that prompted General Sullivan to focus on the Service’s need to learn. The latest admonition for this requirement appears in the preface to the Army/Marine Corps coun- terinsurgency manual.2 It reaffirms the need to change and adapt as a perennial require- ment of our military, a thesis reflected in this statement from General David Petraeus:

We’ve been reminded through hard experience that it’s imperative to continue to learn and adapt . . . to identify and share lessons learned and best practices; and to strive to ensure that our units are learning organizations. What works today may not work tomorrow, we must remain alert to that reality.3

In citing Wheatley back in 1994, Sul- livan claimed that the Army already was a learning organization.4 If that was indeed the case, why was it so slow to respond to the GEN Petraeus recognizes importance of Iraqi insurgency, and why Petraeus’s recent ongoing learning and adaptation reaffirmation? One explanation may be that U.S. Navy (William Selby) Sullivan’s focus was force structure, while Petraeus’s concern has been strategy and As the number of definitions of the Learning does not occur spontaneously or tactics. It is one thing to have a nimble and learning organization grew, several clear naturally since organizations resist change more easily deployable force, but it is another themes emerged. Among them was the dis- and invest in activities that have immediate to have a force whose approach to combat is tinction and interdependence of individual impact rather than those whose impact is improvisational. Another explanation may level learning and organizational learning, uncertain or long-term. However, with delib- be a lack of understanding about the Army’s and that one could not exist without the other. erate effort, leaders and managers can and learning capabilities. Another theme was that learning is linked should build learning organizations.11 to adaptation, whether to external events or In the developmental perspective, learn- A Matter of Perspective knowledge gained internally through experi- ing organizations can be realized through It is difficult to know what Generals Sul- ence. One point of commonality was the the strategic actions of their leaders but only livan and Petraeus know about learning orga- necessity for organizations to learn. That sense through a progression of stages, whether nizations. However, it is clear that they are big of urgency was first characterized by Arie de by evolutionary or revolutionary means.12 advocates of them. The learning organization Geus, who claimed that the only sustainable In effect, learning organizations develop as concept was popularized by Peter Senge, who way to stay ahead of one’s competitors was to a function of their own lifecycles such that described it, in part, as a “place where people learn faster than they did.8 In essence, that learning styles vary over time. Typically, the continually expand their capacity to create the concept underlies General Petraeus’s approach learning characteristics of a startup will differ results they truly desire.”5 Unfortunately, with to counterinsurgency.9 One must be as flexible from those of a well-established organiza- popularity came pretentiousness and vulgar- and adaptive as one’s foes, if not more. tion operating in a more stable environment. ity and efforts by many scholars and practitio- For example, the creation of U.S. Africa ners to redefine the concept or reconceptual- Arie de Geus claimed that the Command as an entirely new structural entity ize it altogether. For some, Senge’s definition within the Department of Defense provides sounded too grandiose or Pollyannaish and only sustainable way to stay new possibilities for learning compared to thus was not taken seriously. Others offered ahead of one’s competitors was those in existing combatant commands. definitions and methodologies to make the to learn faster than they did Both the normative and developmental concept actionable. For example, David perspectives focus on the problems and dif- Garvin defined a learning organization as one Over time, practitioner focus has ficulties in promoting learning in organiza- “skilled at creating, acquiring, and transfer- shifted from definitions to techniques and tions. When organizations fail to establish the ring knowledge, and at modifying its behavior methodologies, and three approaches or per- necessary conditions, they suffer from learn- to reflect new knowledge and insights.”6 spectives have emerged: normative, develop- ing disabilities. These disabilities occur due Even more simply, Peter Kline and Bernard mental, and capability.10 Within the norma- to the fundamental ways in which individuals Saunders defined a learning organization as tive school, learning organizations are viewed have been trained to think and act and from “a viable and vital means for developing a as a particular type of organization charac- barriers to discovering and utilizing solutions culture of high performance learners.”7 terized by a specific set of internal conditions. to organizational problems.13 Organizations

118 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Dibella fail to learn because it is difficult, if not conditions for learning to occur. A strictly dimension with no judgment made as to impossible, to see the long-term consequences normative approach would only focus on correct position along each continuum. Dif- of their actions and decisions due to time lags. normative factors. In fact, that is exactly ferent organizations will exhibit different Learning is avoided when leaders attribute orientations, and the combination of positions failure not to internal causes but to conditions on all seven LOrs reflects learning styles. in the external environment or to factors that existing learning patterns reflect Figure 2 shows the set of seven LOrs that in cannot be controlled. Organizations may learning styles, and these may aggregate depict the critical dimensions of suffer from amnesia (lack of organizational be developed over time learning capability. memory), superstition (biased interpretation Organizations gain knowledge directly of experience), paralysis (inability to act), and the approach taken in an assessment of the through the experiences of their own person- schizophrenia (lack of coordination among Army War College that utilized Senge’s nor- nel and indirectly through the experiences organizational constituencies).14 mative model.15 of other organizations. These contrasting Rather than focusing on why learning Research has validated an integrated approaches are captured by the first LOr, is problematic for organizations, another framework that can be used to assess or Knowledge Source: one approach reflects approach considers how learning is innate profile overall learning capability.16 It con- internal sources, the other external ones. to organizations. In this third perspec- sists of a set of 17 elements, 7 descriptive The Center for Army Lessons Learned is tive (capability), the concept of a learning learning orientations, and 10 normative a repository of insights gained from after- organization is as redundant as the notion facilitating factors. This model has been action reviews. Its focus is internal in that of a breathing mammal. The focus is not on tested and used in a variety of contexts and is the lessons are from the United States rather becoming a learning organization but on depicted simply in figure 1. than foreign militaries. On the other hand, learning processes that already exist. Learn- the United States has learned about counter- ing processes are embedded in organiza- Learning Orientations insurgency from the British, who represent tional culture and structure, both formal and Learning Orientations (LOrs) represent an external source. informal, and there is no one best way for the ways learning takes place and the nature The second LOr, Content-process Focus, organizations to learn. of what is learned. These orientations reflect refers to the preference for knowledge related From this perspective, the question by patterns that shape an organization’s learning to the nature of what the organization does Wheatley is misleading, if not outright non- capability. Each LOr is a bipolar ­continuous as opposed to knowledge about the processes sensical. More appropriate questions would be: How does the Army learn and why? Figure 1. Two Parts of Organizational Learning Capability What does it learn? And how is that learning aligned with its mission and strategy? The balance of this article presents a methodol- ogy for addressing these questions using an FACILITATING approach that integrates insights from each FACTORS of the three perspectives. LEARNING CAPABILITIES An Integrated Approach The first step in developing the Army LEARNING ORIENTATIONS as a learning system is to recognize its profile of current learning capability. The second is to specify a profile that is more aligned with its strategic objectives. The third is the formulation of a change management plan to bridge any gaps. This approach incorporates Figure 2. Learning Orientations the capability perspective that the Army has a culture, and embedded within that culture is a LEARNING patterned set of processes that promote learn- ORIENTATIONS ing. Of course, it could be suggested that the Name Army is not simply a single culture but a series Approach of subcultures (for example, intelligence, Knowledge Source internal >> external artillery, armor), and learning varies between Content-process Focus content >> process different functional units. Consequently, one Knowledge Reserve personal >> public can view the Army as having a portfolio of Dissemination Mode formal >> informal learning practices. Learning Scope incremental >> transformative Value-chain Focus Existing learning patterns reflect design/make >> market/deliver Learning Focus learning styles, and these may be devel- individual >> group oped over time. Normative factors set the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 119 FEATURES | Can the Army Become a Learning Organization? whereby its mission is accomplished. The design, creation (build, manufacture, and so bilities. That experience (internal Knowledge Army, much like the rest of American society, forth), and delivery has been categorized as Source), if processed well, can be an abundant is action oriented. That translates into an orien- the value chain.18 Each activity, or link in the and continuous source of learning. The tation toward knowing what needs to be done chain, provides an opportunity to increase Army’s after-action review process is repre- (content or mission focus) and doing it rather value. Organizations can invest in learning at sentative of this form of learning.20 By analyz- than reflecting on how to do it (process focus). various stages along the chain. ing its experience, a team or Service branch Where does the knowledge within the The sixth LOr, Value-chain Focus, can correct mistakes and errors and thereby Army reside? Is it in the heads of its officers or represents the choices that an organization make incremental improvements to actions in written-down policies and procedures? The can make either explicitly or tacitly in terms already designed and implemented (see figure third LOr, Knowledge Reserve, reflects these of its learning priorities. Accepting Samuel 3, cell 1: correction). preferences and patterns. If an officer wanted Huntington’s claim that the military’s role is When an organization conducts to access, for example, what the Army has the management of violence, the focus of the research to promote completely new ways of learned about special tactics, would he look up Army is clearly delivery rather than design.19 working or doing, it rethinks what it does, the rules of engagement in Army Knowledge It is one thing to learn a trade or be why, and how. For example, developing the Online or phone a fellow West Point gradu- trained to perform some technical func- Future Combat System requires new knowl- ate now serving in special operations? The tion; it is quite another to learn to perform edge and new insights into combat. That answer to that question would point toward that function in the context of a work team. the Army’s dominant orientation. Becoming certified in some professions, such when an organization Quite separate from the location of as an airline pilot, engine mechanic, or sonar conducts research to promote an organization’s knowledge is the means technician, is apt to require individual learn- whereby that knowledge is accessed and dis- ing. However, the successful performance of completely new ways of seminated. This characteristic is captured that skill or function depends on the ability working or doing, it rethinks by the fourth LOr, Dissemination Mode. The to coordinate one’s action with others. That what it does, why, and how publication of this article in a journal repre- challenge leads to the distinction between sents formal dissemination of knowledge. On individual versus group Learning Focus, the knowledge may be based on different assump- the other hand, serendipitous meetings and last LOr. Prior to deployment, Army troops tions about tactics and would be transforma- conversations in officers’ clubs throughout customarily train and learn together since tive in scope (cell 2: innovation). the world are an informal mode of dissemi- their roles are interdependent. By studying the experiences of others nating knowledge. Once an organization is profiled in or collecting data about what is going on in One common issue in the literature terms of its learning orientations, such data the environment, our military can acquire on organizational learning is the distinction can be used to further understand learning knowledge from external sources (external between single- and double-loop learning.17 capability. Learning styles are a function Knowledge Source). When that information The contrast pertains to knowledge about of LOrs and can be identified by matrixing is combined with what is already known or improving what one is already doing based pairs of LOrs. For example, figure 3 shows done, adaptation occurs through incremental on a given set of assumptions versus examin- the matrixing of LOr 1, Knowledge Source change (cell 3: adaptation). For example, as ing and altering the assumptions underlying (internal versus external), with LOr 5, Learn- combat troops encounter intelligence about one’s actions. The former leads to revising ing Scope (incremental versus transforma- what our foes are doing, they can use that tools or techniques, while the latter leads to tive). The result is a typology of four different information to redesign or reconfigure strate- entirely new ways of thinking due to a change styles: correction, innovation, adaptation, gies or tactics to maintain their usefulness. in mindset. The fifth LOr, Learning Scope, and acquisition. Some forms of learning, especially the captures these distinct approaches. Every day, Soldiers gain experience in transformative type, require a major invest- Incremental improvements can enhance the performance of their duties and responsi- ment in resources, especially money, time, or organizational performance, but environmen- tal changes may require more fundamental or Figure 3. Learning Style as Determined by Knowledge Source and transformative change. For example, stabiliz- Learning Scope ing security in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein required that U.S. forces realize 3. 4. how the nature of the conflict had radi- Internal adaptation acquisition cally changed to asymmetric warfare. That demanded a very different type of knowledge Knowledge Source that took some time to propagate because it 1. 2. was so different from what the bulk of our External correction innovation forces have learned to do historically. Organizations provide their clients, customers, or stakeholders with products or Incremental Transformative services that are of value to them. The thread Learning Scope that extends from product conceptualization,

120 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Dibella personnel. Rather than reinventing the wheel, the organization. Good news travels fast, and or error can also be embarrassing and thus so to speak, organizations with significant bad news travels faster. One way in which this socially unacceptable. financial resources may find it easier and characteristic has been captured is with the Openness to learning suggests a more efficient to simply go out to the external term Climate of Openness.23 It reflects the per- certain amount of humility by acknowledg- environment (external Knowledge Source) meability of boundaries such that knowledge ing that one does not know everything. In and purchase the capability they desire (cell essential to learning is shared, not hoarded or effect, an active learner may be perceived as 4: acquisition). For example, if a company in hidden. Through knowledge-sharing, people a fallible person by appearing to be incom- the private sector developed a new weapons working together can learn from and with one plete. However, in many organizations, system, the Army could go out and purchase another. Lessons from experience, successes, showing vulnerability is a sign of lack of it. This approach would be much more cost- and failures can be applied to improve per- confidence and a sure reason to be over- effective compared to the Army developing formance. Climate of Openness also reflects looked at promotion time. the system from scratch. the freedom that individuals feel to express When we know something, we can act The template of seven LOrs provides their opinions or debate issues that affect the on the basis of our knowledge, feel certain insight into the processes whereby learning organization’s overall effectiveness. that we are doing the correct thing, and occurs in an organization. A complete set of In organizations that lack a Climate project confidence about that. Openness and seven data points, one for each LOr, depicts in of Openness, the organization covers up the search for learning require tolerance of a descriptive way any organization’s learning mistakes, errors, and accidents. Absent ambiguity. In learning or inquiry mode, a profile. Such data does not indicate the speed learning, organizations replicate the past person must cope with some level of uncer- whereby learning is taking place or whether and fail to improve performance. It would tainty if only to sense that he is still searching the learning is aligned with the strategy of the take an empirical study to fully investigate for the correct decision to do the right thing. organization. However, it does provide a base- the extent to which Climate of Openness is In general, military culture rewards bravado line to understand current learning capability a characteristic of the Army or any other and the projection of confidence rather than and a platform to discuss desired capability, institution. However, it is possible to con- humility and the projection of uncertainty or which is promoted by normative elements. sider some key traits that constrain learning ambivalence. This value constrains openness. in light of military culture. Finally, in organizations where bad or Normative Side: Facilitating Factors Climate of Openness has been a focal misunderstood decisions can have disastrous The second major aspect of understand- point of Chris Argyris. He has argued that consequences, a high degree of control is ing and developing organizational learning organizational learning is severely limited placed on the discretionary authority of sub- capability relates to the inherent difficulties by the tendency of people to act defensively ordinates. In making clear the distribution in changing organizations. Learning is apt to and to overlook or hide errors to avoid pun- of power, so-called command and control challenge established ways of doing things. ishment.24 This tendency is compounded organizations such as the military constrain Learning also takes resources and attention away from activities that are seen as more pro- ductive. Consequently, a great deal of research the need for professionals and those in authority to be right has been conducted to identify those factors gets in the way of decisions being made based on experience that promote learning or establish conditions in which learning is more apt to occur. where individuals are rewarded for the very the free flow of data. Information must flow Focusing on this aspect brings us to the behaviors or values that prevent learning: through formal channels up and down the normative side of the model. For example, remaining in control, maximizing winning hierarchy. While there are very good reasons Senge advocates for five disciplines (personal and minimizing losing, suppressing negative why military institutions are run this way, mastery, mental models, shared vision, team feelings, and being as rational as possible.25 other institutions seem less constrained. In learning, systems thinking) that he claims In effect, the need for professionals and those effect, an organization’s command structure promote learning organizations.21 These in authority to be right gets in the way of need not dictate the flow of communication elements are not disciplines in the academic decisions being made based on experience. so essential for learning. sense but are five skill areas required for Furthermore, Argyris argues that while orga- Describing learning orientations and learning to occur. In another learning model, nizations may espouse the latter, they act on discerning facilitating factors is a basic start Garvin claims that learning organizations the basis of the former.26 to determining the learning capability of any are skilled at systematic problemsolving, In the military, “truth to power” is an organization. What remains unanswered experimentation, learning from experience, expression that reflects the need for a Soldier is the application of learning to the realiza- and transferring knowledge.22 Other lists can or Sailor to be truthful even if some fact or tion of the organization’s mission or desired be found in the writings of other learning opinion contradicts the view of someone outcomes. What should be of interest is not advocates. What they share is an emphasis on higher up the chain of command. However, learning per se but the impact of that learning prescription—that if certain skills or condi- what one also finds in any hierarchical relative to strategic directions. tions are not present, learning will not occur. organization is a conscious or subconscious If there is one common trait of learn- tendency to defer to those in authority or Building Capability ing organizations, it is that information and positions of command. Beyond avoiding Perhaps more critical than how learning knowledge flows freely up, down, and across conflict, the pointing out of some mistake occurs, as represented by learning orientations, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 121 FEATURES | Can the Army Become a Learning Organization? or why learning occurs, as indicated by that learning processes are embedded in all 11 Peter M. Senge, “The Leader’s New Work: facilitating factors such as Climate of Open- organizations. Building Learning Organizations,” Sloan Manage- ness, is what gets learned. Organizations that By understanding and utilizing how the ment Review (Fall 1990), 7–23. 12 John Kimberly and Robert Miles, The learn to design or implement strategies that Army learns, we can more readily promote Organizational Life-Cycle: Issues in the Creation, are misaligned with organizational demands new ways of combating our foes. For example, Transformation, and Decline of Organizations (San or missions serve no institutional purpose if our military and political leaders ordain Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980). (even though such action may benefit some that the Army learn counterinsurgency, then 13 William Snyder and Thomas Cummings, stakeholders with a vested interest in the status our Army leaders need to know what learn- “Organizational Learning Disabilities,” paper quo). Likewise, organizations may engage ing approaches can best make that happen. A presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of in dysfunctional or superstitious learning formal dissemination approach might be as Management, 1992. whereby biases and subjective judgments over- simple as printing up a lot of counterinsur- 14 Ibid. ride experience or objective realities.27 gency manuals and passing them out among 15 Peter Bucha, “The U.S. Army War College: For organizations to learn strategi- the troops. A more informal style could utilize A Model Learning Organization for the Army?” cally, learning resources and processes need online social networks and . Working Paper, USAWC Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996. to be directed toward the attainment of The Army is not and will never be one 16 DiBella and Nevis. See also Edwin C. Nevis, the organization’s mission and strategy for monolithic learning organization. However, Anthony J. DiBella, and Janet M. Gould, “Under- if learning advocates take an integrated achieving it. The military issues a variety of standing Organizations as Learning Systems,” strategy documents including the National approach, they will recognize the complexity Sloan Management Review (Winter 1995), 73–85; Military Strategy, National Defense Strategy, of the Army in its portfolio of learning ori- and Anthony J. DiBella, “An OD Approach to and Quadrennial Defense Review. Often, entations and practices. An important key is Building Organizational Learning Capability.” OD the implications of these strategies for force how the elements in the portfolio complement Practitioner 30, no. 3 (1998), 33–40. structure are clear. What is not explicit is the one another and how they enable our defense 17 See especially Chris Argyris and Donald establishment to maintain security in times Schon, Organizational Learning (Reading, MA: that are forever evolving. JFQ Addison-Wesley, 1978). organizational learning gets 18 Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage: Cre- to the capacity of the Army as ating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: Free Press, 1998). an institution and its ability as N o t e s a social system to learn from 19 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela- 1 Margaret J. Wheatley, “Can the U.S. Army experience tions (Cambridge: Press, 1957), Become a Learning Organization?” The Journal of 7–17. Quality and Participation 17, no. 2 (1994), 50–56. set of skills, competencies, and knowledge 20 Marilyn Darling, Charles Parry, and Joseph 2 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsur- the military needs to implement its strategies. Moore, “Learning in the Thick of It,” Harvard Busi- gency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago ness Review (July-August 2005), 1–8. Understanding an organization’s learning Press, 2007). 21 Senge, The Fifth Discipline. profile provides a guide to the most effective 3 David H. Petraeus, remarks to the Business 22 Garvin, “Building a Learning Organization.” way such competencies can be learned. Executives for National Security Eisenhower Award 23 DiBella and Nevis. The U.S. Army is an institution whose Dinner, New York, NY, November 19, 2008. 24 Chris Argyris, Strategy, Change and Defen- competence centers around the learning of its 4 Gordon R. Sullivan, “Leadership, Versatility sive Routines (New York: Putman, 1985) officers from their enrollment in its war col- and All that Jazz,” Military Review (August 1994), 25 Chris Argyris, “Teaching Smart People How leges to participation in after-action reviews. 5–13. to Learn,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 5 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art Men and women learn in various ways: by 1991), 99–109. See also Richard H. Kohn, “Tar- and Practice of the Learning Organization (New reading books, interacting with peers, and nished Brass,” World Affairs (Spring 2009), 79. York: Doubleday Currency, 1990). listening to lectures. Organizational learning 26 Argyris, “Teaching Smart People How to 6 David A. Garvin, “Building a Learning gets to the capacity of the Army as an institu- Learn,” 103. Organization,” Harvard Business Review (July- 27 Barbara Levitt and James March, “Organi- tion and its ability as a social system to learn August 1993), 78–91. zational Learning,” Annual Review of Sociology 14 from experience. 7 Peter Kline and Bernard Saunders, Ten Steps (1988), 319–340. Since Margaret Wheatley first posed the to a Learning Organization, 2d ed. (Arlington, VA: 28 See U.S. Army Training and Doctrine question about the Army becoming a learn- Great Ocean Publishers, 1998), 7. Command Pamphlet 525–3–7–01, The U.S. Army ing organization, research has suggested that 8 Arie De Geus, “Planning as Learning,” Study of the Human Dimension of the Future (Fort while the question is provocative, it is not the Harvard Business Review (March-April 1988), Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, 2008); Field right one to ask. Several Army publications 70–74. Manual 6–22, Army Leadership: Competent, Con- 9 David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterin- have since implicitly considered the question fident, and Agile (Washington, DC: Department of 28 surgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” by focusing primarily on normative models. the Army, 2006); Stephen J. Gerras, The Army as Military Review (January-February 2006), 2–12. Instead of seeing the learning organization a Learning Organization (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 10 Anthony J. DiBella and Edwin C. Nevis, concept from a normative, one-way-fits-all War College, 2002). How Organizations Learn: An Integrated Strategy perspective, a more generative, systems for Building Learning Capability (San Francisco: approach respects the idiosyncratic nature Jossey-Bass, 1998.) of all institutions while acknowledging

122 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Pay for Play Countering Threat Financing

By M i c h a e l T . F l y n n and S i m o n e A . L e d e e n

hortly after midnight on March Among these dimensions, we have dis- couriers are used by diverse organizations 20, 2009, in Bilbao, Spain, police covered that illicit financing networks repre- with similar aims of evading law enforcement, began a series of raids to arrest sent both a significant strength and a critical military, and intelligence activities. As Adam S a number of North Africans enemy vulnerability to exploit. Guns, drugs, Fosson asserts, “The connection between many on suspicion of funding terrorism in North weapons of mass destruction, and humans are Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Africa through criminal activity in Spain. all commodities interactively traded by terror- either transnational organized crime groups or While this investigation continues, globally ists in corporate-like networks. global trafficking organizations has increased networked terrorists are operating on low- As we have discovered, these networks over time, and FTOs themselves have become contrast battlefields where understanding the are interrelated, each transcending borders and difference between enemy and friendly forces forming a growing nexus between terrorist Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, is Director is growing increasingly complex. This physi- movements and other criminal and narcotics of Intelligence for the North Atlantic Treaty cal and virtual domain includes numerous enterprises. The same hawalas (money remit- Organization International Security Assistance dimensions unlike any that we have previ- tance systems prevalent in the Muslim world), Force (ISAF), Afghanistan. Simone A. Ledeen is the ously experienced. smuggling channels, and, in some cases, cash Treasury Department Senior Representative to ISAF.

