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NEW APPRECIATIONS IN HISTORY 13 Published by The Historical Association ampaign of 1588

by Simon Adams NEW APPRECIATIONS IN HISTORY 13 The Armada Campaign of 1588

by Simon Adams

The Historical Association 59a Kennington Park Road, London SE11 4JH The chart on the front cover shows the course of the Armada. It is one of a series of engravings by Augustine Ryther from charts by Robert Adams, which were pi4hlished as illustrations to Petruccio Uhaldini's A Discourse concerninge the Contents Spanishe Fleete (1590) The portrait on the back cover is the at Wohurn Abbey, now attributed to (1540-96). It is the best knoivn of several contemporary paintings of in triumph after the defeat of the Armada. Elizabeth's goddess-like image and the prominent symbolism (the crown and the globe) are typical of the highly allegorical style employed in royal portraits between 1588 and 1603- The Channel Battles, Page 5 The Debate, Page 8 Acknowledgements The charts on the front outside cover, on page 7 and the detail of the painting on The Spanish Plans, Page 10 page 17 are reproduced by kind permission of the National Maritime Museum. The English Plans, Page 14 The portrait on the back outside cover is reproduced by kind permission of the Marquess of and the Trustees of the Bedford Estates, Woburn Abbey. The Fleets, Page 18 The Armada cannon on page 20 are reproduced by kind permission of the Collections, Ulster Museum. Consequences and conclusions, Page 19 The chart on page 10 is reproduced by kind permission of David Kelly, Kent Archaeological Society, Maidstone Museum. Notes, Page 22

The plan facing page 5 is reproduced by kind permission of the Master and Further Reading, Page 23 Fellows, Magdalene College, Cambridge.

This pamphlet has been edited by Gareth Elwyn Jones

The Historical Association, founded in 1906, brings together people who share an interest in, and love for, the past. It aims to further the study and teaching of history at all levels; teacher and student, amateur and professional. This is one of over 100 publications available at very preferential rates to members. Membership also includes journals at generous discounts and gives access to courses, conferences, tours and regional and local activities. Full details are available from The Secretary, The Historical Association, 59a Kennington Park Road, London SE11 4JH, telephone: 01-735 3901

The publication of a pamphlet by the Historical Association does not necessarily imply the Association's approval of the opinions expressed in it.

©Simon Adams, 1988

Designed and prepared by Colin Barker

ISBN 0 85278 302 7

Originated and published by The Historical Association, 59a Kennington Park Road, London SE11 4JH and printed in Great Britain by The Chameleon Press Limited, 5-25 Burr Road, London SW18 4SG The Armada Campaign of 1588

Between 1585 and 1588 a state of undeclared war existed between and . During the course of those years, Philip If devised a final plan for the 'Enterprise of England'. It was probably the most ambitious military operation of the sixteenth century: a massive invasion to be mounted jointly by a fleet sent from Spain under Alonso Perez de Muznan, duke of Medina Sidonia and the Army of commanded by Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma. Between 18 and 20 May 1588 the 130 of the Felicissima Armada left harbour.f Two months later 124 of them reached the mouth of the . The following fortnight saw a naval battle that has become one of the best-known of European history. Sir John Hawkins called it 'a matter far passing all that hath been seen in our time or long before'.1 Yet if contemporaries had no doubts about its significance, the way it was conducted and its results have remained subjects of controversy and debate. tDates employed here, unless otherwise noted, are those of the Julian calendar used in England in 1588. Spanish dares were ten days later,