U.S. Army (Jeffrey Alexander) U.S. and Iraqi soldiers battle insurgents in Adhamiya, Iraq

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 123 FEATURES | Pay for Play more involved in criminal and trafficking with criminal networks, these groups profited disruption opportunities from drugs. We can activities. . . . [B]oth sides have a common by cutting into pipelines and trucking oil prod- use the linkages among crime, narcotics, and financial interest, as though two corporations ucts to be sold on the black market. terrorism to map these networks, how they were merging.”1 operate, and how they overlap to determine When we scrutinize terrorism and Indeed, much has already been written vulnerabilities and subsequent targeting. organized crime, the only discernable differ- about the linkages among organized crime, While the FARC has been successful ence is that most terrorists have political or terrorism, and narcotics trafficking, going in the past, it has become increasingly vul- religious motivations, while organized crimi- back to the 1990s and the Fuerzas Armadas nerable, as key nodes of its facilitation and nals are motivated by profit and do not, as a Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); narcotics networks have been chipped away by rule, attack state targets. However, as these designated in 1997 as an FTO by the U.S. the Colombian military and law enforcement internetworked transnational actors become Department of State, the FARC over the years apparatus, with the assistance of the United increasingly capable of warfighting, we are has morphed into an organized criminal States. The FARC continues to operate in witnessing the evolution of entities capable of syndicate and narco-trafficking organization specific geographic areas but no longer poses challenging the primacy and ultimately the in order to maintain its revenue flow. One the same threat. solvency of nation-states.2 We need only look such criminal activity the FARC engages in is In testimony before the House Armed to the examples of Hizballah, al Qaeda in Iraq, the production of counterfeit U.S. currency. Services Committee, Admiral James G. Stavr- and the Taliban for evidence as to how these To date, the U.S. Secret Service has seized over idis, USN, then-Commander of U.S. Southern organizations exploit criminal activities for $241 million in counterfeit currency gener- Command, now their own nefarious purposes. ated by the FARC. Europe, discussed the nexus between drug One of the most complex but most In addition to counterfeiting cur- trafficking, “including routes, profits and important ways that organized crime and ter- rency, the FARC is famously involved in corruptive influence,” and “Islamic radical rorism are connected is through the raising, drug trafficking. In 2003, it was designated terrorism.” In fact, in August 2008, the U.S. storing, and transferring of illicit monies, a significant foreign narcotics trafficker by and Colombian governments disrupted an which are at the core of the global organized the Department of the Treasury’s Office international cocaine smuggling and money- criminal enterprise. Through this enterprise, laundering ring based out of Colombia. This terrorists, warlords, gangsters, and other illicit operation was executed through a partner- actors frequently cooperate, and we have often terrorists can generate and ship between a Colombian drug cartel and successfully disrupted them. hide significant revenues when Lebanese members of Hizballah. Portions of they work in tandem with the profits—allegedly hundreds of millions a Funds Distributed Globally criminal groups, or when they year—were used to finance Hizballah.6 According to Edward Frothingham, undertake criminal activities In addition to drug trafficking in South “In some respects, terrorist organizations are themselves America, Hizballah operatives engage in a similar to businesses anywhere in the world. host of criminal activities to raise, transfer, They need to earn, store, and transmit money. and launder funds to support terrorism. These The faster and easier they are able to do so, the of Foreign Assets Control, pursuant to activities run the gamut from mafia-style more effective they will be.”3 Until recently, the Kingpin Act. The FARC learned over shakedowns to sophisticated import-export we did not understand how to put the pieces time that it did not need to merely dabble scams involving traders from India and together in a comprehensive manner to learn in drugs—it decided to go all the way. The Hong Kong. In one case, Paraguayan officials how terrorist and criminal networks overlap. logistics of drug trafficking is so costly that it arrested an operative—Ali Khalil Mehri—for We now have learned that terrorists can gener- only makes sense to do it on a large scale. To selling millions of dollars in pirated software ate and hide significant revenues when they generate the revenues necessary to maintain and funding Hizballah with the profits. work in tandem with criminal groups, or when its army of 14,000 troops, the FARC moves Back in the Middle East, the Israelis they undertake criminal activities themselves: cocaine to U.S. and European markets. To discovered and disrupted a series of Israeli- transport these drugs to the United States, Arab cells working for Hizballah in return for ■■ Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda the FARC must work with traditional drug money and frequently drugs. Some of these have supported or exploited relationships trafficking organizations to move its product cells, such as one operating out of the Galilee with warlords in Somalia and Afghanistan to through Central America and Mexico. This village of Abu Snan, were planning to kidnap anchor their global terrorist actions.4 is the same route used by those who want Israeli soldiers. In September 2002, an Israeli ■■ According to French intelligence to move illegal aliens, bulk cash shipments, military court indicted an officer for spying officials, “Most of the [extremist] structures stolen cars, and weapons from the United for Hizballah in return for money, hashish, [the French] have dismantled have been States southward. and heroin.7 financed by crime,” including robbery, drugs, All of these items are really commodities All of these examples are drops in and fraud.5 that pass through the same areas, navigate the bucket compared with the activities of ■■ At the height of the insurgency in Iraq, the same sentries, and can be interchange- Assad Amad Barakat and his network in insurgent groups used the Baiji Oil Refinery able. A load of AK–47 rifles can be traded for and around Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este. The and the supply chain supporting its activities heroin as it travels to a final destination. There owner of Apollo Electronics Store in Galleria to skim funds from the oil trade. Together are tremendous intelligence collection and Page, Barakat was identified by Paraguayan

124 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Flynn and Ledeen

U.S. Border Transition Team escorts Iraq Threat Finance Cell officer during visit to Iraqi border post at Basra U.S. Army (Karah Cohen) police as “the Hizballah military chief in the in drugs and cash was seized. It was a true without these ill-gotten gains, these nefarious ­Tri-Border,” an area along the junction of Par- coalition of radicalized gangsters who came characters cannot operate as they wish. aguay, Argentina, and Brazil. The Paraguayan together to conduct the operation, selling These groups historically have raised government assessed that Barakat raised drugs as a weapon of jihad and demonstrat- and spent money autonomously, with little $50 million for Hizballah between 1995 and ing the dangerous combination of Islamic centralized direction or coordination. The 2001. He was arrested in a raid on September extremism and organized crime. focus on money is the insurgency’s weak- 14, 2001, and charged with tax evasion. In Our collective experiences have taught ness as well as its strength. The estimates 2003, he was sentenced to 6½ years in prison. us that contemporary terrorists are operat- of amounts raised and laundered by these According to a recently released RAND ing in a networked fashion, with relatively groups around the world vary widely, but all report, the Barakat clan sent these millions of dollars to Hizballah from drug trafficking contemporary terrorist networks are much more “business” and pirated goods and was responsible for much of the $20 million annually that Hizbal- than we realized even a few short years ago lah was estimated to have received from the Tri-Border Area (TBA). autonomous cells—much like market-driven agree that these are substantial sums. This While it is difficult in the case of businesses. In fact, these networks are much enormous influx of foreign cash relieves Hizballah to tie these activities to a specific more “business” than we realized even a few pressure on governments to meet citizen attack, other examples are readily avail- short years ago.8 demands, especially in today’s economic able. In 2004, the ringleader of the Madrid We have seen in Iraq, for example, that environment. Governments are finding it is bombings, an adherent of Takfir wal Hijira, money is a crucial motivation for a majority easier to look the other way than to combat a largely Moroccan Islamist sect active in of Sunni insurgents, more than the ideol- groups that use violence and coercion the European and North African criminal ogy of radical Islam. Studies of detainees in against the state.9 underworld, turned out to be the brother of American custody found that about three- When the Soviet Union collapsed, orga- one of Morocco’s top hashish traffickers. His quarters were not committed to the jihadist nized crime groups paid handsomely to scoop cell used 30 kilograms of hash to purchase ideology. Money from criminal activities such up intelligence professionals to supplement the explosives used in those attacks. In the as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and fuel- their efforts and improve their capabilities. investigation that followed, nearly $2 million smuggling serves as the insurgency’s oxygen— Former KGB agents who had been stationed ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 125 FEATURES | Pay for Play overseas now use the same “safe” financial or indirectly through “naming and shaming.” cesses, we are progressing slowly in combat- conduits once used for espionage as avenues The name-and-shame tack can provide ing threat financing on a global scale.11 There for money-laundering, improving tradecraft impetus to partners who may have been on is still much to do. to a previously unthinkable level. the fence to take action, as we have seen in a The hybridization of terrorist groups number of cases. Furthermore, it discourages and organized crime has given birth to Targeted Measures people from wittingly doing business with organizations that could become more Faced with this complex and growing designees for fear of becoming implicated dangerous as they gain more skill sets. By challenge, the United States is broadly step- and having their own accounts frozen. Public merging multiple entities or applying their ping up its focus on disrupting adversary designations cause targets to resort to less respective strengths, they stand to improve finances in order to decrease operational secure and costlier mechanisms for moving their capabilities. We must posture ourselves capabilities. In our battle against adversary assets globally. accordingly. infrastructure, money is one of the most criti- In addition to designations, the U.S. We are working to refashion our- cal nodes. Our adversaries are acutely aware approach to combating threat finances selves into a hybrid of sorts, crafted from of the many measures that we take to disrupt includes intelligence and law enforcement our respective cylinders of excellence, to their activities, especially the most visible: action, helping to set international standards include terrorist, narcotics, and proliferation targeted financial measures. and the provisions of international train- One of the major challenges we face ing and technical assistance programs. Law with regard to targeted financial measures enforcement action is increasingly important our adversaries’ reliance undertaken by either the State or Treasury as we gain further understanding of the on what some call Department is that the people we are desig- global nature of the challenge we face. A raid “nontraditional” methods nating are also the best positioned to evade in Spain can directly affect the situation on of moving money is a sanctions. As we designate one entity, another the ground in Africa. vulnerability that provides us pops up under a different name with the Moreover, publicizing these terrorist an opportunity for disruption same shady characters behind the wheel. networks’ engagement in common criminal Due to the stringent legal threshold required activities contradicts the image they seek to to designate an individual or entity, it will maintain. The close association of terrorists be months before a follow-on action can be with criminals, narcotics traffickers, and finance. By focusing on money, we have a approved. Months will pass in which illicit other such characters, and the publicizing shot at cutting across these cylinders and money is raised and moved, often in plain of this association, denies these terrorists bringing a focus and discipline to identify- sight, with the full knowledge of the law the appearance of legitimacy that is critical ing and disrupting these networks. Focused enforcement and/or security services of the in recruiting both operatives and financial intelligence collection must play a signifi- country where this individual or entity is supporters. cant role in this effort. We must follow the based. We in the Department of Defense money trail to impede these illicit financial However, the importance and rel- (DOD) assist these efforts on a number operations and ultimately the international evance of targeted financial measures either of levels and are working to increase our networks they support. In particular, we domestically through Presidential executive support. At the same time, we continue to must develop human intelligence capabili- orders or internationally through the United develop our internal capabilities. We have ties to identify weaknesses or choke points Nations Security Council remain signifi- broadened our aperture from the early focus within these criminal/terrorist hybrid cant. In December 2006, the U.S. Treasury on direct action, to include support to inter- networks. Department listed Sobhi Fayad as a Specially agency efforts to combat threat finance. The As we follow this trail, our adversaries’ Designated Terrorist because “Fayad has geographic combatant commands, through reliance on what some call “nontraditional” been a senior TBA official who their threat finance units, can facilitate the methods of moving money—their use of served as a liaison between the Iranian disruption of threat finance networks of par- hawala, trade-based smuggling, and cash Embassy and the Hezbollah community in ticular interest to the combatant commander. couriers—is a vulnerability that provides us the TBA. He has also been a professional These units work with DOD and non-DOD an opportunity for disruption. These orga- Hezbollah operative who has traveled to intelligence, law enforcement, and regulatory nizations operate on a trust-based network Lebanon and Iran to meet with Hezbollah agencies to detect financial support networks; where infusing and sowing the seeds of leaders. Fayad received military training in collect, process, and analyze information; and doubt and deception could open seams and Lebanon and Iran and was involved in illicit target, disrupt, or destroy financial systems gaps that may not currently exist. activities involving drugs and counterfeit and networks that support activities that Another area of vulnerability is when U.S. dollars.”10 Fayad is currently serving a threaten U.S. interests. the pipelines intersect with the official 6½ year sentence in a Paraguayan prison for The geographic combatant com- economy or state structures. There are many tax evasion and criminal association with mands are currently assessing the ability of means of attacking publicly identifiable orga- Mr. Barakat. adversaries to finance operations and the nizations such as companies, banks, chari- The simple act of publicizing these effectiveness of military efforts to deny them ties, and nongovernmental organizations. individuals and their activities can have an resources. Initial data from these assess- We may not be able to destroy a pipeline, effect, either directly through freezing assets ments indicate that despite some early suc- but we can seriously damage it and force our

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adversaries to spend financial and human N o t e s resources to defend themselves. We have NEW done this in the counter-drug fight for many 1 Adam Fosson, “Confluence of Evil: The from years. Smuggling-Terrorism Nexus,” Homeland Security NDU Press Today, November 30, 2008, available at . Institute for National 2 spoke at the University of California at Berke- John P. Sullivan, “Terrorism, Crime and Strategic Studies Private Armies,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law ley. He told students that the threats we face Enforcement 11, no. 2/3 (Winter 2002), 239–253, today are nontraditional, unlike any we have available at . military,” he said, “isn’t as direct as we would 3 Edward Frothingham III, “Tracking and like, and our theory and doctrine prevent Disrupting Terrorist Financial Networks: A Poten- dealing with the reality, which is overlaid tial Model for Inter-agency Success?” testimony and mixed with politics and economics, and presented to the House Armed Services Subcom- humanitarian and cultural issues. It’s a very mittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats, different world out there . . . the application of Washington, DC, March 2009. 4 military force to this has to change, to adapt Sullivan. 5 to that.”12 Ibid. 6 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: narco-Islam,” General Zinni’s words ring true today, Middle East Strategy at Harvard, March 22, as we are engaged in complex military opera- 2009, available at . to adapt our application of military force, 7 Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah: Funding Terror we must continue to develop our capability Through Criminal Enterprise,” testimony pre- across the U.S. Government to disrupt the sented to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland flow of illicitly gained funds to our adver- Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, saries. At the end of the day, it is all about DC, May 25, 2005. money. 8 Sullivan. 9 The merging of narcotics traffickers, Hans Binnendijk, ed., “Transnational organized criminals, and terrorists tends to Trends: New Threats?” in Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World (Washington, occur simply due to the availability of and DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), access to money. Therefore, to the extent that 254, available at . Strategic Forum 247 alliance between terrorists and conventional 10 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Radicalization by Choice: ISI and the criminals will be weakened and perhaps even Targets Hizballah Fundraising Network in the Pakistani Army broken. Mapping and targeting financial net- Triple Frontier of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay,” works require a focused interagency effort. December 6, 2006, available at . argue that the Inter-Services Intelligence 11 Directorate and Pakistani Army remain up to the challenge. JFQ Wesley J.L. Anderson, Disrupting Threat Finances: Using Financial Information to Disrupt essential to the security of Pakistan. Terrorist Organizations (, FL: Joint Although both groups have in the past Special Operations University, April 2008), 35–37, embraced radicalism as a means to address available at . there are signs that Pakistan is shifting 12 Anthony C. Zinni, “The Military’s Role in its short-term strategic priorities and a Changing World: Conversation with General recognizing that the Taliban is not only a Anthony C. Zinni,” University of California at U.S. problem. After reviewing the major Berkeley, March 6, 2001, available at . restrict U.S. military assistance to Pakistan.

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ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 127 a Joint Staff to Believe In

Gen James T. Conway, Commandant of the ADM Gary Roughead, Chief Marine Corps of Naval Operations U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Gen Norton A. Schwartz, U.S. Navy Air Force Chief of Staff of the Air Force GEN George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army

U.S. Army By G . J o h n D a v i d and P a u l S . R e i n h a r t

t the national level, the United States requires a unified joint military staff with execu- tive authority to manage issues that have grown beyond the frontiers of the geographic combatant commands. The national military command structure must adapt to con- A front the armed conflicts and defense matters of the new millennium. Global national security challenges that require a whole-of-government effort can no longer be militarily compart- mentalized in geographic or functional military commands whose scope cannot encompass them. Similarly, the resource environment demands a more efficient model than that designed during the Cold War for a more discrete adversary set. This environment also requires creative circumvention to adapt to extant threats. Though there are challenges to this concept, civilian overarching author- ity, sufficient separation of power, governmental transparency and oversight, and the cultures and traditions of the Armed Forces make us ready for a new construct. The time has come to change the Joint Chiefs of Staff into a Joint Command Staff.

128 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu David and Reinhart

Strategic Realities States can best be described as “hybrid than a message relay between the Secretary The 2006 National Security Strategy warfare,” or conflicts in which the adversary and a geographic or functional combatant and 2008 National Defense Strategy both employs a variety of techniques across the command (a step that the Secretary can define a set of interests of the United States spectrum of military operations in order to ignore), the Joint Chiefs should provide a that is almost entirely transregional. Specific attack the United States while escaping its global command staff. challenges highlighted by the former are conventional warfighting capacity.3 This role of executive authority within terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, It is safe to assert that most strategies the operational chain of command would weapons proliferation, global economic cite global threats.4 Common knowledge of neither obviate nor change the roles and development, regional conflicts, and failed these realities has created a public conscious- positions of the Service chiefs and staffs, states—and the opportunities these provide ness of them and an expectation of structural who would remain the principal advisors to for the Nation’s adversaries. Section IX of change in government to meet these global national authorities for their Service func- the National Security Strategy is devoted to challenges in all arenas, including the struc- tions while recruiting, training, and equip- the need to “transform America’s security ture of the National Command System, with ping forces that can be provided to the joint institutions to meet the challenges and the possibility of a change in the nature of command system.6 Leaving this arrangement untouched would continue the balance of no transformation of the national military command structure power provided by the Services, who would retain most of the personnel and budgets that has taken place other than the addition of limited geographic drive military operations and without which combatant commands no operating joint force can function. Converting the Joint Staff to an execu- opportunities of the 21st century.”1 Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recommendations tive authority in the chain of command would interagency operations are certainly impor- abound, including disposing of the geo- accomplish four major goals, however. This tant, and though the Department of Defense graphic combatant command concept in favor change would: (DOD) has enacted a series of transforma- of some sort of interagency approach, such as tional actions and experiments with regard a Joint Interagency Command.5 This notion ■■ provide a national global command to its subordinate offices and agencies, the is conceptually derived from the success of staff for global military issues fundamental pillar of national security is the the Joint Interagency Task Force. The new ■■ establish an authoritative military Armed Forces; for this reason, the National entity would have expanded authority rather point of contact for interagency affairs and Security Strategy begets the National Defense than serving merely as a coordination center, operations anywhere in the world, for any Strategy and National Military Strategy. Yet and that authority would entail an exhaustive military purpose; this global role would be no transformation of the national military alteration of both legislation and procedure. performed in the most logical place in the command structure has taken place other The answer may be simpler than many chain of command, at the national command than the addition of limited geographic com- of these recommendations, requiring only level of the Joint Staff, collocated with the batant commands (U.S. Northern Command the modification of a single law and certain centers of authority of the other agencies of and U.S. Africa Command [USAFRICOM]). assumptions rather than a radical altera- the “interagency” The 2008 National Defense Strategy, tion of the Unified Command Plan. For the ■■ streamline DOD strategic authority the next step in the thinking process, further military, the Nation persists with a unique for Title 10 Armed Forces roles and missions defines the strategic environment by enunci- but unsuitable construct largely for historical ■■ create staff efficiencies that could ating six basic threats: reasons that have little to do with the practical enable the growth of more operational units circumstances of today. For this reason, the while reducing the burden of redundant ■■ violent extremist movements such as United States should consider converting the staff elements. Islamic terrorists Joint Staff into a national command element ■■ hostile states armed with weapons of with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dated Structures mass destruction (refined in the document to (CJCS) as its head. No change is required to Exploring each area in detail reveals include the proliferation of these weapons) preserve the role of the Chairman as advisor how this seemingly simple change achieves ■■ rising regional powers to the Secretary of Defense, or as the senior tremendous results. The present command ■■ emerging space and cyber-threats military advisor to both the President and system, for example, remains largely what it ■■ pandemic disasters National Security Council. But within the was at the close of World War II. Codified ■■ growing competition for resources.2 operational chain of command, the Chairman by the National Security Act of 1947 and the and his staff should be included, and they Unified Command Plan, little other than Of these six threats, four to five are should have executive authority to provide a some aspects of authorities has changed since clearly global or, at the very least, transre- military link under the Secretary of Defense then.7 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of gional in nature. As observers have noted, and between the Secretary and operating Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 rational- the conflicts of the near future for the United forces. Rather than serving as little more ized the joint character of the unified com- mands and altered the balance of operational Major G. John David, USMC, is a student at the Spanish Joint War College. Lieutenant Commander Paul S. authority once and for all in favor of the joint Reinhart, USN (Ret.), is an Analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. combatant commands, which exercise it on ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 129 FEATURES | A Joint Staff to Believe In a geographic or functional basis today.8 As a Instead, each combatant command divisions as the combatant commands. More- result of these laws, the Joint Staff is tasked responds directly to the Secretary of Defense over, even DOD’s own combat support agen- generally as follows: and President in the operational chain of cies, those Title 50 agencies given a wartime command with no global military command support role in U.S. law, do not follow these . . . the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of to order and organize action between them. groupings in accordance with the nation-sets Staff shall be responsible for the following: For military issues, this means that to manage managed by the military commands. This Strategic Direction. Assisting the Presi- the India-Pakistan border, the Secretary of difference makes managing the interagency dent and the Secretary of Defense in providing Defense must manage U.S. Central Command process difficult even inside DOD; should for the strategic direction of the armed forces. (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command. these agencies coordinate through the Joint Strategic Planning. To examine Israeli-Palestinian-Arab issues, Staff as it exists in law today, there is no assur- ■■ Preparing strategic plans, including ance that the agreement as conceived will plans which conform with resource levels . . . while the staff can plan, it be implemented by the military because the ■■ Preparing joint logistic and mobility has no authority to act on or operational commands can demur, despite the coordinating role of the Joint Chiefs of plans to support those strategic plans . . . implement anything that it Contingency Planning; Preparedness. Staff. Thus, a nonmilitary entity involved ■■ Providing for the preparation and plans, muting the effects of with the military in an international mission review of contingency plans . . . its efforts of the U.S. Government must theoretically ■■ Preparing joint logistic and mobility coordinate with a multitude of combatant plans to support those contingency plans.9 the Secretary manages U.S. European commands to secure final concurrence, or Command and USCENTCOM. Such exam- alternately it must force the Secretary of These foundations, while reasonable ples are myriad, but more important are the Defense to perform the coordination func- and solid, do not support the military against transregional issues that affect more than two tion, as the Joint Staff has no authority under today’s threats. By law, the Joint Staff may geographic and functional commands, such law. Conversely, a Joint Command Staff with not address global concerns for reasons that as terrorism, narcotics, human trafficking, executive authority can facilitate coordination will be addressed below. So while the staff and the proliferation of various weapons. through a simpler set of contacts. can plan, it has no authority to act on or Although the 1947 and 1986 changes Functional combatant commands may implement anything that it plans, muting the drove jointness into being, these structural fight globally, but they are limited to their effects of its efforts. evolutions did so by creating new fissures specific purposes. Most notably, U.S. Strategic in the joint commands. For example, with Command (USSTRATCOM) and USSOCOM certain important exceptions, a combatant have assumed a number of wartime roles Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen James E. Cartwright command is not responsible to another and responsibilities, but these commands combatant command for a common cannot achieve true unity of effort by them- issue; disagreements must be resolved at selves because even if they are designated a the level of the Office of the Secretary of coordinating authority for a given issue, such Defense. Rather than eliminating rivalries, as terrorism, the entire world in which they the reforms merely changed the rivalries. operate is someone else’s physical zone of Though it can be assumed that the conflict responsibility. USSTRATCOM, for instance, between combatant commands remains manages a series of efforts designed to create less virulent and less culturally driven than global staffs for specific functions in their those between the Services, and based more eight joint component commands. Issues on procedure and command personality, that these components have responsibility it still exists. The difficulty of encourag- for range from missile defense to weapons of ing U.S. Special Operations Command mass destruction. (USSOCOM) to talk with USCENTCOM, In dealing with complex global prob- two headquarters that operate on the same lems, DOD has resorted to the knowledge Florida base, is almost axiomatic among base that it retains in its combat support military planners. The Joint Command Staff agencies (CSAs), and the descriptions of with executive authority would eliminate USSTRATCOM’s component commands this issue by being able to resolve matters identify the CSA that each is associated with. directly through its own authority, rather These agencies do not have military Title 10 than translating it for the Office of the Sec- authority, being subject instead to Title 50 retary and adding layers of bureaucracy. (War and the National Defense). To give these No other part of the executive branch, CSAs Title 10 military authorities, the agencies including those most involved in foreign partner with USSTRATCOM, who becomes affairs in the Department of State or the nominally in charge of an effort run by an Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence agency in Washington in order to obviate