commanders had become convinced The Channel Battles that the chances of the Spanish fleet Like the battle of Jutland in the First still arriving that summer were slender. World War, the Armada fight began The greater part of the English fleet with a series of mutual surprises. By (nearly 100 vessels of all sizes) had been concentrated in May at the Contemporary'pictures of specific Elizabethan are very rare. This plan the time their scouting pinnace spotted advanced harbour at in order (probably by the shipwright Matthew Baker)'may depict the Revenge or the the Armada's first ships off Leicester. on 19 July 1588, the English to attack the Armada in its bases. The fleet had been driven back from the Drake, leading the fleet in the Revenge, Spanish coast in the previous week by disappeared. Though he reappeared the the same winds that blew the Spaniards next day (22 July), having captured north. Now a new attack on the annual the Nuestra Senora, the English did not silver fleet from the was reassemble until the evening. Medina being prepared. The duke of Medina Sidonia, now off Portland Bill, took the Sidonia, on the other hand, had opportunity to concentrate 43 of his expected to encounter only an major warships in the rear of the advanced squadron under Sir Francis Armada. On the 23rd the wind swung Drake at the entrance to the Channel, to the north-east for the first time. The and intended not to proceed beyond Spaniards attempted to cut off an the until he had made apparently isolated English squadron contact with Parma. He believed the (led by Sir in the Lord Admiral, Charles, Lord Howard of Triumph), and a confused and Effingham, and the majority of the inconclusive general engagement English ships to be in the Straits of ensued. Howard was now seriously Dover. Only on the night of 20 July worried by the rate at which did he discover that both Howard and ammunition was being expended and Drake were in Plymouth, and that he limited his activity the following day COURSE OF THE ARN&U3A would have to fight his way up the (the 24th) to an attempt to cut off the UPTHEfCHANNBL Channel. straggling El Gran Grin. He also 1588 reorganised his fleet by dividing it into The surprises continued. Howard a more manageable four squadrons and half his fleet (some 50 to 60 ships) commanded by Drake, Frobisher, John First dates are Old Style were able to escape from Plymouth's Hawkins and himself. On the 25th, nd datesare narrow harbour on the 20th, though in despite a calm, Howard was tempted their haste many ships failed to load again by two further Spanish stragglers, 27th when the Armada suddenly joining forces, the English had attacked adequate food and ammunition. The the galleon San Luis and the hulk anchored off . Howard did the the anchorage with fireships at Spaniards were disconcerted to Santa Ana. Medina Sidonia returned to same and was then joined by Seymour. midnight on the 28th. Medina Sidonia discover, as Howard and his ships rescue his ships and a third general They knew that Calais harbour was too had foreseen this manoeuvre and had sailed round them to gain the wind melee resulted. By this stage Howard's small to be of use to the Spaniards, and ordered the ships of the Armada to slip (the 'weather gauge') on the night of shortage of ammunition had become they suspected that the halt was their cables and return to collect their 20-21 July, that the manoeuvrability of critical. Luckily, there was no beach intended to throw off their pursuit by anchors after the fireships had burnt the English ships was no myth. When suitable for a landing on the Sussex leaving them to be sucked into the themselves out. Here he miscalculated, the English attacked from the west on coast, and he could conduct his pursuit North Sea by the powerful tides of the for on Monday morning it was clear the 21st, on the other hand, they were passively until he reached the straits of Narrows, while Medina Sidonia made that the Spaniards had been driven too so impressed by the Armada's Dover. There he would be joined by contact with Flanders. far along the coast by the tide to defensive formation that they 'durst Lord Henry Seymour and the return. Moreover, the English were not adventure to put in among them, remaining 40 ships of the fleet, while In fact Medina Sidonia stopped for a quick to exploit the opportunity their fleet being so strong'.2 Two further ammunition should be waiting more straightforward reason; his fear provided by the confusion to Spanish ships were crippled and had to for him either at Dover or in the that his own less manoeuvrable ships concentrate on individual ships. Off be abandoned, the Nuestra Senora del Downs. would be carried away by the tide. He the Spaniards suffered real Rosario, flagship of the Andalusian immediately informed Parrna that he losses to English gunnery: one ship squadron, and the pay-ship San The Downs, 'where thousands of had reached Calais, but Parma (then at (the Maria Juan of the Biscay Salvador, but both as a result of ships may ride as safely as in any Bruges) did not receive the message squadron) sank; three others, the accidents, the former from a collision, harbour of Europe', was assumed to be until Monday, 29 July. He ordered the San Lorenzo, and the the latter by a gunpowder explosion. Medina Sidonia's goal as well.4 It was embarkation of his troops to begin and, Portuguese San Mateo and the only anchorage that would both be in the evening, went to the coast San Felipe, ran aground. Howard intended to wait for his large enough for his fleet and provide himself. It was at at mid-day remaining 40 ships and then 'so to landing beaches for Parma's army. But on the 30th that he learnt that the More decisive was the weather, course the enemy as that they shall the procession of the two fleets up the Armada had already been driven deep which had been ideal for the Armada have no leisure to land'.3 But that night Channel on 26 and 27 July came to an into the North Sea. Precisely in order during the past week. A sudden rain the English were thrown into disorder. abrupt end late in the afternoon of the to prevent Medina Sidonia and Parma squall in the afternoon brought the Gravelines battle to an end. On 30 July issues raised by the battle ceased to be between 1577 and 1595) went the shorter essay of Lieutenant- a strong gale threatened first to drive of relevance. Only in the nineteenth the credit for the construction of the Commander Waters, and the brilliant the Armada onto the Zealand Banks, century did serious interest revive. The new 'race-built' warships; Drake was tour de force of Garrett Mattingly. In then veered and blew it out into the credit belongs to J.A. Froude, for the genius behind the new artillery these the Nelson tradition was less North Sea. It may have been saved whom the battle was a major event in tactics and naval strategy. For Corbett, obvious; more immediate was the from the English, but a rende/vous both British and world history: Drake was 'the father of the art of comparison, more or less explicit in all with Parma was impossible, and there warfare at sea' who first expounded three, with Fighter Command in the was no friendly port in which to The action before Gravelines ... decided the 'the root ideas of the new English Battle of Britain. 1940 suggested many shelter. Howard followed as far as the largest problems ever submitted in the school that Nelson brought to parallels with 1588 — though not Firth of Forth; then, with his supplies history of mankind to the arbitrement of perfection'.11 always favourably, as in the rueful exhausted, left the Armada to return to force.6 verdict of The Times on the escape of Spain via the Fair Isle Channel between This late-Victorian orthodoxy was the Scharnborst and Gneisenau in the Shetlands and the Orkneys. The Froude saw the defeat of the Armada as itself challenged in Michael Lewis's February 1942, that 'Vice Admiral grim odyssey left a third of the both the decisive turning point in studies of the gunnery of the battle in Ciliax has succeeded where the Duke Armada's ships either foundering at sea English maritime expansion, and the the 1930s and 1940s. His series of of Medina Sidonia failed'.13 Yet the or strewn along the coasts of Scotland battle that halted 'the Catholic articles on the 'Armada Guns' — a very comparison also inspired a reappraisal and Ireland and cost the lives of some despotism' and saved 'the first great clever piece of extrapolation from of the context of the battle that two-thirds of the 30,000 men who had effort for the emancipation of Europe'.7 highly fragmentary evidence — led to emerges most clearly in Mattingly. Its left Lisbon. His account was, however, riddled an unexpected discovery. If the English significance lay less in the defeat of the with errors, not least because he was retained an overall superiority in major Counter- or the winning of obsessed by the incompetence and artillery (1,972 guns distributed among English naval supremacy, than in the The Debate parsimony of Elizabeth I. His heroes 172 ships, opposed to 1,124 in 124 checking of Spanish power. In R.B. were 'the poor protestant adventurers ships), the Spaniards, far from being Wcrnham's now classic study of Tudor In few battles was the disparity in the who fought through that perilous week equipped with only light pieces, foreign policy, Before the Armada, the 'butcher's bills' so dramatic. William in the English Channel and saved their possessed 489 heavy guns (cannon battle became the crucial turning point Coxe of Limehouse, captain of the country and their country's liberty'.8 type) to 98. The Spaniards also had in the creation of a new English pinnace Delight, was the one identified The battle remained a contest between slightly more culverins (165 to 153); foreign policy of opposition to a single English casualty; the total killed and David and Goliath, in which the only in their 1,721 to 470 lighter hegemonic power on the continent. wounded in the battle was no more maritime population of England took to demi-culverins, sakers and minions did than one hundred, though losses from the seas in their little ships in a naval the English have a significant Mattingly also inaugurated a new disease before and after may have been version of the battle of Marathon. advantage.12 Lewis further observed examination of the Spanish sources. considerable. Damage to the English that the Spanish ships carried a far Previous English accounts had rested ships was minor. But the great majority Froude's dismissal of the 'wildly greater amount of both powder and largely on Fernandez Duro; even the of the 40 or so Spanish ships lost were managed navy of the queen' underwent shot than the English. His conclusions important chapter on the planning of victims of the return voyage. Only six a major reappraisal at the end of the suggested a convincing explanation for the Armada in Leon van der Essen's ships were sunk or captured between century.9 In 1884-85 the Spanish naval several of the mysteries of the battle. If biography of the duke of Parma had 19 July and 1 August. On 29 July, officer Cesareo Fernandez Duro culverin-type artillery had a longer made little impact. Since the 1960s, particularly, many suffered damage published the first major collection of range, and English tactics involved however, the balance has been which may have caused them to documents relating to the battle. He keeping out of the range of the Spanish reversed dramatically, and the major founder later, but the fleet had sailed saw the English victory as one of the heavy artillery, the English culverins discoveries have come from the through the Channel with its formation cannon-armed of the future (until they came in close at Spanish side. Thanks to the intact. The celebrated English artillery over the obsolete tradition; the Gravelines) had been too light to archaeological investigation of the had failed. In the well-known words of Spaniards regarded artillery as a inflict major damage on the wrecks off the Irish coast — one English gunner, 'so much powder weapon 'poco noble' and had armed ships. The secret of the English success the Trinidad Valencera, the Santa and shot spent, and so long in fight, the Armada with only light guns.10 lay not in their gunnery, but in the Maria de la Rosa, El Gran Grifon, and and in comparison thereof so little Fernandez Duro's verdict was sustained manoeuvrability of their ships and their the galleass Girona — much more is harm'.5 by the classical naval historians of the skill as ship-handlers, which enabled now known of the Spanish ships than turn of the century, Michael them to avoid the close-in fight the those of their opponents. The research Had the Armada been defeated, and, Oppenheim, J.K. Laughton, and Julian Spaniards sought. of Geoffrey Parker, I.A.A. Thompson if so, by whom? The contemporary Corbett. The modernisation of the and others has led to further revisions. response will be discussed below. After was now seen as a central The 'Lewis thesis' provided the The 'Lewis thesis' (openly speculative 1650, however, the question became achievement of the of Elizabeth I. tactical explanation employed in the about the Spanish cannon) has been an academic one for the technical To Sir John Hawkins (treasurer of the next generation of accounts: his own, overturned. Not onfy did the English possess a marked superiority in all became more acute after 1558. If the towards intervention. the Portuguese empire now became a types of major artillery except for the direct Spanish experience of England further burden on imperial defence. 8 to 14 Ib range, but many of the during Philip's short reign gave further Underlying this shift was the Philip saw his choice as one between a heavy cannon carried by the Armada weight to the advocates of caution, the identification of Elizabeth as his chief long defensive struggle or a quick and were in fact siege guns mounted on king himself felt a personal enemy. For this there were three main decisive attack on Elizabeth; a major land carriages and unsuitable for naval responsibility to English Catholics. reasons. It was clear after 1577 that expedition 'to sever the root of the use. Moreover, a considerable English exiles (and to some extent the the English would not cease meddling evil' might be cheaper in the long run proportion of the newly-made Spanish papacy) were now allied with the in the rebellion of the Netherlands. than 'the inevitable damages of cannon and shot may have been interventionists and invasion and Drake's circumnavigation voyage of defensive wars'.15 defective. Furthermore, the deposition plans surfaced regularly. Yet 1577-80 had demonstrated appointment of Medina Sidonia to the king was still much influenced by dramatically the vulnerability of the In 1583 the marquis of Santa Cruz command the Armada has been re- the arguments for caution. In 1571 he empire in the Indies to piratical raids, suggested that the fleet of 98 ships assessed. He was not the aristocratic gave hesitant approval to the Ridolphi The English had also taken up the with which he had just captured the non-entity of legend, but an Plot; in 1574 a naval expedition was protection of the Portuguese claimant Azores could be used against England. administrator of experience, who toyed with; but only at the end of the Dom Antonio. Despite the success of Parma, however, advised waiting until actually managed to get the fleet to 1570s did the balance shift decisively the occupation of Portugal in 1580-83, the Netherlands had first been sea. This in turn has led to new consideration of the wider plan. The duke of Parma may not have been going through the motions; his invasion force may have been more prepared than has been thought. Did the Armada, in fact, have a serious chance of success?