DOD (Cherie Cullen) Community, follows the same geographic the need for a national military Title 10 staff

130 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu David and Reinhart to manage the function. The list of agencies same thing (though these components do The Defense Joint Intelligence Opera- in the component command descriptions have other functions). tions Center, which was later renamed the includes the Defense Information Systems Moreover, force and equipment alloca- Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), tion have also entered into this duplicative Center (DIOCC), was established in 2006 in Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Missile process. This is neither to belittle the valu- response to a perceived need for global coor- Defense Agency—and if not for classification able work done by USJFCOM nor to deny dination of the DOD intelligence enterprise. might include more. This tortuous chain of that this change is basically an evolution of The DIOCC is a well-intended response to command is symptomatic of a structure ill the role of the command; it is merely to point a global problem set, in which shared high- adapted to its task. If the Chairman of the Joint out that the system imposed has added a value but low-density intelligence assets are Chiefs had authority, the entire component further layer of bureaucracy to force alloca- employed to address the disparate and usually system of USSTRATCOM would become an tion. Rather than either eliminating Joint competing intelligence requirements of 10 unnecessary redundancy, and any Title 10 Staff input or the USJFCOM step, the Nation combatant commands. The shortcoming of roles sought for military personnel in the CSAs now has both. Services cannot resolve their this relatively ad hoc solution is the lack of could be provided directly by the Joint Staff, differences in one location; they must work backing in Federal law for the authority to who are nearly collocated with the players. with two. It is never good to add a step in the “direct” supporting CSAs or military forces.11 This brings us to the possibility of staff bureaucracy; it will simply slow the process Unfortunately, the orders of the Secretary efficiencies created by the simple extension and, in this example, lead to the expansion compete with the definitions provided in U.S. of executive authority to the Joint Staff. In of staffs comprised of officers and troops law, not least because the DIOCC was con- who could be better employed in operational structed in one of the CSAs rather than in the units (the tooth) rather than shuffling papers Joint Staff. The CSA has no titular authority to in the interest of jointness (the tail). Training joint forces, generating direct or coordinate either other CSAs or mili- and unity of purpose, U.S. joint forces, creating joint doctrine, and tary forces (the latter is the specific province Joint Forces Command has experimenting with that doctrine are all for which the USSTRATCOM component recently been given the extremely valuable “joint force enabler”10 command chains exist). The Joint Staff would role of coordinating force tasks, but whether they require an entirely have been able to coordinate competing intel- contributions to missions and separate command is questionable. ligence requirements between commands, at the very least, though it too would have been mission planning Other Initiatives unable to enforce its decisions. The need to streamline and centralize the interest of jointness and unity of purpose, these processes, however, grows more and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has more obvious. Senior personnel continue to recently been given the role of coordinating recognize the need for functions and authori- force contributions to missions and mission ties of a global command staff. Particularly planning, a function that formerly occurred at in the Intelligence Community, whose the Joint Staff. Currently, rather than having business is to focus on current and the Services that are collocated with the Joint future threats, several initiatives to Staff work out their issues in Washington, achieve the advantages of a global staff each Service has to stand up a component have been attempted, with varying headquarters in Norfolk, in part to do the degrees of success. U.S. Navy (Kevin S. O’Brien)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Michael Mullen

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 131 FEATURES | A Joint Staff to Believe In

The DIOCC experiment can best be USAFRICOM officials meet with African summarized in a notional example wherein government officials at Marshall Center, two geographic combatant commanders Garmisch, Germany, November 3, 2009 simultaneously have different requirements for an intelligence, surveillance, and recon- naissance mission by a single platform. While the DIOCC has the backing of a DOD direc- tive (DODD), combatant commanders have no requirement under existing Federal law to abide by or to recognize the authority of the DIOCC regarding prioritization of their competing intelligence requirements, and they have no uniformed senior to mitigate the occasional disagreement. The highest immediate authority available to the DIOCC without resorting to the Secretary of Defense is the director of DIA, a three-star noncombat command position. Combatant commanders U.S. Africa Command (Amanda McCarty) are well within their rights to point to Title 10 and the defined direct relationship between a 10 and Title 50 exclusive environments.12 enlisted personnel and untold millions of combatant commander and the Secretary of But giving the Ambassador authority in the dollars to return to the operating forces and Defense for all matters, and to object to any military system neither gives him/her author- put boots on the ground. direction from the DIOCC. ity to direct other departments’ assets nor The remaining reluctance to invest such Alternatively, the problem of authority solves the issue of transfrontier seams in the authority in the Joint Staff stems from the exists even in the case of a single combatant military command system. Besides giving concept of the so-called Man on Horseback,13 command with an expressed need for intel- the appearance of failing confidence in the or the fear of military officers exceeding ligence, operating within the guidelines of existing military commands, especially after their authority. It is out of this fear that the DODD 5105.21. The combatant commander its poorly executed initial announcement, the United States, unique among all the world’s is directed to turn to the DIOCC for coordina- USAFRICOM model does not resolve much nations with standing militaries, retains tion and (logically) tasking of the intelligence when confronted with the aforementioned a nondirective military Joint Staff system. requirement to the remainder of the DOD CSAs, as suggested by DODD 5105.21, but besides giving the appearance of failing confidence in the again, there is no backing in Federal law for the DIOCC to perform prioritization or existing military commands, the USAFRICOM model does not tasking to other CSAs and little in the way of resolve much when confronted with global threats formal structure with which to do so, such as the Joint Staff tasking system. CSAs tasked by global threats. When the military issue is The founders of the United States were well DIOCC are well within their rights to point to assisting a response between two combat- aware of the potential for a military man to Title 50 and the direct relationship mandated ant commands, the fact that one has more use his command authority to supersede the by Federal law between a CSA and the Sec- interagency representation will not resolve the Republic, and not just from antiquity. Oliver retary of Defense for guidance and tasking, residual issue for executing strategy in the face Cromwell, sharing Puritan beliefs with New with a refusal to prioritize any but their own of a trans-regional threat contingency. More- Englanders, was only a century earlier, and requirements. The DIOCC, then, while a valu- over, USAFRICOM cannot actually direct the Napoleon seized power during the lifetimes of able experiment energetically undertaken by activities of any other agency outside Title 10 the Constitution’s authors. Foreign examples capable personnel, highlights the weaknesses military forces and by its existence may gener- continued during the history of the Ameri- of proceeding without addressing issues of law ate problems for those other agencies, as some can Republic and reinforced the impression in the organization of executive authorities. observers have pointed out. that strong generals might pose a threat, Another ongoing experiment with including the Chiefs of the German General executive authorities for national security The Joint Command Staff Staffs during the World Wars, and General matters may be seen in the structure of The challenges of the current system Francisco Franco in Spain between those USAFRICOM. Based on recent experi- bring us back to the Joint Staff as the best wars. The specter of military coup rightfully ences with military intervention worldwide, global executive military authority. With unsettles civilian government. USAFRICOM stresses a “whole-of-govern- executive authority in the Joint Staff, it may be There are four counterarguments to this ment” approach at the geographic command possible to curtail the proliferation of unified concern today. First, the Secretary of Defense level. The USAFRICOM experiment may command staffs and to eliminate certain of should be at the top-center of this command contribute greatly to capacity to function these staffs as economy of force measures, concept, above the Chairman for chain of in an interagency manner at least in Title freeing literally thousands of officers and command purposes, providing continued

132 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu David and Reinhart

civilian control. This coupling of authority the Joint Staff had disagreements with him. N o t e s would further increase the efficiency of the In today’s structure, the Secretary was well concept by giving the totality of the command within his legal authority to do so. USCENT- 1 The National Security Strategy of the United staff much more control over CSAs due to COM devised what may have been the most States of America (Washington, DC: The White their direct line from the Secretary. Second, successful joint and coalition operation in House, March 2006), available at . 2 all subject to congressional oversight first by regional limitations, lack of connection to the The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Office of their rank—four stars for the Chairman, his rest of government, necessary tactical focus, the Secretary of Defense, June 2008), available at deputy, and the Service chiefs—and secondly total lack of follow-on troops, and failure . retain their equities, and the combatant com- ensuing occupation, it did not foresee the 3 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and manders would generally retain control of next steps with any degree of clarity. These Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter fielded forces, whereas the Joint Command are strategic tasks that the Joint Staff is par- 2009), 34. Staff would give direction through them for ticularly suited for. 4 “Declassified Key Judgments of the National global operations. The conceivable exceptions Arguably, General Colin Powell’s Intelligence Estimate ‘Trends in Global Terrorism: where a joint task force might work directly time as Chairman most closely approached Implications for the United States’ dated April for the Joint Command Staff already exist in a directive Joint Staff. Overseeing 28 2006,” available at . 5 Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee specific global issues organized currently at cessful phase of humanitarian intervention T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? USSTRATCOM, which are issue-based rather in Somalia to Operation Desert Storm, the Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force than force-based. Powell era demonstrated in part what firm Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 92. Finally, neither the separation of power national joint leadership might accomplish, 6 U.S. Code (USC) Title 10, available at . Func- command and Services nor the information next in the very same country, Iraq. tion of Chief of Naval Operations, USC § 5032, and oversight environment in the transparent As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Function of Commandant of the Marine Corps, governmental world of today lend themselves has noted, DOD “must set priorities and con- USC § 5041, Function of Chief of Staff of the Air to military power-mongering. Similarly, the sider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity Force, USC § 8032, Function of Chief of Staff of the American environment is so open and con- costs.”15 Structural change in the Unified Army, USC § 3032. 7 gressional cognizance so acute that subversion Command Plan is not a simple matter of “The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946 to 1993,” available at . be difficult. Also, the leonine personalities at memoranda. While experiments are both 8 See Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, Reorganiz- issue in 1947—including, for example, com- fruitful and instructive, they can also expose ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Westport, CT: Green- manders who wielded authority over the 10 the flaws of the ideas proposed. Among the wood Press, 1999). percent of the national population that was most glaring flaws highlighted by the experi- 9 USC, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5, § under arms—are not present today. The mili- ments to date is the lack of statutory founda- 153; U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive tary is much smaller in personnel as a portion tion for the changes proposed. Converting 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and of the total population.14 the Joint Staff into a Joint Command Staff, Its Major Components (Washington, DC: DOD, In examining the possibility of one while a simple action, would require statu- August 1, 2002). 10 person exceeding his mandate, it should tory change through Congress, not just an See Posture Statement of General Lance L. be noted that the individual need not be a order from a Cabinet officer. Smith, USAF, Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, before the 110th Congress House Armed general or even in the military. The numer- Services Committee, March 15, 2007. ous problems with the Cobra II plan for the For years, the Nation has built its 11 USC, Title 50, Chapter 15, § 401, 1.12. invasion and security of Iraq from phase four strategic frameworks on the supposition 12 See Mary C. Yates, “U.S. Africa Command: of global and transregional threats. Joint- Value Added,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter ness has passed into the military lexicon as 2009), 152. in examining the possibility an assumption of that which is desired, so 13 Lederman, 57. of one person exceeding much so that discussions now have turned 14 Ibid., 57–61. his mandate, it should be to making military commands more “inter- 15 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: noted that the individual agency.” Before that step, however, the final Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January-February need not be a general or pillar of the joint concept must be erected, and that pillar is a unified global Joint 2009), available at . tying all joint military operational chains (stabilization) onward have been attributed of command together nationally. A Joint in part to a Secretary of Defense who chose Command Staff is the ultimate step in the to ignore his Joint Staff and deal directly with long process of transition toward unified a geographic combatant command because action. The time for change is now. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 133 POINT/COUNTERPOINT

Global Insurgency MYTH Or reality?

he current global security situa- noted as much in testimony before the Senate monality among the disparate local, regional, tion appears to validate and vin- Armed Services Committee.3 and national insurgencies, some binding dicate the doctrinal assumptions Besides Iraq and Afghanistan, there philosophy that makes the local examples really T of U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24, are numerous incidences of local, regional, or just fractal instances of the larger phenomenon? Counterinsurgency, that insurgencies will be national insurgencies. The Tamil Tigers and the The authors also examine the issue of the the “new normal” mode of conflict in which Moro Islamic Liberation Front, though weak- nature of the insurgency itself. If it is a global the United States finds itself engaged around ened substantially in 2008, are still considered insurgency, is it founded on radical Islam, and the world. In 2010, insurgencies abound and viable regional threats to the Sri Lankan and focused on undermining the Western style comprise the vast majority of the world’s con- Philippine states, respectively. The government of governance? Or is it a global insurgency flicts. This is nothing new. In fact, the most of Colombia and its various rebel groups have because we choose to call it one? If so, is it in recent data available on global conflict taken been fighting what amounts to a civil war for the best interests of U.S. national security that from the 2007 Stockholm International Peace decades now, and Mexico appears headed down we have not seriously examined the philo- Research Institute Yearbook suggest that in the same path with respect to what is being called sophical differences and divergences among 2006, there were 17 major armed conflicts a “narco-insurgency.”4 Israel and the Palestinians these insurgencies that are taking place far taking place in 16 regions of the world. Not have been engaged in one of the longest running from each other in both time and space? one of them was an interstate conflict.1 conflicts, though whether the intifada represents These questions, and others, are Despite nearly a year since the change in a classic insurgency is a matter open to debate. debated. While each auther proposes his own Presidential administration, a world rife with Obviously, on the international stage, insurgent solution to the question of whether a global insurgencies is little different than it was at the violence is more common than it is rare. insurgency exists, we leave it to the reader to height of what the Bush administration called But do these local, regional, or national draw conclusions. JFQ the “global war on terror.” Iraq may be now insurgencies, as captivating as they are, com- stabilizing, but there remain regular incidents prise a viable and unified global insurgency? N o t e s of insurgent violence directed at U.S. combat At its heart, that is the question debated by the 1 forces, the Iraqi government, and innocent authors of the two following articles. On its Stockholm International Peace Research civilians. Afghanistan continues to disinte- face, the issue is deceptively simple. Unpack- Institute Yearbook 2007, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford Univer- grate and is the main effort for U.S. military ing it, however, reveals additional wrinkles sity Press, 2007), appendix 2A. operations. The administration of Barack that fundamentally challenge our understand- 2 Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Obama was on course to raise the number of ing of insurgency and perhaps even the roots Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated troops from 38,000 to 68,000 by the end of and characteristics of global conflict itself. Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, April 12, 2009, and military commanders are on record In addressing this question, each author 2001, as amended through August 19, 2009). asking for an additional 10,000 troops above examines the issue of the global insurgency 3 David H. Petraeus, testimony on United States that. As with Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan from an epistemological point of view; in other Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan before the has all the hallmarks of a national insurgency, words, how do we know that (or if) we are facing U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, April 1, typically defined as “an organized movement a global insurgency? What are our measure- 2009, available at . 4 ment through the use of subversion and armed tative, so that we can call an insurgency global Hal Brands, “Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency,” World Politics Review, December 22, 2008, available at conflict.”2 Indeed, General David Petraeus, once we aggregate enough discrete incidents . commander of U.S. Central Command, has of local violence? Or is there a qualitative com-

134 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu POINT/COUNTERPOINT U.S. Air Force (Shawn Weismiller) U.S. Air Force

The

Struggle By D a n i e l G . C o x Against Global Insurgency

Soldier en route to capture insurgents and locate weapons caches in Baqubah, Iraq

ince 9/11, it has become com- superficial criticism, it has never led to any folly of declaring war against a tactic, but also monplace for scholars, politicians, meaningful discussion regarding the implica- one of the few to argue that the U.S. Govern- and military thinkers to refer to tions of this point or what it is that the U.S. ment and military are facing a global insur- current U.S. military and diplo- military is actually combating. Only a few gency and to provide some concrete policy S 4 matic actions as being part of a larger “war on authors have asserted that al Qaeda is an recommendations. terror.” This is an extremely imprecise char- insurgency, and even fewer have made the This article seeks to expand on this acterization of the current conflict. What the connection between al Qaeda’s terror tactics embryonic line of argumentation, but in United States and, in fact, the world are facing and a larger global insurgency movement. order to establish al Qaeda as the first global is more properly dubbed a global insurgent Audrey Kurth Cronin was one of the insurgency, a review of the definition of movement that emanates from al Qaeda at the first scholars to hint that al Qaeda is a global insurgency and its link to terrorism must international level and that slowly seeps into insurgency, writing soon after 9/11 that it be conducted. Next, al Qaeda’s rhetoric and legitimate (and illegitimate) national seces- was aiming not so much at the World Trade demands are briefly examined. The article sionist movements around the world. What Center or the Pentagon or even the United concludes with an analysis of al Qaeda’s strat- follows is an argument in support of the claim States, but was instead aiming to destroy egy for fomenting global insurgency through that al Qaeda is essentially the world’s first the U.S.-led global system.2 David Kilcullen its exploitation of failed and failing states and attempt at a global insurgency. claims that the West is facing a “global jihad,” of (often legitimate) domestic insurgencies According to General Wayne Downing, which is much more akin to a global insur- around the world. USA (Ret.), “terrorism is a tactic used by gency and has as its chief aim the imposition Salafist insurgents to attain their strategic of a worldwide Islamic caliphate.3 One of the goals, which are political in nature.”1 Indeed, newest entries into this field of argumenta- Dr. Daniel G. Cox is an Associate Professor in the terrorism is a tactic—and one cannot wage tion is Dan Roper, who is not only one of a U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies at war on a tactic. Though this is a correct but new breed of scholars who clearly sees the Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 135 FEATURES | The Struggle Against Global Insurgency

Insurgency and Terrorism some view terrorism as an indicator of failed That terrorism is the tactic of choice for insur- David Galula, in his seminal work insurgency in its last death throes, while gencies facing overwhelming conventional Counterinsurgency Warfare, defines insur- others deem it an essential first step toward threats does not conclusively indicate weak- gency as “a protracted struggle conducted gaining momentum. Galula views “blind,” or ness or future failure. In fact, in a recent study methodically, step by step, in order to attain indiscriminate, terrorism as the first step in for the RAND National Defense Research specific intermediate objectives leading finally “bourgeois-nationalist” insurgencies where Institute, Daniel Byman found that while not to the overthrow of the existing order.”5 Field a fledgling movement is seeking to gain all terrorist groups are insurgencies, it does Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, defines an notoriety for its cause.8 This is followed by a appear that “almost every insurgent group insurgency along similar lines as “an orga- second stage of “selective” terrorism in which uses terrorism.”12 nized movement aimed at the overthrow of an insurgency gaining strength seeks to target a constituted government through the use of counterinsurgents and isolate them from the Demands from al Qaeda subversion and armed conflict.” Frank Kitson people.9 Sometimes terrorism is seen as the Establishing that terrorism and insur- expands on these notions, emphasizing that only viable tactic for an insurgent facing a gency are closely linked and that many the successful insurgent generally starts with severe asymmetry in the balance of military national insurgencies have used terrorism little power but a strong cause, while the force. In this case, terrorism becomes one of both to draw attention to a cause and later to counterinsurgent has a near monopoly of the feasible forms of “lesser violence” that can isolate counterinsurgents from the people is power but a weak cause or reason for holding be implemented against a superior conven- insufficient to substantiate the claim that al that power, which the insurgent levers against tional force.10 But not all agree that terrorism Qaeda is an insurgency. An examination of al the counterinsurgent over time until those in is a tactic that can be employed successfully by Qaeda’s own words and deeds is necessary to power are ousted.6 Bard O’Neill adds three insurgents. Anthony Joes, for instance, came close the correlative link. Cronin argues generally that the Soldiers photograph and identify man during Western world has been slow to recognize that operation to track and arrest Iraqi insurgents terrorist activity has increased in response to U.S.-led globalization, or what is being termed “Western imperialism.”13 This is an important point; it is this backlash against globalization that al Qaeda is tapping into in fomenting its own global insurgency. Al Qaeda leaders have referenced the intrusion of Western nations as colonial oppressors, military bullies, and economic exploiters. Al Qaeda’s brand of insurgency against perceived imperial intrusion is grounded in the work of the 12th-century Islamic thinker Ibn Taymiyya, who grew up experiencing a brutal Mongol invasion and oppressive occupation. This created a problem, as the invading Mongols were also Islamic; hence, Taymiyya had to devise a way around Koranic law, which specifically forbade the killing of any Muslim by another, to justify killing fellow Muslims. He had to expand

U.S. Navy (Robert Whelan) the notion of what it is to be Muslim and differentiate between “good” and “bad” types of insurgency, which he dubs “anar- to the conclusion that terrorism is antithetical Muslims. Obviously, since the Mongols were chist,” those wishing to overthrow govern- to the waging of successful guerrilla warfare an invading people, they had to kill Muslims ment but not replace it; “egalitarian,” those after examining modern insurgency move- to achieve their goals, and this fact, coupled attempting to replace the current government ments. He notes that in all but one of the with their horrible treatment of conquered with one that emphasizes distributional insurgent cases, terrorism was employed as a Muslims, allowed Taymiyya to make a con- equality; and “traditionalist,” those bent on last resort by “insurgencies that were losing, vincing argument that invading Mongols replacing corrupt modern society with a or that eventually lost.”11 were “bad” Muslims. The road became clear mythologized distant past that emphasizes While one could certainly conclude when he declared that the invading Mongols traditional values often rooted in fundamen- that terrorism is the tactic of choice for the and the rulers who bowed down to them were tal interpretations of religion.7 weak, the evidence for the assertion that it is a apostates. Now distinctions could be drawn The relationship between insurgency tactic of failed insurgencies is unconvincing. between self-professed and real Muslims, and and terrorism is not without controversy. Galula’s argument that terrorism is the initial some could be determined to be enemies of While most scholars see the two as related, stage of an insurgency seems more plausible. Islam and were, therefore, subject to death.14

136 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Cox

The reason this is so monumentally to Israel and cease interference in all domestic nation-states, global markets, or ethnic important to al Qaeda is that Taymiyya’s affairs within any Middle Eastern state.18 communities.”20 Like sand dunes, Mishal revolutionary shifting of targets allows al In the final analysis, al Qaeda’s demands and Rosenthal see a temporary network Qaeda free rein to conduct its terror attacks that Western imperialists leave the Middle attaching and detaching and “moving against a much broader group of infidels. Not East and refrain from interfering with onward after changing the environment in only are apostate Muslims fair targets, but domestic Arabian politics, that apostate which it has acted.”21 This analogy seems to so are infidel women and children. In fact, rulers in Arabia step down, and that illegal depict al Qaeda accurately and explains why al Qaeda has a written directive in a seized Israeli colonizers give up their claim to Israel direct confrontation is so difficult. Mishal training manual that specifies that “apos- are strikingly similar to demands from the and Rosenthal argue that Dune movement tate rulers” presiding over predominantly Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or the Free Aceh is “almost random,”22 but this assertion is Islamic nations are more of a threat than past Movement in Indonesia, both of which debatable since al Qaeda seems to be spread- colonial oppressors.15 The link to Taymiyya demand autonomy from unfair and abusive ing and growing in strength. is clear, for as one author writes, “Islamic state rule. The only significant difference is The Dune analogy captures the move- radicals everywhere see the United States that al Qaeda’s claims stretch across multiple ment and actions of al Qaeda and helps as the neo-Mongol power lurking behind Islamic countries instead of being confined to illustrate how a complex and adaptive global the apostate governments that they seek to a specific region in a recognized nation-state. insurgency works. Combating a Dune insur- topple.”16 According to al Qaeda theologian O’Neill’s characterization of a traditional gency is difficult because once one tries to Faris Al Shuwayl, Shia Muslims are portrayed insurgency seems appropriate when attempt- stamp a sand dune with his foot, he is likely as polytheists and worthy only of death. ing to categorize al Qaeda. He writes, “Within to find either the wind has blown most of the Christians and Jews can obey sharia law and the category of traditionalist insurgents, one sand to a different area or his foot is now stuck also finds zealous groups seeking to reestab- in the sand. Worse still, successfully dislodged lish an ancient political system that they ideal- sand can blow back into an area that was pre- the demands from al Qaeda ize as a golden age.”19 viously cleared. regarding Western powers This certainly appears to be the modus are instructive, as they Dune Insurgency operandi with al Qaeda’s global insurgency. have the flavor of demands Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal offer From the movement’s humble birth in the late made by many domestic an interesting reinterpretation of al Qaeda 1980s as a successful mujahideen insurgency insurgent groups as an organization. Instead of classifying against Soviet invaders in Afghanistan, bin it as a hierarchical (almost no one claims Laden and al Qaeda constructed their first this anymore) or a networked organization, significant Dune in Sudan. Al Qaeda built a Islamic theological directives or be expunged. Mishal and Rosenthal perceive al Qaeda close relationship with the Sudanese govern- The broadening of enemies of Islam initiated as being “Dune-like.” According to these ment, developing joint business enterprises by Taymiyya, expanded by Wahhabi, and authors, a Dune organization “relies on a in exchange for a safe haven and, on at least carried into modern times by al Qaeda serves process of vacillation between territorial one occasion, securing hundreds of Sudanese as the foundation for terror attacks aimed at presence and a mode of disappearance. passports for al Qaeda operatives to use for overthrowing Western dominance, capital- The perception of territorial presence is travel.23 While in Sudan, al Qaeda branched ism, globalization, and modernization, which associated with stable territorial formations: out, meddling in any regional problem that currently define the world system. While apostate rulers within Dar al Islam are singled out as the prime targets of al Qaeda’s global insurgency, al Qaeda has made it clear that Western powers, especially the United States, are not off the hook. The demands from al Qaeda regarding Western U.S. Army (Matthew Freire) powers are instructive, as they have the flavor of demands made by many domestic insur- gent groups. has on several occasions demanded that the United States withdraw all support for Israel and remove all presence from Saudi Arabia, especially mili- tary presence.17 A slightly expanded version of these demands was offered in a letter sent to the New York Times by al Qaeda propagandist Nidal Ayyad the day after the 9/11 attacks. In this directive, al Qaeda demanded that the Soldier with interpreter questions local resident about suspected United States cut economic and military aid insurgent activities during air assault mission in Afghanistan

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 137 FEATURES | The Struggle Against Global Insurgency contained an Islamic component. In Somalia, one of the group’s most prominent fixations. by 2002, it is estimated that nearly 20 percent 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in a par- There are several reasons why the region is a of all of al Qaeda’s organizational strength ticularly brutal battle on October 3, 1993, by good fit for its brand of insurgency. Zachary was in Southeast Asia.30 Somali fighters trained by al Qaeda operatives Abuza argues that Southeast Asia is perfect Simultaneously with the infiltration in in Sudan.24 Eventually, the United States for al Qaeda and other terror organizations Southeast Asia, al Qaeda began to align itself continued to apply diplomatic and economic because of widespread poverty, lack of equal with a strengthening fundamental Islamic pressure on the Islamic-dominated govern- education, lax border controls (due to many movement in Pakistan. Islamic fundamental- ment of Sudan, and in 1996, bin Laden and his states being reliant on tourism), and the ism sprang up, in part, due to the Pakistani organization had to seek refuge in Afghani- spread of Wahhabist and Salafist Islam.27 government’s decision to back the fundamen- stan.25 But once again, al Qaeda is regaining Another enticement for al Qaeda is that there tal Taliban regime against Soviet invaders. influence in both Sudan and Somalia. The is already a fairly well-established regional When the Taliban mujahideen succeeded in dislodged sand is accumulating once more. J. terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah, resisting Soviet occupation, an explosion of Stephen Morrison argues that this should be which espouses the grand goal of establishing fundamentalism occurred in Pakistan. The expected as “both states are highly porous, a caliphate encompassing all Southeast Asian number of fundamentalist madrassas there fractured, and weak (or wrecked) states; both states.28 Finally, there are numerous Islamic increased tenfold in the decade after the welcomed al-Qaeda in the past and retain secessionist movements looking for support. Soviet Union was unceremoniously expelled linkages to it today.”26 The Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia, mul- from Afghanistan, and these religious schools After Sudan, al Qaeda set up shop in tiple Islamic secessionist groups in the Philip- began training insurgents who would become its old haunt, Afghanistan. But Afghanistan pines, and recent secessionist movement in influential leaders of radical terror organiza- was by no means the only base of operations. southern Thailand all provide fertile grounds tions in Southeast Asia.31 Al Qaeda had learned in Africa to spread its for al Qaeda to infiltrate. Al Qaeda grew as an organization, and operations and to foment violent radicalism Al Qaeda began laying the seeds of the sand dune that was seemingly dislodged wherever possible. While it was only able insurgency in Southeast Asia while head- from Sudan reappeared in Afghanistan. to operate freely in Afghanistan under fun- quartered in Sudan. Ramsey Youssef, a chief While in Afghanistan, al Qaeda gained a damental Taliban rule from 1996 until the architect of the 1993 World Trade Center strong foothold in Southeast Asia that it government itself was removed from power bombing, was one of the main actors manag- largely retains today. In 2002, coalition forces by coalition forces in 2002, al Qaeda grew in ing al Qaeda’s growing regional network would kick the sand again and al Qaeda strength and complexity not only by continu- in Southeast Asia. Youssef regularly visited would relocate to the nearby Northwest Fron- ing to perpetrate successful attacks against the Philippines and consulted with the Abu tier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan. the United States but also through linking Sayyaf group and coordinated cooperation Many pundits, political leaders, and itself and its Salafist cause to many domestic between it and al Qaeda.29 high-ranking members of the military insurgencies and secessionist movements Al Qaeda continued to expand this quickly proclaimed that al Qaeda was severely throughout the world. initial cooperation while in Afghanistan, sup- damaged when its operations were forcefully What is most interesting during this porting secessionist movements and regional dislodged from Afghanistan, that it could no period is that al Qaeda seemed to ramp up insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, longer operate as it used to, and that bin Laden its emphasis on global insurgency. Southeast which allowed it to gain a strong foothold and and his whole organization were hopelessly on Asia became a target of choice and remains a networked base of operations there. In fact, the run. But these proclamations were soon proven premature as al Qaeda continued to Soldiers search for explosives in Iraq’s Diyala River Valley to disrupt al Qaeda networks perpetrate, or at least inspire, major attacks against Spain and Great Britain. Al Qaeda also continued to infiltrate Southeast Asia and revisit old haunts in North Africa. In fact, U.S. intelligence agencies reported in 2007 that al Qaeda had actually become stronger and more dangerous almost 6 years after coalition forces dislodged it from Afghanistan.32 The organization has also continued to strengthen in Sudan and is actively supporting the Islamic Courts movement in Somalia. Al Qaeda consistently calls for an Islamic caliphate and the destruction of Western imperialist interveners in Islamic affairs. It persists in demanding the dissolu- tion of the state of Israel. It continues to grow in strength and arguably in scope even though successful efforts dislodged the organiza- tion from two separate nation-states that it U. S. Army (Bobby L. Allen, Jr.)

138 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Cox was using as its main bases of operations. Al Finally, strategic communication will 12 Daniel Byman, Understanding Proto-Insur- Qaeda is acting like a Dune insurgency, and be a key in managing the al Qaeda problem. gencies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007). 13 forceful attempts to disrupt this organization Industrial powers will need not only to foster Cronin, 34. 14 See Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Fanati- are meeting with what appears to be short- stability in the developing world but also to cism of al-Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in term success but long-term failure. broadcast the benefits of modernization and Middle Eastern Politics,” Political Science Quarterly freedom to a large and diverse body of people 117, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 179; and Daniel Benja- Implications that is largely wary of outsiders and that has min and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror Al Qaeda appears to be using terrorism been exploited by European colonizers. None (New York: Random House, 2002), for a more as an early-stage tactic to draw attention to of these tasks will be easy, but the sooner it is complete accounting of Taymiyya and his influence its insurgent cause and to separate the people accepted that al Qaeda is a complex, adaptive on al Qaeda. in multiple nation-states from the counter- global insurgency, the sooner real debate and 15 Doran, 180. insurgents just the way Galula predicted. It discussion regarding these and broader, more 16 Ibid., 183. 17 also shows the characteristics of being what global initiatives can occur. Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle Against Terror- O’Neill describes as a traditionalist insur- But one must also take caution when ism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics,” Interna- tional Security 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/2002), 40. gency attempting to rail against global forces combating al Qaeda’s global insurgent move- 18 Benjamin and Simon, 12–13. and return at least the Muslim world to a ment. Kinetic options are necessary to take 19 O’Neill, 21. out irreconcilables, but widespread kinetic mythologized caliphate emphasizing tradi- 20 Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, “Al- tional, fundamental Islam. Finally, al Qaeda operations can actually feed the movement Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology appears to be perpetrating a successful Dune and serve to coalesce disparate groups around of Islamic Terrorist Organizations,” Studies in insurgency, transitioning nimbly between the al Qaeda banner. One must always bear Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005), 282. short periods of territorial presence and then in mind that the implication of an attempted 21 Ibid. seemingly disappearing until it becomes global insurgency is that al Qaeda has declared 22 Ibid. evident that it has set up shop elsewhere, war against the world, and the sheer magni- 23 Benjamin and Simon, 112. 24 perhaps even in multiple locations. tude, and perhaps hubris, of such an undertak- Ruth Wedgewood, “Al-Qaeda, Military If the above analysis proves true, then ing might mean that it is doomed to fall under Commissions, and American Self-Defense,” Politi- combating a complex Dune insurgency will the weight of its own ambitions. JFQ cal Science Quarterly 117, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), 358. 25 Benjamin and Simon, 133. be problematic. Successfully countering al 26 J. Stephen Morrison, “Somalia’s and Sudan’s Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan, while vital, N o t e s Race to the Fore in Africa,” Washington Quarterly does not necessarily encompass all that needs 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 192. 1 Wayne A. Downing, “The Global War on to be done to counter a global insurgency. 27 Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al- Terrorism: Re-Focusing the National Strategy,” in Unfortunately, the old counterinsurgency Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the mantra “clear, hold, build” now applies to Southeast Asia 24, no. 3 (December 2002), 428. New Security Environment, ed. Russell D. Howard almost everywhere there is an exploitable 28 Mishal and Rosenthal, 280. and Reid L. Sawyer, 2d ed. (Dubuque, IA: McGraw- 29 Wedgewood, 359. instability. Kinetic options will likely meet Hill, 2006), 439. 30 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global with limited success as the main course of 2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2002). action, as the al Qaeda movement has spread Globalization and International Terrorism,” Inter- 31 Irm Haleem, “Pakistan, Afghanistan, and deeply into multiple states and regions, and national Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003), 38. Central Asia: Recruiting Grounds for Terrorism?” no coalition force could hope to intervene 3 David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global in Democratic Development and Political Terrorism, militarily in all of these places simultaneously. Insurgency,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. ed. William Crotty (: Northeastern Univer- 4 (August 2005), 598, 603–604. What really needs to be combated is instabil- sity Press, 2005), 146. 4 Daniel S. Roper, “Global Insurgency: Strate- ity and fundamentalism, as al Qaeda thrives 32 Mary Louise Kelly, “Is Al Qaida Stronger gic Clarity for the Long War,” Parameters 37, no. 3 off of these two features. Instability provides a Six Years after Sept. 11?” Transcript from National (Autumn 2008). perfect environment for al Qaeda to step into. Public Radio, , September 11, 2007, 5 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Groups with sometimes legitimate secession- available at . Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1968), 4, ist demands provide potential allies, because emphasis in original. poverty and human rights abuses provide 6 Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: causes that al Qaeda organizers can latch on Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping (Saint to and use to leverage popular support for Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1973), 29. their larger global cause. One of the great 7 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: ironies of the al Qaeda insurgency is that it From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2d ed. (Washington, could unintentionally unite the industrialized DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 20–21. 8 world in the first genuine, concerted effort to Galula, 58–59. 9 eradicate poverty and human rights abuses Ibid. 10 O’Neill, 57. in the developing world. Stability operations 11 Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The performed by the military take on prime History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexing- importance in such a struggle. ton: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 20.

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he purported global insurgency T h e D a n g e r s o f M i s ta k i n g that al Qaeda is claimed to rep- resent is nicely captured by the T language of the 2006 National Coherence for Security Strategy of the United States of America, which considers radical groups to be united by a fundamentalist ideology, posing a clear and present danger to the Nation. In Capability the words of the strategy, the war on terror is a Manichean struggle of good and evil, a war of opposing philosophies:

By M i c h a e l W . M o s s e r From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and against their murderous ideology. In the short run, the fight involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists; deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining access to [weapons of mass destruc- tion]; and cut off their sources of support.

Soldiers on counterinsurgency mission prepare to enter mud huts in Tawillah region of Iraq Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Armando Monroig) Mobile Public Affairs th 5

140 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Mosser

In the long run, winning the War on Terror strategies. The question, as it relates to insur- For its part, Hizballah in Lebanon has seem- means winning the battle of ideas, for it is gencies, is similar: how do we counter the ingly put aside traditional Sunni/Shia rivalries ideas that can turn the disenchanted into mur- threat posed to our way of life—to the social and collaborated with Hamas in support of its derers willing to kill innocent victims.1 system in which we operate? struggle. But by misinterpreting the conflict Much as the mitigation strategy for as a rebellion not only against Israel but also It is no secret that the war on terror is a dealing with Earth-impacting asteroids is against Western ideology, the United States war only if we conflate tactics with ideology.2 determined by their internal consistency, a has made the mistake of aggregating griev- Insofar as the tactics employed by terrorists sound understanding of the internal structure ances from local to global, giving it legitimacy since time immemorial have been as much psy- as a foe worthy of fighting. This is not an chological as military, this might be acceptable. the best-case scenario may be isolated case, nor is it surprising when put in But is there really a deeper ideology behind the context of an intersubjective understand- those tactics? It is true that armed insurgencies one of managing rather than ing of the “Other.” To justify the scale of the exist in many parts of the world, but are they solving the insurgency reaction, we must make the Other a vaunted united in a way that makes them global? adversary, one with capabilities that, while not This article argues that there is no truly of the insurgency is key to developing an equal to ours, nonetheless poses a significant unified global insurgency centered around al effective response. Fortunately, insurgen- existential risk to our physical security (for Qaeda and that to make a case that there is cies take place on Earth, not out in space. example, weapons of mass destruction), our risks reifying what is only an accidental simi- Unfortunately, insurgencies are not easy, or identity, or our way of life. larity. The aggregation of localized insurgen- even possible, to fully counter. The best-case We see the same universalizing of the cies into a global insurgency by both thinkers scenario may be one of managing rather than problem once we scale the Palestinian case and practitioners misses a fundamental dis- solving the insurgency. We may need to see to the alleged global insurgency represented tinction of the scope conditions of insurgency, the insurgencies we face as complex puzzles by al Qaeda. Despite the fact that numerous or the setting in which an insurgency takes more than as simple problems. To do so, we recent authors have identified the fractured place. Put another way, imputing a global need to understand the nature of insurgent nature of the global insurgency that we face, nature to a collection of distinct insurgencies groups, and of insurgency more generally. especially with respect to al Qaeda and pat- adds artificial coherence to what is better seen terns that might emerge through analysis, the as a fundamentally incoherent phenomenon. Coherence versus Incoherence National Security Strategy and the policies In support of this argument, the article To what ends and for what purpose and strategies that flow from it continue to makes three main points. First, it posits that are insurgent groups operating? These are link terrorism and insurgency. What is more, the United States has fundamentally mischar- the proper questions to ask when attempt- robust scholarly attempts to understand al acterized the nature of the challenge posed ing to unpack so-called global insurgencies. Qaeda and its motivations have proven quite by al Qaeda and other “global” insurgencies. Together, they comprise a necessary expan- problematic.3 Second, it contends that we may be pursuing sion of an overly simplistic question, which is For those scholars who see insurgency counterproductive strategies in what was for- usually phrased along the lines of, “Why do from a sociological or constructivist point of merly known as the “war on terror.” Finally, it they hate us?” This question presupposes its view, where identities are fluid and intersub- asserts that we have an overly simplistic view answer. Worse, it demands a universal answer jective rather than fixed and objective, the key of the causes of global violence. In a complex, to a phenomenon that is better understood as facet is mischaracterization. While it would be increasingly globalized world in which we a series of local events. naive to suggest that al Qaeda and its ilk are are one actor among many, assuming that we A useful example of a fundamental shift only a problem if we make them one, it is pos- are the targets of insurgent violence merely in perspective gained by asking the right ques- sible that the nature of the problem changes because we exist risks creating a self-fulfilling tion in the right way is to examine the case as we impose our particular problemsolving prophecy via our actions to counter this latent, of the Palestinian unrest in Israel’s occupied mentality on it. Following from the lessons not overt, threat. territories. Scholars of the Palestinian intifada imputed from constructivism and even from To make this case, it is helpful to draw (which, directly translated from the Arabic, poststructuralism, both of which seemingly an analogy from astronomy and the study means “shaking off” rather than its more deny the presence of objective identity, it may of asteroids. Scientists have discovered two common translation as “rebellion” or “upris- be that our interactions with al Qaeda will major categories of asteroid: aggregate (or ing”) note that the uprising against the Israelis change our interpretation of it, and vice versa. “gravel pile”) and coherent (or “monolithic”). is, at its heart, a conflict based on grievance For example, perhaps al Qaeda is truly This is not idle science, as many asteroids have rather than one based on ideology. As the only an aggregator of local grievances, and the potential to impact the Earth and cause Palestinians see it, the intifada is an attempt that various al Qaeda “franchises” are as catastrophic damage. Knowing which type to shake off what the community perceives as much about the redress of perceived local of asteroid is on a collision course with Earth the heavy-handed yoke of Israeli occupation. injustice as any globally coherent ideology. will dictate appropriate mitigation or defeat The conflict is thus almost entirely localized A good case of the franchise model provid- rather than globalized. ing benefits without cost is al Qaeda in the Dr. Michael W. Mosser is a Visiting Assistant Hamas, the duly elected government of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). After the end of Professor in the Department of Political Science at Gaza, has cleverly acted to leverage Palestin- the Algerian civil war, the state effectively lost Southwestern University. ian anger at Israel into support at the polls. its monopoly on internal violence, giving al ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 141 FEATURES | The Dangers of Mistaking Coherence for Capability