The Spanish Plans The origins of the Enterprise of England can be traced to the early 1530s, when English Catholics first appealed to Charles V for aid against the schismatic Henry VIII. Intervention in England thereafter became an important issue in the making of Habsburg policy. There was, from this point on, both an 'interventionist' party, and a cautious one, who regarded an invasion, without evidence of overwhelming popular support, as a very risky enterprise. Not only might it lead to involvement in a prolonged English civil war, 'but even if this expedition succeeds, it will be difficult to hold the Island'.14 The dilemma

Central to English coastal defence was the beacon system. This chart from the revised edition of William Lamharde's Perambulation of Kent (1596) is the most detailed coritemporarv-ex&tnple to survive, and the only one to show the inland relay stations. reconquered. What precipitated the fleet would carry 16,000 soldiers and Parma considered this scheme men, and the reinforcements carried final decision was the open English (6,000 of whom were to be impossible as the English and the by the Armada were vital. Moreover, intervention in the Netherlands and reinforcements for Parma), plus a siege Dutch were now on the alert and the since the English were on the alert, a the dispatch of Drake to the West train, mules, heavy equipment, 35 ships would be outnumbered, surprise attack was impossible and he Indies in the summer of 1585. Most of munitions and supplies. It would go particularly as the Downs were the could move only after the Armada had the advisors Philip consulted during directly to the proposed landing place, obvious place for the English to secured his safe passage. There was the winter of 1585-86 (including and there 'assure the passage' of the concentrate their own fleet. In January also the problem of Drake. If a Medina Sidonia) agreed that some form 30,000 to 40,000 men that Parma 1588 Philip agreed to wait until the diversionary attack on the Spanish of attack on England was both justified would have waiting at the Flemish whole fleet was ready and issued Santa coast was to be ignored, Medina and preferable to a defensive war. ports.'6 Cruz with more precise instructions. Sidonia was still to be prepared for Santa Cruz proposed landing an army He was not be be diverted by rumours Drake to attack him from Plymouth on of 55,000 men in either England or In Philip's instructions the of a new by Drake on Spain, his way up the Channel. The duke was Ireland, but for this he needed a fleet rendezvous and landing place was although he could engage him in the very uneasy about the absence of a of 510 ships. Parma continued to always described as 'el cabo de Margat'. Channel. At 'Cape Margate...which I secure port in which to reassemble in advise postponement at least until It is doubtful that the cliffs of the believe is where the duke of Parma is the event of storms. Philip insisted that Flushing was captured, which would North Foreland were intended, rather aiming, although he does not name it' he proceed directly to the Downs; enable the fleet to use the Scheldt. He the open beaches of Pegwell Bay and he should have sufficient strength to thereafter he could shelter in the was, however, also prepared to Richborough to the south, which defeat the English if he encountered Thames. The Solent was to be used consider a surprise invasion. His army would enable the Armada to anchor in them. His tactical dispositions were left only if that was impossible. would employ barges and coastal the Downs, and render a port on the to his own judgment, but he was shipping dispersed along the Flemish continent unnecessary. The advised about the English use of For all their detail, these instructions coast and land in Kent between Dover experienced admiral Juan Martinez de artillery and fireships, and was leave a number of questions and Margate. Then he could either Recalde understood the goal of the permitted to call on Parma for unexplained. At no point was a halt at advance on London directly, or avoid voyage to be 'to sail to the Downs and reinforcements of men and shipping Calais Roads discussed, and Philip the problem of crossing the Thames at from there assist and support those at should he need them.18 specifically advised Medina Sidonia to Southwark by transporting his men Dunkirk'.17 Philip believed Parma to be avoid the French coast. Philip may across the mouth of the estuary and ready that autumn, and he wished On 30 January 1588 the ailing Santa have been clear about the rendezvous, marching through . Santa Cruz to leave immediately, lest Crux died. Philip wasted no time in but the limited communication the war drag on another year. This, appointing Medina Sidonia, who had between Medina Sidonia and Parma By January 1587 Philip had Santa Cruz was unable to do, for the already been warned of the possibility, failed to clarify this crucial point or the assembled, albeit at the expense of long voyage he had made to protect as his successor on 4 February. At the implication in the January instructions commerce with the Indies, 90 ships the Indies fleet from Drake between end of March he was provided with that he could call on Parma for and 12,000 men in various ports in July and September had left him with copies of both instructions (September assistance. Parma had sent one officer Spain. Landings in Ireland or the Isle of only 31 ships ready to sail. How and January) given to Santa Cruz, and in April; thereafter there was little from Wight were discussed, and, following important Drake's raid on Cadiz in two additions, a new set of secret his end (though he may have sent the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, April had been in preventing the orders and a sealed letter to be given ships that failed to reach the fleet) an expedition to Scotland was also a Armada from in 1587 has been to Parma. Both dealt with the compared to the stream of messengers possibility. Combining with Parma, much debated. By revealing the possibility of failure at the Downs. Medina Sidonia sent once he however, eliminated the need to vulnerability of even the Iberian ports Medina Sidonia was permitted to retire approached the Channel. Co-ordination transport large numbers of men from it certainly reinforced Philip's desire to to the Solent and from there to co- was made even more difficult by the Spain — though there was a problem conclude the enterprise. ordinate further operations. Parma's two stages of the Armada's voyage. It in co-ordinating the two. Initially orders were, in fact, terms for a left Lisbon on 18 May, but it was then Parma had wanted to conduct his Santa Cruz was also unhappy about compromise settlement: English hit by very bad weather, and three attack secretly, after which the fleet sailing in the autumn. Philip was evacuation of the Netherlands, weeks later (9 June) staggered into La could join him. In July 1587 he prepared to run the risk, and wanted toleration for Catholics, and financial Coruna. Reassembly, repairs and changed his mind and now wanted the the 31 ships at least to set up a base in compensation for Drake's raids. The replenishment took another month; the fleet to attack first to provide a Ireland for use the following year. In Armada's presence in English waters, Armada did not leave on its final diversion for the landing. At the December 1587 he changed his mind Philip hoped, should be sufficiently voyage until 12 July. beginning of September Philip finally and ordered that the best 35 ships be intimidatory. In the meantime, resolved the debate: the fleet and the sent immediately to Parma with 6,000 however, circumstances had changed. At La Coruna, Medina Sidonia took army would undertake a single reinforcements. In the meantime Parma Parma was now far more dependent on the bold step of advising the king to combined invasion, for •which an attack was to mount his surprise without the fleet. His effective strength for the call off the expedition while he could. on Ireland would act as a cover. The waiting for the fleet. Both Santa Cruz invasion had been reduced to 18,000 He revealed that he had always had