Qaeda an opportunity to exploit the situation physical entity, any attempt to counter it had even be factually accurate (or “true,” the word and assert control. To this point, the story fits to recognize the degree of factionalism that on which Western strategic communication the accepted model of al Qaeda expansion. existed within it. The IRA, as it turned out, fixates). But because no other domestic pres- But it appears the group that became AQIM was an incoherent insurgency. In effect, the sure group has been willing or able to serve shares little of the Salafist ideology of the “Irish Republican Army” construct oversim- as a counterconsolidator to the insurgency, its main branch, showing that AQIM may be plified the actual dynamics of the insurgency vision remains preeminent. merely using the al Qaeda “brand” to redress and missed the impact of splinter groups such Paradoxically, the ability of al Qaeda to local grievances and has little interest in as the Provisional IRA on the overall peace serve as a global ideological consolidator is expanding its activities elsewhere.4 If the evi- process. Only when the British government strengthened by the decisionmaking apparatus dence proves this to be the case, then a poten- recognized the essential incoherence of the and mode of thought of its sworn enemy, the tially successful U.S. and allied strategy would movement and changed tactics to deal with United States. In America, as in most modern be to disaggregate the grievances, addressing the “legitimate” members of the insurgency nation-states, policymakers spend their careers them from the point of view of local citizens and isolate the “illegitimate” members was looking for solutions to real or perceived and cutting AQIM out of the grievance cycle.5 progress made in the negotiations.8 This problems. They ask simple questions: How dimension of incoherence within insurgen- do I solve the problem in front of me? What The “Puzzle/Problem” Split cies is vital to understand. Just as important, resources do I need to apply to this problem to Insurgencies, at their heart, are social however, is the dimension of systemic coher- arrive at the best possible solution? Contrast systems.6 Unlike a physical system, a social ence—that is, the degree to which various that model with the puzzle-solving model system is highly complex. The system con- insurgent groups’ grievances transcend the favored by scholars. When confronted with tinuously interacts with its environment in a parochial and bind them to other groups. the issue of whether there exists a global insur- series of positive and negative feedback loops. Internally incoherent actors will find it diffi- gency, scholars change the “How do I solve the Inputs do not necessarily lead to predictable cult to create systemic coherent movements. problem in front of me?” question to “Is there a outputs. Moreover, in a process known to With this in mind, it is clear that the problem? How do we know there is a problem?” social scientists as path dependence, small supposed global insurgency faced by the For policymakers, answers to their ques- changes to initial conditions may lead to United States and its allies is in fact not one tions often come in the form of problem-set major changes in outputs.7 coherent entity, but rather an incoherent typologies, heuristics that give them the ability As opposed to the material coherence of agglomeration of grievances held together to react more quickly than otherwise would be physical systems, insurgencies exhibit varying by nothing more than the most ephemeral possible. This is exactly what has happened in degrees of ideological coherence. If an insur- ties, in what could be termed “ideological the war on terror. The U.S. policy community gency is ideologically coherent to the point of gravity.” In this conceptualization, the major has mistakenly classified al Qaeda as a highly rigidity (as is argued is the case with Salafist insurgent groups the United States claims coherent and highly capable actor, one more strains of Islam), its very strength may be used are united by a single ideological vision are akin to the Soviet Union or China than to a against it. The armed forces of a nation or a better understood as playing the role of an terrorist entity. Due almost entirely to its spec- coalition can find the center of gravity, apply ideological consolidator. Like massive stellar tacular attacks perpetrated on U.S. citizens, al enough force, and shatter it into pieces to be bodies that gather material around them, Qaeda’s ideological coherence and its capacity dealt with more easily. If, on the other hand, these ideological consolidators have a central have become conflated. This explains why, at a public diplomacy level, the strategy that the if the insurgency is only loosely held together by some ideological United States has tried so far is to engage in attractor, the binding effect of the attractor may be transient, counterinformation operations or counterstra- tegic communications, in effect attempting and attacking it may do little to affect the outlying elements to show that the “errors” that al Qaeda makes in its interpretation of Islam undermine its the insurgency is ideologically incoherent, and core of true believers around which can be message and weaken its legitimacy. only loosely held together by some ideological found a nebulous collection of members The danger in such a strategy is that, in attractor, the strategy for mitigating the threat with varying commitment levels. Al Qaeda this case, policymakers’ problem-set typology becomes less clear. The binding effect of the is the most successful of these consolidators, conflates coherent with capable. We mistake attractor may be transient, and attacking it but it is by no means the only one. While al Qaeda for a monolith, when in fact it is may do little to affect the outlying elements. al Qaeda has the most global reach of the more of a gravel pile. To be sure, its internal Following the logic of path dependence, an ideological aggregators, Hamas, Hizballah, coherence is weaker, but there is still some initial misread of the entity may make the Abu Sayeff, and other purportedly Islamist external force keeping the whole assemblage effects of early mistakes much harder to insurgencies all serve the same function on together. In the case of the asteroid, that force counter later on. smaller scales. They aggregate the complaints is gravity caused by the accumulated mass of An example of an initial misread that of legitimate domestic pressure groups into the individual pieces of the gravel pile. In the harmed counterinsurgency efforts can be a quasi-coherent philosophy, wrapped in a case of al Qaeda, it is the strong psychological found in the case of the Irish Republican particular ideological vision. This vision is defense mechanism of the reaction to oppres- Army (IRA) in . Because not necessarily beneficial to the groups that sion. But is that enough? Will a reactive strat- the IRA was as much a social construct as a the aggregators represent. Indeed, it may not egy allow the movement to prosper? In other

142 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu Mosser words, is al Qaeda as capable an entity as we against coalition troops. On the other hand, Decision Making),” Studies in Conflict and Ter- believe it to be? precisely because al Qaeda cannot fight sym- rorism 26, no. 6 (November 2003), 399–411; Bruce Evidence to the contrary is strong and metrically, it can use the power differential to Hoffman, “Al-Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism, and Future Potentialities: An Assessment,” Studies in growing. Apparently, al Qaeda is facing a its advantage via public relations and propa- Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 6 (November 2003), serious internal split in its reaction to the ganda. But if it is unable to project a coherent 429–442; David Martin Jones, Michael L.R. Smith, 9 Barack Obama administration. Even before message, its advantage is diluted or even lost and Mark Weeding, “Looking for the Pattern: Obama’s election, however, al Qaeda had three entirely. Because of these problems, al Qaeda Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia—The Genealogy of a fundamental issues. First and foremost is the must operate in the spaces and shadows of the Terror Network,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism distance from its major enemy, the United international system. It is not a member of the 26, no. 6 (November 2003), 443–457; and Xavier States. While undoubtedly there are sleeper international community, except perhaps in Raufer, “Al-Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis,” Studies the negative sense (much as organized crime in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 6 (November syndicates are members, however dysfunc- 2003), 391–398. 4 we mistake al Qaeda for a tional, of domestic society). These problems, See Jean-Luc Marret, “Al-Qaeda in Islamic monolith, when in fact it is as profound as they are for al Qaeda, are not Maghreb: A ‘Glocal’ Organization,” Studies in Con- flict and Terrorism 31, no. 6 (June 2008), 541–552. more of a gravel pile insurmountable. But they are real, and they This argument admittedly goes against the conven- are forcing the movement into a defensive tional wisdom. A typical counterargument can be posture. In the end, al Qaeda is not as capable cells in developed countries around the world, found in David H. Gray and Erik Stockham, “Al- not least in Western Europe and the United as it would like the world to believe. Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: the evolution from States, the core of al Qaeda leadership remains Despite the evidence that al Qaeda today Algerian Islamism to transnational terror,” African isolated in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Al is both less coherent and less capable than it Journal of Political Science and International Rela- Qaeda’s own actions have caused it to be once was, many U.S. and allied policymakers tions 2, no. 4 (December 2008), 91–97. forcibly removed from previously friendly still see it as just the opposite, as the locus of 5 There are a number of issues with this (and centrally located) areas such as Sudan a universalized insurgency bent on Islamist prescription, however. The primary problem, from and western Iraq. In effect, al Qaeda’s lines of domination. Clearly, al Qaeda would be easier the point of view of the U.S. security establishment communication are stretched thin. to defeat were it a monolithic entity such as (both civilian and military), is that al Qaeda’s aggregation of grievances takes the form of injur- The second problem, directly related Nazi Germany or fascist Japan, the last real ing or killing U.S. citizens and troops. The United to the first, is coordination. With modern monolithic enemies we faced. But it is not. It States does not stand idly by while its citizens or means of communication such as the Internet is a gravel pile that may or may not fracture troops suffer at the hands of an enemy, however ill and satellite phones monitored and tracked on its own. We cannot ignore it and hope for defined. Another major problem is the lack of will by superior Western technological means, al this fracturing to take place. But we should on the part of allies (especially those in the region) Qaeda has to coordinate many of its activities not attack the right problem with the wrong to adequately address the grievances of their disaf- via courier and physical interactions. This solutions. Our actions to mitigate the per- fected citizenry. leads to serious problems, not only in the tacti- ceived monolithic threat posed by what may 6 In his most recent work, Marc Sageman cal sense, but also ideologically, as the actions turn out to be a less-than-capable ideological makes the case that al Qaeda is more of a social of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi showed in Iraq in aggregator may splinter the insurgency but network than a social system, but the key point is 2006. There, al Qaeda lost tactical and ideo- not dissuade the constituent elements from similar. See Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Phila- logical control of its operational commanders. pursuing separately destructive paths. The delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 7 See W. Bryan Arthur, Increasing Returns This fact, coupled with increasing realization actions we take without a clear understanding and Path Dependence in the Economy (Ann Arbor: on the part of erstwhile insurgents that actions of the nature of the threat posed to us (or even University of Michigan Press, 2007) and The taken in the name of al Qaeda were no longer whether there is a threat) may be creating the Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves bringing benefits (the franchise model) but reality we wish to avoid. We mistake coher- (New York: The Free Press, 1994); and Arthur, only punishment from U.S. forces, tarnished ence for capability at our peril. JFQ Steven Durlauf, and David Lane, eds., The Economy the al Qaeda brand and led to a backlash as an Evolving Complex System II (Reading, MA: against the movement by local sheikhs. This N o t e s Addison-Wesley, 1997). See also Paul Pierson, Path loss of ideological control gave the United Dependence, Increasing Returns, and the Study of 1 States and its allies a much-needed opening to The National Security Strategy of the United Politics (Cambridge, MA: Center for European enable the Anbar Awakening to flourish. States of America (Washington, DC: The White Studies, Harvard University, 1997); and Pierson, House, March 2006), section III. The third problem al Qaeda faces is “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the 2 John Lehman, “We’re Not Winning This Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review security, which paradoxically is both harmful War,” The Washington Post, August 31, 2006. 94, no. 2 (2000), 251–267. and helpful to the movement. Much like the 3 See, for instance, Victor Asal, Brian Nuss- 8 See John Clark, “Northern Ireland: A Bal- Viet Cong insurgency in Vietnam, al Qaeda baum, and D. William Harrington, “Terrorism as anced Approach to Amnesty, Reconciliation, and confronts a severe security problem in that Transnational Advocacy: An Organizational and Reintegration,” Military Review (January-February it does not have the means to go toe-to-toe Tactical Examination,” Studies in Conflict and Ter- 2008), 37–49. with traditional national armies. Its forces rorism 30, no. 1 (January 2007), 15–39; Victor Asal 9 See “The growing, and mysterious, irrel- would be soundly defeated, as was shown in and Jonathan David Farley, “Breaking Al-Qaeda evance of al-Qaeda,” The Economist, January 26, Afghanistan in the few instances where al Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterror- 2009, available at . ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 143 Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council

By R i c h a r d M. Meinha r t

ilitary leaders at many Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff led levels have used the advice the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and processes associated (JROC), the Nation’s most senior joint mili- M with strategic planning tary advice council, to provide recommenda- councils in various ways to position their tions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of organizations to respond to the demands Staff (CJCS) to help enable him to meet his of current situations while simultaneously resource-focused responsibilities. transforming to meet future challenges. This This resource advice, under the heading article broadly identifies how the last seven of Requirements, Programs, and Budget, is

U.S. Air Force (Adam M. Stump) DOD DOD (R.D. Ward)

Top row, l–r: General James E. Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2007– present), Admiral David E. Jeremiah (1990–1994), Admiral William A. Owens (1994–1996)

Bottom row, l–r: General Joseph W. Ralston (1996– 2000), General Richard B. Myers (2000–2001), General (2001–2005), Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani (2005–2007)

DOD (R.D. Ward) U.S. Air Force (Ann-Marie Boom)

144 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MEINHART one of the Chairman’s six main functions formally providing his advice to the Nation’s Leadership specified in Title 10 U.S. Code. This resource senior civilian leaders. The U.S. strategic Of the seven Vice Chairmen from 1990 responsibility has not changed since his environment, which has external threats and until 2009, three were Navy, two Air Force, overall responsibilities increased as a result challenges and internal fiscal and operational and two Marine. Their leadership responsi- of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Depart- realities, influences JROC focus. In total, this bilities, which included chairing the JROC, ment of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act environment has characteristics associated were generally more internally focused on the of 1986. Prior to this act, these resourcing with the words volatility, uncertainty, com- many Pentagon processes and resource issues, responsibilities were almost exclusively within plexity, and ambiguity.4 versus those of the Chairman, who had more the Services’ domain, but the Chairman now While there are CJCS operating instruc- external advice and strategic communications needed to become more of an advocate in tions that take broad guidance from U.S. Code responsibilities. As such, the Vice Chairman designing, sizing, and structuring the Armed and DOD directives and provide specificity represented the Chairman on many internal Forces to meet combatant commanders’ to JROC tasks, in practice the Vice Chair- Pentagon boards and councils, particularly needs.1 The Vice Chairmen changed this man profoundly influences how issues are when joint military advice was needed on council’s focus and complexity during the last addressed. Most often, the Vice Chairman has resources and specific programs. His leader- two decades to help enable the Chairman to changed operating instructions after trying ship of the JROC, senior leader discussions, meet these new responsibilities, which provide new ways rather than first defining a new way. and countless JROC-related briefings essen- leadership and decisionmaking insights. In providing leadership insights, this article tially prepared him to execute these manage- The JROC is a senior military council focuses on key JROC initiatives by the past six ment responsibilities. led by the Vice Chairman and consisting Vice Chairmen: of the vices or deputies of the four military most often, the Vice Chairman 2 ■■ Services. This council’s main responsibility, Admiral David Jeremiah (1990–1994) has changed operating specified in U.S. Code since 1996, is to provide ■■ Admiral (1994–1996) the CJCS recommendations from a joint per- ■■ General (1996–2000) instructions after trying new spective on three main issues: ■■ General (2000–2001) ways rather than first defining ■■ General Peter Pace (2001–2005) a new way ■■ priorities of military systems and ■■ Admiral requirements to meet the National Military (2005–2007). Overall Evolution. As required by Strategy a DOD directive, the JROC was officially ■■ important acquisition programs to It then identifies a few key initiatives established in June 1986 and consisted of the include cost, schedule, and performance crite- taken by the current Vice Chairman, General director of the Joint Staff and the four Service ria and any alternatives . It broadly identifies how vices with the council’s chairman rotating ■■ prioritizing military programs such JROC processes and lower organizational among the vices.5 Its main mission was to that “the assignment of such priorities con- structures changed over time to become provide formal advice on major military forms to and reflects resource levels projected much more complex and integrated. Next, requirements before they entered the DOD by the Secretary of Defense through defense key JROC-related Vice Chairman initiatives, acquisition processes. With the passage of planning guidance.”3 which can be considered part of their leader- Goldwater-Nichols in October 1986, the Vice ship legacy, are discussed. Finally, the article Chairman’s position was created; and in 1987, The Chairman can either accept or provides concluding insights on how senior the Chairman appointed, with the Defense decline JROC recommendations in consul- leaders can best use councils or boards to Secretary’s approval, the Vice Chairman as tation with the other Service chiefs before respond to strategic challenges. JROC chairman.6 The JROC formally evolved four times, so its advice and impact throughout the mili- tary Services and DOD agencies have signifi- cantly grown. The first major JROC era, from its inception until 1993, was primarily reactive to major Service programs, as the council gen- erally met infrequently with a focus limited to acquisition programs. The second major era, from 1994 to 1996, witnessed a substantial growth period as JROC meetings significantly increased, its focus expanded to broader joint warfighting issues, and a new analytical Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process supported its proactive advice. The

Dr. Richard M. Meinhart is a Professor of Defense and Joint Processes at the U.S. Army War College. U.S. Air Force (Andy Dunaway) DOD (Cherie Thurlby) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 145 RECALL | Leadership of the JROC third major era, from 1996 to 2002, involved rity Council deputies’ meetings with the 1990 Services’ and Defense agencies’ programs to greater organization and process complexity Gulf War and regional operations in Somalia, more proactive with a joint warfighting focus as two formal lower level organizations were Haiti, and Bosnia.8 to shape the military’s ability to respond to created to examine issues, more organizations Later in his tenure, Admiral Jeremiah the strategic environment. These initiatives and individuals were invited to provide advice prioritized JROC efforts in deciding which continue today in spirit, although their exact or attend JROC-related meetings, and meet- weapons and communications would best nature and style have changed. ings decreased due to the substantial work of position the future military within a con- The first two initiatives reflect a phi- the lower organizations. The fourth major era, strained resource environment. Hence, his losophy that a leader’s prior experiences, from 2003 to today, is focused on an overall focus was on weapons systems that could be what he pays attention to, and whose advice capabilities approach and expanded gap produced in smaller quantities, more joint- he seeks will determine what ultimately will analysis enabled by operating, functional, and versus single Service–oriented, and with more get done. Before becoming Vice Chairman, integrating concepts associated with the Joint emphasis on technology.9 These later efforts Admiral Owens was the Deputy Chief of Capability Integrating Development System in 1993 set a foundation for the council to be Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare (JCIDS), with a formal Gatekeeper (the Joint more proactive versus reactive in defining Requirements, and Assessments. Hence, he Staff J8 responsibility) to decide which issues military requirements.10 His overall efforts was familiar with Pentagon processes and a go to the JROC for decision. as Vice Chairman were so widely recognized need to develop consensus to help make tough These changes, while generally evolu- that he became a full member of the Joint weapons system tradeoffs forced by declining tionary in each individual instance, in total Chiefs of Staff in 1992. A key leadership resources. He identified new areas the council can be considered revolutionary in their insight is his use of a council to react to a would consider, to include functioning as an broadened scope and greater complexity. declining resource environment and subtle active spokesperson of combatant command- Furthermore, as inputs from other Defense ways to envision future weapons systems. ers’ requirements, reviewing warfighting and interagency organizations have increased, deficiencies and capabilities, and considering the JROC can be considered the most broad interoperability and cross-Service integrating and influencing council within Admiral Jeremiah prioritized issues.13 He held informal weekly breakfasts DOD on complex joint military issues. It is JROC efforts in deciding which with JROC members,14 quadrupled formal “influencing” because in design the Chair- weapons and communications JROC meetings, and held an “unprecedented man ultimately decides whether to improve its would best position the series of separate off-site, all-day discussions recommendations, but in operation he gener- military within a constrained among the JCS, the Commander-in-Chief ally accepts them. The council’s Secretary, the resource environment of the Unified Commands, and the JROC Joint Staff J8, codifies deliberations and deci- members, centered on the JROC’s effort to sions in various ways, and its work directly identify joint military requirements.”15 Com- shapes the Chairman’s two annual resource Admiral William Owens (1994–1996). batant commanders’ inputs increased as the advice documents to the Secretary of Defense: Admiral Owens had many prior assignments Joint Staff established JROC liaison offices the Chairman’s Program Recommendation in sea operations, Navy Secretariat and Staff, with their staffs, and the council now visited (CPR) issued in the spring and the Chairman’s and academic venues; hence, he had broad them in their areas before formal recom- Program Assessment (CPA) issued in the fall. operations, staff, and intellectual perspec- mendations were developed. To illustrate the Furthermore, the council’s inclusive, collab- tives.11 He introduced the most significant JROC’s importance, its members were spend- orative, and analytical nature influences other JROC changes as processes and products ing roughly 15 percent of their time working Service and DOD leaders that provide input; became much more integrating and compre- on these issues, the greatest share given to any hence, there is agreement well beyond the hensive. These changes included: one activity.16 Council’s formal members and decisions. The The third initiative, and perhaps the following examines each Vice Chairman’s key ■■ quadrupling the number of council most important and lasting, was the Admi- leadership contributions in using the JROC. meetings and increasing tenfold the time spent ral’s establishment of JWCAs to provide Admiral David Jeremiah (1990–1994). by members on council issues an intellectual foundation for the council’s While he served as Commander of the U.S. ■■ aggressively encouraging combat- proactive decisions. These JWCAs focused on Pacific Fleet prior to becoming Vice Chair- ant commanders’ input on warfighting broad, joint mission areas such as strike and man, Admiral Jeremiah’s broad military requirements command and control, to name two.17 These experience included assignments on the Naval ■■ creating the JWCA to conduct lower assessment activities were placed under the Staff and in the Office of the Assistant Sec- level analysis on broad mission areas and inte- management of a Joint Staff directorate. Most retary of Defense for Program Analysis and grate higher level advice importantly, the JWCAs included representa- Evaluation.7 Hence, he appreciated Services’ ■■ increasing the content of the existing tives of the Joint Staff, Services, Office of the and Defense organizations’ interests as well as Chairman’s resource advice by expanding the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Defense agencies, intricate Pentagon processes. He focused on CPA and creating the CPR.12 combatant commanders, and others as needed the internal management and direction of the to consider relevant share and stakeholder Joint Staff, to include orchestrating the time- These four initiatives fundamentally inputs. Within a JWCA, there would be many consuming, but not JROC-related, political- changed the Chairman’s advice to the Sec- different issue work groups generally led by military issues associated with National Secu- retary of Defense from being reactive to colonels. This allowed analysis of numerous

146 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MEINHART

aspects of strike or command and control Marine weighs in before participating in body armor study under a formal timeline, wherein work group leaders briefed the JROC or their Joint Staff directors. While these JWCAs were chaired by a one- or two-star Joint Staff general officer for overall guidance, the lower colonel-led teams were inclusive and collaborative to gain consensus and provided the analytical rigor on which to base recommendations. Building on these assessments, the fourth initiative increased the specificity of resource advice in the existing Chairman’s Program Assessment and developed a new Chairman’s Program Recommendation. The CPA was designed to assess proposed Service programs submitted within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System before they became part of the President’s budget. Prior to 1994, most of the CPAs simply acknowledged or endorsed Service programs. However, the October 1994 assessment, the first submitted from the analytical process described, challenged some Service programs, identified about $8 billion in additional funding, and argued for shifts in $4 billion more.18 While this was a small percentage of defense resources, it established a precedent wherein the Chairman would not just endorse Service programs. Furthermore, the CPR was designed to influence the Secretary of Defense’s resource guidance to the Services and Defense agencies before it was issued. This recommendation was to “enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements.”19 In 1995, a CPR was submitted in the spring and a CPA was submitted in the fall, which reflect this resource advice sequenc- ing that continues today. The October 1995 assessment was much broader in scope than the previous one and recommended shifting resources from some programs to others and reducing some redundant Service capabilities, and it argued for a different recapitalization approach—“steps that, taken together, could require an adjustment of up to 12 percent of the projected defense budget over the FYDP period.”20