12 13 belief in Spanish weakness at sea, raise money or support from invasion they would need a large doubts about the enterprise. So had which accounted for much of the parliament, but she made it clear that amount of shipping. As Sir William Parma, who recommended that Philip surprise caused by the strength of the she was also prepared to entertain Winter pointed out, Henry VIH's make a quick settlement with Armada. The exile of Dom Antonio and proposals for a compromise settlement expedition to Leith in J544 (in which Elizabeth. Yet if his chief commanders Drake's penetration of the East Indies in the Netherlands. By early 1587 he had taken part as a young man) had were under no illusions about the created a new target for English reports circulated of concentrations of employed 260 ships to transport difficulties of their task, both the king maritime power: a Portuguese revolt Spanish shipping and Spanish claims 11,000 men.21 Despite the apparent and some of the leading captains of the that would threaten Philip in the 'that the next year without fail they openness of the English coastline, there Armada (Don Pedro de Vaides and Don Iberian peninsula and open the will have it and with their pikes were only a few landing places with Antonio de Leyva in particular) Portuguese empire to English measure English cloth on London anchorages of sufficient size: Milford continued to emphasise the weakness commerce. This was more than Bridge'.19 This assault England might Haven (considered too remote), of the English. Whether this was opportunism. For Drake's patrons, the have to face alone, having alienated Plymouth, Portland Bay, the Solent and wishful thinking or delusion is not earl of Leicester and Sir Francis France and Scotland through the 'the Downs, Margate and the clear, but it raises the question, as Walsingham, it provided an answer to execution of Mar}7, Queen of Scots. The Thames...in respect of the commodity Geoffrey Parker has suggested, whether the main argument against their policy alternatives were cither making a of landing and the nearness of the Philip regarded even a defeat of the of support for the Netherlands Revolt: settlement or a spoiling attack on Spain prince of Parma in whose forces the Armada in English waters as less of a the financial weakness of England in by Drake who, since his return, had king of Spain reposeth especial trust'.22 failure than halting it at this stage. No the face of an open war with Spain. been planning an Anglo-Dutch In 1584 Lord Burghley had drafted a less curious was the absence of clear Now military intervention in the expedition to restore Dom Antonio to plan for dividing the fleet between the political aims for the invasion. The Netherlands could be funded by naval Portugal. Downs, the Solent and the Jsles of sealed orders to Parma were for a expeditions to the Indies and the war Scilly, with the intention of compromise in the event of failure, but would be self-financing. The attack on Cadiz was 'a brilliant concentrating it once the Spanish what were to be the consequences of piece of opportunism'; yet in a wider target was known. But if there were victory? Understandably, Philip wished This strategy was a central element context the voyage was a further advantages in keeping the fleet in its to avoid discussions of the English in the English lurch into war between disappointment.20 Drake had paid for harbours as long as possible, there succession prior to the death or 1585 and 1588. Fears of the collapse of himself again, but had not produced a were also serious disadvantages: the capture of Elizabeth. But what if Parma the United Provinces following the surplus, nor, despite his claims, had he winds that brought the invaders might had to face a more extended English assassination of William of Orange led been able to remain off the Portuguese trap it there, and English bases would resistance? No serious attempt was to open military intervention in 1585, coast indefinitely. Moreover, singeing provide no defence for Ireland or made to organise an English Catholic but it was accompanied by Drake's the king of Spain's beard so publicly Scotland. The alternative was the rising beforehand. This may be West Indies voyage. This had originally made the threat of a campaign for paralysing of the Spanish fleet in its attributed to a healthy doubt about the been planned as one to the Moluccas, revenge all the more credible. Drake's own waters by a repetition of Drake's reliability of some of the exiles, but it when Philip played into the hands of failure therefore only increased 1587 raid. To this strategy there were also reveals a major weakness in the the English interventionists by his still Elizabeth's desire for a settlement, also powerful counter-arguments: the enterprise. Philip's main concerns were unexplained sei/ure of foreign shipping which she made public that summer Armada might escape, ships and crews the strategic dilemmas facing his in Spain in May 1585. The embargo and autumn. In doing so, she was would be worn down while at sea, the empire; the regaining of England to the provided a justification for letting deliberately encouraged by both Philip logistical difficulties were considerable, Church was essentially a further Drake loose in the West Indies. The and Parma (not that they believed one and Drake might take off on another benefit. The Armada, which might have ambitions of the interventionists were was possible), because it would plundering voyage. appeared an army of Catholic not, however, realised. Leicester soon provide a further deception for the liberation, approached England as a became bogged clown in a war of Armada. Yet evidence of Spanish Over the winter a squadron of nine Spanish army of conquest. sieges in the Netherlands that would preparations was impossible to ignore. ships under Sir Henry Palmer was demand limitless funding from England In October 1587 Elixabeth prohibited stationed in the Downs against a if it were to be successful. Drake further commercial voyages until the surprise by Parma; pinnaces were sent The English Plans recouped the costs of the West Indies emergency had passed, and undertook to scout the Spanish coast; and Drake's In the English debates, defence of the voyage but did not provide the money a serious review of coastal defences Cadiz squadron was retained at realm played a much smaller role than needed for the Netherlands. Although and the militia. A cautious mobilisation Plymouth, while 'the possibility of a is often thought, for the occupation of what amounted to open war between of shipping took place over the diversionary expedition to land Dom Portugal and Drake's circumnavigation Spain and England now existed, formal following months. Antonio in Portugal was explored. The voyage had inspired a particularly hostilities were never declared and main fleet was laid up in the Thames, ambitious strategy of offensive war. Elizabeth's well-known lack of The disposition of the fleet was the to be concentrated at Portsmouth in Drake's success had led to a dangerous enthusiasm for military adventures re- subject of prolonged debate. If the March, and formal peace negotiations overconfidence and a widespread surfaced. Not only did she refuse to Spaniards intended an amphibious inaugurated at Bourbourg in Flanders. u 15 The stalemate of the talks reopened for a western voyage. Supplies had to the debate over a pre-emptive strike, be transported by sea from London, and Drake urged that a fleet of 50 and, since Elizabeth refused to ships be sent to lie in wait for the stockpile them there, provisioning of Armada off Lisbon. In May the Queen the voyages to Spain took considerable agreed. Howard brought the greater time. Furthermore, ready money was in part of the fleet to Plymouth, leaving short supply. The navy cost a total of only 40 ships in the Downs, now some £150,000 in 1588, £50,000 of under Lord Henry Seymour. Seymour which went on food. A series of loans should have been accompanied by a brought in .£1 30,000 between January Dutch squadron, requested by the and August; but, as Burghley's savage Queen in January under the terms of comment 'I marvel that where so many the 1 585 treaty of assistance but when are dead on the seas the pay is not it arrived in June it was considered too dead with them' makes clear, both small to be of use. It joined instead the resources and nerves were under great fleet of 90 ships that the admiralties of strain by mid-summer.24 South Holland and Zealand had moblilised to conduct their own Nevertheless, when the Armada was of the Flemish coast. sighted, the fleet had supplies to last until 10 August. It was owing to their The concentrated English fleet of hasty departure that 'divers...ships had nearly a hundred ships left for Lisbon not leisure to receive the full of their on 30 May but was blown back to proportions'.25 As the battle moved Plymouth on 6 June. Elizabeth then nearer the Thames, it would work to proposed that the fleet cruise in the Howard's advantage. The squadron middle of the , a scheme most affected was Seymour's, which Howard and his council unanimously had retired to Dover to re-supply on opposed. Two further attempts to 27 July, but had been interrupted by reach the Spanish coast (on 19 and 23 the Armada's approach. The main June) were also blown back, the last fleet's problems really arose after the on 9 and 10 July by the same wind return from the Forth. Supplies had with which the Armada finally left La been sent to Harwich, but a large part Coruna. In the meantime Drake and of the fleet was blown down to Howard had received some news of Margate and the Downs. A more Typical of many sixteenth-century London do not reveal much. His initial the Armada's difficulties, which led difficult question is posed by depictions of the battle, this Dutch concern over a landing between them on their return in July to ammunition, for accurate figures of painting, though accurate in its ship- Plymouth and the Solent was soon discount its arrival at all, and to plan ammunition in hand, expenditure types, is purely generalised. Neither a overtaken by fears for his ammunition for the attack on the silver convoy. The during the battle, or Howard's success particular engagement nor specific ships supply. He had every reason to Armada's belated appearance thus in replenishing (when did the 23 lasts can be identified. welcome a fight in the Downs where forced them to fight an unexpected of powder and shot sent from London he would be near his bases. In the running battle in the Channel. on the 26th reach him?) are not the first resolutions and courses taken are meantime he hoped to pick off to be altered as was well seene in our stragglers, and 'pluck their feathers by available. If the estimates that only 30 actions with the Spanyards in Anno 1588 at The circumstances surrounding the rounds per gun were in hand at the sea, where our first determinations and little and little'.27 Contemporaries Channel battles account for both the departure from Plymouth are true, appointed orders were upon our joyning wondered whether he deliberately English difficulties with food and then the later accounts of heavy firing with the enemie quite altered and ordered his captains to avoid a ammunition, and their ad hoc tactics. may be greatly exaggerated. chaunged, and so chaunging dayly as boarding fight while in the Channel, The problems of supply arose from the occasions were offered.26 but there is no evidence of a policy of fact that Plymouth was not a major In the eyes of one contemporary trying to sink ships by cannon. The naval station, but a small town in a Howard's ad hoc conduct of the battle Howard's only known tactical decision case of the Maria Juan and some 'narrow corner of the realm' with a was wholly justified: was the division of the fleet on 24 July, earlier examples apart, the history of difficult and unpopular harbour.23 It but minutes of his council of war naval warfare after 1588 reveals how derived its strategic importance from For the occurcnts of warre bee so manifold between 19 July and 1 August do not rarely this occurred and how being the last major source of water and strange, that sometimes upon a moment exist and his scanty surviving letters to important boarding remained. Firing

16 17 into the enemy's stern, thereby The Spanish transports, the great escorted the Armada were either disabling the steering gear and raking command of a number of major ureas and hulks, had no counterparts in Portuguese or of new Spanish the decks, and then offering the warships to his relations, Lord Thomas the English fleet. Much larger than any construction. Less successful was the crippled ship the choice between Howard and Lord Sheffield being the English merchantman, and in some provision of artillery, which the best known. The Spaniards, however, boarding or surrender remained, until cases even than the warships, their Trafalgar, the most successful tactic. Spaniards knew was inferior, despite a had the advantage of the most presence made the Armada a giant crash programme of gun-founding in The Elizabethans were fully aware of it, immediate experience of handling convoy, and accounted for many of its 1587-88. If they wished to fight a fleets of this si/e at Lepanto in 1571 or as the account of the capture of the problems. Their slowness and Portuguese Madre de Dtos in battle by boarding, it was less out of the Azores in 1582-83. Elizabethan clumsiness limited its speed, while ignorance or conservatism than a fleets to date had been much smaller; 1592 reveals. It was the Armada's their vulnerability made a close escort formation that made such attacks desire to capitalise on their one clear only the few veterans of Henry VIH's of shielding warships essential. There advantage. campaigns had been involved in impossible; only stragglers could be were not enough of the latter to isolated in this way. anything similar. The Portugal Voyage enable an independently manoeuvring The comparisons in the structures of of 1589 was the first comparable screen to be formed, The other major command are also revealing. Both Elizabethan expedition. From this The Fleets difference between the fleets lay in fleets were commanded by experience came the Spanish discipline their organisation. The Armada was conscientious grandees. Medina that so impressed English observers. Once the legends of the Armada battle composed of ten great squadrons: six Sidonia's aversion to the sea is well The English, by contrast, were more are dismissed, the important provincial (Portugal, Castile, Andalusia, known, but his experience of large- freebooting in approach, and more similarities and differences between Guipiizcoa, Biscay, Levant), one of 23 scale administration in the occupation casual in conduct. Much is revealed the fleets emerge. Both monarchies hulks, one of 22 (pinnaces), of Portugal was vastly superior to about Drake's method of command by possessed the power to conscript men and one each of four and Howard's, whose creation as Lord the £ 100 he gave to the crew of the (between 8,000 and 9,000 mariners galleys (the latter did not reach the Admiral by Elizabeth was in the main a .Revenge as a reward for the 'second were mustered in each fleet) and ships. Channel). These were not so much gesture to his family's tradition of naval day's fight' (and then claimed back Their fleets in 1588 thus represented a fighting formations, as administrative service. Both admirals had their from the crown). The English fought as full mobilisation, but at tremendous ones, and reflect the fact that there freedom of action circumscribed by individual ships or informal groups; the cost. It was clear that neither side was no 'Spanish Fleet', but rather a royal instructions on the one hand and Spaniards fought as squadrons in a could maintain it indefinitely; the collection of provincial fleets. Nor was councils of war composed of mariners military order. paralysis of trade and commerce, and there any central administration; the of experience on the other. If the the drain on treasuries, created assembly of the Armada was an ad hoc admirals and their councils were powerful pressures for a decision that process in which the key figure was allowed to make tactical decisions, Consequences and summer. Yet both the 197 ships the King himself. Only after 1588 was neither had control of strategy or mobilised by Elizabeth and the 130 a central naval administration created. logistics. The rigidity of Philip's plan conclusions ships assembled for the Armada were left Medina Sidonia with little room to If there was a turning point in the greatly inflated figures. The great The English, on the other hand, had manoeuvre. Howard's commission, on Channel battle, it was less the majority of the English ships were possessed a central naval administration the other hand, was broader, and by engagement off Gravelines than Medina small coasting vessels; in the battie, 'we since the reign of Henry VIII; if concentrating most of the fleet in his Sidonia's decision to halt at Calais. The had been little holpen by them, anything their difficulties arose from hands, Elizabeth surrendered any real Downs should have seen the decisive otherwise than that they did make a over-centralisation. Here lay the crucial chance to control the battle. encounter; by stopping where he did show'.28 Even the 34 ships of the Royal difference between the fleets: England Medina Sidonia threw everybody's Navy were reduced in practice to 20 possessed a precocious navy and an Drake, whose own approach to calculations out. Thus, however or so major warships, to which could underdeveloped merchant fleet, Spain command was highly autocratic, inconclusive the earlier fighting, the be added a few large vessels, mainly the opposite. The creation of the occupied an anomalous position on the Armada had failed to achieve its owned by the and largest battle-fleet in northern Europe English council of war. It would appear strategic purpose. This failure had a other London merchants, and some was one of the main achievements, or that Howard handled him with kid- dramatic impact on England. What private warships like the earl of extravagances, of Henry VIII. What gloves. Yet despite Drake's reputation, most impressed contemporaries was Leicester's Galleon Leicester, a sister- made it the more potent was the there was little difference on grounds the hand of God displayed in the wind ship to the Revenge. There were thus Elizabethan government's near- of seamanship or experience between that drove the Armada into the North only about 50 effective English ships. monopoly of the supply of heavy him and Hawkins on the one hand and Sea: a dramatic example of the The Armada mustered a similar ordnance, both brass and cast-iron. By Recalde and Miguel de Oquendo on workings of divine providence. number with a core of 23 'front-line' contrast the development of an the other. Nor were young noblemen Seventeen years later the foiling of the galleons and galleasses.29 Fifty or so Atlantic (as against a Mediterranean) similar to Antonio de Leyva or the provided further ships, roughly comparable in size, did navy had been a low priority in Spain prince of Ascoli absent from the evidence of God's intervention. most of the fighting on both sides. before the . The warships that English fleet. Howard gave the Between them the Armada and the

18 Gunpowder Plot served as the leading examples of divine intervention in the contemporary world and thereby helped to establish the providential view of history in seventeenth-century English political culture.