General Joseph Ralston (1996–2000). Hunt) U.S. Marine Corps (Albert F. General Ralston, who was Commander of prior to becoming Vice the Chairman’s Program Recommendation was designed to Chairman, had multiple assignments on the Air Force’s Secretary and Air Staff in require- influence the Secretary’s resource guidance to the Services and ments, acquisition, plans, and operations, all Defense agencies before it was issued of which indicated a balance between staff and operations experiences.21 General Ralston, to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 147 RECALL | Leadership of the JROC perhaps reflect his leadership style and allow more directly respond to the changing strate- Joint Vision 2010 (1996) and further described time to focus on interagency issues, envi- gic environment, 6 of the 10 original JWCA in Joint Vision 2020 (2000) to gain full-spec- sioned his JROC focus “to be ‘harmonizing’ domains changed and ultimately the number trum dominance. The existing JROC Review Service positions on programs so that national increased to 12 and then 14 as domains Board was changed to the Joint Requirements security needs could be met within budgetary on interoperability, combating terrorism, Board. Also, an Enhanced Joint Requirements constraints.”22 This contrasts with the more reform initiative, and combat identification Board, cochaired by the Joint Staff J8 and the direct and time-consuming approach taken were created.25 A leadership insight is that Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, by his predecessor. Hence, General Ralston creating a lower board with proper responsi- Technology, and Logistics, was created to gain created a JROC Review Board (JRB), led by bilities and an inclusive nature not only has advice on selected programs from civilian the three-star J8 with one- or two-star Service the advantage of focusing a leader’s time, but perspectives. To assist the JROC and JRB, representatives, to assist in reviewing ana- it can also assist in developing future leaders General Myers created a Joint Requirements lytical assessments, nominating topics, and and creating a joint climate. Conversely, Panel, chaired by a one-star, to focus primar- shaping issues before coming to the JROC.23 increasing bureaucratic structure can have ily on acquisition issues and the requirements This reduced the frequency of JROC meetings a negative effect in delaying or perhaps development process. to perhaps a more manageable weekly level reducing the controversy associated with Combatant commanders as well as as many issues were now considered by this some issues that senior leaders need to hear the Assistants to the Chairman for National review board’s focus and expanded schedule. as consensus is greatly valued before finally Guard and Reserve matters now had a stand- The JRB’s stature and responsibilities briefing these leaders. ing invitation to attend JROC meetings in increased as it comprehensively reviewed General Richard Myers (2000–2001). an advisory capacity. Finally, General Myers many issues and semiannually held three Prior to becoming Vice Chairman, General created an inclusive process to identify all-day issue update conferences before Myers served as Commander of U.S. Space strategic topics to better focus the JROC and visiting combatant commanders.24 It visited Command and earlier was a special assistant lower boards’ efforts.27 Key leadership insights commanders prior to scheduled JROC visits, to the Chairman. Hence, he experienced include implementing the Chairman’s vision, which the JROC still did semiannually, but the JROC from a combatant commander’s establishing lower boards to enable joint one of these trips was to a central location perspective and appreciated the Chairman’s climate and develop future leaders, and solic- where a few commanders would gather. To views. He spent the shortest time in this iting broader and strategic inputs to JROC position, as he was the Vice Chairman for meetings not only to address greater complex- 18 months before being made Chairman in ity but also to provide for a more informed U.S. Navy’s newest Aegis , USS Wayne E. Meyer, commissioned October 10, 2009 October 2001. In his April 2000 testimony to consensus to execute decisions. Congress, General Myers identified three key General Peter Pace (2001–2005). JROC areas that needed improvement: (1) Prior to becoming Vice Chairman, General shifting the council to be more strategic in Pace was the Commander of U.S. Southern requirements and integrating joint warfight- Command and previously served as Com- ing capabilities, (2) institutionalizing U.S. mander, Marine Corps Forces and joint

combatant commanders as well as the Assistants to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve matters had a standing invitation to attend JROC meetings in an advisory capacity

Joint Forces Command’s joint experimenta- task forces in Somalia, as well as the Joint tion efforts and integrating with other DOD Staff’s Director of Operations. Hence, he decisionmaking processes, and (3) shifting clearly understood the operator’s needs. He capability assessments from being narrow changed the names of the lower level boards to far reaching.26 These views, codified to reflect the capability and transformation in a March 2001 Chairman’s instruction, focus that continues as lower level boards reflected a sense that assessments had grown were now Functional Capability Boards and were not strategic enough, and changes (FCBs) and the three-star-led board was were needed in existing structure and now the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB). processes. The FCBs were responsible to analytically To achieve this new focus, the overall review issues within a newly developed and JWCA structure significantly changed as complex JCIDS to identify, analyze, and 14 mission areas were reduced to 8 with 4 prioritize joint warfighting capability needs named: precision engagement, full dimen- to fill capability gaps to better respond to the sional protection, dominant maneuver, and changing strategic environment. The JCB focused logistics. These names reflected assisted the JROC in executing its respon- U.S. Navy (Desiree Green) emerging operational concepts introduced in sibilities by directly assessing the work of

148 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MEINHART the FCBs and the JCIDS process. Moreover, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani for commanders to attend JROC meetings to gain civilian input, representatives from (2005–2007). Prior to becoming Vice Chair- and used videoteleconferencing to make this 8 OSD organizations, 10 Defense agencies, man, Admiral Giambastiani was Commander a routine event as evidenced by their par- and 6 interagency organizations could of U.S. Joint Forces Command for 3 years and ticipation in 17 of the first 21 meetings. He participate on FCBs as needed and attend earlier was the Senior Military Assistant to was more inclusive when integrating JROC JROC-related meetings in an advisory role.28 Secretary of Defense ; hence, efforts with the Deputies Advisory Working A group of Joint Staff documents, designed he experienced transformation from both Group, created to work Quadrennial Defense to shape future military capabilities out to 20 operational and Pentagon perspectives. He Review issues. Recognizing the value of civil- years, informed this capability focus and the inherited a complex process that he consid- ian inputs, nearly 70 percent of the JROC JCIDS processes. Starting in 2003 with the ered somewhat bureaucratic, not sufficiently meetings had senior leader representatives Chairman’s Joint Operations Concept, later focused on combatant commanders’ needs, from OSD.33 Overall, Admiral Giambas- replaced by the 2005 Capstone Concept for and sometimes too geared to lower level pro- tiani’s efforts enabled the JROC to focus on Joint Operations, there was now a family of grams. However, he did embrace the overall higher priority items and gain greater civil- Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional capability approach and the need to identify ian input. Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts to those critical combatant commanders’ gaps General James Cartwright (2007– help promote interdependence.29 Recogniz- to shape future resource decisions. His JROC present). While it is too early to provide ing this complexity and a need to streamline tasks had greatly expanded, as there were now definitive insights on General Cartwright’s decisions to focus the JROC’s activities, 27 specific functions, a substantive increase JROC leadership legacy, the current Vice General Pace established a Gatekeeper. This over the 7 functions in 1995, and there were 21 Chairman has the most prior experience general officer in the J8 formally directed approved Tier 1 and 240 approved Tier 2 Joint dealing with the council from Joint Staff what issues needed to be elevated to the Capability Areas in 2006.32 and combatant commander perspectives. JROC and what FCBs would lead or support To solve these complexity concerns, General Cartwright was the Deputy Director specific issues.30 This family of concepts and the Admiral instituted an integrated process for Force Structure, Resources, and Assess- the associated work created a high degree to gather all requirements identified to the ment in the J8 from 1996 to 1999 and later of complexity that some leaders inside and Joint Staff from other existing processes and served as the Director for Force Structure, outside the military criticized and others distilled them down to a more manageable Resources, and Assessment from 2002 to embraced.31 A leadership insight is that too number called the Most Pressing Military 2004. He was Commander of U.S. Strategic much complexity can be overwhelming and Issues. To gain more combatant command- Command from 2004 to 2007 before becom- inhibit crisp decisionmaking. ers’ inputs, he extended a standing invitation ing the Nation’s eighth Vice Chairman in the

MRAP vehicles are offloaded from MV Marilyn for training exercise in Europe U.S. Army (Pierre-Etienne Courtejoie) U.S. Army (Pierre-Etienne

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 149 RECALL | Leadership of the JROC summer of 2007. Hence, he saw JROC from Insights viewed by their successors. Hence, to create many perspectives as it evolved from the From this examination of the Vice a needed balance, a process to become more early 1990s to today. Chairmen’s use of the JROC, there are four strategic was introduced by General Myers, During his confirmation as Vice broad insights for senior leaders who use and a process to focus on the most pressing Chairman, General Cartwright advocated or are considering using councils to shape military issues was introduced by Admiral building on his predecessor’s initiatives, strategic decisions. These insights center Giambastiani. Leaders need to appreciate getting the JROC ahead on strategic issues, on simplicity versus complexity, organiza- that balance in the event they become too and keeping the JROC’s formal military tional culture, process characteristics, and comfortable or are captured by their own membership along with seeking civilian decisionmaking. processes. Thus, entrenched leaders need leadership advice. He continues to actively Leaders need a balance between to reflect on this balance, and new leaders seek both combatant commander advice complexity and simplicity to focus their should access the strengths and weak- through senior warfighter forums and civil- intellectual energy. If processes are too nesses of processes they inherit from varied ian leadership advice, to include the inter- simple, decisions will be more linear and perspectives before embracing or changing agency community when appropriate. He not integrating. If they are too complex, a them. The ongoing challenge is how best to has aligned Functional Capability Boards leader’s focus is not optimized and impact is reduce today’s complexity to a manageable with the DOD portfolio approach, focused diminished. Too much simplicity was likely level but still get integrated decisionmaking. more on streamlining the overall capability process, and empowered U.S. Joint Forces General Cartwright advocated keeping the JROC’s formal military Command with the Command and Control Functional Capability Board.34 Finally, the membership along with seeking civilian leadership advice Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, a key Chairman’s guidance document that serves the case during most of Admiral Jeremiah’s Leaders can use councils and boards as the intellectual foundation for future tenure. A needed degree of complexity with within an overall strategic planning system to capabilities, was significantly rewritten a broader and more analytical focus was help create a climate and embed an organiza- by U.S. Joint Forces Command before the added by Admiral Owens. That complexity tional culture. This recommendation reflects Chairman signed it in 2009, which reflects exploded during the next decade such that the work of all the Vice Chairmen since Gold- more influence by this command for capa- there was too much at the end of General water-Nichols. To help create a joint climate, bility development. Ralston’s and General Pace’s tenures as there has been an expansive interaction of

Lockheed Martin F–35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter at production facility DOD (Cherie Cullen)

150 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MEINHART civilian and military leaders working together groups and advised the JROC when needed. Assessment Process (Washington, DC: The Joint with a joint focus on JROC-related boards, The bargaining decisionmaking process, Chiefs of Staff, February 2, 1996), 3. 20 as combatant commanders and many DOD which seeks to maximize political support, Office of the Vice Chairman, 23. 21 Cole et al., 223–227. organizations now have input on require- was conceptually evident as considerable 22 Ibid., 227–228. ments and capabilities that were formerly internal coordination efforts were pursued to 23 CJCSI 5120.01, Charter of the Joint Require- primarily under the Services’ domain. This gain internal support through consensus on ments Oversight Council (Washington, DC: The assisted the successful transition from Service recommendations before issues were elevated Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2, 1995), 19. deconfliction in the early 1990s to Service for final JROC decisions. Finally, processes 24 CJCSI 3137.01A, The Joint Warfighting Capa- interoperability in the late 1990s and early were explicit on how to share JROC decisions bility Assessment Process (Washington, DC: The 2000s to the present emerging joint interde- with Congress, which has ultimate funding Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 22, 1999), enclosures pendence. It is this author’s assessment from responsibility. JFQ B, C, and E. working within and studying the effects of the 25 Ibid., 30. This January 22, 1999, CJCSI docu- Chairman’s overall strategic planning system, ments the change to 12 JWCAs. 26 and the work of the JROC during these seven Richard B. Myers, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Vice Chairmen’s tenures, that the culture of N o t e s Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, April 4, jointness envisioned by many of our nation’s 1 William A. Owens and James R. Baker, 2000, available at . hold with those who support these efforts. Quarterly 13 (Autumn 1996), 37. 27 CJCSI 5123.01A, Charter of the Joint Require- Leaders need to ensure that processes 2 Joint Requirements Oversight Council ments Oversight Council (Washington, DC: The are integrated, inclusive, and flexible to (JROC), U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 181. This Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 8, 2001), enclosure A. improve effectiveness. This integrated nature section specifies the formal membership of the The changes attributed to General Myers came is illustrated by the initial JWCAs and now council (Service general or admiral) and its chair, from this instruction, which was a major update the capability gap assessments briefed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who can from the 1997 version. 28 the lower level boards before reaching the delegate this responsibility only to the Vice Chair- CJCSI 5123.01B, Charter of the Joint Require- JROC. This inclusiveness is demonstrated by man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ments Oversight Council (Washington, DC: The 3 Ibid., Section 181, Para. b (3). the greater representation of civilians from Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 15, 2004), enclosure A. 4 Stephen Shambach, Strategic Leadership 29 Richard B. Myers, Capstone Concept of Joint many organizations and their increasing Primer, 2d ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of contributions to the analytical assessments War College, 2004), 13–14. Staff, August 2005), 2–5. This document guides and to JROC-related decisions. Flexibility is 5 Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning the development of future joint capabilities across demonstrated by the way various Vice Chair- in a Revolutionary Era (Washington, DC: Institute the range of military operations for the period men have changed the JROC focus to meet the for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996), 2. 2012–2025. changing strategic environment. Interviews 6 Ibid., 2–3. 30 CJCSI 5123.01B, enclosure A. with strategic planners indicate that using 7 Ronald H. Cole et al., The Chairmanship 31 “Van Riper’s E-mail to Pace, Hagee, and inclusive, integrated, and flexible processes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Joint Schoomaker Regarding JCIDS, with Responses helped educate them on others’ perspectives, History Office, 1995), 203–206. from Deptula and Mattis,” Inside the Navy, January 8 which in the end enabled them to do their Ibid., 205–209. 23, 2006. This article addressed the pros and 9 Ibid., 208–209. own jobs better. Finally, the overall effective- cons of the existing JCIDS complexity by email 10 Owens and Baker, 37; Office of the Vice correspondence. ness is supported by the manner in which this Chairman, 9. 32 CJCSI 5123.01D, Charter of the Joint Require- council’s decisions are embraced and imple- 11 Cole et al., 213–215. ments Oversight Council (Washington, DC: The mented. While there have been studies that 12 Office of the Vice Chairman, 9–12. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 8, 2007), enclosure called for JROC improvements, there has been 13 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Memoran- A; CJCSM MCM–14–95; and Joint Staff J7, “Joint a broad recognition of its achievements. dum (CJCSM) MCM–14–95, Charter of the Joint Force Development,” April 2007, briefing slide 5. Leaders need to be aware of the Requirements Oversight Council (Washington, DC: 33 Gordon R. England, “Statement of the strengths and weaknesses of three main types The Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 7, 1995), 2–4. Honorable Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of 14 of decisionmaking to better enable success.35 Cole et al., 216. Defense, before the House Armed Services Com- 15 The rational decisionmaking process, Office of the Vice Chairman, 10. mittee 26 June 2007,” available at . 17 Ibid. The other eight assessment areas were 34 “Pentagon Leaders Inch toward More Joint approach to maximize efficiency, was gener- land and littoral; strategic mobility and sustainabil- Management of Capabilities,” Inside the Army, ally used throughout to initially consider ity; sea, air, and space superiority; deterrence/coun- January 14, 2008; Memorandum for the JROC: issues, access tradeoffs, and determine terproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; Subject: Functional Capabilities Boards Rebaseline, capability gaps. This was augmented by the information warfare; intelligence, surveillance, and March 4, 2008; and “JROC Hands JFCOM Author- participative decisionmaking process, which reconnaissance; regional engagement/presence; and ity for Command and Control Requirements,” requires the involvement of those affected by joint readiness. Inside the Navy, December 19, 2008. the decisions. As the JROC evolved, combat- 18 Office of the Vice Chairman, 11–12, 22–23. 35 Donald F. Kettle and James W. Fesler, “The ant commanders who used the systems and 19 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction Politics of the Administrative Processes,” in Deci- OSD civilians who eventually decided which (CJCSI) 3137.01, The Joint Warfighting Capabilities sion Making (Washington, DC: Congressional systems to resource were added to working Quarterly Press, 2005). ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 151 Unity of Command in the Pacific During World War II

By P h i l l i p S. Meilinge r

ne of the myths of World War II resulted in divided effort, the waste, diffusion, and “piecemeal strategy.”3 Another historian is that, unlike in Europe, unity and duplication of force, and the consequent is even more critical, arguing that the U.S. of command was lacking in the extension of the war, with added casualties effort in the Pacific was “hamstrung” because O Pacific. The argument goes that and cost.”1 of the inability to appoint a single theater the Southwest Pacific had one commander, For its part, the Navy believed that the commander. The result was “a wasteful General Douglas MacArthur, and the Pacific Pacific war was “a naval problem.” Admiral allocation of resources, a dispersion of effort, Ocean areas had another, Admiral Chester Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, and a consistent failure to pursue the most Nimitz. MacArthur often commented that insisted that “the entire Pacific Ocean should effective and economical strategy against the the Pacific Ocean areas drained resources for constitute a single theater with a unified Japanese.” The compromise of appointing little gain that he could have put to far better Naval command headed by Nimitz.”2 Because two commanders for two different theaters use. In his memoirs, he railed against the MacArthur and Nimitz were so powerful, and was “grotesque.”4 In truth, however, a basic command structure: “Of all the faulty deci- because their champions in Washington were assumption of the above argument is false. sions of war perhaps the most unexplainable so entrenched, however, unity could not be There was no unified command in Europe, so one was the failure to unify the command achieved. As a result, a fundamental principle the ideal to which the critics of the Pacific war in the Pacific. . . . [It] cannot be defended in of war was violated, and the result was inef- allude never existed.

logic, in theory, or in common sense. . . . It ficiency, confusion, waste, and an “ad hoc” U.S. Navy U.S.

President Roosevelt at conference in Hawaiian Islands with GEN MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander of the Southwest Pacific Theater, ADM Leahy, Senior Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ADM Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, 1944

152 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MEILINGER

Defining Unity of Command him for the accomplishment of a mission or smaller than either the Pacific Ocean or First, a word about the term unity of task. This force will include all the means Southwest Pacific areas. (Note that the Pacific command is in order. Principles of war, in necessary for the mission’s successful execu- Ocean areas consisted of four subcommands, one form or another, have been claimed since tion. Unified command vests in the designated although the South-East Pacific area was Sun Tzu wrote over 2,000 years ago. The first commander, the responsibility and authority never activated.) If, therefore, one advances modern effort to enumerate such principles to control the organizations of all arms and the argument that the areas of Eisenhower, was by a British officer, then-Captain J.F.C. services composing his force, by the organiza- Alexander, and Horton were too large to be Fuller, who published them in 1916. These tion of task forces, assignment of missions, commanded effectively by one man, then how principles were soon enshrined in British Field designation of objectives, and the exercise of much more impossible would it have been for Service Regulations, and in 1921 were adopted such control as he deems necessary to insure any one person to run the entire Pacific?9 with minor revisions by the U.S. Army. These the success of his mission.8 early doctrinal writings referred to a principle of “cooperation” that allowed diverse fighting It was such unity of command that there was no unified command forces to work efficiently toward success.5 existed in Europe. Or did it? in Europe, so the ideal to By 1931, the U.S. Army had substituted the which the critics of the Pacific term unity of command for this idea, stating Disunity of Command? war allude never existed authoritatively: “It is a well-established prin- Italy is part of Europe, as are the ciple that there shall be only one commander Balkans and Poland. Most definitions would for each unit, and one commander in each also include Iceland and Greenland. And yet Similarly, it is specious to argue that zone of action, who shall be responsible for the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, effective coordination between the Pacific everything within his unit or within his zone General Dwight Eisenhower, had no authority Ocean and Southwest Pacific areas was unat- of action.”6 This principle was not, however, over the Mediterranean theater of operations, tainable. Such coordination existed in Europe established in a joint environment. Theater which included Italy and Greece and was led and was exercised by the Combined Chiefs commanders were not yet common in Ameri- by Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander. Nor of Staff (CCS)—the union of the British and can military operations; rather, Army and did Eisenhower control the Atlantic sea lanes U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The CCS Navy commanders were still expected simply or the vital bases in Iceland and Greenland met regularly throughout the war to debate to “cooperate” when circumstances dictated. that fell under the authority of Admiral Max and draft grand strategy and to allocate This would lead to problems as late as 1941, Horton at Allied Naval Forces in the Atlantic. resources between the theaters. They would when the Services could not agree on a single Finally, Eisenhower had no say over—and then recommend a course of action to their commander for the Caribbean. indeed, was barely informed of—Soviet opera- political superiors.10 Although the CCS system The Caribbean was a crucial theater tions in Eastern or Central Europe. A look at was not perfect, and many would argue that for the United States because it guarded the the map (next page) illustrates this issue even national and Service politics too often shaped Panama Canal, vital to hemisphere defenses. further. its decisions, the system in the main worked Yet when the Army appointed Lieutenant As is apparent, the European and in Europe. If or forces had to be General Daniel Van Voorhis as commander of Mediterranean theaters combined were much moved from the Mediterranean the Caribbean Defense Command, it quickly discovered that the Navy had other ideas. Whenever Van Voorhis attempted to exert the authority given him by the President over the naval forces in the theater, local admirals replied tartly that “he was not in their chain of command.”7 Pearl Harbor changed things. In October 1942, U.S. planners preparing for the Casablanca Conference issued a definition to guide Allied leaders regarding future joint and combined commands:

Unified command is the control, exercised by a designated commander, over a force integrated from combined and joint forces allocated to

Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.), served in

U.S. Navy the U.S. Air Force for 30 years. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Michigan. His latest book is Hubert R. Harmon: Airman, Officer, Father of Above: ADM Chester W. Nimitz the Air Force Academy (Fulcrum, 2009). Left: GEN Douglas A. MacArthur