The Armada victory also confirmed the apotheosis of Elizabeth the virgin queen (see back cover). Her virginity now symbolised the safety of the realm, and transcended the political difficulties it had caused during the first decades of the reign. Philip's emphasis on the Spanish rather than the Catholic aims of the Armada had provided Eii/abeth with a propaganda victory of the first order. The patriotic and defensive nature of the battle undercut decisively the argument for a compromise settlement. The negotiations terminated at Bourbourg in the summer of 1588 were not resumed for another eleven years. Also transformed was the position of English Catholics. If the earl of Arundel had a mass said for the victory of the Armada (as was claimed), most Catholics found it impossible to support what appeared a foreign invasion. In this respect the Armada was a real turning point in Elizabethan foreign policy. The Protestant cause had been a central character of naval command led to the by Philip's decision to intervene in Bronze half-saker and breech-loading concern for Leicester, Walsingham and wider controversy over gentlemen France in 1589- In doing so, the king esmeril retrieved from the wreck of the the interventionists. Now the war versus seamen officers that absorbed tacitly accepted the existence of the galleass Girona off the Ulster coast. The could be redefined as one of defence the Stuart navy. In this, the impression defensive war he had tried to avoid. If great majority of the guns the Armada of the realm against an hegemonical made by Spanish discipline in the future naval expeditions against carried were light pieces like these. tyrant. Armada fight was of no small England in 1596 and 1597 were importance. The tensions between dispersed by storms, an Atlantic fleet The post-Armada shift of emphasis Howard and Drake had been carefully was created that held its own for the had a number of ramifications. The smoothed over in Elizabethan rest of the war. Nevetheless the defeat presence in northern Europe, they battle was the last triumph of the old accounts; the issues that underlay them of the Armada had its effect, for would need to bring seapower to bear. . Drake had the opportunity to would not, however, go away. although Spain had suffered naval Good relations with England were one carry out his cherished Portuguese disasters before, the image of the answer; the alternative was a massive project in 1589; his reputation never In Spain the defeat initially brought invincibility of Spanish arms created by naval offensive. Spain's failure to recovered from its failure. When he, recrimination. Although Medina Lepanto, the Azores and the resolve the dilemma was revealed 59 Hawkins and Frobisher died in 1594-96 Sidonia's report to the king emphasised Netherlands had been shattered. years later (in 1639) when, in the they were not replaced. The navy now the English fleet's seaworthiness and its Moreover, the strategic dilemmas that Downs, another fleet was destroyed by became a Howard machine, for the artillery, other Spanish accounts underlay the planning of the Armada the Dutch. The defeat of the Armada battle had also served as the first stage attributed the defeat to the cowardice continued to face the may not have given England mastery of in the revival of the house of Howard and incompetence of the duke himself, throughout the first half of the the seas, but it confirmed her naval after the execution of the duke of or the questionable conduct of Parma. seventeenth century. So long as the pre-eminence in northern European Norfolk in 1572. The change in the This debate was, however, overtaken kings of Spain sought to maintain a waters 20 21 Notes Further Readinj