U.S. Army ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 153 RECALL | Unity of Command in the Pacific theater to reinforce the European, or if air fact that in 1942 and 1943, Australians com- Air Forces (USSTAF), consisting of the assets from Europe were needed to bolster the prised the majority of MacArthur’s combat Eighth Air Force based in England and the Middle East, the CCS directed such changes— forces.13 In short, the Pacific was controlled Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy. Cutting often overruling the wishes of the theater almost totally by the JCS. As a consequence, across theater boundaries, USSTAF ensured commanders involved.11 it was not necessary to go through the time- unity of command of the strategic air forces, In the Pacific, command relationships consuming and politically charged process of but ingeniously employed the principle of were less cumbersome. Both the Pacific Ocean securing the approval of Allies as was the case focusing that unity on the target—Germany— and Southwest Pacific areas were largely in Europe. rather than in the different theaters where American affairs. The British played almost Strategic Airpower no role, and when they attempted to interject it was not necessary to go themselves into operations near the end of the Another anomaly throughout the war, U.S. military leaders adamantly rejected war regarded the status of the British and through the time-consuming their offer. At the Potsdam Conference in American strategic air forces. In Europe, and politically charged process May 1945, for example, the British offered to the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command, of securing the approval deploy more of the Royal Navy to the Pacific led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris of Allies as was the case in to take part in the planned invasions of the after February 1942, enjoyed a special status Europe Japanese home islands scheduled for Novem- during the war. Harris was a favorite of ber 1945 and March 1946. Admiral King heat- Winston Churchill, who ensured that Bomber edly objected, arguing that he could neither Command existed as a separate force, answer- the bombers were based. This system was use nor support additional British vessels.12 able directly to the CCS, and thus was treated modified prior to Operation Overlord, when The Australians were steadfast and loyal allies as an equal of the various theater commands.14 the CCS gave Eisenhower temporary target- throughout World War II, but U.S. leaders On January 1, 1944, the United States ing authority over both USSTAF and Bomber effectively denied them much of a voice in established a similar system. General Carl Command to support the Normandy inva- Allied planning or command despite the Spaatz became commander of U.S. Strategic sion. He relinquished control of the bombers

World War II Areas of Command

British Operational Strategic Area U.S. Operational Strategic Area British Limits of Operational Command U.S. Limits of Operational Command British Spheres of Influence U.S. Spheres of Influence British/U.S. Operational Command BRITISH British/U.S. Sphere of Influence ZONE Extension to S.E.A.C. August 1945

NORTHWEST EUROPEAN NORTH PACIFIC AREA COMMAND (SUB-COMMAND OF PACIFIC AREA) MEDITERRANEAN U.S. COMMAND CENTRAL PACIFIC ZONE AREA (SUB-COMMAND OF PACIFIC AREA)

SOUTH- EAST PACIFIC SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AREA SOUTHEAST (SUB-COMMAND OF ASIA PACIFIC AREA) BRITISH ZONE COMMAND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

154 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu MEILINGER

Marines shell Japanese positions on Iwo Jima, 1945

U.S. Navy

Motion of propeller forms aura around F6F Hellcat aboard USS Yorktown, 1943 U.S. Marine Corps in September 1944, and they returned to the He maintained that it would be impossible to redesignated Tenth Fleet, while remaining in overall direction of the CCS.15 delegate command authority to three differ- Washington as Chief of Naval Operations.17) The situation was similar in the Pacific, ent theater commanders and have any hope As in Europe, however, if the ground situ- although only U.S. air units were involved. that an effective, coordinated strategic air ation was such that the strategic bombers In April 1944, B–29 long-range bombers campaign could be conducted against Japan. were needed, Arnold would place them at the began deploying to India, and staging bases (When selling this idea to his fellow chiefs, disposal of the theater commander. This hap- were also established in China. B–29s of XX Arnold noted that much the same system pened in March and April 1945 when Twen- Bomber Command would depart from their in the U.S. Navy allowed Admiral King to tieth Air Force was diverted from its strategic bases in India, land in China to refuel, con- command U.S. Antisubmarine Command, tinue on to bomb targets in Japan, and then return to India via China. In October 1944, the were liberated by Allied Navy U.S. forces and airfields were immediately built on , , and Tinian to accommodate the B–29s of the newly formed XXI Bomber Command. This meant that B–29 bases were established in two different theaters—in the South-East Asian theater commanded by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (Royal Navy) and in the Pacific Ocean areas under Nimitz (U.S. Navy) while transiting the theater of General Joseph Stilwell (U.S. Army) in China.16 Who was in overall command of the B–29s? In an unusual move, General Henry “Hap” Arnold, commanding general of Army Air Forces in Washington, formed Twentieth Air Force, composed of XX and XXI Bomber Commands, and then elected to command the Twentieth himself. Arnold argued that, as in Europe, unity of command over the target area—Japan—was far more important than unity of command in the basing areas. GEN MacArthur signs formal surrender of Japan aboard USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 155 RECALL | Unity of Command in the Pacific bombing campaign to support the invasion One should also note that the entire and Combined Chiefs of Staff,” Joint Chiefs of Staff of Okinawa; targeting authority then passed grand strategy of attacking the enemy simul- History Office study, 1972. 11 temporarily to Nimitz.18 taneously on several fronts was a deliberate Regarding the allocation of landing craft, for example, see Foreign Relations of the United In sum, in both Europe and the Pacific, and essential aspect of the war against Nazi States: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, strategic air forces operated side by side with Germany. Why should such a multipronged 1943 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1970), 1146–1148. As the theater commanders, all of whom took offensive be considered inspired in Europe but for air assets, the Eighth Air Force in England was their guidance from the CCS, or in the case a “grotesque compromise” in the Pacific? denuded of aircraft and trained crews throughout of the Pacific, from the JCS. If the situation In reality, the entire “unity of 1942 in order to stand up the Twelfth Air Force required, forces or resources were shifted command” argument seems to be nothing in preparation for the invasion of North Africa. from one theater to another, or air assets were more than an inter-Service turf battle. See Wesley Frank Craven and James L. Cate, The temporarily placed at the disposal of a theater However, because it would look unseemly for Army Air Forces in World War II, 7 vols. (Chicago: commander if the tactical situation deemed it one Service to admit that it wanted command University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958), vol. II, necessary. The system worked. priority simply because it would enhance its chapter 2. 12 prestige, the debate has acquired the fig leaf Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Washington, DC: Focusing on Japan’s Defeat of centering on a hallowed principle of war— GPO, 1972), 333. It would be difficult to prove that a unity of command. As the facts show, there 13 James, 311–314. In April 1943, MacArthur’s was actually far greater unity of command in single commander in the Pacific could have land forces consisted of 18 divisions, 15 of which waged the war more effectively than the com- the Pacific than there was in Europe during were Australian. bination of Nimitz, MacArthur, and Arnold World War II, and operations against the 14 Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New working under the guidance of the JCS. Japanese did not suffer in any event. JFQ York: Dial, 1979), 136–137. Indeed, there is no evidence that the refusal 15 Craven and Cate, III, 79–83. to settle on either a central Pacific thrust or 16 China was technically part of Mountbatten’s one coming up through and the N o t e s theater, but Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ran Philippines delayed Allied victory. On the things within his country with little interference. 1 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New contrary, simultaneous attacks on the central To help smooth things out, Stilwell was dual-hatted York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 172–173. This argu- as the deputy to Mountbatten and the chief of staff and southern fronts—as well as the strategic ment is echoed in the Army’s official history: to Chiang. bombing offensive, the U.S. Navy’s unre- Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: Strategy 17 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of stricted submarine warfare campaign, and the and Command, The First Two Years (Washington, Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford: operations in China and Burma—stretched DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), Stanford University Press, 1994), 203; Haywood S. the Japanese defenders to the breaking point. chapter 11. Hansell, Strategic Air War against Japan (Maxwell 2 Had the Allies focused on a single thrust, the D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1980), Japanese would have been able to use their Vol. II: 1941–1945 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 26–27. Hansell was on the Air Staff at the time the interior lines to concentrate their forces to 1975), 309. Twentieth Air Force was formed and then took over 3 Stephen T. Ross, American War Plans, meet that threat. Instead, they were forced XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas. 1941–1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 50. 18 Craven and Cate, V, 630–631. to disperse and defend against attacks from 4 John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy 19 This was purportedly the deliberate intent several directions. The Allies had the forces and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: to conduct such a multipronged strategy; the of Joseph Stalin when he played his two great mar- Viking, 1990), 505, 510–511. shals, Georgy Zhukov and Ivan Konev, against each Japanese did not. 5 John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The other to see who would take Berlin first. See Max In such a view, redundancy is the true History of the Principles of War (Westport, CT: Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, American way of war. The United States Greenwood, 1982), 240. 1944–1945 (New York: Knopf, 2004), 461–476. had the personnel and materiel resources to 6 Ibid., 246. 7 follow several different strategies. To put it Larry I. Bland, Sharon Ritenour, and Clar- more cynically, indecision became the key to ence E. Wunderlin, Jr., eds., The Papers of George flexibility. Because U.S. political and military Catlett Marshall, Vol. III: “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941 (: The Johns leaders refused to decide upon a supreme Hopkins University Press, 1986), 257. commander in the vast Pacific region, they 8 Foreign Relations of the United States: The unwittingly introduced enormous flexibility Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casa- into Allied planning—and consternation into blanca, 1943 (Washington, DC: Government Print- Japanese planning. ing Office [GPO], 1968), 733–734. In truth, the competition between 9 One should also note that the Atlantic Nimitz, MacArthur, and even Arnold spurred Ocean—far smaller in area than the Pacific—was them and their staffs to heightened efforts. All divided into U.S. and British zones with no overall wanted to claim that it was their command commander. 10 that was the decisive instrument in bringing The history of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Japan to its knees.19 Indeed, this has been a has not yet been written. For a brief overview, see Vernon E. Davis, “The History of the Joint Chiefs central issue in postwar debates by historians of Staff in World War II: Vol. I: Origins of the Joint ever since.

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how we think about battle or, price of the book. Anyone who these chapters presents a superb more precisely, how we develop believes that we can predict with treatise on the use of examples our theories of warfare. It is a any degree of certainty how and counterexamples to support serious and profound look at how a specific action will turn out points of view. A single counter- and why human nature should should read this chapter. What example is not sufficient to falsify guide the theories of combat and results from Storr’s effort is a an argument, for there are no their implications for doctrine, superb guide for how to approach absolutes. Rather, we are looking organizations, training, and the conduct of operations. Much for patterns that appear better leader development. of it focuses on the need to act than others, the fact that they The first three chapters in order to provide concrete sometimes fail notwithstanding. discuss theories of conflict: what evidence of how things will The Human Face of War The Human Face of War they should do, how they should evolve, all the time maintaining is a densely packed book that by Jim Storr be developed, and why many an open mind instead of fol- takes on much of the conven- London: Continuum Interna- recent attempts at theories are lowing a predetermined script. tional wisdom about theories tional Publishing, 2009 really shallow approaches based While much of this approach is of combat. Whether one agrees 240 pp. $120 on a single governing idea, ignor- not new, Storr’s explanation of or not, the ideas are all amply ISBN: 978–1–84706–523–0 ing many of the contradictory or why it is necessary is compelling. documented and well reasoned. more complex aspects of warfare. The chapter further looks at One would ignore them at the Reviewed by Storr discusses rationalism, some advanced research done by peril of overlooking insights pro- Clinton J. Ancker III determinism, and empiricism, the British Defence Operational vided by superb research. While dissecting why each is or is not Analysis Centre on the factors Storr’s stated focus is the tactical t a time when debates a valid approach to a working that do have a significant impact level of war, the discussions of on a range of issues are theory of combat. He clearly on the outcome of battles. Four what makes for good theory are A taking place within the establishes why rationalism fails factors tended to dominate, applicable at any level of war. The defense community, the ability us in our quest for a theory, and regardless of force ratios: sur- book is also clearly focused on to step back from the particulars why empiricism is an appropri- prise, air superiority, aggressive classic combat operations. While and look at first principles is ate approach. It boils down to a ground reconnaissance, and there are some who feel that the particularly important. This simple test: does our theory work shock. Storr closes the chapter days of major combat operations book, an important work by a in the current circumstances, and with a discussion of the much- are over, much evidence exists serious student of the profes- do we think it will work in the denigrated and misunderstood that small unit combined arms sion of arms, does just that. future? Even if a theory appears idea of attrition. His defense of operations encompass the skills Surveying an array of disciplines to be working, we must recognize attrition runs counter to much needed for any kind of combat. including history, psychology, that it is never more than a best of what is being bandied about The idea that we will not have to systems theory, complexity guess that must be continually today but, when put in context, fight a “conventional” fight again theory, and philosophy, Storr revised based on the results of is quite convincing. All these because we are so good at it only (a former officer) actual operations. Nothing we factors are linked to the funda- holds as long as we are good at looks at what a theory of combat propose is ever an immutable mental idea that combat is about it. This book can go a long way should include, and then pro- law, but rather a hypothesis to how humans behave in battle, toward helping to build a force vides one. He goes on to apply be tested and, if found wanting, not some mechanistic approach that is formidable in the conduct that theory to the design of discarded in favor of one that based on a thorough systems of combined arms combat. organizations and staffs, leader- does work, at least for now. Com- analysis. If there is a downside to ship, information management, bining a healthy pragmatism After developing his pre- this book, it is the absurd price and the creation of cohesion in with empiricism should produce cepts in the first three chapters, of $120. One can only hope that units. In doing so, he takes on something that works for a given Storr uses the rest of the book some American publisher will many currently popular theories set of circumstances. Storr’s posi- to deal with specifics about produce it in paperback at a such as effects-based operations, tion is best summed up with this how to apply those precepts to reasonable price. It deserves to be the observe-orient-decide-act passage: “[C]ritically, military “Tools and Models,” “Shock and widely read by those who think loop, and the use of postmodern theory should not be a case of Surprise,” “Tactics and Orga- seriously about the profession of theory and language. ‘this is the right course of action,’ nizations,” “Commanding the arms. JFQ Its title may lead readers to but rather ‘doing this will prob- Battle,” “The Soul of an Army” (a expect The Human Face of War ably have beneficial outcome’” fascinating discussion of leader- Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, USA to be similar to Richard Holmes’ (p. 29). ship styles), and “Regulators and (Ret.), is Director of the Combined Acts of War or John Keegan’s The third chapter, “The Ratcatchers” (a discussion of Arms Doctrine Directorate at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort The Face of Battle, both of which Nature of Combat,” is a detailed personality types based on the Leavenworth, Kansas. focused on how people behave look at why combat is not, and Myers-Briggs Type Indicator in combat. Rather, this book is cannot be, deterministic. This and how they relate to military about how that behavior affects discussion alone is worth the leadership). The discussion in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 157 BOOK REVIEWS

out to clarify it, but not at the engagements to accomplish the at the operational level—a level expense of losing the subtlety purpose of the war,” by which he did not recognize because and nuance of the original he meant the balancing of ends, it muddied conceptual clarity. work. For that reason, the first ways, and means to use violence That said, it would be a trap for part of his study, on the purpose or, according to Echevarria, the readers to assume that only the and method of On War, is also threat of violence to achieve familiar is relevant to contem- the most difficult. Clausewitz the purpose of the war. In that porary military studies. sought an understanding or sense, it is useful to remember Perhaps the best that can theory of war that transcended that the book is called On War, be said for Echevarria’s book specific time and place while not On Statecraft. The threat of is that it is not easy. Whether recognizing that all real wars war is the domain of statecraft. Clausewitz’s intention or not, remained constrained by their The threat of violence in war is the effort to find order across specific context. For example, a dimension of strategy. his work is exactly the sort of his discussion of absolute war Lest those definitions mental exercise that is necessary Clausewitz and represented one aspect of a gen- sound too restrictive for to find order in either making Contemporary War by Antulio J. Echevarria II eralized theory, but the prob- contemporary war, Echevar- or studying war, in this or any New York: Oxford University abilities of reality kept actual ria argues in one of the more other era. The easy practice is Press, 2007 wars from ever reaching their contentious sections of his book to take the parts that make the 210 pp. $99.00 absolute nature. For Clausewitz, that Clausewitz said war “occurs most sense from Clausewitz (or ISBN: 978–0–19–923191–1 such testing through experi- whenever one party resists the Echevarria, Strachan, Sumida, ence and history of the tension violent actions of another” (p. and others) and excerpt them Reviewed by between the ideal and the real 145). Therefore, most of the to prove military theory bona Thomas Bruscino improved the understanding of missions of the military today, fides. But that is precisely what war far more than the declara- to include arms control, peace must be avoided. We must nterpreting the writing of tion of fixed principles found operations, humanitarian assis- continue to do the hard work of Carl von Clausewitz contin- in the work of some of his con- tance, combating terrorism, and struggling with Clausewitz and Iues to be a cottage industry; temporaries, including Antoine- civil support in domestic emer- his interpreters because after all in the last few years, Jon Tetsuro Henri Jomini. gencies, reside in the domain these years, war is simple, Sumida, Hew Strachan, and That said, Echevarria of Clausewitz’s definition of but the simplest thing is still Andreas Herberg-Rothe have spends most of part two of his strategy. Echevarria probably difficult. JFQ all added to a library already work explaining what Clause- reaches too far here—some well stocked with the works of witz did find to be universal missions carried out by the Thomas Bruscino is an Assistant Michael Howard, Peter Paret, in the nature of war, focusing military belong to statecraft, Professor of Military History at the and Michael Handel, to name especially on the importance of not war—but then again from U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. but a few. Indeed, Antulio violence. Too many interpreters the military’s perspective, the Echevarria’s Clausewitz and have misunderstood Clause- principles of strategy probably Contemporary War builds on witz’s emphasis on combat to still apply. his significant writings on the mean the search for decisive Those principles, which work and influence of the Prus- battle, when in reality he was Echevarria calls more subjec- sian theorist. What can one making the assertion that war tive and flexible than laws, review add to this voluminous itself was inherently about the constitute much of On War literature? Very little, except a use of violence to achieve some and the final part of Clausewitz reaffirmation that engaging that purpose. Policy determines the and Contemporary War. They literature is still worthwhile for purpose of the war, and politics include the issues of strength any serious student of military (the interplay among political, of defense and attack, superior- affairs. military, social, and economic ity of numbers, concentration With Clausewitz and institutions) affect the purpose of forces, economy of force, Contemporary War, Echevar- and the conduct of the war; but surprise, perseverance, turning ria, the Director of Research at war itself is always about the use movements, culminating points, the Strategic Studies Institute, of violence. and the much-debated center has provided one of the more Where things get a bit of gravity (Echevarria makes useful contributions to the less familiar in today’s terms a solid case for its continued Clausewitz canon. Anyone who is the discussion of strategy, relevance). Much of this section has grappled with On War is part three of Clausewitz and will be familiar to modern well aware of the difficulty of Contemporary War. Clausewitz readers, even if many of the the material, and Echevarria, understood strategy in the principles laid out by Clause- like so many before him, has set classical sense, as “the use of witz now more properly belong

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simultaneously claim such a Peace, the spread of autocracy To Lead the World ben- diversity of political opinion. is the chief menace to the efits from its contributors’ The book’s authors encompass a Nation. Undemocratic powers varied backgrounds. Stanford wide range of political perspec- Russia and China are pursu- University historian David tives, from Robert Kagan’s neo- ing regional predominance M. Kennedy offers one of the conservatism to Stephen Van and encouraging the spread of best chapters, the historically Evera’s defensive realism. autocracy to protect themselves informed “Two Concepts of For all the range of (p. 48). It follows that the United Sovereignty.” Kennedy roots the opinion, however, the contribu- States should form democratic U.S. interventionist streak in its tors find commonalities. As the coalitions, and spread democ- messianic birth: “When Britain’s book’s title indicates, all the racy, to push back against the North American colonies struck authors agree with the neces- Sino-Russian offensive (p. 53). for their independence in 1776 sity for American leadership. Kagan is thought-provoking they at once invoked Westpha- To Lead the World: All agree that the United States and provocative, but ultimately lian principles and bid them American Strategy after the should maintain its military he starkly overemphasizes the defiance” (p. 159). America’s Bush Doctrine dominance. All agree, further- dangers of Russia and China respect for self-determination Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and more, on the benefits of an open and consequently overstates the has led to great successes, but its Jeffrey W. Legro economic order. There is also need for U.S. power projection. moralistic streak leads it to cru- Oxford: Oxford University Press, consensus on the need for the G. John Ikenberry, Francis sades. Kennedy also places great 2008 United States to embrace multi- Fukuyama, Samantha Power, importance on the so-called 303 pp. $17.95 lateralism. Finally, unanimity is and James Kurth also offer revolution in military affairs, ISBN: 978–0–19–536941–0 present among the contributors intriguing, if ultimately less believing that devastating force on the desirability of improved persuasive, ideas. Not one of wielded by an all-volunteer Reviewed by democracy and human rights the 10 contributions is unorigi- army divorced from the mass Jordan Michael Smith abroad. nal, nor is any ludicrous. public tempts policymakers into Agreement ends there. Perhaps the most frustrating unnecessary wars (pp. 169–176). n June 2007, as the George MIT political scientist Stephen contributor is Niall Ferguson, Books such as this have an W. Bush administration’s Van Evera, in the book’s most who spends most of his chapter expiration date. With interna- I batteries died, the Univer- specific, persuasive chapter, ruing the public’s ignorance tional events changing rapidly, sity of Virginia’s Miller Center identifies nuclear-armed ter- of the statesman’s dilemmas, foreign policy assessments in of Public Affairs hosted a 2-day rorists as the greatest threat only to hastily declare near his general become obsolete as workshop called “After the Bush to the United States (p. 11). conclusion that a new President quickly as computer software Doctrine: National Security Global warming and epidemic should jettison the assumption programs. The lack of a narra- Strategy for a New Adminis- diseases are other potential that the biggest threat to the tive puts edited volumes in par- tration.” The event brought threats he names. With these U.S. is nuclear-armed terror- ticular at risk of being overrun together 10 U.S. scholars—his- three problems posing dangers ists (p. 242). He identifies four by the train of time. But before torians, political scientists, and to the world, Van Evera calls alternative dangers, among To Lead the World’s time is up, economists—from across the for a “Concert of Coopera- them the Middle East’s disin- international relations students political spectrum and tasked tion” among the great powers, tegration, as more important. and policymakers would do well them each with writing a along the lines of the Concert Given the provocative nature to read its contents and consider concise national security state- of Europe established in 1815 of this claim, it would have its recommendations. JFQ ment. The statements were to (pp. 16–17). He writes that helped if he had elaborated on offer advice to future officials cooperation with China should it. Instead, he simply says that Jordan Michael Smith is a writer in on the overall goals of national be a primary goal of American “we must take very seriously Washington, DC. strategy, and to identify and foreign policy (p. 18), and that the risk that the Greater Middle assign priority to the great- “the main threat to the United East could become in our time est threats facing the Nation. States is no longer conquest what Eastern Europe was in This book is a collection of the but war itself” (p. 4). Van Evera the 1940s or Central Africa responses. contends that the main impedi- in the 1990s: a lethal zone of To Lead the World is ments to this grand strategy are conflict.” The wars in 1990s notable for the prominence and foreign lobbies and the defense Central Africa were horrid, but eclecticism of its contributors. establishment (p. 25). they were not a major threat to Few editors can entice such Robert Kagan disagrees. the United States. If the Middle high-profile names as Samantha For Kagan, a at the East now poses as little a threat Power, Francis Fukuyama, and Washington Post and Senior to the United States as Africa Niall Ferguson to write for Associate at the Carnegie did, we are in for a peaceful them. Even fewer volumes can Endowment for International future. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 159 BOOK REVIEWS

Funding Extended Con- branches. Exacerbating these supplemental funding is that flicts offers such an analysis tensions was the tendency of the funding the war on terror with case studies of how the leg- administrations considered in exclusively through supplemen- islative and executive branches this study—Harry S. Truman, tals excluded these costs from budgeted for the wars in Korea, Lyndon B. Johnson, and George long-term budget projections, Vietnam, and the war on terror. W. Bush—to lowball estimates obscured the real size of pro- Because it was published in or conceal potential war costs at jected deficits, and minimized 2007, the book covers funding the outset of the conflict. More- congressional oversight. Miller only through Congress’ consid- over, determining what the war takes a somewhat contrary eration of the Bush administra- costs exactly are is problematic. view. Although he agrees that tion’s request for fiscal year For example, as Miller points war costs need to be incorpo- 2006 emergency supplemental out, during the Korean War, rated into long-term Federal funding. Nevertheless, it pro- sorting out the direct costs of budget projections, he argues vides an essential starting point the fight on the peninsula from that supplementals offer more, Funding Extended Conflicts: for a thoughtful consideration the general Cold War expansion not less, visibility of direct Korea, Vietnam, and the War and understanding of the triggered by the North Korean war costs, and, furthermore, on Terror arcane issues associated with invasion was a contentious they offer the executive branch by Richard M. Miller with funding extended conflicts. and challenging issue. Similar necessary planning and opera- foreword by Dov Zakheim Westport, CT: Praeger Security Richard M. Miller, Jr., an problems emerged during the tional flexibility. This complex International, 2007 Active-duty U.S. Navy officer, war on terror. Arguments over argument cannot be adjudi- 200 pp. $49.95 as well as a resource manager whether funding for the Army’s cated in a short book review. ISBN: 0–275–99896–7 and congressional analyst modularity program should Suffice it to say that Miller for the Chairman of the Joint be included in the emergency introduces the issue fairly, care- Reviewed by Chiefs of Staff, is well suited to supplemental appropriations fully outlines the parameters Richard S. Tracey this task. A laudatory foreword bills or folded into the regular of the argument, and offers by Dov Zakheim, Under Secre- base budget illustrate this issue. his perspective for the reader’s n his first address to Con- tary of Defense (Comptroller) Next, Miller appropriately notes consideration. gress, President Barack from 2001 to 2004, attests to that capturing second- and Finally, a pair of distrac- I Obama declared that his his bona fides and the value of third-order war costs is elusive, tions in an otherwise fine study budget would include “for the his analysis. A winner of the as expanded Servicemember should be noted. First, a chart first time . . . the full cost of fight- B. Franklin Reinauer Defense benefits and pay, veterans’ titled “Funding Tensions in ing in Iraq and Afghanistan.” He Economics Prize at the Naval care, and equipment reset costs Clausewitz’s Trinity” reflects then bluntly added an exclama- War College, Miller makes his continue to make demands on a common misunderstand- tion point to his declaration: judgments based on his deep budgets well after the end of a ing of the trinity that misses “For seven years, we have been knowledge of defense budgetary conflict. Clausewitz’s profound insights a nation at war. No longer will policy and an ability to handle All three conflicts fea- regarding the nonlinear, we hide its price.” Unquestion- a range of budgetary data span- tured the use of emergency interactive, and unpredictable ably, the price of the wars in ning over five decades. supplemental appropriations nature of war. Miller, as have Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Miller’s close analysis to fund costs. Miller notes that many others, takes Clausewitz’s global war on terror operations of the war funding for Korea, debates over when and how to remarkable trinity and flat- has been extraordinary. At the Vietnam, and war on terror move ongoing war costs into tens it into a linear model for time of the President’s speech, through 2005 identifies a set of the baseline budget and the pursuing successful war poli- according to the Congressional enduring issues that he summa- regular appropriations cycle is a cies that emphasizes the need Research Service, the total direct rizes in 12 “Resourcing Consid- “perennial” resourcing consid- to maintain balance among cost of operations since Septem- erations.” Here, Miller correctly eration. Thus, while the initial the army, people, and govern- ber 11, 2001, was $864 billion. concludes that determining war use of wartime emergency ment. Second, at the beginning While it is true that the George costs before, during, and after supplemental appropriations of most of Miller’s chapters, W. Bush administration and a conflict is an extraordinarily was not a Bush administration a string of four to five quota- Congress largely funded costs for difficult exercise. The inherent innovation, the continued use tions appears without proper the war on terror outside of the problem with predicting the of supplementals to fully fund citations or consistently clear normal budget cycle with a string nature, intensity, and extent of operations over an extended connections to the subsequent of emergency supplemental any war should be self-evident period did stretch the norms of text. These numerous quota- appropriations bills, the issues to policymakers, but often past practice. tions, although often interest- behind President Obama’s asser- it is not. This uncertainty The argument underlin- ing, should have been reduced, tions are more complex and less contributes to tensions and sus- ing President Obama’s asser- properly cited in the endnotes, unique than one might suppose, picions over funding between tion that the Bush administra- and in many cases integrated and thus merit close analysis. the legislative and executive tion hid war costs through into the text.

160 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu These distractions aside, this is a balanced, well- Wargaming the Flu documented, and thoughtful work that makes a significant By M a r g a r e t M . M c C o w n contribution to understanding an important subject. It recog- s the winter wears on and swine flu (H1N1) spreads, the importance of transnational nizes that the struggles between public health issues seems more apparent. Swine flu has not proved as deadly as first the legislative and executive feared, but the large-scale health and public communications effort mounted to address it branch over war funding are A illustrates the complex exigencies of the response, where an array of partners, both domes- not new and identifies enduring tic and international, with numerous and overlapping areas of responsibility and expertise shape policy war funding issues that will vex options and their efficacy. Analyzing and formulating policy responses to complex, strategic level issues the current as well as future that are dynamic and are affected by similarly rapidly changing local, state, national, and international governments. We should look efforts and concerns present political scientists and policy planners with great challenges. forward to further contribu- Other recent articles from the Center for Applied Strategic Learning in Joint Force Quarterly have tions from the author on this addressed how to select topics for exercises and using qualitatively specified games for teaching versus subject. JFQ analytical purposes. This article explores the substantive and methodological findings that National Defense University (NDU) gleaned from a series of pandemic influenza exercises conducted for senior Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Tracey, government participants over a 2 ½-year period. In particular, it focuses on how participant observations USA (Ret.), teaches strategy and joint and feedback shaped the design of subsequent exercises, creating an iterative process in which lessons operations at the Army Command and learned from earlier games informed structure that, in turn, elicited further and more refined insights in General Staff College’s Fort Belvoir, subsequent ones. VA, satellite campus. In 2005, he worked for a Member of the House Armed Services Committee. Background Between February 2006 and June 2008, the Strategic Policy Forum (SPF), the strategic exercise group within NDU targeting senior executive and legislative participants, conducted six pandemic influenza exercises, addressing state, national, and international strategic issues. Two exercises were conducted in Washington, DC, in February 2006 and again in February 2007 for sets of participants that included Members of Congress and senior executive branch participants from a wide range of agencies. At the invitation of the respective governors, three state exercises were subsequently conducted in Alaska (August 2007) and Hawaii (December 2006 and January 2008) with many of the same executive branch participants, combined with state level elected officials and agencies. The cycle of games concluded with an international exercise conducted for American and Mexican officials and executive branch officials in May of 2008. Participants constituted an unusually broad and representative sample of policymakers involved in the planning for and response to pandemic.

Findings As design work began on the first pandemic flu exercise in 2005, the issue was still somewhat new to the defense community. Another Defense Department research group shared with SPF materials that it had used for a quickly designed and executed game. This game, which SPF modified for the February 2006 exercise Global Tempest, was originally based on a bioterrorism policy exercise. The exercise began with a first move in which a novel, highly pathogenic influenza virus emerged overseas, asking partici- pants questions such as:

■■ Are there measures to contain the virus before it reaches the United States? ■■ How much of the supply of antivirals in the Strategic National Stockpile should be shared with the foreign countries in which the disease is present? ■■ Should surveillance systems be put in place?

Subsequent moves portrayed a limited and then full-blown disease pandemic in the United States, and asked participants questions about roles and responsibilities in the response and to make prioritiza- tions over the allocation of limited resources such as vaccine and antivirals. There was even some discus- sion of whether poultry flocks should be culled and the impact of this on the national economy. As the notional pandemic worsened in the United States, participants even discussed what to do if civil unrest— in reaction to deaths, disruption, and limited resources—complicated the situation. One public health participant wryly noted that one sees so few flu patients with the vigor to rise from their sick beds to riot. The congressional Members’ experience of constant constituent contact allowed them to expand on and underscore the importance of effective public communications strategies appropriately coordinated ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 161 greatest emphasis on these measures and risk communication to make them effective. This exercise also weighed whether significant levels of unreimbursed or slowly reimbursed hospital care, coupled with many nationwide U.S. Navy (Jessica Pounds) deaths, could shock health and life insurance companies to the extent to which the health care system faltered. This was the first pan- demic exercise to devote a move to examining the aftermath of the pandemic. The final international exercise incorpo- rated many of the factors or constraints that had emerged from the different evolutions of the game. Instead of taking an “emergency Commander, Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, response approach,” exercise Partnered Virginia, receives influenza vaccination to make a difference. Similarly, participants Response focused on broad social issues that agreed that containing the disease overseas would shape the course of a pandemic as well across levels and branches of government, so was probably not realistic and placed a greater as its impact. The difficulties and yet impor- that the public received consistent and accu- emphasis on using the time before it reached tance of the free movement of goods, services, rate information and guidance. the United States to prepare the public. persons, and capital across North America The exercise was a success; bring- Drawing on these findings, the last three during a pandemic, particularly if Asian trade ing together multiple perspectives and sets games introduced rather different factors. was heavily disrupted, was traced across all of expertise elicited new insights into the In August, SPF ran the exercise for the state three moves of the exercise. The exercise also problem as well as highlighting its salience of Alaska, including state policymakers and addressed transnational communication to to a broad range of actors beyond the public representatives from Alaska and U.S. Pacific a coordinated response. And, similar to the health community. In a statement after the Command. Like the Hawaii exercise, this Pandemic Tempest exercise, it devoted an exercise, Senator Pat Roberts observed that game allowed the opportunity to discuss the entire move of the game to examining the the “exercise taught us a valuable lesson: we need for coordinating the pandemic response postpandemic world. must be prepared at all levels to deal with a in a geographically isolated state, which also large-scale public health emergency such as hosts a significant Federal and, particularly, This series of pandemic flu exercises pandemic flu. This system must be able to Defense Department presence. is an excellent example of how qualitatively respond in any type of crisis, but more impor- One of the more interesting observations specified games can help us refine our tantly, this system must be ready to respond came from an Alaska Department of Labor understanding of the key independent factors before the crisis begins.” official, addressing the assertion that a crucial that structure a problem. Some factors or The exercise taught SPF several valu- part of the response would be convincing constraints, particularly public communica- able lessons as well, most particularly the the public to stay home if ill. As the official tion, were found consistently important importance of the complex Federal-state rela- stated, “We have a large tourism industry and present across all exercises. Even this tionship where questions of public health are with seasonal employees here. What do we do factor was refined, however, as the emphasis concerned. At the Governor’s invitation, SPF about workers who won’t stay home because switched from justifying resource allocations conducted an updated, but similar, version of they have no sick leave?” This simple question to explaining the benefits of nonpharmaceuti- the exercise for a Hawaii state audience that informed a major overhaul of the exercise cal measures. All told, exercises moved away included the Adjutant General and Speaker before it was run again in Hawaii in January from what could be characterized as an emer- of the House for Hawaii in December of 2006 of 2008. That exercise eliminated many of the gency response understanding of the problem and, 2 months later, ran it for Congress again. allocation-of-limited-resources scenario details toward a more public health understanding. Like the initial exercise, these iterations pre- and questions in favor of factors the previous Multiple iterations of the exercise, a set of par- sented an essentially emergency response con- exercises had highlighted as more important. ticipants who were both diverse and represen- ceptualization of the strategic challenges raised The second Hawaii exercise, Pandemic tative of the decisionmaking community, and by a pandemic. Public communications and Tempest, asked how the demographics of exercises that were sufficiently explicit about the importance of clear and credible public affected populations and, particularly, varia- the constraints or factors that we posited as messages and identifying the right agency or tions in access to care might shape the policy composing the strategic challenge were the level of government to address the right issues options open to decisionmakers as well as three factors key to using qualitatively speci- were a dominant topic of conversation. Public their efficacy. It also posited an antiviral resis- fied exercises to refine and validate how we health officials began to caution against an tant strain of the disease in order to focus the conceptualized the problem. JFQ overfocus on vaccine and antiviral allocation discussion on nonpharmaceutical response and prioritization, pointing out that it was far measures, such as isolation and closing Dr. Margaret M. McCown is an Associate Research from certain the former would work or that schools. Throughout the exercises, public Fellow in the Center for Applied Strategic Learning there would be enough of the latter in time health participants had continued to put the at the National Defense Univeristy.

162 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu RUSH and BOGDANOS

Joint Doctrine Update Joint Chiefs of Staff J7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division

his issue of Joint Force Quarterly, As our awareness and understanding of devoted to the contributions security cooperation (SC) continues to grow, JPs Revised or Under Review of special operations forces to the importance of JP 3–22 will become even JP 1–05, Religious Support to Joint Operations joint warfighting, is particularly more critical to understand. This JP is the JP 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to T Military Operations timely given the explosion of joint doctrine source document for SC and will provide the development and revision efforts regarding foundation for how we interact as a joint force JP 3–0, Joint Operations special operations within this arena. in the future, especially in areas such as the JP 3–02.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Currently U.S. Special Operations Middle East. Today, each Service has its own for Landing Force Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the lead agent view on what SC really is and USSOCOM has JP 3–06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations for six joint publications (JP) devoted to reached out to the Services and combatant JP 3–07, Stability Operations “traditional” special operations mission sets. commands to ensure that this publication is JP 3–07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures These include JP 3–26, Counterterrorism, and clear, cohesive, and enduring. The publica- for Antiterrorism JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense, both of tion addresses specific sources of U.S. power JP 3–08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, which have been under revision and are close (financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination to being signed. USSOCOM is also the lead applied through the instruments of U.S. during Joint Operations agent for JP 3–57, Civil Military Operations, JP national power and introduces a discussion of JP 3–09, Joint Fire Support 3–05, Joint Special Operations, JP 3–13.2, Psy- security force assistance into joint doctrine. JP 3–10, Joint Security Operations in Theater chological Operations (PSYOP), and JP 3–05.1, JP 3–13.2, which also recently completed JP 3–13, Information Operations Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for its revision, refocuses PSYOP within the JP 3–13.2, Psychological Operations Joint Special Operations Task Force Opera- context of military and informational instru- JP 3–13.3, Operations Security tions. Each of these JPs has been influential in ments of national power and communications JP 3–13.4, Military Deception not only how we interact with our interagency strategy and expands the discussion of joint JP 3–17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, partners but also how we will continue to PSYOP activities at all levels of war. The and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations operate in the future. publication also discusses PSYOP support JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in of combat operations, Defense Department JP 3–24, Counterinsurgency 1991, terrorism has emerged as the signature information capabilities in peace, civil JP 3–26, Counterterrorism activity for ideological extremists around the authority information support of domestic- JP 3–30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations world, directly or indirectly affecting millions led Federal agencies, and special operations. JP 3–31, Command and Control for Joint Land of people. The evolution of terrorism from a Finally, it introduces a seven-phase PSYOP Operations sparsely used tactic by relatively few individu- process into joint operations. JP 3–52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the als to a widespread, globally coordinated, These three highlighted JPs, along Combat Zone long-term conflict has sparked significant with the others for which USSOCOM is the JP 3–53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations political and military changes. lead agent, show how involved and relevant JP 3–61, Public Affairs JP 3–26, for instance, redefines and USSOCOM is in shaping the nature of our JP 4–01.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures refocuses counterterrorism away from military’s future engagements. for Transportation Terminal Operations obsolete constructs; reflects current policy As we go forward, we will continue to JP 4–03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine and strategy adjustments to the evolution challenge the entire doctrine community to JP 4–05, Joint Mobilization Planning of terrorism from a tactic to a transnational ensure that we are on the leading edge of the JP 4–06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations threat of strategic proportions; discusses integration of lessons learned and identify- JP 4–08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multina- the relationship of counterterrorism within ing the best practices to be cited into joint tional Operations irregular warfare and existing doctrine doctrine. Doctrine development and assess- JP 4–09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution applied to these operations; introduces the ment will remain the core focus areas with the JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning strategic campaign framework for the direct implied task of identifying potential subject JP 6–0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support in Joint and indirect approaches for conducting these areas for future inclusion. The doctrine devel- Operations operations; and discusses the enhanced role opment community continues to remain open of conventional forces in counterterrorism and transparent and welcomes dialogue and Looking for the latest in doctrine? Check out operations. feedback. the JDEIS Web portal at https://jdeis.js.mil

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 / JFQ 163 “A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone.” — President Barack Obama March 27, 2009

Looking for a Challenge? “As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people…We

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States,

Afghanistan. These are non-career Foreign Service our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have

least a Bachelor’s degree and eight years of relevant suffered the most at the hands of experience, four of which must be overseas. violent extremists. So I want the American people to understand that

For more information and to apply, go to we have a clear and focused goal: http://www.usaid.gov/careers/fsls.html to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan,

The United States has a long history of extending a and to prevent their return to either helping hand to people overseas struggling to make a country in the future…To achieve our better life, to recover from a disaster or to live in a free goals, we need a stronger, smarter and and democratic country. It is this caring that stands as a comprehensive strategy.” hallmark of the United States — and shows the world our — President Barack Obama true character as a nation. March 27, 2009

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) works in almost 110 countries around the world to meet these goals. www.usaid.gov

164 JFQ / issue 56, 1 st quarter 2010 ndupress.ndu.edu JFQ Dialogue Inside NEW for the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction st Issue 56, 1 Quarter 2010 3 Ambassadors to the World: A New Paradigm for Public Diplomacy and (WMD Center) Strategic Communication By Robert D. Deutsch from NDU Press Public Engagement 101: What Strategic Communication Is, Isn’t, Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) 6 Editor and Should Be By Kristin M. Lord [email protected] Case Study 1 Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 10 “Strategic Communication” Is Vague: Say What You Mean Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz By Christopher Paul President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Biological Weapons Program Open Letter Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 14 Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick 15 Letters to the Editor In the first of a new series of case studies, coauthors Jonathan B. Tucker Graphic Design Tara J. Parekh and Erin R. Mahan examine President Nixon’s 1969 decision to re- Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich Forum nounce offensive biological weapons. This renunciation of biological Design Chris Dunham and Jeremy Swanston, and toxin weapons was the first time that a major power unilaterally U.S. Government Printing Office 16 Executive Summary abandoned an entire category of armament. The decision opened the way for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, while Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 18 Afghanistan: Context and What’s Next By Volney F. Warner marking the end of three longstanding assumptions regarding U.S. by 25 Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level: A Rejoinder to chemical and biological weapons policy: that chemical and biological Volney F. Warner and “C” By Christopher D. Kolenda weapons were inextricably linked, that an offensive biological capabil- ity was required for deterrence, and that the United States needed to be NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 32 A Better War in Afghanistan By John A. Nagl prepared to retaliate in kind to a biological weapons attack. cross-component, professional military and academic publishing house. It publishes books, 40 Unified Effort: Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and in Afghanistan By Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, national military strategy, regional security 54 Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan: Creating Unity of Command affairs, and global strategic problems. By Joshua W. Welle Occasional Paper 7 This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department Special Feature of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint 60 Interview with Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, Commander, Looking Ahead Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever U.S. Special Operations Command material is quoted from or based on its content. In this general assessment of the 20 years since the United States began U.S. Special Operations: Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare 64 worrying seriously about the risks of regional weapons of mass destruc- By Eric T. Olson COMMUNICATIONS tion (WMD) proliferation, the authors begin by looking back at the Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly Countering Irregular Threats: The Army Special Operations Contribution evolution of the countering-WMD enterprise in the Clinton and Bush online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming 71 issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and By John F. Mulholland, Jr. administrations. Paul Bernstein, John Caves, and W. Seth Carus close access to many other useful NDU Press publications. this section with some observations on why, in fact, America has not Constructive comments and contributions 76 Adapting Across the Spectrum of Conflict: The Role of Naval been attacked with WMD. Turning to the future, they examine such is- are important to us. Please direct editorial Special Warfare By Edward G. Winters communications to the link on the NDU Press Web sues as creeping proliferation, the likelihood of a “proliferation cascade,” site or write to: 80 Mastering the Art of the Possible: The Air Force Special Operations Command other challenges, and initial observations of the Obama administration. By Donald C. Wurster They conclude that although investments and other efforts have to some Editor, Joint Force Quarterly extent prevented our worst WMD fears from being realized, much re- National Defense University Press Forging Marine Special Operators By Mastin M. Robeson 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2505) 85 mains to be done to counter the WMD threat of today and as it is likely Fort Lesley J. McNair to evolve in the future. Washington, DC 20319 Commentary Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations By Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 89 Email: [email protected] The Business of War: The Impact of “PLA, Inc.” on Chinese Officers JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu 94 By Dean Cheng Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at

st ndupress.ndu.edu 1 Quarter, January 2010 Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Infrastructure By Brent J. Talbot ISSN 1070-0692 97

Issue 56, 1st Quarter 2010 New Journal from NDU Press PRISM JFQ

National Defense University (NDU) is pleased to introduce PRISM, a complex operations journal. PRISM will explore, promote, and debate emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in operations in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, coun- terinsurgency, and irregular warfare. PRISM complements Joint Force Quarterly, introduced by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 years ago to similarly advance joint force integration and understanding. Complexity in PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially those that focus on the nexus of civil-military integration. The journal will be published four times a year both online and in hardcopy. Manuscripts submitted to PRISM should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words in length and sent via email to [email protected]. Afghanistan Strategy

Call for Entries for the

2010 Y L R E T R A U Q E C R O F T N I O J Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition

Are you a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) stu- typically occurs each spring. JPME colleges are free to run their dent? Imagine your winning essay appearing in a future issue own internal competitions to select nominees but must meet of Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, a chance to catch the ear these deadlines: of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an important national security issue, recognition by n April 27, 2010: colleges submit nominated essays to peers, and monetary prizes await the winners. NDU Press for first round of judging.

Who’s Eligible: Students at the JPME colleges, schools, and n May 18–19, 2010: final judging and selection of programs, including Service research fellows and international winners. students. National Defense University Press conducts the What: Research and write an original, unclassified essay in competitions with the generous support of the NDU one or more of the various categories. May be done in conjunc- Foundation. For further information, see your college’s tion with a course writing requirement. Must be selected by essay coordinator or go to: and submitted through your college. www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_SECDEFEC.htm When: Essays may be written any time during the 2009- www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/NDUPress_CSEC.htm 2010 academic year, but students are encouraged to begin the process early and avoid the end-of-academic-year rush that ® ISSUE fifty -SIX, 1 U.S. Special Operations Command st quarter 2010

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Global Insurgency: Point/Counterpoint Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC

Joint Force Quarterly