Like this account of the Armada and the (1898, to be 1 State Papers Relating to the Defeat of ^ Felipe II y el Marques de Santa Cruz campaign, the bibliography must be reprinted 1988), D.M. Waters, 'The the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588, en la Empresa de Inglaterra, edited by selective. Only those works of direct Elizabethan Navy and the Armada edited by J.K. Laughton (Navy Records E. Herrera Oria (Madrid, 1946), p. 113, relevance, or referred to in the text, are Campaign', Mariner's Mirror, xxxv, 1949 Society, 1-2, 1894, 1898), 1, p. 351, Instructions for Santa Cruz 4/14 included. 1988 will see the publication (reprinted together with the documents Hawkins to Burghley (?), 31 July 1588. September 1587. of a number of further books and published by Naish in D.M. Waters, The 2 Armada Papers, 1, p. 288, Howard to 16/W4 p. 114. articles. Geoffrey Parker and Colin Elizabethan Nairy and the Armada of Walsingham, 21 July 1588. pArmada Invencible, 2, p. 170. To Martin, The Spanish Armada, and the Spain, National Maritime Museum, I Armada Papers, 1. p. 299, Howard to Philip II, 1/11 July 1588. catalogue of the exhibition at the Monograph Series, 17, 1975), G. the earl of Sussex (?), 22 July 1588. 1MLa Armada Invencible, 1587-1589, National Maritime Museum, edited by Mattingly, The Defeat of the Spanish ^Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson, edited by E. Herrera Oria (Archivo MJ. Rodrlguez-Salgado will be of Armada (1959), and M. Lewis, The edited by M. Oppenheim, 3 (Navy Historico Espanol, 2, 1929), pp. 130-31, particular importance. Spanish Armada (I960). D. Howarth, Records Society, 43, 1912), p. 31. Instructions for Santa Cruz, January The Voyage of the Armada: the *Armada Papers, 2, p. 259. 1588, Many of the surviving documents Spanish Story (1981) is a popular '': The Reign of 19 British Library, Cottonian MS Galba C relating to the Armada campaign can be account based mainly on the documents Elizabeth (Everyman edition, n.d.), 5, p. XI, fo. 309, Edmund Palmer to the earl found in print. The basic Spanish in Fernandez Duro. A.N. Ryan, '400 456. of Leicester, 10 April 1587. collection is La Armada Invencible, Years Ago: Reflections on the Armada 'Ibid, p. 458. 20 D.B. Quinn and A.N. Ryan, England's edited by C. Fernandez Duro (Madrid, Campaign1, The Historian, 16, 1987, is a HJ.A. Froucle, English Seamen in the Sea Empire, 1550-1642 (1983), p. 100. 1884-85), much of which is translated in perceptive brief analysis. Sixteenth Century (1905), p. 309. 21 Armada Papers, 1, p. 212-13, Winter Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, 9/bid, p. 255. to Walsingham, 20 June 1588. Elizabeth, 4 1587-1603 (1899, reprint For the military planning of the 10 La Armada Invencible, edited by C 22 Brit. Lib, Harleian MS 137, fo. 110, 1971). The two main English collections campaign, see L. van der Essen, Fernandez Duro (Madrid, 1884-85), 1, Survey commission of 27 November are State Papers relating to the Defeat Alexandre Parnese, Prince de Parme, 5 pp. 76-7. 1587. of the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588, (Brussels, 1937); and G. Parker 'If the II J.S. Corbett, Drake and the Tudor 23Armada Papers, 1, p. 199, Howard to edited byJ.K. laughton and Papers Armada had Landed', Spain and the Navy (1905), 2, pp, 131, 172. Walsingham, 13 June 1588. relating to the Navy during the Netherlands, 1559-1659. Ten Studies 12 The remainder of the 2,431 guns -'Ibid, 1, p. 284, to Walsingham, 19 July Spanish War, 1585-1587, edited byJ.S. (1979), and Philip II (1979). Also carried by the Armada were too small 1588. Corbctt (Navy Records Society, 1-2, 11; relevant are G. Parker and I.A.A. to be of significance. Sixteenth-century filbid, 1, p. 294, Marmaduke Darell to 1894, 1898, to be reprinted in 1987-88). Thompson 'Lepanto (1571): the Costs of 'cannon' fired projectiles between 30 Burghley, 22 July 1588. These should be supplemented by La Victory1 in Spain and the Netherlands, and 50lbs in weight, culverins, 17 to 26 R. Barrett, The Theorie and Practike Armada Im>encible, 1587-1589 and Magdalena de Pazzis Pi Corrales, 19Ibs, and demi-culverins, minions and ofModeme Warres (1598), p. 75. (Archive Historico Espanol, 2, 1929), Espana y las Potencias Nordicas: 'La sakers between 3 and 91bs. 27 Armada Papers, 1, p. 341, to and Felipe II y el Marques de Santa Otra. Invencible; 1574 (Madrid, 1983). * 13 P. Kemp, The Escape of the Walsingham, 29 July 1588. Cruz en La Empresa de Inglaterra The case for the duke of Medina Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (1975), p. MIbid, 2, p. 13, Winter to Walsingham, (Madrid, 1946), both edited by E. Sidonia is made by the cluque de 74. 1 August 1588. Herrera Oria. Further documents are Maura, El designio de Felipe IIy el 14 Discurso sobre la Jornada de w C. Martin, Full Fathom Five: Wrecks printed in 'Documents illustrating the Episodio de la Armada Invencible Inglaterra, quoted in G.P.B. Naish, 'The of the Spanish Armada (1975), pp. Spanish Armada', G.P.B. Naish (ed), (Madrid, 1957); I.A.A. Thompson, 'The Spanish Armada', Naval Miscellany IV 263-64. Naval Miscellany IV (Navy Records Appointment of the duke of Medina (Navy Records Society, 92, 1952), pp. 4-5- Society, xcii; 1952) and in Sir Francis Sidonia to the Command of the Spanish Drake: A Pictorial Biography, edited Armada1, Historical Journal, 12, 1969; by ILP. Kraus (Amsterdam, 1970). and P O'M. Pierson, A Commander for the Armada', Mariner's Mirror, 55, 1969. The classic accounts of the battle itself are those of J.S, Corbett, Drake R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada:

23 22 •

The Growth of English Foreign Policy whole, byJ.F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder 1485-1588 (1966) has not been and Galleys: Changing Technology superseded. The most recent accounts and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in of Elizabethan are the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, those of K.R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder 1974). For the tactics used in the and Settlement; Maritime Enterprise capture of the Madre de Dios, see E.W, and the Genesis of the British Empire, Bovill, 'The Madre de Dios\ 1480-1630 (Cambridge, 1984) and D.B. Mirror, 54, 1968- Further technical Quinn and A.N. Ryan, England's Sea aspects of the ships are discussed in T. Empire, 1550-1642 (1983), The older Glasgow, The Shape of the Ships that biographies of Hawkins, J.A. Williamson, Defeated the Spanish Armada', Sir John Hawkins: The Times and the Mariner's Mirror, 50, 1964, and RJ. Man (1929), and Hawkins of Lander Assessment of the Numbers, Plymouth (1949), should be Sizes and Types of English and Spanish supplemented by K.R. Andrews' Ships mobilized for the Armada1, stimulating study of Drake, Drake's Mariner's Mirror, 63, 1977. Knowledge Voyages (1967), and R.W. Kenny, of the Spanish ships has expanded Elizabeth's Admiral: The Political greatly thanks to the work of marine Career of Charles Howard, Earl of archaeologists, see in particular, C. Nottingham, 1536-1624 (Baltimore, Martin, Full Fathom Five: Wrecks of 1970). M. Oppenheim, A History of the the Spanish Armada (1975), and the Administration of the Royal Navy, catalogue for the exhibition Tresors de 1509-1660 (1896 to be reprinted in L'Armada, edited by L.N.W. Flanagan 1988) needs revision, in the meantime and R, Stenuit (Brussels, 1985). see the important series of articles by T. Glasgow on the the mid-Tudor navy in For the Dutch involvement see J.B, Mariner's Mirror, 53-56, 1967-1970, and van Overeem, Justinus van Nassau en R. Pollitt, 'Bureaucracy and the Armada: de Armada (1588)', Marineblad, 53, The Administrator's Battle', Mariner's 1938, and more conveniently J. den Tex, Mirror, 60, 1974. Oldenharnevelt, ! (Cambridge, 1973). For the English land defences, L. The gunnery debate can be followed Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, in the series of eight articles, Armada 1558-1638 (1967) andJ.J.N. McGurk, Guns' published by Michael Lewis in Armada Preparations in Kent and Mariner's Mirror, 28-29, 1942-43, and Arrangements made after the Defeat reprinted as Armada Guns (1961). This (1587-1589)', Archaeologia Cantiana, should by supplemented by I.A.A. 87, 1972. Valuable observations on the Thompson, 'Spanish Armada Guns', religious context can be found in AJ. Mariner's Mirror, 61, 1975, and War Ixromie, The Armadas and the Catholics and Government in , of England', Catholic Historical 1560-1620 (1976), and on the subject Review, 59, 1973, and R. Bauckham, The of sixteenth-century naval gunnery as a Tudor Apocalypse (1978).

24 refipffleaEB n